

Framework to Integrate Post-Quantum Key Exchanges into IKEv2

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Agenda

- Overview of problem to be solved
- Version 02
- Questions for the WG

Overview of the Problem

- Add postquantum key exchanges to IKE
- Allow multiple key exchanges
 - So we rely on both standard DH/ECDH, and on these new fangled postquantum key exchanges
 - So we can rely on multiple postquantum key exchanges
- Deal with fragmentation

Version 02 - Strategy

- It implements 'hybrid key exchanges' by performing multiple consecutive exchanges
 - Uses the IKE_AUX exchanges proposed by Valery
 - The final IKE keys is secure if any of the key exchanges are secure
- All key exchanges except the first are encrypted
 - Standard IKE fragmentation applied to the later key exchanges

Version 02 - Protocol


- The initial exchange is the standard IKEv2 IKE_INIT exchange, with postquantum policy attached.

```
Initiator                               Responder
-----
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, N(Policy)  -->
      <-- HDR, SAR1, KE-Hybrid, Nr, [CERTREQ], N(AcceptedPolicy)
```

- The initiator lists what additional key exchanges it would accept
- The responder lists which set of key exchanges it agrees to

Version 02 – Protocol (continued)

- The IKE_AUX exchanges iterate through the negotiated key exchanges.



- Each exchange is encrypted with keys based on all previous key exchanges
- Each exchange updates the keys for the next exchange
- We then complete it with a standard IKE_AUTH exchange

Version 02 – Format of the Policy

- The proposed policy format is simply a list of the sets of additional key exchanges (DH transform id's) acceptable to the initiator.

Example:

```
ROUND2 + SIKE  
NTRU + SIKE  
ROUND2  
NTRU
```

- This is in addition to the initial KE performed in the IKE_INIT
- The responder replies with the set that matches his policy

Example:

```
ROUND2 + SIKE
```

Comments and Suggestions are Welcome

- This is a work in progress
- We tried to keep things simple
- We felt it would be easier to add new requirements from the working group, than it would be to take them out

Open Questions for the Group

- Do you agree with this general approach?
- Do you agree with the strategy of treating classical and postquantum key exchanges equivalently?
- Should we allow multiple key exchanges per exchange?
- How do we encode the policy?
- No native support for key shares $> 64k$
 - Only about 25 out of 175 NIST submissions would require that.

Thank You