

# **Route Leaks Solution**

## **Merger of RLP and eOTC Drafts**

### **ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-09**

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# Draft Merger Efforts

- Authors from the two drafts met in Chicago (March 2017) and in London (March 2018)
- Support and encouragement from IDR Chairs John and Sue, and Ignas
- Productive authors' meeting in London (IETF 101) followed by substantial discussions via email
- Authors happy to report on convergence to a merged solution and draft

# Merged Solution and Design Discussion Drafts

- Merged Solution:

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-09>


- Design Discussion:

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-solution-discussion-00>


# Format of RLP Attribute

## Optional Transitive Attribute

### Design A (original RLP)



### Design B



- **eOTC: Design B with only one ASN in the attribute is the original eOTC**


UP: RLP = 0    DOWN/LATERAL: RLP = 1

# Comparison / Tradeoffs


	<b>Design A (Original RLP)</b>	<b>Design B</b>	<b>Original eOTC (Design B with only one ASN)</b>
Functionality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detect multiple leaks</li> <li>• Provide up link info also</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detect multiple leaks</li> <li>• Only down/peer info</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can't detect multiple leaks</li> <li>• Lack of differentiation in some cases</li> </ul>
Detection / mitigation strength	Best	Very good	See above
Memory use* (per update)	~ 136 bytes	~ 72 bytes	~ 32 bytes

\* Assume average 4 hop AS path

# Design B: Example



# Alexander's scenario: Avoid Persistent Oscillation Possibility



P1, P2 are aware of eOTC/RLP.  
P0, P3, P4 may or may not be.

# Examine Provider Route vis-à-vis Customer's

- If customer route is a leak, and alternative route via provider includes the customer AS in the path, then prioritize customer route over the provider route.


\* Stated simply here. See formal statement and explanation in the drafts.

# Next Steps

- Request WG feedback on Design A vs. Design B
  - How much utility for the additional information in the RLP attribute in Design A?
    - Indicating when update is sent to transit provider
- Request WG feedback on Attribute vs. Community
- Prepare a finalized version for WGLC

# Backup slides

# Route-Leak Detection Theorem: Illustration



The only possible way that [X] is not violated in r2 is if the path from B to C consists of C2P links only. But that would violate the “No cycle of customer-provider relationships” requirement [Gao-Rexford].

# Route-Leak Detection Theorem

The “Gao-Rexford” Stability Conditions

[Gao-Rexford] <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr11/cos461/docs/lec17-bgp-policy.ppt>

- **Topology** condition (acyclic) (slide 27)
  - No cycle of customer-provider relationships


**Route-Leak Detection Theorem:** Let it be given that ISP A receives a route r1 from customer AS C and another route r2 from provider AS B (for the same prefix), and both routes r1 and r2 contain AS C and AS X in the path and also contain [X] in their RLP/eOTC. Then, clearly r1 is in violation of [X]. It follows that r2 is also necessarily in violation of [X].

**Proof:** Let us suppose that r2 is not in violation of [X]. That implies that r2’s path from C to B to A included only P2C links. That would mean that there is a cycle of customer-provider relationships involving the ASes in the AS path in r2. However, any such cycle is ruled out in practice as a necessary stability condition [Gao-Rexford]. QED.

# Route-Leak Mitigation Rules

**Rule 1:** If ISP A receives a route r1 from customer AS C and another route r2 from provider (or peer) AS B (for the same prefix), and both routes r1 and r2 contain AS C and AS X (any X not equal to C) in the path and also contain [X] in their RLP, then prioritize the customer (AS C) route over the provider (or peer) route.  
(Rationale: This rule is based on the theorem (slide 8). See detailed rationale in Section 3.1 in [1].)

**Rule 2:** If ISP A receives a route r1 from peer AS C and another route r2 from provider AS B (for the same prefix), and both routes r1 and r2 contain AS C and AS X (any X not equal to C) in the path and also contain [X] in their RLP, then prioritize the peer (AS C) route over the provider (AS B) route.  
(Rationale: See illustration below. See detailed rationale in Section 3.1 in [1].)






[1] <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-solution-discussion-00>

# Default Route-Leak Mitigation Policy

- **Given a choice between a customer route versus a provider (or peer) route,**
  - if no route leak is detected in the customer route, then prioritize the customer over the provider (or peer);
  - else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the customer route) and the conditions of Rule 1 apply, then too prioritize the customer over the provider (or peer);
  - else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the customer route and the conditions of Rule 1 DO NOT apply), then prioritize the provider (or peer) over the customer.
- **Given a choice between a peer route versus a provider route\*,**
  - if no route leak is detected in the peer route, then prioritize the peer over the provider;
  - else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the peer route) and the conditions of Rule 2 apply, then too prioritize the peer over the provider;
  - else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the peer route and the conditions of Rule 2 DO NOT apply), then prioritize the provider over the peer.


\* Operator MAY override (the second bullet) to prefer provider route over peer route.

# Examples Showing Policy in Action (1 of 2)



# Examples Showing Policy in Action (2 of 2)

Scenario 4



Legend:



AS does not participate in RLP and/or Propagates a route that violates RLP


**Green** – not violation

**Red** – violation

**Purple** – can't tell

# Design A – RLP Attribute

- Insert  $\langle \text{ASN}, 1 \rangle$  if sending to Customer or Peer
- else, insert  $\langle \text{ASN}, 0 \rangle$



# Design B – RLP Attribute

- Insert <ASN> if sending to Customer or Peer
- else, insert nothing

