

School of Computing Science



The Impact of Transport Header Confidentiality on Network Operation and Evolution of the Internet

draft-fairhurst-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-09

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Aims and Goals

- Transport protocols beginning to use end-to-end encryption and/or integrity protection to protect transport-layer headers
- Goals of the draft:
 - To identify in-network uses of transport layer header information
 - To review implications of transport protocols that use integrity protection and encryption to protect transport protocol header
 - To discuss impact of such changes on transport protocol design and network operation
 - Since measurement and analysis of transport protocols has been important to protocol design, to consider impact on transport and application evolution



Draft Status

- Three revisions since IETF 101
 - Address comments from Al Morton, Chris Seal, Kathleen Moriarty, Spencer Dawkins, and Joe Touch
 - Improved readability of the draft and revised to provide a more neutral view of the trade-offs
 - Greatly expanded security considerations section



Neutral Point of View

- Revised to better reflect a neutral point-of-view around the impact of transport header confidentiality, and to avoid advocating a particular position
- Expand introductory remarks on ossification as result of in-network inspection of transport headers, the wire image of the protocol, and heuristic inspection of packet timing, etc.
- Added note on implications on accountability and network neutrality



Updated Security Considerations

- Discusses implications of confidentiality and integrity protection of transport headers in avoiding ossification vs. exposing information to network
 - Limits ossification
 - Limits ability to measure and characterise traffic, detect anomalies
 - Prevents data injection attacks
- Summarises issues that are elaborated upon elsewhere in the draft



Next Steps

- Received considerable feedback over the last 18 months
- Seems to be clear interest in the work
- Trying to reflect and learn some broader lessons from development of QUIC
- Please consider adoption as TSVWG working group draft we believe the draft is in good shape, and the topic is important to consider

