

# Proving prior-key possession to mitigate IP-use-after-free attacks


Tobias Fiebig, Kevin Borgolte

# The Problem: IP-use-after-free


- Attackers can re-use IP addresses if a stale DNS record still point to them
  - Serious problem (found >700,000 Domains only with Amazon EC2)
- Problem for ACME: We are verifying the target (IP) to which a domain points as a proxy for verifying authority over a domain

# The Problem: \*-use-after-free

- Also hits other things we use to point domains at: Loadbalancer, BGP hijacks,...


 Arne Swinnen (arneswinnen) 4002 Reputation 76th Rank 6.81 Signal 97th Percentile

---

 129 #219205 **Authentication bypass on auth.uber.com via subdomain takeover of saostatic.uber.com** Share:

---


State ● Resolved (Closed) Severity ■ Critical (9.3)

Disclosed publicly **July 12, 2017 5:43pm -0700** Participants 

Reported To **Uber** Visibility Public (Full)

Weakness **Improper Authentication - Generic**

Bounty **\$5,000**



If an old certificate was found, require it to be current HTTPS certificate.

# What to do when things fail


- When to fail: Expired certs?
- Proof of (prior) key possession originally planned (-00 §7.3)
- What to do when this fails?
  - Gracefully to DNS Challenge?
  - Corner cases: Lost keys, disaster, broken deployment processes

# Problems to solve

- Problems with using HTTPS
  - Not allowed in base HTTP challenge (-12 §8.3)
  - Default vhosts
    - Not a problem here (can assume prior cert)
- Build a dedicated challenge format?
  - Rolling own crypto?
  - Using keys for non-original purpose

# Next Steps

- Measurements:
  - Figure out corner cases
  - How many certs would be affected?
- Write a Draft next few weeks
  - Discussion in Bangkok?
- Write PRs to ACME client/server



If an old certificate was found, require it to be current HTTPS certificate.