HMAC security for Babel

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17 July 2018
Disclaimer

I am just the janitor here. Credit goes to:

- Denis Ovsienko (started the whole thing);
- Clara Dô and Weronika Kołodziejak (implementation and new protocol design based on Denis’ work);
- David Schinazi (pseudo-header);
- Markus Stenberg (index mechanism);
- Toke Høyland-Jørgensen;
- Florian Horn and Paul Rozière.
Two protocols for Babel security

There is a natural tension between:
- simple, reviewable protocol;
- useful features.

Two security protocols for Babel:

HMAC (this talk):
- Babel unchanged;
- no dependencies;
- minimal features:
  - symmetric keying;
  - few keys per interface;
  - key rotation.

DTLS (David’s talk):
- Babel over unicast;
- depends on DTLS;
- features of DTLS:
  - asymmetric keying;
  - pairwise keying;
  - ASN.1.
Naive HMAC

HMAC guarantees the authenticity of a message. Very roughly, send

\[ m \| H(m \| k) \]

where \( m \) is the message, \( k \) is the (secret) key, and \( H \) is a cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA256).

HMAC does not protect against replay.

B: announce, HMAC
A installs a route through B.
(later)
C: replays announce, HMAC.
A installs a route through C.
Protecting addresses: pseudo-header

Mitigation: protect addresses as well as packet contents.

Send:

\[ m \parallel H(src \parallel dst \parallel m \parallel k) \]

where src is the source address and dst is the destination address. \( src \parallel dst \) is the pseudo-header.

B: announce, HMAC
A: installs a route through B.
(later)
C: replays announce, HMAC, with B’s source address. A installs a route through B.

The protocol is still vulnerable to replay, but the consequences are less severe.
HMAC with simple replay protection

Include a *per-sender packet* counter in each packet.

B: announce, \textbf{PC=42}, HMAC
A installs a route through B.
(later)
C: *replays* announce, \textbf{PC=42}, HMAC
A: rejects C’s packet (PC too old).

The protocol requires that:

- the sender’s PC is *strictly increasing* (reliable hardware clock or reliable persistent storage);

- the receiver keeps *persistent state* about each neighbour *forever*. 
Simple replay protection: issues

RFC 7298 does simple replay protection. Two issues:

- requires that every sender maintain a **strictly monotonic** PC;
- requires that every receiver keep the PC history of every peer it has ever encountered **forever**.

Persistent **sender state** difficult to do portably;

- **persistent storage** is non-portable and unreliable;
- **hardware clocks** are not universal, sometimes reset even when available.

**Very unpleasant failure mode**: node is blackholed.

Persistent **receiver state** (“ANM”) unrealistic:

- **unbounded** amounts of **persistent storage**.

Failure mode is gentler: after loss of state, we are vulnerable to replay (Denis Ovsienko, IETF 96).
Avoiding persistent state

In draft-do-babel-hmac, we avoid persistent state by using two additional mechanisms:

– a challenge mechanism (a cryptographic handshake, with nonces) to create fresh receiver state;

– an index mechanism to indicate when sender state has been reset.
Receiver-side state: challenge with nonce

B: announces, PC=42, HMAC
A (has no state about B): challenge, nonce=57, HMAC
B: challenge reply, nonce=57, PC=43, HMAC

Since the nonce is fresh, B’s challenge reply cannot be a replayed packet. A can safely establish receiver state from the challenge reply.

A can send a new challenge at any time (cost = 1RTT); when to purge receiver state is now an implementation detail.
Sender-side state: indices

B: announce, PC=42, index=99, HMAC
A (index mismatch): challenge, nonce=57, HMAC
B: challenge reply, nonce=57, PC=43, index=99, HMAC

Whenever it has no state (e.g. at boot), B generates a fresh index, which it sends with every PC.

Whenever it detects an index change, A sends a new challenge; if the challenge is successful, A discards its old state about B.

B can generate a new index at any time (cost = 1RTT); when to purge sender state is now an implementation detail.
draft-do-babel-hmac-00 needs some more work, but good enough for implementation. 16 pages including boilerplate, 7 normative.

We already have two independent implementations:

- Dô, Kołodziejak:
  - integrated in babeld (but not merged yet);
  - 793 lines of code (not counting SHA256);
  - minimal changes to babeld;
  - “Easier to implement than RFC 7298.”

- Højland-Jørgensen:
  - integrated in BIRD (but not merged yet);
  - 533 lines of code;
  - “I found the draft pleasant to read and straightforward to implement.”
Open questions

A number of choices remain (already discussed on list):
- size of nonce and index;
- use of packet trailer;
- explicit vs. implicit indices.
Open questions: size of nonce and index

A Babel TLV can be up to 255 octets long. This gives enough space for up to **255 octets of nonce** and up to **251 octets of index**.

- a nonce can usefully encode a cookie (for DoS avoidance); arbitrary size nonces do not complicate implementation much;
- we see no reason to allow large indices; arbitrary size indices complicate implementation somewhat.

Proposition:

- **nonces can be any size**, from 0 to 255 octets;
- **indices can be 0 to 10 octets**, larger indices are silently dropped.
Open questions: packet trailer

Where should HMACs live? Two possibilities:
- within the packet trailer, beyond the packet body;
- within the packet body itself.

Storing HMACs within the packet body itself (which participates in HMAC computation) requires a complex dance of clearing the HMAC TLV before computing HMAC.

Storing HMACs in the packet trailer simplifies implementation, at the cost of a slightly more complex specification. The authors support this choice.
Open questions: implicit indices

Markus Stenberg noticed that the index is already known by the receiver, except during challenges.

Idea: omit the index in ordinary packets, only include it in challenge replies.

Pros:
- shaves off a few bytes on the wire;
- clever solution.

Cons:
- HMAC can only be computed after parsing the packet;
- more complex encoding;
- clever solution.

See Appendix C of draft-do-babel-hmac-00 for details.
A simple, easily implementable cryptographic authenticity extension for Babel:

– simple specification: 16 pages (7 normative);
– simple implementation: 533 to 793 lines of code;
– two independent, interoperable implementations.

Some open issues, need discussion and thought.

Please adopt?