Adaptive RESTful Real-time Live Streaming for Things (A-REaLiST)
draft-bhattacharyya-core-a-realist-00

Abstract

This draft presents extensions to Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) to enable RESTful Real-time Live Streaming for improving the
Quality of Experience (QoE) for delay-sensitive Internet of Things
(IoT) applications. The overall architecture is termed ‘‘Adaptive
RESTful Real-time Live Streaming for Things (A-REaLiST)’’. It is
particularly designed for applications which rely on real-time
augmented vision through live First Person View (FPV) feed from
constrained remote agents like Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), etc.
These extensions provide the necessary hooks to help solution
designers ensure low-latency transfer of streams and, for contents
like video, a quick recovery from freeze and corruption without
incurring undue lag. A-REaLiST is an attempt to provide an
integrated approach to maintain the balance amongst QoE, resource-
efficiency and loss resilience. It provides the necessary hooks to
optimize system performance by leveraging contextual intelligence
inferred from instantaneous information segments in flight. These
extensions equip CoAP with a standard for efficient RESTful
streaming for Internet of Things (IoT) contrary to HTTP-streaming in
conventional Internet.

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1. Introduction

IoT emerged to facilitate exchange of frequent-but-small sensory information amongst numerous constrained sensors [IOT-ISOC][RFC7452]. However, recent trends in industry and research community realize the importance of live visual data as important sensory information. There are many discourses available to support this observation [Murphy]. Live First Person View (FPV) from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and dumb robot terminals are being used for futuristic remote control and actuation applications for Augmented Reality (AR), Visual Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (VSLAM), UAV based surveillance, etc. Efficacy of these applications depends on resource-efficient, low-latency, yet high QoE transfer of the FPV over the Internet (or IP networks in general). Contrary to the traditional video streaming applications, the UAV-like endpoints (henceforth referred as ‘video producer’) that capture and transmit the FPV are resource constrained devices. Moreover, the producer may work in a lossy environment marred with fluctuating radio connectivity and disruptions due network congestion.

The QoE considerations of the video rendering unit (henceforth referred as ‘video consumer’) for these applications are quite different from traditional applications. For example, in case of highly delay sensitive AR applications, a human brain may not tolerate a noticeable video freeze or delayed reception, which might have been overlooked for usual content delivery service like a YouTube video. Such delay may result in wrong actuation. For example, delayed FPV from a UAV may lead to wrong control commands leading to catastrophic consequences. In addition, the communication should be as light-weight as possible to optimize the usage of on-board computing and energy resources of the UAV. So, real-time video transmissions for IoT applications require special treatment [Pereira]. However, as revealed through a detail analysis of the state-of-the-art in the next section, the existing solutions do not
address such special requirements. This draft attempts to bridge this important gap by extending CoAP [RFC7252].

To realize its purpose, the A-REaLiST architecture relies on [RFC7967] and adds few new header options which, taken together, can be conceived to form a conceptual 'Stream' extension on CoAP (Fig. 1).

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

Figure 1: Abstract extended layering of CoAP for A-REaLiST with the conceptual layer for streaming.

Though primarily designed for video streaming, these extensions can also be used to allow streaming of time-series information on CoAP.

Note: Block-wise transfer [RFC7959] is a standardized extension to CoAP for transferring large application data. The cited use case for this is to perform firmware upgrade for a large number of constrained devices. Block-wise transfer is primarily concerned with reliable delivery of information. It works in synchronized manner. If a message remains unacknowledged despite retransmissions then the whole exchange is cancelled. So, it is not suitable for real-time delivery [GIoTS] which is requirement for many time-series information streams including video.
2. Revisiting CoAP

2.1. Some Interesting Aspects of CoAP

(i) CoAP allows both confirmable (CON) and non-confirmable (NON) messaging.

(ii) CON mode enables CoAP with an option for reliable RESTful delivery like HTTP [RFC2616] on TCP. On the other hand, intelligent use of No-Response option [RFC7967] along with NON mode can create an RTP like best-effort messaging on UDP.

(iii) Context based switching between the reliable and best-effort semantics can be executed from the end-application level. This way an optimum balance between reliability delay-performance can be maintained to improve the overall Quality of Experience (QoE).

(iv) The base CoAP specification is inherently designed for resource constrained devices. Hence, a streaming protocol using the stateless RESTful semantics on CoAP makes the solution inherently lightweight. So, unlike conventional approach the designers can use a single stack that is equally efficient for sending the small data out of sensors, as well as, infinite visual stream.

2.2. The Prevalent Approaches for Streaming over Internet

The two prevalent approaches for streaming over the Internet are as below.

First approach is to send the information segment over HTTP which uses the reliability feature of the underlying Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) transport. In this case TCP state-machine puts more emphasis on reliable delivery of segments rather than maintaining the real-time deadlines. However, this is right now the prevalent approach as it treats video and other streams as general Internet traffic. So, streaming can seamlessly co-exist with the existing Internet architecture. Also, since TCP takes care of ordered delivery, the end-application does not need to worry about these matters.

The other approach is to use a specialized protocol like Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550]. It treats video and other real-time streams as a special type of traffic. To ensure real-time delivery, the data is delivered in best-effort manner on top of UDP. So, reliable delivery is undermined.
2.3. CoAP as the Best of Two Worlds

It can be conjectured, tallying the above with previous section, that CoAP inherently imbibes the functional features from HTTP-on-TCP (reliable delivery) and RTP-on-UDP (best-effort delivery). Further CoAP allows the switching between these two seamlessly just by maneuvering the header options.

3. The Approach behind A-REaLiST

The design stems from the principles of "progressive download" on top of the RESTful request/response semantics of CoAP. The "producer" chunks the continuous information stream into segments as per the agreed maximum payload size suggested in [RFC7252]. Each chunk is transmitted as a CoAP request to a given resource at the "consumer". This draft provides the necessary header extensions that enable the "consumer" to maintain the sequence of the information segments in time and space.

3.1. Optional Context Aware Semantic Switch

Before forming the CoAP message for each segment, the streaming application may use a real-time analytics module (henceforth referred as 'analytics module') which may provide inference to the "Stream" layer to decide the exchange semantics for the current segment. The message is sent reliably (CON message) or as best-effort (NON message with No-Response option) based on the segment's information criticality. Criticality is measured in terms of importance of the segment-content in reconstruction of the frames at the consumer. However, determination of criticality can be done on many aspects involving several application features like the source encoding type, the rendering logic at the consumer, etc. This way the over-all balance between QoE and resource-consumption may be maintained. Fig. 2 explains the idea with conceptual blocks. The overall concept and its efficacy has been explained with experimental results in [Wi-UAV-Globecom]
Some examples are:

Example-1: Temporally compressed videos like MPEG consist of Group of Pictures (GoP) which comprises I-frames (Intra-frames) or key-frames, P-frames (Predicted frames) and B-frames (Bidirectional frames). Out of these 3 types of frames I-frames are most critical in terms of synchronizing with the GoP at the receiver end for successful rendering. So, an analytics module at the ‘‘video producer’’ end may infer each information segments of I-frames as critical and send those segments reliably. The segments corresponding to P and B frames may be transferred as best-effort requests.

Example-2: Let us consider a Motion JPEG (MJPEG) stream. In this case all the frames are independent JPEG frames and there is no temporal compression. The analytics module may treat the segments containing MJPEG meta-data for each frame as critical segments and transfer them through reliable messaging. Rest of the segments may be transferred as best-effort requests. An intelligent rendering engine at the ‘‘consumer’’ application may compensate for / conceal any possible loss of non-meta-data (non-critical) segments using the reliably received meta-data and rest of the non-meta-data segments received through best-effort. This way high QoE can be ensured despite reduced resource usage.

4. The Options Introduced

To achieve the purpose of the Stream layer, three new protocol header options have been proposed as below:

1) Stream_info: Consumes one unsigned byte. It maintains the stream identity and indicates the present phase of exchange. It is both a request and response option. It has two fields. The 3-LSBs indicate the state of exchange (Stream_state) and 5-MSBs indicate an identifier (Stream_id) for the stream. The identifier remains unchanged for the entire stream. So,

\[
\text{Stream_id} = \text{Stream_info} \gg 3;
\]

\[
\text{Stream_state} = \text{Stream_info} \& 0x7.
\]

Interpretation of Stream_state bits are:

000=> stream initiation (always with request);

001=> initiation accepted (always with response);
010=> initiation rejected (always with response);
011=> stream re-negotiation (with request or response);
100=> stream ongoing.

2) Time-stamp: It consumes 32-bit unsigned integer. It is a request option. It relates a particular application information segment to the corresponding frame in the play sequence.

3) Position: It consumes 16-bit unsigned integer. It is a request option and MUST be accompanied with the Time-stamp option. It is a combination of two fields. The 15-MSBs indicate the ‘‘offset’’ at which the present segment is placed in the frame corresponding to the given timestamp. The LSB indicates if the current segment is the last segment of the frame corresponding to the given timestamp. Hence,
   Last_segment = Position &0x01 ? True : False;
   Offset = (Position >> 1).

+-----+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
| No. | C | U | N | R | Name         | Format | Length | Default |
+-----+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
| TBD | X |   | - |   | Stream-info  | uint   |    1   | (none)  |
+-----+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
| TBD | X |   | - |   | Time-stamp   | uint   |    4   | (none)  |
+-----+---+---+---+---+--------------+--------+--------+---------+
| TBD | X |   | - |   | Position     | uint   |    2   | (none)  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

Table 1: Option Properties

5. The Handshake and Exchange Semantics

As per the design considerations in view of the scenarios conceived at present, video transfer is initiated by the ‘‘producer’’ which acts as the client.

Note: The design considerations are driven by the experiences drawn from the applications where live video feeds are transmitted from battery operated constrained ‘‘video producers’’ like UAVs and dumb robotic terminals, etc. For example, while a fixed infrastructure system is using streamed FPV feed from UAVs, there may be situations where each time a UAV is low on resources (energy and computation, a new UAV with better state of resources (fresh battery, etc.) is commissioned. The overall operation becomes simple if the newly commissioned UAV readily starts its job by streaming to the same

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resource at the fixed infrastructure. It can be easily configured to
determine whether the consumer is up and watching by observing the
responses to the CON requests. In case the exchange is initiated by
the consumer then whenever a new UAV is commissioned, the consumer
has to re-initiate the request again.

Each segment is transmitted to the ‘’video consumer’’ as a POST
request. The Time-stamp and Position options help sequential
ordering of the segments at the consumer.

5.1. Initial Negotiation

Initial negotiations for frame rate, video type, encoding details,
etc., are performed by exchanging configuration scripts (cbor or
json) over POST request. Exact format of the script is application
dependent and is not part of this draft.

Fig. 3 illustrates the exemplary exchanges related to handshakes for
connection initiation.

Note: All reliable transfers are in blocking mode. So, the producer
MUST wait to send any further segment (critical/ on-critical) till
the response is received for the critical segment. Please refer to
Section 6 for suggested behavior in case a reliable transfer fails.
Client (Producer)                                  Server (Consumer)

POST: CON;
   URI=/video;
   Stream-info = <5-bit ID>000;
   Payload= CBOR or JSON

ACK;
Response = 2.04 CHANGED
Stream-info = <5-bit ID>001

(First segment of an MJPEG frame. Contains meta-data. Critical segment needs reliable delivery.)

POST: CON;
   URI=/video;
   Stream-info = <5-bit ID>100;
   Time-stamp = <time_stamp_of_this_frame>;
   Position = 0;
   Payload= <Bytes_in_1st_segment>

ACK;
Response = 2.04 CHANGED
Stream-info = <5-bit ID>100

(Second segment of an MJPEG frame. Contains non-meta-data. Non-critical segment- best effort transfer.)

POST: NON;
   URI=/video; No-response = 127
   Stream-info = <5-bit ID>100;
   Time-stamp = <time_stamp_of_this_frame>;
   Position = 1024;
   Payload= <Bytes_in_2nd_segment>
Figure 3: Example showing successful negotiation of streaming parameters followed by transmission of video information and control. It is assumed that the segment size negotiated as 1024 at the initiation. So, the position of the 2nd block is 1024. Note the use of No-response option with NON request for the non-critical segment.

5.2. Renegotiation

The renegotiation phase may occur when the ‘consumer’ does not agree to parameters proposed by the producer and proposes a modified set. This may happen when the consumer application may need a less frame-rate than what is proposed by the producer. So, the ‘consumer’ may request a lower frame-rate and thereby avoid unnecessary traffic in the network. The reduction may also be driven by the processing load on the producer which is anyway a constrained device. So, if a consumer requests more frame-rate than what is initially proposed by the producer, then the producer may insist on the lower frame-rate. Renegotiation may also occur if, during a stream, the producer senses a change in the end-to-end channel condition and proposes a new set of best possible parameters that can be served to the consumer.

Note that, that the consumer is never allowed to exceed the limits advertised by the producer.

Fig. 4 illustrates exemplary exchanges for re-negotiation.
Client (Producer)                                  Server (Consumer)

POST: CON;
    URI=/video;
    Stream-info = <5-bit ID>000;
    Payload= CBOR or JSON
+------------------------------------------------->\ Initial

ACK;
Response = 2.04 CHANGED
Stream-info = <5-bit ID>010
Payload= CBOR or JSON
<-------------------------------------------------|

POST: CON;
    URI=/video;
    Stream-info = <5-bit ID>010;
    Payload= CBOR or JSON
+------------------------------------------------->\ Successful

ACK;
Response = 2.04 CHANGED
Stream-info = <5-bit ID>001
<-------------------------------------------------|\ renegotiation

: (Streaming starts)

Fig. 4: Example showing successful renegotiation of streaming
parameters. Note the maneuvering of the Stream-info bit patterns.

Fig. 5 illustrates exemplary exchanges when a stream negotiation is
unsuccessful. The accompanied script may provide hints to the reason
for unsuccessful negotiations. A simple case of unsuccessful attempt
may be observed if the resource on the ”consumer” side is not ready.
The exact formatting of the script is not in the scope of this
draft.
6. Some Design Guidelines

6.1. Implicit Congestion Avoidance

The throughput and resource optimization for A-REaLiST depends largely on the best-effort delivery on UDP. Despite that the application designer can make A-REaLiST implicitly congestion aware and proactively avoid congestion. CoAP has a basic congestion avoidance mechanism which uses exponential back off to increase the timeout for retransmissions. However, that works only for CON messages.

The implicit congestion avoidance works like this: In case the producer fails to successfully transfer a critical segment of a frame within the MAX_TRANSMIT_SPAN as well as within MAX_RETRANSMIT [RFC7252] attempts, the producer drops transmission of rest of the segments in that frame and waits for the next frame to be ready. The rationale is, since the critical segment is not delivered, the consumer will fail to reconstruct this frame anyway. So, there is no point in clogging the network with rest of the segments.

6.2. Considerations for Consumer-side Rendering

While the critical segments are delivered reliably in a sequential manner, non-critical are delivered with best-effort in an open-loop exchange. Also, the whole frame can be dropped to avoid congestion. Hence, the application at the ‘‘consumer’’ end-point (server) needs to
deal with issues like out-of-order delivery, frame/segment loss, asynchronous segment arrival.

The issues mentioned above have been discussed in literatures [Perkins]. So the basic approach should be: Buffer till a critical time to iron out the jittery, out-of-order arrival of the segments, play out from the appropriate buffer at a constant rate determined by the frame-rate of the video. There may be intelligent algorithms to play-out with high QoE despite non-arrival of non-critical segments within the play-out deadline. This draft provides the hooks to create such designs. Reference architecture of the play-out mechanism is provided in [Wi-UAV-Globecom]. The play-out architecture leverages on the design assumption about the ‘less-constrained’ nature of the consumer in terms of memory and processor.

7. IANA Considerations

The IANA is requested to assign numbers to the three options introduced in this draft for inclusion in the “CoAP Option Numbers” registry as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Stream-info</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Time-stamp</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Security Considerations

This draft presents no security considerations beyond those in Section 11 of the base CoAP specification [RFC7252].

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[RFC7252]


[Bhattacharyya]
9.2. Informative References

[IOT-ISOC]

[RFC7452]

[Murphy]

[Pereira]

[RFC7959]
Bormann, C., Shelby, Z., '‘Block-Wise Transfers in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)’’, RFC 7959, August, 2016.

[GIoTS]

[RFC2616]


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Abstract

There is an increased demand of trustworthy claim sets -- a set of system entity characteristics tied to an entity via signatures -- in order to provide information. Claim sets represented via CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) can compose a variety of evidence suitable for constrained-node networks and to support secure device automation. This document focuses on sets of identifiers and attributes that are tied to a system entity and are typically used to compose identities appropriate for Constrained RESTful Environment (CoRE) authentication needs.
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1. Introduction

X.509 certificates [RFC5280] and Secure Device Identifier [IEEE-802.1AR] are ASN.1 encoded identity documents and intended to be tied to a system entity uniquely identified via these identity documents. An identity document - a certificate - can be conveyed to other system entities in order to prove the identity of the owner of the identity document. Trust in the proof can be established by mutual trust of the provider and assessor of the identity in a third party verification (TVP) provided, for example, by a certificate authority (CA) or its subsidiaries (sub CA).

The evidence a certificate comprises is typically composed of a set of claims that is signed using secret keys issued by a (sub) CA. The core set of claims included in a certificate - its attributes - are well defined in the X.509v3 specifications and IEEE 802.1AR.

This document summarizes the core set of attributes and provides a corresponding list of claims using concise integer labels to be used in claim sets for CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) [RFC8392]. A resulting Concise Identity (CoID) is able to represent a signed set of claims that composes an Identity as defined in [RFC4949].

The objective of using CWT as a basis for the signed claim sets defined in this document is to gain more flexibility and at the same time more rigorously defined semantics for the signed claim sets. In addition, the benefits of using CBOR, COSE, and the corresponding CWT structure accrue, including more compact encoding and a simpler implementation in contrast to classical ASN.1 (DER/BER/PEM) structures and the X.509 complexity and uncertainty that has accrued since X.509 was released 29 years ago. One area where both the compactness and the definiteness are highly desirable is in Constrained-Node Networks [RFC7228], which may also make use of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP, [RFC7252]); however, the area of application of Concise Identities is not limited to constrained-node networks.
The present version of this document is a strawman that attempts to indicate the direction the work is intended to take. Not all inspirations this version takes from X.509 maybe need to be taken.

1.1. Terminology

This document uses terminology from [RFC8392] and therefore also [RFC7519], as well as from [RFC8152]. Specifically, we note:

Claim: A piece of information asserted about a subject. A claim is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a Claim Name and a Claim Value.

Claims are grouped into claims sets (represented here by a CWT), which need to be interpreted as a whole. Note that this usage is a bit different from idiomatic English usage, where a claim would stand on its own.

(Note that the current version of this draft is not very explicit about the relationship of identities and identifiers. To be done in next version.)

2. Claims in a Concise Identity

A Concise Identity (CoID) is a CBOR Web Token [RFC8392] with certain claims present. It can be signed in a number of ways, including a COSE_Sign1 data object [RFC8152].

2.1. iss: CWT issuer

Optional: identifies the principal that is the claimant for the claims in the CoID ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.1, cf. Section 4.1.1 in [RFC7519]).

- Note that this is a StringOrURI (if it contains a ":" it needs to be a URI)
- For the "string" case (no ":"), there is no way to extract meaningful components from the string
- Make it a URI if it needs to be structured (not for routine retrieval, unless specified so by an application)
- If this URI looks like an HTTP or HTTPS URI then something retrievable by humans should exist there.
- Alternatively, some arithmetic can be applied to the URI (extract origin, add "/.well-known/...") to find relevant information.
2.2. sub: CWT subject

Optional: identifies the principal that is the subject for the claims in the CoID ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.2, cf. Section 4.1.2 in [RFC7519]).

2.3. aud: CWT audience

Optional: identifies the recipients that the CoID is intended for ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.4, cf. Section 4.1.4 in [RFC7519]).

2.4. exp: CWT expiration time

Optional: the time on or after which the CoID must no longer be accepted for processing ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.4, cf. Section 4.1.4 in [RFC7519]).

2.5. nbf: CWT start of validity

Optional: the time before which the CoID must not be accepted for processing ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.5, cf. Section 4.1.5 in [RFC7519]).

2.6. iat: CWT time of issue

Optional: the creation time of the CoID ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.6, cf. Section 4.1.6 in [RFC7519]).

2.7. cti: CWT ID

The "cti" (CWT ID) claim provides a unique identifier for the CoID ([RFC8392] Section 3.1.7, cf. "jti" in Section 4.1.7 in [RFC7519]).

CWT IDs are intended to be unique within an application, so they need to be either coordinated between issuers or based on sufficient randomness (e.g., 112 bits or more).

2.8. cnf: CWT proof-of-possession key claim

The "cnf" claim identifies the key that can be used by the subject for proof-of-possession and provides parameters to identify the CWT Confirmation Method ([I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] Section 3.1).

3. Signature Envelope

The signature envelope [TBD: need not actually be envelope, may be detached, too] carries additional information, e.g., the signature, as well as the identification of the signature algorithm employed
(COSE: alg). Additional information may pertain to the signature (as opposed to the claims being signed), e.g., a key id (COSE: kid) may be given in the header of the signature.

4. Processing Rules

(TBD: This should contain some discussion of the processing rules that apply for CoIDs. Some of this will just be pointers to [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp].)

5. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA

6. Security Considerations

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]

[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]


7.2. Informative References

[IEEE-802.1AR]


Appendix A. Examples of claims taken from IEEE 802.1AR identifiers

This appendix briefly discusses common fields in a X.509 certificate or an IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier and relates them to claims in a CoID.

The original purpose of X.509 was only to sign the association between a name and a public key. In principle, if something else needs to be signed as well, CMS [RFC5652] is required. This principle has not been strictly upheld over time; this is demonstrated by the growth of various extensions to X.509 certificates that might or might not be interpreted to carry various additional claims.

This document details only the claim sets for CBOR Web Tokens that are necessary for authentication. The plausible integration or replacement of ASN.1 formats in enrollment protocols, [D]TLS handshakes and similar are not in scope of this document.
Subsections in this appendix are marked by the ASN.1 Object Identifier (OID) typically used for the X.509 item. [TODO: Make this true; there are still some section numbers.]

A.1. 7.2.1 version

The version field is typically not employed usefully in an X.509 certificate, except possibly in legacy applications that accept original (pre-v3) X.509 certificates.

Generally, the point of versioning is to deliberately inhibit interoperability (due to semantic meaning changes). CoIDs do not employ versioning. Where future work requires semantic changes, these will be expressed by making alternate kinds of claims.

A.2. 7.2.2 serialNumber

Covered by cti claim.

A.3. 7.2.3 signature

The signature, as well as the identification of the signature algorithm, are provided by the COSE container (e.g., COSE_Sign1) used to sign the CoID’s CWT.

A.4. 7.2.4 issuer Name

Covered by iss claim.

A.5. 7.2.5 authoritykeyidentifier

Covered by COSE kid in signature, if needed.

A.6. 7.2.7.1 notBefore

Covered by nbf claim.

A.7. 7.2.7.2 notAfter

Covered by exp claim.

For Secured Device identifiers, this claim is typically left out.

- get a new one whenever you think you need it ("normal path")

- nonced ocsp? might benefit from a more lightweight freshness verification of existing signed assertion - exploration required!
A.8. 7.2.8 subject

Covered by sub claim.

Note that if claim sets need to be made about multiple subjects, the favored approach in CoID is to create multiple CoIDs, one each per subject.

A.9. 7.2.10 subjectPublicKeyInfo

Covered by cnf claim.

A.10. 7.2.11 signatureAlgorithm

In COSE_Sign1 envelope.

A.11. 7.2.12 signatureValue

In COSE_Sign1 envelope.

Appendix B. Examples of claims taken from X.509 certificates

Most claims in X.509 certificates take the form of certificate extensions. This section reviews a few common (and maybe not so common) certificate extensions and assesses their usefulness in signed claim sets.

B.1. 2.5.29.35 - Authority Key Identifier

Used in certificate chaining. Can be mapped to COSE "kid" of the issuer.

B.2. 2.5.29.14 - Subject Key Identifier

Used in certificate chaining. Can be mapped to COSE "kid" in the "cnf" (see Section 3.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]).

B.3. 2.5.29.15 - Key Usage

Usage information for a key claim that is included in the signed claims. Can be mapped to COSE "key_ops" [TBD: Explain details].
B.4.  2.5.29.37 - Extended key usage

Can include additional usage information such as 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
for TLS server certificates or 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 for TLS client
certificates.

B.5.  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 - Authority Information Access

More information about the signer. May include a pointer to signers
higher up in the certificate chain (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2), typically in
the form of a URI to their certificate.

B.6.  1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2 - Certificate Template Name Domain Controller
(Microsoft)

This is an example for many ill-defined extensions that are on some
arcs of the OID space somewhere.

E.g., the UCS-2 string (ASN.1 BMPString) "IPSECIntermediateOffline"

Appendix C.  Graveyard

C.1.  7.2.9 subjectAltName

(See "sub").

C.2.  7.2.13 extensions

Extensions are handled by adding CWT claims to the CWT.

C.3.  2.5.29.31 - CRL Distribution Points

Usually URIs of places where a CRL germane to the certificate can be
obtained. Other forms of validating claim sets may be more
appropriate than CRLs for the applications envisaged here.

(Might be replaced by a more general freshness verification approach
later. For example one could define a generic "is this valid"
request to an authority.)

C.4.  2.5.29.17 - Subject Alternative Name

Additional names for the Subject.

These may be an "OtherName", i.e. a mystery blob "defined by" an
ASN.1 OID such as 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.21.2.3, or one out of a few formats
such as URIs (which may, then, turn out not to be really URIs).
Naming subjects obviously is a major issue that needs attention.
C.5.  2.5.29.19 - Basic Constraints

Can identify the key claim as that for a CA, and can limit the length of a certificate path. Empty in all the examples analyzed.

Any application space can define new fields / claims as appropriate and use them. There is no need for the underlying structure to define an additional extension method for this. Instead, they can use the registry as defined in Section 9.1 of [RFC8392].

Acknowledgements

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Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Corrections and Clarifications

draft-bormann-core-corr-clar-00

Abstract

RFC 7252 defines the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), along with a number of additional specifications, including RFC 7641, RFC 7959, RFC 8132, and RFC 8323. RFC 6690 defines the link format that is used in CoAP self-description documents.

Some parts of the specification may be unclear or even contain errors that may lead to misinterpretations that may impair interoperability between different implementations. The present document provides corrections, additions, and clarifications to the RFCs cited; this document thus updates these RFCs. In addition, other clarifications related to the use of CoAP in other specifications, including RFC 7390 and RFC 8075, are also provided.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

[RFC7252] defines the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), along with a number of additional specifications, including [RFC7641], [RFC7959], [RFC8132], and [RFC8323]. [RFC6690] defines the link format that is used in CoAP self-description documents.

During implementation and interoperability testing of these RFCs, and in their practical use, some ambiguities and common misinterpretations have been identified, as well as a few errors.

The present document summarizes identified issues and provides corrections needed for implementations of CoAP to interoperate, i.e., it constitutes an update to the RFCs referenced. This document also provides other clarifications related to common misinterpretations of the specification. References to CoAP should, therefore, also include this document.

In addition, some clarifications and corrections are also provided for documents that are related to CoAP, including RFC 7390 and RFC 8075.
1.1. Process

The present document is an Internet-Draft, which is not intended to be published as an RFC quickly. Instead, it will be maintained as a running document of the CoRE WG, probably for a number of years, until the need for new entries tails off and the document can finally be published as an RFC. (This paragraph to be rephrased when that happens.)

The status of this document as a running document of the WG implies a consensus process that is applied in making updates to it. The rest of this subsection provides more details about this consensus process. (This is the intended status; currently, the document is an individual submission only.)

(Consensus process TBD, but it will likely be based on an editor’s version in a publicly accessible git repository, as well as periodic calls for consensus that lead to a new published Internet-Draft;.)

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

When a section of this document makes formal corrections, additions or invalidations to text in a referenced RFC, this is clearly summarized. The text from the RFC that is being addressed is given and labeled "INCOMPLETE", "INCORRECT", or "INCORRECT AND INVALIDATED", followed by the correct text labeled "CORRECTED", where applicable. When text is added that does not simply correct text in previous specifications, it is given with the label "FORMAL ADDITION".

Where a resolution has not yet been agreed, the resolution is marked PENDING.

In this document, a reference to a section in RFC nnnn is written as RFC nnnn-<number>, where <number> is the section number.

2. RFC 7252
2.1. RFC7252-5.10.5: Max-Age

In the discussion of [I-D.ietf-core-too-many-reqs], a comment was made that it would be needed to define the point in time relative to which Max-Age is defined. A sender might reference it to the time it actually sends the message containing the option (and paragraph 3 of RFC7252-5.10.5 indeed requests that Max-Age be updated each time a message is retransmitted). The receiver of the message does not have reliable information about the time of sending, though. It may instead reference the Max-Age to the time of reception. This in effect extends the time of Max-Age by the latency of the packet. This extension was deemed acceptable for the purposes of [I-D.ietf-core-too-many-reqs], but may be suboptimal when Max-Age is about the lifetime of a response object.

INCOMPLETE:
The value is intended to be current at the time of transmission.

PENDING.

3. IANA Considerations

None yet.

(Individual clarifications may contain IANA considerations; these will then be referenced here.)

4. Security Considerations

This document provides a number of corrections and clarifications to existing RFCs, but it does not make any changes with regard to the security aspects of the protocol. As a consequence, the security considerations of the referenced RFCs apply without additions.

(To be changed when that is no longer true; probably the security considerations will then be on the individual clarifications.)

5. References

5.1. Normative References

5.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-core-too-many-reqs]

Acknowledgements

The present document is modeled after RFC 4815 and the Internet-Drafts of the ROHC WG that led to it. Many thanks to the co-chairs of the ROHC WG and WG members that made this a worthwhile and successful experiment at the time.
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Abstract

In order to use a media type with the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), a numeric identifier needs to be registered for it, the Content-Format number.

RFC 7252 defines registration procedures for Content-Format numbers. The present document defines a proactive procedure to register a Content-Format number for many of the media types that are registered and discusses the benefits and limitations of that approach.

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1. Introduction

To identify representation formats in a concise form, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) uses numeric identifiers, the Content-Format Numbers [RFC7252]. A Content-Format number identifies a media type [RFC6838] and a content coding (usually the identity coding). Content-Format numbers are assigned in the CoAP Content-Formats Registry, as defined in Section 12.3 of [RFC7252].

At the time of writing, a couple dozen Content-Format numbers are registered. Any new application that needs to register new media types for use with CoAP can define the Content-Format numbers for its media types as well. However, using existing applications and their media types over CoAP is complicated by the need to register the Content-Format numbers for these media types.

As of 2018, less than 2000 media types have been registered in the Media Type Registry managed by [RFC6838], in a registry established by [RFC1590] in 1994. No trends significantly accelerating the growth of this registry are currently anticipated.
The size of the space available for Content-Format numbers is a 16-bit unsigned number. It is therefore very well possible to go ahead and pre-define a Content-Format number for each media type (where possible). When CoAP was defined, the space between 1000 and 9999 was informally set aside for this purpose (as part of the space between 256 and 9999 that is reserved for future use in IETF specifications, with IETF Review or IESG Approval).

The present document defines how the assignment of Content-Format numbers for each existing media type and media type registered in the future is performed.

1.1. Terminology

This memo uses terms from [RFC7252] and [RFC6838].

2. Media Types and Content-Format Numbers

A Content-Format number identifies a media type with all the media type parameters, as well as a content-coding to be used with the media type. E.g., Content-Format 0 stands for "text/plain; charset=utf-8" with identity content-coding.

It is generally not easy to extract from its registration the parameters and ranges of parameter values that will be used with a media type. The present document therefore only attempts to handle media type parameters for one specific case: Where a charset needs to be defined, this is always set to "utf-8".

Where parameters other than charset are needed by an application, it will continue to need to register Content-Format numbers despite the proactive registration defined here.

Similarly, any content-coding beyond identity will need to be defined in a separate registration.

Therefore, the proactive registration procedure defined in this document defines a single Content-Format number for each media type, with no parameters (or just charset), and with identity content-coding. This number is assigned by the below Procedure to fall in the space between 1000 and 9999.

3. Procedure

Content-Format numbers need to be assigned for each existing and new media type. Instead of defining a detailed procedure for this, the present document delegates the definition of the procedure to a designated expert.
The designated expert publishes the list of proactively registered Content-Format numbers regularly at https://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/wg/core/mediatypes.txt

The designated expert is requested to

- only ever add information to the proactive registration document (no changes or deletions)
- ensure that the proactive registration document is updated in some reasonable cadence (e.g., monthly)
- provide a way to effect a quick update if such an update is reasonably called for
- alert IANA to such updates.

IANA regularly (and when alerted) pulls the published list of registrations, detects additions, and adds those additions to its Content-Format registry.

4. Discussion

4.1. Latency

New media types do not immediately cause an update of the pre-registration list, and such an update does not immediately cause new Content-Format number registries. Where this latency becomes an issue (e.g., because of deadlines of other standards development organizations that depend on these procedures), the designated expert can be alerted to effect a quick update.

New media types that are expressly intended for use in constrained environments of course should not wait for the procedure described here to effect their content-format registration, but should include the registration of a Content-Format number in their IANA considerations, as before. This also makes sure that any additional considerations (such as the potential need for a single-byte content-format number) are taken into account.

4.2. Potential Mishaps

4.2.1. Race Conditions

When the IANA registers a new media type and associated content-format numbers, the registry state could briefly show the new media type but not the new content-format numbers. If an update is created
to the pre-registrations at this very moment, the assignment of redundant Content-Format numbers could not be prevented.

The present document does not attempt to prevent the registration of redundant Content-Format numbers. So, "application/json" is both identified by Content-Format number 50 [RFC7252] and by the Content-Format number 4330 assigned under the pre-registration procedure.

4.2.2. Depletion of Pre-Registration Space

When a survey was run June 2018, 1726 media types were registered. 1006 of these have no parameters and will be proactively assigned a Content-Format number under this scheme. 276 more have just one parameter, "charset", and will also be proactively assigned a Content-Format number by setting this parameter to "utf-8".

418 media types have parameters that would require manual assignment of appropriate parameter values. This is not envisioned for the scheme described in this document. Finally, 26 media types could not easily be automatically analyzed and would require manual processing before sorting into one of the categories; this document leaves it up to the designated expert to decide whether to perform this processing and where.

In summary, as of the time of the survey, about 1/7 of the space envisioned for the scheme will be used by the media type registrations performed in the first 24 years of the registry (and the entire space reserved in turn is a bit less than 1/7 of the total space for Content-Format numbers).

Sudden changes in the patterns of media type registrations, although not anticipated at this time, could lead to depletion of the pre-registration space. This would not be a disaster, but would simply return Content-Format number registration to the situation before proactive registration (with the existing assignment of course continuing to be usable). The present document does not attempt to define a solution for this unlikely case.

However, the pre-registration procedure could motivate a malicious actor to define a large number of media types just to cause this depletion. One would hope that this is already prevented by the media type registration procedures, but just to reduce the incentive for such an attack, the procedures defined in this document make use of a designated expert that could detect such an attack and allow the designated expert to apply some mitigation.
5. Instructions to the Designated Expert

The designated expert is instructed to operate along the lines of the procedure described in Section 3, and towards the objectives defined in this document.

Between these two, the objectives are the overriding concern. Where the procedure turns out to no longer serve to further the objectives, the designated expert is instructed to adapt the procedure. If substantive changes to the procedure are deemed necessary, the designated expert is instructed to raise a discussion on the mailing list "core-parameters@ietf.org"; if the result of the discussion is a change of moderate extent, the designated expert can simply perform that change, document it on the mailing list, and act based on the updated procedure.

(If several designated experts are appointed, the above requires consensus between the designated experts.)

Fundamental changes, e.g., stepping out of the boundary of the number space, require further IETF review.

6. IANA Considerations

This entire document is about a IANA procedure.

7. Security Considerations

Accurate identification of representation formats can be important for security. Lowering the threshold for obtaining the registrations needed for this identification can therefore have a positive security impact. Conversely, limiting the representation formats pre-registered for each media type to just the single case without parameters and with identity content-coding might encourage imprecise identification. The present document is therefore not to be used as a substitute for registering any more specific Content-Format numbers needed by an application.

Procedures as defined in the present document can also be the subject of attacks. See Section 4.2.2 for one such consideration.

Acknowledgements

TBD
9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


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CoRE Applications
draft-hartke-core-apps-08

Abstract

The application programmable interfaces of RESTful, hypermedia-driven Web applications consist of a number of reusable components such as Internet media types and link relation types. This document proposes "CoRE Applications", a convention for application designers to build the interfaces of their applications in a structured way, so that implementers can easily build interoperable clients and servers, and other designers can reuse the components in their own applications.

Note to Readers

This Internet-Draft should be discussed on the Thing-to-Thing Research Group (T2TRG) mailing list <t2trg@irtf.org> <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/t2trg>.

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1. Introduction

Representational State Transfer (REST) [16] is an architectural style for distributed hypermedia systems. Over the years, REST has gained popularity not only as an approach for large-scale information dissemination, but also as the basic principle for designing and building Internet-based applications in general.

In the coming years, the size and scope of the Internet is expected to increase greatly as physical-world objects become smart enough to communicate over the Internet -- a phenomenon known as the Internet of Things (IoT). As things learn to speak the languages of the net,
the idea of applying REST principles to the design of IoT application architectures suggests itself. To this end, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [23] was created, an application-layer protocol that enables RESTful applications in constrained-node networks [10], giving rise to a new setting for Internet-based applications: the Constrained RESTful Environment (CoRE).

To realize the full benefits and advantages of the REST architectural style, a set of constraints needs to be maintained when designing applications and their application programming interfaces (APIs). One of the fundamental principles of REST is that "REST APIs must be hypertext-driven" [17]. However, this principle is often ignored by application designers. Instead, APIs are specified out-of-band in terms of fixed URI patterns (e.g., in the API documentation or in a machine-readable format that facilitates code generation). Although this approach may appear easy for clients to use, the fixed resource names and data formats lead to a tight coupling between client and server implementations and make the system less flexible [5]. Violations of REST design principles like this result in APIs that may not be as scalable, extensible, and interoperable as promised by REST.

REST is intended for network-based applications that are long-lived and span multiple organizations [17]. Principled REST APIs require some design effort, since application designers do not only have to take current requirements into consideration, but also have to anticipate changes that may be required in the future -- years or even decades after the application has been deployed for the first time. The reward is long-term stability and evolvability, both of which are very desirable features in the Internet of Things.

To aid application designers in the design process, this document proposes "CoRE Applications", a convention for building the APIs of RESTful, hypermedia-driven Web applications. The goal is to help application designers avoid common mistakes by focusing almost all of the descriptive effort on defining the Internet media type(s) that are used for representing resources and driving application state.

A template for a "CoRE Application Description" provides a consistent format for the description of APIs so that implementers can easily build interoperable clients and servers, and other application designers can reuse the components in their own applications.

2. CoRE Applications

A CoRE Application API is a named set of reusable components. It describes a contract between a server hosting an instance of the
described application and clients that wish to interface with that instance.

The API is generally comprised of:

- communication protocols, identified by URI schemes,
- representation formats, identified by Internet media types,
- link relation types,
- form relation types,
- template variables in templated links,
- form field names in forms, and
- well-known locations.

Together, these components provide the specific, in-band instructions to a client for interfacing with a given application.

2.1. Communication Protocols

The foundation of a hypermedia-driven REST API are the communication protocol(s) spoken between a client and a server. Although HTTP/1.1 [14] is by far the most common communication protocol for REST APIs, a REST API should typically not be dependent on any specific communication protocol.

2.1.1. URI Schemes

The usage of a particular protocol by a client is guided by URI schemes [7]. URI schemes specify the syntax and semantics of URI references [1] that the server includes in hypermedia controls such as links and forms.

A URI scheme refers to a family of protocols, typically distinguished by a version number. For example, the "http" URI scheme refers to the two members of the HTTP family of protocols: HTTP/1.1 [14] and HTTP/2 [8] (as well as some predecessors). The specific HTTP version used is negotiated between a client and a server in-band using the version indicator in the HTTP request-line or the TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension [10].

IANA maintains a list of registered URI schemes at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes>.
2.2. Representation Formats

In RESTful applications, clients and servers exchange representations that capture the current or intended state of a resource and that are labeled with a media type. A representation is a sequence of bytes whose structure and semantics are specified by a representation format: a set of rules for encoding information.

Representation formats should generally allow clients with different goals, so they can do different things with the same data. The specification of a representation format "describes a problem space, not a prescribed relationship between client and server. Client and server must share an understanding of the representations they're passing back and forth, but they don’t need to have the same idea of what the problem is that needs to be solved." [21]

Representation formats and their specifications frequently evolve over time. It is part of the responsibility of the designer of a new version to insure both forward and backward compatibility: new representations should work reasonably (with some fallback) with old processors and old representations should work reasonably with new processors [20].

Representation formats enable hypermedia-driven applications when they support the expression of hypermedia controls such as links (Section 2.3) and forms (Section 2.4).

2.2.1. Internet Media Types

One of the most important aspect of hypermedia-driven communications is the concept of Internet media types [2]. Media types are used to label representations so that it is known how the representation should be interpreted and how it is encoded. The centerpiece of a CoRE Application Description should be one or more media types.

Note: The terms media type and representation format are often used interchangeably. In this document, the term "media type" refers specifically to a string of characters such as "application/xml" that is used to label representations; the term "representation format" refers to the definition of the syntax and semantics of representations, such as XML 1.0 [12] or XML 1.1 [13].

A media type identifies a versioned series of representation formats (Section 2.2): a media type does not identify a particular version of a representation format; rather, the media type identifies the family, and includes provisions for version indicator(s) embedded in the representations themselves to determine more precisely the nature
of how the data is to be interpreted [20]. A new media type is only needed to designate a completely incompatible format [20].

Media types consist of a top-level type and a subtype, structured into trees [2]. Optionally, media types can have parameters. For example, the media type "text/plain; charset=utf-8" is a subtype for plain text under the "text" top-level type in the standards tree and has a parameter "charset" with the value "utf-8".

Media types can be further refined by

- structured type name suffixes (e.g., "+xml" appended to the base subtype name; see Section 4.2.8 of RFC 6838 [2]),
- a "profile" parameter (see Section 3.1 of RFC 6906 [24]),

or a similar annotation. An annotation directly in the media type is generally preferable, since subtype information embedded in representations can typically not be negotiated during content negotiation (e.g., using the CoAP Accept option).

In CoAP, media types are paired with a content coding [15] to indicate the "content format" [23] of a representation. Each content format is assigned a numeric identifier that can be used instead of the (more verbose) textual name of the media type in representation formats with size constraints. The flat number space loses the structural information that the textual names have, however.

The media type of a representation must be determined from in-band information (e.g., from the CoAP Content-Format option). Clients must not assume a structure from the application context or other out-of-band information.

IANA maintains a list of registered Internet media types at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.

IANA maintains a list of registered structured suffixes at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-type-structured-suffix>.

IANA maintains a list of registered CoAP content formats at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.
2.3. Links

As defined in RFC 8288 [6], a link is a typed connection between two resources. Additionally, a link is the primary means for a client to navigate from one resource to another.

A link is comprised of:

- a link context,
- a link relation type that identifies the semantics of the link (see Section 2.3.1),
- a link target, identified by a URI, and
- optionally, target attributes that further describe the link or the link target.

A link can be viewed as a statement of the form "{link context} has a {link relation type} resource at {link target}, which has {target attributes}" [6]. For example, the resource <http://example.com/> could have a "terms-of-service" resource at <http://example.com/tos>, which has a representation with the media type "text/html".

There are two special kinds of links:

- An embedding link is a link with an additional hint: when the link is processed, it should be substituted with the representation of the referenced resource rather than cause the client to navigate away from the current resource. Thus, traversing an embedding link adds to the current state rather than replacing it.

  The most well known example for an embedding link is the HTML <img> element. When a Web browser processes this element, it automatically dereferences the "src" and renders the resulting image in place of the <img> element.

- A templated link is a link where the client constructs the link target URI from provided in-band instructions. The specific rules for such instructions are described by the representation format. URI Templates [3] provide a generic way to construct URIs through variable expansion.

  Templated links allow a client to construct resource URIs without being coupled to the resource structure at the server, provided that the client learns the template from a representation sent by the server and does not have the template hard-coded.
2.3.1. Link Relation Types

A link relation type identifies the semantics of a link [6]. For example, a link with the relation type "copyright" indicates that the resource identified by the target URI is a statement of the copyright terms applying to the link context.

Relation types are not to be confused with media types; they do not identify the format of the representation that results when the link is dereferenced [6]. Rather, they only describe how the link context is related to another resource [6].

IANA maintains a list of registered link relation types at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations>.

Applications that don't wish to register a link relation type can use an extension link relation type [6]: a URI that uniquely identifies the link relation type. For example, an application can use the string "http://example.com/foo" as link relation type without having to register it. Using a URI to identify an extension link relation type, rather than a simple string, reduces the probability of different link relation types using the same identifiers.

2.3.2. Template Variable Names

A templated link enables clients to construct the target URI of a link, for example, when the link refers to a space of resources rather than a single resource. The most prominent mechanisms for this are URI Templates [3] and the HTML <form> element with a submission method of GET.

To enable an automated client to construct an URI reference from a URI Template, the name of the variable in the template can be used to identify the semantics of the variable. For example, when retrieving the representation of a collection of temperature readings, a variable named "threshold" could indicate the variable for setting a threshold of the readings to retrieve.

Template variable names are scoped to link relation types, i.e., two variables with the same name can have different semantics if they appear in links with different link relation types.

2.4. Forms

A form is the primary means for a client to submit information to a server, typically in order to change resource state.

A form is comprised of:
o a form context,
o a form relation type that identifies the semantics of the form (see Section 2.4.1),
o a request method (e.g., PUT, POST, DELETE),
o a submission URI,
o a description of a representation that the server expects as part of the form submission, and

o optionally, target attributes that further describe the form or the form target.

A form can be viewed as an instruction of the form "To perform a {form relation type} operation on {form context}, make a {request method} request to {submission URI}, which has {target attributes}". For example, to "update" the resource <http://example.com/config>, a client would make a PUT request to <http://example.com/config>. (In many cases, the target of a form is the same resource as the context, but this is not required.)

The description of the expected representation can be a set of form fields (see Section 2.4.2) or simply a list of acceptable media types.

Note: A form with a submission method of GET is, strictly speaking, a templated link, since it provides a way to construct a URI and does not submit a representation to the server.

2.4.1. Form Relation Types

A form relation type identifies the semantics of a form. For example, a form with the form relation type "create" indicates that a new item can be created within the form context by making a request to the resource identified by the target URI.

Similarly to extension link relation types, applications can use extension form relation types when they don't wish to register a form relation type.

2.4.2. Form Field Names

Forms can have a detailed description of the representation expected by the server as part of form submission. This description typically consists of a set of form fields where each form field is comprised
of a field name, a field type, and optionally a number of attributes such as a default value, a validation rule or a human-readable label.

To enable an automated client to fill out a form, the field name can be used to identify the semantics of the form field. For example, when controlling a smart light bulb, the field name "brightness" could indicate the field for setting the desired brightness of the light bulb.

Field names are scoped to form relation types, i.e., two form fields with the same name can have different semantics if they appear in forms with different form relation types.

The type of a form field is a data type such as "an integer between 1 and 100" or "an RGB color". The type is orthogonal to the field name, i.e., the type should not be determined from the field name even though the client can identify the semantics of the field from the name. This separation makes it easy to change the set of acceptable values in the future.

2.5. Well-Known Locations

Some applications may require the discovery of information about a host, known as "site-wide metadata" in RFC 5785 [4]. For example, RFC 6415 [19] defines a metadata document format for describing a host; similarly, RFC 6690 [22] defines a link format for the discovery of resources hosted by a server.

Applications that need to define a resource for this kind of metadata can register new "well-known locations". RFC 5785 [4] defines the path prefix "/.well-known/" in "http" and "https" URIs for this purpose. RFC 7252 [23] extends this convention to "coap" and "coaps" URIs.

IANA maintains a list of registered well-known URIs at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.

3. CoRE Application Descriptions

As applications are implemented and deployed, it becomes important to describe them in some structured way. This section provides a simple template for CoRE Application Descriptions. A uniform structure allows implementers to easily determine the components that make up the interface of an application.

The template below lists all components of applications that both the client and the server implementation of the application need to understand in order to interoperate. Crucially, items not listed in
the template are not part of the contract between clients and servers -- they are implementation details. This includes in particular the URIs of resources (see Section 4).

CoRE Application Descriptions are intended to be published in human-readable format by designers of applications and by operators of deployed application instances. Application designers may publish an application description as a general specification of all application instances, so that implementers can create interoperable clients and servers. Operators of application instances may publish an application description as part of the API documentation of the service, which should also include instructions how the service can be located and which communication protocols and security modes are used.

3.1. Template

The fields of the template are as follows:

Application name:
Name of the application. The name is not used to negotiate capabilities; it is purely informational. A name may include a version number or, for example, refer to a living standard that is updated continuously.

URI schemes:
URI schemes identifying the communication protocols that need to be understood by clients and servers. This information is mostly relevant for deployed instances of the application rather than for the general specification of the application.

Media types:
Internet media types that identify the representation formats that need to be understood by clients and servers. An application description must comprise at least one media type. Additional media types may be required or optional.

Link relation types:
Link relation types that identify the semantics of links. An application description may comprise IANA-registered link relation types and extension link relation types. Both may be required or optional.

Template variable names:
For each link relation type, variable names that identify the semantics of variables in templated links with that link relation type. Whether a template variable is required or optional is indicated in-band inside the templated link.
Form relation types:
Form relation types that identify the semantics of forms and, for each form relation type, the submission method(s) to be used. An application description may comprise IANA-registered form relation types and extension form relation types. Both may be required or optional.

Form field names:
For each form relation type, form field names that identify the semantics of form fields in forms with that form relation type. Whether a form field is required or optional is indicated in-band inside the form.

Well-known locations:
Well-known locations in the resource identifier space of servers that clients can use to discover information given the DNS name or IP address of a server.

Interoperability considerations:
Any issues regarding the interoperable use of the components of the application should be given here.

Security considerations:
Security considerations for the security of the application must be specified here.

Contact:
Person (including contact information) to contact for further information.

Author/Change controller:
Person (including contact information) authorized to change this application description.

Each field should include full citations for all specifications necessary to understand the application components.

4. URI Design Considerations

URIs [1] are a cornerstone of RESTful applications. They enable uniform identification of resources via URI schemes [7] and are used every time a client interacts with a particular resource or when a resource representation references another resource.

URIs often include structured application data in the path and query components, such as paths in a filesystem or keys in a database. It is common for many RESTful applications to use these structures not only as an implementation detail but also make them part of the
public REST API, prescribing a fixed format for this data. However, there are a number of problems with this practice [5], in particular if the application designer and the server owner are not the same entity.

In hypermedia-driven applications, URIs are therefore not included in the application interface. A CoRE Application Description must not mandate any particular form of URI substructure.

RFC 7320 [5] describes the problematic practice of fixed URI structures in detail and provides some acceptable alternatives.

Nevertheless, the design of the URI structure on a server is an essential part of implementing a RESTful application, even though it is not part of the application interface. The server implementer is responsible for binding the resources identified by the application designer to URIs.

A good RESTful URI is:

- Short. Short URIs are easier to remember and cause less overhead in requests and representations.

- Meaningful. A URI should describe the resource in a way that is meaningful and useful to humans.

- Consistent. URIs should follow a consistent pattern to make it easy to reason about the application.

- Bookmarkable. Cool URIs don’t change [9]. However, in practice, application resource structures do change. That should cause URIs to change as well so they better reflect reality. Implementations should not depend on unchanging URIs.

- Shareable. A URI should not be context sensitive, e.g., to the currently logged-in user. It should be possible to share a URI with third parties so they can access the same resource.

- Extension-less. Some applications return different data for different extensions, e.g., for "contacts.xml" or "contacts.json". But different URIs imply different resources. RESTful URIs should identify a single resource. Different representations of the resource can be negotiated (e.g., using the CoAP Accept option).
5. Security Considerations


All components of an application description are expected to contain clear security considerations. CoRE Application Descriptions should furthermore contain security considerations that need to be taken into account for the security of the overall application.

6. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


Acknowledgements

Jan Algermissen, Mike Amundsen, Mike Kelly, Julian Reschke, and Erik Wilde provided valuable input on link and form relation types.

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Abstract

This document provides considerations for alleviating CoAP clients and intermediaries of maintaining per-request state. Additionally, it introduces a new, optional CoAP protocol extension for extended token lengths.

This document updates RFCs 7252 and 8323.

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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a RESTful application-layer protocol for constrained environments [RFC7228]. In CoAP, clients (or intermediaries in the client role) make requests to servers (or intermediaries in the server role), which serve the requests by returning responses.

While a request is ongoing, a client typically maintains some state that it requires for processing the response when it arrives. Identification of this state is done by means of a _token_ in CoAP, an opaque sequence of bytes chosen by the client and included in the CoAP request. The server returns the token verbatim in any resulting CoAP response (Figure 1).
In some scenarios, it can be beneficial to reduce the amount of state stored at the client at the cost of increased message sizes. Clients can implement this by serializing (parts of) their state into the token itself and recovering the state from the token in the response (Figure 2).

Section 3 of this document provides considerations for making clients "stateless" in this way, i.e., avoiding per-request state. (They’ll still need to maintain per-server state and other kinds of state, so they’re not entirely stateless.)

Serializing state into tokens is complicated by the fact that both CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] and CoAP over reliable transports [RFC8323] limit the maximum token length to 8 bytes. To overcome this limitation, Section 2 of this document first introduces a CoAP protocol extension for extended token lengths.
While the mechanism (extended token lengths) and the use case (stateless clients) presented in this document are closely related, both can be used independently of the other: Some implementations may fit their state in 8 bytes; some implementations may have other use cases for extended token lengths.

1.1. Terminology

Stateless

In this document, "stateless" refers to an implementation strategy for a client (or intermediary in the client role) that doesn’t keep state for the individual requests it sends to a server (or intermediary in the server role). The client still needs to keep state for each server it communicates with (such as state for generating tokens and congestion control), so it’s not free of any state.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Extended Tokens

2.1. Extended Token Length (TKL) Field

This document updates the message formats defined for CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] and CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets [RFC8323] with the following new definition of the TKL field, increasing the maximum token length to 65804 bytes.

Token Length (TKL): 4-bit unsigned integer. A value between 0 and 12 inclusive indicates the length of the variable-length Token field in bytes. Three values are reserved for special constructs:

13: An 8-bit unsigned integer precedes the Token field and indicates the length of the Token field minus 13.

14: A 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order precedes the Token field and indicates the length of the Token field minus 269.

15: Reserved. This value MUST NOT be sent and MUST be processed as a message format error.

All other fields retain their definition.
The updated message formats are illustrated in Appendix A.

2.2. Discovering Support

Extended token lengths require support from the server or, if there are one or more intermediaries between the client and the server, the intermediary in the server role that the client is interacting with.

Support can be discovered by a client (or intermediary in the client role) in one of two ways: In case Capabilities and Settings Messages (CSMs) are available, such as in CoAP over TCP, support can be discovered using the Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option defined in Section 2.2.1. Otherwise, such as in CoAP over UDP, support can only be discovered by trial and error, as described in Section 2.2.2.

2.2.1. Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option

A sender can use the elective Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option to indicate its support for the new TKL field definition specified in Section 2.1.

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<th>C</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Applies to</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Base Value</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Extended-Token-</td>
<td>empty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lengths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C=Critical, R=Repeatable

Table 1: The Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option

2.2.2. Trial and Error

A request with a TKL field value outside the range from 0 to 8 will be considered a message format error (Section 3 of RFC 7252) and be rejected by a recipient that does not support the updated TKL field definition. A client thus can determine support by sending a request with an extended token length and checking whether it’s rejected by the recipient or not.

In CoAP over UDP, a recipient rejects a malformed confirmable message by sending a Reset message (Section 4.2 of RFC 7252). In case of a non-confirmable message, sending a Reset message is permitted but not required (Section 4.3 of RFC 7252). It is therefore RECOMMENDED that clients use a confirmable message.
As per RFC 7252, Reset messages are empty and don’t contain a token; they only return the Message ID (Figure 3). They also don’t contain any indication of what caused a message format error. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that clients use a request that contains no potential message format error other than the extended token length.

In CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets, a recipient rejects a malformed message by sending an Abort message and shutting down the connection (Section 5.6 of RFC 8323).

2.3. Intermediaries

Tokens are a hop-by-hop feature: When an intermediary receives a request, the only requirement is that it echoes the token back in any resulting response. There is no requirement or expectation that an intermediary passes a client’s token on to a server or that an intermediary uses extended token lengths itself when receiving a request with an extended token length.

3. Stateless Clients

A client can be alleviated of keeping request state by serializing the state into a sequence of bytes and sending the result as the token of the request. The server will return the token to the client in the response, so that the client can recover the state and process the response as if it had kept the state locally.

The format of the serialized state is an implementation detail of the client and opaque to any server implementation. Using tokens to serialize state has significant and non-obvious security and privacy implications that need to be mitigated; see Section 4.
3.1. Intermediaries

Tokens are a hop-by-hop feature: If a client makes a request to an intermediary, that intermediary needs to store the client’s token (along with the client’s transport address) while it makes its own request to the next hop towards the origin server and waits for the response.

An intermediary might want to be "stateless" as well, i.e., be alleviated of storing the client's token and transport address for ongoing requests. This can be implemented by serializing this information along the request state into the token to the next hop. When the next hop returns the response, the intermediary can recover the information from the token and use it to satisfy the client’s request.

The downside of this approach is that an intermediary, without keeping request state, is unable to aggregate requests, which reduces efficiency. In particular, when multiple clients observe [RFC7641] the same resource, aggregating requests is REQUIRED for efficiency (Section 3.1 of RFC 7641). This implies that an intermediary MUST NOT include an Observe Option in requests it sends without keeping request state.

When using blockwise transfers [RFC7959], a server might not be able to distinguish blocks originating from different clients once they have been forwarded by an intermediary. To ensure that this does not lead to inconsistent resource state, a stateless intermediary MUST include the Request-Tag Option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] in blockwise transfers with a value that uniquely identifies the next hop towards the client in the intermediary’s namespace.

3.2. Extended Tokens

A client (or intermediary in the role of a client) that depends on support for extended token lengths (Section 2) from the next hop to avoid keeping request state MUST perform a discovery of support (Section 2.2) before it can be stateless. This discovery MUST be performed in a stateful way, i.e., keeping state for the request (Figure 4): If the client was stateless from the start and the next hop doesn’t support extended tokens, then any error message couldn’t be processed since the state would neither be present at the client nor returned in the Reset message (Figure 5).
Figure 4: Depending on Extended Tokens for Being Stateless First Requires a Successful Stateful Discovery of Support

Figure 5: Stateless Discovery of Support Does Not Work
3.3. Message Transmission

As a further step in the case of CoAP over UDP [RFC7252], a client (or intermediary in the client role) might want to also avoid keeping message transmission state.

Generally, a client can use confirmable or non-confirmable messages for requests. When using confirmable messages, it needs to keep message exchange state for performing retransmissions and handling Acknowledgement and Reset messages. When using non-confirmable messages, it can keep no message exchange state. However, in either case the client needs to keep congestion control state. That is, it needs to maintain state for each node it communicates with and, e.g., enforce NSTART.

As per RFC 7252, a client must be prepared to receive a response as a piggybacked response, a separate response or non-confirmable response (Section 5.2 of RFC 7252), regardless of the message type used for the request. A stateless client needs to handle these response types as follows:

- If a piggybacked response contains a valid authentication tag and freshness indicator in the token, the client MUST process the message as specified in RFC 7252; otherwise, it MUST silently ignore the message.

- If a separate response contains a valid authentication tag and freshness indicator in the token, the client MUST process the message as specified in RFC 7252; otherwise, it MUST reject the message as specified in Section 4.2 of RFC 7252.

- If a non-confirmable response contains a valid authentication tag and freshness indicator in the token, the client MUST process the message as specified in RFC 7252; otherwise, it MUST reject the message as specified in Section 4.3 of RFC 7252.

4. Security Considerations

4.1. Extended Tokens

Tokens significantly larger than the 8 bytes specified in RFC 7252 have implications for nodes in particular with constrained memory size that need to be mitigated.

A node in the server role supporting extended token lengths may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service when an attacker (either on-path or a malicious client) sends large tokens to fill up the memory of the node. Implementations MUST be prepared for this and mitigate it.
4.2. Stateless Clients

Transporting the state needed by a client to process a response as serialized state information in the token has several significant and non-obvious security and privacy implications that need to be mitigated.

Serialized state information is an attractive target for both unwanted nodes (attackers between the node in client role and the next hop) and wanted nodes (the next hop itself) on the path. Therefore, a node in the client role MUST integrity protect the state information, unless processing a response does not modify state or cause other significant side effects.

Even when the serialized state is integrity protected, an attacker may still replay a response, making the client believe it sent the same request twice. Therefore, the node in client role MUST implement replay protection (e.g., by using sequence numbers and a replay window), unless processing a response does not modify state or cause other significant side effects. Integrity protection is REQUIRED for replay protection.

If processing a response without keeping request state is sensitive to the time elapsed to sending the request, then the serialized state MUST include freshness information (e.g., a timestamp).

Information in the serialized state may be privacy sensitive. A node in client role MUST encrypt the serialized state if it contains privacy sensitive information that an attacker would not get otherwise. For example, an intermediary that serializes the client’s token and transport address into its token leaks that information to the next hop, which may be undesirable. In wireless mesh networks, where all traffic is visible to a passive attacker, encryption may not be needed as the attacker can get the same information from analyzing the traffic flows.

A node in client role using OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] always MUST encrypt the serialized state.

4.2.1. Recommended Algorithms

The use of encryption, integrity protection, and replay protection of serialized state is recommended in general, unless a careful analysis of any potential attacks to security and privacy is performed. AES_CCM with a 64 bit tag is recommended, combined with a sequence number and a replay window. Where encryption is not needed, HMAC-SHA-256, combined with a sequence number and a replay window, may be used.
5. IANA Considerations

5.1. CoAP Signaling Option Number

The following entries are added to the "CoAP Signaling Option Numbers" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry.

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</table>

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]


6.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson,

[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,

[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,

Appendix A. Updated Message Formats

This appendix illustrates the CoAP message formats updated with the new definition of the TKL field (Section 2).
A.1. CoAP over UDP

```
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-------+-------+---------------+
|       |       |               |
|  Ver  |   T   |      TKL      |   1 byte
|       |       |               |
+-------+-------+---------------+

|                               |
|             Code              |   1 byte |
|                               |
+-------------------------------+

|                               |
|             Message ID         |   2 bytes |
|                               |
+-------------------------------+

| /                              |
|  TKL                           |   0-2 bytes |
| (extended)                     |
+-------------------------------+

| /                              |
|  Token                         |   0 or more bytes |
|                                |
+-------------------------------+

| /                              |
|  Options                       |   0 or more bytes |
|                                |
+-------------------------------+

| 15                             |
|                               |
|                                |
+-------------------------------+

| /                              |
|  Payload                       |   0 or more bytes |
|                                |
+-------------------------------+
```

Hartke                   Expires April 25, 2019                [Page 13]
### A.2. CoAP over TCP

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<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
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### A.3. CoAP over WebSockets

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The diagram above illustrates the structure of a CoAP message over WebSockets, showing the fields and their respective byte lengths. The fields include a Token (TKL), a Code, an Option field, and the Payload.
Acknowledgements

This document is based on the requirements of and work on the Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] by Malisa Vucinic, Jonathan Simon, Kris Pister, and Michael Richardson.

Thanks to Carsten Bormann, Ari Keranen, John Mattsson, Jim Schaad, Goeran Selander, and Malisa Vucinic for helpful comments and discussions that have shaped the document.

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Abstract

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and related extensions are intended to support machine-to-machine communication in systems where one or more nodes are resource constrained, in particular for low power wireless sensor networks. This document defines a publish-subscribe Broker for CoAP that extends the capabilities of CoAP for supporting nodes with long breaks in connectivity and/or up-time.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] supports machine-to-machine communication across networks of constrained devices. CoAP uses a request/response model where clients make requests to servers in order to request actions on resources. Depending on the situation the same device may act either as a server or a client.

One important class of constrained devices includes devices that are intended to run for years from a small battery, or by scavenging energy from their environment. These devices have limited...
reachability because they spend most of their time in a sleeping state with no network connectivity. Devices may also have limited reachability due to certain middle-boxes, such as Network Address Translators (NATs) or firewalls. Such middle-boxes often prevent connecting to a device from the Internet unless the connection was initiated by the device.

This document specifies the means for nodes with limited reachability to communicate using simple extensions to CoAP. The extensions enable publish-subscribe communication using a Broker node that enables store-and-forward messaging between two or more nodes. Furthermore the extensions facilitate many-to-many communication using CoAP.

2. Terminology


This specification requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [RFC5988] and [RFC6690]. Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC7252] and [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]. The URI template format [RFC6570] is used to describe the REST API defined in this specification.

This specification makes use of the following additional terminology:

Publish-Subscribe (pub/sub): A messaging paradigm where messages are published to a Broker and potential receivers can subscribe to the Broker to receive messages. The publishers do not (need to) know where the message will be eventually sent: the publications and subscriptions are matched by a Broker and publications are delivered by the Broker to subscribed receivers.

CoAP pub/sub service: A group of REST resources, as defined in this document, which together implement the required features of this specification.

CoAP pub/sub Broker: A server node capable of receiving messages (publications) from and sending messages to other nodes, and able to match subscriptions and publications in order to route messages to the right destinations. The Broker can also temporarily store publications to satisfy future subscriptions and pending notifications.
CoAP pub/sub Client: A CoAP client which is capable of publish or subscribe operations as defined in this specification.

Topic: A unique identifier for a particular item being published and/or subscribed to. A Broker uses the topics to match subscriptions to publications. A topic is a valid CoAP URI as defined in [RFC7252]

3. Architecture

3.1. CoAP Pub/sub Architecture

Figure 1 shows the architecture of a CoAP pub/sub service. CoAP pub/sub Clients interact with a CoAP pub/sub Broker through the CoAP pub/sub REST API which is hosted by the Broker. State information is updated between the Clients and the Broker. The CoAP pub/sub Broker performs a store-and-forward of state update representations between certain CoAP pub/sub Clients. Clients Subscribe to topics upon which representations are Published by other Clients, which are forwarded by the Broker to the subscribing clients. A CoAP pub/sub Broker may be used as a REST resource proxy, retaining the last published representation to supply in response to Read requests from Clients.

![Diagram of CoAP pub/sub Architecture]

Figure 1: CoAP pub/sub Architecture

3.2. CoAP Pub/sub Broker

A CoAP pub/sub Broker is a CoAP Server that exposes a REST API for clients to use to initiate publish-subscribe interactions. Avoiding the need for direct reachability between clients, the Broker only needs to be reachable from all clients. The Broker also needs to have sufficient resources (storage, bandwidth, etc.) to host CoAP resource services, and potentially buffer messages, on behalf of the clients.
3.3. CoAP Pub/sub Client

A CoAP pub/sub Client interacts with a CoAP pub/sub Broker using the CoAP pub/sub REST API defined in this document. Clients initiate interactions with a CoAP pub/sub Broker. A data source (e.g., sensor clients) can publish state updates to the Broker and data sinks (e.g., actuator clients) can read from or subscribe to state updates from the Broker. Application clients can make use of both publish and subscribe in order to exchange state updates with data sources and data sinks.

3.4. CoAP Pub/sub Topic

The clients and Broker use topics to identify a particular resource or object in a publish-subscribe system. Topics are conventionally formed as a hierarchy, e.g. "/sensors/weather/barometer/pressure" or "/EP-33543/sen/3303/0/5700". The topics are hosted by a Broker and all the clients using the Broker share the same namespace for topics. Every CoAP pub/sub topic has an associated link, consisting of a reference path on the Broker using URI path [RFC3986] construction and link attributes [RFC6690]. Every topic is associated with zero or more stored representations and a content-format specified in the link. A CoAP pub/sub topic value may alternatively consist of a collection of one or more sub-topics, consisting of links to the sub-topic URIs and indicated by a link-format content-format. Sub-topics are also topics and may have their own sub-topics, forming a tree structure of unique paths that is implemented using URIs. The full URI of a topic includes a scheme and authority for the Broker, for example "coaps://10.0.0.13:5684/EP-33543/sen/3303/0/5700".

3.5. brokerless Pub/sub

Figure 2 shows an arrangement for using CoAP pub/sub in a "Brokerless" configuration between peer nodes. Nodes in a Brokerless system may act as both Broker and client. A node that supports Broker functionality may be pre-configured with topics that expose services and resources. Brokerless peer nodes can be mixed with client and Broker nodes in a system with full interoperability.
4. CoAP Pub/sub REST API

This section defines the REST API exposed by a CoAP pub/sub Broker to pub/sub Clients. The examples throughout this section assume the use of CoAP [RFC7252]. A CoAP pub/sub Broker implementing this specification SHOULD support the DISCOVERY, CREATE, PUBLISH, SUBSCRIBE, UNSUBSCRIBE, READ, and REMOVE operations defined in this section. Optimized implementations MAY support a subset of the operations as required by particular constrained use cases.

4.1. DISCOVERY

CoAP pub/sub Clients discover CoAP pub/sub Brokers by using CoAP Simple Discovery or through a Resource Directory (RD) [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]. A CoAP pub/sub Broker SHOULD indicate its presence and availability on a network by exposing a link to the entry point of its pub/sub API at its .well-known/core location [RFC6690]. A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY register its pub/sub REST API entry point with a Resource Directory. Figure 3 shows an example of a client discovering a local pub/sub API using CoAP Simple Discovery. A Broker wishing to advertise the CoAP pub/sub API for Simple Discovery or through a Resource Directory MUST use the link relation rt=core.ps. A Broker MAY advertise its supported content formats and other attributes in the link to its pub/sub API.

A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY offer a topic discovery entry point to enable Clients to find topics of interest, either by topic name or by link attributes which may be registered when the topic is created. Figure 4 shows an example of a client looking for a topic with a resource type (rt) of "temperature" using Discover. The client then receives the URI of the resource and its content-format. A pub/sub Broker wishing to advertise topic discovery MUST use the relation rt=core.ps.discover in the link.
A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY provide topic discovery functionality through the .well-known/core resource. Links to topics may be exposed at .well-known/core in addition to links to the pub/sub API. Figure 5 shows an example of topic discovery through .well-known/core.

Topics in the broker may be created in hierarchies (see {create}) with parent topics having sub-topics. For a discovery the broker may choose to not expose the sub-topics in order to limit amount of topic links sent in a discovery response. The client can then perform discovery for the parent topics it wants to discover the sub-topics.

The DISCOVER interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> Broker

Method: GET

URI Template: \{+ps\}\{+topic\}\{?q*\}

URI Template Variables:
- \+ps\ := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.
- \+topic\ := The desired topic to return links for (optional).
- \?q\ := Query Filter (optional). MAY contain a query filter list as per [RFC6690] Section 4.1.

Content-Format: application/link-format

The following response codes are defined for the DISCOVER operation:

Success: 2.05 "Content" with an application/link-format payload containing one or more matching entries for the Broker resource. A pub/sub Broker SHOULD use the value "/ps/" for the base URI of the pub/sub API wherever possible.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found" is returned in case no matching entry is found for a unicast request.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" is returned in case of a malformed request for a unicast request.

Failure: No error response to a multicast request.
4.2. CREATE

A CoAP pub/sub broker SHOULD allow Clients to create new topics on the broker using CREATE. Some exceptions are for fixed brokerless devices and pre-configured brokers in dedicated installations. A client wishing to create a topic MUST use a CoAP POST to the pub/sub API with a payload indicating the desired topic. The topic specification sent in the payload MUST use a supported serialization of the CoRE link format [RFC6690]. The target of the link MUST be a URI formatted string. The client MUST indicate the desired content format for publishes to the topic by using the ct (Content Format) link attribute in the link-format payload. The client MAY indicate
the lifetime of the topic by including the Max-Age option in the CREATE request.

Topics may be created as sub-topics of other topics. A client MAY create a topic with a ct (Content Format) link attribute value which describes a supported serialization of the CoRE link format [RFC6690] such as application/link-format (ct=40) or its JSON or CBOR serializations. If a topic is created which describes a link serialization, that topic may then have sub-topics created under it as shown in Figure 7.

Only one level in the topic hierarchy may be created as a result of a CREATE operation, unless create on PUBLISH is supported (see Section 4.3). The topic string used in the link target MUST NOT contain the "/" character.

A topic creator MUST include exactly one content format link attribute value (ct) in the create payload. If the Broker does not support the indicated format for both publish and subscribe, it MUST reject the operation with an error code of 4.00 "Bad Request".

There is no default content format. If no ct is specified, the Broker MUST reject the operation with an error code of 4.00 "Bad Request".

A Broker MUST return a response code of "2.01 Created" if the topic is created and return the URI path of the created topic via Location-Path options. The Broker MUST return the appropriate 4.xx response code indicating the reason for failure if a new topic can not be created. Broker SHOULD remove topics if the Max-Age of the topic is exceeded without any publishes to the topic. Broker SHOULD retain a topic indefinitely if the Max-Age option is elided or is set to zero upon topic creation. The lifetime of a topic MUST be refreshed upon create operations with a target of an existing topic.

Topic hierarchies can be created by creating parent topics. A parent topic is created with a POST using ct (Content Format) link attribute value which describes a supported serialization of the CoRE link format [RFC6690], such as application/link-format (ct=40) or its JSON or CBOR serializations. If a topic is created which describes a link serialization, that topic may then have sub-topics created under it as shown in Figure 7.

The CREATE interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> Broker

Method: POST
URI Template:  {+ps}/{+topic}

URI Template Variables:  ps := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.

topic := The desired topic to return links for (optional).

Content-Format:  application/link-format

Payload:  The desired topic to CREATE

The following response codes are defined for the CREATE operation:

Success:  2.01 "Created". Successful Creation of the topic

Failure:  4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure:  4.01 "Unauthorized". Authorization failure.

Failure:  4.03 " Forbidden". Topic already exists.

Failure:  4.06 "Not Acceptable". Unsupported content format for topic.

Figure 6 shows an example of a topic called "topic1" being successfully created.

Client                                          Broker
|                                               |
| ---------- POST /ps/ "<topic1>;ct=50" ----------|
|                                               |
| <--------------- 2.01 Created ---------------|
|               Location: /ps/topic1            |

Figure 6: Example of CREATE topic
4.3. PUBLISH

A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY allow clients to PUBLISH to topics on the Broker. A client MAY use the PUT or the POST method to publish state updates to the CoAP pub/sub Broker. A client MUST use the content format specified upon creation of a given topic to publish updates to that topic. The Broker MUST reject publish operations which do not use the specified content format. A CoAP client publishing on a topic MAY indicate the maximum lifetime of the value by including the Max-Age option in the publish request. The Broker MUST return a response code of "2.04 Changed" if the publish is accepted. A Broker MAY return a "4.04 Not Found" if the topic does not exist. A Broker MAY return "4.29 Too Many Requests" if simple flow control as described in Section 7 is implemented.

A Broker MUST accept PUBLISH operations using the PUT method. PUBLISH operations using the PUT method replace any stored representation associated with the topic, with the supplied representation. A Broker MAY reject, or delay responses to, PUT requests to a topic while pending resolution of notifications to subscribers from previous PUT requests.

Create on PUBLISH: A Broker MAY accept PUBLISH operations to new topics using the PUT method. If a Broker accepts a PUBLISH using PUT to a topic that does not exist, the Broker MUST create the topic using the information in the PUT operation. The Broker MUST create a topic with the URI-Path of the request, including all of the sub-topics necessary, and create a topic link with the ct attribute set to the content-format value from the header of the PUT request. If topic is created, the Broker MUST return the response "2.01 Created"
with the URI of the created topic, including all of the created path segments, returned via the Location-Path option.

Figure 9 shows an example of a topic being created on first PUBLISH.

A Broker MAY accept PUBLISH operations using the POST method. If a Broker accepts PUBLISH using POST it shall respond with the 2.04 Changed status code. If an attempt is made to PUBLISH using POST to a topic that does not exist, the Broker SHALL return a response status indicating resource not found, such as HTTP 404 or CoAP 4.04.

A Broker MAY perform garbage collection of stored representations which have been delivered to all subscribers or which have timed out. A Broker MAY retain at least one most recently published representation to return in response to SUBSCRIBE and READ requests.

A Broker MUST make a best-effort attempt to notify all clients subscribed on a particular topic each time it receives a publish on that topic. An example is shown in Figure 10.

If a client publishes to a Broker with the Max-Age option, the Broker MUST include the same value for the Max-Age option in all notifications.

A Broker MUST use CoAP Notification as described in [RFC7641] to notify subscribed clients.

The PUBLISH operation is specified as follows:

Interaction:  Client -> Broker

Method:  PUT, POST

URI Template:  {ps}/{topic}

URI Template Variables:  ps := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.

  topic := The desired topic to return links for (optional).

Content-Format:  Any valid CoAP content format

Payload:  Representation of the topic value (CoAP resource state representation) in the indicated content format

The following response codes are defined for the PUBLISH operation:
Success: 2.01 "Created". Successful publish, topic is created
Success: 2.04 "Changed". Successful publish, topic is updated
Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.
Failure: 4.01 "Unauthorized". Authorization failure.
Failure: 4.04 "Not Found". Topic does not exist.
Failure: 4.29 "Too Many Requests". The client should slow down the
rate of publish messages for this topic (see Section 7).

Figure 8 shows an example of a new value being successfully published
to the topic "topic1". See Figure 10 for an example of a Broker
forwarding a message from a publishing client to a subscribed client.

Client                                          Broker
|                                               |
| ---------- PUT /ps/topic1 "1033.3" -------->
|                                               |
|                                               |
| <--------------- 2.04 Changed----------------|
|             Location: /ps/topic1              |
|                                               |

Figure 8: Example of PUBLISH

Client                                          Broker
|                                               |
| -------- PUT /ps/exa/mpl/e "1033.3" ------>    |
|                                               |
|                                               |
| <--------------- 2.01 Created---------------- |
|             Location: /ps/exa/mpl/e           |

Figure 9: Example of CREATE on PUBLISH

4.4. SUBSCRIBE

A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY allow Clients to subscribe to topics on the
Broker using CoAP Observe as described in [RFC7641]. A CoAP pub/sub
Client wishing to Subscribe to a topic on a Broker MUST use a CoAP
GET with the Observe option set to 0 (zero). The Broker MAY add the
client to a list of observers. The Broker MUST return a response
code of "2.05 Content" along with the most recently published value
if the topic contains a valid value and the Broker can supply the requested content format. The Broker MUST reject Subscribe requests on a topic if the content format of the request is not the content format the topic was created with.

If the topic was published with the Max-Age option, the Broker MUST set the Max-Age option in the valid response to the amount of time remaining for the value to be valid since the last publish operation on that topic. The Broker MUST return a response code of "2.07 No Content" if the topic has not yet been published to, or if Max-Age of the previously stored value has expired. The Broker MUST return a response code "4.04 Not Found" if the topic does not exist or has been removed.

The Broker MUST return a response code "4.15 Unsupported Content Format" if it can not return the requested content format. If a Broker is unable to accept a new Subscription on a topic, it SHOULD return the appropriate response code without the Observe option as per [RFC7641] Section 4.1.

There is no explicit maximum lifetime of a Subscription, thus a Broker may remove subscribers at any time. The Broker, upon removing a Subscriber, will transmit the appropriate response code without the Observe option, as per [RFC7641] Section 4.2, to the removed Subscriber.

The SUBSCRIBE operation is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> Broker

Method: GET

Options: Observe:0

URI Template: {+ps}/{+topic}

URI Template Variables: ps := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.

topic := The desired topic to return links for (optional).

The following response codes are defined for the SUBSCRIBE operation:

Success: 2.05 "Content". Successful subscribe, current value included
Success: 2.07 "No Content". Successful subscribe, value not included.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.01 "Unauthorized". Authorization failure.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found". Topic does not exist.

Failure: 4.15 "Unsupported Content Format". Unsupported content format.

Figure 10 shows an example of Client2 subscribing to "topic1" and receiving a response from the Broker, with a subsequent notification. The subscribe response from the Broker uses the last stored value associated with the topic1. The notification from the Broker is sent in response to the publish received from Client1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client1</th>
<th>Client2</th>
<th>Broker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subscribe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>----- GET /ps/topic1 Observe:0 Token:XX ----&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;--------------- 2.05 Content Observe:10 ---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>---------- PUT /ps/topic1 &quot;1033.3&quot; --------&gt;</td>
<td>Notify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;--------------- 2.05 Content Observe:11 ---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Example of SUBSCRIBE

4.5. UNSUBSCRIBE

If a CoAP pub/sub Broker allows clients to SUBSCRIBE to topics on the Broker, it MUST allow Clients to unsubscribe from topics on the Broker using the CoAP Cancel Observation operation. A CoAP pub/sub Client wishing to unsubscribe to a topic on a Broker MUST either use CoAP GET with Observe using an Observe parameter of 1 or send a CoAP Reset message in response to a publish, as per [RFC7641].

The UNSUBSCRIBE operation is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> Broker

Method: GET
Options: Observe:1

URI Template: {ps}/{topic}{?q*}

URI Template Variables: ps := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.

      topic := The desired topic to return links for (optional).

      q := Query Filter (optional). MAY contain a query filter list as per [RFC6690] Section 4.1.

The following response codes are defined for the UNSUBSCRIBE operation:

Success: 2.05 "Content". Successful unsubscribe, current value included

Success: 2.07 "No Content". Successful unsubscribe, value not included

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.01 "Unauthorized". Authorization failure.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found". Topic does not exist.

Figure 11 shows an example of a client unsubscribe using the Observe=1 cancellation method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Broker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>------ GET /ps/topic1 Observe:1 Token:XX ----&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;---------- 2.05 Content ---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Example of UNSUBSCRIBE

4.6. READ

A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY accept Read requests on a topic using the CoAP GET method if the content format of the request matches the content format the topic was created with. The Broker MUST return a response code of "2.05 Content" along with the most recently
published value if the topic contains a valid value and the Broker can supply the requested content format.

If the topic was published with the Max-Age option, the Broker MUST set the Max-Age option in the valid response to the amount of time remaining for the topic to be valid since the last publish. The Broker MUST return a response code of "2.07 No Content" if the Max-Age of the previously stored value has expired, or if the topic has not yet been published to.

The Broker MUST return a response code "4.04 Not Found" if the topic does not exist or has been removed. The Broker MUST return a response code "4.15 Unsupported Content Format" if the Broker can not return the requested content format.

The READ operation is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> Broker

Method: GET

URI Template: {+ps}/{+topic}

URI Template Variables:  ps := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.

                  topic := The desired topic to return links for (optional).

The following response codes are defined for the READ operation:

Success: 2.05 "Content". Successful READ, current value included

Success: 2.07 "No Content". Topic exists, value not included

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.01 "Unauthorized". Authorization failure.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found". Topic does not exist.

Failure: 4.15 "Unsupported Content Format". Unsupported content-format.

Figure 12 shows an example of a successful READ from topic1, followed by a Publish on the topic, followed at some time later by a read of the updated value from the recent Publish.
Figure 12: Example of READ

4.7. REMOVE

A CoAP pub/sub Broker MAY allow clients to remove topics from the Broker using the CoAP Delete method on the URI of the topic. The CoAP pub/sub Broker MUST return "2.02 Deleted" if the removal is successful. The Broker MUST return the appropriate 4.xx response code indicating the reason for failure if the topic can not be removed.

When a topic is removed for any reason, the Broker SHOULD remove all of the observers from the list of observers and return a final 4.04 "Not Found" response as per [RFC7641] Section 3.2. If a topic which has sub-topics is removed, then all of its sub-topics MUST be recursively removed.

The REMOVE operation is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> Broker

Method: DELETE

URI Template: {+ps}/{+topic}

URI Template Variables: ps := Pub/sub REST API entry point (optional). The entry point of the pub/sub REST API, as obtained from discovery, used to discover topics.

topic := The desired topic to return links for (optional).
The following response codes are defined for the REMOVE operation:

**Success:** 2.02 "Deleted". Successful remove

**Failure:** 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

**Failure:** 4.01 "Unauthorized". Authorization failure.

**Failure:** 4.04 "Not Found". Topic does not exist.

Figure 13 shows a successful remove of topic1.

```
Client                                 Broker
|------------- DELETE /ps/topic1 ---------->
<------------------ 2.02 Deleted ---------->
```

**Figure 13: Example of REMOVE**


A CoAP pub/sub Broker may register the base URI, which is the REST API entry point for a pub/sub service, with a Resource Directory. A pub/sub Client may use an RD to discover a pub/sub Broker.

A CoAP pub/sub Client may register links [RFC6690] with a Resource Directory to enable discovery of created pub/sub topics. A pub/sub Client may use an RD to discover pub/sub Topics. A client which registers pub/sub Topics with an RD MUST use the context relation (con) [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] to indicate that the context of the registered links is the pub/sub Broker.

A CoAP pub/sub Broker may alternatively register links to its topics to a Resource Directory by triggering the RD to retrieve it’s links from .well-known/core. In order to use this method, the links must first be exposed in the .well-known/core of the pub/sub Broker. See Section 4.1 in this document.

The pub/sub Broker triggers the RD to retrieve its links by sending a POST with an empty payload to the .well-known/core of the Resource
Directory. The RD server will then retrieve the links from the .well-known/core of the pub/sub Broker and incorporate them into the Resource Directory. See [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] for further details.

6. Sleep-Wake Operation

CoAP pub/sub provides a way for client nodes to sleep between operations, conserving energy during idle periods. This is made possible by shifting the server role to the Broker, allowing the Broker to be always-on and respond to requests from other clients while a particular client is sleeping.

For example, the Broker will retain the last state update received from a sleeping client, in order to supply the most recent state update to other clients in response to read and subscribe operations.

Likewise, the Broker will retain the last state update received on the topic such that a sleeping client, upon waking, can perform a read operation to the Broker to update its own state from the most recent system state update.

7. Simple Flow Control

Since the Broker node has to potentially send a large amount of notification messages for each publish message and it may be serving a large amount of subscribers and publishers simultaneously, the Broker may become overwhelmed if it receives many publish messages to popular topics in a short period of time.

If the Broker is unable to serve a certain client that is sending publish messages too fast, the Broker SHOULD respond with Response Code 4.29, "Too Many Requests" [I-D.keranen-core-too-many-reqs] and set the Max-Age Option to indicate the number of seconds after which the client can retry. The Broker MAY stop creating notifications from the publish messages from this client and to this topic for the indicated time.

If a client receives the 4.29 Response Code from the Broker for a publish message to a topic, it MUST NOT send new publish messages to the Broker on the same topic before the time indicated in Max-Age has passed.

8. Security Considerations

CoAP pub/sub re-uses CoAP [RFC7252], CoRE Resource Directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], and Web Linking [RFC5988] and therefore the security considerations of those documents also apply.
to this specification. Additionally, a CoAP pub/sub Broker and the clients SHOULD authenticate each other and enforce access control policies. A malicious client could subscribe to data it is not authorized to or mount a denial of service attack against the Broker by publishing a large number of resources. The authentication can be performed using the already standardized DTLS offered mechanisms, such as certificates. DTLS also allows communication security to be established to ensure integrity and confidentiality protection of the data exchanged between these relevant parties. Provisioning the necessary credentials, trust anchors and authorization policies is non-trivial and subject of ongoing work.

The use of a CoAP pub/sub Broker introduces challenges for the use of end-to-end security between for example a client device on a sensor network and a client application running in a cloud-based server infrastructure since Brokers terminate the exchange. While running separate DTLS sessions from the client device to the Broker and from Broker to client application protects confidentially on those paths, the client device does not know whether the commands coming from the Broker are actually coming from the client application. Similarly, a client application requesting data does not know whether the data originated on the client device. For scenarios where end-to-end security is desirable the use of application layer security is unavoidable. Application layer security would then provide a guarantee to the client device that any request originated at the client application. Similarly, integrity protected sensor data from a client device will also provide guarantee to the client application that the data originated on the client device itself. The protected data can also be verified by the intermediate Broker ensuring that it stores/caches correct request/response and no malicious messages/requests are accepted. The Broker would still be able to perform aggregation of data/requests collected.

Depending on the level of trust users and system designers place in the CoAP pub/sub Broker, the use of end-to-end object security is RECOMMENDED as described in [I-D.palombini-ace-coap-pubsub-profile]. When only end-to-end encryption is necessary and the CoAP Broker is trusted, Payload Only Protection (Mode:PAYL) could be used. The Publisher would wrap only the payload before sending it to the Broker and set the option Content-Format to application/smpayl. Upon receival, the Broker can read the unencrypted CoAP header to forward it to the subscribers.

9. IANA Considerations

This document registers one attribute value in the Resource Type (rt=) registry established with [RFC6690] and appends to the definition of one CoAP Response Code in the CoRE Parameters Registry.
9.1. Resource Type value ‘core.ps’
  o Attribute Value: core.ps
  o Description: Section 4 of [[This document]]
  o Reference: [[This document]]
  o Notes: None

9.2. Resource Type value ‘core.ps.discover’
  o Attribute Value: core.ps.discover
  o Description: Section 4 of [[This document]]
  o Reference: [[This document]]
  o Notes: None

9.3. Response Code value ‘2.07’
  o Response Code: 2.07
  o Description: No Content
  o Reference: [[This document]]
  o Notes: The server sends this code to the client to indicate that
    the request was valid and accepted, but the response may contain
    an empty payload. It is comparable to and may be proxied with the
    HTTP 204 No Content status code.

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    Sethi, Peter van der Stok, Tim Kellogg, Anders Eriksson, Goran
    Selander, Mikko Majanen, and Olaf Bergmann for their contributions
    and reviews.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[I-D.keranen-core-too-many-reqs]
Keranen, A., "Too Many Requests Response Code for the
Constrained Application Protocol", draft-keranen-core-too-
many-reqs-01 (work in progress), March 2018.


11.2. Informative References


[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988,

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Abstract

CoAP, the Constrained Application Protocol, needs to be implemented in such a way that it does not cause persistent congestion on the network it uses. The CoRE CoAP specification defines basic behavior that exhibits low risk of congestion with minimal implementation requirements. It also leaves room for combining the base specification with advanced congestion control mechanisms with higher performance.

This specification defines more advanced, but still simple CoRE Congestion Control mechanisms, called CoCoA. The core of these mechanisms is a Retransmission TimeOut (RTO) algorithm that makes use of Round-Trip Time (RTT) estimates, in contrast with how the RTO is determined as per the base CoAP specification (RFC 7252). The mechanisms defined in this document have relatively low complexity, yet they improve the default CoAP RTO algorithm. The design of the mechanisms in this specification has made use of input from simulations and experiments in real networks.

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Appendix D. Analysis: difference between strong and weak
1. Introduction

CoAP, the Constrained Application Protocol, needs to be implemented in such a way that it does not cause persistent congestion on the network it uses. The CoRE CoAP specification defines basic behavior that exhibits low risk of congestion with minimal implementation requirements. It also leaves room for combining the base specification with advanced congestion control mechanisms with higher performance.

The present specification defines such an advanced CoRE Congestion Control mechanism, with the goal of improving performance while retaining safety as well as the simplicity that is appropriate for constrained devices. Hence, we are calling this mechanism Simple Congestion Control/Advanced, or CoCoA for short.

CoCoA calculates the retransmission time-out (RTO) based on RTT estimations with and without loss. By taking retransmissions (in a potentially lossy network) into account when estimating the RTT, this algorithm reacts to congestion with a lower sending rate. For non-confirmable packets, it also limits the sending rate to 1/RTO; assuming that the RTO estimation in CoCoA works as expected, RTO should be slightly greater than the RTT, thus CoCoA would be more conservative than the original specification in [RFC7641].

In the Internet, congestion control is typically implemented in a way that it can be introduced or upgraded unilaterally. Still, a new congestion control scheme must not be introduced lightly. To ensure that the new scheme is not posing a danger to the network, considerable work has been done on simulations and experiments in real networks. Some of this work will be mentioned in "Discussion" subsections in the following sections; an overview is given in Appendix A. Extended rationale for this specification can also be found in the historical Internet-Drafts [I-D.bormann-core-congestion-control] and [I-D.eggert-core-congestion-control], as well as in the minutes of the IETF 84 CoRE WG meetings.

1.1. Terminology

This specification uses terms from [RFC7252]. In addition, it defines the following terminology:
Initiator: The endpoint that sends the message that initiates an exchange. E.g., the party that sends a confirmable message, or a non-confirmable message (see Section 4.3 of [RFC7252]) conveying a request.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The term "byte", abbreviated by "B", is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

2. Context

In the definition of the CoAP protocol [RFC7252], an approach was taken that includes a very simple basic scheme (lock-step with the number of parallel exchanges usually limited to 1) in the base specification together with performance-enhancing advanced mechanisms.

The present specification is based on the approved text in the [RFC7252] base specification. It is making use of the text that permits advanced congestion control mechanisms and allows them to change protocol parameters, including NSTART and the binary exponential backoff mechanism. Note that Section 4.8 of [RFC7252] limits the leeway that implementations have in changing the CoRE protocol parameters.

The present specification also assumes that, outside of exchanges, non-confirmable messages can only be used at a limited rate without an advanced congestion control mechanism (this is mainly relevant for [RFC7641]). It is also intended to address the [RFC8085] guideline about combining congestion control state for a destination; and to clarify its meaning for CoAP using the definition of an endpoint.

The present specification does not address multicast or dithering beyond basic retransmission dithering.

3. Area of Applicability

The present algorithm is intended to be generally applicable. The objective is to be "better" than default CoAP congestion control in a number of characteristics, including achievable goodput for a given offered load, latency, and recovery from bursts, while providing more predictable stress to the network and the same level of safety from catastrophic congestion. The algorithm defined in this document is
intended to adapt to the current characteristics of any underlying network, and therefore is well suited for a wide range of network conditions, in terms of bandwidth, latency, load, loss rate, topology, etc. In particular, CoCoA has been found to perform well in scenarios with latencies ranging from the order of milliseconds to peaks of dozens of seconds, as well as in single-hop and multihop topologies. Link technologies used in existing evaluation work comprise IEEE 802.15.4, GPRS, UMTS and Wi-Fi (see Appendix A). CoCoA is also expected to work suitably across the general Internet. The algorithm does require three state variables per scope plus the state needed to do RTT measurements, so it may not be applicable to the most constrained devices (say, class 1 as per [RFC7228]).

The scope of each instance of the algorithm in the current set of evaluations has been the five-tuple, i.e., CoAP + endpoint (transport address) for Initiator and Responder. Potential applicability to larger scopes needs to be examined.

4. Advanced CoAP Congestion Control: RTO Estimation

For an initiator that plans to make multiple requests to one destination endpoint, it may be worthwhile to make RTT measurements in order to compute a more appropriate RTO than the default initial timeout of 2 to 3 s. In particular, a wide spectrum of RTT values is expected in different types of networks where CoAP is used. Those RTTs range from several orders of magnitude below the default initial timeout to values larger than the default. The algorithm defined in this document is based on the algorithm for RTO estimation defined in [RFC6298], with appropriately extended default/base values, as proposed in Section 4.2.1. Note that such a mechanism must, during idle periods, decay RTO estimates that are shorter or longer than the default RTO estimate back to the default RTO estimate, until fresh measurements become available again, as proposed in Section 4.3.

RTT variability challenges RTO estimation. In TCP, delayed ACKs contribute to RTT variability, since this option adds a delay of up to 500 ms (typically, 200 ms) before an ACK is sent by a receiving TCP endpoint. However, one important consideration not relevant for TCP is the fact that a CoAP round-trip may include application processing time, which may be hard to predict, and may differ between different resources available at the same endpoint. Also, for communications with networks of constrained devices that apply radio duty cycling, large and variable round-trip times are likely to be observed. Servers will only trigger their early ACKs (with a non-piggybacked response to be sent later) based on the default timers, e.g. after 1 s. A client that has arrived at a RTO estimate shorter than 1 s SHOULD therefore use a larger backoff factor for retransmissions to avoid expending all of its retransmissions.
(MAX_RETRANSMIT, see Section 4.2 of [RFC7252], normally 4) in the default interval of 2 to 3 s. The approach chosen for a mechanism with variable backoff factors is presented in Section 4.2.1.

It may also be worthwhile to perform RTT estimation not just based on information measured from a single destination endpoint, but also based on entire hosts (IP addresses) and/or complete prefixes (e.g., maintain an RTT estimate for a whole /64). The exact way this can be used to reduce the amount of state in an initiator is for further study.

4.1. Blind RTO Estimate

The initial RTO estimate for an endpoint is set to 2 seconds (the initial RTO estimate is used as the initial value for both E_weak_ and E_strong_ below).

If only the initial RTO estimate is available, the RTO estimate for each of up to NSTART exchanges started in parallel is set to 2 s times the number of parallel exchanges, e.g. if two exchanges are already running, the initial RTO estimate for an additional exchange is 6 seconds.

4.2. Measurement-based RTO Estimate

The RTO estimator runs two copies of the algorithm defined in [RFC6298], using the same variables and calculations to estimate the RTO, with the differences introduced in Section 4.2.1: One copy for exchanges that complete on initial transmissions (the "strong estimator", E_strong_), and one copy for exchanges that have run into retransmissions, where only the first two retransmissions are considered (the "weak estimator", E_weak_). For the latter, there is some ambiguity whether a response is based on the initial transmission or the retransmissions. For the purposes of the weak estimator, the time from the initial transmission counts. Responses obtained after the third retransmission are not used to update an estimator.

The overall RTO estimate is an exponentially weighted moving average computed of the strong and the weak estimator, which is evolved after each contribution to the weak estimator (1) or to the strong estimator (2), from the estimator (either the weak or strong estimator) that made the most recent contribution:

\[
\text{RTO} := w_{\text{weak}} \times E_{\text{weak}} + (1 - w_{\text{weak}}) \times \text{RTO} \quad (1) \\
\text{RTO} := w_{\text{strong}} \times E_{\text{strong}} + (1 - w_{\text{strong}}) \times \text{RTO} \quad (2)
\]
(Splitting this update into the two cases avoids making the contribution of the weak estimator too big in naturally lossy networks.)

The default values for the corresponding weights, $w_{\text{weak}}$ and $w_{\text{strong}}$, are 0.25 and 0.5, respectively. These values have been found to offer good performance in evaluations (see Appendix A). Pseudocode and examples for the overall RTO estimate presented are available in Appendix B.1 and Appendix C.1.

4.2.1. Differences with the algorithm of RFC 6298

This subsection presents three differences of the algorithm defined in this document with the one defined in [RFC6298]. The first two recommend new parameter settings. The third one is the variable backoff factor (VBF), which replaces RFC6298's simple exponential backoff that always multiplies the RTO by a factor of 2 when the RTO timer expires.

The initial value for each of the two RTO estimators is 2 s.

For the weak estimator, the factor $K$ (the RTT variance multiplier) is set to 1 instead of 4. This is necessary to avoid a strong increase of the RTO in the case that the RTTVAR value is very large, which may be the case if a weak RTT measurement is obtained after one or more retransmissions.

In order to avoid that exchanges with small initial RTOs (i.e. RTO estimate lower than 1 s) use up all retransmissions in a short interval of time, the RTO for a retransmission is multiplied by 3 for each retransmission as long as the RTO is less than 1 s.

On the other hand, to avoid exchanges with large initial RTOs (i.e., RTO estimate greater than 3 s) not being able to carry out all retransmissions within MAX_TRANSMIT_WAIT (normally 93 s), the RTO is multiplied only by 1.5 when RTO is greater than 3 s.

Pseudocode for the variable backoff factor is in Appendix B.3.

The binary exponential backoff is truncated at 32 seconds. Similar to the way retransmissions are handled in the base specification, they are dithered between 1 x RTO and ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR x RTO.

4.2.2. Discussion

In contrast to [RFC6298], this algorithm attempts to make use of ambiguous information from retransmissions. This is motivated by the high non-congestion loss rates expected in constrained node networks,
and the need to update the RTO estimators even in the presence of loss. This approach appears to contravene the mandate in Section 3.1.1 of [RFC8085] that "latency samples MUST NOT be derived from ambiguous transactions". However, those samples are not simply combined into the strong estimator, but are used to correct the limited knowledge that can be gained from the strong RTT measurements by employing an additional weak estimator. In fact, the weak estimator allows to better update the RTO estimator when mostly weak RTTs are available, either due to the lossy nature of links or due to congestion-induced losses. In the presence of the latter, and compared to a strong-only estimator (w\_weak=0), spurious timeouts are avoided and the rate of retries is reduced, which allows to decrease congestion. Evidence that has been collected from experiments appears to support that the overall effect of using this data in the way described is beneficial (Appendix A).

Some evaluation has been done on earlier versions of this specification [Betzler2013]. A more recent (and more comprehensive) reference is [Betzler2015].

4.3. Lifetime, Aging

The state of the RTO estimators for an endpoint SHOULD be kept as long as possible. If other state is kept for the endpoint (such as a DTLS connection), it is very strongly RECOMMENDED to keep the RTO state alive at least as long as this other state. In the absence of such other state, the RTO state SHOULD be kept at least long enough to avoid frequent returns to inappropriate initial values. For the default parameter set of Section 4.8 of [RFC7252], it is strongly RECOMMENDED to keep it for at least 255 s.

If an estimator has a value that is lower than 1 s, and it is left without further update for 16 times its current value, the RTO estimate is doubled. If an estimator has a value that is higher than 3 s, and it is left without further update for 4 times its current value, the RTO estimate is set to be

\[
RTO := 1 \text{ s} + (0.5 \times RTO)
\]

(Note that, instead of running a timer, it is possible to implement these RTO aging calculations cumulatively at the time the estimator is used next.)

Pseudocode and examples for the aging mechanism presented are available in Appendix B.2 and in Appendix C.2.)
5. Advanced CoAP Congestion Control: Non-Confirmables

A CoAP endpoint MUST NOT send non-confirmables to another CoAP endpoint at a rate higher than defined by this document. Independent of any congestion control mechanisms, a CoAP endpoint can always send non-confirmables if their rate does not exceed 1 B/s.

Non-confirmables that form part of exchanges are governed by the rules for exchanges.

Non-confirmables outside exchanges (e.g., [RFC7641] notifications sent as non-confirmables) are governed by the following rules:

1. Of any 16 consecutive messages towards this endpoint that aren’t responses or acknowledgments, at least 2 of the messages must be confirmable.
2. An RTO as specified in Section 4 must be used for confirmable messages.
3. The packet rate of non-confirmable messages cannot exceed 1/RTO, where RTO is the overall RTO estimator value at the time the non-confirmable packet is sent.

5.1. Discussion

The mechanism defined above for non-confirmables is relatively conservative. More advanced versions of this algorithm could run a TFRC-style Loss Event Rate calculator [RFC5348] and apply the TCP equation to achieve a higher rate than 1/RTO.

[RFC7641], Section 4.5.1, specifies that the rate of Non-Confirmables SHOULD NOT exceed 1/RTT on average, if the server can maintain an RTT estimate for a client. CoCoA limits the packet rate of Non-Confirmables in this situation to 1/RTO. Assuming that the RTO estimation in CoCoA works as expected, RTO[k] should be slightly greater than the RTT[k], thus CoCoA would be more conservative. The expectation therefore is that complying with the NON rate set by CoCoA leads to complying with [RFC7641].

6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requirements on IANA. (This section to be removed by RFC editor.)
The security considerations of, e.g., [RFC5681], [RFC2914], and [RFC8085] apply. Some issues are already discussed in the security considerations of [RFC7252].

If a malicious node manages to prevent the delivery of some packets, a consequence will be an RTO increase, which will further reduce network performance. Note that this type of attack is not specific for CoCoA (and not even specific for CoAP), and many congestion control algorithms increase the RTO upon packet loss detection. While it is hard to prevent radio jamming, some mitigation for other forms of this type of attack is provided by network access control techniques. Also, the weak estimator in CoCoA increases the chances of obtaining RTT measurements in the presence of heavy packet losses, allowing to keep the RTO updated, which in turn allows recovery from a jamming attack in reasonable time.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References

[Betzler2013]

[Betzler2015]

[I-D.bormann-core-congestion-control]

[I-D.eggert-core-congestion-control]


Appendix A. Supporting evidence

(Editor’s note: The references local to this appendix may need to be merged with those from the specification proper, depending on the discretion of the RFC editor.)
CoCoA has been evaluated by means of simulation and experimentation in diverse scenarios comprising different link layer technologies, network topologies, traffic patterns and device classes. The main overall evaluation result is that CoCoA consistently delivers a performance which is better than, or at least similar to, that of default CoAP congestion control. While the latter is insensitive to network conditions, CoCoA is adaptive and makes good use of RTT samples.

It has been shown over real GPRS and IEEE 802.15.4 mesh network testbeds that in these settings, in comparison to default CoAP, CoCoA increases throughput and reduces the time it takes for a network to process traffic bursts, while not sacrificing fairness. In contrast, other RTT-sensitive approaches such as Linux-RTO or Peak-Hopper-RTO may be too simple or do not adapt well to IoT scenarios, underperforming default CoAP under certain conditions [1]. On the other hand, CoCoA has been found to reduce latency in GPRS and WiFi setups, compared with default CoAP [2].

CoCoA performance has also been evaluated for non-confirmable traffic over emulated GPRS/UMTS links and over a real IEEE 802.15.4 mesh testbed. Results show that since CoCoA is adaptive, it yields better packet delivery ratio than default CoAP (which does not apply congestion control to non-confirmable messages) or Observe (which introduces congestion control that is not adaptive to network conditions) [3, 4].

A.1. Older versions of the draft and improvement

CoCoA has evolved since its initial draft version. Its core has remained mostly stable since draft-bormann-core-cocoa-02. The evolution of CoCoA has been driven by research work. This process, including evaluations of early versions of CoCoA, as well as improvement proposals that were finally incorporated in CoCoA, is reflected in published works [5-10].

A.2. References


B.1. Updating the RTO estimator
// Default values
ALPHA = 0.125 // RFC 6298
BETA = 0.25 // RFC 6298
W_STRONG = 0.5
W_WEAK = 0.25

updateRTO(retransmissions, RTT) {
  if (retransmissions == 0) {
    RTTVAR_strong = (1 - BETA) * RTTVAR_strong + BETA * (RTT_strong - RTT);
    RTT_strong = (1 - ALPHA) * RTT_strong + ALPHA * RTT;
    E_strong = RTT_strong + 4 * RTTVAR_strong;
    RTO = W_STRONG * E_strong + (1 - W_STRONG) * RTO;
  } else if (retransmissions <= 2) {
    RTTVAR_weak = (1 - BETA) * RTTVAR_weak + BETA * (RTT_weak - RTT);
    RTT_weak = (1 - ALPHA) * RTT_weak + ALPHA * RTT;
    E_weak = RTT_weak + 1 * RTTVAR_weak;
    RTO = W_WEAK * E_weak + (1 - W_WEAK) * RTO
  }
}

B.2. RTO aging

checkAging() {
  clock_time difference = getCurrentTime() - lastUpdatedTime;

  if ((RTO < 1s) && (difference > (16 * RTO))) {
    RTO = 2 * RTO;
    lastUpdatedTime = getCurrentTime();
  } else if ((RTO > 3s) && (difference > (4 * RTO))) {
    RTO = 1s + 0.5 * RTO;
    lastUpdatedTime = getCurrentTime();
  }
}

B.3. Variable Backoff Factor

backOffRTO() {
  if (RTO < 1s) {
    RTO = RTO * 3;
  } else if (RTO > 3s) {
    RTO = RTO * 1.5;
  } else {
    RTO = RTO * 2;
  }
}
Appendix C. Examples

C.1. Example A.1: weak RTTs

A large network of sensor nodes that report periodical measurements is operating normally, without congestion. The nodes transmit their sensor readings via CON messages every 20 s in an asynchronous way towards a server located behind a gateway, obtaining strong RTT measurements (RTT 1.1 s, RTTVAR 0.1 s) that lead to the calculation of an RTO of 1.5 s (in average) in each node. In this mode of operation, no aging is applied, since the RTO is refreshed before the aging mechanism applies.

Suddenly, upon detection of a global event, the majority of sensor nodes start transmitting at a higher rate (every 5 s) to increase the resolution of the acquired data, which creates heavy congestion that leads to packet losses and an important increase of real RTT between the nodes and the server (RTT 2 s, RTTVAR 1 s). Due to the packet losses and spurious retransmissions (which can fuel congestion even more), many nodes are not able to update their RTO via strong RTT measurements, but they are able to obtain weak RTT measurements. A node with an initial RTO of 1.5 s would run into a retransmission, before obtaining an ACK (given the RTT of 2 s and that the ACK is not lost).

This weak RTT measurement would increase the overall RTO of the node to 1.875 s (RTO = 0.25 * 3 s + 0.75 * 1.5 s). Following the same calculus (and RTT/RTTVAR values), after obtaining another weak RTT, the RTO would increase to 2.156 s. At this point, the benefits of the weak RTT measurements are twofold:

1. Further spurious retransmissions are avoided as the RTO has increased above the real RTT.

2. The increase of RTOs across the whole network reduces the rate with which retransmissions are generated, decreasing the network congestion (which leads to an RTT and packet loss decrease).

C.2. Example A.2: VBF and aging

Assuming that the frequency of message generation is even higher (every 3 s) and the real RTT would further increase due to congestion, the RTO at some point would increase to 4 s. Since now the RTO is above 3 s, no longer a binary backoff is used to avoid the RTO growing too much in case of retransmissions. As the generation of data from the nodes ceases at some point (the network returns to a normal state), the aging mechanism would reduce the RTO automatically...
(with an RTO of 4 s, after 16 s the RTO would be shifted to 3 s before a new RTT is measured).

C.3. Example B: VBF and aging

A network of nodes connected over 4G with an Internet service is calculating very small RTO values (0.3 s) and the nodes are transmitting CON messages every 1 s. Suddenly, the connection quality gets worse and the nodes switch to a more stable, yet slower connection via GPRS. As a result of this change, the nodes run into retransmissions, as the real RTT has increased above the calculated RTO.

Since the RTO is below 1 s, the Variable Backoff Factor increases the backoff values quickly to avoid spurious retransmissions (0.9 s first retry, 2.7 s second retry, etc.). Further, if due to the packet losses and increased delays in the network no new RTT measurements are obtained, the aging mechanism automatically increases the RTO (doubling it) after 3.8 s (16 * 0.3 s) to adapt better to the sudden changes of network conditions. Without the Variable Backoff Factor and the aging mechanism, the number of spurious retransmissions would be much higher and the RTO would be corrected more slowly.

Appendix D. Analysis: difference between strong and weak estimators

This section analyzes the difference between the strong and weak RTO estimators. If there is no congestion, assume a static RTT of \( R' \).

Then, \( E_{\text{strong}} \) can be expressed as:

\[
E_{\text{strong}} = R' + G,
\]

since RTTVAR is reduced constantly by RTTVAR = RTTVAR * 3/4 (according to [RFC6298], and SRTT=\( R' \)), \( G \) would be dominant term in the max(\( G \), \( K \times RTTVAR \)) expression in the long run.

For the weak estimator: assume that the RTO setting converges to \( E_{\text{strong}} \) calculated above in the long run. If there is a packet loss, and an RTT is obtained for the first retransmission, then the weak RTT sample obtained by the weak estimator is:

\[
RW' = R' + G + R'
\]

Therefore, \( E_{\text{weak}} \) can be expressed as:

\[
E_{\text{weak}} = RW' + \max(G, RW'/2) = 3 \times R'
\]
Acknowledgements

The first document to examine CoAP congestion control issues in detail was [I-D.eggert-core-congestion-control], to which this draft owes a lot.

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CoAP Management Interface
draft-ietf-core-comi-03

Abstract

This document describes a network management interface for constrained devices and networks, called CoAP Management Interface (CoMI). The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is used to access datastore and data node resources specified in YANG, or SMIv2 converted to YANG. CoMI uses the YANG to CBOR mapping and converts YANG identifier strings to numeric identifiers for payload size reduction. CoMI extends the set of YANG based protocols, NETCONF and RESTCONF, with the capability to manage constrained devices and networks.

Note

Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested, and should be sent to core@ietf.org.

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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is designed for Machine to Machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy, smart city and building control. Constrained devices need to be managed in an automatic fashion to handle the large quantities of devices that are expected in future installations. Messages between devices need to be as small and infrequent as possible. The implementation complexity and runtime resources need to be as small as possible.

This draft describes the CoAP Management Interface which uses CoAP methods to access structured data defined in YANG [RFC7950]. This draft is complementary to [RFC8040] which describes a REST-like interface called RESTCONF, which uses HTTP methods to access structured data defined in YANG.

The use of standardized data models specified in a standardized language, such as YANG, promotes interoperability between devices and applications from different manufacturers.

CoMI and RESTCONF are intended to work in a stateless client-server fashion. They use a single round-trip to complete a single editing transaction, where NETCONF needs up to 10 round trips.
To promote small messages, CoMI uses a YANG to CBOR mapping [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] and numeric identifiers [I-D.ietf-core-sid] to minimize CBOR payloads and URI length.

+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| WARNING:                                                          |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Mapping between data nodes and CoAP resources should be extended  |
| in order to support the "Network Management Datastore             |
| Architecture" (NMDA) [RFC8342] and [RFC8342] and the YANG Schema |
| Mount [I-D.ietf-netmod-schema-mount].                              |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The following terms are defined in the YANG data modelling language [RFC7950]: action, anydata, anyxml, client, configuration data, container, data model, data node, datastore, identity, instance identifier, key, key leaf, leaf, leaf-list, list, module, RPC, schema node, server, state data, submodule.

The following term is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]: YANG schema item identifier (SID).

The following terms are defined in the CoAP protocol [RFC7252]: Confirmable Message, Content-Format.

The following terms are defined in this document:

data node resource:  a CoAP resource that models a YANG data node.

datastore resource:  a CoAP resource that models a YANG datastore.

event stream resource:  a CoAP resource used by clients to observe YANG notifications.

target resource: the resource that is associated with a particular CoAP request, identified by the request URI.

data node instance: An instance of a data node specified in a YANG module and stored in the server.

notification instance: An instance of a schema node of type notification, specified in a YANG module implemented by the
server. The instance is generated in the server at the occurrence of the corresponding event and reported by an event stream.

list instance identifier: Handle used to identify a YANG data node that is an instance of a YANG "list" specified with the values of the key leaves of the list.

single instance identifier: Handle used to identify a specific data node which can be instantiated only once. This includes data nodes defined at the root of a YANG module or data nodes defined within a container. This excludes data nodes defined within a list or any children of these data nodes.

instance identifier: List instance identifier or single instance identifier.

data node value: The value assigned to a data node instance. Data node values are serialized into the payload according to the rules defined in section 4 of [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor].

2. CoMI Architecture

This section describes the CoMI architecture to use CoAP for reading and modifying the content of datastore(s) used for the management of the instrumented node.
Figure 1 is a high-level representation of the main elements of the CoMI management architecture. The different numbered components of Figure 1 are discussed according to component number.

(1) YANG specification: contains a set of named and versioned modules.

(2) SMIv2 specification: A named module specifies a set of variables and "conceptual tables". There is an algorithm to translate SMIv2 specifications to YANG specifications.

(3) CoAP request/response messages: The CoMI client sends request messages to and receives response messages from the CoMI server.

(4) Request, Indication, Response, Confirm: The processes performed by the CoMI clients and servers.

(5) Datastore: A resource used to access configuration data, state data, RPCs and actions. A CoMI server may support multiple datastores to support more complex operations such as configuration rollback, scheduled update.

(6) Event stream: An observable resource used to get real time notifications. A CoMI server may support multiple Event streams.
serving different purposes such as normal monitoring, diagnostic, syslog, security monitoring.

(7) Security: The server MUST prevent unauthorized users from reading or writing any CoMI resources. CoMI relies on security protocols such as DTLS [RFC6347] to secure CoAP communication.

2.1. Major differences between RESTCONF and CoMI

CoMI is a RESTful protocol for small devices where saving bytes to transport counts. Contrary to RESTCONF, many design decisions are motivated by the saving of bytes. Consequently, CoMI is not a RESTCONF over CoAP protocol, but differs more significantly from RESTCONF. Some major differences are cited below:

- CoMI uses CoAP/UDP as transport protocol and CBOR as payload format [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]. RESTCONF uses HTTP/TCP as transport protocol and JSON [RFC7159] or XML [XML] as payload formats.

- CoMI encodes YANG identifier strings as numbers, where RESTCONF does not.

- CoMI uses the methods FETCH and iPATCH, not used by RESTCONF. RESTCONF uses the HTTP methods HEAD, and OPTIONS, which are not used by CoMI.

- CoMI does not support "insert" query parameter (first, last, before, after) and the "point" query parameter which are supported by RESTCONF.

- CoMI does not support the "start-time" and "stop-time" query parameters to retrieve past notifications.

- CoMI and RESTCONF also differ in the handling of:
  * notifications.
  * default values.

2.2. Compression of YANG identifiers

In the YANG specification, items are identified with a name string. In order to significantly reduce the size of identifiers used in CoMI, numeric identifiers are used instead of these strings. YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID) is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 2.1.
When used in a URI, SIDs are encoded in base64 using the URL and Filename safe alphabet as defined by [RFC4648] section 5. The last 6 bits encoded is always aligned with the least significant 6 bits of the SID represented using an unsigned integer. ‘A’ characters (value 0) at the start of the resulting string are removed.

\[
\text{SID in base64} = \text{URLsafeChar}[\text{SID} >> 60 & 0x3F] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 54 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 48 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 42 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 36 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 30 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 24 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 18 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 12 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} >> 6 & 0x3F)] | \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[(\text{SID} & 0x3F)]
\]

For example, SID 1721 is encoded as follow.

\[
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 60 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 54 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 48 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 42 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 36 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 30 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 24 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 18 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[0] = 'A' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 >> 12 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[26] = 'a' \\
\text{URLsafeChar}[1721 & 0x3F] = \text{URLsafeChar}[57] = '5'
\]

The resulting base64 representation of SID 1721 is "a5"

2.3. Instance identifier

Instance identifiers are used to uniquely identify data node instances within a datastore. This YANG built-in type is defined in [RFC7950] section 9.13. An instance identifier is composed of the data node identifier (i.e. a SID) and for data nodes within list(s) the keys used to index within these list(s).

When part of a payload, instance identifiers are encoded in CBOR based on the rules defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 5.13.1. When part of a URI, the SID is appended to the URI of the targeted datastore, the keys are specified using the ‘k’ URI-Query as defined in Section 5.1.
2.4. CBOR ordered map schematic

An ordered map is used as a root container of the application/yang-tree+cbor Content-Format. This datatype share the same functionalities as a CBOR map without the following limitations:

- The ordering of the pairs of data items is preserved from serialization to deserialization.
- Duplicate keys are allowed

This schematic is constructed using a CBOR array comprising pairs of data items, each pair consisting of a key that is immediately followed by a value. Unlike a CBOR map for which the length denotes the number of pairs, the length of the ordered map denotes the number of items (i.e. number of keys plus number of values).

The use of this schematic can be inferred from its context or by the presence of a preceding tag. The tag assigned to the Ordered map is defined in Section 11.4.

In the case of CoMI, the use of the ordered map as the root container of the application/yang-tree+cbor Content-Format is inferred, the Ordered map tag is not used.

2.5. Content-Formats

CoMI uses Content-Formats based on the YANG to CBOR mapping specified in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]. All Content-Formats defined hereafter are constructed using one or both of these constructs:

- YANG data node value, encoded based on the rules defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 4.

The following Content-formats are defined:

application/yang-value+cbor: represents a CBOR YANG document containing one YANG data node value. The YANG data node instance can be a leaf, a container, a list, a list instance, a RPC input, a RPC output, an action input, an action output, a leaf-list, an anydata or an anyxml. The CBOR encoding for each of these YANG data node instances are defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 4.

FORMAT: data-node-value
DELTA ENCODING: SIDs included in a YANG container, a list instance, a RPC input, a RPC output, an action input, an actions output and an anydata are encoded using a delta value equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the parent. The parent SID of root data nodes is defined by the URI carried in the associated request (i.e. GET, PUT, POST).

application/yang-values+cbor: represents a YANG document containing a list of data node values.

FORMAT: CBOR array of data-node-value

DELTA ENCODING: SIDs included in a YANG container, a list instance and an anydata are encoded using a delta value equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the parent. The parent SID of root data nodes is defined by the corresponding instance-identifier carried in the FETCH request.

application/yang-tree+cbor: represents a CBOR YANG document containing a YANG data tree.

FORMAT: ordered map of single-instance-identifier, data-node-value

DELTA ENCODING: The SID part of the first instance-identifier within the ordered map is encoded using its absolute value. Subsequent instance-identifiers are encoded using a delta value equal to the SID of the current instance-identifiers minus the SID of the previous instance-identifier.

application/yang-selectors+cbor: represents a CBOR YANG document containing a list of data node selectors (i.e. instance identifier).

FORMAT: CBOR array of instance-identifier

DELTA ENCODING: The SID part of the first instance-identifier within the CBOR array is encoded using its absolute value. Subsequent instance-identifiers are encoded using a delta value equal to the SID of the current instance-identifiers minus the SID of the previous instance-identifier.

application/yang-patch+cbor: represents a CBOR YANG document containing a list of data nodes to be replaced, created, or deleted.

For each data node instance, D, for which the instance identifier is the same as for a data node instance, I, in the targeted resource: the data node value of D replaces the data node value of
I. When the data node value of D is null, the data node instance I is removed. When the targeted resource does not contain a data node instance with the same instance identifier as D, a new data node instance is created in the targeted resource with the same instance identifier and data node value as D.

FORMAT: ordered map of instance-identifier, data-node-value

DELTA ENCODING: Same as Content-Format application/yang-tree+cbor

The different Content-formats usage is summarized in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Content-Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET response</td>
<td>data node</td>
<td>/application/yang-value+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT request</td>
<td>data node</td>
<td>/application/yang-value+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST request</td>
<td>data node</td>
<td>/application/yang-value+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>data node</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GET response</td>
<td>datastore</td>
<td>/application/yang-tree+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT request</td>
<td>datastore</td>
<td>/application/yang-tree+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST request</td>
<td>datastore</td>
<td>/application/yang-tree+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FETCH request</td>
<td>datastore</td>
<td>/application/yang-selectors+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FETCH response</td>
<td>datastore</td>
<td>/application/yang-values+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iPATCH request</td>
<td>datastore</td>
<td>/application/yang-patch+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GET response</td>
<td>event stream</td>
<td>/application/yang-tree+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST request</td>
<td>rpc, action</td>
<td>/application/yang-value+cbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST response</td>
<td>rpc, action</td>
<td>/application/yang-value+cbor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Example syntax

This section presents the notation used for the examples. The YANG modules that are used throughout this document are shown in Appendix C. The example modules are copied from existing modules and
annotated with SIDs. The values of the SIDs are taken over from [yang-cbor].

CBOR is used to encode CoMI request and response payloads. The CBOR syntax of the YANG payloads is specified in [RFC7049]. The payload examples are notated in Diagnostic notation (defined in section 6 of [RFC7049]) that can be automatically converted to CBOR.

SIDs in URIs are represented as a base64 number, SIDs in the payload are represented as decimal numbers.

4. CoAP Interface

The format of the links is specified in [I-D.ietf-core-interfaces]. This note specifies a Management Collection Interface. CoMI endpoints that implement the CoMI management protocol, support at least one discoverable management resource of resource type (rt): core.c.datastore, with example path: /c, where c is short-hand for CoMI. The path /c is recommended but not compulsory (see Section 8).

Three CoMI resources are accessible with the following three example paths:

/c: Datastore resource with path "/c" and using CBOR content encoding format. Sub-resources of format /c/instance-identifier may be available to access directly each data node resource for this datastore.

/mod.uri: URI identifying the location of the YANG module library used by this server, with path "/mod.uri" and Content-Format "text/plain; charset=utf-8". An ETag MUST be maintained for this resource by the server, which MUST be changed to a new value when the set of YANG modules in use by the server changes.

/s: Event stream resource to which YANG notification instances are reported. Notification support is optional, so this resource will not exist if the server does not support any notifications.

The mapping of YANG data node instances to CoMI resources is as follows. Every data node of the YANG modules loaded in the CoMI server represents a sub-resource of the datastore resource (e.g. /c/instance-identifier).

When multiple instances of a list exist, instance selection is possible as described in Section 5.1, Section 5.2.4, and Section 5.2.3.1.
The description of the management collection interface, with if=core.c, is shown in the table below, following the guidelines of [I-D.ietf-core-interfaces]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Recommended path</th>
<th>rt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Datastore</td>
<td>/c</td>
<td>core.c.datastore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data node</td>
<td>/c/instance-identifier</td>
<td>core.c.datanode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YANG module library</td>
<td>/mod.uri</td>
<td>core.c.moduri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event stream</td>
<td>/s</td>
<td>core.c.eventstream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The path values are example values. On discovery, the server makes the actual path values known for these four resources.

5. CoMI Collection Interface

The CoMI Collection Interface provides a CoAP interface to manage YANG servers.

The methods used by CoMI are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>Retrieve the datastore resource or a data node resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FETCH</td>
<td>Retrieve specific data nodes within a datastore resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>Create a datastore resource or a data node resource, invoke an RPC or action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Create or replace a datastore resource or a data node resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iPATCH</td>
<td>Idem-potently create, replace, and delete data node resource(s) within a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>datastore resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>Delete a datastore resource or a data node resource</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is one Uri-Query option for the GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE methods.

+-----------------+----------------------------------------+
| Uri-Query option | Description                            |
+-----------------+----------------------------------------+
| k               | Select an instance within YANG list(s) |
+-----------------+----------------------------------------+

This parameter is not used for FETCH and iPATCH, because their request payloads support list instance selection.

5.1. Using the ‘k’ Uri-Query option

The "k" (key) parameter specifies a specific instance of a data node. The SID in the URI is followed by the (?k=key1, key2,..). Where SID identifies a data node, and key1, key2 are the values of the key leaves that specify an instance. Lists can have multiple keys, and lists can be part of lists. The order of key value generation is given recursively by:

- For a given list, if a parent data node is a list, generate the keys for the parent list first.
- For a given list, generate key values in the order specified in the YANG module.

Key values are encoded using the rules defined in the following table.
In this table:

- The method `int2str()` is used to convert an integer value to a string. For example, `int2str(0x0123)` returns the string "291".

- The method `urlSafeBase64()` is used to convert a binary string to base64 using the URL and Filename safe alphabet as defined by [RFC4648] section 5. For example, `urlSafeBase64(\xF9\x56\xA1\x3C)` returns the string "-VahPA".

- The method `CBORencode()` is used to convert a YANG value to CBOR as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 5, item 8.

The resulting key string is encoded in a Uri-Query as specified in [RFC7252] section 6.5.

### 5.2. Data Retrieval

One or more data nodes can be retrieved by the client. The operation is mapped to the GET method defined in section 5.8.1 of [RFC7252] and to the FETCH method defined in section 2 of [RFC8132].
It is possible that the size of the payload is too large to fit in a single message. In the case that management data is bigger than the maximum supported payload size, the Block mechanism from [RFC7959] may be used, as explained in more detail in Section 7.

There are two additional Uri-Query options for the GET and FETCH methods.

+-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Uri-Query   | Description                                         |
| option      |                                                     |
+-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| c           | Control selection of configuration and non-configuration data nodes (GET and FETCH) |
| d           | Control retrieval of default values.                 |
+-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+

5.2.1. Using the 'c' Uri-Query option

The 'c' (content) parameter controls how descendant nodes of the requested data nodes will be processed in the reply.

The allowed values are:

+----------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Value | Description                                         |
+----------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| c     | Return only configuration descendant data nodes     |
| n     | Return only non-configuration descendant data nodes  |
| a     | Return all descendant data nodes                    |
+----------------+-----------------------------------------------------+

This parameter is only allowed for GET and FETCH methods on datastore and data node resources. A 4.02 (Bad Option) error is returned if used for other methods or resource types.

If this Uri-Query option is not present, the default value is "a".

5.2.2. Using the 'd' Uri-Query option

The "d" (with-defaults) parameter controls how the default values of the descendant nodes of the requested data nodes will be processed.

The allowed values are:
### Value Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>All data nodes are reported. Defined as ‘report-all’ in section 3.1 of [RFC6243].</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>Data nodes set to the YANG default are not reported. Defined as ‘trim’ in section 3.2 of [RFC6243].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the target of a GET or FETCH method is a data node that represents a leaf that has a default value, and the leaf has not been given a value by any client yet, the server MUST return the default value of the leaf.

If the target of a GET method is a data node that represents a container or list that has child resources with default values, and these have not been given value yet,

- The server MUST not return the child resource if d= ‘t’
- The server MUST return the child resource if d= ‘a’.

If this Uri-Query option is not present, the default value is ‘t’.

#### 5.2.3. GET

A request to read the values of a data node instance is sent with a confirmable CoAP GET message. An instance identifier is specified in the URI path prefixed with the example path /c.

**FORMAT:**

```
GET /c/instance-identifier
```

```
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)
data-node-value
```

The returned payload contains the CBOR encoding of the specified data node instance value.

#### 5.2.3.1. GET Examples

Using for example the current-datetime leaf from Appendix C.1, a request is sent to retrieve the value of system-state-clock/current-datetime specified in container system-state. The SID of system-state-clock/current-datetime is 1723, encoded in octal 3273, yields two 6 bit decimal numbers 32 and 73, encoded in base64, (according to table 2 of [RFC4648]) yields a7. The response to the request returns...
the CBOR encoding of this leaf of type 'string' as defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 5.4.

REQ: GET example.com/c/a3

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)
"2014-10-26T12:16:31Z"

The next example represents the retrieval of a YANG container. In this case, the CoMI client performs a GET request on the clock container (SID = 1721; base64: a5). The container returned is encoded using a CBOR map as specified by [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 4.2.

REQ: GET example.com/c/a5

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)
{
  +1 : "2014-10-21T03:00:00Z"    / boot-datetime SID 1722 /
}

This example shows the retrieval of the /interfaces/interface YANG list accessed using SID 1533 (base64: X9). The return payload is encoded using a CBOR array as specified by [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 4.4.1 containing 2 instances.

REQ: GET example.com/c/X9

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)
[
  {
    +4 : "eth0",                / name  (SID 1537) /
    +1 : "Ethernet adaptor",   / description (SID 1534) /
    +5 : 1880,                  / type, (SID 1538) identity /
    / ethernetCsmacd (SID 1880) /
    +2 : true                   / enabled (SID 1535) /
  },
  {
    +4 : "eth1",                / name  (SID 1537) /
    +1 : "Ethernet adaptor",   / description (SID 1534) /
    +5 : 1880,                  / type, (SID 1538) identity /
    / ethernetCsmacd (SID 1880) /
    +2 : false                  / enabled /
  }
]
It is equally possible to select a leaf of a specific instance of a list. The example below requests the description leaf (SID=1534, base64: X-) within the interface list corresponding to the list key "eth0". The returned value is encoded in CBOR based on the rules specified by [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 5.4.

REQ: GET example.com/c/X-?k="eth0"

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)
"Ethernet adaptor"

5.2.4. FETCH

The FETCH is used to retrieve multiple data node values. The FETCH request payload contains a list of instance-identifier encoded based on the rules defined by Content-Format application/yang-selectors+cbor in Section 2.5. The return response payload contains a list of values encoded based on the rules defined by Content-Format application/yang-values+cbor in Section 2.5. A value MUST be returned for each instance-identifier specified in the request. A CBOR null is returned for each data node requested by the client, not supported by the server or not currently instantiated.

FORMAT:
- FETCH /c (Content-Format :application/yang-selectors+cbor)
  CBOR array of instance-identifier

2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-values+cbor)
  CBOR array of data-node-value

5.2.4.1. FETCH examples

The example uses the current-datetime leaf and the interface list from Appendix C.1. In the following example the value of current-datetime (SID 1723 and the interface list (SID 1533) instance identified with name="eth0" are queried.
REQ: FETCH /c (Content-Format :application/yang-selectors+cbor)
[ 
  1723,       / current-datetime SID 1723 /
  [-190, "eth0"] / interface SID 1533 with name = "eth0" /
]

RES:  2.05 Content (Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
[ 
  { 
    +4 : "eth0",                / name (SID 1537) /
    +1 : "Ethernet adaptor",   / description (SID 1534) /
    +5 : 1880,                  / type (SID 1538), identity /
    / ethernetCsmacd (SID 1880) /
    +2 : true                   / enabled (SID 1535) /
  }
]

5.3. Data Editing

CoMI allows datastore contents to be created, modified and deleted using CoAP methods.

5.3.1. Data Ordering

A CoMI server SHOULD preserve the relative order of all user-ordered list and leaf-list entries that are received in a single edit request. These YANG data node types are encoded as CBOR arrays so messages will preserve their order.

5.3.2. POST

The CoAP POST operation is used in CoMI for creation of data node resources and the invocation of "ACTION" and "RPC" resources. Refer to Section 5.6 for details on "ACTION" and "RPC" resources.

A request to create a data node resource is sent with a confirmable CoAP POST message. The URI specifies the data node to be instantiated at the exception of list intances. In this case, for compactness, the URI specifies the list for which an instance is created.

FORMAT:

POST /c/<instance identifier>
(Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
  data-node-value

  2.01 Created
If the data node resource already exists, then the POST request MUST fail and a "4.09 Conflict" response code MUST be returned

5.3.2.1.  Post example

The example uses the interface list from Appendix C.1. Example is creating a new list instance within the interface list (SID = 1533):

REQ: POST /c/X9 (Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
{
    +4 : "eth5",             / name (SID 1537) /
    +1 : "Ethernet adaptor", / description (SID 1534) /
    +5 : 1880,               / type (SID 1538), identity /
        ethernetCsmacd (SID 1880) /
    +2 : true                 / enabled (SID 1535) /
}

RES: 2.01 Created

5.3.3.  PUT

A data node resource instance is created or replaced with the PUT method. A request to set the value of a data node instance is sent with a confirmable CoAP PUT message.

FORMAT:
PUT /c/<instanceidentifier>
(Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
    data-node-value

2.01 Created

5.3.3.1.  PUT example

The example uses the interface list from Appendix C.1. Example is renewing an instance of the list interface (SID = 1533) with key name="eth0":

REQ: PUT /c/X9?k="eth0"
(Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
{
    +4 : "eth0",             / name (SID 1537) /
    +1 : "Ethernet adaptor", / description (SID 1534) /
    +5 : 1880,               / type (SID 1538), identity /
                        / ethernetCsmacd (SID 1880) /
    +2 : true                / enabled (SID 1535) /
}

RES:  2.04 Changed

5.3.4. iPATCH

One or multiple data node instances are replaced with the idempotent
iPATCH method [RFC8132]. A request is sent with a confirmable CoAP
iPATCH message.

There are no Uri-Query options for the iPATCH method.

The processing of the iPATCH command is specified by Content-Format
application/yang-patch+cbor. In summary, if the CBOR patch payload
contains a data node instance that is not present in the target, this
instance is added. If the target contains the specified instance,
the content of this instance is replaced with the value of the
payload. A null value indicates the removal of an existing data node
instance.

FORMAT:
iPATCH /c (Content-Format :application/yang-patch+cbor)
ordered map of instance-identifier, data-node-value

2.04 Changed

5.3.4.1. iPATCH example

In this example, a CoMI client requests the following operations:

- Set "/system/ntp/enabled" (SID 1755) to true.
- Remove the server "tac.nrc.ca" from the "/system/ntp/server" (SID
  1756) list.
- Add the server "NTP Pool server 2" to the list "/system/ntp/
  server" (SID 1756).
REQ: iPATCH /c (Content-Format: application/yang-patch+cbor)
[
  1755, true,                          / enabled (1755) / 
  [+1, "tac.nrc.ca"], null,             / server (SID 1756) / 
  +0,                                   / server (SID 1756) / 
  {
    +3 : "tic.nrc.ca",                  / name (SID 1759) / 
    +4 : true,                          / prefer (SID 1760) / 
    +5 : {
      +1 : "132.246.11.231"           / address (SID 1762) / 
    }
  }
]

RES: 2.04 Changed

5.3.5. DELETE

A data node resource is deleted with the DELETE method.

FORMAT:
Delete /c/<instance identifier>

2.02 Deleted

5.3.5.1. DELETE example

The example uses the interface list from Appendix C.3. Example is deleting an instance of the interface list (SID = 1533):

REQ: DELETE /c/X9?k="eth0"

RES: 2.02 Deleted

5.4. Full datastore access

The methods GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE can be used to request, replace, create, and delete a whole datastore respectively.

FORMAT:
GET /c

2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-tree+cbor)
ordered map of single-instance-identifier, data-node-value
FORMAT:
PUT /c (Content-Format: application/yang-tree+cbor)
ordered map of single-instance-identifier, data-node-value

2.04 Changed

FORMAT:
POST /c (Content-Format: application/yang-tree+cbor)
ordered map of single-instance-identifier, data-node-value

2.01 Created

FORMAT:
DELETE /c

2.02 Deleted

The content of the ordered map represents the complete datastore of
the server at the GET indication of after a successful processing of
a PUT or POST request. When an Ordered map is used to carry a whole
datastore, all data nodes MUST be identified using single instance
identifiers (i.e. a SID), list instance identifiers are not allowed.

5.4.1. Full datastore examples

The example uses the interface list and the clock container from
Appendix C.3. Assume that the datastore contains two modules ietf-
system (SID 1700) and ietf-interfaces (SID 1500); they contain the
list interface (SID 1533) with one instance and the container Clock
(SID 1721). After invocation of GET, a map with these two modules is
returned:
REQ: GET /c

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format :application/yang-tree+cbor)
[
  1721, / Clock (SID 1721) /
      +1: "2014-10-05T09:00:00Z" / boot-datetime (SID 1722) /
    },
  -188, / clock (SID 1533) /
    {,+4 : "eth0", / name (SID 1537) /
      +1 : "Ethernet adaptor", / description (SID 1534) /
      +5 : 1880, / type (SID 1538), identity: /
      / ethernetCsmacd (SID 1880) /
      +2 : true / enabled (SID 1535) /
    }
]

5.5. Event stream

Event notification is an essential function for the management of servers. CoMI allows notifications specified in YANG [RFC5277] to be reported to a list of clients. The recommended path of the default event stream is /s. The server MAY support additional event stream resources to address different notification needs.

Reception of notification instances is enabled with the CoAP Observe [RFC7641] function. Clients subscribe to the notifications by sending a GET request with an "Observe" option, specifying the /s resource when the default stream is selected.

Each response payload carries one or multiple notifications. The number of notification reported and the conditions used to remove notifications from the reported list is left to the implementers. When multiple notifications are reported, they MUST be ordered starting from the newest notification at index zero.

An example implementation is:

Every time an event is generated, the generated notification instance is appended to the chosen stream(s). After appending the instance, the content of the instance is sent to all clients observing the modified stream.

Depending on the storage space allocated to the notification stream, the oldest notifications that do not fit inside the notification stream storage space are removed.
FORMAT:
Get /<stream-resource> Observe(0)

2.05 Content (Content-Format :application/yang-tree+cbor)
   ordered map of instance-identifier, data-node-value

The array of data node instances may contain identical entries which have been generated at different times.

5.5.1. Notify Examples

Suppose the server generates the event specified in Appendix C.4. By executing a GET on the /s resource the client receives the following response:

REQ: GET /s Observe(0) Token(0x93)

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format :application/yang-tree+cbor)
     Observe(12) Token(0x93)

[60010,   / example-port-fault (SID 60010) /
  {+1 : "0/4/21",   / port-name (SID 60011) /
   +2 : "Open pin 2" / port-fault (SID 60012) /}
 , +0,   / example-port-fault (SID 60010) /
  {+1 : "1/4/21",   / port-name (SID 60011) /
   +2 : "Open pin 5" / port-fault (SID 60012) /}]

In the example, the request returns a success response with the contents of the last two generated events. Consecutively the server will regularly notify the client when a new event is generated.

To check that the client is still alive, the server MUST send confirmable notifications periodically. When the client does not confirm the notification from the server, the server will remove the client from the list of observers [RFC7641].

5.6. RPC statements

The YANG "action" and "RPC" statements specify the execution of a Remote procedure Call (RPC) in the server. It is invoked using a POST method to an "Action" or "RPC" resource instance. The request payload contains the values assigned to the input container when
specified. The response payload contains the values of the output container when specified. Both the input and output containers are encoded in CBOR using the rules defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] section 4.2.1. Root data nodes are encoded using the delta between the current SID and the SID of the invoked instance identifier a specified by the URI.

The returned success response code is 2.05 Content.

FORMAT:

POST /c/<instance identifier>
(Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
data-node-value

2.05 Content (Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
data-node-value

5.6.1. RPC Example

The example is based on the YANG action specification of Appendix C.2. A server list is specified and the action "reset" (SID 60002, base64: Opq), that is part of a "server instance" with key value "myserver", is invoked.

REQ: POST /c/Opq?k="myserver"
(Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
{
  +1 : "2016-02-08T14:10:08Z09:00" / reset-at (SID 60003) /
}

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format :application/yang-value+cbor)
{
  +2 : "2016-02-08T14:10:08Z09:18" / reset-finished-at (SID 60004)/
}

6. Access to MIB Data

Appendix C.5 shows a YANG module mapped from the SMI specification "IP-MIB" [RFC4293]. The following example shows the "ipNetToPhysicalEntry" list with 2 instances, using diagnostic notation without delta encoding.
In this example one instance of /ip/ipNetToPhysicalEntry (SID 60021, base64: Oz1) that matches the keys ipNetToPhysicalIfIndex = 1, ipNetToPhysicalNetAddressType = ipv4 and ipNetToPhysicalNetAddress = 9.2.3.4 (h'09020304', base64: CQIDBA) is requested.

REQ: GET example.com/c/Oz1?k="1,1,CQIDBA"

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)

```json
{
  +1 : 1,          /* ( SID 60022 ) */
  +2 : 1,          /* ( SID 60023 ) */
  +3 : h'09020304',/* ( SID 60024 ) */
  +4 : h'00000A36200A',/* ( SID 60025 ) */
  +5 : 2329836,   /* ( SID 60026 ) */
  +6 : 3,          /* ( SID 60027 ) */
  +7 : 6,          /* ( SID 60028 ) */
  +8 : 1           /* ( SID 60029 ) */
}
```
7. Use of Block

The CoAP protocol provides reliability by acknowledging the UDP datagrams. However, when large pieces of data need to be transported, datagrams get fragmented, thus creating constraints on the resources in the client, server and intermediate routers. The block option [RFC7959] allows the transport of the total payload in individual blocks of which the size can be adapted to the underlying transport sizes such as: (UDP datagram size ~64KiB, IPv6 MTU of 1280, IEEE 802.15.4 payload of 60-80 bytes). Each block is individually acknowledged to guarantee reliability.

Notice that the Block mechanism splits the data at fixed positions, such that individual data fields may become fragmented. Therefore, assembly of multiple blocks may be required to process the complete data field.

Beware of race conditions. Blocks are filled one at a time and care should be taken that the whole data representation is sent in multiple blocks sequentially without interruption. On the server, values are changed, lists are re-ordered, extended or reduced. When these actions happen during the serialization of the contents of the resource, the transported results do not correspond with a state having occurred in the server; or worse the returned values are inconsistent. For example: array length does not correspond with the actual number of items. It may be advisable to use CBOR maps or CBOR arrays of undefined length, which are foreseen for data streaming purposes.

8. Resource Discovery

The presence and location of (path to) the management data are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value "core.c.datastore" [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of the management data. It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource, the value "/c" is used as an example. The example below shows the discovery of the presence and location of management data.

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=core.c.datastore

RES: 2.05 Content
</c>; rt="core.c.datastore"

Implemented data nodes MAY be discovered using the standard CoAP resource discovery. The implementation can add the data node identifiers (SID) supported to /.well-known/core with...
The available SIDs can be discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (rt) parameter with the value "core.c.datanode". Upon success, the return payload will contain the registered SIDs and their location.

The example below shows the discovery of the presence and location of data nodes.

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=core.c.datanode

RES: 2.05 Content
</c/BaAlN>; rt="core.c.datanode",
</c/CF_fa>; rt="core.c.datanode"

The list of data nodes may become prohibitively long. Therefore, it is recommended to discover the details about the YANG modules implemented by reading a YANG module library (e.g. "ietf-comi-yang-library" ad defined by [I-D.veillette-core-yang-library]).

The resource "/mod.uri" is used to retrieve the location of the YANG module library. This library can be stored locally on each server, or remotely on a different server. The latter is advised when the deployment of many servers are identical.

The following example shows the URI of a local instance of container modules-state (SID=1802) as defined in [I-D.veillette-core-yang-library].

REQ: GET example.com/mod.uri

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: text/plain; charset=utf-8)
example.com/c/ck

The following example shows the URI of a remote instance of same container.

REQ: GET example.com/mod.uri

RES: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: text/plain; charset=utf-8)
example-remote-server.com/group17/ck

Within the YANG module library all information about the module is stored such as: module identifier, identifier hierarchy, grouping, features and revision numbers.
9. Error Handling

In case a request is received which cannot be processed properly, the CoMI server MUST return an error message. This error message MUST contain a CoAP 4.xx or 5.xx response code.

Errors returned by a CoMI server can be broken into two categories, those associated to the CoAP protocol itself and those generated during the validation of the YANG data model constrains as described in [RFC7950] section 8.

The following list of common CoAP errors should be implemented by CoMI servers. This list is not exhaustive, other errors defined by CoAP and associated RFCs may be applicable.

- Error 4.01 (Unauthorized) is returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client is not authorized to perform the requested action on the targeted resource (i.e. data node, datastore, rpc, action or event stream).

- Error 4.02 (Bad Option) is returned by the CoMI server when one or more CoAP options are unknown or malformed.

- Error 4.04 (Not Found) is returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client is requesting a non-instantiated resource (i.e. data node, datastore, rpc, action or event stream).

- Error 4.05 (Method Not Allowed) is returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client is requesting a method not supported on the targeted resource. (e.g. GET on an rpc, PUT or POST on a data node with "config" set to false).

- Error 4.08 (Request Entity Incomplete) is returned by the CoMI server if one or multiple blocks of a block transfer request is missing, see [RFC7959] for more details.

- Error 4.13 (Request Entity Too Large) may be returned by the CoMI server during a block transfer request, see [RFC7959] for more details.

- Error 4.15 (Unsupported Content-Format) is returned by the CoMI server when the Content-Format used in the request don’t match those specified in section 2.3.

CoMI server MUST also enforce the different constraints associated to the YANG data models implemented. These constraints are described in [RFC7950] section 8. These errors are reported using the CoAP error code 4.00 (Bad Request) and may have the following error container as
payload. The YANG definition and associated .sid file are available in Appendix A and Appendix B. The error container is encoded using delta value equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the parent container (i.e 1024).

```yang
++-rw error!
   +--rw error-tag     identityref
   +--rw error-app-tag? identityref
   +--rw error-data-node?  instance-identifier
   +--rw error-message? string
```

The following error-tag and error-app-tag are defined by the ietf-comi YANG module, these tags are implemented as YANG identity and can be extended as needed.

- error-tag operation-failed is returned by the CoMI server when the operation request cannot be processed successfully.
  - error-app-tag malformed-message is returned by the CoMI server when the payload received from the CoMI client don’t contain a well-formed CBOR content as defined in [RFC7049] section 3.3 or don’t comply with the CBOR structure defined within this document.
  - error-app-tag data-not-unique is returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘unique’ constraint of a list or leaf-list fails.
  - error-app-tag too-many-elements is returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘max-elements’ constraint of a list or leaf-list fails.
  - error-app-tag too-few-elements is returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘min-elements’ constraint of a list or leaf-list fails.
  - error-app-tag must-violation is returned by the CoMI server when the restrictions imposed by a ‘must’ statement are violated.
  - error-app-tag duplicate is returned by the CoMI server when a client tries to create a duplicate list or leaf-list entry.

- error-tag invalid-value is returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client tries to update or create a leaf with a value encoded using an invalid CBOR datatype or if the ‘range’, ‘length’, ‘pattern’ or ‘require-instance’ constrain is not fulfilled.
* error-app-tag invalid-datatype is returned by the CoMI server when CBOR encoding don’t follow the rules set by or when the value is incompatible with the YANG Built-In type. (e.g. a value greater than 127 for an int8, undefined enumeration)

* error-app-tag not-in-range is returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘range’ property fails.

* error-app-tag invalid-length is returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘length’ property fails.

* error-app-tag pattern-test-failed is returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘pattern’ property fails.

* error-app-tag missing-element is returned by the CoMI server when the operation requested by a CoMI client fail to comply with the ‘mandatory’ constraint defined. The ‘mandatory’ constraint is enforced for leafs and choices, unless the node or any of its ancestors have a ‘when’ condition or ‘if-feature’ expression that evaluates to ‘false’.

* error-app-tag missing-key is returned by the CoMI server to further qualify an missing-element error. This error is returned when the CoMI client tries to create or list instance, without all the ‘key’ specified or when the CoMI client tries to delete a leaf listed as a ‘key’.

* error-app-tag missing-input-parameter is returned by the CoMI server when the input parameters of an RPC or action are incomplete.

* error-app-tag unknown-element is returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client tries to access a data node of a YANG module not supported, of a data node associated to an ‘if-feature’ expression evaluated to ‘false’ or to a ‘when’ condition evaluated to ‘false’.

* error-app-tag bad-element is returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client tries to create data nodes for more than one case in a choice.

* error-app-tag data-missing is returned by the CoMI server when a data node required to accept the request is not present.

* error-app-tag instance-required is returned by the CoMI server when a leaf of type ‘instance-identifier’ or ‘leafref’ marked with require-instance set to ‘true’ refers to an instance that does not exist.
* error-app-tag missing-choice is returned by the CoMI server when no nodes exist in a mandatory choice.

- error-tag error is returned by the CoMI server when an unspecified error has occurred.

For example, the CoMI server might return the following error.

```res
RES: 4.00 Bad Request (Content-Format: application/yang-value+cbor)
{
  +4 : 1011, / error-tag (SID 1028) /
  / = invalid-value (SID 1011) /
  +1 : 1018, / error-app-tag (SID 1025) /
  / = not-in-range (SID 1018) /
  +2 : 1740, / error-data-node (SID 1026) /
  / = timezone-utc-offset (SID 1740) /
  +3 : "maximum value exceeded" / error-message (SID 1027) /
}
```

10. Security Considerations

For secure network management, it is important to restrict access to configuration variables only to authorized parties. CoMI re-uses the security mechanisms already available to CoAP, this includes DTLS [RFC6347] for protected access to resources, as well suitable authentication and authorization mechanisms.

Among the security decisions that need to be made are selecting security modes and encryption mechanisms (see [RFC7252]). This requires a trade-off, as the NoKey mode gives no protection at all, but is easy to implement, whereas the X.509 mode is quite secure, but may be too complex for constrained devices.

In addition, mechanisms for authentication and authorization may need to be selected.

CoMI avoids defining new security mechanisms as much as possible. However, some adaptations may still be required, to cater for CoMI’s specific requirements.

11. IANA Considerations

11.1. Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry

This document adds the following resource type to the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values", within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry.
11.2. CoAP Content-Formats Registry

This document adds the following Content-Format to the "CoAP Content-Formats", within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>Encoding ID</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>application/yang-value+cbor</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>application/yang-values+cbor</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>application/yang-selectors+cbor</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>application/yang-tree+cbor</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>application/yang-ipatch+cbor</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

// RFC Ed.: replace XXX with assigned IDs and remove this note. // RFC Ed.: replace RFC XXXX with this RFC number and remove this note.

11.3. Media Types Registry

This document adds the following media types to the "Media Types" registry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Template</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yang-value+cbor</td>
<td>application/yang-value+cbor</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yang-values+cbor</td>
<td>application/yang-values+cbor</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yang-selectors+cbor</td>
<td>application/yang-selectors+cbor</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yang-tree+cbor</td>
<td>application/yang-tree+cbor</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yang-ipatch+cbor</td>
<td>application/yang-ipatch+cbor</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these media types share the following information:

- Subtype name: <as listed in table>
- Required parameters: N/A
- Optional parameters: N/A
- Encoding considerations: binary
- Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of RFC XXXX
- Interoperability considerations: N/A
- Published specification: RFC XXXX
- Applications that use this media type: CoMI
- Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
- Additional information:
  - Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
  - Magic number(s): N/A
  - File extension(s): N/A
  - Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
- Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org
11.4. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags Registry

This document adds the following tags to the "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags" registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Data Item</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xxx</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>Ordered map</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

// RFC Ed.: replace xxx by the assigned Tag and remove this note. //
RFC Ed.: replace RFC XXXX with this RFC number and remove this note.

12. Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to Bert Greevenbosch who was one of the original authors of the CoMI specification and specified CBOR encoding and use of hashes.

Mehmet Ersue and Bert Wijnen explained the encoding aspects of PDUs transported under SNMP. Carsten Bormann has given feedback on the use of CBOR.

The draft has benefited from comments (alphabetical order) by Rodney Cummings, Dee Denteneer, Esko Dijk, Michael van Hartskamp, Tanguy Ropitault, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Anuj Sehgal, Zach Shelby, Hannes Tschofenig, Michael Verschoor, and Thomas Watteyne.

13. References
13.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-core-sid]

[I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]

[I-D.veillette-core-yang-library]


13.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-core-interfaces]

[I-D.ietf-netmod-schema-mount]

[netconfcentral]

[RFC4293]

[RFC6347]

[RFC6690]
Appendix A. ietf-comi YANG module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-comi@2017-07-01.yang"
module ietf-comi {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-comi";
  prefix comi;

  organization
    "IETF Core Working Group";

  contact
    "Michel Veillette
      <mailto:michel.veillette@trilliant.com>
    Alexander Pelov
      <mailto:alexander@ack1.io>
    Peter van der Stok
      <mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org>
    Andy Bierman

Veillette, et al. Expires December 6, 2018 [Page 40]
<mailto:andy@yumaworks.com>";

description
  "This module contains the different definitions required
  by the CoMI protocol."
;
revision 2017-07-01 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "[I-D.ietf-core-comi] CoAP Management Interface"
}

typedef sid {
  type uint64;
  description
    "YANG Schema Item iDentifier";
  reference
    "[I-D.ietf-core-sid] YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID)"
}

typedef date_and_time_b {
  type int64;
  description
    "Binary representation of a date and time. This value is
    encoded using a positive or negative value representing
    a number of seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC
    time (i.e. the epoch). Negative values represent a date
    and time before the epoch, positive values represent a
date and time after the epoch.
    This representation is defined in [RFC 7049] section
    2.4.1. When implemented using CoMI, tag 0 is assumed
    and not encoded.";
  reference
    "[RFC 7049] Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)"
}

identity error-tag {
  description
    "Base identity for error-tag."
}

identity operation-failed {
  base error-tag;
  description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the operation request
    can’t be processed successfully.";
}
identity invalid-value {
  base error-tag;
  description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client tries to
    update or create a leaf with a value encoded using an
    invalid CBOR datatype or if the 'range', 'length',
    'pattern' or 'require-instance' constrain is not
    fulfilled.";
}

identity missing-element {
  base error-tag;
  description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the operation requested
    by a CoMI client fails to comply with the 'mandatory'
    constraint defined. The 'mandatory' constraint is
    enforced for leafs and choices, unless the node or any of
    its ancestors have a 'when' condition or 'if-feature'
    expression that evaluates to 'false'.";
}

identity unknown-element {
  base error-tag;
  description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client tries to
    access a data node of a YANG module not supported, of a
    data node associated with an 'if-feature' expression
    evaluated to 'false' or to a 'when' condition evaluated
    to 'false'.";
}

identity bad-element {
  base error-tag;
  description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the CoMI client tries to
    create data nodes for more than one case in a choice.";
}

identity data-missing {
  base error-tag;
  description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when a data node required to
    accept the request is not present.";
}

identity error {
  base error-tag;
  description

"Returned by the CoMI server when an unspecified error has occurred."

identity error-app-tag {
    description
    "Base identity for error-app-tag."
}

identity malformed-message {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the payload received from the CoMI client don’t contain a well-formed CBOR content as defined in [RFC7049] section 3.3 or don’t comply with the CBOR structure defined within this document.";
}

identity data-not-unique {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘unique’ constraint of a list or leaf-list fails.";
}

identity too-many-elements {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘max-elements’ constraint of a list or leaf-list fails.";
}

identity too-few-elements {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the ‘min-elements’ constraint of a list or leaf-list fails.";
}

identity must-violation {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
    "Returned by the CoMI server when the restrictions imposed by a ‘must’ statement are violated.";
}
identity duplicate {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
        "Returned by the CoMI server when a client tries to create
         a duplicate list or leaf-list entry.";
}

identity invalid-datatype {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
        "Returned by the CoMI server when CBOR encoding is
         incorrect or when the value encoded is incompatible with
         the YANG Built-In type. (e.g. value greater than 127
         for an int8, undefined enumeration).";
}

identity not-in-range {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
        "Returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the
         'range' property fails.";
}

identity invalid-length {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
        "Returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the
         'length' property fails.";
}

identity pattern-test-failed {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
        "Returned by the CoMI server when the validation of the
         'pattern' property fails.";
}

identity missing-key {
    base error-app-tag;
    description
        "Returned by the CoMI server to further qualify a
         missing-element error. This error is returned when the
         CoMI client tries to create or list instance, without all
         the 'key' specified or when the CoMI client tries to
         delete a leaf listed as a 'key'.";
}

identity missing-input-parameter {

base error-app-tag;
description
"Returned by the CoMI server when the input parameters
of a RPC or action are incomplete.";
}

identity instance-required {
    base error-app-tag;
description
"Returned by the CoMI server when a leaf of type
'instance-identifier' or 'leafref' marked with
require-instance set to 'true' refers to an instance
that does not exist.";
}

identity missing-choice {
    base error-app-tag;
description
"Returned by the CoMI server when no nodes exist in a
mandatory choice.";
}

container error {
presence "Error payload";
description
"Optional payload of a 4.00 Bad Request CoAP error.";

leaf error-tag {
type identityref {
    base error-tag;
} 
mandatory true;
description
"The enumerated error-tag.";
}

leaf error-app-tag {
type identityref {
    base error-app-tag;
} 
description
"The application-specific error-tag.";
}

leaf error-data-node {
type instance-identifier;
description
"When the error reported is caused by a specific data node, this leaf identifies the data node in error."

leaf error-message {
    type string;
    description
        "A message describing the error."
}

Appendix B. ietf-comi .sid file

{  
    "assignment-ranges": [  
        {  
            "entry-point": 1000,  
            "size": 100
        }
    ],  
    "module-name": "ietf-comi",  
    "module-revision": "2017-07-01",  
    "items": [  
        {  
            "namespace": "module",  
            "identifier": "ietf-comi",  
            "sid": 1000
        },  
        {  
            "namespace": "identity",  
            "identifier": "bad-element",  
            "sid": 1001
        },  
        {  
            "namespace": "identity",  
            "identifier": "data-missing",  
            "sid": 1002
        },  
        {  
            "namespace": "identity",  
            "identifier": "data-not-unique",  
            "sid": 1003
        },  
        {  
            "namespace": "identity",  
            "identifier": "duplicate",  
            "sid": 1004
        }  
    ]
}
"sid": 1004
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "error",
  "sid": 1005
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "error-app-tag",
  "sid": 1006
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "error-tag",
  "sid": 1007
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "instance-required",
  "sid": 1008
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "invalid-datatype",
  "sid": 1009
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "invalid-length",
  "sid": 1010
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "invalid-value",
  "sid": 1011
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "malformed-message",
  "sid": 1012
},
{
  "namespace": "identity",
  "identifier": "missing-choice",
  "sid": 1013
},

"namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "missing-element",
"sid": 1014
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "missing-input-parameter",
"sid": 1015
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "missing-key",
"sid": 1016
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "must-violation",
"sid": 1017
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "not-in-range",
"sid": 1018
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "operation-failed",
"sid": 1019
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "pattern-test-failed",
"sid": 1020
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "too-few-elements",
"sid": 1021
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "too-many-elements",
"sid": 1022
},

{ "namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "unknown-element",
"sid": 1023
}
Appendix C. YANG example specifications

This appendix shows five YANG example specifications taken over from as many existing YANG modules. The YANG modules are available from [netconfcentral]. Each YANG item identifier is accompanied by its SID shown after the "//" comment sign.

C.1. ietf-system

Excerpt of the YANG module ietf-system [RFC7317].

```yang
module ietf-system { // SID 1700
    container system { // SID 1717
        container clock { // SID 1738
            choice timezone {
                case timezone-name {
                    leaf timezone-name { // SID 1739
                        type timezone-name;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

case timezone-utc-offset {
  leaf timezone-utc-offset { // SID 1740
    type int16 {
    }
  }
}

container ntp { // SID 1754
  leaf enabled { // SID 1755
    type boolean;
    default true;
  }
  list server { // SID 1756
    key name;
    leaf name { // SID 1759
      type string;
    }
    choice transport {
      case udp {
        container udp { // SID 1761
          leaf address { // SID 1762
            type inet:host;
          }
          leaf port { // SID 1763
            type inet:port-number;
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
  leaf association-type { // SID 1757
    type enumeration {
      enum server {
      }
      enum peer {
      }
      enum pool {
      }
    }
  }
  leaf iburst { // SID 1758
    type boolean;
  }
  leaf prefer { // SID 1760
    type boolean;
    default false;
  }
}
C.2. server list

Taken over from [RFC7950] section 7.15.3.
module example-server-farm {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:example:server-farm";
  prefix "sfarm";

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix "yang";
  }

  list server { // SID 60000
    key name;
    leaf name { // SID 60001
      type string;
    }
  }

  action reset { // SID 60002
    input {
      leaf reset-at { // SID 60003
        type yang:date-and-time;
        mandatory true;
      }
    }
    output {
      leaf reset-finished-at { // SID 60004
        type yang:date-and-time;
        mandatory true;
      }
    }
  }
}

C.3. interfaces

Excerpt of the YANG module ietf-interfaces [RFC7223].
module ietf-interfaces {   // SID 1500
  container interfaces {   // SID 1505
    list interface {   // SID 1533
      key "name";
      leaf name {   // SID 1537
        type string;
      }
      leaf description {   // SID 1534
        type string;
      }
      leaf type {   // SID 1538
        type identityref {
          base interface-type;
        }
        mandatory true;
      }
      leaf enabled {   // SID 1535
        type boolean;
        default "true";
      }
      leaf link-up-down-trap-enable {   // SID 1536
        if-feature if-mib;
        type enumeration {
          enum enabled {
            value 1;
          }
          enum disabled {
            value 2;
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

C.4. Example-port

Notification example defined within this document.
module example-port {
  ...
  notification example-port-fault { // SID 60010
    description
      "Event generated if a hardware fault on a
       line card port is detected";
    leaf port-name { // SID 60011
      type string;
      description "Port name";
    }
    leaf port-fault { // SID 60012
      type string;
      description "Error condition detected";
    }
  }
}

C.5. IP-MIB

The YANG translation of the SMI specifying the IP-MIB [RFC4293],
extended with example SID numbers, yields:

module IP-MIB {
  import IF-MIB {
    prefix if-mib;
  }
  import INET-ADDRESS-MIB {
    prefix inet-address;
  }
  import SNMPv2-TC {
    prefix smiv2;
  }
  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
  }
  import yang-smi {
    prefix smi;
  }
  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
  }

  container ip { // SID 60020
    list ipNetToPhysicalEntry { // SID 60021
      key "ipNetToPhysicalIfIndex
          ipNetToPhysicalNetAddressType
          ipNetToPhysicalNetAddress";
      leaf ipNetToPhysicalIfIndex { // SID 60022
      }
    }
  }
}
type if-mib:InterfaceIndex;
}
leaf ipNetToPhysicalNetAddressType { // SID 60023
  type inet-address:InetAddressType;
}
leaf ipNetToPhysicalNetAddress { // SID 60024
  type inet-address:InetAddress;
}
leaf ipNetToPhysicalPhysAddress { // SID 60025
  type yang:phys-address {
    length "0..65535";
  }
}
leaf ipNetToPhysicalLastUpdated { // SID 60026
  type yang:timestamp;
}
leaf ipNetToPhysicalType { // SID 60027
  type enumeration {
    enum "other" {
      value 1;
    }
    enum "invalid" {
      value 2;
    }
    enum "dynamic" {
      value 3;
    }
    enum "static" {
      value 4;
    }
    enum "local" {
      value 5;
    }
  }
}
leaf ipNetToPhysicalState { // SID 60028
  type enumeration {
    enum "reachable" {
      value 1;
    }
    enum "stale" {
      value 2;
    }
    enum "delay" {
      value 3;
    }
    enum "probe" {
      value 4;
    }
  }
}
enum "invalid" {
    value 5;
}
enum "unknown" {
    value 6;
}
enum "incomplete" {
    value 7;
}

leaf ipNetToPhysicalRowStatus { // SID 60029
    type smiv2:RowStatus;
} // list ipNetToPhysicalEntry
} // container ip
} // module IP-MIB

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Uniform Resource Names for Device Identifiers  
draft-ietf-core-dev-urn-03

Abstract

This memo describes a new Uniform Resource Name (URN) namespace for hardware device identifiers. A general representation of device identity can be useful in many applications, such as in sensor data streams and storage, or equipment inventories. A URN-based representation can be easily passed along in any application that needs the information.

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1. Introduction

This memo describes a new Uniform Resource Name (URN) [RFC8141][RFC3406] namespace for hardware device identifiers. A general representation of device identity can be useful in many applications, such as in sensor data streams and storage, or equipment inventories [RFC7252], [RFC8428]. A URN-based representation can be easily passed along in any application that needs the information, as it fits in protocols mechanisms that are designed to carry URNs [RFC2616], [RFC3261], [RFC7252]. Finally, URNs can also be easily carried and stored in formats such as XML [W3C.REC-xml-19980210] or JSON [RFC8428] [RFC4627]. Using URNs in these formats is often preferable as they are universally recognized, self-describing, and
therefore avoid the need for agreeing to interpret an octet string as a specific form of a MAC address, for instance.

This memo defines identity URN types for situations where no such convenient type already exist. For instance, [RFC6920] defines cryptographic identifiers, [RFC7254] defines International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) identifiers for use with 3GPP cellular systems, and [I-D.atarius-dispatch-meid-urn] defines Mobile Equipment Identity (MEID) identifiers for use with 3GPP2 cellular systems. Those URN types should be employed when such identities are transported; this memo does not redefine these identifiers in any way.

Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URNs [RFC4122] are another alternative way for representing device identifiers, and already support MAC addresses as one of type of an identifier. However, UUIDs can be inconvenient in environments where it is important that the identifiers are as simple as possible and where additional requirements on stable storage, real-time clocks, and identifier length can be prohibitive. UUID-based identifiers are recommended for all general purpose uses when MAC addresses are available as identifiers. The device URN defined in this memo is recommended for constrained environments.

Future device identifier types can extend the device device URN type defined here, or define their own URNs.

Note that long-term stable unique identifiers are problematic for privacy reasons and should be used with care or avoided as described in [RFC7721].

The rest of this memo is organized as follows. Section 3 defines the "DEV" URN type, and Section 4 defines subtypes for IEEE MAC-48, EUI-48 and EUI-64 addresses and 1-wire device identifiers. Section 5 gives examples. Section 6 discusses the security considerations of the new URN type. Finally, Section 7 specifies the IANA registration for the new URN type and sets requirements for subtype allocations within this type.

2. Requirements language

In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "OPTIONAL", "RECOMMENDED", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. DEV URN Definition

Namespace Identifier: "dev" requested

Version: 1

Date: 2018-03-19

Registration Information: This is the first registration of this namespace, 2018-03-19.

Registrant: IETF and the CORE working group. Should the working group cease to exist, discussion should be directed to the general IETF discussion forums or the IESG.

3.1. Purpose

Purpose: The DEV URNs identify devices with device-specific identifiers such as network card hardware addresses. These URNs may be used in any relevant networks that benefit from the ability to refer to these identifiers in the form of URNs; DEV URN is global in scope.

Some typical applications include equipment inventories and smart object systems.

DEV URNs can be used in various ways in applications, software systems, and network components, in tasks ranging from discovery (for instance when discovering 1-wire network devices or detecting MAC-addressable devices on a LAN) to intrusion detection systems and simple catalogues of system information.

While it is possible to implement resolution systems for specific applications or network locations, DEV URNs are typically not used in a way that requires resolution beyond direct observation of the relevant identity fields in local link communication. However, it is often useful to be able to pass device identity information in generic URN fields in databases or protocol fields, which makes the use of URNs for this purpose convenient.

The DEV URN name space complements existing name spaces such as those involving IMEI or UUID identifiers. DEV URNs are expected to be a part of the IETF-provided basic URN types, covering identifiers that have previously not been possible to use in URNs.
3.2. Syntax

Syntax: The identifier is expressed in ASCII characters and has a hierarchical structure as follows:

```plaintext
devurn = "urn:dev:" body componentpart
body = macbody / owbody / orgbody / osbody / opsbody / otherbody
macbody = "mac:" hexstring
owbody = "ow:" hexstring
orgbody = "org:" number "-" identifier
osbody = "os:" number "-" serial
opsbody = "ops:" number "-" product "-" serial
otherbody = subtype ":" identifier
subtype = ALPHA *(DIGIT / ALPHA)
identifier = 1*unreservednout
product = identifier
serial = identifier
unreservednout = ALPHA / DIGIT / ":"
componentpart = [ ":" component [ componentpart ]]
component = *1(DIGIT / ALPHA)
hexstring = hexbyte /
    hexbyte hexstring
hexbyte = hexdigit hexdigit
hexdigit = DIGIT / hexletter
hexletter = "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
number = *1DIGIT
```

The above Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) uses the DIGIT and ALPHA rules defined in [RFC5234], which are not repeated here. The rule for pct-encoding is defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC3986].

The device identity namespace includes three subtypes (see Section 4, and more may be defined in the future as specified in Section 7).

The optional components following the hexstring are strings depicting individual aspects of a device. The specific strings and their semantics are up to the designers of the device, but could be used to refer to specific interfaces or functions within the device.

There are no special character encoding rules or considerations for conforming with the URN syntax, beyond those applicable for URNs in general [RFC8141], or the context where these URNs are carried (e.g., inside JSON [RFC8259] or SenML [RFC8428]).

The lexical equivalence of the DEV URNs is defined as an exact and case sensitive string match. Note that the two subtypes defined in this document use only lower case letters, however. Future types
might use identifiers that require other encodings that require a more full-blown character set (such as BASE64), however.

DEV URNs do not use r-, q-, or f-components.

Specific subtypes of DEV URNs may be validated through mechanisms discussed in Section 4.

Finally, the string representation of the device identity URN and of the MEID sub namespace is fully compatible with the URN syntax.

3.3. Assignment

Assignment: The process for identifier assignment is dependent on the used subtype, and documented in the specific subsection under Section 4.

Device identifiers are generally expected to be unique, barring the accidental issue of multiple devices with the same identifiers.

This URN type SHOULD only be used for persistent identifiers, such as hardware-based identifiers or cryptographic identifiers based on keys intended for long-term usage.

3.4. Security and Privacy

Security and Privacy: As discussed in Section 6, care must be taken to use device identifier-based identifiers due to their nature as a long-term identifier that is often not changeable. Leakage of these identifiers outside systems where their use is justified should be controlled.

3.5. Interoperability

Interoperability: There are no specific interoperability concerns.

3.6. Resolution

Resolution: The device identities are not expected to be globally resolvable. No identity resolution system is expected. Systems may perform local matching of identities to previously seen identities or configured information, however.

3.7. Documentation

See RFC NNNN (RFC Editor: Please replace NNNN by a reference to the RFC number of this document).
3.8. Additional Information

See Section 1 for a discussion of related name spaces.

3.9. Revision Information

Revision Information: This is the first version of this registration.

4. DEV URN Subtypes

4.1. MAC Addresses

DEV URNs of the "mac" subtype are based on the EUI-64 identifier [IEEE.EUI64] derived from a device with a built-in 64-bit EUI-64. The EUI-64 is formed from 24 or 36 bits of organization identifier followed by 40 or 28 bits of device-specific extension identifier assigned by that organization.

In the DEV URN "mac" subtype the hexstring is simply the full EUI-64 identifier represented as a hexadecimal string. It is always exactly 16 characters long.

MAC-48 and EUI-48 identifiers are also supported by the same DEV URN subtype. To convert a MAC-48 address to an EUI-64 identifier, The OUI of the Ethernet address (the first three octets) becomes the organization identifier of the EUI-64 (the first three octets). The fourth and fifth octets of the EUI are set to the fixed value FFFF hexadecimal. The last three octets of the Ethernet address become the last three octets of the EUI-64. The same process is used to convert an EUI-48 identifier, but the fixed value FFFE is used instead.

Identifier assignment for all of these identifiers rests within the IEEE.

4.2. 1-Wire Device Identifiers

The 1-Wire* system is a device communications bus system designed by Dallas Semiconductor Corporation. 1-Wire devices are identified by a 64-bit identifier that consists of 8 byte family code, 48 bit identifier unique within a family, and 8 bit CRC code [OW].

*) 1-Wire is a registered trademark.

In DEV URNs with the "ow" subtype the hexstring is a representation of the full 64 bit identifier as a hexadecimal string. It is always exactly 16 characters long. Note that the last two characters
represent the 8-bit CRC code. Implementations MAY check the validity of this code.

Family code and identifier assignment for all 1-wire devices rests with the manufacturers.

4.3. Organization-Defined Identifiers

Device identifiers that have only a meaning within an organisation can also be used to represent vendor-specific or experimental identifiers or identifiers designed for use within the context of an organisation. Organisations are identified by their Private Enterprise Number (PEN) [RFC2578].

4.4. Organization Serial Numbers

The "os" subtype specifies an organization and a serial number. Organizations are identified by their PEN.

Note: The DEV URN "os" subtype has originally been defined in the LwM2M standard, but has been incorporated here to collect all syntax associated with DEV URNs in one place. At the same time, the syntax of this subtype was changed to avoid the possibility of characters that are not allowed in SenML Name field (see [RFC8428] Section 4.5.1).

4.5. Organization Product and Serial Numbers

The DEV URN "ops" subtype has originally been defined in the LwM2M standard, but has been incorporated here to collect all syntax associated with DEV URNs in one place. The "ops" subtype specifies an organization, product class, and a serial number. Organizations are identified by their PEN.

Note: As with the "os" subtype, the "ops" subtype has originally been defined in the LwM2M standard, and its format has been slightly changed.

5. Examples

The following three examples provide examples of MAC-based, 1-Wire, and Cryptographic identifiers:
urn:dev:mac:0024befffe804ff1  # The MAC address of
# Jari’s laptop

urn:dev:ow:10e2073a01080063  # The 1-Wire temperature
# sensor in Jari’s
# kitchen

urn:dev:ow:264437f5000000ed_humidity  # The laundry sensor’s
# humidity part

urn:dev:ow:264437f5000000ed_temperature  # The laundry sensor’s
# temperature part

urn:dev:org:32473-123456  # Device 123456 in
# the RFC 5612 example
# organisation

urn:dev:ops:32473-Refrigerator-5002  # Refrigerator serial
# number 5002 in the
# RFC 5612 example
# organisation

6. Security Considerations

On most devices, the user can display device identifiers. Depending
on circumstances, device identifiers may or may not be modified or
tampered by the user. An implementation of the DEV URN MUST NOT
change these properties from what they were intended. In particular,
a device identifier that is intended to be immutable should not
become mutable as a part of implementing the DEV URN type. More
generally, nothing in this memo should be construed to override what
the relevant device specifications have already said about the
identifiers.

Other devices in the same network may or may not be able to identify
the device. For instance, on Ethernet network, the MAC address of a
device is visible to all other devices.

The URNs generated according to the rules defined in this document
result in long-term stable unique identifiers for the devices. Such
identifiers may have privacy and security implications because they
may enable correlating information about a specific device over a
long period of time, location tracking, and device specific
vulnerability exploitation [RFC7721]. Also, usually there is no easy
way to change the identifier. Therefore these identifiers need to be
used with care and especially care should be taken avoid leaking them
outside of the system that is intended to use the identifiers.
7. IANA Considerations

This document requests the registration of a new URN namespace for "DEV", as described in Section 3.

Additional subtypes for DEV URNs can be defined through IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC5226].

Such allocations are appropriate when there is a new namespace of some type of device identifiers, defined in stable fashion and with a publicly available specification that can be pointed to.

Note that the organisation (Section 4.3) device identifiers can also be used in some cases, at least as a temporary measure. It is preferrable, however, that long-term usage of a broadly employed device identifier be registered with IETF rather than used through the organisation device identifier type.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Changes from Previous Version

Version -03 of the WG draft removed some unnecessary references, updated some other references, removed pct-encoding to ensure the DEV URNs fit [RFC8428] Section 4.5.1 rules, and clarified that the original source of the "os" and "ops" subtypes.

Version -02 of the WG draft folded in the "ops" and "os" branches of the dev:urn syntax from LwM2M, as they seemed to match well what already existed in this memo under the "org" branch. However, as a part of this three changes were incorporated:

- The syntax for the "org:" changes to use "-_" rather than ":_" between the OUI and the rest of the URN.
- The organizations for the "ops" and "os" branches have been changed to use PEN numbers rather than OUI numbers [OUI]. The reason for this is that PEN numbers are allocated through a simpler and less costly process. However, this is a significant change to how LwM2M identifiers were specified before.
- There were also changes to what general characters can be used in the otherbody branch of the ABNF.

The rationale for all these changes is that it would be helpful for the community collect and unify syntax between the different uses of DEV URNs. If there is significant use of either the org:, os:, or ops: subtypes, then changes at this point may not be warranted, but otherwise unified syntax, as well as the use of PEN numbers would probably be beneficial. Comments on this topic are appreciated.

Version -01 of the WG draft converted the draft to use the new URN registration template from [RFC8141].

Version -00 of the WG draft renamed the file name and fixed the ABNF to correctly use "org:" rather than "dn:".

Version -05 made a change to the delimiter for parameters within a DEV URN. Given discussions on allowed character sets in SenML [RFC8428], we would like to suggest that the "-_" character be used instead of "_;", to avoid the need to translate DEV URNs in SenML-formatted communications or files. However, this reverses the earlier decision to not use unreserved characters. This also means that device IDs cannot use "-_" characters, and have to employ other characters instead. Feedback on this decision is sought.

Version -05 also introduced local or organisation-specific device identifiers. Organisations are identified by their PEN number.
(although we considered FQDNs as a potential alternative. The authors believe an organisation-specific device identifier type will make experiments and local use easier, but feedback on this point and the choice of PEN numbers vs. other possible organisation identifiers would be very welcome.

Version -05 also added some discussion of privacy concerns around long-term stable identifiers.

Finally, version -05 clarified the situations when new allocations within the registry of possible device identifier subtypes is appropriate.

Version -04 is a refresh, as the need and interest for this specification has re-emerged. And the editing author has emerged back to actual engineering from the depths of IETF administration.

Version -02 introduced several changes. The biggest change is that with the NI URNs [RFC6920], it was no longer necessary to define cryptographic identifiers in this specification. Another change was that we incorporated a more generic syntax for future extensions; non-hexstring identifiers can now also be supported, if some future device identifiers for some reason would, for instance, use BASE64. As a part of this change, we also changed the component part separator character from ‘–’ to ‘;’ so that the general format of the rest of the URN can employ the unreserved characters [RFC3986].

Appendix B. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Ari Keranen, Stephen Farrell, Christer Holberg, Peter Saint-Andre, Wouter Cloetens, Jaime Jimenez, Padmakumar Subramani, Mert Ocak, Hannes Tschofenig, and Ahmad Muhanna for interesting discussions in this problem space. We would also like to note prior documents that focused on specific device identifiers, such as [RFC7254] or [I-D.atarius-dispatch-meid-urn].

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Dynamic Resource Linking for Constrained RESTful Environments
draft-ietf-core-dynlink-07

Abstract

For CoAP (RFC7252), Dynamic linking of state updates between resources, either on an endpoint or between endpoints, is defined with the concept of Link Bindings. This specification defines conditional observation attributes that work with Link Bindings or with CoAP Observe (RFC7641).

Editor note

The git repository for the draft is found at https://github.com/core-wg/dynlink

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1. Introduction

IETF Standards for machine to machine communication in constrained environments describe a REST protocol [RFC7252] and a set of related information standards that may be used to represent machine data and machine metadata in REST interfaces. CoRE Link-format [RFC6690] is a standard for doing Web Linking [RFC8288] in constrained environments.

This specification introduces the concept of a Link Binding, which defines a new link relation type to create a dynamic link between resources over which state updates are conveyed. Specifically, a Link Binding is a unidirectional link for binding the states of source and destination resources together such that updates to one are sent over the link to the other. CoRE Link Format representations are used to configure, inspect, and maintain Link Bindings. This specification additionally defines a set of conditional Observe Attributes for use with Link Bindings and with the standalone CoRE Observe [RFC7641] method.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [RFC8288] and [RFC6690]. This specification makes use of the following additional terminology:

Link Binding: A unidirectional logical link between a source resource and a destination resource, over which state information is synchronized.

State Synchronization: Depending on the binding method (Polling, Observe, Push) different REST methods may be used to synchronize the resource values between a source and a destination. The process of using a REST method to achieve this is defined as "State Synchronization". The endpoint triggering the state synchronization is the synchronization initiator.

Notification Band: A resource value range that results in state synchronization. The value range may be bounded by a minimum and maximum value or may be unbounded having either a minimum or maximum value.
3. Link Bindings

In a M2M RESTful environment, endpoints may directly exchange the content of their resources to operate the distributed system. For example, a light switch may supply on-off control information that may be sent directly to a light resource for on-off control. Beforehand, a configuration phase is necessary to determine how the resources of the different endpoints are related to each other. This can be done either automatically using discovery mechanisms or by means of human intervention and a so-called commissioning tool. In this specification such an abstract relationship between two resources is defined, called a link Binding. The configuration phase necessitates the exchange of binding information so a format recognized by all CoRE endpoints is essential. This specification defines a format based on the CoRE Link-Format to represent binding information along with the rules to define a binding method which is a specialized relationship between two resources. The purpose of such a binding is to synchronize the content between a source resource and a destination resource. The destination resource MAY be a group resource if the authority component of the destination URI contains a group address (either a multicast address or a name that resolves to a multicast address). Since a binding is unidirectional, the binding entry defining a relationship is present only on one endpoint. The binding entry may be located either on the source or the destination endpoint depending on the binding method.

3.1. The "bind" attribute and Binding Methods

A binding method defines the rules to generate the web-transfer exchanges that synchronize state between source and destination resources. By using REST methods content is sent from the source resource to the destination resource.

In order to use binding methods, this specification defines a special CoRE link attribute "bind". This is the identifier of a binding method which defines the rules to synchronize the destination resource. This attribute is mandatory.

| Attribute      | Parameter | Value      |
|----------------+-----------+------------|
| Binding method | bind      | xsd:string |

Table 1: The bind attribute

The following table gives a summary of the binding methods defined in this specification.
The description of a binding method must define the following aspects:

Identifier: This is the value of the "bind" attribute used to identify the method.

Location: This information indicates whether the binding entry is stored on the source or on the destination endpoint.

REST Method: This is the REST method used in the Request/Response exchanges.

Conditions: A binding method definition must state how the condition attributes of the abstract binding definition are actually used in this specialized binding.

The binding methods are described in more detail below.

3.1.1. Polling

The Polling method consists of sending periodic GET requests from the destination endpoint to the source resource and copying the content to the destination resource. The binding entry for this method MUST be stored on the destination endpoint. The destination endpoint MUST ensure that the polling frequency does not exceed the limits defined by the pmin and pmax attributes of the binding entry. The copying process MAY filter out content from the GET requests using value-based conditions (e.g, based on the Change Step, Less Than, Greater Than attributes).

3.1.2. Observe

The Observe method creates an observation relationship between the destination endpoint and the source resource. On each notification the content from the source resource is copied to the destination resource. The creation of the observation relationship requires the
CoAP Observation mechanism [RFC7641] hence this method is only permitted when the resources are made available over CoAP. The binding entry for this method MUST be stored on the destination endpoint. The binding conditions are mapped as query string parameters (see Section 4).

3.1.3. Push

When the Push method is assigned to a binding, the source endpoint sends PUT requests to the destination resource when the binding condition attributes are satisfied for the source resource. The source endpoint MUST only send a notification request if the binding conditions are met. The binding entry for this method MUST be stored on the source endpoint.

3.2. Link Relation

Since Binding involves the creation of a link between two resources, Web Linking and the CoRE Link-Format are a natural way to represent binding information. This involves the creation of a new relation type, named "boundto". In a Web link with this relation type, the target URI contains the location of the source resource and the context URI points to the destination resource.

4. Binding and Resource Observation Attributes

In addition to "bind", this specification further defines Web link attributes allowing a fine-grained control of the type of state synchronization along with the conditions that trigger an update.

When resource interfaces following this specification are made available over CoAP, the CoAP Observation mechanism [RFC7641] MAY also be used to observe any changes in a resource, and receive asynchronous notifications as a result. A resource using an interface description defined in this specification and marked as Observable in its link description SHOULD support these observation parameters.

In addition, the set of parameters are defined here allow a client to control how often a client is interested in receiving notifications and how much a resource value should change for the new representation to be interesting, as query parameters.

These query parameters MUST be treated as resources that are read using GET and updated using PUT, and MUST NOT be included in the Observe request. Multiple parameters MAY be updated at the same time by including the values in the query string of a PUT. Before being updated, these parameters have no default value.
These attributes are defined below:

| Attribute          | Parameter | Value            |
|--------------------+-----------+------------------|
| Minimum Period (s) | pmin      | xsd:integer (>0) |
| Maximum Period (s) | pmax      | xsd:integer (>0) |
| Change Step        | st        | xsd:decimal (>0) |
| Greater Than       | gt        | xsd:decimal      |
| Less Than          | lt        | xsd:decimal      |
| Notification Band  | band      | xsd:boolean      |

Table 3: Binding Attributes Summary

4.1. Minimum Period (pmin)

When present, the minimum period indicates the minimum time to wait (in seconds) before triggering a new state synchronization (even if it has changed). In the absence of this parameter, the minimum period is up to the synchronization initiator. The minimum period MUST be greater than zero otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

4.2. Maximum Period (pmax)

When present, the maximum period indicates the maximum time in seconds between two consecutive state synchronizations (regardless if it has changed). In the absence of this parameter, the maximum period is up to the synchronization initiator. The maximum period MUST be greater than zero and MUST be greater than the minimum period parameter (if present) otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

4.3. Change Step (st)

When present, the change step indicates how much the value of a resource SHOULD change before triggering a new state synchronization (compared to the value of the previous synchronization). Upon reception of a query including the st attribute the current value (CurrVal) of the resource is set as the initial value (STinit). Once the resource value differs from the STinit value (i.e. CurrVal >= STinit + ST or CurrVal <= STinit - ST) then a new state
synchronization occurs. STinit is then set to the state synchronization value and new state synchronizations are based on a change step against this value. The change step MUST be greater than zero otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

The Change Step parameter can only be supported on resources with an atomic numeric value.

Note: Due to the state synchronization based update of STint it may result in that resource value received in two sequential state synchronizations differs by more than st.

4.4. Greater Than (gt)

When present, Greater Than indicates the upper limit value the resource value SHOULD cross before triggering a new state synchronization. State synchronization only occurs when the resource value exceeds the specified upper limit value. The actual resource value is used for the synchronization rather than the gt value. If the value continues to rise, no new state synchronizations are generated as a result of gt. If the value drops below the upper limit value and then exceeds the upper limit then a new state synchronization is generated.

4.5. Less Than (lt)

When present, Less Than indicates the lower limit value the resource value SHOULD cross before triggering a new state synchronization. State synchronization only occurs when the resource value is less than the specified lower limit value. The actual resource value is used for the synchronization rather than the lt value. If the value continues to fall no new state synchronizations are generated as a result of lt. If the value rises above the lower limit value and then drops below the lower limit then a new state synchronization is generated.

4.6. Notification Band (band)

The notification band attribute allows a bounded or unbounded (based on a minimum or maximum) value range that may trigger multiple state synchronizations. This enables use cases where different ranges results in differing behaviour. For example: monitoring the temperature of machinery. Whilst the temperature is in the normal operating range only periodic observations are needed. However as the temperature moves to more abnormal ranges more frequent synchronization/reporting may be needed.
Without a notification band, a transition across a less than (lt), or greater than (gt) limit only generates one notification. This means that it is not possible to describe a case where multiple notifications are sent so long as the limit is exceeded.

The band attribute works as a modifier to the behaviour of gt and lt. Therefore, if band is present in a query, gt, lt or both, MUST be included.

When band is present with the lt attribute, it defines the lower bound for the notification band (notification band minimum). State synchronization occurs when the resource value is equal to or above the notification band minimum. If lt is not present there is no minimum value for the band.

When band is present with the gt attribute, it defines the upper bound for the notification band (notification band maximum). State synchronization occurs when the resource value is equal to or below the notification band maximum. If gt is not present there is no maximum value for the band.

If band is present with both the gt and lt attributes, two kinds of signaling bands are specified.

If a band is specified in which the value of gt is less than that of lt, in-band signaling occurs. State synchronization occurs whenever the resource value is between the notification band minimum and maximum or is equal to the notification band minimum or maximum.

On the other hand if the band is specified in which the value of gt is greater than that of lt, out-of-band signaling occurs. State synchronization occurs whenever the resource value is outside the notification band minimum and maximum or is equal to the notification band minimum or maximum.

4.7. Attribute Interactions

Pmin, pmax, st, gt and lt may be present in the same query. Parameters are not defined at multiple prioritization levels. Instead, the server state machine generates a notification whenever any of the parameter conditions are met, after which it performs a reset on all the requested conditions. State synchronization also occurs only once even if there are multiple conditions being met at the same time. The reference code below illustrates how notifications are generated.
bool notifiable( Resource * r ) {
    #define BAND r->band
    #define SCALAR_TYPE ( num_type == r->type )
    #define STRING_TYPE ( str_type == r->type )
    #define BOOLEAN_TYPE ( bool_type == r->type )
    #define PMIN_EX ( r->last_sample_time - r->last_rep_time >= r->pmin )
    #define PMAX_EX ( r->last_sample_time - r->last_rep_time > r->pmax )
    #define LT_EX ( r->v < r->lt ^ r->last_rep_v < r->lt )
    #define GT_EX ( r->v > r->gt ^ r->last_rep_v > r->gt )
    #define ST_EX ( abs( r->v - r->last_rep_v ) >= r->st )
    #define IN_BAND ( ( r->gt <= r->v && r->v <= r->lt ) || ( r->lt <= r->gt && r->g t <= r->v ) || ( r->v <= r->lt && r->lt <= r->gt ) )
    #define VB_CHANGE ( r->vb != r->last_rep_vb )
    #define VS_CHANGE ( r->vs != r->last_rep_vs )
    return ( PMIN_EX &&
        ( SCALAR_TYPE ?
            ( !BAND && ( GT_EX || LT_EX || ST_EX || PMAX_EX ) ) ||
            ( BAND && IN_BAND && ( ST_EX || PMAX_EX ) )
        ) &&
        STRING_TYPE ?
            ( VS_CHANGE || PMAX_EX )
        : BOOLEAN_TYPE ?
            ( VB_CHANGE || PMAX_EX )
        : false );
}

Figure 1: Code logic for attribute interactions for observe notification

5. Binding Table

The Binding table is a special resource that gives access to the bindings on a endpoint. This section defines a REST interface for Binding table resources. The Binding table resource MUST support the Binding interface defined below. The interface supports the link-format type.

The if= column defines the Interface Description (if=) attribute value to be used in the CoRE Link Format for a resource conforming to that interface. When this value appears in the if= attribute of a link, the resource MUST support the corresponding REST interface described in this section. The resource MAY support additional functionality, which is out of scope for this specification. Although this interface description is intended to be used with the CoRE Link Format, it is applicable for use in any REST interface definition.
The Methods column defines the REST methods supported by the interface, which are described in more detail below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interface</th>
<th>if=</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Content-Formats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binding</td>
<td>core.bnd</td>
<td>GET, POST, DELETE</td>
<td>link-format</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Binding Interface Description

The Binding interface is used to manipulate a binding table. A request with a POST method and a content format of application/link-format simply appends new bindings to the table. All links in the payload MUST have a relation type "boundto". A GET request simply returns the current state of a binding table whereas a DELETE request empties the table. Individual entries may be deleted from the table by specifying the resource path in a DELETE request.

The following example shows requests for adding, retrieving and deleting bindings in a binding table.

Req: POST /bnd/ (Content-Format: application/link-format)
<coap://sensor.example.com/s/light>
  rel="boundto";anchor="/a/light";bind="obs";pmin="10";pmax="60"
Res: 2.04 Changed

Req: GET /bnd/
Res: 2.05 Content (application/link-format)
<coap://sensor.example.com/s/light>
  rel="boundto";anchor="/a/light";bind="obs";pmin="10";pmax="60"

Req: DELETE /bnd/a/light
Res: 2.04 Changed

Req: DELETE /bnd/
Res: 2.04 Changed

Figure 2: Binding Interface Example

6. Implementation Considerations

When using multiple resource bindings (e.g. multiple Observations of resource) with different bands, consideration should be given to the resolution of the resource value when setting sequential bands. For example: Given BandA (Abmn=10, Bbmx=20) and BandB (Bbmn=21, Bbmx=30). If the resource value returns an integer then notifications for values between and inclusive of 10 and 30 will be triggered. Whereas
if the resolution is to one decimal point (0.1) then notifications for values 20.1 to 20.9 will not be triggered.

The use of the notification band minimum and maximum allow for a synchronization whenever a change in the resource value occurs. Theoretically this could occur in-line with the server internal sample period for the determining the resource value. Implementors SHOULD consider the resolution needed before updating the resource, e.g. updating the resource when a temperature sensor value changes by 0.001 degree versus 1 degree.

The initiation of a link binding can be delegated from a client to a link state machine implementation, which can be an embedded client or a configuration tool. Implementation considerations have to be given to how to monitor transactions made by the configuration tool with regards to link bindings, as well as any errors that may arise with establishing link bindings as well as with established link bindings.

7. Security Considerations

Consideration has to be given to what kinds of security credentials the state machine of a configuration tool or an embedded client needs to be configured with, and what kinds of access control lists client implementations should possess, so that transactions on creating link bindings and handling error conditions can be processed by the state machine.

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Interface Description

The specification registers the "binding" CoRE interface description link target attribute value as per [RFC6690].

Attribute Value: core.bnd

Description: The binding interface is used to manipulate a binding table which describes the link bindings between source and destination resources for the purposes of synchronizing their content.

Reference: This specification. Note to RFC editor: please insert the RFC of this specification.

Notes: None
8.2. Link Relation Type

This specification registers the new "boundto" link relation type as per [RFC8288].

Relation Name: boundto

Description: The purpose of a boundto relation type is to indicate that there is a binding between a source resource and a destination resource for the purposes of synchronizing their content.

Reference: This specification. Note to RFC editor: please insert the RFC of this specification.

Notes: None

Application Data: None

9. Acknowledgements

Acknowledgement is given to colleagues from the SENSEI project who were critical in the initial development of the well-known REST interface concept, to members of the IPSO Alliance where further requirements for interface types have been discussed, and to Szymon Sasin, Cedric Chauvenet, Daniel Gavelle and Carsten Bormann who have provided useful discussion and input to the concepts in this specification. Christian Amsuss supplied a comprehensive review of draft -06.

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11. Changelog

- Added reference code to illustrate attribute interactions for observations

Shelby, et al. Expires April 25, 2019
Document restructure and refactoring into three main sections

Clarifications on band usage

Implementation considerations introduced

Additional text on security considerations

draft-ietf-core-dynlink-05

Addition of a band modifier for gt and lt, adapted from draft-groves-core-obsattr

Removed statement prescribing gt MUST be greater than lt

draft-ietf-core-dynlink-03

General: Reverted to using "gt" and "lt" from "gth" and "lth" for this draft owing to concerns raised that the attributes are already used in LwM2M with the original names "gt" and "lt".

New author and editor added.

draft-ietf-core-dynlink-02

General: Changed the name of the greater than attribute "gt" to "gth" and the name of the less than attribute "lt" to "lth" due to conflict with the core resource directory draft lifetime "lt" attribute.

Clause 6.1: Addressed the editor’s note by changing the link target attribute to "core.binding".

Added Appendix A for examples.

draft-ietf-core-dynlink-01

General: The term state synchronization has been introduced to describe the process of synchronization between destination and source resources.

General: The document has been restructured to make the information flow better.

Clause 3.1: The descriptions of the binding attributes have been updated to clarify their usage.
o Clause 3.1: A new clause has been added to discuss the interactions between the resources.

o Clause 3.4: Has been simplified to refer to the descriptions in 3.1. As the text was largely duplicated.

o Clause 4.1: Added a clarification that individual resources may be removed from the binding table.

o Clause 6: Formalised the IANA considerations.

draft-ietf-core-dynlink Initial Version 00:

o This is a copy of draft-groves-core-dynlink-00

draft-groves-core-dynlink Draft Initial Version 00:

o This initial version is based on the text regarding the dynamic linking functionality in I.D.ietf-core-interfaces-05.

o The WADL description has been dropped in favour of a thorough textual description of the REST API.

12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Examples

This appendix provides some examples of the use of binding attribute / observe attributes.

Note: For brevity the only the method or response code is shown in the header field.

A.1. Greater Than (gt) example
### A.2. Greater Than (gt) and Period Max (pmax) example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>t</th>
<th>Observed State</th>
<th>CLIENT</th>
<th>SERVER</th>
<th>Actual State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>GET</td>
<td></td>
<td>Header: GET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Query: gt=&quot;25&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 0 (register)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>&lt;-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>Header: 2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: &quot;18.5 Cel&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>&lt;-----</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>Header: 2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 Cel</td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>26 Cel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: &quot;26 Cel&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Client Registers and Receives one Notification of the Current State and One of a New State when it passes through the greater than threshold of 25.
Figure 4: Client Registers and Receives one Notification of the Current State, one when pmax time expires and one of a new State when it passes through the greater than threshold of 25.

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Abstract

This document specifies security enhancements to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). Two optional extensions are defined: the Echo option and the Request-Tag option. Each of these options provide additional features to CoAP and protects against certain attacks. The document also updates the processing requirements on the Token of RFC 7252. The updated Token processing ensures secure binding of responses to requests.

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1. Introduction

The initial Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) suite of specifications ([RFC7252], [RFC7641], and [RFC7959]) was designed with the assumption that security could be provided on a separate layer, in particular by using DTLS ([RFC6347]). However, for some use cases, additional functionality or extra processing is needed to
support secure CoAP operations. This document specifies security enhancements to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP).

This document specifies two server-oriented CoAP options, the Echo option and the Request-Tag option: The Echo option enables a CoAP server to verify the freshness of a request, synchronize state, or force a client to demonstrate reachability at its apparent network address. The Request-Tag option allows the CoAP server to match message fragments belonging to the same request, fragmented using the CoAP Block-Wise Transfer mechanism, which mitigates attacks and enables concurrent blockwise operations. These options in themselves do not replace the need for a security protocol; they specify the format and processing of data which, when integrity protected using e.g. DTLS ([RFC6347]), TLS ([RFC8446]), or OSCORE ([I-D.ietf-core-object-security]), provide the additional security features.

The document also updates the processing requirements on the Token. The updated processing ensures secure binding of responses to requests, thus mitigating error cases and attacks where the client may erroneously associate the wrong response to a request.

1.1. Request Freshness

A CoAP server receiving a request is in general not able to verify when the request was sent by the CoAP client. This remains true even if the request was protected with a security protocol, such as DTLS. This makes CoAP requests vulnerable to certain delay attacks which are particularly incriminating in the case of actuators ([I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]). Some attacks are possible to mitigate by establishing fresh session keys, e.g. performing a DTLS handshake for each actuation, but in general this is not a solution suitable for constrained environments, for example, due to increased message overhead and latency. Additionally, if there are proxies, fresh DTLS session keys between server and proxy does not say anything about when the client made the request. In a general hop-by-hop setting, freshness may need to be verified in each hop.

A straightforward mitigation of potential delayed requests is that the CoAP server rejects a request the first time it appears and asks the CoAP client to prove that it intended to make the request at this point in time. The Echo option, defined in this document, specifies such a mechanism which thereby enables a CoAP server to verify the freshness of a request. This mechanism is not only important in the case of actuators, or other use cases where the CoAP operations require freshness of requests, but also in general for synchronizing state between CoAP client and server and to verify aliveness of the client.
1.2. Fragmented Message Body Integrity

CoAP was designed to work over unreliable transports, such as UDP, and include a lightweight reliability feature to handle messages which are lost or arrive out of order. In order for a security protocol to support CoAP operations over unreliable transports, it must allow out-of-order delivery of messages using e.g. a sliding replay window such as described in Section 4.1.2.6 of DTLS ([RFC6347]).

The Block-Wise Transfer mechanism [RFC7959] extends CoAP by defining the transfer of a large resource representation (CoAP message body) as a sequence of blocks (CoAP message payloads). The mechanism uses a pair of CoAP options, Block1 and Block2, pertaining to the request and response payload, respectively. The blockwise functionality does not support the detection of interchanged blocks between different message bodies to the same resource having the same block number. This remains true even when CoAP is used together with a security protocol such as DTLS or OSCORE, within the replay window ([I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]), which is a vulnerability of CoAP when using RFC7959.

A straightforward mitigation of mixing up blocks from different messages is to use unique identifiers for different message bodies, which would provide equivalent protection to the case where the complete body fits into a single payload. The ETag option [RFC7252], set by the CoAP server, identifies a response body fragmented using the Block2 option. This document defines the Request-Tag option for identifying the request body fragmented using the Block1 option, similar to ETag, but ephemeral and set by the CoAP client.

1.3. Request-Response Binding

A fundamental requirement of secure REST operations is that the client can bind a response to a particular request. If this is not valid a client may erroneously associate the wrong response to a request. The wrong response may be an old response for the same resource or for a completely different resource (see e.g. Section 2.3 of [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]). For example a request for the alarm status "GET /status" may be associated to a prior response "on", instead of the correct response "off".

In HTTPS, binding is assured by the ordered and reliable delivery as well as mandating that the server sends responses in the same order that the requests were received. The same is not true for CoAP where the server (or an attacker) can return responses in any order. Concurrent requests are instead differentiated by their Token. Note that the CoAP Message ID cannot be used for this purpose since those
are typically different for REST request and corresponding response in case of "separate response", see Section 2.2 of [RFC7252].

Unfortunately, CoAP [RFC7252] does not treat Token as a cryptographically important value and does not give stricter guidelines than that the tokens currently "in use" SHOULD (not SHALL) be unique. If used with security protocol not providing bindings between requests and responses (e.g. DTLS and TLS) token reuse may result in situations where a client matches a response to the wrong request. Note that mismatches can also happen for other reasons than a malicious attacker, e.g. delayed delivery or a server sending notifications to an uninterested client.

A straightforward mitigation is to mandate clients to never reuse tokens until the AEAD keys have been replaced. As there may be any number of responses to a request (see e.g. [RFC7641]), the easiest way to accomplish this is to implement the token as a counter and never reuse any tokens at all. This document updates the Token processing in [RFC7252] to always assure a cryptographically secure binding of responses to requests.

1.4. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Unless otherwise specified, the terms "client" and "server" refers to "CoAP client" and "CoAP server", respectively, as defined in [RFC7252]. The term "origin server" is used as in [RFC7252]. The term "origin client" is used in this document to denote the client from which a request originates; to distinguish from clients in proxies.

The terms "payload" and "body" of a message are used as in [RFC7959]. The complete interchange of a request and a response body is called a (REST) "operation". An operation fragmented using [RFC7959] is called a "blockwise operation". A blockwise operation which is fragmenting the request body is called a "blockwise request operation". A blockwise operation which is fragmenting the response body is called a "blockwise response operation".

Two request messages are said to be "matchable" if they occur between the same endpoint pair, have the same code and the same set of options except for elective NoCacheKey options and options involved
in block-wise transfer (Block1, Block2 and Request-Tag). Two
operations are said to be matchable if any of their messages are.

Two matchable blockwise operations are said to be "concurrent" if a
block of the second request is exchanged even though the client still
intends to exchange further blocks in the first operation.
(Concurrent blockwise request operations are impossible with the
options of [RFC7959] because the second operation’s block overwrites
any state of the first exchange.).

The Echo and Request-Tag options are defined in this document.

2. The Echo Option

The Echo option is a lightweight server-driven challenge-response
mechanism for CoAP, motivated by the need for a server to verify
freshness of a request as described in Section 1.1. With request
freshness we mean that the server can determine that the client (or
in the case of hop-by-hop security the proxy) sent the request
recently. The time threshold for being fresh is application
specific. The Echo option value is a challenge from the server to
the client included in a CoAP response and echoed back to the server
in one or more CoAP requests.

2.1. Option Format

The Echo Option is elective, safe-to-forward, not part of the cache-
key, and not repeatable, see Figure 1, which extends Table 4 of
[RFC7252]).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Len.</th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Echo</td>
<td>opaque</td>
<td>4-40</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Critical, U = Unsafe, N = NoCacheKey, R = Repeatable,
E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (when using OSCORE)

Figure 1: Echo Option Summary

[ Note to RFC editor: If this document is released before core-
object-security, then the following paragraph and the "E"/"U" columns
above need to move into core-object-security, as they are defined in
that draft. ]

The Echo option MAY be an Inner or Outer option
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and the Inner and Outer values are

The Inner option is encrypted and integrity protected between the endpoints, whereas the Outer option is not protected by OSCORE and visible between the endpoints to the extent it is not protected by some other security protocol. E.g. in the case of DTLS hop-by-hop between the endpoints, the Outer option is visible to proxies along the path.

The Echo option value is generated by a server, and its content and structure are implementation specific. Different methods for generating Echo option values are outlined in Appendix A. Clients and intermediaries MUST treat an Echo option value as opaque and make no assumptions about its content or structure.

When receiving an Echo option in a request, the server MUST be able to verify that the Echo option value was generated by the server as well as the point in time when the Echo option value was generated.

2.2. Echo Processing

The Echo option MAY be included in any request or response (see Section 2.3 for different applications), but the Echo option MUST NOT be used with empty CoAP requests (i.e. Code=0.00).

If a server receives a request which has freshness requirements, the request does not contain a fresh Echo option value, and the server cannot verify the freshness of the request in some other way, the server MUST NOT process the request further and SHOULD send a 4.01 Unauthorized response with an Echo option. The server MAY include the same Echo option value in several different responses and to different clients.

The application decides under what conditions a CoAP request to a resource is required to be fresh. These conditions can for example include what resource is requested, the request method and other data in the request, and conditions in the environment such as the state of the server or the time of the day.

The server may use request freshness provided by the Echo option to verify the aliveness of a client or to synchronize state. The server may also include the Echo option in a response to force a client to demonstrate reachability at their apparent network address.

Upon receiving a 4.01 Unauthorized response with the Echo option, the client SHOULD resend the original request with the addition of an Echo option with the received Echo option value. The client MAY send a different request compared to the original request. Upon receiving any other response with the Echo option, the client SHOULD echo the Echo option value in the next request to the server. The client MAY...
include the same Echo option value in several different requests to the server.

Upon receiving a request with the Echo option, the server determines if the request has freshness requirements. If the request does not have freshness requirements, the Echo option MAY be ignored. If the request has freshness requirements and the server cannot verify the freshness of the request in some other way, the server MUST verify that the Echo option value was generated by the server; otherwise the request is not processed further. The server MUST then calculate the round-trip time \( RTT = (t_1 - t_0) \), where \( t_1 \) is the request receive time and \( t_0 \) is the time when the Echo option value was generated. The server MUST only accept requests with a round-trip time below a certain threshold \( T \), i.e. \( RTT < T \). If the server cannot verify that the Echo option value was generated by the server or the round-trip time is not below the threshold the request is not processed further, and an error message MAY be sent. The error message SHOULD include a new Echo option. The threshold \( T \) is application specific, its value depends e.g. on the freshness requirements of the request. An example message flow is illustrated in Figure 2.

Client | Server
-------|--------
\[ \text{\textbf{----------}} \] | Code: 0.03 (PUT)  
\[ \text{\textbf{PUT}} \] | Token: 0x41  
\[ \text{Uri-Path: lock} \] | Payload: 0 (Unlock)  
\[ \text{\textbf{<------}} \ t_0 \] | Code: 4.01 (Unauthorized)  
\[ \text{4.01} \] | Token: 0x41  
\[ \text{Echo: 0x437468756c687521} \]  
\[ \text{\textbf{----------}} \] | Code: 0.03 (PUT)  
\[ \text{\textbf{PUT}} \] | Token: 0x42  
\[ \text{Uri-Path: lock} \] | Payload: 0 (Unlock)  
\[ \text{\textbf{<------}} \ t_1 \] | Code: 2.04 (Changed)  
\[ \text{2.04} \] | Token: 0x42  

Figure 2: Example Echo Option Message Flow

Note that the server does not have to synchronize the time used for the Echo timestamps with any other party. However, if the server loses time continuity, e.g. due to reboot, it MUST reject all Echo values that was created before time continuity was lost.
When used to serve freshness requirements (including client aliveness and state synchronizing), CoAP messages containing the Echo option MUST be integrity protected between the intended endpoints, e.g. using DTLS, TLS, or an OSCORE Inner option ([I-D.ietf-core-object-security]). When used to demonstrate reachability at their apparent network address, the Echo option MAY be unprotected.

A CoAP-to-CoAP proxy MAY respond to requests with 4.01 with an Echo option to ensure the client’s reachability at its apparent address, and MUST remove the Echo option it recognizes as one generated by itself on follow-up requests. However, it MUST relay the Echo option of responses unmodified, and MUST relay the Echo option of requests it does not recognize as generated by itself unmodified.

The CoAP server side of CoAP-to-HTTP proxies MAY request freshness, especially if they have reason to assume that access may require it (e.g. because it is a PUT or POST); how this is determined is out of scope for this document. The CoAP client side of HTTP-to-CoAP proxies SHOULD respond to Echo challenges themselves if they know from the recent establishing of the connection that the HTTP request is fresh. Otherwise, they SHOULD respond with 503 Service Unavailable, Retry-After: 0 and terminate any underlying Keep-Alive connection. They MAY also use other mechanisms to establish freshness of the HTTP request that are not specified here.

2.3. Applications

1. Actuation requests often require freshness guarantees to avoid accidental or malicious delayed actuator actions. In general, all non-safe methods (e.g. POST, PUT, DELETE) may require freshness guarantees for secure operation.

   * The same Echo value may be used for multiple actuation requests to the same server, as long as the total round-trip time since the Echo option value was generated is below the freshness threshold.

   * For actuator applications with low delay tolerance, to avoid additional round-trips for multiple requests in rapid sequence, the server may include the Echo option with a new value in response to a request containing the Echo option. The client then uses the Echo option with the new value in the next actuation request, and the server compares the receive time accordingly.

2. A server may use the Echo option to synchronize state or time with a requesting client. A server MUST NOT synchronize state or
time with clients which are not the authority of the property being synchronized. E.g. if access to a server resource is dependent on time, then the client MUST NOT set the time of the server.

* If a server reboots during operation it may need to synchronize state or time before continuing the interaction. For example, with OSCORE it is possible to reuse a partly persistently stored security context by synchronizing the Partial IV (sequence number) using the Echo option, see Section 7.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

* A device joining a CoAP group communication [RFC7390] protected with OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] may be required to initially verify freshness and synchronize state or time with a client by using the Echo option in a unicast response to a multicast request. The client receiving the response with the Echo option includes the Echo option with the same value in a request, either in a unicast request to the responding server, or in a subsequent group request. In the latter case, the Echo option will be ignored except by responding server.

3. A server that sends large responses to unauthenticated peers SHOULD mitigate amplification attacks such as described in Section 11.3 of [RFC7252] (where an attacker would put a victim’s address in the source address of a CoAP request). For this purpose, a server MAY ask a client to Echo its request to verify its source address. This needs to be done only once per peer and limits the range of potential victims from the general Internet to endpoints that have been previously in contact with the server. For this application, the Echo option can be used in messages that are not integrity protected, for example during discovery.

* In the presence of a proxy, a server will not be able to distinguish different origin client endpoints. Following from the recommendation above, a proxy that sends large responses to unauthenticated peers SHOULD mitigate amplification attacks. The proxy MAY use Echo to verify origin reachability as described in Section 2.2. The proxy MAY forward idempotent requests immediately to have a cached result available when the client’s Echoed request arrives.

4. A server may want to use the request freshness provided by the Echo to verify the aliveness of a client. Note that in a deployment with hop-by-hop security and proxies, the server can only verify aliveness of the closest proxy.
3. The Request-Tag Option

The Request-Tag is intended for use as a short-lived identifier for keeping apart distinct blockwise request operations on one resource from one client, addressing the issue described in Section 1.2. It enables the receiving server to reliably assemble request payloads (blocks) to their message bodies, and, if it chooses to support it, to reliably process simultaneous blockwise request operations on a single resource. The requests must be integrity protected in order to protect against interchange of blocks between different message bodies.

In essence, it is an implementation of the "proxy-safe elective option" used just to "vary the cache key" as suggested in [RFC7959] Section 2.4.

3.1. Option Format

The Request-Tag option is not critical, is safe to forward, repeatable, and part of the cache key, see Figure 3, which extends Table 4 of [RFC7252]).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Len.</th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Request-Tag</td>
<td>opaque</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Critical, U = Unsafe, N = NoCacheKey, R = Repeatable, E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (when using OSCORE)

Figure 3: Request-Tag Option Summary

[ Note to RFC editor: If this document is released before core-object-security, then the following paragraph and the "E"/"U" columns above need to move into core-object-security, as they are defined in that draft. ]

Request-Tag, like the block options, is both a class E and a class U option in terms of OSCORE processing (see Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]): The Request-Tag MAY be an inner or outer option. It influences the inner or outer block operation, respectively. The inner and outer values are therefore independent of each other. The inner option is encrypted and integrity protected between client and server, and provides message body identification in case of end-to-end fragmentation of requests. The outer option is visible to proxies and labels message bodies in case of hop-by-hop fragmentation of requests.
The Request-Tag option is only used in the request messages of blockwise operations.

The Request-Tag mechanism can be applied independently on the server and client sides of CoAP-to-CoAP proxies as are the block options, though given it is safe to forward, a proxy is free to just forward it when processing an operation. CoAP-to-HTTP proxies and HTTP-to-CoAP proxies can use Request-Tag on their CoAP sides; it is not applicable to HTTP requests.

3.2. Request-Tag Processing by Servers

The Request-Tag option does not require any particular processing on the server side outside of the processing already necessary for any unknown elective proxy-safe cache-key option: The option varies the properties that distinguish blockwise operations (which includes all options except elective NoCacheKey and except Block1/2), and thus the server can not treat messages with a different list of Request-Tag options as belonging to the same operation.

To keep utilizing the cache, a server (including proxies) MAY discard the Request-Tag option from an assembled block-wise request when consulting its cache, as the option relates to the operation-on-the-wire and not its semantics. For example, a FETCH request with the same body as an older one can be served from the cache if the older’s Max-Age has not expired yet, even if the second operation uses a Request-Tag and the first did not. (This is similar to the situation about ETag in that it is formally part of the cache key, but implementations that are aware of its meaning can cache more efficiently, see [RFC7252] Section 5.4.2).

A server receiving a Request-Tag MUST treat it as opaque and make no assumptions about its content or structure.

Two messages carrying the same Request-Tag is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being part of the same operation. They can still be treated as independent messages by the server (e.g. when it sends 2.01/2.04 responses for every block), or initiate a new operation (overwriting kept context) when the later message carries Block1 number 0.

As it has always been, a server that can only serve a limited number of block-wise operations at the same time can delay the start of the operation by replying with 5.03 (Service unavailable) and a Max-Age indicating how long it expects the existing operation to go on, or it can forget about the state established with the older operation and respond with 4.08 (Request Entity Incomplete) to later blocks on the first operation.
3.3. Setting the Request-Tag

For each separate blockwise request operation, the client can choose a Request-Tag value, or choose not to set a Request-Tag. Starting a request operation matchable to a previous operation and even using the same Request-Tag value is called request tag recycling. The absence of a Request-Tag option is viewed as a value distinct from all values with a single Request-Tag option set; starting a request operation matchable to a previous operation where neither has a Request-Tag option therefore constitutes request tag recycling just as well (also called "recycling the absent option").

Clients MUST NOT recycle a request tag unless the first operation has concluded. What constitutes a concluded operation depends on the application, and is outlined individually in Section 3.4.

When Block1 and Block2 are combined in an operation, the Request-Tag of the Block1 phase is set in the Block2 phase as well for otherwise the request would have a different set of options and would not be recognized any more.

Clients are encouraged to generate compact messages. This means sending messages without Request-Tag options whenever possible, and using short values when the absent option can not be recycled.

3.4. Applications

3.4.1. Body Integrity Based on Payload Integrity

When a client fragments a request body into multiple message payloads, even if the individual messages are integrity protected, it is still possible for a man-in-the-middle to maliciously replace a later operation’s blocks with an earlier operation’s blocks (see Section 2.5 of [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]). Therefore, the integrity protection of each block does not extend to the operation’s request body.

In order to gain that protection, use the Request-Tag mechanism as follows:

- The individual exchanges MUST be integrity protected end-to-end between client and server.
- The client MUST NOT recycle a request tag in a new operation unless the previous operation matchable to the new one has concluded.
If any future security mechanisms allow a block-wise transfer to continue after an endpoint’s details (like the IP address) have changed, then the client MUST consider messages sent to _any_ endpoint address within the new operation’s security context.

- The client MUST NOT regard a blockwise request operation as concluded unless all of the messages the client previously sent in the operation have been confirmed by the message integrity protection mechanism, or are considered invalid by the server if replayed.

  Typically, in OSCORE, these confirmations can result either from the client receiving an OSCORE response message matching the request (an empty ACK is insufficient), or because the message’s sequence number is old enough to be outside the server’s receive window.

  In DTLS, this can only be confirmed if the request message was not retransmitted, and was responded to.

Authors of other documents (e.g. [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) are invited to mandate this behavior for clients that execute blockwise interactions over secured transports. In this way, the server can rely on a conforming client to set the Request-Tag option when required, and thereby conclude on the integrity of the assembled body.

Note that this mechanism is implicitly implemented when the security layer guarantees ordered delivery (e.g. CoAP over TLS [RFC8323]). This is because with each message, any earlier message can not be replayed any more, so the client never needs to set the Request-Tag option unless it wants to perform concurrent operations.

3.4.2. Multiple Concurrent Blockwise Operations

CoAP clients, especially CoAP proxies, may initiate a blockwise request operation to a resource, to which a previous one is already in progress, which the new request should not cancel. A CoAP proxy would be in such a situation when it forwards operations with the same cache-key options but possibly different payloads.

For those cases, Request-Tag is the proxy-safe elective option suggested in [RFC7959] Section 2.4 last paragraph.

When initializing a new blockwise operation, a client has to look at other active operations:
o If any of them is matchable to the new one, and the client neither wants to cancel the old one nor postpone the new one, it can pick a Request-Tag value that is not in use by the other matchable operations for the new operation.

o Otherwise, it can start the new operation without setting the Request-Tag option on it.

3.4.3. Simplified Block-Wise Handling for Constrained Proxies

The Block options were defined to be unsafe to forward because a proxy that would forward blocks as plain messages would risk mixing up clients’ requests.

The Request-Tag option provides a very simple way for a proxy to keep them separate: if it appends a Request-Tag that is particular to the requesting endpoint to all request carrying any Block option, it does not need to keep track of any further block state.

This is particularly useful to proxies that strive for stateless operation as described in [I-D.hartke-core-stateless] Section 3.1.

3.5. Rationale for the Option Properties

The Request-Tag option can be elective, because to servers unaware of the Request-Tag option, operations with differing request tags will not be matchable.

The Request-Tag option can be safe to forward but part of the cache key, because to proxies unaware of the Request-Tag option will consider operations with differing request tags unmatchable but can still forward them.

The Request-Tag option is repeatable because this easily allows stateless proxies to "chain" their origin address. Were it a single option, they would need to employ some length/value scheme to avoid confusing requests without a Request-Tag option with requests that carry a zero-length request tag.

In earlier versions of this draft, the Request-Tag option used to be critical and unsafe to forward. That design was based on an erroneous understanding of which blocks could be composed according to [RFC7959].
3.6. Rationale for Introducing the Option

An alternative that was considered to the Request-Tag option for coping with the problem of fragmented message body integrity (Section 3.4.1) was to update [RFC7959] to say that blocks could only be assembled if their fragments’ order corresponded to the sequence numbers.

That approach would have been difficult to roll out reliably on DTLS where many implementations do not expose sequence numbers, and would still not prevent attacks like in [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators] Section 2.5.2.

4. Block2 / ETag Processing

The same security properties as in Section 3.4.1 can be obtained for blockwise response operations. The threat model here is not an attacker (because the response is made sure to belong to the current request by the security layer), but blocks in the client’s cache.

Rules stating that response body reassembly is conditional on matching ETag values are already in place from Section 2.4 of [RFC7959].

To gain equivalent protection to Section 3.4.1, a server MUST use the Block2 option in conjunction with the ETag option ([RFC7252], Section 5.10.6), and MUST NOT use the same ETag value for different representations of a resource.

5. Token Processing

As described in Section 1.3, the client must be able to verify that a response corresponds to a particular request. This section updates the Token processing in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC7252] by adding the following text:

When CoAP is used with a security protocol not providing bindings between requests and responses, the client MUST NOT reuse tokens until the traffic keys have been replaced. The easiest way to accomplish this is to implement the Token as a counter, this approach SHOULD be followed.

6. Security Considerations

The availability of a secure pseudorandom number generator and truly random seeds are essential for the security of the Echo option. If no true random number generator is available, a truly random seed must be provided from an external source.
An Echo value with 64 (pseudo-)random bits gives the same theoretical security level against forgeries as a 64-bit MAC (as used in e.g. AES_128_CCM_8). In practice, forgery of an Echo option value is much harder as an attacker must also forge the MAC in the security protocol. The Echo option value MUST contain 32 (pseudo-)random bits that are not predictable for any other party than the server, and SHOULD contain 64 (pseudo-)random bits. A server MAY use different security levels for different uses cases (client aliveness, request freshness, state synchronization, network address reachability, etc.).

The security provided by the Echo and Request-Tag options depends on the security protocol used. CoAP and HTTP proxies require (D)TLS to be terminated at the proxies. The proxies are therefore able to manipulate, inject, delete, or reorder options or packets. The security claims in such architectures only hold under the assumption that all intermediaries are fully trusted and have not been compromised.

Servers MUST use a monotonic clock to generate timestamps and compute round-trip times. Use of non-monotonic clocks is not secure as the server will accept expired Echo option values if the clock is moved backward. The server will also reject fresh Echo option values if the clock is moved forward.

Servers are not allowed to use wall clock time for timestamps, as wall clock time is not monotonic. Furthermore, an attacker may be able to affect the server’s wall clock time in various ways such as setting up a fake NTP server or broadcasting false time signals to radio-controlled clocks.

Servers MAY use the time since reboot measured in some unit of time. Servers MAY reset the timer at certain times and MAY generate a random offset applied to all timestamps. When resetting the timer, the server MUST reject all Echo values that was created before the reset.

Servers that use the List of Cached Random Values and Timestamps method described in Appendix A may be vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks. One way to minimize state is to use the Integrity Protected Timestamp method described in Appendix A.

7. Privacy Considerations

Implementations SHOULD NOT put any privacy sensitive information in the Echo or Request-Tag option values. Unencrypted timestamps MAY reveal information about the server such as location or time since reboot. The use of wall clock time is not allowed (see Section 6)
and there also privacy reasons, e.g. it may reveal that the server will accept expired certificates. Timestamps MAY be used if Echo is encrypted between the client and the server, e.g. in the case of DTLS without proxies or when using OSCORE with an Inner Echo option.

8. IANA Considerations

This document adds the following option numbers to the "CoAP Option Numbers" registry defined by [RFC7252]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD1</td>
<td>Echo</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD2</td>
<td>Request-Tag</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: CoAP Option Numbers

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References
[I-D.hartke-core-stateless]
Hartke, K., "Extended Tokens and Stateless Clients in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-hartke-core-stateless-01 (work in progress), September 2018.

[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]

[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]

[I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]


Appendix A. Methods for Generating Echo Option Values

The content and structure of the Echo option value are implementation specific and determined by the server. Two simple mechanisms are outlined in this section, the first is RECOMMENDED in general, and the second is RECOMMENDED in case the Echo option is encrypted between the client and the server.

Different mechanisms have different tradeoffs between the size of the Echo option value, the amount of server state, the amount of computation, and the security properties offered. A server MAY use different methods and security levels for different uses cases (client aliveness, request freshness, state synchronization, network address reachability, etc.).

1. List of Cached Random Values and Timestamps. The Echo option value is a (pseudo-)random byte string. The server caches a list containing the random byte strings and their transmission times. Assuming 64-bit random values and 32-bit timestamps, the size of the Echo option value is 8 bytes and the amount of server state is 12n bytes, where n is the number of active Echo Option values. If the server loses time continuity, e.g. due to reboot, the entries in the old list MUST be deleted.

   Echo option value: random value r
   Server State: random value r, timestamp t0

2. Integrity Protected Timestamp. The Echo option value is an integrity protected timestamp. The timestamp can have different resolution and range. A 32-bit timestamp can e.g. give a resolution of 1 second with a range of 136 years. The (pseudo-)random secret key is generated by the server and not shared with any other party. The use of truncated HMAC-SHA-256 is RECOMMENDED. With a 32-bit timestamp and a 64-bit MAC, the size of the Echo option value is 12 bytes and the Server state is small and constant. If the server loses time continuity, e.g. due to reboot, the old key MUST be deleted and replaced by a new random secret key. Note that the privacy considerations in Section 7 may apply to the timestamp. A server MAY want to encrypt its timestamps, and, depending on the choice of encryption algorithms, this may require a nonce to be included in the Echo option value.

   Echo option value: timestamp t0, MAC(k, t0)
   Server State: secret key k

Other mechanisms complying with the security and privacy considerations may be used. The use of encrypted timestamps in the Echo option typically requires an IV to be included in the Echo
option value, which adds overhead and makes the specification of such a mechanism slightly more complicated than the two mechanisms specified here.

Appendix B. Request-Tag Message Size Impact

In absence of concurrent operations, the Request-Tag mechanism for body integrity (Section 3.4.1) incurs no overhead if no messages are lost (more precisely: in OSCORE, if no operations are aborted due to repeated transmission failure; in DTLS, if no packages are lost), or when blockwise request operations happen rarely (in OSCORE, if there is always only one request blockwise operation in the replay window).

In those situations, no message has any Request-Tag option set, and that can be recycled indefinitely.

When the absence of a Request-Tag option can not be recycled any more within a security context, the messages with a present but empty Request-Tag option can be used (1 Byte overhead), and when that is used-up, 256 values from one byte long options (2 Bytes overhead) are available.

In situations where those overheads are unacceptable (e.g. because the payloads are known to be at a fragmentation threshold), the absent Request-Tag value can be made usable again:

- In DTLS, a new session can be established.

- In OSCORE, the sequence number can be artificially increased so that all lost messages are outside of the replay window by the time the first request of the new operation gets processed, and all earlier operations can therefore be regarded as concluded.

Appendix C. Change Log

[ The editor is asked to remove this section before publication. ]

- Major changes since draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-01:
  - Follow-up changes after the "relying on blockwise" change in -01:
    - Simplify the description of Request-Tag and matchability
    - Do not update RFC7959 any more
  - Make Request-Tag repeatable.
* Add rationale on not relying purely on sequence numbers.

- Major changes since draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-00:
  - Reworded the Echo section.
  - Added rules for Token processing.
  - Added security considerations.
  - Added actual IANA section.
  - Made Request-Tag optional and safe-to-forward, relying on blockwise to treat it as part of the cache-key.
  - Dropped use case about OSCORE outer-blockwise (the case went away when its Partial IV was moved into the Object-Security option).

- Major changes since draft-amsuess-core-repeat-request-tag-00:
  - The option used for establishing freshness was renamed from "Repeat" to "Echo" to reduce confusion about repeatable options.
  - The response code that goes with Echo was changed from 4.03 to 4.01 because the client needs to provide better credentials.
  - The interaction between the new option and (cross) proxies is now covered.
  - Two messages being "Request-Tag matchable" was introduced to replace the older concept of having a request tag value with its slightly awkward equivalence definition.

Acknowledgments

The authors want to thank Jim Schaad for providing valuable input to the draft.

Authors’ Addresses

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Abstract

The presence of Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) proxies may lead to infinite forwarding loops, which is undesirable. To prevent and detect such loops, this document specifies the Hop-Limit CoAP option.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

More and more applications are using Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] as a communication protocol between involved application agents. For example, [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] specifies how CoAP is used as a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack signaling protocol seeking for help from DDoS mitigation providers. In such contexts, a CoAP client can communicate directly with a server or indirectly via proxies.

When multiple proxies are involved, infinite forwarding loops may be experienced. To prevent such loops, this document defines a new CoAP option, called Hop-Limit, which is inserted in particular by on-path proxies. Also, the document defines a new CoAP Response Code to report loops together with relevant diagnostic information to ease troubleshooting.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Readers should be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in [RFC7252].

Within this document, CoAP agent refers to both CoAP client and CoAP proxy.
3. Hop-Limit Option

Hop-Limit option (see Section 4.2) is an elective option used to detect and prevent infinite loops when proxies are involved. Only one single instance of the option is allowed in a message. Therefore, any message carrying multiple Hop-Limit option instances MUST be rejected using 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

The value of the Hop-Limit option is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer (see Section 3.2 of [RFC7252]). This value MUST be between 1 and 255 inclusive. CoAP messages received with a Hop-Limit option set to '0' or greater than '255' MUST be rejected by a CoAP agent using 4.00 (Bad Request).

The Hop-Limit option is safe to forward. That is, a CoAP proxy which does not understand the Hop-Limit option should forward it on.

If a CoAP proxy receives a request which does not include a Hop-Limit option, it SHOULD insert a Hop-Limit option when relaying the request to a next hop (absent explicit policy/configuration otherwise).

The initial Hop-Limit value SHOULD be configurable. If no initial value is explicitly provided, the default initial Hop-Limit value of 16 MUST be used. This value is chosen to be sufficiently large to guarantee that a CoAP request would not be dropped in networks when there were no loops, but not so large as to consume CoAP proxy resources when a loop does occur. Lower values should be used with caution and only in networks where topologies are known by the CoAP agent inserting the Hop-Limit option.

Because forwarding errors may occur if inadequate Hop-Limit values are used, proxies at the boundaries of an administrative domain MAY be instructed to remove or rewrite the value of Hop-Limit carried in received messages (i.e., ignore the value of Hop-Limit received in a message). This modification should be done with caution in case proxy-forwarded traffic repeatedly crosses the administrative domain boundary in a loop and so Hop-Limit detection gets broken.

Otherwise, each intermediate proxy, which understands the Hop-Limit option, involved in the handling of a CoAP message MUST decrement the Hop-Limit option value by 1 prior to forwarding upstream if this parameter exists.

CoAP messages MUST NOT be forwarded if the Hop-Limit option is set to '0' after decrement. Messages that cannot be forwarded because of exhausted Hop-Limit SHOULD be logged with a TBA1 (Hop Limit Reached) error message sent back to the CoAP peer. It is RECOMMENDED that
CoAP agents support means to alert administrators about loop errors so that appropriate actions are undertaken.

To ease debugging and troubleshooting, the CoAP proxy which detects a loop SHOULD include its information (e.g., proxy name, proxy alias, IP address) in the diagnostic payload under the conditions detailed in Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252].

Each intermediate proxy involved in relaying a TBA1 (Hop Limit Reached) error message SHOULD prepend its own information in the diagnostic payload with a space character used as separator. Only one information per proxy SHOULD appear in the diagnostic payload. Doing so allows to limit the size of the TBA1 (Hop Limit Reached) error message, and to ease correlation with hops count.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. CoAP Response Code

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#response-codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBA1</td>
<td>Hop Limit Reached</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: CoAP Response Codes

4.2. CoAP Option Number

IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "CoAP Option Numbers" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#option-numbers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBA2</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hop-Limit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=NoCacheKey, R=Repeatable

Table 2: CoAP Option Number
5. Security Considerations

Security considerations related to CoAP proxying are discussed in Section 11.2 of [RFC7252].

The diagnostic payload of a TBA1 (Hop Limit Reached) error message may leak sensitive information revealing the topology of an administrative domain. To prevent that, a CoAP proxy which is located at the boundary of an administrative domain MAY be instructed to strip the diagnostic payload or part of it before forwarding on the TBA1 response.

6. Acknowledgements

This specification was part of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. Many thanks to those who reviewed DOTS specifications.

Thanks to Klaus Hartke, Carsten Bormann, Peter van der Stok, and Jim Schaad for the review.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses
Abstract

This document defines a set of Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format Interface Descriptions [RFC6690] applicable for use in constrained environments. These include the: Actuator, Parameter, Read-only parameter, Sensor, Batch, Linked Batch and Link List interfaces.

The Batch, Linked Batch and Link List interfaces make use of resource collections. This document further describes how collections relate to interfaces.

Many applications require a set of interface descriptions in order to provide the required functionality. This document defines an Interface Description attribute value to describe resources conforming to a particular interface.

Editor's notes:

- The git repository for the draft is found at https://github.com/core-wg/interfaces

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

IETF Standards for machine to machine communication in constrained environments describe a REST protocol and a set of related information standards that may be used to represent machine data and machine metadata in REST interfaces. CoRE Link-format is a standard for doing Web Linking [RFC8288] in constrained environments. SenML [RFC8428] is a simple data model and representation format for composite and complex structured resources. CoRE Link-Format and SenML can be used by CoAP [RFC7252] or HTTP servers.

The discovery of resources offered by a constrained server is very important in machine-to-machine applications where there are no humans in the loop. Machine application clients must be able to adapt to different resource organizations without advance knowledge of the specific data structures hosted by each connected thing. The use of Web Linking for the description and discovery of resources hosted by constrained origin servers is specified by CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]. CoRE Link Format additionally defines a link attribute for interface description ("if") that can be used to describe the REST interface of a resource, and may include a link to a description document.

This document defines a set of Link Format interface descriptions for some common design patterns that enable the server side composition and organization, and client side discovery and consumption, of machine resources using Web Linking. A client discovering the "if" link attribute will be able to consume resources based on its knowledge of the expected interface types. In this sense the Interface Type acts in a similar way as a Content-Format, but as a selector for a high level functional abstraction.

An interface description describes a resource in terms of its associated content formats, data types, URI templates, REST methods, parameters, and responses. Basic interface descriptions are defined for sensors, and actuators.

A set of collection types is defined for organizing resources for discovery, and for various forms of bulk interaction with resource sets using typed embedding links.

This document first defines the concept of collection interface descriptions. It then defines a number of generic interface descriptions that may be used in constrained environments. Several of these interface descriptions utilise collections.

Whilst this document assumes the use of CoAP [RFC7252], the REST interfaces described can also be realized using HTTP [RFC7230].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

This document requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [RFC8288] and [RFC6690]. This document makes use of the following additional terminology:

Gradual Reveal: A REST design where resources are discovered progressively using Web Linking.

Interface Description: The Interface Description describes the generic REST interface to interact with a resource or a set of resources. Its use is described via the Interface Description "if" attribute which is an opaque string used to provide a name or URI indicating a specific interface definition used to interact with the target resource. One can think of this as describing verbs usable on a resource.

Resource Discovery: The process allowing a client to identify resources being hosted on an origin server.

3. Collections
3.1. Introduction to Collections

A Collection is a resource which represents one or more related resources. [RFC6573] describes the "item" and "collection" Link Relation. An "item" link relation identifies a member of collection. A "collection" indicates the collection that an item is a member of. For example, a collection might be a resource representing a catalog of products, while an item is a resource related to an individual product.

Section 1.2.2/[RFC6690] also describes resource collections.

This document uses the concept of "collection" and applies it to interface descriptions. A collection interface description consists of a set of links and a set of items pointed to by the links which may be sub-resources of the collection resource. The collection interface descriptions described in this document are Link List, Batch and Linked Batch.

The links in a collection are represented in CoRE Link-Format Content-Formats including JSON and CBOR variants, and the items in the collection may be represented by SenML, including JSON and CBOR variants. In general, a collection may support items of any available Content-Format.

A particular resource item may be a member of more than one collection at a time by being linked to, but may only be a subresource of one collection.

Some collections may have pre-configured items and links, and some collections may support dynamic creation and removal of items and links. Likewise, modification of items in some collections may be permitted, and not in others.

Links in collections may be selected for processing by a particular request by using Query Filtering as described in CoRE Link-Format [RFC6690].

3.2. Use Cases for Collections

Collections may be used to provide gradual reveal of resources on an endpoint. There may be a small set of links at the .well-known/core location, which may in turn point to other collections of resources that represent device information, device configuration, device management, and various functional clusters of resources on the device.
A collection may be used to group a set of like resources for bulk state update or actuation. For example, the brightness control resources of a number of luminaries may be grouped by linking to them in a collection. The collection type may support receiving a single update from a client and sending that update to each resource item in the collection.

Items may be sub-resources of the collection resource. This enables updates to multiple items in the collection to be processed together within the context of the collection resource.

3.3. Collection Types

There are three collection types defined in this document:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Type</th>
<th>if</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Link List</td>
<td>core.ll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batch</td>
<td>core.b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Batch</td>
<td>core.lb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Collection Type Summary

The interface description defined in this document offer a deeper explanation of the methods that may be applied to the three collections.

3.4. Content-Formats for Collections

The collection interfaces can use the CoRE Link-Format for the link representations and SenML or text/plain for representations of items. The examples given are for collections that expose resources and links in these formats.

The choice of whether to return a representation of the links or of the items or of the collection format is determined by the Accept header option in the request. Likewise, the choice of updating link metadata or item data or the collection resource itself is determined by the Content-Format option in the header of the update request operation.

The default Content-Formats for collection types described in this document are:
3.5. Link Embedding

Collections may provide resource encapsulation by supporting link embedding. Link embedding may be used to provide a single resource with which a client may interact to obtain a set of related resource values. This is analogous to an image tag (link) causing the image to display inline in a browser window. Link embedding enables the bulk processing of items in the collection using a single operation targeting the collection resource. Performing a GET on a collection resource may return a single representation containing all of the embedded linked resources. For example, a collection for manufacturer parameters may consist of manufacturer name, date of manufacture, location of manufacture, and serial number resources which can be read as a single SenML data object.

A subset of resources in the collection may be selected for operation using Query Filtering. Bulk Read operations using GET return a SenML representation of all selected resources. Bulk item Update operations using PUT or POST apply the payload document to all selected resource items in the collection. A Batch update is performed by applying the resource values in the payload document to all resources in the collection that match any resource name in the payload document.

3.6. Links and Items in Collections

Links use CoRE Link-Format representation by default and may point to any resource reachable from the context of the collection. This includes links to resources with absolute paths as well as links that point to other network locations, if the context of the collection allows. Links to sub-resources in the collection MUST have a path-element starting with the resource name, as per [RFC3986]. Links to resources in the global context MUST start with a root path identifier [RFC8288]. Links to other collections are formed per [RFC3986].

Examples of links:

`</sen/>;if="core.lb":` Link to the /sen/ collection describing it as a core.lb type collection (Linked Batch)

`</sen/temp>;rt="temperature":` A link to the temp resource with an absolute path.
<temp>;rt="temperature": Link to the temp subresource of the collection in which this link appears.

<temp>;anchor="/sen/": A link to the temp subresource of the collection /sen/ which is assumed not to be a subresource of the collection in which the link appears, but is expected to be identified in the collection by resource name.

Links in the collection MAY be Read, Updated, Added, or Removed using the CoRE Link-Format or JSON Merge-Patch Content-Formats on the collection resource. Reading links uses the GET method and returns an array or list containing the link-values of all selected links. Links may be added to the collection using POST or PATCH methods. Updates to links MUST use the PATCH method and MAY use query filtering to select links for updating. The PATCH method on links MUST use the JSON Merge-Patch Content-Format (application/merge-patch+json) specified in [RFC7396].

Items in the collection SHOULD be represented using the SenML (application/senml+json) or plain text (text/plain) Content-Formats, depending on whether the representation is of a single data point or multiple data points. Items MAY be represented using any supported Content-Format.

3.7. Queries on Collections

Collections MAY support query filtering as defined in CoRE Link-Format [RFC6690]. Operations targeting either the links or the items MAY select a subset of links and items in the collection by using query filtering. The Content-Format specified in the request header selects whether the links or items are targeted by the operation.

3.8. Observing Collections

Resource Observation via [I-D.ietf-core-dynlink] using CoAP [RFC7252] MAY be supported on items in a collection. A subset of the conditional observe parameters MAY be specified to apply. In most cases pmin and pmax are useful. Resource observation on a collection’s resource returns the collection representation. Observation Responses, or notifications, SHOULD provide the collection representations in SenML Content-Format. Notifications MAY include multiple observations of the collection resource, with SenML time stamps indicating the observation times.
4. Interface Descriptions

This section defines REST interfaces for Sensor, Parameter, Read-Only Parameter and Actuator resource types, in addition to the Link List, Batch and Linked Batch collection types. Each type is described along with its Interface Description attribute value, valid methods and content formats. These are shown for each interface in the table below.

The if= column defines the Interface Description (if=) attribute value to be used in the CoRE Link Format for a resource conforming to that interface. When this value appears in the if= attribute of a link, the resource MUST support the corresponding REST interface described in this section. The resource MAY support additional functionality, which is out of scope for this document. Although these interface descriptions are intended to be used with the CoRE Link Format, they are applicable for use in any REST interface definition.

The Methods column defines the methods supported by that interface, which are described in more detail below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interface</th>
<th>if=</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Content-Formats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Link List</td>
<td>core.ll</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td>link-format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batch</td>
<td>core.b</td>
<td>GET, PUT, POST</td>
<td>senml</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Batch</td>
<td>core.lb</td>
<td>GET, PUT, POST,</td>
<td>link-format, senml</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensor</td>
<td>core.s</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td>senml,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>core.p</td>
<td>GET, PUT</td>
<td>senml,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read-only</td>
<td>core rp</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td>senml,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>core.a</td>
<td>GET, PUT, POST</td>
<td>senml,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actuator</td>
<td></td>
<td>GET, PUT, POST</td>
<td>text/plain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Interface Description Summary

The following is an example of links in the CoRE Link Format using these interface descriptions.

Req: GET /.well-known/core
Res: 2.05 Content (application/link-format)
&lt;/s/;rt="simple.sen";if="core.b",
&lt;/s/light>;rt="simple.sen.lt";if="core.s",
&lt;/s/temp>;rt="simple.sen.tmp";if="core.s";obs,
&lt;/s/humidity>;rt="simple.sen.hum";if="core.s",
&lt;/a/;rt="simple.act";if="core.b",
&lt;/a/1/led>;rt="simple.act.led";if="core.a",
&lt;/a/2/led>;rt="simple.act.led";if="core.a",
&lt;/d/;rt="simple.dev";if="core.ll",
&lt;/l/;if="core.lb"

Figure 1: Binding Interface Example
4.1. Link List

Link List is the base interface to provide gradual reveal of resources on a CoRE origin server. It is used to retrieve (GET) a list of resources on an origin server. The GET request SHOULD contain an Accept option with the application/link-format content format. However if the resource does not support any other form of content-format the Accept option MAY be elided.

Note: The use of an Accept option with application/link-format is recommended even though it is not strictly needed for the Link List interface because this interface is extended by the batch and linked batch interfaces where different content-formats are possible.

The request returns a list of URI references with absolute paths to the resources as defined in CoRE Link Format. This interface is typically used with a parent resource to enumerate sub-resources but may be used to reference any resource on an origin server.

The following example interacts with a Link List /d/ containing Parameter sub-resources /d/name, /d/model.

Req: GET /d/ (Accept:application/link-format)
Res: 2.05 Content (application/link-format)
   </d/name>;rt="simple.dev.n";if="core.p",
   </d/model>;rt="simple.dev.mdl";if="core,rp"

4.2. Batch

The Batch interface is used to manipulate a collection of sub-resources at the same time. The Batch interface description supports the same methods as its sub-resources, and can be used to read (GET), update (PUT) or apply (POST) the values of those sub-resource with a single resource representation. The sub-resources of a Batch MAY be heterogeneous. Hence, a method used on the Batch only applies to sub-resources that support it. For example Sensor interfaces do not support PUT, and thus a PUT request to a Sensor member of that Batch would be ignored. A batch requires the use of SenML Media types in order to support multiple sub-resources.

The following example interacts with a Batch /s/ with Sensor sub-resources /s/light, /s/temp and /s/humidity.
4.3. Linked Batch

The Linked Batch interface is an extension of the Batch interface. Contrary to the basic Batch which is a collection statically defined by the origin server, a Linked Batch is dynamically controlled by a client. A Linked Batch resource has no sub-resources. Instead the resources forming the batch are referenced using Web Linking [RFC8288] and the CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]. A request with a POST method and a content format of application/link-format simply appends new resource links to the collection. The links in the payload MUST reference a resource on the origin server with an absolute path. A DELETE request removes the entire collection. All other requests available for a basic Batch are still valid for a Linked Batch.

The following example interacts with a Linked Batch /l/ and creates a collection containing /s/light, /s/temp and /s/humidity in 2 steps.
4.4. Sensor

The Sensor interface allows the value of a sensor resource to be read (GET). The Media type of the resource can be either plain text or SenML. Plain text MAY be used for a single measurement that does not require meta-data. For a measurement with meta-data such as a unit or time stamp, SenML SHOULD be used. A resource with this interface MAY use SenML to return multiple measurements in the same representation, for example a list of recent measurements.

The following are examples of Sensor interface requests in both text/plain and application/senml+json.
4.5. Parameter

The Parameter interface allows configurable parameters and other information to be modeled as a resource. The value of the parameter can be read (GET) or update (PUT). Plain text or SenML Media types MAY be returned from this type of interface.

The following example shows request for reading and updating a parameter.

Req: GET /d/name
Res: 2.05 Content (text/plain)
node5

Req: PUT /d/name (text/plain)
outdoor
Res: 2.04 Changed

4.6. Read-only Parameter

The Read-only Parameter interface allows configuration parameters to be read (GET) but not updated. Plain text or SenML Media types MAY be returned from this type of interface.

The following example shows request for reading such a parameter.

Req: GET /d/model
Res: 2.05 Content (text/plain)
SuperNode200

4.7. Actuator

The Actuator interface is used by resources that model different kinds of actuators (changing its value has an effect on its environment). Examples of actuators include for example LEDs, relays, motor controllers and light dimmers. The current value of the actuator can be read (GET) or the actuator value can be updated
(PUT). In addition, this interface allows the use of POST to change the state of an actuator, for example to toggle between its possible values. Plain text or SenML Media types MAY be returned from this type of interface. A resource with this interface MAY use SenML to include multiple measurements in the same representation, for example a list of recent actuator values or a list of values to updated.

The following example shows requests for reading, setting and toggling an actuator (turning on a LED).

```
Req: GET /a/1/led
Res: 2.05 Content (text/plain)
    0

Req: PUT /a/1/led (text/plain)
    1
Res: 2.04 Changed

Req: POST /a/1/led (text/plain)
Res: 2.04 Changed

Req: GET /a/1/led
Res: 2.05 Content (text/plain)
    0
```

5. Security Considerations

An implementation of a client needs to be prepared to deal with responses to a request that differ from what is specified in this document. A server implementing what the client thinks is a resource with one of these interface descriptions could return malformed representations and response codes either by accident or maliciously. A server sending maliciously malformed responses could attempt to take advantage of a poorly implemented client for example to crash the node or perform denial of service. Conversely, a malicious client could attempt to write to arbitrary resources on a poorly implemented server described in a linked batch.

6. IANA Considerations

This document registers the following CoRE Interface Description (if=) Link Target Attribute Values.

6.1. Link List

Attribute Value: core.ll
Description: The Link List interface is used to retrieve a list of resources on an origin server.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor – please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None

6.2. Batch

Attribute Value: core.b

Description: The Batch interface is used to manipulate a collection of sub-resources at the same time.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor – please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None

6.3. Linked Batch

Attribute Value: core.lb

Description: The Linked Batch interface is an extension of the Batch interface. Contrary to the basic Batch which is a collection statically defined by the origin server, a Linked Batch is dynamically controlled by a client.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor – please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None

6.4. Sensor

Attribute Value: core.s

Description: The Sensor interface allows the value of a sensor resource to be read.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor – please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None
6.5. Parameter

Attribute Value: core.p

Description: The Parameter interface allows configurable parameters and other information to be modeled as a resource. The value of the parameter can be read or update.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor - please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None

6.6. Read-only parameter

Attribute Value: core,rp

Description: The Read-only Parameter interface allows configuration parameters to be read but not updated.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor - please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None

6.7. Actuator

Attribute Value: core.a

Description: The Actuator interface is used by resources that model different kinds of actuators (changing its value has an effect on its environment). Examples of actuators include LEDs, relays, motor controllers and light dimmers. The current value of the actuator can be read or the actuator value can be updated. In addition, this interface allows the use of POST to change the state of an actuator, for example to toggle between its possible values.

Reference: This document. Note to RFC Editor - please insert the appropriate RFC reference.

Notes: None

7. Acknowledgements

Acknowledgement is given to colleagues from the SENSEI project who were critical in the initial development of the well-known REST interface concept, to members of the IPSO Alliance where further
requirements for interface descriptions have been discussed, and to Szymon Sasin, Cedric Chauvenet, Daniel Gavelle and Carsten Bormann who have provided useful discussion and input to the concepts in this document. Ari Keraenen provided updated SenML examples. Christian Amsuss supplied a comprehensive review of draft -12.

8. Contributors

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9. Changelog

Changes from -12 to -13:
- SenML examples now use the Base Name (bn) labels from RFC 8428
- Security considerations discusses client misuse of linked batches

Changes from -11 to -12:
- Removed all text referring to function sets/profiles
- Clarified list collections
- Content-formats for collections and items rectified
- Simplified Appendix A and removed Appendix B

Changes from -10 to -11:
- Added a new Section 3.4 for Link Embedding
- Updated examples in Section 3.5
- Removed "Service Discovery" from Terminologies
- Removed discussion of function sets

Changes from -09 to -10:
- Section 1: Amendments to remove discussing properties. *
New author and editor added.

Changes from -08 to -09:

- Section 3.6: Modified to indicate that the entire collection resource is returned.
- General: Added editor’s note with open issues.

Changes from -07 to -08:

- Section 3.3: Modified Accepts to Accept header option.
- Addressed the editor’s note in Section 4.1 to clarify the use of the Accept option.

Changes from -06 to -07:

- Corrected Figure 1 sub-resource names e.g. tmp to temp and hum to humidity.
- Addressed the editor’s note in Section 4.2.
- Removed section on function sets and profiles as agreed to at the IETF#97.

Changes from -05 to -06:

- Updated the abstract.
- Section 1: Updated introduction.
- Section 2: Alphabetised the order
- Section 2: Removed the collections definition in favour of the complete definition in the collections section.
- Removed section 3 on interfaces in favour of an updated definition in section 1.3.
- General: Changed interface type to interface description as that is the term defined in RFC6690.
- Removed section on future interfaces.
- Section 8: Updated IANA considerations.
 Added Appendix A to discuss current state of the art wrt to collections, function sets etc.

Changes from -04 to -05:

- Removed Link Bindings and Observe attributes. This functionality is now contained in I-D.ietf-core-dynlink.
- Hypermedia collections have been removed. This is covered in a new T2TRG draft.
- The WADL description has been removed.
- Fixed minor typos.
- Updated references.

Changes from -03 to -04:

- Fixed tickets #385 and #386.
- Changed abstract and intro to better describe content.
- Focus on Interface and not function set/profiles in intro.
- Changed references from draft-core-observe to RFC7641.
- Moved Function sets and Profiles to section after Interfaces.
- Moved Observe Attributes to the Link Binding section.
- Add a Collection section to describe the collection types.
- Add the Hypermedia Collection Interface Description.

Changes from -02 to -03:

- Added lt and gt to binding format section.
- Added pmin and pmax observe parameters to Observation Attributes.
- Changed the definition of lt and gt to limit crossing.
- Added definitions for getattr and setattr to WADL.
- Added getattr and setattr to observable interfaces.
- Removed query parameters from Observe definition.
o Added observe-cancel definition to WADL and to observable interfaces.

Changes from -01 to -02:
o Updated the date and version, fixed references.
o "Removed pmin and pmax observe parameters "[Ticket #336]."

Changes from -00 to WG Document -01
o Improvements to the Function Set section.

Changes from -05 to WG Document -00
o Updated the date and version.

Changes from -04 to -05
o Made the Observation control parameters to be treated as resources rather than Observe query parameters. Added Less Than and Greater Than parameters.

Changes from -03 to -04
o Draft refresh

Changes from -02 to -03
o Added Bindings
o Updated all rt= and if= for the new Link Format IANA rules

Changes from -01 to -02
o Defined a Function Set and its guidelines.
o Added the Link List interface.
o Added the Linked Batch interface.
o Improved the WADL interface definition.
o Added a simple profile example.
10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Current Usage of Interfaces

Editor’s note: This appendix will be removed. It is only included for information.

This appendix analyses the current landscape with regards the definition and use of collections and interfaces. This should be considered when considering the scope of this document.

A.1. Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format (IETF)

[RFC6690] assumes that different deployments or application domains will define the appropriate REST Interface Descriptions along with Resource Types to make discovery meaningful. It highlights that collections are often used for these interfaces.
Whilst 3.2/[RFC6690] defines a new Interface Description ‘if’ attribute the procedures around it are about the naming of the interface not what information should be included in the documentation about the interface.

A.2. Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)

The OIC Core Specification [OIC-Core] most closely aligns with the work in this specification. It makes use of interface descriptions as per [RFC6690] and has registered several interface identifiers (https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#if-link-target-att-value). These interface descriptors are similar to those defined in this specification. From a high level perspective:

- links list: OCF (oic.if.ll) -> IETF (core.ll)  
  Note: it’s called "link list" in the IETF.
- linked batch: OCF (oic.if.b) -> IETF (core.lb)
- read-only: OCF (oic.if.r) -> IETF (core.rp)
- read-write: OCF (oic.if.rw) -> IETF (core.p)
- actuator: OCF (oic.if.a) -> IETF (core.a)
- sensor: OCF (oic.if.s) -> IETF (core.s)
- batch: No OCF equivalent -> IETF (core.b)

Some of the OCF interfaces make use of collections.

The OIC Core specification does not use the concept of function sets. It does however discuss the concept of profiles. The OCF defines two sets of documents. The core specification documents such as [OIC-Core] and vertical profile specification documents which provide specific information for specific applications. The OIC Smart Home Device Specification [OIC-SmartHome] is one such specification. It provides information on the resource model, discovery and data types.

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JavaScript Object Notation, JSON (RFC 8259) is a text-based data format which is popular for Web based data exchange. Concise Binary Object Representation, CBOR (RFC7049) is a binary data format which has been optimized for data exchange for the Internet of Things (IoT). For many IoT scenarios, CBOR formats will be preferred since it can help decrease transmission payload sizes as well as implementation code sizes compared to other data formats.

Web Linking (RFC 8288) provides a way to represent links between Web resources as well as the relations expressed by them and attributes of such a link. In constrained networks, a collection of Web links can be exchanged in the CoRE link format (RFC 6690). Outside of constrained environments, it may be useful to represent these collections of Web links in JSON, and similarly, inside constrained environments, in CBOR. This specification defines a common format for this.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on August 30, 2018.
1. Introduction

Web Linking [RFC8288] provides a way to represent links between Web resources as well as the relations expressed by them and attributes of such a link. In constrained networks, a collection of Web links can be exchanged in the CoRE link format [RFC6690] to enable resource discovery, for instance by using the CoAP protocol [RFC7252].
The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259] is a lightweight, text-based, language-independent data interchange format. JSON is popular in the Web development environment as it is easy for humans to read and write.

The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] is a binary data format which requires extremely small code size, allows very compact message representation, and provides extensibility without the need for version negotiation. CBOR is especially well suited for IoT environments because of these efficiencies.

When converting between a bespoke syntax such as that defined by [RFC6690] and JSON or CBOR, many small decisions have to be made. If left without guidance, it is likely that a number of slightly incompatible dialects will emerge. This specification defines a common format for representing CoRE Web Linking in JSON and CBOR.

Note that there is a separate question on how to represent Web links pointing out of JSON documents, as discussed for example in [MNOT11]. While there are good reasons to stay as compatible as possible to developments in this area, the present specification is solving a different problem.

1.1. Objectives

This specification has been designed based on the following objectives:

- Canonical mapping
  * lossless conversion in both directions between any pair of [RFC6690], JSON, and CBOR ("round-tripping"), unless prevented by a limitation of [RFC6690]
  * but not attempting to ensure that a sequence of conversions from one of the formats through one or both of the others and back to the original would result in a bit-wise identical representation
- The simplest thing that could possibly work.

While the formats defined in this document are based on the above objectives, they are general enough that they can be used for other applications of links in the Web. The same basic formats can be used for Web links that do not default to the "hosts" relation type (as is defined in [RFC6690]) and that allow percent encoding and general IRI syntax in what is an URI-Reference field in [RFC6690]. Also, specific support has been added for internationalized link attributes.
such as "title*", including their language tags (while staying limited to UTF-8 as the character set).

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The term "byte" is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

CoAP: Constrained Application Protocol [RFC7252]

CBOR: Concise Binary Object Representation [RFC7049]

CoRE: Constrained RESTful Environments, the field of work underlying [RFC6690], [RFC7049], [RFC7252], [RFC7641], [RFC7959], [RFC8075], and [RFC8323]

IoT: Internet of Things

JSON: JavaScript Object Notation [RFC8259]

The objective of the JSON and CBOR mappings defined in this document is to contain information of the formats specified in [RFC8288] and [RFC6690]. This specification therefore uses the names of the ABNF productions used in those documents.

2. Web Links in JSON and CBOR

2.1. Background

Web Linking [RFC8288] provides a way to represent links between Web resources as well as the relations expressed by them and attributes of such a link. In constrained networks, a collection of Web links can be exchanged in the CoRE link format [RFC6690] to enable resource discovery, for instance by using the CoAP protocol [RFC7252] and in conjunction with the CoRE resource directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

2.2. Information Model

This section discusses the information model underlying the CORE Link Format payload.
An "application/link-format" document is a collection of Web links ("link-value"), each of which is a collection of attributes ("link-param") applied to a "URI-Reference".

We straightforwardly map:

- the collection of Web links to a JSON or CBOR array of links;
- each link to a JSON object or CBOR map, mapping attribute names to attribute values.

In the object representing a "link-value", each target attribute or other parameter ("link-param") is represented by a JSON name/value pair (member). The name is a string representation of the parameter or attribute name (as in "parmname"). The value can be a string, a language-tagged string, a boolean, or an array of these, as described below.

If the attribute value ("ptoken" or "quoted-string") is present, and a Link attribute with this name ("parmname") is present just once in the "link-value", the value is a string representation of the parameter or attribute value ("ptoken" or "quoted-string"). "quoted-string" productions are parsed (i.e., the outer quotes removed and the backslash constructions evaluated) as defined in [RFC6690] and its referenced documents, before placing them in JSON strings (in the representation of which they may gain back additional decorations such as backslashes as defined in [RFC8259]).

Attribute values represented as per [RFC8187], e.g. for the "title*" attribute, are converted in a language-tagged string; the attribute name is then represented without the "*" character. A language-tagged string is represented as a CBOR map (JSON object) that carries the language tag as the key for a single member and the attribute value in UTF-8 form as its value.

If no attribute value ("ptoken" or "quoted-string") is present, the presence of the attribute name is indicated by using the Boolean value "true" as the value.

If a Link attribute ("parmname") is present more than once in a "link-value", its values are then represented as a JSON array of JSON string values or "true"; this array becomes the value of the JSON name/value pair where the attribute name is the JSON name. Attributes occurring just once MUST NOT be represented as JSON arrays but MUST be directly represented as JSON strings or "true". (Note that [RFC6690] has cut down on the use of repeated parameter names; they are still allowed by [RFC8288] though. No attempt has been made to decode the possibly space-separated values for rt=, if=, and rel=...
The URI-Reference is represented as a name/value pair with the name "href" and the URI-Reference as the value, with the latter converted to an IRI-Reference as per Section 3.2 of [RFC3987] (Rationale: The usage of "href" is consistent with the use of "href" as a query parameter for link-format query filtering and with link-format reserving the link parameter "href" specifically for this use [RFC6690]. The usage of an IRI-Reference is consistent with the mandate in [RFC6690] that percent-encoding be processed. Note that the format is able to represent IRIs the URIs for which cannot be represented in [RFC6690] as not all percent-encoded constructions are amenable to the pre-processing required by [RFC6690].)

As a convenient reference, the resulting structure can be described in CBOR Data Definition Language (CDDL) [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] as in Figure 1 (informative).

\[
\text{links} = \{ \ast \text{link} \}
\]

\[
\text{link} = \{ \\
\hspace{1em} \text{href: tstr} \; \text{resource URI} \\
\hspace{1em} \ast \text{tstr} => \text{value} \\
\}
\]

\[
\text{value1} = \text{tstr} \; \text{text value -- the normal case} \\
\hspace{1em} / \{ \text{tstr} => \text{tstr} \} \; \text{language tag and value} \\
\hspace{1em} / \text{true} \; \text{no value given, just the name} \\
\hspace{1em} / \{ \ast \text{value1} \} \; \text{repeats for two or more}
\]

**Figure 1: CoRE Link Format Data Model (JSON)**

### 2.3. Additional Encoding Step for CBOR

The above specification for JSON might have been used as is for the CBOR encoding as well. However, to further reduce message sizes, an extra encoding step is performed: "href" and some commonly occurring attribute names are encoded as small integers.

The substitution is defined in Table 1:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>encoded value</th>
<th>origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>href</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>[RFC6690], [RFCthis]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anchor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rev</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hreflang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>title</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>[RFC5988] Section 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rt</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>[RFC6690] Section 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>[RFC6690] Section 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sz</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>[RFC6690] Section 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ct</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>[RFC7252] Section 7.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>[RFC7641] Section 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Integer Encoding of common attribute names

This list of substitutions is fixed by the present specification; no future expansion of the list is foreseen. "href" as well as all attribute names in this list MUST be represented by their integer substitutions and MUST NOT use the attribute name in text form. Recipients MUST NOT accept documents that violate this requirement.

As a convenient reference, the resulting structure can be described in CBOR Data Definition Language (CDDL) [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] as in Figure 2 (informative).
links = [* link]
link = {
    href => tstr ; resource URI
    * label => value
}
href = 1
label = tstr / &(
    rel: 2,       anchor: 3,  rev: 4,
    hreflang: 5,  media: 6,   title: 7,
    type: 8,      rt: 9,      if: 10,
    sz: 11,       ct: 12,     obs: 13,
)
value1 = tstr ; text value -- the normal case
    / ( tstr => tstr ) ; language tag and value
    / true ; no value given, just the name
value = value1
    / [2* value1 ] ; repeats for two or more

Figure 2: CoRE Link Format Data Model (CBOR)

2.4. Converting JSON or CBOR to Link-Format

When a JSON or CBOR representation needs to be converted back to link-format, the above process is performed in inverse. Since link-format allows serializing link parameter values both in unquoted form ("ptoken") or in quoted form ("quoted-string"), a decision has to be made for each value. Where the syntax of "ptoken" does not allow the value to be represented, the quoted form clearly needs to be used. However, when both forms are possible, the decision is arbitrary. The recently republished Web Linking specification, [RFC8288], clarifies that this is indeed intended to be the case. However, previous specifications of link attributes, including those in [RFC5988] and [RFC6690], sometimes have made this decision in a specific way by only including one or the other alternative in the ABNF given for a link parameter. This requires a converter to know about all these cases, including those that have not been defined yet at the time of writing the converter. This problem becomes even harder by the fact that there is no central registry of link-attribute names.

Obviously, the conversion back to link-format needs to result in a valid link-format document. The reference implementation in Appendix A has addressed this problem with the following two rules:

- Where a "ptoken" representation is possible, that is used instead of "quoted-string". This rule covers most of the special cases listed above.
As a special exception to the above rule, the four link attributes "anchor", "title", "rt", and "if" are always expressed as "quoted-string". This rule covers these specific four cases.

This set of rules is based on the hope that future definitions of link attributes will no longer hardcode one or the other serialization.

2.5. Examples

The examples in this section are based on an example on page 15 of [RFC6690] (Figure 3).

```xml
</sensors>;ct=40;title="Sensor Index",
</sensors/temp>;rt="temperature-c";if="sensor",
</sensors/light>;rt="light-lux";if="sensor",
<http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;anchor="/sensors/temp";
rel="describedby",
</t>;anchor="/sensors/temp";rel="alternate"
```

Figure 3: Example from page 15 of [RFC6690]

2.5.1. Link Format to JSON Example

The link-format document in Figure 3 becomes (321 bytes, line breaks shown are not part of the minimally-sized JSON document):

```
[{
"href": "/sensors","ct": "40","title": "Sensor Index"},
{"href": "/sensors/temp","rt": "temperature-c","if": "sensor"},{
"href": "/sensors/light","rt": "light-lux","if": "sensor"},{
"href": "http://www.example.com/sensors/t123","anchor": "/sensors/temp","rel": "describedby"},{
"href": "/t","anchor": "/sensors/temp","rel": "alternate"}
```

To demonstrate the handling of value-less and array-valued attributes, we extend the link-format example by examples of these (Figure 4; the "obs" attribute is defined in Section 6 of [RFC7641], while the "foo" attribute is for exposition only):

```xml
</sensors>;ct=40;title="Sensor Index",
</sensors/temp>;rt="temperature-c";if="sensor";obs,
</sensors/light>;rt="light-lux";if="sensor",
<http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;anchor="/sensors/temp";
rel="describedby";foo="bar";foo=3;ct=4711,
</t>;anchor="/sensors/temp";rel="alternate"
```

Figure 4: Example derived from page 15 of [RFC6690]
The link-format document in Figure 4 becomes the JSON document in Figure 5 (some spacing and indentation added):

```json
[{
  "href": "/sensors",
  "ct": "40",
  "title": "Sensor Index",
},
{
  "href": "/sensors/temp",
  "rt": "temperature-c",
  "if": "sensor",
  "obs": true,
},
{
  "href": "/sensors/light",
  "rt": "light-lux",
  "if": "sensor",
},
{
  "href": "http://www.example.com/sensors/t123",
  "anchor": "/sensors/temp",
  "rel": "describedby",
  "foo": ["bar", "3"],
  "ct": "4711",
},
{
  "href": "/t",
  "anchor": "/sensors/temp",
  "rel": "alternate"
}]
```

Figure 5: Example derived from page 15 of [RFC6690]

Note that the conversion is unable to convert the string-valued "ct" attribute to a number, which would be the natural type for a Content-Format value; similarly, both "foo" values are treated as strings independently of whether they are quoted or numeric in syntax.

2.5.2. Link Format to CBOR Example

This examples shows conversion from link format to CBOR format.

The link-format document in Figure 3 becomes (in CBOR diagnostic format):

```cbor
[{1: "/sensors", 12: "40", 7: "Sensor Index"},
 {1: "/sensors/temp", 9: "temperature-c", 10: "sensor"},
 {1: "/sensors/light", 9: "light-lux", 10: "sensor"},
 {1: "/t", 3: "/sensors/temp", 2: "alternate"}]
```

or, in hexadecimal (203 bytes):

```
85 # array(number of data items:5)
a3 # map(# data item pairs:3)
 01 # unsigned integer(value:1,"href")
 68 # text string(8 bytes)
   2f73656e736f7273 # "/sensors"
 0c # unsigned integer(value:12,"ct")
 62 # text(2)
   3430 # "40"
 07 # unsigned integer(value:7,"title")
 6c # text string(12 bytes)
   53656e776974686572657373696f6e73696f6e732f73656e736f7273 # "Sensor Index"
a3 # map(# data item pairs:3)
 01 # unsigned integer(value:1,"href")
```
Figure 6: Web Links Encoded in CBOR
3. IANA Considerations

3.1. Media types

This specification registers the following additional Internet Media Types:

Type name: application
Subtype name: link-format+json
Required parameters: None
Optional parameters: None

Encoding considerations: Resources that use the "application/link-format+json" media type are required to conform to the "application/json" Media Type and are therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in [RFC8259], Section 11.

Security considerations: See Section 4 of [RFCthis].

Published specification: [RFCthis].

Applications that use this media type: Applications that interchange collections of Web links based on CoRE link format [RFC6690] in JSON.

Additional information:
- Magic number(s): N/A
- File extension(s): N/A
- Macintosh file type code(s): TEXT

Person & email address to contact for further information: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>

Intended usage: COMMON

Change controller: IESG

and

Type name: application
Subtype name: link-format+cbor
Required parameters: None

Optional parameters: None

Encoding considerations: Resources that use the "application/link-format+cbor" media type are required to conform to the "application/cbor" Media Type and are therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in [RFC7049], Section 7.

Security considerations: See Section 4 of [RFCthis].

Published specification: [RFCthis].

Applications that use this media type: Applications that interchange collections of Web links based on CoRE link format [RFC6690] in CBOR.

Additional information:

Magic number(s): N/A

File extension(s): N/A

Macintosh file type code(s): CBOR

Person & email address to contact for further information: Kepeng Li <kepeng.lkp@alibaba-inc.com>

Intended usage: COMMON

Change controller: IESG

3.2. CoAP Content-Format Registration

IANA is requested to assign CoAP Content-Format IDs for the above media types in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-registry, within the "CoRE Parameters" registry [RFC7252]. The ID for "application/link-format+cbor" is assigned from the "Expert Review" (0-255) range, while the ID for "application/link-format+json" is assigned from the "IETF review" range. The assigned IDs are show in Table 2.
4. Security Considerations

The security considerations relevant to the data model of [RFC6690], as well as those of [RFC7049] and [RFC8259] apply.

5. References

5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]


A reference implementation of a converter from [RFC6690] link-format to JSON and CBOR (and back to link-format) in the programming language Ruby [RUBY] is reproduced below. (Note that this implementation does not handle [RFC8187]-encoded attributes.) For pretty-printing the binary CBOR, this uses the "cbor-diag" gem (Ruby library), which may need to be installed by "gem install cbor-diag".

```ruby
require 'strscan'
require 'json'
require 'cbor-pretty'

class String
  def as_utf8
    force_encoding(Encoding::UTF_8)
  end
end

module CoRE
  module Links
    def self.map_to_true(a)
      Hash[a.map{ |t| [t, true] }]
    end

    PTOKENCHAR = %r"[\[]\w!#-+\-/:<-?^-'{-˜@]"
    QUOSTRCHAR = %r{(?:[^"\]|\.)}    # to be used inside "
    ATTRCHAR   = %r"[\w!#$&+.^'˜-]"
    MUSTBEQUOTED = map_to_true(%w{anchor title rt if})
    ANCHORNAME = "href"
    SCANATTR = %r{(#{ATTRCHAR}+)(?:=(?:(#{PTOKENCHAR}+)|"(#{QUOSTRCHAR}+)"))} # "

    RAWMAPPINGS = <<-DATA
      href: 1,  rel: 2,    anchor: 3,
      rev: 4,  hreflang: 5,  media: 6,
      title: 7,  type: 8,    rt: 9,
      if: 10,  sz: 11,     ct: 12,
    DATA
  end
end
```

Li, et al. Expires August 30, 2018
obs: 13,
DATA

MAPPINGS = Hash.new { |h, k| k }

RAWMAPPINGS.scan(/([-\w]+)\s*:\s*(-\w+),/) do |n, v|
  MAPPINGS[n] = Integer(v)
end

def self.parse(*args)
  WLNK.parse(*args)
end

class WLNK
  attr_accessor :resources

  def initialize(r = [])
    # make sure the keys are strings
    @resources = r.to_ary
    # make sure it's an Array
  end

  def self.parse(s, robust = true)
    wl = WLNK.new
    ss = StringScanner.new(s.as_utf8)
    ss.skip(/\s+/) if robust
    while ss.scan(%r{<[^>]+>})
      res = { ANCHORNAME => ss[1].as_utf8 }
      ss.skip(/\s*/) if robust
      while ss.skip(/;/)
        ss.skip(/\s*/) if robust
        unless ss.scan(SCANATTR)
          raise ArgumentError, "must have attribute behind ';'
          at: #{ss.peek(20).inspect} (byte #{ss.pos})"
        end
        key = ss[1].as_utf8
        value = ss[2] ||
        if res[key]
          res[key] = Array(res[key]) << value
        else
          res[key] = value
        end
        ss.skip(/\s*/) if robust
      end
      wl.resources << res
      break unless ss.skip(/,/) # make sure there's an Array
      ss.skip(/\s*/) if robust
    end
    ss.skip(/\s*/) if robust
    raise ArgumentError, "link-format unparseable at:
    #{ss.peek(20).inspect} (byte #{ss.pos})" unless ss.eos?
  end

end
wl
end
def to_json
  JSON.pretty_generate(@resources)
end
def to_cbor
  CBOR.encode(@resources.map { |r|
    Hash[r.map { |k, v| [MAPPINGS[k], v] }])
end
def to_wlnk
  resources.map do |res|
    res = res.dup
    u = res.delete(ANCHORNAME)
    "<#{u}>", *res.map { |k, v| wlnk_item(k, v) }.join('/;')
  end.join(',
end

private
def wlnk_item(k, v)
case v
  when String
    if MUSTBEQUOTED[k] || v ~ /^\A#{PTOKENCHAR}+\z/ 
      "#{k}=""v.gsub(/[\"\]/) { |x| "\#{x}"}"
    else
      "#{k}=#{v}"
  end
  when Array
    v.map { |v1| wlnk_item(k, v1) }.join(';')
  when true
    "#{k}"
  else
    fail "Don’t know how to represent #{(k=>v).inspect}"
  end
end
end
end
end

lf = CoRE::Links.parse(ARGF.read)

puts lf.to_json # JSON
puts CBOR.pretty(lf.to_cbor) # CBOR "pretty" binary form
puts lf.to_wlnk # RFC 6690 link-format
# <CODE ENDS>
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Abstract

This memo defines application/multipart-core, an application-independent media-type that can be used to combine representations of several different media types into a single CoAP message-body with minimal framing overhead, each along with a CoAP Content-Format identifier.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This memo defines application/multipart-core, an application-independent media-type that can be used to combine representations of several different media types into a single CoAP [RFC7252] message-body with minimal framing overhead, each along with a CoAP Content-Format identifier.

This simple and efficient binary framing mechanism can be employed to create application specific request and response bodies which build on multiple already existing media types.

Applications using the application/multipart-core Content-Format define the internal structure of the application/multipart-core representation.

For example, one way to structure the sub-types specific to an application/multipart-core container is to always include them at the same fixed position. This specification allows to indicate that an optional part is not present by substituting a null value for the representation of the part.

Optionally, an application might use the general format defined here, but also register a new media type and an associated Content-Format identifier -- typically one in the range 10000-64999 -- instead of using application/multipart-core.
2. Multipart Content-Format Encoding

A representation of media-type application/multipart-core contains a collection of zero or more representations, each along with their respective content format.

The collection is encoded as a CBOR [RFC7049] array with an even number of elements. The second, fourth, sixth, etc. element is a byte string containing a representation, or the value "null" if an optional part is indicated as not given. The first, third, fifth, etc. element is an unsigned integer specifying the content format ID of the representation following it. (Future extensions might want to include additional alternative ways of specifying the media type of a representation in such a position.)

For example, a collection containing two representations, one with content format ID 42 and one with content format ID 0, looks like this in CBOR diagnostic notation:

```
[42, h'0123456789abcdef', 0, h'3031323334']
```

For illustration, the structure of an application/multipart-core representation can be described by the CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] specification in Figure 1:

```
multipart-core = [* multipart-part]
multipart-part = (type: uint .size 2, part: bytes / null)
```

Figure 1: CDDL for application/multipart-core

3. Usage Examples

3.1. Observing Resources

When a client registers to observe a resource [RFC7641] for which no representation is available yet, the server may send one or more 2.05 (Content) notifications before sending the first actual 2.05 (Content) or 2.03 (Valid) notification. The possible resulting sequence of notifications is shown in Figure 1.
The specification of the Observe option requires that all notifications carry the same Content-Format. The application/multipart-core media type can be used to provide that Content-Format: e.g., carrying an empty list of representations in the case marked as "Pending" in Figure 2, and carrying a single representation specified as the target content-format in the case in the middle of the figure.

3.2. Implementation hints

This section describes the serialization for readers that may be new to CBOR. It does not contain any new information.

An application/multipart-core representation carrying no representations is represented by an empty CBOR array, which is serialized as a single byte with the value 0x80.

An application/multipart-core representation carrying a single representation is represented by a two-element CBOR array, which is serialized as 0x82 followed by the two elements. The first element is an unsigned integer for the Content-Format value, which is represented as described in Table 1. The second element is the object as a byte string, which is represented as a length as described in Table 2 followed by the bytes of the object.

```
Figure 2: Sequence of Notifications:

The specification of the Observe option requires that all notifications carry the same Content-Format. The application/multipart-core media type can be used to provide that Content-Format: e.g., carrying an empty list of representations in the case marked as "Pending" in Figure 2, and carrying a single representation specified as the target content-format in the case in the middle of the figure.

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An application/multipart-core representation carrying no representations is represented by an empty CBOR array, which is serialized as a single byte with the value 0x80.

An application/multipart-core representation carrying a single representation is represented by a two-element CBOR array, which is serialized as 0x82 followed by the two elements. The first element is an unsigned integer for the Content-Format value, which is represented as described in Table 1. The second element is the object as a byte string, which is represented as a length as described in Table 2 followed by the bytes of the object.

```

+----------------+------------+
| Serialization   | Value      |
+----------------+------------+
| 0x00..0x17     | 0..23      |
| 0x18 0xnn      | 24..255    |
| 0x19 0xnn 0xnn | 256..66535 |
+----------------+------------+

Table 1: Serialization of content-format
Table 2: Serialization of object length

For example, a single text/plain object (content-format 0) of value "Hello World" (11 characters) would be serialized as

0x82 0x00 0x4b H e l l o 0x20 w o r l d

In effect, the serialization for a single object is done by prefixing the object with information about its content-format (here: 0x82 0x00) and its length (here: 0x4b).

For more than one representation included in an application/multipart-core representation, the head of the CBOR array is adjusted (0x84 for two representations, 0x86 for three, ...) and the sequences of content-format and embedded representations follow.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. Registration of media type application/multipart-core

IANA is requested to register the following media type [RFC6838]:

Type name: application
Subtype name: multipart-core
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations Section of RFC
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: RFC
Applications that use this media type: Applications that need to combine representations of potentially several media types into one, e.g., EST-CoAP [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:

Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

Magic number(s): N/A

File extension(s): N/A

Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: CoRE WG

Change controller: IESG

Provisional registration? (standards tree only): no

4.2. Registration of a Content-Format identifier for application/multipart-core

IANA is requested to register the following Content-Format to the "CoAP Content-Formats" subregistry, within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry, from the Expert Review space (0..255):

+-------------------+--------+---+------------------+
| Media Type         | Encoding| ID | Reference        |
|-------------------+--------+---+------------------+
| application/multipart-core | --     | TBD1 | RFCthis          |

5. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC7049] apply. In particular, resource exhaustion attacks may employ large values for the byte
string size fields, or deeply nested structures of recursively embedded application/multipart-core representations.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References


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Abstract

This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web transfer protocol, designed for constrained nodes and networks [RFC7228], and may be mapped from HTTP [RFC8075]. CoAP specifies the use of proxies for scalability and efficiency and references DTLS [RFC6347] for security. CoAP-to-CoAP, HTTP-to-CoAP, and CoAP-to-HTTP proxies require DTLS or TLS [RFC8446] to be terminated at the proxy. The proxy therefore not only has access to the data required for performing the intended proxy functionality, but is also able to eavesdrop on, or manipulate any part of, the message payload and metadata in transit between the endpoints. The proxy can also inject, delete, or reorder packets since they are no longer protected by (D)TLS.

This document defines the Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) security protocol, protecting CoAP and CoAP-mappable HTTP requests and responses end-to-end across intermediary nodes such as CoAP forward proxies and cross-protocol translators including HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075]. In addition to the core CoAP features defined in [RFC7252], OSCORE supports the Observe [RFC7641], Block-wise [RFC7959], and No-Response [RFC7967] options, as well as the PATCH and FETCH methods [RFC8132]. An analysis of end-to-end security for CoAP messages through some types of intermediary nodes is performed in [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. OSCORE essentially protects the RESTful interactions; the request method, the requested resource, the message payload, etc. (see Section 4). OSCORE protects neither the CoAP Messaging Layer nor the CoAP Token which may change between the endpoints, and those are therefore processed as defined in [RFC7252]. Additionally, since the message formats for CoAP over unreliable transport [RFC7252] and for CoAP over reliable transport [RFC8323] differ only in terms of CoAP Messaging Layer, OSCORE can be applied to both unreliable and reliable transports (see Figure 1).
OSCORE works in very constrained nodes and networks, thanks to its small message size and the restricted code and memory requirements in addition to what is required by CoAP. Examples of the use of OSCORE are given in Appendix A. OSCORE may be used over any underlying layer, such as e.g. UDP or TCP, and with non-IP transports (e.g., [I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-1e]). OSCORE may also be used in different ways with HTTP. OSCORE messages may be transported in HTTP, and OSCORE may also be used to protect CoAP-mappable HTTP messages, as described below.

OSCORE is designed to protect as much information as possible while still allowing CoAP proxy operations (Section 10). It works with existing CoAP-to-CoAP forward proxies [RFC7252], but an OSCORE-aware proxy will be more efficient. HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075] and CoAP-to-HTTP proxies can also be used with OSCORE, as specified in Section 11. OSCORE may be used together with TLS or DTLS over one or more hops in the end-to-end path, e.g. transported with HTTPS in one hop and with plain CoAP in another hop. The use of OSCORE does not affect the URI scheme and OSCORE can therefore be used with any URI scheme defined for CoAP or HTTP. The application decides the conditions for which OSCORE is required.

OSCORE uses pre-shared keys which may have been established out-of-band or with a key establishment protocol (see Section 3.2). The technical solution builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], providing end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay protection, and binding of response to request. A compressed version of COSE is used, as specified in Section 6. The use of OSCORE is signaled in CoAP with a new option (Section 2), and in HTTP with a new header field (Section 11.1) and content type (Section 13.5). The solution transforms a CoAP/HTTP message into an "OSCORE message" before sending, and vice versa after receiving. The OSCORE message
is a CoAP/HTTP message related to the original message in the following way: the original CoAP/HTTP message is translated to CoAP (if not already in CoAP) and protected in a COSE object. The encrypted message fields of this COSE object are transported in the CoAP payload/HTTP body of the OSCORE message, and the OSCORE option/ header field is included in the message. A sketch of an exchange of OSCORE messages, in the case of the original message being CoAP, is provided in Figure 2. The use of OSCORE with HTTP is detailed in Section 11.

Client                                           Server
| OSCORE request - POST example.com:              |
|        Header, Token,                          |
|        Options: OSCORE, ...,                   |
|        Payload: COSE ciphertext                |
+-----------------------------------------------+<---------------------------------------------+|
|                                              |
| OSCORE response - 2.04 (Changed):             |
|        Header, Token,                          |
|        Options: OSCORE, ...,                   |
|        Payload: COSE ciphertext                |

Figure 2: Sketch of CoAP with OSCORE

An implementation supporting this specification MAY implement only the client part, MAY implement only the server part, or MAY implement only one of the proxy parts.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252], Observe [RFC7641], Block-wise [RFC7959], COSE [RFC8152], CBOR [RFC7049], CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] as summarized in Appendix E, and constrained environments [RFC7228].

The term "hop" is used to denote a particular leg in the end-to-end path. The concept "hop-by-hop" (as in "hop-by-hop encryption" or "hop-by-hop fragmentation") opposed to "end-to-end", is used in this document to indicate that the messages are processed accordingly in the intermediaries, rather than just forwarded to the next node.
The term "stop processing" is used throughout the document to denote that the message is not passed up to the CoAP Request/Response layer (see Figure 1).

The terms Common/Sender/Recipient Context, Master Secret/Salt, Sender ID/Key, Recipient ID/Key, ID Context, and Common IV are defined in Section 3.1.

2. The OSCORE Option

The OSCORE option defined in this section (see Figure 3, which extends Table 4: Options of [RFC7252]) indicates that the CoAP message is an OSCORE message and that it contains a compressed COSE object (see Sections 5 and 6). The OSCORE option is critical, safe to forward, part of the cache key, and not repeatable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCORE</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>0-255</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Critical,  U = Unsafe,  N = NoCacheKey,  R = Repeatable

(*) See below.

Figure 3: The OSCORE Option

The OSCORE option includes the OSCORE flag bits (Section 6), the Sender Sequence Number, the Sender ID, and the ID Context when these fields are present (Section 3). The detailed format and length is specified in Section 6. If the OSCORE flag bits are all zero (0x00) the Option value SHALL be empty (Option Length = 0). An endpoint receiving a CoAP message without payload, that also contains an OSCORE option SHALL treat it as malformed and reject it.

A successful response to a request with the OSCORE option SHALL contain the OSCORE option. Whether error responses contain the OSCORE option depends on the error type (see Section 8).

For CoAP proxy operations, see Section 10.

3. The Security Context

OSCORE requires that client and server establish a shared security context used to process the COSE objects. OSCORE uses COSE with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD, [RFC5116]) algorithm for protecting message data between a client and a server. In this section, we define the security context and how it is derived
in client and server based on a shared secret and a key derivation function.

3.1. Security Context Definition

The security context is the set of information elements necessary to carry out the cryptographic operations in OSCORE. For each endpoint, the security context is composed of a "Common Context", a "Sender Context", and a "Recipient Context".

The endpoints protect messages to send using the Sender Context and verify messages received using the Recipient Context, both contexts being derived from the Common Context and other data. Clients and servers need to be able to retrieve the correct security context to use.

An endpoint uses its Sender ID (SID) to derive its Sender Context, and the other endpoint uses the same ID, now called Recipient ID (RID), to derive its Recipient Context. In communication between two endpoints, the Sender Context of one endpoint matches the Recipient Context of the other endpoint, and vice versa. Thus, the two security contexts identified by the same IDs in the two endpoints are not the same, but they are partly mirrored. Retrieval and use of the security context are shown in Figure 4.
The Common Context contains the following parameters:

- **AEAD Algorithm.** The COSE AEAD algorithm to use for encryption.

- **An HMAC-based key derivation function HKDF [RFC5869] used to derive Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV.**

- **Master Secret.** Variable length, random byte string (see Section 12.3) used to derive AEAD keys and Common IV.

- **Master Salt.** Optional variable length byte string containing the salt used to derive AEAD keys and Common IV.

- **ID Context.** Optional variable length byte string providing additional information to identify the Common Context and to derive AEAD keys and Common IV. The use of ID Context is described in Section 5.1.

- **Common IV.** Byte string derived from Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context. Used to generate the AEAD Nonce (see Section 5.2). Same length as the nonce of the AEAD Algorithm.

The Sender Context contains the following parameters:
Sender ID. Byte string used to identify the Sender Context, to derive AEAD keys and Common IV, and to assure unique AEAD nonces. Maximum length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

Sender Key. Byte string containing the symmetric AEAD key to protect messages to send. Derived from Common Context and Sender ID. Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

Sender Sequence Number. Non-negative integer used by the sender to enumerate requests and certain responses, e.g. Observe notifications. Used as ‘Partial IV’ [RFC8152] to generate unique AEAD nonces. Maximum value is determined by the AEAD Algorithm. Initialization is described in Section 3.2.2.

The Recipient Context contains the following parameters:

Recipient ID. Byte string used to identify the Recipient Context, to derive AEAD keys and Common IV, and to assure unique AEAD nonces. Maximum length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

Recipient Key. Byte string containing the symmetric AEAD key to verify messages received. Derived from Common Context and Recipient ID. Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

Replay Window (Server only). The replay window to verify requests received. Replay protection is described in Section 7.4 and Section 3.2.2.

All parameters except Sender Sequence Number and Replay Window are immutable once the security context is established. An endpoint may free up memory by not storing the Common IV, Sender Key, and Recipient Key, deriving them when needed. Alternatively, an endpoint may free up memory by not storing the Master Secret and Master Salt after the other parameters have been derived.

Endpoints MAY operate as both client and server and use the same security context for those roles. Independent of being client or server, the endpoint protects messages to send using its Sender Context, and verifies messages received using its Recipient Context. The endpoints MUST NOT change the Sender/Recipient ID when changing roles. In other words, changing the roles does not change the set of AEAD keys to be used.

3.2. Establishment of Security Context Parameters

Each endpoint derives the parameters in the security context from a small set of input parameters. The following input parameters SHALL be pre-established:
The following input parameters MAY be pre-established. In case any of these parameters is not pre-established, the default value indicated below is used:

- **Master Secret**
- **Sender ID**
- **Recipient ID**

All input parameters need to be known to and agreed on by both endpoints, but the replay window may be different in the two endpoints. The way the input parameters are pre-established, is application specific. Considerations of security context establishment are given in Section 12.2 and examples of deploying OSCORE in Appendix B.

### 3.2.1. Derivation of Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV

The HKDF MUST be one of the HMAC-based HKDF [RFC5869] algorithms defined for COSE [RFC8152]. HKDF SHA-256 is mandatory to implement. The security context parameters Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV SHALL be derived from the input parameters using the HKDF, which consists of the composition of the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps [RFC5869]:

\[
\text{output parameter} = \text{HKDF}(\text{salt}, \text{IKM}, \text{info}, L)
\]

where:

- **salt is the Master Salt** as defined above
IKM is the Master Secret as defined above

info is the serialization of a CBOR array consisting of (the notation follows Appendix E):

info = [
    id : bstr,
    id_context : bstr / nil,
    alg_aead : int / tstr,
    type : tstr,
    L : uint
]

where:

- id is the Sender ID or Recipient ID when deriving Sender Key and Recipient Key, respectively, and the empty byte string when deriving the Common IV.
- id_context is the ID Context, or nil if ID Context is not provided.
- alg_aead is the AEAD Algorithm, encoded as defined in [RFC8152].
- type is "Key" or "IV". The label is an ASCII string, and does not include a trailing NUL byte.
- L is the size of the key/nonce for the AEAD algorithm used, in bytes.

For example, if the algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 (see Section 10.2 in [RFC8152]) is used, the integer value for alg_aead is 10, the value for L is 16 for keys and 13 for the Common IV. Assuming use of the default algorithms HKDF SHA-256 and AES-CCM-16-64-128, the extract phase of HKDF produces a pseudorandom key (PRK) as follows:

PRK = HMAC-SHA-256(Master Salt, Master Secret)

and as L is smaller than the hash function output size, the expand phase of HKDF consists of a single HMAC invocation, and the Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV are therefore the first 16 or 13 bytes of

output parameter = HMAC-SHA-256(PRK, info | 0x01)

where different info are used for each derived parameter and where | denotes byte string concatenation.
Note that [RFC5869] specifies that if the salt is not provided, it is set to a string of zeros. For implementation purposes, not providing the salt is the same as setting the salt to the empty byte string. OSCORE sets the salt default value to empty byte string, which is converted to a string of zeroes (see Section 2.2 of [RFC5869]).

3.2.2. Initial Sequence Numbers and Replay Window

The Sender Sequence Number is initialized to 0. The supported types of replay protection and replay window length is application specific and depends on how OSCORE is transported, see Section 7.4. The default is DTLS-type replay protection with a window size of 32 initiated as described in Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC6347].

3.3. Requirements on the Security Context Parameters

To ensure unique Sender Keys, the quartet (Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context, Sender ID) MUST be unique, i.e. the pair (ID Context, Sender ID) SHALL be unique in the set of all security contexts using the same Master Secret and Master Salt. This means that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context; such a requirement guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs for the AEAD.

Different methods can be used to assign Sender IDs: a protocol that allows the parties to negotiate locally unique identifiers, a trusted third party (e.g., [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), or the identifiers can be assigned out-of-band. The Sender IDs can be very short (note that the empty string is a legitimate value). The maximum length of Sender ID in bytes equals the length of AEAD nonce minus 6, see Section 5.2. For AES-CCM-16-64-128 the maximum length of Sender ID is 7 bytes.

To simplify retrieval of the right Recipient Context, the Recipient ID SHOULD be unique in the sets of all Recipient Contexts used by an endpoint. If an endpoint has the same Recipient ID with different Recipient Contexts, i.e. the Recipient Contexts are derived from different Common Contexts, then the endpoint may need to try multiple times before verifying the right security context associated to the Recipient ID.

The ID Context is used to distinguish between security contexts. The methods used for assigning Sender ID can also be used for assigning the ID Context. Additionally, the ID Context can be generated by the client (see Appendix B.2). ID Context can be arbitrarily long.
4. Protected Message Fields

OSCORE transforms a CoAP message (which may have been generated from an HTTP message) into an OSCORE message, and vice versa. OSCORE protects as much of the original message as possible while still allowing certain proxy operations (see Sections 10 and 11). This section defines how OSCORE protects the message fields and transfers them end-to-end between client and server (in any direction).

The remainder of this section and later sections focus on the behavior in terms of CoAP messages. If HTTP is used for a particular hop in the end-to-end path, then this section applies to the conceptual CoAP message that is mappable to/from the original HTTP message as discussed in Section 11. That is, an HTTP message is conceptually transformed to a CoAP message and then to an OSCORE message, and similarly in the reverse direction. An actual implementation might translate directly from HTTP to OSCORE without the intervening CoAP representation.

Protection of Signaling messages (Section 5 of [RFC8323]) is specified in Section 4.3. The other parts of this section target Request/Response messages.

Message fields of the CoAP message may be protected end-to-end between CoAP client and CoAP server in different ways:

- Class E: encrypted and integrity protected,
- Class I: integrity protected only, or
- Class U: unprotected.

The sending endpoint SHALL transfer Class E message fields in the ciphertext of the COSE object in the OSCORE message. The sending endpoint SHALL include Class I message fields in the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) of the AEAD algorithm, allowing the receiving endpoint to detect if the value has changed in transfer. Class U message fields SHALL NOT be protected in transfer. Class I and Class U message field values are transferred in the header or options part of the OSCORE message, which is visible to proxies.

Message fields not visible to proxies, i.e., transported in the ciphertext of the COSE object, are called "Inner" (Class E). Message fields transferred in the header or options part of the OSCORE message, which is visible to proxies, are called "Outer" (Class I or U). There are currently no Class I options defined.
An OSCORE message may contain both an Inner and an Outer instance of a certain CoAP message field. Inner message fields are intended for the receiving endpoint, whereas Outer message fields are used to enable proxy operations.

4.1. CoAP Options

A summary of how options are protected is shown in Figure 5. Note that some options may have both Inner and Outer message fields which are protected accordingly. Certain options require special processing as is described in Section 4.1.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>If-Match</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Uri-Host</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ETag</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>If-None-Match</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Observe</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Uri-Port</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Location-Path</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD1</td>
<td>OSCORE</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Uri-Path</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Content-Format</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Max-Age</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Uri-Query</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Location-Query</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Block2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Block1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Size2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Proxy-Uri</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Proxy-Scheme</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>No-Response</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (Inner)
U = Unprotected (Outer)

Figure 5: Protection of CoAP Options

Options that are unknown or for which OSCORE processing is not defined SHALL be processed as class E (and no special processing). Specifications of new CoAP options SHOULD define how they are processed with OSCORE. A new CoAP option SHOULD be of class E unless it requires proxy processing. If a new CoAP option is of class U,
the potential issues with the option being unprotected SHOULD be documented (see Appendix D.4).

4.1.1. Inner Options

Inner option message fields (class E) are used to communicate directly with the other endpoint.

The sending endpoint SHALL write the Inner option message fields present in the original CoAP message into the plaintext of the COSE object (Section 5.3), and then remove the Inner option message fields from the OSCORE message.

The processing of Inner option message fields by the receiving endpoint is specified in Sections 8.2 and 8.4.

4.1.2. Outer Options

Outer option message fields (Class U or I) are used to support proxy operations, see Appendix D.1.

The sending endpoint SHALL include the Outer option message field present in the original message in the options part of the OSCORE message. All Outer option message fields, including the OSCORE option, SHALL be encoded as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252], where the delta is the difference to the previously included instance of Outer option message field.

The processing of Outer options by the receiving endpoint is specified in Sections 8.2 and 8.4.

A procedure for integrity-protection-only of Class I option message fields is specified in Section 5.4. Specifications that introduce repeatable Class I options MUST specify that proxies MUST NOT change the order of the instances of such an option in the CoAP message.

Note: There are currently no Class I option message fields defined.

4.1.3. Special Options

Some options require special processing as specified in this section.

4.1.3.1. Max-Age

An Inner Max-Age message field is used to indicate the maximum time a response may be cached by the client (as defined in [RFC7252]), end-to-end from the server to the client, taking into account that the option is not accessible to proxies. The Inner Max-Age SHALL be
processed by OSCORE as a normal Inner option, specified in Section 4.1.1.

An Outer Max-Age message field is used to avoid unnecessary caching of error responses caused by OSCORE processing at OSCORE-unaware intermediary nodes. A server MAY set a Class U Max-Age message field with value zero to such error responses, described in Sections 7.4, 8.2, and 8.4, since these error responses are cacheable, but subsequent OSCORE requests would never create a hit in the intermediary caching it. Setting the Outer Max-Age to zero relieves the intermediary from uselessly caching responses. Successful OSCORE responses do not need to include an Outer Max-Age option since the responses appear to the OSCORE-unaware intermediary as 2.04 Changed responses, which are non-cacheable (see Section 4.2).

The Outer Max-Age message field is processed according to Section 4.1.2.

4.1.3.2. Uri-Host and Uri-Port

When the Uri-Host and Uri-Port are set to their default values (see Section 5.10.1 [RFC7252]), they are omitted from the message (Section 5.4.4 of [RFC7252]), which is favorable both for overhead and privacy.

In order to support forward proxy operations, Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, and Uri-Port need to be Class U. For the use of Proxy-Uri, see Section 4.1.3.3.

Manipulation of unprotected message fields (including Uri-Host, Uri-Port, destination IP/port or request scheme) MUST NOT lead to an OSCORE message becoming verified by an unintended server. Different servers SHOULD have different security contexts.

4.1.3.3. Proxy-Uri

When Proxy-Uri is present, the client SHALL first decompose the Proxy-Uri value of the original CoAP message into the Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, Uri-Port, Uri-Path, and Uri-Query options according to Section 6.4 of [RFC7252].

Uri-Path and Uri-Query are class E options and SHALL be protected and processed as Inner options (Section 4.1.1).

The Proxy-Uri option of the OSCORE message SHALL be set to the composition of Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, and Uri-Port options as specified in Section 6.5 of [RFC7252], and processed as an Outer option of Class U (Section 4.1.2).
Note that replacing the Proxy-Uri value with the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-* options works by design for all CoAP URIs (see Section 6 of [RFC7252]). OSCORE-aware HTTP servers should not use the userinfo component of the HTTP URI (as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC3986]), so that this type of replacement is possible in the presence of CoAP-to-HTTP proxies (see Section 11.2). In future specifications of cross-protocol proxying behavior using different URI structures, it is expected that the authors will create Uri-* options that allow decomposing the Proxy-Uri, and specifying the OSCORE processing.

An example of how Proxy-Uri is processed is given here. Assume that the original CoAP message contains:

- Proxy-Uri = "coap://example.com/resource?q=1"

During OSCORE processing, Proxy-Uri is split into:

- Proxy-Scheme = "coap"
- Uri-Host = "example.com"
- Uri-Port = "5683"
- Uri-Path = "resource"
- Uri-Query = "q=1"

Uri-Path and Uri-Query follow the processing defined in Section 4.1.1, and are thus encrypted and transported in the COSE object:

- Uri-Path = "resource"
- Uri-Query = "q=1"

The remaining options are composed into the Proxy-Uri included in the options part of the OSCORE message, which has value:

- Proxy-Uri = "coap://example.com"

See Sections 6.1 and 12.6 of [RFC7252] for more details.

4.1.3.4. The Block Options

Block-wise [RFC7959] is an optional feature. An implementation MAY support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting block-wise transfers. The Block options (Block1, Block2, Size1, Size2), when Inner message fields, provide secure message segmentation such that
each segment can be verified. The Block options, when Outer message
fields, enables hop-by-hop fragmentation of the OSCORE message.
Inner and Outer block processing may have different performance
properties depending on the underlying transport. The end-to-end
integrity of the message can be verified both in case of Inner and
Outer Block-wise transfers provided all blocks are received.

4.1.3.4.1. Inner Block Options

The sending CoAP endpoint MAY fragment a CoAP message as defined in
[RFC7959] before the message is processed by OSCORE. In this case
the Block options SHALL be processed by OSCORE as normal Inner
options (Section 4.1.1). The receiving CoAP endpoint SHALL process
the OSCORE message before processing Block-wise as defined in
[RFC7959].

4.1.3.4.2. Outer Block Options

Proxies MAY fragment an OSCORE message using [RFC7959], by
introducing Block option message fields that are Outer
(Section 4.1.2). Note that the Outer Block options are neither
encrypted nor integrity protected. As a consequence, a proxy can
maliciously inject block fragments indefinitely, since the receiving
endpoint needs to receive the last block (see [RFC7959]) to be able
to compose the OSCORE message and verify its integrity. Therefore,
applications supporting OSCORE and [RFC7959] MUST specify a security
policy defining a maximum unfragmented message size
(MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE) considering the maximum size of message which
can be handled by the endpoints. Messages exceeding this size SHOULD
be fragmented by the sending endpoint using Inner Block options
(Section 4.1.3.4.1).

An endpoint receiving an OSCORE message with an Outer Block option
SHALL first process this option according to [RFC7959], until all
blocks of the OSCORE message have been received, or the cumulated
message size of the blocks exceeds MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE. In the
former case, the processing of the OSCORE message continues as
defined in this document. In the latter case the message SHALL be
discarded.

Because of encryption of Uri-Path and Uri-Query, messages to the same
server may, from the point of view of a proxy, look like they also
target the same resource. A proxy SHOULD mitigate a potential mix-up
of blocks from concurrent requests to the same server, for example
using the Request-Tag processing specified in Section 3.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].
4.1.3.5. Observe

Observe [RFC7641] is an optional feature. An implementation MAY support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting [RFC7641], in which case the Observe related processing can be omitted.

The support for Observe [RFC7641] with OSCORE targets the requirements on forwarding of Section 2.2.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs], i.e. that observations go through intermediary nodes, as illustrated in Figure 8 of [RFC7641].

Inner Observe SHALL be used to protect the value of the Observe option between the endpoints. Outer Observe SHALL be used to support forwarding by intermediary nodes.

The server SHALL include a new Partial IV (see Section 5) in responses (with or without the Observe option) to Observe registrations, except for the first response where Partial IV MAY be omitted.

For cancellations, Section 3.6 of [RFC7641] specifies that all options MUST be identical to those in the registration request except for Observe and the set of ETag Options. For OSCORE messages, this matching is to be done to the options in the decrypted message.

[RFC7252] does not specify how the server should act upon receiving the same Token in different requests. When using OSCORE, the server SHOULD NOT remove an active observation just because it receives a request with the same Token.

Since POST with Observe is not defined, for messages with Observe, the Outer Code MUST be set to 0.05 (FETCH) for requests and to 2.05 (Content) for responses (see Section 4.2).

4.1.3.5.1. Registrations and Cancellations

The Inner and Outer Observe in the request MUST contain the Observe value of the original CoAP request; 0 (registration) or 1 (cancellation).

Every time a client issues a new Observe request, a new Partial IV MUST be used (see Section 5), and so the payload and OSCORE option are changed. The server uses the Partial IV of the new request as the ‘request_piv’ of all associated notifications (see Section 5.4).

Intermediaries are not assumed to have access to the OSCORE security context used by the endpoints, and thus cannot make requests or transform responses with the OSCORE option which verify at the...
receiving endpoint as coming from the other endpoint. This has the following consequences and limitations for Observe operations.

- An intermediary node removing the Outer Observe 0 does not change the registration request to a request without Observe (see Section 2 of [RFC7641]). Instead other means for cancellation may be used as described in Section 3.6 of [RFC7641].

- An intermediary node is not able to transform a normal response into an OSCORE protected Observe notification (see figure 7 of [RFC7641]) which verifies as coming from the server.

- An intermediary node is not able to initiate an OSCORE protected Observe registration (Observe with value 0) which verifies as coming from the client. An OSCORE-aware intermediary SHALL NOT initiate registrations of observations (see Section 10). If an OSCORE-unaware proxy re-sends an old registration message from a client this will trigger the replay protection mechanism in the server. To prevent this from resulting in the OSCORE-unaware proxy to cancel of the registration, a server MAY respond to a replayed registration request with a replay of a cached notification. Alternatively, the server MAY send a new notification.

- An intermediary node is not able to initiate an OSCORE protected Observe cancellation (Observe with value 1) which verifies as coming from the client. An application MAY decide to allow intermediaries to cancel Observe registrations, e.g. to send Observe with value 1 (see Section 3.6 of [RFC7641]), but that can also be done with other methods, e.g. reusing the Token in a different request or sending a RST message. This is out of scope for this specification.

4.1.3.5.2. Notifications

If the server accepts an Observe registration, a Partial IV MUST be included in all notifications (both successful and error), except for the first one where Partial IV MAY be omitted. To protect against replay, the client SHALL maintain a Notification Number for each Observation it registers. The Notification Number is a non-negative integer containing the largest Partial IV of the received notifications for the associated Observe registration. Further details of replay protection of notifications are specified in Section 7.4.1.

For notifications, the Inner Observe value MUST be empty (see Section 3.2 of [RFC7252]). The Outer Observe in a notification is needed for intermediary nodes to allow multiple responses to one
request, and may be set to the value of Observe in the original CoAP message. The client performs ordering of notifications and replay protection by comparing their Partial IVs and SHALL ignore the outer Observe value.

If the client receives a response to an Observe request without an Inner Observe option, then it verifies the response as a non-Observe response, as specified in Section 8.4. If the client receives a response to a non-Observe request with an Inner Observe option, then it stops processing the message, as specified in Section 8.4.

A client MUST consider the notification with the highest Partial IV as the freshest, regardless of the order of arrival. In order to support existing Observe implementations the OSCORE client implementation MAY set the Observe value to the three least significant bytes of the Partial IV. Implementations need to make sure that the notification without Partial IV is considered the oldest.

4.1.3.6. No-Response

No-Response [RFC7967] is an optional feature used by the client to communicate its disinterest in certain classes of responses to a particular request. An implementation MAY support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting [RFC7967].

If used, No-Response MUST be Inner. The Inner No-Response SHALL be processed by OSCORE as specified in Section 4.1.1. The Outer option SHOULD NOT be present. The server SHALL ignore the Outer No-Response option. The client MAY set the Outer No-Response value to 26 (‘suppress all known codes’) if the Inner value is set to 26. The client MUST be prepared to receive and discard 5.04 Gateway Timeout error messages from intermediaries potentially resulting from destination time out due to no response.

4.1.3.7. OSCORE

The OSCORE option is only defined to be present in OSCORE messages, as an indication that OSCORE processing have been performed. The content in the OSCORE option is neither encrypted nor integrity protected as a whole but some part of the content of this option is protected (see Section 5.4). Nested use of OSCORE is not supported: If OSCORE processing detects an OSCORE option in the original CoAP message, then processing SHALL be stopped.
4.2. CoAP Header Fields and Payload

A summary of how the CoAP header fields and payload are protected is shown in Figure 6, including fields specific to CoAP over UDP and CoAP over TCP (marked accordingly in the table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Version (UDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (UDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (TCP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Token Length</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message ID (UDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Token</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payload</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (Inner)
U = Unprotected (Outer)

Figure 6: Protection of CoAP Header Fields and Payload

Most CoAP Header fields (i.e. the message fields in the fixed 4-byte header) are required to be read and/or changed by CoAP proxies and thus cannot in general be protected end-to-end between the endpoints. As mentioned in Section 1, OSCORE protects the CoAP Request/Response layer only, and not the Messaging Layer (Section 2 of [RFC7252]), so fields such as Type and Message ID are not protected with OSCORE.

The CoAP Header field Code is protected by OSCORE. Code SHALL be encrypted and integrity protected (Class E) to prevent an intermediary from eavesdropping on or manipulating the Code (e.g., changing from GET to DELETE).

The sending endpoint SHALL write the Code of the original CoAP message into the plaintext of the COSE object (see Section 5.3). After that, the sending endpoint writes an Outer Code to the OSCORE message. With one exception (see Section 4.1.3.5) the Outer Code SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST) for requests and to 2.04 (Changed) for responses. The receiving endpoint SHALL discard the Outer Code in the OSCORE message and write the Code of the COSE object plaintext (Section 5.3) into the decrypted CoAP message.

The other currently defined CoAP Header fields are Unprotected (Class U). The sending endpoint SHALL write all other header fields of the original message into the header of the OSCORE message. The
receiving endpoint SHALL write the header fields from the received OSCORE message into the header of the decrypted CoAP message.

The CoAP Payload, if present in the original CoAP message, SHALL be encrypted and integrity protected and is thus an Inner message field. The sending endpoint writes the payload of the original CoAP message into the plaintext (Section 5.3) input to the COSE object. The receiving endpoint verifies and decrypts the COSE object, and recreates the payload of the original CoAP message.

4.3. Signaling Messages

Signaling messages (CoAP Code 7.00-7.31) were introduced to exchange information related to an underlying transport connection in the specific case of CoAP over reliable transports [RFC8323].

OSCORE MAY be used to protect Signaling if the endpoints for OSCORE coincide with the endpoints for the signaling message. If OSCORE is used to protect Signaling then:

- To comply with [RFC8323], an initial empty CSM message SHALL be sent. The subsequent signaling message SHALL be protected.

- Signaling messages SHALL be protected as CoAP Request messages, except in the case the Signaling message is a response to a previous Signaling message, in which case it SHALL be protected as a CoAP Response message. For example, 7.02 (Ping) is protected as a CoAP Request and 7.03 (Pong) as a CoAP response.

- The Outer Code for Signaling messages SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST), unless it is a response to a previous Signaling message, in which case it SHALL be set to 2.04 (Changed).

- All Signaling options, except the OSCORE option, SHALL be Inner (Class E).

NOTE: Option numbers for Signaling messages are specific to the CoAP Code (see Section 5.2 of [RFC8323]).

If OSCORE is not used to protect Signaling, Signaling messages SHALL be unaltered by OSCORE.

5. The COSE Object

This section defines how to use COSE [RFC8152] to wrap and protect data in the original message. OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0 structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
The AEAD (AEAD) algorithm. The AEAD key lengths, AEAD nonce length, and maximum Sender Sequence Number are algorithm dependent.

The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 10.2 of [RFC8152] is mandatory to implement. For AES-CCM-16-64-128 the length of Sender Key and Recipient Key is 128 bits, the length of AEAD nonce and Common IV is 13 bytes. The maximum Sender Sequence Number is specified in Section 12.

As specified in [RFC5116], plaintext denotes the data that is to be encrypted and integrity protected, and Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) denotes the data that is to be integrity protected only.

The COSE Object SHALL be a COSE_Encrypt0 object with fields defined as follows:

- The ‘protected’ field is empty.
- The ‘unprotected’ field includes:
  - The ‘Partial IV’ parameter. The value is set to the Sender Sequence Number. All leading bytes of value zero SHALL be removed when encoding the Partial IV, except in the case of Partial IV of value 0 which is encoded to the byte string 0x00. This parameter SHALL be present in requests. The Partial IV SHALL be present in responses to Observe registrations (see Section 4.1.3.5.1), otherwise the Partial IV will not typically be present in responses.
  - The ‘kid’ parameter. The value is set to the Sender ID. This parameter SHALL be present in requests and will not typically be present in responses. An example where the Sender ID is included in a response is the extension of OSCORE to group communication [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
  - Optionally, a ‘kid context’ parameter (see Section 5.1) containing an ID Context (see Section 3.1). This parameter MAY be present in requests and MUST NOT be present in responses. If ‘kid context’ is present in the request, then the server SHALL use a security context with that ID Context when verifying the request.
  - The ‘ciphertext’ field is computed from the secret key (Sender Key or Recipient Key), AEAD nonce (see Section 5.2), plaintext (see Section 5.3), and the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) (see Section 5.4) following Section 5.2 of [RFC8152].

The encryption process is described in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152].
5.1. Kid Context

For certain use cases, e.g. deployments where the same Sender ID is used with multiple contexts, it is possible (and sometimes necessary, see Section 3.3) for the client to use an ID Context to distinguish the security contexts (see Section 3.1). For example:

- If the client has a unique identifier in some namespace, then that identifier can be used as ID Context.
- In case of group communication [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], a group identifier can be used as ID Context to enable different security contexts for a server belonging to multiple groups.

The Sender ID and Context ID are used to establish the necessary input parameters and in the derivation of the security context (see Section 3.2). Whereas the ‘kid’ parameter is used to transport the Sender ID, the new COSE header parameter ‘kid context’ is used to transport the ID Context, see Figure 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>label</th>
<th>value type</th>
<th>value registry</th>
<th>description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kid</td>
<td>TBD2</td>
<td>bstr</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identifies the context for kid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>context</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Common Header Parameter kid context for the COSE object

5.2. AEAD Nonce

The high level design of the AEAD nonce follows Section 4.4 of [I-D.mcgrew-iv-gen], here follows the detailed construction (see Figure 8):

1. left-pad the Partial IV (PIV) in network byte order with zeroes to exactly 5 bytes,
2. left-pad the Sender ID of the endpoint that generated the Partial IV (ID_PIV) in network byte order with zeroes to exactly nonce length minus 6 bytes,
3. concatenate the size of the ID_PIV (a single byte S) with the padded ID_PIV and the padded PIV,
4. and then XOR with the Common IV.
Note that in this specification only AEAD algorithms that use nonces equal or greater than 7 bytes are supported. The nonce construction with S, ID_PIV, and PIV together with endpoint unique IDs and encryption keys makes it easy to verify that the nonces used with a specific key will be unique, see Appendix D.3.

If the Partial IV is not present in a response, the nonce from the request is used. For responses that are not notifications (i.e. when there is a single response to a request), the request and the response should typically use the same nonce to reduce message overhead. Both alternatives provide all the required security properties, see Section 7.4 and Appendix D.3. The only non-Observe scenario where a Partial IV must be included in a response is when the server is unable to perform replay protection, see Section 7.5.2. For processing instructions see Section 8.

```
<-- nonce length minus 6 B -->  <-- 5 bytes -->
+-------------------------------+--------+---------+-----+
|     padding      | ID_PIV | padding | PIV |
+-------------------------------+--------+---------+-----+    |
|                   Common IV   |        |
+-------------------------------+    |
|                   Nonce       |<---+    |
+-------------------------------+ |
```

Figure 8: AEAD Nonce Formation

5.3. Plaintext

The plaintext is formatted as a CoAP message without Header (see Figure 9) consisting of:

- the Code of the original CoAP message as defined in Section 3 of [RFC7252]; and

- all Inner option message fields (see Section 4.1.1) present in the original CoAP message (see Section 4.1). The options are encoded as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252], where the delta is the difference to the previously included instance of Class E option; and
the Payload of original CoAP message, if present, and in that case prefixed by the one-byte Payload Marker (0xFF).

```
+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+
<p>| | | | |
|                              |                              |                              |                              |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Class E options (if any)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>Payload (if any)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

(only if there is payload)

Figure 9: Plaintext

NOTE: The plaintext contains all CoAP data that needs to be encrypted end-to-end between the endpoints.

5.4. Additional Authenticated Data

The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array wrapped in a bstr object as defined below:

```
external_aad = bstr .cbor aad_array
```

```
aad_array = [ 
  oscore_version : uint, 
  algorithms : [ alg_aead : int / tstr ], 
  request_kid : bstr, 
  request_piv : bstr, 
  options : bstr 
]
```

where:

- oscore_version: contains the OSCORE version number. Implementations of this specification MUST set this field to 1. Other values are reserved for future versions.

- algorithms: contains (for extensibility) an array of algorithms, according to this specification only containing alg_aead.

- alg_aead: contains the AEAD Algorithm from the security context used for the exchange (see Section 3.1).

- request_kid: contains the value of the 'kid' in the COSE object of the request (see Section 5).
request_piv: contains the value of the 'Partial IV' in the COSE object of the request (see Section 5).

options: contains the Class I options (see Section 4.1.2) present in the original CoAP message encoded as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252], where the delta is the difference to the previously included instance of class I option.

The oscore_version and algorithms parameters are established out-of-band and are thus never transported in OSCORE, but the external_aad allows to verify that they are the same in both endpoints.

NOTE: The format of the external_aad is for simplicity the same for requests and responses, although some parameters, e.g. request_kid, need not be integrity protected in all requests.

The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is composed from the external_aad as described in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152]:

AAD = Enc_structure = [ "Encrypt0", h'', external_aad ]

The following is an example of AAD constructed using AEAD Algorithm = AES-CCM-16-64-128 (10), request_kid = 0x00, request_piv = 0x25 and no Class I options.

oscore_version = 0x01
algorithms = 0x810A
request_kid = 0x00
request_piv = 0x25
options = 0x

aad_array = 0x8501810A4100412540
external_aad = 0x498501810A4100412540
AAD = 0x8368456E63727970743040498501810A4100412540

Note that the AAD consists of a fixed string of 11 bytes concatenated with the external_aad.

6. OSCORE Header Compression

The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] combines very small message sizes with extensibility. The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] uses CBOR to create compact encoding of signed and encrypted data. COSE is however constructed to support a large number of different stateless use cases, and is not fully optimized for use as a stateful security protocol, leading to a
larger than necessary message expansion. In this section, we define a stateless header compression mechanism, simply removing redundant information from the COSE objects, which significantly reduces the per-packet overhead. The result of applying this mechanism to a COSE object is called the "compressed COSE object".

The COSE_Encrypt0 object used in OSCORE is transported in the OSCORE option and in the Payload. The Payload contains the Ciphertext of the COSE object. The headers of the COSE object are compactly encoded as described in the next section.

6.1. Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value

The value of the OSCORE option SHALL contain the OSCORE flag bits, the Partial IV parameter, the kid context parameter (length and value), and the kid parameter as follows:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <--------- n bytes --------->
+------------------------------------------+
| 0 0 0 | h | k | n | Partial IV (if any) ...
+------------------------------------------+

<- 1 byte -> <----- s bytes ------>
+------------------------------------------+
| s (if any) | kid context (if any) | kid (if any) ...
+------------------------------------------+
```

Figure 10: The OSCORE Option Value

- The first byte, containing the OSCORE flag bits, encodes the following set of bits and the length of the Partial IV parameter:
  * The three least significant bits encode the Partial IV length n. If n = 0 then the Partial IV is not present in the compressed COSE object. The values n = 6 and n = 7 are reserved.
  * The fourth least significant bit is the kid flag, k: it is set to 1 if the kid is present in the compressed COSE object.
  * The fifth least significant bit is the kid context flag, h: it is set to 1 if the compressed COSE object contains a kid context (see Section 5.1).
  * The sixth to eighth least significant bits are reserved for future use. These bits SHALL be set to zero when not in use. According to this specification, if any of these bits are set
to 1 the message is considered to be malformed and
decompression fails as specified in item 3 of Section 8.2.

The flag bits are registered in the OSCORE Flag Bits registry
specified in Section 13.7.

- The following n bytes encode the value of the Partial IV, if the
  Partial IV is present (n > 0).
- The following 1 byte encode the length of the kid context
  (Section 5.1) s, if the kid context flag is set (h = 1).
- The following s bytes encode the kid context, if the kid context
  flag is set (h = 1).
- The remaining bytes encode the value of the kid, if the kid is
  present (k = 1).

Note that the kid MUST be the last field of the OSCORE option value,
even in case reserved bits are used and additional fields are added
to it.

The length of the OSCORE option thus depends on the presence and
length of Partial IV, kid context, kid, as specified in this section,
and on the presence and length of the other parameters, as defined in
the separate documents.

6.2. Encoding of the OSCORE Payload

The payload of the OSCORE message SHALL encode the ciphertext of the
COSE object.

6.3. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects

This section covers a list of OSCORE Header Compression examples for
requests and responses. The examples assume the COSE_Encrypt0 object
is set (which means the CoAP message and cryptographic material is
known). Note that the full CoAP unprotected message, as well as the
full security context, is not reported in the examples, but only the
input necessary to the compression mechanism, i.e. the COSE_Encrypt0
object. The output is the compressed COSE object as defined in
Section 6, divided into two parts, since the object is transported in
two CoAP fields: OSCORE option and payload.

1. Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
   0x25, and Partial IV = 0x05
Before compression (24 bytes):

```
{
  4:h'25', 6:h'05',
  h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
}
```

After compression (17 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00001001 = 0x09
Option Value: 09 05 25 (3 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

2. Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = empty string, and Partial IV = 0x00

Before compression (23 bytes):

```
{
  4:h'', 6:h'00',
  h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
}
```

After compression (16 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00001001 = 0x09
Option Value: 09 00 (2 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

3. Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = empty string, Partial IV = 0x05, and kid context = 0x44616c656b

Before compression (30 bytes):

```
{
  4:h'', 6:h'05', 8:h'44616c656b',
  h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
}
```
4. Response with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 and no Partial IV

Before compression (18 bytes):

```plaintext
[
  h"",
  {}
  h"aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9"
]
```

After compression (14 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b000011001 = 0x19
Option Value: 19 05 05 44 61 65 6b (8 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

5. Response with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 and Partial IV = 0x07

Before compression (21 bytes):

```plaintext
[
  h"",
  {}
  h"aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9"
]
```

After compression (16 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00000001 = 0x01
Option Value: 01 07 (2 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)
7. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection

7.1. Message Binding

In order to prevent response delay and mismatch attacks [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators] from on-path attackers and compromised intermediaries, OSCORE binds responses to the requests by including the kid and Partial IV of the request in the AAD of the response. The server therefore needs to store the kid and Partial IV of the request until all responses have been sent.

7.2. Sequence Numbers

An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs (which encode the Sender Sequence Numbers, see Section 5). If messages are processed concurrently, the operation of reading and increasing the Sender Sequence Number MUST be atomic.

7.2.1. Maximum Sequence Number

The maximum Sender Sequence Number is algorithm dependent (see Section 12), and SHALL be less than $2^{40}$. If the Sender Sequence Number exceeds the maximum, the endpoint MUST NOT process any more messages with the given Sender Context. If necessary, the endpoint SHOULD acquire a new security context before this happens. The latter is out of scope of this document.

7.3. Freshness

For requests, OSCORE provides only the guarantee that the request is not older than the security context. For applications having stronger demands on request freshness (e.g., control of actuators), OSCORE needs to be augmented with mechanisms providing freshness, for example as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].

Assuming an honest server (see Appendix D), the message binding guarantees that a response is not older than its request. For responses that are not notifications (i.e. when there is a single response to a request), this gives absolute freshness. For notifications, the absolute freshness gets weaker with time, and it is RECOMMENDED that the client regularly re-register the observation. Note that the message binding does not guarantee that misbehaving server created the response before receiving the request, i.e. it does not verify server aliveness.
For requests and notifications, OSCORE also provides relative freshness in the sense that the received Partial IV allows a recipient to determine the relative order of requests or responses.

7.4. Replay Protection

In order to protect from replay of requests, the server’s Recipient Context includes a Replay Window. A server SHALL verify that a Partial IV = Sender Sequence Number received in the COSE object has not been received before. If this verification fails the server SHALL stop processing the message, and MAY optionally respond with a 4.01 Unauthorized error message. Also, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero, to inform any intermediary that the response is not to be cached. The diagnostic payload MAY contain the "Replay detected" string. The size and type of the Replay Window depends on the use case and the protocol with which the OSCORE message is transported. In case of reliable and ordered transport from endpoint to endpoint, e.g. TCP, the server MAY just store the last received Partial IV and require that newly received Partial IVs equals the last received Partial IV + 1. However, in case of mixed reliable and unreliable transports and where messages may be lost, such a replay mechanism may be too restrictive and the default replay window be more suitable (see Section 3.2.2).

Responses (with or without Partial IV) are protected against replay as they are bound to the request and the fact that only a single response is accepted. Note that the Partial IV is not used for replay protection in this case.

The operation of validating the Partial IV and updating the replay protection MUST be atomic.

7.4.1. Replay Protection of Notifications

The following applies additionally when Observe is supported.

The Notification Number is initialized to the Partial IV of the first successfully verified notification in response to the registration request. A client MUST only accept at most one Observe notifications without Partial IV, and treat it as the oldest notification received. A client receiving a notification containing a Partial IV SHALL compare the Partial IV with the Notification Number associated to that Observe registration. The client MUST stop processing notifications with a Partial IV which has been previously received. Applications MAY decide that a client only processes notifications which have greater Partial IV than the Notification Number.
If the verification of the response succeeds, and the received Partial IV was greater than the Notification Number then the client SHALL overwrite the corresponding Notification Number with the received Partial IV.

7.5. Losing Part of the Context State

To prevent reuse of an AEAD nonce with the same AEAD key, or from accepting replayed messages, an endpoint needs to handle the situation of losing rapidly changing parts of the context, such as the request Token, Sender Sequence Number, Replay Window, and Notification Numbers. These are typically stored in RAM and therefore lost in the case of an unplanned reboot.

After boot, an endpoint can either use a persistently stored complete or partial security context, or establish a new security context with each endpoint it communicates with. However, establishing a fresh security context may have a non-negligible cost in terms of, e.g., power consumption.

If the endpoint uses a persistently stored partial security context, it MUST NOT reuse a previous Sender Sequence Number and MUST NOT accept previously received messages. Some ways to achieve this are described in the following sections.

7.5.1. Sequence Number

To prevent reuse of Sender Sequence Numbers, an endpoint may perform the following procedure during normal operations:

- Before using a Sender Sequence Number that is evenly divisible by K, where K is a positive integer, store the Sender Sequence Number in persistent memory. After boot, the endpoint initiates the Sender Sequence Number to the value stored in persistent memory + K. Storing to persistent memory can be costly. The value K gives a trade-off between the number of storage operations and efficient use of Sender Sequence Numbers.

7.5.2. Replay Window

To prevent accepting replay of previously received requests, the server may perform the following procedure after boot:

- For each stored security context, the first time after boot the server receives an OSCORE request, the server responds with the Echo option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] to get a request with verifiable freshness. The server MUST use its Sender Sequence
Number (initiated as in Section 7.5.1) when generating the AEAD nonce and MUST include it as Partial IV in the response.

If the server using the Echo option can verify a second request as fresh, then the Partial IV of the second request is set as the lower limit of the replay window of Sender Sequence Numbers.

7.5.3. Replay of Notifications

To prevent accepting replay of previously received notifications, the client may perform the following procedure after boot:

- The client forgets about earlier registrations, removes all Notification Numbers and registers using Observe.

8. Processing

This section describes the OSCORE message processing. Additional processing for Observe or Block-wise are described in subsections.

Note that, analogously to [RFC7252] where the Token and source/destination pair are used to match a response with a request, both endpoints MUST keep the association (Token, (Security Context, Partial IV of the request)), in order to be able to find the Security Context and compute the AAD to protect or verify the response. The association MAY be forgotten after it has been used to successfully protect or verify the response, with the exception of Observe processing, where the association MUST be kept as long as the Observation is active.

The processing of the Sender Sequence Number follows the procedure described in Section 3 of [I-D.mcgrew-iv-gen].

8.1. Protecting the Request

Given a CoAP request, the client SHALL perform the following steps to create an OSCORE request:

1. Retrieve the Sender Context associated with the target resource.

2. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data and the plaintext, as described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

3. Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV as described in Section 5.2.
4. Encrypt the COSE object using the Sender Key. Compress the COSE Object as specified in Section 6.

5. Format the OSCORE message according to Section 4. The OSCORE option is added (see Section 4.1.2).

8.2. Verifying the Request

A server receiving a request containing the OSCORE option SHALL perform the following steps:

1. Discard Code and all class E options (marked in Figure 5 with 'x' in column E) present in the received message. For example, an If-Match Outer option is discarded, but an Uri-Host Outer option is not discarded.

2. Decompress the COSE Object (Section 6) and retrieve the Recipient Context associated with the Recipient ID in the 'kid' parameter, additionally using the 'kid context', if present. If either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, or the server fails to retrieve a Recipient Context with Recipient ID corresponding to the 'kid' parameter received, then the server SHALL stop processing the request.

* If either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, the server MAY respond with a 4.02 Bad Option error message. The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero. The diagnostic payload SHOULD contain the string "Failed to decode COSE".

* If the server fails to retrieve a Recipient Context with Recipient ID corresponding to the 'kid' parameter received, the server MAY respond with a 4.01 Unauthorized error message. The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero. The diagnostic payload SHOULD contain the string "Security context not found".

3. Verify that the ‘Partial IV’ has not been received before using the Replay Window, as described in Section 7.4.

4. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data, as described in Section 5.4.

5. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Recipient ID, Common IV, and the ‘Partial IV’ parameter, received in the COSE Object.
6. Decrypt the COSE object using the Recipient Key, as per [RFC8152] Section 5.3. (The decrypt operation includes the verification of the integrity.)

* If decryption fails, the server MUST stop processing the request and MAY respond with a 4.00 Bad Request error message. The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero. The diagnostic payload MAY contain the "Decryption failed" string.

* If decryption succeeds, update the Replay Window, as described in Section 7.

7. Add decrypted Code, options, and payload to the decrypted request. The OSCORE option is removed.

8. The decrypted CoAP request is processed according to [RFC7252].

8.2.1. Supporting Block-wise

If Block-wise is supported, insert the following step before any other:

A. If Block-wise is present in the request then process the Outer Block options according to [RFC7959], until all blocks of the request have been received (see Section 4.1.3.4).

8.3. Protecting the Response

If a CoAP response is generated in response to an OSCORE request, the server SHALL perform the following steps to create an OSCORE response. Note that CoAP error responses derived from CoAP processing (step 8 in Section 8.2) are protected, as well as successful CoAP responses, while the OSCORE errors (steps 2, 3, and 6 in Section 8.2) do not follow the processing below, but are sent as simple CoAP responses, without OSCORE processing.

1. Retrieve the Sender Context in the Security Context associated with the Token.

2. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data and the plaintext, as described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

3. Compute the AEAD nonce as described in Section 5.2:

* Either use the AEAD nonce from the request, or
* Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV.

4. Encrypt the COSE object using the Sender Key. Compress the COSE Object as specified in Section 6. If the AEAD nonce was constructed from a new Partial IV, this Partial IV MUST be included in the message. If the AEAD nonce from the request was used, the Partial IV MUST NOT be included in the message.

5. Format the OSCORE message according to Section 4. The OSCORE option is added (see Section 4.1.2).

8.3.1. Supporting Observe

If Observe is supported, insert the following step between step 2 and 3 of Section 8.3:

A. If the response is an observe notification:

   o If the response is the first notification:

      * compute the AEAD nonce as described in Section 5.2:

         + Either use the AEAD nonce from the request, or

         + Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV.

         Then go to 4.

   o If the response is not the first notification:

      * encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV, then go to 4.

8.4. Verifying the Response

A client receiving a response containing the OSCORE option SHALL perform the following steps:
1. Discard Code and all class E options (marked in Figure 5 with ‘x’ in column E) present in the received message. For example, ETag Outer option is discarded, as well as Max-Age Outer option.

2. Retrieve the Recipient Context in the Security Context associated with the Token. Decompress the COSE Object (Section 6). If either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, then go to 8.

3. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data, as described in Section 5.4.

4. Compute the AEAD nonce
   * If the Partial IV is not present in the response, the AEAD nonce from the request is used.
   * If the Partial IV is present in the response, compute the AEAD nonce from the Recipient ID, Common IV, and the ‘Partial IV’ parameter, received in the COSE Object.

5. Decrypt the COSE object using the Recipient Key, as per [RFC8152] Section 5.3. (The decrypt operation includes the verification of the integrity.) If decryption fails, then go to 8.

6. Add decrypted Code, options and payload to the decrypted request. The OSCORE option is removed.

7. The decrypted CoAP response is processed according to [RFC7252].

8. In case any of the previous erroneous conditions apply: the client SHALL stop processing the response.

8.4.1. Supporting Block-wise

   If Block-wise is supported, insert the following step before any other:

   A. If Block-wise is present in the request then process the Outer Block options according to [RFC7959], until all blocks of the request have been received (see Section 4.1.3.4).

8.4.2. Supporting Observe

   If Observe is supported:

   Insert the following step between step 5 and step 6:
A. If the request was an Observe registration, then:

- If the Partial IV is not present in the response, and Inner Observe is present, and the AEAD nonce from the request was already used once, then go to 8.

- If the Partial IV is present in the response and Inner Observe is present, then follow the processing described in Section 4.1.3.5.2 and Section 7.4.1, then:
  * initialize the Notification Number (if first successfully verified notification), or
  * overwrite the Notification Number (if the received Partial IV was greater than the Notification Number).

Replace step 8 of Section 8.4 with:

B. In case any of the previous erroneous conditions apply: the client SHALL stop processing the response. An error condition occurring while processing a response to an observation request does not cancel the observation. A client MUST NOT react to failure by re-registering the observation immediately.

9. Web Linking

The use of OSCORE MAY be indicated by a target attribute "osc" in a web link [RFC8288] to a resource, e.g. using a link-format document [RFC6690] if the resource is accessible over CoAP.

The "osc" attribute is a hint indicating that the destination of that link is only accessible using OSCORE, and unprotected access to it is not supported. Note that this is simply a hint, it does not include any security context material or any other information required to run OSCORE.

A value MUST NOT be given for the "osc" attribute; any present value MUST be ignored by parsers. The "osc" attribute MUST NOT appear more than once in a given link-value; occurrences after the first MUST be ignored by parsers.

The example in Figure 11 shows a use of the "osc" attribute: the client does resource discovery on a server, and gets back a list of resources, one of which includes the "osc" attribute indicating that the resource is protected with OSCORE. The link-format notation (see Section 5 of [RFC6690]) is used.
REQ: GET /.well-known/core

RES: 2.05 Content
</sensors/temp>;osc,
</sensors/light>;if="sensor"

Figure 11: The web link

10. CoAP-to-CoAP Forwarding Proxy

CoAP is designed for proxy operations (see Section 5.7 of [RFC7252]).

OSCORE is designed to work with OSCORE-unaware CoAP proxies. Security requirements for forwarding are listed in Section 2.2.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. Proxy processing of the (Outer) Proxy-Uri option works as defined in [RFC7252]. Proxy processing of the (Outer) Block options works as defined in [RFC7959].

However, not all CoAP proxy operations are useful:

- Since a CoAP response is only applicable to the original CoAP request, caching is in general not useful. In support of existing proxies, OSCORE uses the outer Max-Age option, see Section 4.1.3.1.

- Proxy processing of the (Outer) Observe option as defined in [RFC7641] is specified in Section 4.1.3.5.

Optionally, a CoAP proxy MAY detect OSCORE and act accordingly. An OSCORE-aware CoAP proxy:

- SHALL bypass caching for the request if the OSCORE option is present

- SHOULD avoid caching responses to requests with an OSCORE option

In the case of Observe (see Section 4.1.3.5) the OSCORE-aware CoAP proxy:

- SHALL NOT initiate an Observe registration

- MAY verify the order of notifications using Partial IV rather than the Observe option
11. HTTP Operations

The CoAP request/response model may be mapped to HTTP and vice versa as described in Section 10 of [RFC7252]. The HTTP-CoAP mapping is further detailed in [RFC8075]. This section defines the components needed to map and transport OSCORE messages over HTTP hops. By mapping between HTTP and CoAP and by using cross-protocol proxies OSCORE may be used end-to-end between e.g. an HTTP client and a CoAP server. Examples are provided at the end of the section.

11.1. The HTTP OSCORE Header Field

The HTTP OSCORE Header Field (see Section 13.4) is used for carrying the content of the CoAP OSCORE option when transporting OSCORE messages over HTTP hops.

The HTTP OSCORE header field is only used in POST requests and 200 (OK) responses. When used, the HTTP header field Content-Type is set to ‘application/oscore’ (see Section 13.5) indicating that the HTTP body of this message contains the OSCORE payload (see Section 6.2). No additional semantics is provided by other message fields.

Using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234], including the following core ABNF syntax rules defined by that specification: ALPHA (letters) and DIGIT (decimal digits), the HTTP OSCORE header field value is as follows.

base64url-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "."  
OSCORE = 2*base64url-char

The HTTP OSCORE header field is not appropriate to list in the Connection header field (see Section 6.1 of [RFC7230]) since it is not hop-by-hop. OSCORE messages are generally not useful when served from cache (i.e., they will generally be marked Cache-Control: no-cache) and so interaction with Vary is not relevant (Section 7.1.4 of [RFC7231]). Since the HTTP OSCORE header field is critical for message processing, moving it from headers to trailers renders the message unusable in case trailers are ignored (see Section 4.1 of [RFC7230]).

Intermediaries are in general not allowed to insert, delete, or modify the OSCORE header. Changes to the HTTP OSCORE header field will in general violate the integrity of the OSCORE message resulting in an error. For the same reason the HTTP OSCORE header field is in general not preserved across redirects.
Since redirects are not defined in the mappings between HTTP and CoAP [RFC8075][RFC7252], a number of conditions need to be fulfilled for redirects to work. For CoAP client to HTTP server, such conditions include:

- the CoAP-to-HTTP proxy follows the redirect, instead of the CoAP client as in the HTTP case
- the CoAP-to-HTTP proxy copies the HTTP OSCORE header field and body to the new request
- the target of the redirect has the necessary OSCORE security context required to decrypt and verify the message

Since OSCORE requires HTTP body to be preserved across redirects, the HTTP server is recommended to reply with 307 or 308 instead of 301 or 302.

For the case of HTTP client to CoAP server, although redirect is not defined for CoAP servers [RFC7252], an HTTP client receiving a redirect should generate a new OSCORE request for the server it was redirected to.

11.2. CoAP-to-HTTP Mapping

Section 10.1 of [RFC7252] describes the fundamentals of the CoAP-to-HTTP cross-protocol mapping process. The additional rules for OSCORE messages are:

- The HTTP OSCORE header field value is set to
  * AA if the CoAP OSCORE option is empty, otherwise
  * the value of the CoAP OSCORE option (Section 6.1) in base64url (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) encoding without padding. Implementation notes for this encoding are given in Appendix C of [RFC7515].
- The HTTP Content-Type is set to ‘application/oscore’ (see Section 13.5), independent of CoAP Content-Format.

11.3. HTTP-to-CoAP Mapping

Section 10.2 of [RFC7252] and [RFC8075] specify the behavior of an HTTP-to-CoAP proxy. The additional rules for HTTP messages with the OSCORE header field are:

- The CoAP OSCORE option is set as follows:
empty if the value of the HTTP OSCORE header field is a single zero byte (0x00) represented by AA, otherwise

the value of the HTTP OSCORE header field decoded from base64url (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding. Implementation notes for this encoding are given in Appendix C of [RFC7515].

> The CoAP Content-Format option is omitted, the content format for OSCORE (Section 13.6) MUST NOT be used.

### 11.4. HTTP Endpoints

Restricted to subsets of HTTP and CoAP supporting a bijective mapping, OSCORE can be originated or terminated in HTTP endpoints.

The sending HTTP endpoint uses [RFC8075] to translate the HTTP message into a CoAP message. The CoAP message is then processed with OSCORE as defined in this document. The OSCORE message is then mapped to HTTP as described in Section 11.2 and sent in compliance with the rules in Section 11.1.

The receiving HTTP endpoint maps the HTTP message to a CoAP message using [RFC8075] and Section 11.3. The resulting OSCORE message is processed as defined in this document. If successful, the plaintext CoAP message is translated to HTTP for normal processing in the endpoint.

### 11.5. Example: HTTP Client and CoAP Server

This section is giving an example of how a request and a response between an HTTP client and a CoAP server could look like. The example is not a test vector but intended as an illustration of how the message fields are translated in the different steps.

Mapping and notation here is based on "Simple Form" (Section 5.4.1 of [RFC8075]).

```
[HTTP request -- Before client object security processing]
GET http://proxy.url/hc/?target_uri=coap://server.url/orders
HTTP/1.1
```
[HTTP request -- HTTP Client to Proxy]

POST http://proxy.url/hc/?target_uri=coap://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: CSU
Body: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

[CoAP request -- Proxy to CoAP Server]

POST coap://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
OSCORE: 09 25
Payload: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

[CoAP request -- After server object security processing]

GET coap://server.url/orders HTTP/1.1

[CoAP response -- Before server object security processing]

2.05 Content
Content-Format: 0
Payload: Exterminate! Exterminate!

[CoAP response -- CoAP Server to Proxy]

2.04 Changed
OSCORE: [empty]
Payload: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]

[HTTP response -- Proxy to HTTP Client]

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: AA
Body: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]

[HTTP response -- After client object security processing]

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Body: Exterminate! Exterminate!

Note that the HTTP Status Code 200 in the next-to-last message is the mapping of CoAP Code 2.04 (Changed), whereas the HTTP Status Code 200 in the last message is the mapping of the CoAP Code 2.05 (Content), which was encrypted within the compressed COSE object carried in the Body of the HTTP response.
11.6. Example: CoAP Client and HTTP Server

This section is giving an example of how a request and a response between a CoAP client and an HTTP server could look like. The example is not a test vector but intended as an illustration of how the message fields are translated in the different steps

[CoAP request -- Before client object security processing]

GET coap://proxy.url/
Proxy-Uri=http://server.url/orders

[CoAP request -- CoAP Client to Proxy]

POST coap://proxy.url/
Proxy-Uri=http://server.url/
OSCORE: 09 25
Payload: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

[HTTP request -- Proxy to HTTP Server]

POST http://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: CSU
Body: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

[HTTP request -- After server object security processing]

GET http://server.url/orders HTTP/1.1

[HTTP response -- Before server object security processing]

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Body: Exterminate! Exterminate!

[HTTP response -- HTTP Server to Proxy]

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: AA
Body: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]

[CoAP response -- Proxy to CoAP Client]

2.04 Changed
OSCORE: [empty]
Payload: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]
[CoAP response -- After client object security processing]

2.05 Content
Content-Format: 0
Payload: Exterminate! Exterminate!

Note that the HTTP Code 2.04 (Changed) in the next-to-last message is the mapping of HTTP Status Code 200, whereas the CoAP Code 2.05 (Content) in the last message is the value that was encrypted within the compressed COSE object carried in the Body of the HTTP response.

12. Security Considerations

An overview of the security properties is given in Appendix D.

12.1. End-to-end Protection

In scenarios with intermediary nodes such as proxies or gateways, transport layer security such as (D)TLS only protects data hop-by-hop. As a consequence, the intermediary nodes can read and modify any information. The trust model where all intermediary nodes are considered trustworthy is problematic, not only from a privacy perspective, but also from a security perspective, as the intermediaries are free to delete resources on sensors and falsify commands to actuators (such as "unlock door", "start fire alarm", "raise bridge"). Even in the rare cases where all the owners of the intermediary nodes are fully trusted, attacks and data breaches make such an architecture brittle.

(D)TLS protects hop-by-hop the entire message. OSCORE protects end-to-end all information that is not required for proxy operations (see Section 4). (D)TLS and OSCORE can be combined, thereby enabling end-to-end security of the message payload, in combination with hop-by-hop protection of the entire message, during transport between endpoint and intermediary node. In particular when OSCORE is used with HTTP, the additional TLS protection of HTTP hops is recommended, e.g. between an HTTP endpoint and a proxy translating between HTTP and CoAP.

Applications need to consider that certain message fields and messages types are not protected end-to-end and may be spoofed or manipulated. The consequences of unprotected message fields are analyzed in Appendix D.4.
12.2. Security Context Establishment

The use of COSE_Encrypt0 and AEAD to protect messages as specified in this document requires an established security context. The method to establish the security context described in Section 3.2 is based on a common Master Secret and unique Sender IDs. The necessary input parameters may be pre-established or obtained using a key establishment protocol augmented with establishment of Sender/Recipient ID such as the OSCORE profile of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. Such a procedure must ensure that the requirements of the security context parameters for the intended use are complied with (see Section 3.3) and also in error situations. While recipient IDs are allowed to coincide between different security contexts (see Section 3.3), this may cause a server to process multiple verifications before finding the right security context or rejecting a message. Moreover, it is recommended to use a key establishment protocol which provides forward secrecy whenever possible. Considerations for deploying OSCORE with a fixed Master Secret are given in Appendix B.

12.3. Master Secret

OSCORE uses HKDF [RFC5869] and the established input parameters to derive the security context. The required properties of the security context parameters are discussed in Section 3.3, in this section we focus on the Master Secret. HKDF denotes in this specification the composition of the expand and extract functions as defined in [RFC5869] and the Master Secret is used as Input Key Material (IKM).

Informally, HKDF takes as source an IKM containing some good amount of randomness but not necessarily distributed uniformly (or for which an attacker has some partial knowledge) and derive from it one or more cryptographically strong secret keys [RFC5869]. Therefore, the main requirement for the OSCORE Master Secret, in addition to being secret, is that it is has a good amount of randomness. The selected key establishment schemes must ensure that the necessary properties for the Master Secret are fulfilled. For pre-shared key deployments and key transport solutions such as [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], the Master Secret can be generated offline using a good random number generator. Randomness requirements for security are described in [RFC4086].

12.4. Replay Protection

Replay attacks need to be considered in different parts of the implementation. Most AEAD algorithms require a unique nonce for each message, for which the sender sequence numbers in the COSE message...
field ‘Partial IV’ is used. If the recipient accepts any sequence number larger than the one previously received, then the problem of sequence number synchronization is avoided. With reliable transport, it may be defined that only messages with sequence number which are equal to previous sequence number + 1 are accepted. An adversary may try to induce a device reboot for the purpose of replaying a message (see Section 7.5).

Note that sharing a security context between servers may open up for replay attacks, for example if the replay windows are not synchronized.

12.5. Client Aliveness

A verified OSCORE request enables the server to verify the identity of the entity who generated the message. However, it does not verify that the client is currently involved in the communication, since the message may be a delayed delivery of a previously generated request which now reaches the server. To verify the aliveness of the client the server may use the Echo option in the response to a request from the client (see [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]).

12.6. Cryptographic Considerations

The maximum sender sequence number is dependent on the AEAD algorithm. The maximum sender sequence number is $2^{40} - 1$, or any algorithm specific lower limit, after which a new security context must be generated. The mechanism to build the AEAD nonce (Section 5.2) assumes that the nonce is at least 56 bits, and the Partial IV is at most 40 bits. The mandatory-to-implement AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 is selected for compatibility with CCM*. AEAD algorithms that require unpredictable nonces are not supported.

In order to prevent cryptanalysis when the same plaintext is repeatedly encrypted by many different users with distinct AEAD keys, the AEAD nonce is formed by mixing the sequence number with a secret per-context initialization vector (Common IV) derived along with the keys (see Section 3.1 of [RFC8152]), and by using a Master Salt in the key derivation (see [MF00] for an overview). The Master Secret, Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV must be secret, the rest of the parameters may be public. The Master Secret must have a good amount of randomness (see Section 12.3).

12.7. Message Segmentation

The Inner Block options enable the sender to split large messages into OSCORE-protected blocks such that the receiving endpoint can verify blocks before having received the complete message. The Outer
Block options allow for arbitrary proxy fragmentation operations that cannot be verified by the endpoints, but can by policy be restricted in size since the Inner Block options allow for secure fragmentation of very large messages. A maximum message size (above which the sending endpoint fragments the message and the receiving endpoint discards the message, if complying to the policy) may be obtained as part of normal resource discovery.

12.8. Privacy Considerations

Privacy threats executed through intermediary nodes are considerably reduced by means of OSCORE. End-to-end integrity protection and encryption of the message payload and all options that are not used for proxy operations, provide mitigation against attacks on sensor and actuator communication, which may have a direct impact on the personal sphere.

The unprotected options (Figure 5) may reveal privacy sensitive information, see Appendix D.4. CoAP headers sent in plaintext allow, for example, matching of CON and ACK (CoAP Message Identifier), matching of request and responses (Token) and traffic analysis. OSCORE does not provide protection for HTTP header fields which are not both CoAP-mappable and class E. The HTTP message fields which are visible to on-path entity are only used for the purpose of transporting the OSCORE message, whereas the application layer message is encoded in CoAP and encrypted.

COSE message fields, i.e. the OSCORE option, may reveal information about the communicating endpoints. E.g. 'kid' and 'kid context', which are intended to help the server find the right context, may reveal information about the client. Tracking 'kid' and 'kid context' to one server may be used for correlating requests from one client.

Unprotected error messages reveal information about the security state in the communication between the endpoints. Unprotected signaling messages reveal information about the reliable transport used on a leg of the path. Using the mechanisms described in Section 7.5 may reveal when a device goes through a reboot. This can be mitigated by the device storing the precise state of sender sequence number and replay window on a clean shutdown.

The length of message fields can reveal information about the message. Applications may use a padding scheme to protect against traffic analysis.
13. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this document]]" with the RFC number of this specification.

Note to IANA: Please note all occurrences of "TBDx" in this specification should be assigned the same number.

13.1. COSE Header Parameters Registry

The ‘kid context’ parameter is added to the "COSE Header Parameters Registry":

- Name: kid context
- Label: TBD2
- Value Type: bstr
- Value Registry:
- Description: Identifies the context for kid
- Reference: Section 5.1 of this document

Note to IANA: Label assignment in (Integer value between 1 and 255) is requested. (RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)

13.2. CoAP Option Numbers Registry

The OSCORE option is added to the CoAP Option Numbers registry:

+-----------------+-----------------+-------------------+
| Number | Name            | Reference         |
|--------+-----------------+-------------------|
| TBD1   | OSCORE          | [[this document]] |
+-----------------+-----------------+-------------------+

Note to IANA: Label assignment in (Integer value between 0 and 12) is requested. We also request Expert review if possible, to make sure a correct number for the option is selected (RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)

Furthermore, the following existing entries in the CoAP Option Numbers registry are updated with a reference to the document specifying OSCORE processing of that option:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>If-Match</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uri-Host</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ETag</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>If-None-Match</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Observe</td>
<td>[RFC7641] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Uri-Port</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Location-Path</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Uri-Path</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Content-Format</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Max-Age</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Uri-Query</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Location-Query</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Block2</td>
<td>[RFC7959] [RFC8323] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Block1</td>
<td>[RFC7959] [RFC8323] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Size2</td>
<td>[RFC7959] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Proxy-Uri</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Proxy-Scheme</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Size1</td>
<td>[RFC7252] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>No-Response</td>
<td>[RFC7967] [this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Future additions to the CoAP Option Numbers registry need to provide a reference to the document where the OSCORE processing of that CoAP Option is defined.

13.3. CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry

The OSCORE option is added to the CoAP Signaling Option Numbers registry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applies to</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.xx (all)</td>
<td>TBD1</td>
<td>OSCORE</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note to IANA: The value in the "Number" field is the same value that’s being assigned to the new Option Number. Please make sure TBD1 is not the same as any value in Numbers for any existing entry in the CoAP Signaling Option Numbers registry (at the time of writing this, that means make sure TBD1 is not 2 or 4). (RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)
13.4. Header Field Registrations

The HTTP OSCORE header field is added to the Message Headers registry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSCORE</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>[[this document]], Section 11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13.5. Media Type Registrations

This section registers the 'application/oscore' media type in the "Media Types" registry. These media types are used to indicate that the content is an OSCORE message. The OSCORE body cannot be understood without the OSCORE header field value and the security context.
Type name: application
Subtype name: oscore
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[This document]].
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [[This document]]
Applications that use this media type: IoT applications sending security content over HTTP(S) transports.
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): N/A
* File extension(s): N/A
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: Goeran Selander, goran.selander@ericsson.com
Change Controller: IESG
Provisional registration? No
13.6.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry

Note to IANA: ID assignment in the 10000–64999 range is requested.
(RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)

This section registers the media type ‘application/oscore’ media type in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry. This Content-Format for the OSCORE payload is defined for potential future use cases and SHALL NOT be used in the OSCORE message. The OSCORE payload cannot be understood without the OSCORE option value and the security context.

+-------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>application/oscore</td>
<td></td>
<td>TBD3</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+

13.7.  OSCORE Flag Bits Registry

This document defines a sub-registry for the OSCORE flag bits within the "CoRE Parameters" registry. The name of the sub-registry is "OSCORE Flag Bits". The registry should be created with the Expert Review policy. Guidelines for the experts are provided in Section 13.8.

The columns of the registry are:

- bit position: This indicates the position of the bit in the set of OSCORE flag bits, starting at 0 for the most significant bit. The bit position must be an integer or a range of integers, in the range 0 to 63.

- name: The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss the registration entry. The value is not used in the protocol. Names are to be unique in the table.

- description: This contains a brief description of the use of the bit.

- specification: This contains a pointer to the specification defining the entry.

The initial contents of the registry can be found in the table below. The specification column for all rows in that table should be this document. The entries with Bit Position of 0 and 1 are to be marked as 'Reserved'. The entry with Bit Position of 1 is going to be specified in a future document, and will be used to expand the space.
for the OSCORE flag bits in Section 6.1, so that entries 8-63 of the registry are defined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kid Context Flag</td>
<td>Set to 1 if kid context is present in the compressed COSE object</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kid Flag</td>
<td>Set to 1 if kid is present in the compressed COSE object</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>Partial IV Length</td>
<td>Encodes the Partial IV length; can have value 0 to 5</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-63</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13.8. Expert Review Instructions

The expert reviewers for the registry defined in this document are expected to ensure that the usage solves a valid use case that could not be solved better in a different way, that it is not going to duplicate one that is already registered, and that the registered point is likely to be used in deployments. They are furthermore expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested code points. Experts should take into account the expected usage of entries when approving point assignment, and the length of the encoded value should be weighed against the number of code points left that encode to that size and the size of device it will be used on. Experts should block registration for entries 8-63 until these points are defined (i.e. until the mechanism for the OSCORE flag bits expansion via bit 1 is specified).
14. References

14.1. Normative References


14.2. Informative References

Selander, et al. Expires March 4, 2019
Internet-Draft                   OSCORE                      August 2018

[I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie]  

[I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]  

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]  

[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]  

[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]  

[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]  

[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]  

[I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]  
This section gives examples of OSCORE, targeting scenarios in Section 2.2.1.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. The message exchanges are made, based on the assumption that there is a security...
context established between client and server. For simplicity, these examples only indicate the content of the messages without going into detail of the (compressed) COSE message format.

### A.1. Secure Access to Sensor

This example illustrates a client requesting the alarm status from a server.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Proxy</th>
<th>Server</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+------</td>
<td>POST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code: 0.02 (POST)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Token: 0x8c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCORE: [kid:5f, Partial IV:42]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payload: {Code:0.01, Uri-Path:&quot;alarm_status&quot;}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| +------| POST  |        |
| Code: 0.02 (POST) |
| Token: 0x7b |
| OSCORE: [kid:5f, Partial IV:42] |
| Payload: {Code:0.01, Uri-Path:"alarm_status"} |

| <-------| 2.04 |        |
| Code: 2.04 (Changed) |
| Token: 0x7b |
| OSCORE: - |
| Payload: (Code:2.05, "0") |

| <-------| 2.04 |        |
| Code: 2.04 (Changed) |
| Token: 0x8c |
| OSCORE: - |
| Payload: (Code:2.05, "0") |

Figure 12: Secure Access to Sensor. Square brackets [ ... ] indicate content of compressed COSE object. Curly brackets { ... } indicate encrypted data.

The request/response Codes are encrypted by OSCORE and only dummy Codes (POST/Changed) are visible in the header of the OSCORE message. The option Uri-Path ("alarm_status") and payload ("0") are encrypted.

The COSE header of the request contains an identifier (5f), indicating which security context was used to protect the message and a Partial IV (42).

The server verifies the request as specified in Section 8.2. The client verifies the response as specified in Section 8.4.
A.2. Secure Subscribe to Sensor

This example illustrates a client requesting subscription to a blood sugar measurement resource (GET /glucose), first receiving the value 220 mg/dl and then a second value 180 mg/dl.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Proxy</th>
<th>Server</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✡️</td>
<td></td>
<td>⚙️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✡️</td>
<td></td>
<td>⚙️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✡️</td>
<td></td>
<td>⚙️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✡️</td>
<td></td>
<td>⚙️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✡️</td>
<td></td>
<td>⚙️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✡️</td>
<td></td>
<td>⚙️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
Figure 13: Secure Subscribe to Sensor. Square brackets [ ... ] indicate content of compressed COSE object header. Curly brackets { ... } indicate encrypted data.

The dummy Codes (FETCH/Content) are used to allow forwarding of Observe messages. The options Content-Format (0) and the payload ("220" and "180"), are encrypted.

The COSE header of the request contains an identifier (ca), indicating the security context used to protect the message and a Partial IV (15). The COSE headers of the responses contains Partial IVs (32 and 36).

The server verifies that the Partial IV has not been received before. The client verifies that the responses are bound to the request and that the Partial IVs are greater than any Partial IV previously received in a response bound to the request.

Appendix B. Deployment Examples

Two examples complying with the requirements on the security context parameters (Section 3.3) are given in this section.

B.1. Master Secret Used Once

An application may derive a security context once and use it for the lifetime of a device. For many IoT deployments, a 128 bit uniformly random Master Key is sufficient for encrypting all data exchanged with the IoT device. This specification describes techniques for persistent storage of the security context and synchronization of sequence numbers (see Section 7.5) to ensure that security is maintained with the existing security context.

B.2. Master Secret Used Multiple Times

Section 12.2 recommends that the Master Secret is obtained from a key establishment protocol providing forward secrecy.

An application which does not require forward secrecy may allow multiple security contexts to be derived from one Master Secret. The requirements on the security context parameters must be fulfilled (Section 3.3) even if the client or server is rebooted, recommissioned or in error cases.
This section gives an example of an application allowing new security contexts to be derived from input parameters pre-established between client and server for this purpose: in particular Master Secret, Master Salt and Sender/Recipient ID (see Section 3.2):

- The client generates an ID Context which has previously not been used with the pre-established input parameters and derives a new security context. ID context may be pseudo-random and large for stochastic uniqueness, but care must be taken e.g. to avoid re-use of the same seed for random number generation. Using this new security context, the client generates an OSCORE request with (kid context, kid) = (ID Context, Sender ID) in the OSCORE option.

- The server receiving such an OSCORE request with kid matching the Recipient ID of pre-established input parameters, but with a new kid context, derives the security context using ID Context = kid context. If the message verifies then a new security context with this ID Context is stored in the server, and used in the response. Further requests with the same (kid context, kid) are verified with this security context.

As an alternative procedure to reduce the subsequent overhead in requests due to kid context, the verification of a message with a new ID Context may trigger the server to generate a new kid to replace the Client Sender ID in future requests. A client may e.g. indicate support for such a procedure by requesting a special well-known URI and receive the new kid in the response, which together with the input parameters and the ID context is used to derive the new security context which may be identified only by its kid. The details are out of scope for this specification.

The procedures may be complemented with the use of the Echo option for verifying the aliveness of the client requesting a new security context.

Appendix C. Test Vectors

This appendix includes the test vectors for different examples of CoAP messages using OSCORE. Given a set of inputs, OSCORE defines how to set up the Security Context in both the client and the server.

Note that in Appendix C.4 and all following test vectors the Token and the Message ID of the OSCORE-protected CoAP messages are set to the same value of the unprotected CoAP message, to help the reader with comparisons.

[NOTE: the following examples use option number = 9 (TBD1 assigned by IANA). If that differs, the RFC editor is asked to update the test
C.1.  Test Vector 1: Key Derivation with Master Salt

In this test vector, a Master Salt of 8 bytes is used. The default values are used for AEAD Algorithm and HKDF.

C.1.1.  Client

Inputs:
- Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
- Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)
- Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)
- Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

From the previous parameters,
- info (for Sender Key): 0x8540f60a634b657910 (9 bytes)
- info (for Recipient Key): 0x854101f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)
- info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

Outputs:
- Sender Key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)
- Recipient Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)
- Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eebf54987c (13 bytes)

From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for sender and recipient):
- sender nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eebf54987c (13 bytes)
- recipient nonce: 0x4722d4dd6d944169eebf54987c (13 bytes)

C.1.2.  Server

Inputs:
- Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
From the previous parameters,

- info (for Sender Key): 0x854101f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)
- info (for Recipient Key): 0x8540f60a634b657910 (9 bytes)
- info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

Outputs:

- Sender Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)
- Recipient Key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)
- Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for sender and recipient):

- sender nonce: 0x4722d4dd6d944169eefb54987c (13 bytes)
- recipient nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

C.2. Test Vector 2: Key Derivation without Master Salt

In this test vector, the default values are used for AEAD Algorithm, HKDF, and Master Salt.

C.2.1. Client

Inputs:

- Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
- Sender ID: 0x00 (1 byte)
- Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

From the previous parameters,

- info (for Sender Key): 0x854100f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)
Outputs:

- Sender Key: 0x321b26943253c7ff60b64d74041 (16 bytes)
- Recipient Key: 0xe57b5635815177cd679ab4bcec9d7dda (16 bytes)
- Common IV: 0xbe35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for sender and recipient):

- sender nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2d91c52e99f9 (13 bytes)
- recipient nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace810c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

C.2.2. Server

Inputs:

- Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
- Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
- Recipient ID: 0x00 (1 byte)

From the previous parameters,

- info (for Sender Key): 0x854101f60a6249560d (10 bytes)
- info (for Recipient Key): 0x854100f60a6249560d (10 bytes)
- info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

Outputs:

- Sender Key: 0xe57b5635815177cd679ab4bcec9d7dda (16 bytes)
- Recipient Key: 0x321b26943253c7ff60b64d74041 (16 bytes)
- Common IV: 0xbe35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for sender and recipient):
o sender nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace810c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

o recipient nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

C.3. Test Vector 3: Key Derivation with ID Context

In this test vector, a Master Salt of 8 bytes and a ID Context of 8 bytes are used. The default values are used for AEAD Algorithm and HKDF.

C.3.1. Client

Inputs:

o Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

o Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)

o Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)

o Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

o ID Context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)

From the previous parameters,

o info (for Sender Key): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (17 bytes)

o info (for Recipient Key): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (18 bytes)

o info (for Common IV): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a6249560d (16 bytes)

Outputs:

o Sender Key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)

o Recipient Key: 0xe39a0c7c77b43f03b4b39ab9a268699f (16 bytes)

o Common IV: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)

From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for sender and recipient):

o sender nonce: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)
C.3.2. Server

Inputs:

- Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
- Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)
- Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
- Recipient ID: 0x0 (0 byte)
- ID Context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)

From the previous parameters,

- info (for Sender Key): 0x8541014837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (18 bytes)
- info (for Recipient Key): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (17 bytes)
- info (for Common IV): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a6249560d (16 bytes)

Outputs:

- Sender Key: 0xe39a0c7c77b43f03b4b39ab9a268699f (16 bytes)
- Recipient Key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)
- Common IV: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)

From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for sender and recipient):

- sender nonce: 0x2da58fb85ff1b81d0b7181b85e (13 bytes)
- recipient nonce: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)

C.4. Test Vector 4: OSCORE Request, Client

This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET request using the security context derived in Appendix C.1. The unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path and Uri-Host options.
Unprotected CoAP request:
0x44015d1f00003974396c6f63616c686f73743747631 (22 bytes)

Common Context:
  o AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
  o Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
  o Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

Sender Context:
  o Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)
  o Sender Key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)
  o Sender Sequence Number: 20

The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
  o Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)
  o kid: 0x (0 byte)
  o external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)
  o AAD: 0x8368456e6372797074304048501810a40411440 (20 bytes)
  o plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)
  o encryption key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)
  o nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb549868 (13 bytes)

From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
  o OSCORE option value: 0x0914 (2 bytes)
  o ciphertext: 0x612f1092f1776f1c1668b3825e (13 bytes)

From there:
  o Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x44025d1f00003974396c6f63616c686f737437476310914612f1092f1776f1c1668b3825e (35 bytes)
C.5.  Test Vector 5: OSCORE Request, Client

This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET request using the security context derived in Appendix C.2. The unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path and Uri-Host options.

Unprotected CoAP request:
0x440171c30000b932396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)

Common Context:
- AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
- Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
- Common IV: 0xbe35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

Sender Context:
- Sender ID: 0x00 (1 bytes)
- Sender Key: 0x321b26943253c7ffb6003b0b64d74041 (16 bytes)
- Sender Sequence Number: 20

The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
- Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)
- kid: 0x00 (1 byte)
- external_aad: 0x8501810a4100411440 (9 bytes)
- AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040498501810a4100411440 (21 bytes)
- plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)
- encryption key: 0x321b26943253c7ffb6003b0b64d74041 (16 bytes)
- nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace910c52e99ed (13 bytes)

From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
- OSCORE option value: 0x091400 (3 bytes)
- ciphertext: 0x4ed339a5a379b0b8bc731fffb0 (13 bytes)

From there:
Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x440271c30000b932396c6f63616c686f737463091400ff4ed339a5a379b0b8bc731fffb0 (36 bytes)

C.6. Test Vector 6: OSCORE Request, Client

This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET request for an application that sets the ID Context and requires it to be sent in the request, so kid context is present in the protected message. This test vector uses the security context derived in Appendix C.3. The unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path and Uri-Host options.

Unprotected CoAP request:
0x44012f8eef9bbf7a396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)

Common Context:
- AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
- Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
- Common IV: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)
- ID Context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)

Sender Context:
- Sender ID: 0x (0 bytes)
- Sender Key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)
- Sender Sequence Number: 20

The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
- Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)
- kid: 0x (0 byte)
- kid context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)
- external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)
- AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440 (20 bytes)
- plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)
- encryption key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)
From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

- OSCORE option value: `0x19140837cbf3210017a2d3` (11 bytes)
- ciphertext: `0x72cd7273fd331ac45cffbe55c3` (13 bytes)

From there:

- Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message):
  
  `0x44022f8eef9bbf7a396c6f63616c686f73746b19140837cbf3210017a2d3ff72cd7273fd331ac45cffbe55c3` (44 bytes)

C.7. Test Vector 7: OSCORE Response, Server

This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected 2.05 Content response to the request in Appendix C.4. The unprotected response has payload "Hello World!" and no options. The protected response does not contain a kid nor a Partial IV. Note that some parameters are derived from the request.

Unprotected CoAP response:

`0x64455d1f00003974ff48656c667465737421` (21 bytes)

Common Context:

- AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
- Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
- Common IV: `0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c` (13 bytes)

Sender Context:

- Sender ID: `0x01` (1 byte)
- Sender Key: `0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710` (16 bytes)
- Sender Sequence Number: 0

The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:

- `external_aad`: `0x8501810a40411440` (8 bytes)
- AAD: `0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440` (20 bytes)
- plaintext: `0x45ff48656c667465737421` (14 bytes)
- encryption key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)
- nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb549868 (13 bytes)

From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
- OSCORE option value: 0x (0 bytes)
- ciphertext: 0xdbaad1e9a7b2a813d3c31524378303cdafae119106 (22 bytes)

From there:
- Protected CoAP response (OSCORE message):
  0x64445d1f0000397490ffdbaad1e9a7b2a813d3c31524378303cdafae119106 (32 bytes)

C.8. Test Vector 8: OSCORE Response with Partial IV, Server

This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected 2.05 Content response to the request in Appendix C.4. The unprotected response has payload "Hello World!" and no options. The protected response does not contain a kid, but contains a Partial IV. Note that some parameters are derived from the request.

Unprotected CoAP response:
0x64455d1f00003974ff48656c6f20576f726c6421 (21 bytes)

Common Context:
- AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
- Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
- Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

Sender Context:
- Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
- Sender Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)
- Sender Sequence Number: 0

The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
- Partial IV: 0x00 (1 byte)
From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

- OSCORE option value: 0x0100 (2 bytes)
- ciphertext: 0x4d4c13669384b67354b2b6175ff4b8658c666a6cf88e (22 bytes)

From there:

- Protected CoAP response (OSCORE message): 0x644445d1ff00003974920100 ff4d4c13669384b67354b2b6175ff4b8658c666a6cf88e (34 bytes)

Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties

D.1. Supporting Proxy Operations

CoAP is designed to work with intermediaries reading and/or changing CoAP message fields to perform supporting operations in constrained environments, e.g. forwarding and cross-protocol translations.

Securing CoAP on transport layer protects the entire message between the endpoints in which case CoAP proxy operations are not possible. In order to enable proxy operations, security on transport layer needs to be terminated at the proxy in which case the CoAP message in its entirety is unprotected in the proxy.

Requirements for CoAP end-to-end security are specified in [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs], in particular forwarding is detailed in Section 2.2.1. The client and server are assumed to be honest, while proxies and gateways are only trusted to perform their intended operations.

By working at the CoAP layer, OSCORE enables different CoAP message fields to be protected differently, which allows message fields required for proxy operations to be available to the proxy while message fields intended for the other endpoint remain protected. In the remainder of this section we analyze how OSCORE protects the...
protected message fields and the consequences of message fields intended for proxy operation being unprotected.

D.2. Protected Message Fields

Protected message fields are included in the Plaintext (Section 5.3) and the Additional Authenticated Data (Section 5.4) of the COSE_Encrypt0 object and encrypted using an AEAD algorithm.

OSCORE depends on a pre-established random Master Secret (Section 12.3) used to derive encryption keys, and a construction for making (key, nonce) pairs unique (Appendix D.3). Assuming this is true, and the keys are used for no more data than indicated in Section 7.2.1, OSCORE should provide the following guarantees:

- Confidentiality: An attacker should not be able to determine the plaintext contents of a given OSCORE message or determine that different plaintexts are related (Section 5.3).

- Integrity: An attacker should not be able to craft a new OSCORE message with protected message fields different from an existing OSCORE message which will be accepted by the receiver.

- Request-response binding: An attacker should not be able to make a client match a response to the wrong request.

- Non-replayability: An attacker should not be able to cause the receiver to accept a message which it has previously received and accepted.

In the above, the attacker is anyone except the endpoints, e.g. a compromised intermediary. Informally, OSCORE provides these properties by AEAD-protecting the plaintext with a strong key and uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs. AEAD encryption [RFC5116] provides confidentiality and integrity for the data. Response-request binding is provided by including the kid and Partial IV of the request in the AAD of the response. Non-replayability of requests and notifications is provided by using unique (key, nonce) pairs and a replay protection mechanism (application dependent, see Section 7.4).

OSCORE is susceptible to a variety of traffic analysis attacks based on observing the length and timing of encrypted packets. OSCORE does not provide any specific defenses against this form of attack but the application may use a padding mechanism to prevent an attacker from directly determine the length of the padding. However, information about padding may still be revealed by side-channel attacks observing differences in timing.
D.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)

In this section we show that (key, nonce) pairs are unique as long as the requirements in Sections 3.3 and 7.2.1 are followed.

Fix a Common Context (Section 3.1) and an endpoint, called the encrypting endpoint. An endpoint may alternate between client and server roles, but each endpoint always encrypts with the Sender Key of its Sender Context. Sender Keys are (stochastically) unique since they are derived with HKDF using unique Sender IDs, so messages encrypted by different endpoints use different keys. It remains to prove that the nonces used by the fixed endpoint are unique.

Since the Common IV is fixed, the nonces are determined by a Partial IV (PIV) and the Sender ID of the endpoint generating that Partial IV (ID_PIV). The nonce construction (Section 5.2) with the size of the ID_PIV (S) creates unique nonces for different (ID_PIV, PIV) pairs. There are two cases:

A. For requests, and responses with Partial IV (e.g. Observe notifications):

- ID_PIV = Sender ID of the encrypting endpoint
- PIV = current Partial IV of the encrypting endpoint

Since the encrypting endpoint steps the Partial IV for each use, the nonces used in case A are all unique as long as the number of encrypted messages is kept within the required range (Section 7.2.1).

B. For responses without Partial IV (e.g. single response to a request):

- ID_PIV = Sender ID of the endpoint generating the request
- PIV = Partial IV of the request

Since the Sender IDs are unique, ID_PIV is different from the Sender ID of the encrypting endpoint. Therefore, the nonces in case B are different compared to nonces in case A, where the encrypting endpoint generated the Partial IV. Since the Partial IV of the request is verified for replay (Section 7.4) associated to this Recipient Context, PIV is unique for this ID_PIV, which makes all nonces in case B distinct.
D.4. Unprotected Message Fields

This section lists and discusses issues with unprotected message fields.

D.4.1. CoAP Header Fields

- Version. The CoAP version [RFC7252] is not expected to be sensitive to disclose. Currently there is only one CoAP version defined. A change of this parameter is potentially a denial-of-service attack. Future versions of CoAP need to analyze attacks to OSCORE protected messages due to an adversary changing the CoAP version.

- Token/Token Length. The Token field is a client-local identifier for differentiating between concurrent requests [RFC7252]. CoAP proxies are allowed to read and change Token and Token Length between hops. An eavesdropper reading the Token can match requests to responses which can be used in traffic analysis. In particular this is true for notifications, where multiple responses are matched with one request. Modifications of Token and Token Length by an on-path attacker may become a denial-of-service attack, since it may prevent the client to identify to which request the response belongs or to find the correct information to verify integrity of the response.

- Code. The Outer CoAP Code of an OSCORE message is POST or FETCH for requests with corresponding response codes. The use of FETCH reveals no more than what is revealed by the Outer Observe option. Changing the Outer Code may be a denial-of-service attack by causing errors in the proxy processing.

- Type/Message ID. The Type/Message ID fields [RFC7252] reveal information about the UDP transport binding, e.g. an eavesdropper reading the Type or Message ID gain information about how UDP messages are related to each other. CoAP proxies are allowed to change Type and Message ID. These message fields are not present in CoAP over TCP [RFC8323], and does not impact the request/response message. A change of these fields in a UDP hop is a denial-of-service attack. By sending an ACK, an attacker can make the endpoint believe that the other endpoint received the previous message. By sending a RST, an attacker may be able to cancel an observation, make one endpoint believe the other endpoint is alive, or make one endpoint endpoint believe that the other endpoint is missing some context. By changing a NON to a CON, the attacker can cause the receiving endpoint to respond to messages for which no response was requested.
- Length. This field contains the length of the message [RFC8323] which may be used for traffic analysis. These message fields are not present in CoAP over UDP, and does not impact the request/response message. A change of Length is a denial-of-service attack similar to changing TCP header fields.

D.4.2. CoAP Options

- Max-Age. The Outer Max-Age is set to zero to avoid unnecessary caching of OSCORE error responses. Changing this value thus may cause unnecessary caching. No additional information is carried with this option.

- Proxy-Uri/Proxy-Scheme. These options are used in forward proxy deployments. With OSCORE, the Proxy-Uri option does not contain the Uri-Path/Uri-Query parts of the URI. The other parts of Proxy-Uri cannot be protected since they are allowed to be changed by a forward proxy. The server can verify what scheme is used in the last hop, but not what was requested by the client or what was used in previous hops.

- Uri-Host/Uri-Port. In forward proxy deployments, the Uri-Host/Uri-Port may be changed by an adversary, and the application needs to handle the consequences of this (see Section 4.1.3.2). The Uri-Host may either be omitted, reveal information equivalent to that of the IP address or more privacy-sensitive information, which is discouraged.

- Observe. The Outer Observe option is intended for a proxy to support forwarding of Observe messages, but is ignored by the endpoints since the Inner Observe determines the processing in the endpoints. Since the Partial IV provides absolute ordering of notifications it is not possible for an intermediary to spoof reordering (see Section 4.1.3.5). The absence of Partial IV, since only allowed for the first notification, does not prevent correct ordering of notifications. The size and distributions of notifications over time may reveal information about the content or nature of the notifications. Cancellations (Section 4.1.3.5.1) are not bound to the corresponding registrations in the same way responses are bound to requests in OSCORE (see Appendix D.2), but that does not open up for attacks based on mismatched cancellations, since for cancellations to be accepted, all options in the decrypted message except for ETag Options MUST be the same (see Section 4.1.3.5).

- Block1/Block2/Size1/Size2. The Outer Block options enable fragmentation of OSCORE messages in addition to segmentation performed by the Inner Block options. The presence of these
options indicates a large message being sent and the message size can be estimated and used for traffic analysis. Manipulating these options is a potential denial-of-service attack, e.g. injection of alleged Block fragments. The specification of a maximum size of message, MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE (Section 4.1.3.4.2), above which messages will be dropped, is intended as one measure to mitigate this kind of attack.

- **No-Response.** The Outer No-Response option is used to support proxy functionality, specifically to avoid error transmissions from proxies to clients, and to avoid bandwidth reduction to servers by proxies applying congestion control when not receiving responses. Modifying or introducing this option is a potential denial-of-service attack against the proxy operations, but since the option has an Inner value its use can be securely agreed between the endpoints. The presence of this option is not expected to reveal any sensitive information about the message exchange.

- **OSCORE.** The OSCORE option contains information about the compressed COSE header. Changing this field may cause OSCORE verification to fail.

### D.4.3. Error and Signaling Messages

Error messages occurring during CoAP processing are protected end-to-end. Error messages occurring during OSCORE processing are not always possible to protect, e.g. if the receiving endpoint cannot locate the right security context. For this setting, unprotected error messages are allowed as specified to prevent extensive retransmissions. Those error messages can be spoofed or manipulated, which is a potential denial-of-service attack.

Signaling messages used in CoAP over TCP [RFC8323] are intended to be hop-by-hop; spoofing signaling messages can be used as a denial-of-service attack of a TCP connection.

### D.4.4. HTTP Message Fields

In contrast to CoAP, where OSCORE does not protect header fields to enable CoAP-CoAP proxy operations, the use of OSCORE with HTTP is restricted to transporting a protected CoAP message over an HTTP hop. Any unprotected HTTP message fields may reveal information about the transport of the OSCORE message and enable various denial-of-service attacks. It is recommended to additionally use TLS [RFC8446] for HTTP hops, which enables encryption and integrity protection of headers, but still leaves some information for traffic analysis.
Appendix E. CDDL Summary

Data structure definitions in the present specification employ the CDDL language for conciseness and precision. CDDL is defined in [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl], which at the time of writing this appendix is in the process of completion. As the document is not yet available for a normative reference, the present appendix defines the small subset of CDDL that is being used in the present specification.

Within the subset being used here, a CDDL rule is of the form "name = type", where "name" is the name given to the "type". A "type" can be one of:

- a reference to another named type, by giving its name. The predefined named types used in the present specification are: "uint", an unsigned integer (as represented in CBOR by major type 0); "int", an unsigned or negative integer (as represented in CBOR by major type 0 or 1); "bstr", a byte string (as represented in CBOR by major type 2); "tstr", a text string (as represented in CBOR by major type 3);

- a choice between two types, by giving both types separated by a ";

- an array type (as represented in CBOR by major type 4), where the sequence of elements of the array is described by giving a sequence of entries separated by commas ",", and this sequence is enclosed by square brackets "[" and "]". Arrays described by an array description contain elements that correspond one-to-one to the sequence of entries given. Each entry of an array description is of the form "name : type", where "name" is the name given to the entry and "type" is the type of the array element corresponding to this entry.

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Group OSCORE – Secure Group Communication for CoAP
draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-03

Abstract

This document describes a mode for protecting group communication over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). The proposed mode relies on Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) and the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) format. In particular, it defines how OSCORE is used in a group communication setting, while fulfilling the same security requirements for group requests and responses. Source authentication of all messages exchanged within the group is provided by means of digital signatures produced by the sender and embedded in the protected CoAP messages.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web transfer protocol specifically designed for constrained devices and networks [RFC7228].

Group communication for CoAP [RFC7390] addresses use cases where deployed devices benefit from a group communication model, for example to reduce latencies, improve performance and reduce bandwidth utilisation. Use cases include lighting control, integrated building control, software and firmware updates, parameter and configuration updates, commissioning of constrained networks, and emergency multicast (see Appendix B). Furthermore, [RFC7390] recognizes the importance to introduce a secure mode for CoAP group communication. This specification defines such a mode.

Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] describes a security protocol based on the exchange of protected CoAP messages. OSCORE builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] and provides end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay protection and binding of response to request between a sender and a recipient, also in the presence of intermediaries. To this end, a CoAP message is protected by including its payload (if any), certain options, and header fields in a COSE object, which replaces the authenticated and encrypted fields in the protected message.

This document defines Group OSCORE, providing end-to-end security of CoAP messages exchanged between members of a group, and preserving independence of transport layer. In particular, the described approach defines how OSCORE should be used in a group communication setting, so that end-to-end security is assured in the same way as OSCORE for unicast communication. That is, end-to-end security is provided for CoAP multicast requests sent by a client to the group, and for related CoAP responses sent by multiple servers. Group OSCORE provides source authentication of all CoAP messages exchanged...
within the group, by means of digital signatures produced through private keys of sender devices and embedded in the protected CoAP messages.

As in OSCORE, it is still possible to simultaneously rely on DTLS [RFC6347] to protect hop-by-hop communication between a sender and a proxy (and vice versa), and between a proxy and a recipient (and vice versa). Note that DTLS cannot be used to secure messages sent over multicast.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252] including "endpoint", "client", "server", "sender" and "recipient"; group communication for CoAP [RFC7390]; COSE and counter signatures [RFC8152].

Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts for protection and processing of CoAP messages through OSCORE, such as "Security Context" and "Master Secret", defined in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

Terminology for constrained environments, such as "constrained device", "constrained-node network", is defined in [RFC7228].

This document refers also to the following terminology.

- Keying material: data that is necessary to establish and maintain secure communication among endpoints. This includes, for instance, keys and IVs [RFC4949].
- Group: a set of endpoints that share group keying material and security parameters (Common Context, see Section 2). The term group used in this specification refers thus to a "security group", not to be confused with network/multicast group or application group.
- Group Manager (GM): entity responsible for a group. Each endpoint in a group communicates securely with the respective GM, which is neither required to be an actual group member nor to take part in the group communication. The full list of responsibilities of the Group Manager is provided in Section 7.
o Silent server: member of a group that never responds to requests. Note that a silent server can act as a client, the two roles are independent.

o Group Identifier (Gid): identifier assigned to the group. Group Identifiers should be unique within the set of groups of a given Group Manager, in order to avoid collisions. In case they are not, the considerations in Section 8.5 apply.

o Group request: CoAP request message sent by a client in the group to all servers in that group.

o Source authentication: evidence that a received message in the group originated from a specific identified group member. This also provides assurance that the message was not tampered with by anyone, be it a different legitimate group member or an endpoint which is not a group member.

2. OSCORE Security Context

To support group communication secured with OSCORE, each endpoint registered as member of a group maintains a Security Context as defined in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], extended as defined below. Each endpoint in a group makes use of:

1. one Common Context, shared by all the endpoints in a given group. In particular:

   * The ID Context parameter contains the Gid of the group, which is used to retrieve the Security Context for processing messages intended to the endpoints of the group (see Section 6). The choice of the Gid is application specific. An example of specific formatting of the Gid is given in Appendix C. The application needs to specify how to handle possible collisions between Gids, see Section 8.5.

   * A new parameter Counter Signature Algorithm is included. Its value identifies the digital signature algorithm used to compute a counter signature on the COSE object (see Section 4.5 of [RFC8152]) which provides source authentication within the group. Its value is immutable once the Common Context is established. The EdDSA signature algorithm ed25519 [RFC8032] is mandatory to implement.

2. one Sender Context, unless the endpoint is configured exclusively as silent server. The Sender Context is used to secure outgoing messages and is initialized according to Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], once the endpoint has joined the
group. The Sender Context of a given endpoint matches the corresponding Recipient Context in all the endpoints receiving a protected message from that endpoint. Besides, in addition to what is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], the Sender Context stores also the endpoint’s private key.

3. one Recipient Context for each distinct endpoint from which messages are received, used to process incoming messages. The recipient may generate the Recipient Context upon receiving an incoming message from another endpoint in the group for the first time (see Section 6.2 and Section 6.4). Each Recipient Context matches the Sender Context of the endpoint from which protected messages are received. Besides, in addition to what is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], each Recipient Context stores also the public key of the associated other endpoint from which messages are received.

The table in Figure 1 overviews the new information included in the OSCORE Security Context, with respect to what defined in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context portion</th>
<th>New information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Context</td>
<td>Counter signature algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sender Context</td>
<td>Endpoint’s own private key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Recipient Context</td>
<td>Public key of the associated other endpoint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Additions to the OSCORE Security Context

Upon receiving a secure CoAP message, a recipient uses the sender’s public key, in order to verify the counter signature of the COSE Object (see Section 3).

If not already stored in the Recipient Context associated to the sender, the recipient retrieves the public key from the Group Manager, which collects public keys upon endpoints’ joining, acts as trusted key repository and ensures the correct association between the public key and the identifier of the sender, for instance by means of public key certificates.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Group Manager collects public keys and provides them to group members upon request as described in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining], where the join process is based on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization in constrained environments [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Further details about how public keys can be handled and retrieved in the group is out of the scope of this document.

An endpoint receives its own Sender ID from the Group Manager upon joining the group. That Sender ID is valid only within that group, and is unique within the group. An endpoint uses its own Sender ID (together with other data) to generate unique AEAD nonces for outgoing messages, as in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. Endpoints which are configured only as silent servers do not have a Sender ID.

The Sender/Recipient Keys and the Common IV are derived according to the same scheme defined in Sections 3.2 and 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. The mandatory-to-implement HKDF and AEAD algorithms for Group OSCORE are the same as in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

2.1. Management of Group Keying Material

In order to establish a new Security Context in a group, a new Group Identifier (Gid) for that group and a new value for the Master Secret parameter MUST be distributed. An example of Gid format supporting this operation is provided in Appendix C. Then, each group member re-derives the keying material stored in its own Sender Context and Recipient Contexts as described in Section 2, using the updated Gid.

Consistently with the security assumptions in Appendix A.1, it is RECOMMENDED to adopt a group key management scheme, and securely distribute a new value for the Gid and for the Master Secret parameter of the group’s Security Context, before a new joining endpoint is added to the group or after a currently present endpoint leaves the group. This is necessary to preserve backward security and forward security in the group, if the application requires it.

The specific approach used to distribute the new Gid and Master Secret parameter to the group is out of the scope of this document. However, it is RECOMMENDED that the Group Manager supports the distribution of the new Gid and Master Secret parameter to the group according to the Group Rekeying Process described in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining].
2.2. Wrap-Around of Partial IVs

A client can eventually experience a wrap-around of its own Sender Sequence Number, which is used as Partial IV in outgoing requests and incremented after each request. When this happens, the OSCORE Security Context MUST be renewed in the group, in order to avoid reusing nonces with the same keys.

Therefore, when experiencing a wrap-around of its own Sender Sequence Number, a group member MUST NOT transmit further group requests until a new OSCORE Security Context has been derived. In particular, the endpoint SHOULD inform the Group Manager of the occurred wrap-around, in order to trigger a prompt renewal of the OSCORE Security Context.

3. The COSE Object

Building on Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], this section defines how to use COSE [RFC8152] to wrap and protect data in the original message. OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0 structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm. For Group OSCORE, the following modifications apply:

- The external_aad in the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is extended with the counter signature algorithm used to sign messages. In particular, compared with Section 5.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], the 'algorithms' array in the aad_array MUST also include 'alg_countersign', which contains the Counter Signature Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2). This external_aad structure is used both for the encryption process producing the ciphertext (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8152]) and for the signing process producing the counter signature, as defined below.

```
external_aad = bstr .cbor aad_array

aad_array = [
    oscore_version : uint,
    algorithms : [alg_aead : int / tstr , alg_countersign : int / tstr],
    request_kid : bstr,
    request_piv : bstr,
    options : bstr
]
```

- The value of the 'kid' parameter in the 'unprotected' field of response messages MUST be set to the Sender ID of the endpoint transmitting the message. That is, unlike in...
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security], the 'kid' parameter is always present in all messages, i.e. both requests and responses.

- The 'unprotected' field MUST additionally include the following parameter:
  - CounterSignature0 : its value is set to the counter signature of the COSE object, computed by the sender using its own private key as described in Appendix A.2 of [RFC8152]. In particular, the Sig_structure contains the external_aad as defined above and the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object as payload.

4. OSCORE Header Compression

The OSCORE compression defined in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is used, with the following additions for the encoding of the OSCORE Option and the OSCORE Payload.

4.1. Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value

Analogously to [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], the value of the OSCORE option SHALL contain the OSCORE flag bits, the Partial IV parameter, the kid context parameter (length and value), and the kid parameter, with the following modifications:

- The first byte, containing the OSCORE flag bits, has the following encoding modifications:
  - The fourth least significant bit MUST be set to 1 in every message, to indicate the presence of the 'kid' parameter for all group requests and responses. That is, unlike in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], the 'kid' parameter is always present in all messages.
  - The fifth least significant bit MUST be set to 1 for group requests, to indicate the presence of the 'kid context' parameter in the compressed COSE object. The 'kid context' MAY be present in responses if the application requires it. In such a case, the kid context flag MUST be set to 1.
  - The sixth least significant bit is set to 1 if the 'CounterSignature0' parameter is present, or to 0 otherwise. In order to ensure source authentication of messages as described in this specification, this bit MUST be set to 1.
The flag bits are registered in the OSCORE Flag Bits registry specified in Section 13.7 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] and in Section 9.1 of this Specification.

- The ‘kid context’ value encodes the Group Identifier value (Gid) of the group’s Security Context.

- The remaining bytes in the OSCORE Option value encode the value of the ‘kid’ parameter, which is always present both in group requests and in responses.

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <-------- n bytes -------->
+----------------------------------------+
| 0 0|1|h|1| n | Partial IV (if any) |
+----------------------------------------+

<-- 1 byte --> <------ s bytes ------>
+----------------------------------------+
| s (if any) | kid context = Gid | kid |
+----------------------------------------+
```

Figure 2: OSCORE Option Value

4.2. Encoding of the OSCORE Payload

The payload of the OSCORE message SHALL encode the ciphertext of the COSE object concatenated with the value of the CounterSignature0 (if present) of the COSE object, computed as in Appendix A.2 of [RFC8152].

4.3. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects

This section covers a list of OSCORE Header Compression examples for group requests and responses. The examples assume that the COSE_Encrypt0 object is set (which means the CoAP message and cryptographic material is known). Note that the examples do not include the full CoAP unprotected message or the full security context, but only the input necessary to the compression mechanism, i.e. the COSE_Encrypt0 object. The output is the compressed COSE object as defined in Section 4 and divided into two parts, since the object is transported in two CoAP fields: OSCORE option and payload.

The examples assume that the label for the new kid context defined in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] has value 10. COUNTERSIGN is the CounterSignature0 byte string as described in Section 3 and is 64 bytes long.
1. Request with ciphertext = 0xea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = 0x25, Partial IV = 5 and kid context = 0x44616c

Before compression (96 bytes):

[  
  h'',  
  ( 4:h'25', 6:h'05', 10:h'44616c', 9:COUNTERSIGN ),  
  h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'  
]

After compression (85 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00111001 = 0x39

Option Value: 39 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)

Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 COUNTERSIGN
(14 bytes + size of COUNTERSIGN)

1. Response with ciphertext = 60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b, kid = 0x52 and no Partial IV.

Before compression (88 bytes):

[  
  h'',  
  ( 4:h'52', 9:COUNTERSIGN ),  
  h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'  
]

After compression (80 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00101000 = 0x28

Option Value: 28 52 (2 bytes)

Payload: 60 b0 35 05 9d 9e f5 66 7c 5a 07 10 82 3b COUNTERSIGN
(14 bytes + size of COUNTERSIGN)

5. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection

The requirements and properties described in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] also apply to OSCORE used in group communication. In particular, group OSCORE provides message binding of responses to requests, which provides relative freshness of responses, and replay protection of requests. More details about error processing for replay detection in group OSCORE are specified
in Section 6 of this specification. The mechanisms describing replay protection and freshness of Observe notifications do not apply to group OSCORE, as Observe is not defined for group settings.

5.1. Synchronization of Sender Sequence Numbers

Upon joining the group, new servers are not aware of the Sender Sequence Number values currently used by different clients to transmit group requests. This means that, when such servers receive a secure group request from a given client for the first time, they are not able to verify if that request is fresh and has not been replayed or (purposely) delayed. The same holds when a server loses synchronization with Sender Sequence Numbers of clients, for instance after a device reboot.

The exact way to address this issue is application specific, and depends on the particular use case and its synchronization requirements. The list of methods to handle synchronization of Sender Sequence Numbers is part of the group communication policy, and different servers can use different methods.

Requests sent over Multicast must be Non-Confirmable (Section 8.1 of [RFC7252]), as overall most of the messages sent within a group. Thus, senders should store their outgoing messages for an amount of time defined by the application and sufficient to correctly handle possible retransmissions.

Appendix E describes three possible approaches that can be considered for synchronization of sequence numbers.

6. Message Processing

Each request message and response message is protected and processed as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], with the modifications described in the following sections. The following security objectives are fulfilled, as further discussed in Appendix A.2: data replay protection, group-level data confidentiality, source authentication, message integrity, and message ordering.

Furthermore, endpoints in the group locally perform error handling and processing of invalid messages according to the same principles adopted in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. However, a recipient MUST stop processing and silently reject any message which is malformed and does not follow the format specified in Section 3, or which is not cryptographically validated in a successful way. Either case, the recipient MUST NOT send back any error message. This prevents servers from replying with multiple error messages to a
client sending a group request, so avoiding the risk of flooding and possibly congesting the group.

As per [RFC7252][RFC7390], group requests sent over multicast must be Non-confirmable. However, this does not prevent the acknowledgment of Confirmable group requests in non-multicast environments.

6.1. Protecting the Request

A client transmits a secure group request as described in Section 8.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], with the following modifications.

- In step 2, the ‘algorithms’ array in the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 3.
- In step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as described in Section 3. The encoding of the compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 4.

6.2. Verifying the Request

Upon receiving a secure group request, a server proceeds as described in Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], with the following modifications.

- In step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object follows Section 4. If the received Recipient ID (‘kid’) does not match with any Recipient Context for the retrieved Gid (‘kid context’), then the server creates a new Recipient Context, initializes it according to Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], also retrieving the client’s public key.
- In step 4, the ‘algorithms’ array in the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 3.
- In step 6, the server also verifies the counter signature using the public key of the client from the associated Recipient Context.

6.3. Protecting the Response

A server that has received a secure group request may reply with a secure response, which is protected as described in Section 8.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], with the following modifications.

- In step 2, the ‘algorithms’ array in the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 3.
o In step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as described in Section 3. The encoding of the compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 4.

6.4. Verifying the Response

Upon receiving a secure response message, the client proceeds as described in Section 8.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], with the following modifications.

o In step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 3. If the received Recipient ID (‘kid’) does not match with any Recipient Context for the retrieved Gid (‘kid context’), then the client creates a new Recipient Context, initializes it according to Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], also retrieving the server’s public key.

o In step 3, the ‘algorithms’ array in the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 3.

o In step 5, the client also verifies the counter signature using the public key of the server from the associated Recipient Context.

7. Responsibilities of the Group Manager

The Group Manager is responsible for performing the following tasks:

1. Creating and managing OSCORE groups. This includes the assignment of a Gid to every newly created group, as well as ensuring uniqueness of Gids within the set of its OSCORE groups.

2. Defining policies for authorizing the joining of its OSCORE groups. Such policies can be enforced locally by the Group Manager, or by a third party in a trust relation with the Group Manager and entrusted to enforce join policies on behalf of the Group Manager.

3. Driving the join process to add new endpoints as group members.

4. Establishing Security Common Contexts and providing them to authorized group members during the join process, together with a corresponding Security Sender Context.

5. Generating and managing Sender IDs within its OSCORE groups, as well as assigning and providing them to new endpoints during the
join process. This includes ensuring uniqueness of Sender IDs within each of its OSCORE groups.

6. Defining a communication policy for each of its OSCORE groups, and signalling it to new endpoints during the join process.

7. Renewing the Security Context of an OSCORE group upon membership change, by revoking and renewing common security parameters and keying material (rekeying).

8. Providing the management keying material that a new endpoint requires to participate in the rekeying process, consistent with the key management scheme used in the group joined by the new endpoint.

9. Updating the Gid of its OSCORE groups, upon renewing the respective Security Context.

10. Acting as key repository, in order to handle the public keys of the members of its OSCORE groups, and providing such public keys to other members of the same group upon request. The actual storage of public keys may be entrusted to a separate secure storage device.

8. Security Considerations

The same security considerations from OSCORE (Section 11 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) apply to this specification. Additional security aspects to be taken into account are discussed below.

8.1. Group-level Security

The approach described in this document relies on commonly shared group keying material to protect communication within a group. This has the following implications.

- Messages are encrypted at a group level (group-level data confidentiality), i.e. they can be decrypted by any member of the group, but not by an external adversary or other external entities.

- The AEAD algorithm provides only group authentication, i.e. it ensures that a message sent to a group has been sent by a member of that group, but not by the alleged sender. This is why source authentication of messages sent to a group is ensured through a counter signature, which is computed by the sender using its own private key and then appended to the message payload.
Note that, even if an endpoint is authorized to be a group member and to take part in group communications, there is a risk that it behaves inappropriately. For instance, it can forward the content of messages in the group to unauthorized entities. However, in many use cases, the devices in the group belong to a common authority and are configured by a commissioner (see Appendix B), which results in a practically limited risk and enables a prompt detection/reaction in case of misbehaving.

8.2. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)

The proof for uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs in Appendix D.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is also valid in group communication scenarios. That is, given an OSCORE group:

- Uniqueness of Sender IDs within the group is enforced by the Group Manager.

- The case A in Appendix D.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] for messages including a Partial IV concerns only group requests, and same considerations from [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] apply here as well.

- The case B in Appendix D.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] for messages not including a Partial IV concerns all group responses, and same considerations from [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] apply here as well.

As a consequence, each message encrypted/decrypted with the same Sender Key is processed by using a different (ID_PIV, PIV) pair. This means that nonces used by any fixed encrypting endpoint are unique. Thus, each message is processed with a different (key, nonce) pair.

8.3. Management of Group Keying Material

The approach described in this specification should take into account the risk of compromise of group members. In particular, this document specifies that a key management scheme for secure revocation and renewal of Security Contexts and group keying material should be adopted.

Especially in dynamic, large-scale, groups where endpoints can join and leave at any time, it is important that the considered group key management scheme is efficient and highly scalable with the group size, in order to limit the impact on performance due to the Security Context and keying material update.
8.4. Update of Security Context and Key Rotation

A group member can receive a message shortly after the group has been rekeyed, and new security parameters and keying material have been distributed by the Group Manager. In the following two cases, this may result in misaligned Security Contexts between the sender and the recipient.

In the first case, the sender protects a message using the old Security Context, i.e. before having installed the new Security Context. However, the recipient receives the message after having installed the new Security Context, hence not being able to correctly process it. A possible way to ameliorate this issue is to preserve the old, recent, Security Context for a maximum amount of time defined by the application. By doing so, the recipient can still try to process the received message using the old retained Security Context as second attempt. Note that a former (compromised) group member can take advantage of this by sending messages protected with the old retained Security Context. Therefore, a conservative application policy should not admit the storage of old Security Contexts.

In the second case, the sender protects a message using the new Security Context, but the recipient receives that request before having installed the new Security Context. Therefore, the recipient would not be able to correctly process the request and hence discards it. If the recipient receives the new Security Context shortly after that and the sender endpoint uses CoAP retransmissions, the former will still be able to receive and correctly process the message. In any case, the recipient should actively ask the Group Manager for an updated Security Context according to an application-defined policy, for instance after a given number of unsuccessfully decrypted incoming messages.

8.5. Collision of Group Identifiers

In case endpoints are deployed in multiple groups managed by different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is possible for Group Identifiers of different groups to coincide. That can also happen if the application cannot guarantee unique Group Identifiers within a given Group Manager. However, this does not impair the security of the AEAD algorithm.

In fact, as long as the Master Secret is different for different groups and this condition holds over time, and as long as the Sender IDs within a group are unique, AEAD keys are different among different groups.
9. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this document]]" with the RFC number of this specification.

9.1. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry

The entry with Bit Position TBD is added to the "OSCORE Flag Bits" registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Counter</td>
<td>Set to 1 if counter signature present in the</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>compressed COSE object</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]  

[RFC2119]  

[RFC7252]  

[RFC8032]  

[RFC8152]  
10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]

[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]

[I-D.somaraju-ace-multicast]

[I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining]


Appendix A. Assumptions and Security Objectives

This section presents a set of assumptions and security objectives for the approach described in this document.

A.1. Assumptions

The following assumptions are assumed to be already addressed and are out of the scope of this document.

- **Multicast communication topology**: this document considers both 1-to-N (one sender and multiple recipients) and M-to-N (multiple senders and multiple recipients) communication topologies. The 1-to-N communication topology is the simplest group communication scenario that would serve the needs of a typical low-power and lossy network (LLN). Examples of use cases that benefit from secure group communication are provided in Appendix B.

  In a 1-to-N communication model, only a single client transmits data to the group, in the form of request messages; in an M-to-N communication model (where M and N do not necessarily have the same value), M group members are clients. According to [RFC7390], any possible proxy entity is supposed to know about the clients in the group and to not perform aggregation of response messages from multiple servers. Also, every client expects and is able to handle multiple response messages associated to a same request sent to the group.

- **Group size**: security solutions for group communication should be able to adequately support different and possibly large groups. The group size is the current number of members in a group. In the use cases mentioned in this document, the number of clients (normally the controlling devices) is expected to be much smaller than the number of servers (i.e., the controlled devices). A security solution for group communication that supports 1 to 50 clients would be able to properly cover the group sizes required for most use cases that are relevant for this document. The maximum group size is expected to be in the range of 2 to 100.
devices. Groups larger than that should be divided into smaller independent groups.

- Communication with the Group Manager: an endpoint must use a secure dedicated channel when communicating with the Group Manager, also when not registered as group member.

- Provisioning and management of Security Contexts: an OSCORE Security Context must be established among the group members. A secure mechanism must be used to generate, revoke and (re-)distribute keying material, multicast security policies and security parameters in the group. The actual provisioning and management of the Security Context is out of the scope of this document.

- Multicast data security ciphersuite: all group members must agree on a ciphersuite to provide authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of messages in the group. The ciphersuite is specified as part of the Security Context.

- Backward security: a new device joining the group should not have access to any old Security Contexts used before its joining. This ensures that a new group member is not able to decrypt confidential data sent before it has joined the group. The adopted key management scheme should ensure that the Security Context is updated to ensure backward confidentiality. The actual mechanism to update the Security Context and renew the group keying material upon a group member’s joining has to be defined as part of the group key management scheme.

- Forward security: entities that leave the group should not have access to any future Security Contexts or message exchanged within the group after their leaving. This ensures that a former group member is not able to decrypt confidential data sent within the group anymore. Also, it ensures that a former member is not able to send encrypted and/or integrity protected messages to the group anymore. The actual mechanism to update the Security Context and renew the group keying material upon a group member’s leaving has to be defined as part of the group key management scheme.

A.2. Security Objectives

The approach described in this document aims at fulfilling the following security objectives:

- Data replay protection: replayed group request messages or response messages must be detected.
o Group-level data confidentiality: messages sent within the group shall be encrypted if privacy sensitive data is exchanged within the group. This document considers group-level data confidentiality since messages are encrypted at a group level, i.e. in such a way that they can be decrypted by any member of the group, but not by an external adversary or other external entities.

o Source authentication: messages sent within the group shall be authenticated. That is, it is essential to ensure that a message is originated by a member of the group in the first place, and in particular by a specific member of the group.

o Message integrity: messages sent within the group shall be integrity protected. That is, it is essential to ensure that a message has not been tampered with by an external adversary or other external entities which are not group members.

o Message ordering: it must be possible to determine the ordering of messages coming from a single sender. In accordance with OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], this results in providing relative freshness of group requests and absolute freshness of responses. It is not required to determine ordering of messages from different senders.

Appendix B. List of Use Cases

Group Communication for CoAP [RFC7390] provides the necessary background for multicast-based CoAP communication, with particular reference to low-power and lossy networks (LLNs) and resource constrained environments. The interested reader is encouraged to first read [RFC7390] to understand the non-security related details. This section discusses a number of use cases that benefit from secure group communication. Specific security requirements for these use cases are discussed in Appendix A.

o Lighting control: consider a building equipped with IP-connected lighting devices, switches, and border routers. The devices are organized into groups according to their physical location in the building. For instance, lighting devices and switches in a room or corridor can be configured as members of a single group. Switches are then used to control the lighting devices by sending on/off/dimming commands to all lighting devices in a group, while border routers connected to an IP network backbone (which is also multicast-enabled) can be used to interconnect routers in the building. Consequently, this would also enable logical groups to be formed even if devices in the lighting group may be physically in different subnets (e.g. on wired and wireless networks).
Connectivity between lighting devices may be realized, for instance, by means of IPv6 and (border) routers supporting 6LoWPAN [RFC4944][RFC6282]. Group communication enables synchronous operation of a group of connected lights, ensuring that the light preset (e.g. dimming level or color) of a large group of luminaires are changed at the same perceived time. This is especially useful for providing a visual synchronicity of light effects to the user. As a practical guideline, events within a 200 ms interval are perceived as simultaneous by humans, which is necessary to ensure in many setups. Devices may reply back to the switches that issue on/off/dimming commands, in order to report about the execution of the requested operation (e.g. OK, failure, error) and their current operational status. In a typical lighting control scenario, a single switch is the only entity responsible for sending commands to a group of lighting devices. In more advanced lighting control use cases, a M-to-N communication topology would be required, for instance in case multiple sensors (presence or day-light) are responsible to trigger events to a group of lighting devices. Especially in professional lighting scenarios, the roles of client and server are configured by the lighting commissioner, and devices strictly follow those roles.

- Integrated building control: enabling Building Automation and Control Systems (BACSs) to control multiple heating, ventilation and air-conditioning units to pre-defined presets. Controlled units can be organized into groups in order to reflect their physical position in the building, e.g. devices in the same room can be configured as members of a single group. As a practical guideline, events within intervals of seconds are typically acceptable. Controlled units are expected to possibly reply back to the BACS issuing control commands, in order to report about the execution of the requested operation (e.g. OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.

- Software and firmware updates: software and firmware updates often comprise quite a large amount of data. This can overload a LLN that is otherwise typically used to deal with only small amounts of data, on an infrequent base. Rather than sending software and firmware updates as unicast messages to each individual device, multicasting such updated data to a larger group of devices at once displays a number of benefits. For instance, it can significantly reduce the network load and decrease the overall time latency for propagating this data to all devices. Even if the complete whole update process itself is secured, securing the individual messages is important, in case updates consist of relatively large amounts of data. In fact, checking individual received data piecemeal for tampering avoids that devices store...
large amounts of partially corrupted data and that they detect tampering hereof only after all data has been received. Devices receiving software and firmware updates are expected to possibly reply back, in order to provide a feedback about the execution of the update operation (e.g. OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.

- **Parameter and configuration update**: by means of multicast communication, it is possible to update the settings of a group of similar devices, both simultaneously and efficiently. Possible parameters are related, for instance, to network load management or network access controls. Devices receiving parameter and configuration updates are expected to possibly reply back, to provide a feedback about the execution of the update operation (e.g. OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.

- **Commissioning of LLNs systems**: a commissioning device is responsible for querying all devices in the local network or a selected subset of them, in order to discover their presence, and be aware of their capabilities, default configuration, and operating conditions. Queried devices displaying similarities in their capabilities and features, or sharing a common physical location can be configured as members of a single group. Queried devices are expected to reply back to the commissioning device, in order to notify their presence, and provide the requested information and their current operational status.

- **Emergency multicast**: a particular emergency related information (e.g. natural disaster) is generated and multicast by an emergency notifier, and relayed to multiple devices. The latters may reply back to the emergency notifier, in order to provide their feedback and local information related to the ongoing emergency. This kind of setups should additionally rely on a fault tolerance multicast algorithm, such as MPL.

### Appendix C. Example of Group Identifier Format

This section provides an example of how the Group Identifier (Gid) can be specifically formatted. That is, the Gid can be composed of two parts, namely a Group Prefix and a Group Epoch.

The Group Prefix is constant over time and is uniquely defined in the set of all the groups associated to the same Group Manager. The choice of the Group Prefix for a given group’s Security Context is application specific. The size of the Group Prefix directly impact on the maximum number of distinct groups under the same Group Manager.
The Group Epoch is set to 0 upon the group’s initialization, and is incremented by 1 upon completing each renewal of the Security Context and keying material in the group (see Section 2.1). In particular, once a new Master Secret has been distributed to the group, all the group members increment by 1 the Group Epoch in the Group Identifier of that group.

As an example, a 3-byte Group Identifier can be composed of: i) a 1-byte Group Prefix ‘0xb1’ interpreted as a raw byte string; and ii) a 2-byte Group Epoch interpreted as an unsigned integer ranging from 0 to 65535. Then, after having established the Security Common Context 61532 times in the group, its Group Identifier will assume value ‘0xb1f05c’.

Using an immutable Group Prefix for a group assumes that enough time elapses between two consecutive usages of the same Group Epoch value in that group. This ensures that the Gid value is temporally unique during the lifetime of a given message. Thus, the expected highest rate for addition/removal of group members and consequent group rekeying should be taken into account for a proper dimensioning of the Group Epoch size.

As discussed in Section 8.5, if endpoints are deployed in multiple groups managed by different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is possible that Group Identifiers of different groups coincide at some point in time. In this case, a recipient has to handle coinciding Group Identifiers, and has to try using different OSCORE Security Contexts to process an incoming message, until the right one is found and the message is correctly verified. Therefore, it is favourable that Group Identifiers from different Group Managers have a size that result in a small probability of collision. How small this probability should be is up to system designers.

Appendix D. Set-up of New Endpoints

An endpoint joins a group by explicitly interacting with the responsible Group Manager. When becoming members of a group, endpoints are not required to know how many and what endpoints are in the same group.

Communications between a joining endpoint and the Group Manager rely on the CoAP protocol and must be secured. Specific details on how to secure communications between joining endpoints and a Group Manager are out of the scope of this document.

The Group Manager must verify that the joining endpoint is authorized to join the group. To this end, the Group Manager can directly authorize the joining endpoint, or expect it to provide authorization...
evidence previously obtained from a trusted entity. Further details about the authorization of joining endpoints are out of scope.

In case of successful authorization check, the Group Manager generates a Sender ID assigned to the joining endpoint, before proceeding with the rest of the join process. That is, the Group Manager provides the joining endpoint with the keying material and parameters to initialize the OSCORE Security Context (see Section 2). The actual provisioning of keying material and parameters to the joining endpoint is out of the scope of this document.

It is RECOMMENDED that the join process adopts the approach described in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining] and based on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization in constrained environments [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

Appendix E. Examples of Synchronization Approaches

This section describes three possible approaches that can be considered by server endpoints to synchronize with sender sequence numbers of client endpoints sending group requests.

E.1. Best-Effort Synchronization

Upon receiving a group request from a client, a server does not take any action to synchronize with the sender sequence number of that client. This provides no assurance at all as to message freshness, which can be acceptable in non-critical use cases.

E.2. Baseline Synchronization

Upon receiving a group request from a given client for the first time, a server initializes its last-seen sender sequence number in its Recipient Context associated to that client. However, the server drops the group request without delivering it to the application layer. This provides a reference point to identify if future group requests from the same client are fresher than the last one received.

A replay time interval exists, between when a possibly replayed or delayed message is originally transmitted by a given client and the first authentic fresh message from that same client is received. This can be acceptable for use cases where servers admit such a trade-off between performance and assurance of message freshness.
E.3. Challenge-Response Synchronization

A server performs a challenge-response exchange with a client, by using the Echo Option for CoAP described in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] and according to Section 7.5.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

That is, upon receiving a group request from a particular client for the first time, the server processes the message as described in Section 6.2 of this specification, but, even if valid, does not deliver it to the application. Instead, the server replies to the client with a 4.03 Forbidden response message including an Echo Option, and stores the option value included therein.

Upon receiving a 4.03 Forbidden response that includes an Echo Option and originates from a verified group member, a client sends a request as a unicast message addressed to the same server, echoing the Echo Option value. In particular, the client does not necessarily resend the same group request, but can instead send a more recent one, if the application permits it. This makes it possible for the client to not retain previously sent group requests for full retransmission, unless the application explicitly requires otherwise. In either case, the client uses the sender sequence number value currently stored in its own Sender Context. If the client stores group requests for possible retransmission with the Echo Option, it should not store a given request for longer than a pre-configured time interval. Note that the unicast request echoing the Echo Option is correctly treated and processed as a message, since the ‘kid context’ field including the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group is still present in the OSCORE Option as part of the COSE object (see Section 3).

Upon receiving the unicast request including the Echo Option, the server verifies that the option value equals the stored and previously sent value; otherwise, the request is silently discarded. Then, the server verifies that the unicast request has been received within a pre-configured time interval, as described in [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]. In such a case, the request is further processed and verified; otherwise, it is silently discarded. Finally, the server updates the Recipient Context associated to that client, by setting the Replay Window according to the Sequence Number from the unicast request conveying the Echo Option. The server either delivers the request to the application if it is an actual retransmission of the original one, or discards it otherwise. Mechanisms to signal whether the resent request is a full retransmission of the original one are out of the scope of this specification.
In case it does not receive a valid unicast request including the Echo Option within the configured time interval, the server endpoint should perform the same challenge-response upon receiving the next group request from that same client.

A server should not deliver group requests from a given client to the application until one valid request from that same client has been verified as fresh, as conveying an echoed Echo Option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]. Also, a server may perform the challenge-response described above at any time, if synchronization with sender sequence numbers of clients is (believed to be) lost, for instance after a device reboot. It is the role of the application to define under what circumstances sender sequence numbers lose synchronization. This can include a minimum gap between the sender sequence number of the latest accepted group request from a client and the sender sequence number of a group request just received from the same client. A client has to be always ready to perform the challenge-response based on the Echo Option in case a server starts it.

Note that endpoints configured as silent servers are not able to perform the challenge-response described above, as they do not store a Sender Context to secure the 4.03 Forbidden response to the client. Therefore, silent servers should adopt alternative approaches to achieve and maintain synchronization with sender sequence numbers of clients.

This approach provides an assurance of absolute message freshness. However, it can result in an impact on performance which is undesirable or unbearable, especially in large groups where many endpoints at the same time might join as new members or lose synchronization.

Appendix F. No Verification of Signatures

There are some application scenarios using group communication that have particularly strict requirements. One example of this is the requirement of low message latency in non-emergency lighting applications [I-D.somaraju-ace-multicast]. For those applications which have tight performance constraints and relaxed security requirements, it can be inconvenient for some endpoints to verify digital signatures in order to assert source authenticity of received messages. In other cases, the signature verification can be deferred or only checked for specific actions. For instance, a command to turn a bulb on where the bulb is already on does not need the signature to be checked. In such situations, the counter signature needs to be included anyway as part of the message, so that an
endpoint that needs to validate the signature for any reason has the ability to do so.

In this specification, it is NOT RECOMMENDED that endpoints do not verify the counter signature of received messages. However, it is recognized that there may be situations where it is not always required. The consequence of not doing the signature validation is that security in the group is based only on the group-authenticity of the shared keying material used for encryption. That is, endpoints in the group have evidence that a received message has been originated by a group member, although not specifically identifiable in a secure way. This can violate a number of security requirements, as the compromise of any element in the group means that the attacker has the ability to control the entire group. Even worse, the group may not be limited in scope, and hence the same keying material might be used not only for light bulbs but for locks as well. Therefore, extreme care must be taken in situations where the security requirements are relaxed, so that deployment of the system will always be done safely.

Appendix G. Document Updates

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

G.1. Version -02 to -03

- Revised structure and phrasing for improved readability and better alignment with draft-ietf-core-object-security.
- Added discussion on wrap-Around of Partial IVs (see Section 2.2).
- Separate sections for the COSE Object (Section 3) and the OSCORE Header Compression (Section 4).
- The countersignature is now appended to the encrypted payload of the OSCORE message, rather than included in the OSCORE Option (see Section 4).
- Extended scope of Section 5, now titled "Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection".
- Clarifications about Non-Confirmable messages in Section 5.1 "Synchronization of Sender Sequence Numbers".
- Clarifications about error handling in Section 6 "Message Processing".
- Compacted list of responsibilities of the Group Manager in Section 7.
- Revised and extended security considerations in Section 8.
- Added IANA considerations for the OSCORE Flag Bits Registry in Section 9.
- Revised Appendix D, now giving a short high-level description of a new endpoint set-up.

G.2. Version -01 to -02

- Terminology has been made more aligned with RFC7252 and draft-ietf-core-object-security: i) "client" and "server" replace the old "multicaster" and "listener", respectively; ii) "silent server" replaces the old "pure listener".
- Section 2 has been updated to have the Group Identifier stored in the 'ID Context' parameter defined in draft-ietf-core-object-security.
- Section 3 has been updated with the new format of the Additional Authenticated Data.
- Major rewriting of Section 4 to better highlight the differences with the message processing in draft-ietf-core-object-security.
- Added Sections 7.2 and 7.3 discussing security considerations about uniqueness of (key, nonce) and collision of group identifiers, respectively.
- Minor updates to Appendix A.1 about assumptions on multicast communication topology and group size.
- Updated Appendix C on format of group identifiers, with practical implications of possible collisions of group identifiers.
- Updated Appendix D.2, adding a pointer to draft-palombini-ace-key-groupcomm about retrieval of nodes’ public keys through the Group Manager.
- Minor updates to Appendix E.3 about Challenge-Response synchronization of sequence numbers based on the Echo option from draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag.
G.3. Version -00 to -01

- Section 1.1 has been updated with the definition of group as "security group".
- Section 2 has been updated with:
  * Clarifications on establishment/derivation of security contexts.
  * A table summarizing the additional context elements compared to OSCORE.
- Section 3 has been updated with:
  * Examples of request and response messages.
  * Use of CounterSignature0 rather than CounterSignature.
  * Additional Authenticated Data including also the signature algorithm, while not including the Group Identifier any longer.
- Added Section 6, listing the responsibilities of the Group Manager.
- Added Appendix A (former section), including assumptions and security objectives.
- Appendix B has been updated with more details on the use cases.
- Added Appendix C, providing an example of Group Identifier format.
- Appendix D has been updated to be aligned with draft-palombini-ace-key-groupcomm.

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Abstract

Resource and service discovery are complimentary. Resource discovery provides fine-grained detail about the content of a server, while service discovery can provide a scalable method to locate servers in large networks. This document defines a method for mapping between CoRE Link Format attributes and DNS-Based Service Discovery fields to facilitate the use of either method to locate RESTful service interfaces (APIs) in heterogeneous HTTP/CoAP environments.

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1. Introduction

The Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) working group aims at realizing the REST architecture in a suitable form for the most constrained devices (e.g. 8-bit microcontrollers with limited RAM and ROM) and networks (e.g. 6LoWPAN). CoRE is aimed at machine-to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. The main deliverable of CoRE is the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) specification [RFC7252].

Automated discovery of resources hosted by a constrained server is critical in M2M applications where human intervention is minimal and
static interfaces result in brittleness. CoRE Resource Discovery is intended to support fine-grained discovery of hosted resources, their attributes, and possibly other resource relations [RFC6690].

In contrast to resource discovery, service discovery generally refers to a coarser-grained resolution of an endpoint’s IP address, port number, and protocol. This definition may be extended to include multi-function devices, where the result of the discovery process may include a path to a resource representing a RESTful service interface and possibly a reference to a description of the interface such as a JSON Hyper-Schema document [I-D.handrews-json-schema-hyperschema] per function.

Resource and service discovery are complimentary in the case of large networks, where the latter can facilitate scaling. This document defines a mapping between CoRE Link Format attributes and DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] fields that permits discovery of CoAP services by either method. It also addresses the CoRE charter goal to interoperate with DNS-SD.

The actual publishing of DNS services on the basis of the contents of the Resource Directory is the subject of [I-D.sctl-service-registration].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The term "byte" is used in its now conventional sense as a synonym for "octet".

This specification requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [RFC6690] and [RFC8288]. Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC7252]. To describe the REST interfaces defined in this specification, the URI Template format is used [RFC6570].

This specification also incorporates the terminology of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

1.2. CoRE Resource Discovery

[RFC8288] defines a Web Link (link) as a typed connection between two resources, comprised of:

- a link context,
A link can be viewed as a statement of the form "link context has a link relation type resource at link target, which (optionally) has target attributes", where link target (and context) is typically a Universal Resource Identifier (URI) [RFC3986].

For example, "https://www.example.com/" has a "canonical" resource at "https://example.com", which has a "type" of "text/html".

The main function of Resource Discovery is to return links to the resources hosted by a server, complemented by attributes about those resources and additional link relations. In CoRE this collection of links and attributes is itself a resource (as opposed to HTTP headers delivered with a specific resource).

[RFC6690] specifies a link format for use in CoRE Resource Discovery by extending the HTTP Link Header Format [RFC8288] to describe these link descriptions. The CoRE Link Format is carried as a payload and is serialized according to one of several Internet media types. CoRE Resource Discovery is accomplished by sending a GET request to the well-known URI "/.well-known/core", which is defined as a default entry-point for requesting the collection of links to resources hosted by a server.

Resource Discovery can be performed either via unicast or multicast. When a server’s IP address is already known, either a priori or resolved via the Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1034][RFC1035], unicast discovery is performed in order to locate a URI for the resource of interest. This is performed using a GET to /.well-known/core on the server, which returns the links. A client would then match the appropriate Resource Type, Interface Description, and possible Content-Type [RFC2045] for its application. These attributes may also be included in the query string in order to filter the number of links returned in a response.

1.3. CoRE Resource Directories

In many M2M scenarios, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes, limited bandwidth, or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by deploying a network element called a Resource Directory (RD), which hosts descriptions of resources held on other servers (referred to as "end-points") and allows lookups to be performed for those resources. An
endpoint is a web server associated with a specific IP address and port; thus a physical device may host one or more endpoints. Endpoints may also act as clients.

The Resource Directory implements a set of REST interfaces for endpoints to register and maintain collections of links, called resource directory registrations. [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] specifies the web interfaces that an RD supports for endpoints to discover the RD and to register, maintain, lookup and remove resource descriptions; for the RD to validate entries; and for clients to lookup resources from the RD.

1.4. DNS-Based Service Discovery

DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) defines a conventional method of naming and configuring DNS PTR, SRV, and TXT resource records to facilitate discovery of services (such as CoAP servers in a subdomain) using the existing DNS infrastructure. This section gives a brief overview of DNS-SD; for a detailed specification see [RFC6763].

DNS-SD Service Names are limited to 255 bytes and are of the form:

\[
\text{Service Name} = \langle\text{Instance}\rangle.\langle\text{ServiceType}\rangle.\langle\text{Domain}\rangle
\]

The Service Name identifies a SRV/TXT resource record (RR) pair. The SRV RR specifies the host and port of an endpoint. The TXT RR provides additional information in the form of key/value pairs. DNS-Based Service Discovery is accomplished by sending a DNS request for PTR records with the name \langle\text{ServiceType}\rangle.\langle\text{Domain}\rangle, which will return a list of zero or more Service Names.

The \langle\text{Domain}\rangle part of the Service Name is identical to the global (DNS subdomain) part of the authority in URIs that identify the resources on an individual server or group of servers.

The \langle\text{ServiceType}\rangle part is composed of at least two labels. The first label of the pair is the application protocol name [RFC6335] preceded by an underscore character. For example, an organization such as the Open Connectivity Foundation [OCF] that specifies resources might register the application protocol name "_oic", which all servers that advertise OCF resources would use as part of their ServiceType. The second label indicates the transport and is typically "_udp" for CoAP services. In cases where narrowing the scope of the search may be useful, these labels may be optionally preceded by a subtype name followed by the "_sub" label. An example of this more specific \langle\text{ServiceType}\rangle is "light._sub._oic._udp".
The default <Instance> part of the Service Name SHOULD be set to a default value at the factory and MAY be modified during the commissioning process. It MUST uniquely identify an instance of <ServiceType> within a <Domain>. Taken together, these three elements comprise a unique name for an SRV/TXT record pair within the DNS subdomain.

The granularity of a Service Name MAY be that of a host or group, or it might represent a particular resource within a CoAP server. The SRV record contains the host name (AAAA record name) and port of the endpoint while protocol is part of the Service Name. In the case where a Service Name identifies a particular resource, the path part of the URI must be carried in a corresponding TXT record.

A DNS TXT record is in practice limited to a few hundred bytes in length, which is indicated in the resource record header in the DNS response message [RFC6763]. The data consists of one or more strings comprising a key/value pair. By convention, the first pair is txtver=<number> (to support different versions of a service description). An example string is:

```
| 0x08 | t | x | t | v | e | r | = | 1 |
```

2. Mapping from web resources DNS services

These sections describe how each of the three parts of the Service Name can be mapped to link attributes.

2.1. Domain mapping

TBD: A method must be specified to determine in which DNS zone the CoAP service should be registered. See, for example, Section 11 in [RFC6763] and Section 2 in [I-D.sctl-service-registration]

2.2. ServiceType mapping

ServiceTypes are registered by IANA [st]. They identify services that can be specified by IETF or any other Standards Development Organization (SDO). The IANA resource type registry [rt] is based on the resource type (rt= attribute) [RFC6690] which identifies endpoint functionality specified by IETF or any other SDO.

It is expected that an endpoint providing a given ServiceType represents a collection of resources each with its own Resource Type. The Resource Type of the collection MUST be mapped directly to the
ServiceType. A registry is required to specify the mapping between Resource Types and ServiceTypes.

2.3. Instance mapping

The Instance name may be freely chosen by the manufacturer and inserted in the device. During installation the pre-configured Instance name can be pre- or post-fixed with a string to make the (Instance, ServiceType) pair unique within the domain. For manual discovery it is useful when the Instance name is a human readable string containing the manufacturer name or the device type.

IoT devices are not necessarily equipped with an Instance name for DNS-SD. To make the (Instance, ServiceType) pair unique, it is sufficient to use another unique identifier stored in the device such as the Public key or UUID of the device. When a human readable name is required, the interface description (if= attribute) [RFC6690] may provide for example, a URN that can be made unique by pre- or post-fixing it with a string as is currently done for the Instance name devices conforming to DNS-SD specification.

When the device selects the Instance name, the device, registering with the RD, MUST provide an Instance name in its link. When a third party device, the Commissioning Tool (CT) [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], selects the Instance name, it specifies the Instance name when registering the device with the Resource Directory.

3. New Link-Format Attributes

When using the CoRE Link Format to describe resources being discovered by or posted to a resource directory service, additional information about those resources is useful. This specification defines the following new attributes for use in the CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]:

\[
\text{link-extension} = \begin{cases} "\text{exp}" \end{cases} \\
\text{link-extension} = \begin{cases} "\text{ins}" = "" (ptoken | quoted-string) \end{cases} \\
\text{; The token or string is max 63 bytes}
\]

3.1. Export attribute "exp"

The Export "exp" attribute is used as a flag to indicate that a link description MAY be exported from a resource directory to external directories.

The CoRE Link Format is used for many purposes between CoAP endpoints. Some are useful mainly locally; for example checking the
observability of a resource before accessing it, determining the size of a resource, or traversing dynamic resource structures. However, other links are very useful to be exported to other directories, for example the entry point resource to a functional service. This attribute MAY be used as a query parameter in the RD Lookup Function Set defined in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

3.2. Resource Instance attribute "ins"

The Resource Instance "ins" attribute is an identifier for this resource, which makes it possible to distinguish it from other similar resources. This attribute is equivalent in use to the <Instance> portion of a DNS-SD record (see Section 1.4), and SHOULD be unique across resources with the same Resource Type attribute in the domain in which it is used. A Resource Instance SHOULD be a descriptive string like "Ceiling Light, Room 3", but MAY be a short ID like "AF39", a unique UUID, or fingerprint of a public key. This attribute is used by a Resource Directory to distinguish between multiple instances of the same resource type within the directory.

This attribute MUST NOT be more than 63 bytes in length. The resource identifier attribute MUST NOT appear more than once in a link description. This attribute MAY be used as a query parameter in the RD Lookup Function Set defined in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

4. Mapping CoRE Link Attributes to DNS-SD Record Fields

4.1. Mapping Resource Instance attribute "ins" to <Instance>

The Resource Instance "ins" attribute maps to the <Instance> part of a DNS-SD Service Name. It is stored directly in the DNS as a single DNS label of canonical precomposed UTF-8 [RFC3629] "Net-Unicode" (Unicode Normalization Form C) [RFC5198] text. However, if the "ins" attribute is chosen to match the DNS host name of a service, it SHOULD use the syntax defined in Section 3.5 of [RFC1034] and Section 2.1 of [RFC1123].

The <Instance> part of the name of a service being offered on the network SHOULD be configurable by the user setting up the service, so that he or she may give it an informative name. However, the device or service SHOULD NOT require the user to configure a name before it can be used. A sensible choice of default name can allow the device or service to be accessed in many cases without any manual configuration at all (see Appendix D of [RFC6763]).

DNS labels are limited to 63 bytes in length and the entire Service Name may not exceed 255 bytes.
4.2. Mapping Resource Type attribute "rt" to <ServiceType>

The <ServiceType> part of a DNS-SD Service Name is derived from the "rt" attribute and SHOULD conform to the reg-rel-type production of the Link Format defined in Section 2 of [RFC6690].

In practice, the ServiceType should unambiguously identify interoperable devices. It is up to individual SDOs to specify how to map between their registered Resource Type (rt=) values and ServiceType values. Two approaches are possible; either a hierarchical approach as in Section 1.4 above, or a flat identifier. Both approaches are shown below for illustration, but in practice only ONE would be specified.

In either case, the resulting application protocol name MUST be composed of at least a single Net-Unicode text string, without underscore '_' or or period '.' and limited to 15 bytes in length (see Section 5.1 of [RFC6335]). This string is mapped to the DNS-SD <ServiceType> by prepending an underscore and appending a period followed by the "_udp" label. For example, rt="oic.d.light" might be mapped into "_oic-d-light._udp".

The application protocol name may be optionally followed by a period and a service subtype name consisting of a Net-Unicode text string, without underscore or period and limited to 63 bytes. This string is mapped to the DNS-SD <ServiceType> by appending a period followed by the "_sub" label and then appending a period followed by the service type label pair derived as in the previous paragraph. For example, rt="oic.d.light" might be mapped into "light._sub._oic._udp".

The resulting string is used to form labels for DNS-SD records which are stored directly in the DNS.

4.3. TXT Record key=value strings

A number of [RFC6763] key/value pairs are derived from link-format information, to be exported in the DNS-SD as key=value strings in a TXT record (See Section 6.3 of [RFC6763]).

The resource <URI> is exported as key/value pair "path=<URI>".

The Interface Description "if" attribute is exported as key/value pair "if=<Interface Description>".

The DNS TXT record can be further populated by importing any other resource description attributes as they share the same key=value format specified in Section 6 of [RFC6763].
4.4. Exporting resource links into DNS-SD

Assuming the ability to query a Resource Directory or multicast a GET (?exp) over the local link, CoAP resource discovery may be used to populate the DNS-SD database in an automated fashion. CoAP resource descriptions (links) can be exported to DNS-SD for exposure to service discovery by using the Resource Instance attribute as the basis for a unique Service Name, composed with the Resource Type as the <ServiceType>, and registered in the correct <Domain>. The agent responsible for exporting records to the DNS zone file SHOULD be authenticated to the DNS server. The following example, using the example lookup location /rd-lookup, shows an agent discovering a resource to be exported:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?exp

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap://[FDFD::1234]:5683/light/1>; exp;rt=oic.d.light;ins="Spot"; d="office"; ep="node1"

The agent subsequently registers the following DNS-SD RRs, assuming a zone name "example.com" prefixed with "office":

   _oic._udp.office.example.com   IN PTR
   Spot._oic._udp.office.example.com
   light._sub._oic._udp.example.com  IN PTR
   Spot._oic._udp.office.example.com
   Spot._oic._udp.office.example.com  IN TXT
txver=1;path=/light/1
   Spot._oic._udp.office.example.com  IN SRV 0 0 5683
   node1.office.example.com.
   node1.office.example.com.        IN AAAA FDFD::1234

In the above figure the Service Name is chosen as
Spot._oic._udp.office.example.com without the light._sub service prefix. An alternative Service Name would be:
Spot.light._sub._oic._udp.office.example.com.

5. IANA considerations

5.1. Mapping Resource Type into ServiceType

TBD

6. Security considerations

TBD
7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References

[I-D.handrews-json-schema-hyperschema]

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]

[I-D.sctl-service-registration]

[OCF]

[rt]

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

This document was split out from [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].
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Abstract

In many M2M applications, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes, disperse networks, or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by employing an entity called a Resource Directory (RD), which hosts registrations of resources held on other servers, allowing lookups to be performed for those resources. This document specifies the web interfaces that a Resource Directory supports for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, lookup and remove resource descriptions. Furthermore, new link attributes useful in conjunction with an RD are defined.

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1. Introduction

The work on Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) aims at realizing the REST architecture in a suitable form for the most constrained nodes (e.g., 8-bit microcontrollers with limited RAM and ROM) and networks (e.g. 6LoWPAN). CoRE is aimed at machine-to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation.
The discovery of resources offered by a constrained server is very important in machine-to-machine applications where there are no humans in the loop and static interfaces result in fragility. The discovery of resources provided by an HTTP Web Server is typically called Web Linking [RFC5988]. The use of Web Linking for the description and discovery of resources hosted by constrained web servers is specified by the CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]. However, [RFC6690] only describes how to discover resources from the web server that hosts them by querying "/.well-known/core". In many M2M scenarios, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes, disperse networks, or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by employing an entity called a Resource Directory (RD), which hosts registrations of resources held on other servers, allowing lookups to be performed for those resources.

This document specifies the web interfaces that a Resource Directory supports for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, lookup and remove resource descriptions. Furthermore, new link attributes useful in conjunction with a Resource Directory are defined. Although the examples in this document show the use of these interfaces with CoAP [RFC7252], they can be applied in an equivalent manner to HTTP [RFC7230].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The term "byte" is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

This specification requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [RFC3986], [RFC5988] and [RFC6690]. Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC7252]. To describe the REST interfaces defined in this specification, the URI Template format is used [RFC6570].

This specification makes use of the following additional terminology:

resolve against

The expression "a URI-reference is _resolved against_ a base URI" is used to describe the process of [RFC3986] Section 5.2. Noteworthy corner cases are that if the URI-reference is a (full) URI and resolved against any base URI, that gives the original full URI, and that resolving an empty URI reference gives the base URI without any fragment identifier.
Resource Directory
A web entity that stores information about web resources and implements the REST interfaces defined in this specification for registration and lookup of those resources.

Sector
In the context of a Resource Directory, a sector is a logical grouping of endpoints.

The abbreviation "d=" is used for the sector in query parameters for compatibility with deployed implementations.

Endpoint
Endpoint (EP) is a term used to describe a web server or client in [RFC7252]. In the context of this specification an endpoint is used to describe a web server that registers resources to the Resource Directory. An endpoint is identified by its endpoint name, which is included during registration, and has a unique name within the associated sector of the registration.

Registration Base URI
The Base URI of a Registration is a URI that typically gives scheme and authority information about an Endpoint. The Registration Base URI is provided at registration time, and is used by the Resource Directory to resolve relative references of the registration into URIs.

Target
The target of a link is the destination address (URI) of the link. It is sometimes identified with "href=", or displayed as "<target>". Relative targets need resolving with respect to the Base URI (section 5.2 of [RFC3986]).

This use of the term Target is consistent with [RFC8288]’s use of the term.

Context
The context of a link is the source address (URI) of the link, and describes which resource is linked to the target. A link’s context is made explicit in serialized links as the "anchor=" attribute.

This use of the term Context is consistent with [RFC8288]’s use of the term.

Directory Resource
A resource in the Resource Directory (RD) containing registration resources.
Registration Resource
A resource in the RD that contains information about an Endpoint and its links.

Commissioning Tool
Commissioning Tool (CT) is a device that assists during the installation of the network by assigning values to parameters, naming endpoints and groups, or adapting the installation to the needs of the applications.

Registrant-ep
Registrant-ep is the endpoint that is registered into the RD. The registrant-ep can register itself, or a CT registers the registrant-ep.

RDAO
Resource Directory Address Option.

For several operations, interface descriptions are given in list form; those describe the operation participants, request codes, URIs, content formats and outcomes. Those templates contain normative content in their Interaction, Method, URI Template and URI Template Variables sections as well as the details of the Success condition. The additional sections on options like Content-Format and on Failure codes give typical cases that an implementation of the RD should deal with. Those serve to illustrate the typical responses to readers who are not yet familiar with all the details of CoAP based interfaces; they do not limit what a server may respond under atypical circumstances.

3. Architecture and Use Cases

3.1. Principles

The Resource Directory is primarily a tool to make discovery operations more efficient than querying /.well-known/core on all connected devices, or across boundaries that would be limiting those operations.

It provides a cache (in the high-level sense, not as defined in [RFC7252]/[RFC2616]) of data that could otherwise only be obtained by directly querying the /.well-known/core resource on the target device, or by accessing those resources with a multicast request.

Only information SHOULD be stored in the resource directory that is discoverable from querying the described device’s /.well-known/core resource directly.
Data in the resource directory can only be provided by the device which hosts those data or a dedicated Commissioning Tool (CT). These CTs are thought to act on behalf of endpoints too constrained, or generally unable, to present that information themselves. No other client can modify data in the resource directory. Changes in the Resource Directory do not propagate automatically back to the web server from where the links originated.

3.2. Architecture

The resource directory architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. A Resource Directory (RD) is used as a repository for Web Links [RFC5988] describing resources hosted on other web servers, also called endpoints (EP). An endpoint is a web server associated with a scheme, IP address and port. A physical node may host one or more endpoints. The RD implements a set of REST interfaces for endpoints to register and maintain sets of Web Links (called resource directory registration entries), and for endpoints to lookup resources from the RD. An RD can be logically segmented by the use of Sectors. This information hierarchy is shown in Figure 2.

A mechanism to discover an RD using CoRE Link Format [RFC6690] is defined.

Registration entries in the RD are soft state and need to be periodically refreshed.

An endpoint uses specific interfaces to register, update and remove a resource directory registration entry. It is also possible for an RD to fetch Web Links from endpoints and add them as resource directory registration entries.

At the first registration of a set of entries, a "registration resource" is created, the location of which is returned to the registering endpoint. The registering endpoint uses this registration resource to manage the contents of registration entries.

A lookup interface for discovering any of the Web Links held in the RD is provided using the CoRE Link Format.
A Registrant-EP MAY keep concurrent registrations to more than one RD at the same time if explicitly configured to do so, but that is not expected to be supported by typical EP implementations. Any such registrations are independent of each other. The usual expectation when multiple discovery mechanisms or addresses are configured is that they constitute a fallback path for a single registration.

3.3. RD Content Model

The Entity-Relationship (ER) models shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 model the contents of `/well-known/core` and the resource directory respectively, with entity-relationship diagrams [ER]. Entities (rectangles) are used for concepts that exist independently. Attributes (ovals) are used for concepts that exist only in connection with a related entity. Relations (diamonds) give a semantic meaning to the relation between entities. Numbers specify the cardinality of the relations.
Some of the attribute values are URIs. Those values are always full
URIs and never relative references in the information model. They
can, however, be expressed as relative references in serializations,
and often are.

These models provide an abstract view of the information expressed in
link-format documents and a Resource Directory. They cover the
concepts, but not necessarily all details of an RD’s operation; they
are meant to give an overview, and not be a template for
implementations.

Figure 3: E-R Model of the content of ./well-known/core

The model shown in Figure 3 models the contents of ./well-known/core
which contains:

- a set of links belonging to the hosting web server
The web server is free to choose links it deems appropriate to be exposed in its ".well-known/core". Typically, the links describe resources that are served by the host, but the set can also contain links to resources on other servers (see examples in [RFC6690] page 14). The set does not necessarily contain links to all resources served by the host.

A link has the following attributes (see [RFC5988]):

- Zero or more link relations: They describe relations between the link context and the link target.

  In link-format serialization, they are expressed as space-separated values in the "rel" attribute, and default to "hosts".

- A link context URI: It defines the source of the relation, e.g. _who_ "hosts" something.

  In link-format serialization, it is expressed in the "anchor" attribute. It defaults to that document’s URI.

- A link target URI: It defines the destination of the relation (e.g. _what_ is hosted), and is the topic of all target attributes.

  In link-format serialization, it is expressed between angular brackets, and sometimes called the "href".

- Other target attributes (e.g. resource type (rt), interface (if), or content-type (ct)). These provide additional information about the target URI.
Figure 4: E-R Model of the content of the Resource Directory

The model shown in Figure 4 models the contents of the resource directory which contains in addition to /.well-known/core:

- 0 to n Registration (entries) of endpoints,
A registration is associated with one endpoint. A registration defines a set of links as defined for /.well-known/core. A Registration has six types of attributes:

- a unique endpoint name ("ep") within a sector
- a Registration Base URI ("base", a URI typically describing the scheme://authority part)
- a lifetime ("lt"),
- a registration resource location inside the RD ("href"),
- optionally a sector ("d")
- optional additional endpoint attributes (from Section 9.3)

The cardinality of "base" is currently 1; future documents are invited to extend the RD specification to support multiple values (e.g. [I-D.silverajan-core-coap-protocol-negotiation]). Its value is used as a Base URI when resolving URIs in the links contained in the endpoint.

Links are modelled as they are in Figure 3.

3.4. Use Case: Cellular M2M

Over the last few years, mobile operators around the world have focused on development of M2M solutions in order to expand the business to the new type of users: machines. The machines are connected directly to a mobile network using an appropriate embedded wireless interface (GSM/GPRS, WCDMA, LTE) or via a gateway providing short and wide range wireless interfaces. From the system design point of view, the ambition is to design horizontal solutions that can enable utilization of machines in different applications depending on their current availability and capabilities as well as application requirements, thus avoiding silo like solutions. One of the crucial enablers of such design is the ability to discover resources (machines -- endpoints) capable of providing required information at a given time or acting on instructions from the end users.

Imagine a scenario where endpoints installed on vehicles enable tracking of the position of these vehicles for fleet management purposes and allow monitoring of environment parameters. During the boot-up process endpoints register with a Resource Directory, which is hosted by the mobile operator or somewhere in the cloud.
Periodically, these endpoints update their registration and may modify resources they offer.

When endpoints are not always connected, for example because they enter a sleep mode, a remote server is usually used to provide proxy access to the endpoints. Mobile apps or web applications for environment monitoring contact the RD, look up the endpoints capable of providing information about the environment using an appropriate set of link parameters, obtain information on how to contact them (URLs of the proxy server), and then initiate interaction to obtain information that is finally processed, displayed on the screen and usually stored in a database. Similarly, fleet management systems provide the appropriate link parameters to the RD to look up for EPs deployed on the vehicles the application is responsible for.

3.5. Use Case: Home and Building Automation

Home and commercial building automation systems can benefit from the use of M2M web services. The discovery requirements of these applications are demanding. Home automation usually relies on run-time discovery to commission the system, whereas in building automation a combination of professional commissioning and run-time discovery is used. Both home and building automation involve peer-to-peer interactions between endpoints, and involve battery-powered sleeping devices.

3.6. Use Case: Link Catalogues

Resources may be shared through data brokers that have no knowledge beforehand of who is going to consume the data. Resource Directory can be used to hold links about resources and services hosted anywhere to make them discoverable by a general class of applications.

For example, environmental and weather sensors that generate data for public consumption may provide data to an intermediary server, or broker. Sensor data are published to the intermediary upon changes or at regular intervals. Descriptions of the sensors that resolve to links to sensor data may be published to a Resource Directory. Applications wishing to consume the data can use RD Lookup to discover and resolve links to the desired resources and endpoints. The Resource Directory service need not be coupled with the data intermediary service. Mapping of Resource Directories to data intermediaries may be many-to-many.

Metadata in web link formats like [RFC6690] which may be internally stored as triples, or relation/attribute pairs providing metadata about resource links, need to be supported by Resource Directories.

External catalogues that are represented in other formats may be converted to common web linking formats for storage and access by Resource Directories. Since it is common practice for these to be URN encoded, simple and lossless structural transforms should generally be sufficient to store external metadata in Resource Directories.

The additional features of Resource Directory allow sectors to be defined to enable access to a particular set of resources from particular applications. This provides isolation and protection of sensitive data when needed. Application groups with multicast addresses may be defined to support efficient data transport.


A (re-)starting device may want to find one or more resource directories for discovery purposes.

The device may be pre-configured to exercise specific mechanisms for finding the resource directory:

1. It may be configured with a specific IP address for the RD. That IP address may also be an anycast address, allowing the network to forward RD requests to an RD that is topologically close; each target network environment in which some of these preconfigured nodes are to be brought up is then configured with a route for this anycast address that leads to an appropriate RD. (Instead of using an anycast address, a multicast address can also be preconfigured. The RD servers then need to configure one of their interfaces with this multicast address.)

2. It may be configured with a DNS name for the RD and use DNS to return the IP address of the RD; it can find a DNS server to perform the lookup using the usual mechanisms for finding DNS servers.

3. It may be configured to use a service discovery mechanism such as DNS-SD [RFC6763]. The present specification suggests configuring the service with name rd._sub._coap._udp, preferably within the domain of the querying nodes.

For cases where the device is not specifically configured with a way to find a resource directory, the network may want to provide a suitable default.

1. If the address configuration of the network is performed via SLAAC, this is provided by the RDAO option Section 4.1.
2. If the address configuration of the network is performed via DHCP, this could be provided via a DHCP option (no such option is defined at the time of writing).

Finally, if neither the device nor the network offers any specific configuration, the device may want to employ heuristics to find a suitable resource directory.

The present specification does not fully define these heuristics, but suggests a number of candidates:

1. In a 6LoWPAN, just assume the Border Router (6LBR) can act as a resource directory (using the ABRO option to find that [RFC6775]). Confirmation can be obtained by sending a Unicast to "coap://[6LBR]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd*".

2. In a network that supports multicast well, discovering the RD using a multicast query for /.well-known/core as specified in CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]: Sending a Multicast GET to "coap://[MCD1]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd*". RDs within the multicast scope will answer the query.

As some of the RD addresses obtained by the methods listed here are just (more or less educated) guesses, endpoints MUST make use of any error messages to very strictly rate-limit requests to candidate IP addresses that don’t work out. For example, an ICMP Destination Unreachable message (and, in particular, the port unreachable code for this message) may indicate the lack of a CoAP server on the candidate host, or a CoAP error response code such as 4.05 "Method Not Allowed" may indicate unwillingness of a CoAP server to act as a directory server.

If multiple candidate addresses are discovered, the device may pick any of them initially, unless the discovery method indicates a more precise selection scheme.

4.1. Resource Directory Address Option (RDAO)

The Resource Directory Address Option (RDAO) using IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) carries information about the address of the Resource Directory (RD). This information is needed when endpoints cannot discover the Resource Directory with a link-local or realm-local scope multicast address because the endpoint and the RD are separated by a Border Router (6LBR). In many circumstances the availability of DHCP cannot be guaranteed either during commissioning of the network. The presence and the use of the RD is essential during commissioning.
It is possible to send multiple RDAO options in one message, indicating as many resource directory addresses.

The RDAO format is:

```
+-----------------------------------------------+   +-----------------------------------------------+
|     Type      |  Length = 3   |       Valid Lifetime          |
+-----------------+-----------------+----------------------+
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
|                           |                 |                          +
+-----------------------------------------------+   +-----------------------------------------------+
```

Fields:

Type: 38

Length: 8-bit unsigned integer. The length of the option in units of 8 bytes. Always 3.

Valid Lifetime: 16-bit unsigned integer. The length of time in units of 60 seconds (relative to the time the packet is received) that this Resource Directory address is valid. A value of all zero bits (0x0) indicates that this Resource Directory address is not valid anymore.

Reserved: This field is unused. It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.

RD Address: IPv6 address of the RD.

Figure 5: Resource Directory Address Option
5. Resource Directory

This section defines the required set of REST interfaces between a Resource Directory (RD) and endpoints. Although the examples throughout this section assume the use of CoAP [RFC7252], these REST interfaces can also be realized using HTTP [RFC7230]. In all definitions in this section, both CoAP response codes (with dot notation) and HTTP response codes (without dot notation) are shown. An RD implementing this specification MUST support the discovery, registration, update, lookup, and removal interfaces defined in this section.

All operations on the contents of the Resource Directory MUST be atomic and idempotent.

A resource directory MAY make the information submitted to it available to further directories, if it can ensure that a loop does not form. The protocol used between directories to ensure loop-free operation is outside the scope of this document.

5.1. Payload Content Formats

Resource Directory implementations using this specification MUST support the application/link-format content format (ct=40).

Resource Directories implementing this specification MAY support additional content formats.

Any additional content format supported by a Resource Directory implementing this specification MUST have an equivalent serialization in the application/link-format content format.

5.2. URI Discovery

Before an endpoint can make use of an RD, it must first know the RD’s address and port, and the URI path information for its REST APIs. This section defines discovery of the RD and its URIs using the well-known interface of the CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]. A complete set of RD discovery methods is described in Section 4.

Discovery of the RD registration URI path is performed by sending either a multicast or unicast GET request to "/.well-known/core" and including a Resource Type (rt) parameter [RFC6690] with the value "core.rd" in the query string. Likewise, a Resource Type parameter value of "core.rd-lookup*" is used to discover the URIs for RD Lookup operations, core.rd* is used to discover all URI paths for RD operations. Upon success, the response will contain a payload with a link format entry for each RD function discovered, indicating the URI...
of the RD function returned and the corresponding Resource Type. When performing multicast discovery, the multicast IP address used will depend on the scope required and the multicast capabilities of the network (see Section 9.5.

A Resource Directory MAY provide hints about the content-formats it supports in the links it exposes or registers, using the "ct" link attribute, as shown in the example below. Clients MAY use these hints to select alternate content-formats for interaction with the Resource Directory.

HTTP does not support multicast and consequently only unicast discovery can be supported using HTTP. The well-known entry points SHOULD be provided to enable unicast discovery.

An implementation of this resource directory specification MUST support query filtering for the rt parameter as defined in [RFC6690].

While the link targets in this discovery step are often expressed in path-absolute form, this is not a requirement. Clients of the RD SHOULD therefore accept URIs of all schemes they support, both as URIs and relative references, and not limit the set of discovered URIs to those hosted at the address used for URI discovery.

The URI Discovery operation can yield multiple URIs of a given resource type. The client of the RD can use any of the discovered addresses initially.

The discovery request interface is specified as follows (this is exactly the Well-Known Interface of [RFC6690] Section 4, with the additional requirement that the server MUST support query filtering):

Interaction: EP and Client -> RD

Method: GET

URI Template: /.well-known/core{?rt}

URI Template Variables:

rt := Resource Type. SHOULD contain one of the values "core.rd", "core.rd-lookup***", "core.rd-lookup-res", "core.rd-lookup-ep", or "core.rd***"

Content-Format: application/link-format (if any)

Content-Format: application/link-format+json (if any)
Content-Format: application/link-format+cbor (if any)

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.05 "Content" or 200 "OK" with an application/link-format, application/link-format+json, or application/link-format+cbor payload containing one or more matching entries for the RD resource.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" or 400 "Bad Request" is returned in case of a malformed request for a unicast request.

Failure: No error response to a multicast request.

HTTP support: YES (Unicast only)

The following example shows an endpoint discovering an RD using this interface, thus learning that the directory resource location, in this example, is /rd, and that the content-format delivered by the server hosting the resource is application/link-format (ct=40). Note that it is up to the RD to choose its RD locations.

Req: GET coap://[MCD1]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd*

Res: 2.05 Content
</rd>;rt="core.rd";ct=40,
</rd-lookup/ep>;rt="core.rd-lookup-ep";ct=40,
</rd-lookup/res>;rt="core.rd-lookup-res";ct=40,

Figure 6: Example discovery exchange

The following example shows the way of indicating that a client may request alternate content-formats. The Content-Format code attribute "ct" MAY include a space-separated sequence of Content-Format codes as specified in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC7252], indicating that multiple content-formats are available. The example below shows the required Content-Format 40 (application/link-format) indicated as well as the CBOR and JSON representation of link format. The RD resource locations /rd, and /rd-lookup are example values. The server in this example also indicates that it is capable of providing observation on resource lookups.

[ The RFC editor is asked to replace these and later occurrences of MCD1, TBD64 and TBD504 with the assigned IPv6 site-local address for "all CoRE Resource Directories" and the numeric ID values assigned by IANA to application/link-format+cbor and application/link-format+json, respectively, as they are defined in I-D.ietf-core-links-json. ]
From a management and maintenance perspective, it is necessary to identify the components that constitute the RD server. The identification refers to information about for example client-server incompatibilities, supported features, required updates and other aspects. The URI discovery address, a described in section 4 of [RFC6690] can be used to find the identification.

It would typically be stored in an implementation information link (as described in [I-D.bormann-t2trg-rel-impl]):

Req: GET /.well-known/core?rel=impl-info

Res: 2.05 Content

Note that depending on the particular server’s architecture, such a link could be anchored at the RD server’s root, at the discovery site (as in this example) or at individual RD components. The latter is to be expected when different applications are run on the same server.

5.3. Registration

After discovering the location of an RD, a registrant-ep or CT MAY register the resources of the registrant-ep using the registration interface. This interface accepts a POST from an endpoint containing the list of resources to be added to the directory as the message payload in the CoRE Link Format [RFC6690], JSON CoRE Link Format (application/link-format+json), or CBOR CoRE Link Format (application/link-format+cbor) [I-D.ietf-core-links-json], along with query parameters indicating the name of the endpoint, and optionally the sector, lifetime and base URI of the registration. It is expected that other specifications will define further parameters (see Section 9.3). The RD then creates a new registration resource in the RD and returns its location. The receiving endpoint MUST use that location when refreshing registrations using this interface. Registration resources in the RD are kept active for the period indicated by the lifetime parameter. The creating endpoint is responsible for refreshing the registration resource within this period using either the registration or update interface. The
registration interface MUST be implemented to be idempotent, so that registering twice with the same endpoint parameters ep and d (sector) does not create multiple registration resources.

The following rules apply for an update identified by a given (ep, d) value pair:

- when the parameter values of the Update generate the same attribute values as already present, the location of the already existing registration is returned.
- when for a given (ep, d) value pair the update generates attribute values which are different from the existing one, the existing registration is removed and a new registration with a new location is created.
- when the (ep, d) value pair of the update is different from any existing registration, a new registration is generated.

The posted link-format document can (and typically does) contain relative references both in its link targets and in its anchors, or contain empty anchors. The RD server needs to resolve these references in order to faithfully represent them in lookups. They are resolved against the base URI of the registration, which is provided either explicitly in the "base" parameter or constructed implicitly from the requester’s URI as constructed from its network address and scheme.

Link format documents submitted to the resource directory are interpreted as Modernized Link Format (see Appendix D) by the RD. A registrant-ep SHOULD NOT submit documents whose interpretations according to [RFC6690] and Appendix D differ to avoid the ambiguities described in Appendix B.4.

In practice, most links (precisely listed in Appendix D.1) can be submitted without consideration for those details.

The registration request interface is specified as follows:

Interaction:  EP -> RD
Method:  POST
URI Template:  {+rd}{?ep,d,lt,base,extra-attrs*}

URI Template Variables:
rd := RD registration URI (mandatory). This is the location of the RD, as obtained from discovery.

ep := Endpoint name (mostly mandatory). The endpoint name is an identifier that MUST be unique within a sector. The maximum length of this parameter is 63 bytes. If the RD is configured to recognize the endpoint (e.g. based on its security context), the endpoint sets no endpoint name, and the RD assigns one based on a set of configuration parameter values.

d := Sector (optional). The sector to which this endpoint belongs. The maximum length of this parameter is 63 bytes. When this parameter is not present, the RD MAY associate the endpoint with a configured default sector or leave it empty. The endpoint name and sector name are not set when one or both are set in an accompanying authorization token.

lt := Lifetime (optional). Lifetime of the registration in seconds. Range of 60-4294967295. If no lifetime is included in the initial registration, a default value of 90000 (25 hours) SHOULD be assumed.

base := Base URI (optional). This parameter sets the base URI of the registration, under which the relative links in the payload are to be interpreted. The specified URI typically does not have a path component of its own, and MUST be suitable as a base URI to resolve any relative references given in the registration. The parameter is therefore usually of the shape "scheme://authority" for HTTP and CoAP URIs. The URI SHOULD NOT have a query or fragment component as any non-empty relative part in a reference would remove those parts from the resulting URI.

In the absence of this parameter the scheme of the protocol, source address and source port of the registration request are assumed. That Base URI is constructed by concatenating the used protocol’s scheme with the characters "://", the requester’s source address as an address literal and ":" followed by its port (if it was not the protocol’s default one) in analogy to [RFC7252] Section 6.5.

This parameter is mandatory when the directory is filled by a third party such as an commissioning tool.

If the registrant-ep uses an ephemeral port to register with, it MUST include the base parameter in the registration to provide a valid network path.
If the registrant-ep, located behind a NAT gateway, is registering with a Resource Directory which is on the network service side of the NAT gateway, the endpoint MUST use a persistent port for the outgoing registration in order to provide the NAT gateway with a valid network address for replies and incoming requests.

Endpoints that register with a base that contains a path component can not meaningfully use [RFC6690] Link Format due to its prevalence of the Origin concept in relative reference resolution; they can submit payloads for interpretation as Modernized Link Format. Typically, links submitted by such an endpoint are of the "path-noscheme" (starts with a path not preceded by a slash, precisely defined in [RFC3986] Section 3.3) form.

```plaintext
extra-attrs := Additional registration attributes (optional).

The endpoint can pass any parameter registered at Section 9.3 to the directory. If the RD is aware of the parameter’s specified semantics, it processes it accordingly. Otherwise, it MUST store the unknown key and its value(s) as an endpoint attribute for further lookup.
```

**Content-Format:** application/link-format

**Content-Format:** application/link-format+json

**Content-Format:** application/link-format+cbor

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

**Success:** 2.01 "Created" or 201 "Created". The Location-Path option or Location header MUST be included in the response. This location MUST be a stable identifier generated by the RD as it is used for all subsequent operations on this registration resource. The registration resource location thus returned is for the purpose of updating the lifetime of the registration and for maintaining the content of the registered links, including updating and deleting links.

A registration with an already registered ep and d value pair responds with the same success code and location as the original registration; the set of links registered with the endpoint is replaced with the links from the payload.

The location MUST NOT have a query or fragment component, as that could conflict with query parameters during the Registration...
Update operation. Therefore, the Location-Query option MUST NOT be present in a successful response.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" or 400 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable" or 503 "Service Unavailable". Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: YES

If the registration fails with a Service Unavailable response and a Max-Age option or Retry-After header, the registering endpoint SHOULD retry the operation after the time indicated. If the registration fails in another way, including request timeouts, or if the Service Unavailable error persists after several retries, or indicates a longer time than the endpoint is willing to wait, it SHOULD pick another registration URI from the "URI Discovery" step and if there is only one or the list is exhausted, pick other choices from the "Finding a Resource Directory" step. Care has to be taken to consider the freshness of results obtained earlier, e.g. of the result of a "/.well-known/core" response, the lifetime of an RDAO option and of DNS responses. Any rate limits and persistent errors from the "Finding a Resource Directory" step must be considered for the whole registration time, not only for a single operation.

The following example shows a registrant-ep with the name "node1" registering two resources to an RD using this interface. The location "/rd" is an example RD location discovered in a request similar to Figure 6.

Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=node1
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</sensors/temp>;ct=41;rt="temperature-c";if="sensor";
anchor="coap://spurious.example.com:5683",
</sensors/light>;ct=41;rt="light-lux";if="sensor"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/4521

Figure 7: Example registration payload

A Resource Directory may optionally support HTTP. Here is an example of almost the same registration operation above, when done using HTTP and the JSON Link Format.
Req: POST /rd?ep=node1&base=http://[2001:db8:1::1] HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/link-format+json
Payload:
[
  {"href": "/sensors/temp", "ct": "41", "rt": "temperature-c", "if": "sensor", "anchor": "coap://spurious.example.com:5683"},
  {"href": "/sensors/light", "ct": "41", "rt": "light-lux", "if": "sensor"}
]

Res: 201 Created
Location: /rd/4521

5.3.1. Simple Registration

Not all endpoints hosting resources are expected to know how to upload links to an RD as described in Section 5.3. Instead, simple endpoints can implement the Simple Registration approach described in this section. An RD implementing this specification MUST implement Simple Registration. However, there may be security reasons why this form of directory discovery would be disabled.

This approach requires that the registrant-ep makes available the hosted resources that it wants to be discovered, as links on its "/.well-known/core" interface as specified in [RFC6690]. The links in that document are subject to the same limitations as the payload of a registration (with respect to Appendix D).

The registrant-ep finds one or more addresses of the directory server as described in Section 4.

The registrant-ep asks the selected directory server to probe its "/.well-known/core" and publish the links as follows:

The registrant-ep sends (and regularly refreshes with) a POST request to the "/.well-known/core" URI of the directory server of choice. The body of the POST request is empty, and triggers the resource directory server to perform GET requests at the requesting registrant-ep’s "/.well-known/core" to obtain the link-format payload to register.

The registrant-ep includes the same registration parameters in the POST request as it would per Section 5.3. The registration base URI of the registration is taken from the requesting server’s URI.

The Resource Directory MUST NOT query the registrant-ep’s data before sending the response; this is to accommodate very limited endpoints.
The success condition only indicates that the request was valid (i.e. the passed parameters are valid per se), not that the link data could be obtained or parsed or was successfully registered into the RD.

The simple registration request interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: EP -> RD

Method: POST

URI Template: /.well-known/core{?ep,d,lt,extra-attrs*}

URI Template Variables are as they are for registration in Section 5.3. The base attribute is not accepted to keep the registration interface simple; that rules out registration over CoAP-over-TCP or HTTP that would need to specify one.

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.04 "Changed".

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable". Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: NO

For the second interaction triggered by the above, the registrant-ep takes the role of server and the RD the role of client. (Note that this is exactly the Well-Known Interface of [RFC6690] Section 4):

Interaction: RD -> EP

Method: GET

URI Template: /.well-known/core

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.05 "Content".

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found". /.well-known/core does not exist or is empty.
Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable". Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: NO

The registration resources MUST be deleted after the expiration of their lifetime. Additional operations on the registration resource cannot be executed because no registration location is returned.

The following example shows a registrant-ep using Simple Registration, by simply sending an empty POST to a resource directory.

Req: (to RD server from [2001:db8:2::1])
POST /.well-known/core?lt=6000&ep=node1
No payload

Res: 2.04 Changed

(later)

Req: (from RD server to [2001:db8:2::1])
GET /.well-known/core
Accept: 40

Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</sen/temp>

5.3.2. Third-party registration

For some applications, even Simple Registration may be too taxing for some very constrained devices, in particular if the security requirements become too onerous.

In a controlled environment (e.g. building control), the Resource Directory can be filled by a third party device, called a Commissioning Tool (CT). The commissioning tool can fill the Resource Directory from a database or other means. For that purpose scheme, IP address and port of the URI of the registered device is the value of the "base" parameter of the registration described in Section 5.3.

It should be noted that the value of the "base" parameter applies to all the links of the registration and has consequences for the anchor value of the individual links as exemplified in Appendix B. An
eventual (currently non-existing) "base" attribute of the link is not affected by the value of "base" parameter in the registration.

5.3.3. RD-Groups

The RD-Groups usage pattern allows announcing application groups inside a Resource Directory.

Groups are represented by endpoint registrations. Their base address is a multicast address, and they SHOULD be entered with the endpoint type "core.rd-group". The endpoint name can also be referred to as a group name in this context.

The registration is inserted into the RD by a Commissioning Tool, which might also be known as a group manager here. It performs third party registration and registration updates.

The links it registers SHOULD be available on all members that join the group. Depending on the application, members that lack some resource MAY be permissible if requests to them fail gracefully.

The following example shows a CT registering a group with the name "lights" which provides two resources. The directory resource path /rd is an example RD location discovered in a request similar to Figure 6.

Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=lights&et=core.rd-group
&base=coap://[ff35:30:2001:db8::1]

Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</light>;rt="light";if="core.a",
</color-temperature>;if="core.p";u="K"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/12

In this example, the group manager can easily permit devices that have no writable color-temperature to join, as they would still respond to brightness changing commands. Had the group instead contained a single resource that sets brightness and color temperature atomically, endpoints would need to support both properties.

The resources of a group can be looked up like any other resource, and the group registrations (along with any additional registration parameters) can be looked up using the endpoint lookup interface.
6. RD Lookup

To discover the resources registered with the RD, a lookup interface must be provided. This lookup interface is defined as a default, and it is assumed that RDs may also support lookups to return resource descriptions in alternative formats (e.g. Atom or HTML Link) or using more advanced interfaces (e.g. supporting context or semantic based lookup).

RD Lookup allows lookups for endpoints and resources using attributes defined in this document and for use with the CoRE Link Format. The result of a lookup request is the list of links (if any) corresponding to the type of lookup. Thus, an endpoint lookup MUST return a list of endpoints and a resource lookup MUST return a list of links to resources.

The lookup type is selected by a URI endpoint, which is indicated by a Resource Type as per Table 1 below:

```
+-------------+--------------------+-----------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lookup Type</th>
<th>Resource Type</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>core.rd-lookup-res</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endpoint</td>
<td>core.rd-lookup-ep</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-------------+--------------------+-----------+
```

Table 1: Lookup Types

6.1. Resource lookup

Resource lookup results in links that are semantically equivalent to the links submitted to the RD. The links and link parameters returned by the lookup are equal to the submitted ones, except that the target and anchor references are fully resolved.

Links that did not have an anchor attribute are therefore returned with the base URI of the registration as the anchor. Links of which href or anchor was submitted as a (full) URI are returned with these attributes unmodified.

Above rules allow the client to interpret the response as links without any further knowledge of the storage conventions of the RD. The Resource Directory MAY replace the registration base URIs with a configured intermediate proxy, e.g. in the case of an HTTP lookup interface for CoAP endpoints.
6.2. Lookup filtering

Using the Accept Option, the requester can control whether the returned list is returned in CoRE Link Format ("application/link-format", default) or its alternate content-formats ("application/link-format+json" or "application/link-format+cbor").

The page and count parameters are used to obtain lookup results in specified increments using pagination, where count specifies how many links to return and page specifies which subset of links organized in sequential pages, each containing 'count' links, starting with link zero and page zero. Thus, specifying count of 10 and page of 0 will return the first 10 links in the result set (links 0-9). Count = 10 and page = 1 will return the next 'page' containing links 10-19, and so on.

Multiple search criteria MAY be included in a lookup. All included criteria MUST match for a link to be returned. The Resource Directory MUST support matching with multiple search criteria.

A link matches a search criterion if it has an attribute of the same name and the same value, allowing for a trailing "*" wildcard operator as in Section 4.1 of [RFC6690]. Attributes that are defined as "link-type" match if the search value matches any of their values (see Section 4.1 of [RFC6690]; e.g. "?if=core.s" matches ";if="abc core.s";". A resource link also matches a search criterion if its endpoint would match the criterion, and vice versa, an endpoint link matches a search criterion if any of its resource links matches it.

Note that "href" is a valid search criterion and matches target references. Like all search criteria, on a resource lookup it can match the target reference of the resource link itself, but also the registration resource of the endpoint that registered it. Queries for resource link targets MUST be in URI form (i.e. not relative references) and are matched against a resolved link target. Queries for endpoints SHOULD be expressed in path-absolute form if possible and MUST be expressed in URI form otherwise; the RD SHOULD recognize either.

Endpoints that are interested in a lookup result repeatedly or continuously can use mechanisms like ETag caching, resource observation ([RFC7641]), or any future mechanism that might allow more efficient observations of collections. These are advertised, detected and used according to their own specifications and can be used with the lookup interface as with any other resource.

When resource observation is used, every time the set of matching links changes, or the content of a matching link changes, the RD
sends a notification with the matching link set. The notification contains the successful current response to the given request, especially with respect to representing zero matching links (see "Success" item below).

The lookup interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: Client -> RD

Method: GET

URI Template: {+type-lookup-location}{?page, count, search*}

URI Template Variables:

  type-lookup-location := RD Lookup URI for a given lookup type (mandatory). The address is discovered as described in Section 5.2.

  search := Search criteria for limiting the number of results (optional).

  page := Page (optional). Parameter cannot be used without the count parameter. Results are returned from result set in pages that contain ‘count’ links starting from index (page * count). Page numbering starts with zero.

  count := Count (optional). Number of results is limited to this parameter value. If the page parameter is also present, the response MUST only include ‘count’ links starting with the (page * count) link in the result set from the query. If the count parameter is not present, then the response MUST return all matching links in the result set. Link numbering starts with zero.

  Content-Format: application/link-format (optional)

  Content-Format: application/link-format+json (optional)

  Content-Format: application/link-format+cbor (optional)

The following responses codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.05 "Content" or 200 "OK" with an "application/link-format", "application/link-format+cbor", or "application/link-format+json" payload containing matching entries for the lookup. The payload can contain zero links (which is an empty payload,
"80" (hex) or "[]" in the respective content format), indicating that no entities matched the request.

Failure: No error response to a multicast request.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" or 400 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable" or 503 "Service Unavailable". Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: YES

The endpoint lookup returns registration resources which can only be manipulated by the registering endpoint. Examples of endpoint lookup belong to the management aspects of the RD and are shown in Appendix A.5. The resource lookup examples are shown in this section.

6.3. Resource lookup examples

The examples in this section assume the existence of CoAP hosts with a default CoAP port 61616. HTTP hosts are possible and do not change the nature of the examples.

The following example shows a client performing a resource lookup with the example resource look-up locations discovered in Figure 6:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap://[2001:db8:3::123]:61616/temp>;rt="temperature";
  anchor="coap://[2001:db8:3::123]:61616"

The same lookup using the CBOR Link Format media type:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature
Accept: TBD64

Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: TBD64
Payload in Hex notation:
81A3017823636F61703A2F2F5B3230303133A6462383A333A3132353D3A3331363133
62F74656D7003781E63F61703A2F2F5B3230303133A6462383A333A3132353D3A36
31363136096B74656D7065726174757265
Decoded payload:
[{1: "coap://[2001:db8:3::123]:61616/temp", 9: "temperature", 3: "coap://[2001:db8:3::123]:61616"}]
A client that wants to be notified of new resources as they show up can use observation:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=light
Observe: 0

Res: 2.05 Content
Observe: 23
Payload: empty

(at a later point in time)

Res: 2.05 Content
Observe: 24
Payload:
<coap://[2001:db8:3::124]/west>;rt="light";
  anchor="coap://[2001:db8:3::124]",
<coap://[2001:db8:3::124]/south>;rt="light";
  anchor="coap://[2001:db8:3::124]",
<coap://[2001:db8:3::124]/east>;rt="light";
  anchor="coap://[2001:db8:3::124]"

The following example shows a client performing a paginated resource lookup
The following example shows a client performing a lookup of all
resources from endpoints of all endpoints of a given endpoint type.
It assumes that two endpoints (with endpoint names "sensor1" and
"sensor2") have previously registered with their respective addresses
"coap://sensor1.example.com" and "coap://sensor2.example.com", and
posted the very payload of the 6th request of section 5 of [RFC6690].

It demonstrates how absolute link targets stay unmodified, while
relative ones are resolved:
Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?et=oic.d.sensor

<coap://sensor1.example.com/sensors>;ct=40;title="Sensor Index";
anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com",
<coap://sensor1.example.com/sensors/temp>;rt="temperature-c";
  if="sensor"; anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com",
<coap://sensor1.example.com/sensors/light>;rt="light-lux";
  if="sensor"; anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com",
<http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;rel="describedby";
  anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com/sensors/temp",
<coap://sensor1.example.com/t>;rel="alternate";
  anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com/sensors/temp",
<coap://sensor2.example.com/sensors>;ct=40;title="Sensor Index";
  anchor="coap://sensor2.example.com",
<coap://sensor2.example.com/sensors/temp>;rt="temperature-c";
  if="sensor"; anchor="coap://sensor2.example.com",
<coap://sensor2.example.com/sensors/light>;rt="light-lux";
  if="sensor"; anchor="coap://sensor2.example.com",
<http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;rel="describedby";
  anchor="coap://sensor2.example.com/sensors/temp",
<coap://sensor2.example.com/t>;rel="alternate";
  anchor="coap://sensor2.example.com/sensors/temp"

The following example shows a client performing a lookup of all resources of all endpoints (groups) with et=core.rd-group.

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?et=core.rd-group

<coap://[ff35:30:2001:db8::1]/light>;rt="light";if="core.a";
et=core.rd-group";anchor="coap://[ff35:30:2001:db8::1]",
<coap://[ff35:30:2001:db8::1]/color-temperature>;if="core.p";u="K";
et=core.rd-group";anchor="coap://[ff35:30:2001:db8::1]"

7. Security policies

The Resource Directory (RD) provides assistance to applications situated on a selection of nodes to discover endpoints on connected nodes. This section discusses different security aspects of accessing the RD.

The contents of the RD are inserted in two ways:

1. The node hosting the discoverable endpoint fills the RD with the contents of /.well-known/core by:

   * Storing the contents directly into RD (see Section 5.3)
* Requesting the RD to load the contents from ".well-known/core" (see Section 5.3.1)

2. A Commissioning Tool (CT) fills the RD with endpoint information for a set of discoverable nodes. (see Section 5.3 with base=authority parameter value)

In both cases, the nodes filling the RD should be authenticated and authorized to change the contents of the RD. An Authorization Server (AS) is responsible to assign a token to the registering node to authorize the node to discover or register endpoints in a given RD [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

It can be imagined that an installation is divided in a set of security regions, each one with its own RD(s) to discover the endpoints that are part of a given security region. An endpoint that wants to discover an RD, responsible for a given region, needs to be authorized to learn the contents of a given RD. Within a region, for a given RD, a more fine-grained security division is possible based on the values of the endpoint registration parameters. Authorization to discover endpoints with a given set of filter values is recommended for those cases.

When a node registers its endpoints, criteria are needed to authorize the node to enter them. An important aspect is the uniqueness of the (endpoint name, and optional sector) pair within the RD. Consider the two cases separately: (1) CT registers endpoints, and (2) the registering node registers its own endpoint(s). * A CT needs authorization to register a set of endpoints. This authorization can be based on the region, i.e. a given CT is authorized to register any endpoint (endpoint name, sector) into a given RD, or to register an endpoint with (endpoint name, sector) value pairs assigned by the AS, or can be more fine-grained, including a subset of registration parameter values. * A given endpoint that registers itself, needs to proof its possession of its unique (endpoint name, sector) value pair. Alternatively, the AS can authorize the endpoint to register with an (endpoint name, sector) value pair assigned by the AS. * A separate document needs to specify these aspects to ensure interoperability between registering nodes and RD. The subsections below give some hints how to handle a subset of the different aspects.

7.1. Secure RD discovery

The Resource Server (RS) discussed in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] is equated to the RD. The client (C) needs to discover the RD as discussed in Section 4. C can discover the related AS by sending a request to the RD. The RD denies the request by sending the address

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of the related AS, as discussed in section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The client MUST send an authorization request to the AS. When appropriate, the AS returns a token that specifies the authorization permission which needs to be specified in a separate document.

7.2. Secure RD filtering

The authorized parameter values for the queries by a given endpoint must be registered by the AS. The AS communicates the parameter values in the token. A separate document needs to specify the parameter value combinations and their storage in the token. The RD decodes the token and checks the validity of the queries of the client.

7.3. Secure endpoint Name assignment

This section only considers the assignment of a name to the endpoint based on an automatic mechanism without use of AS. More elaborate protocols are out of scope. The registering endpoint is authorized by the AS to discover the RD and add registrations. A token is provided by the AS and communicated from registering endpoint to RD. It is assumed that DTLS is used to secure the channel between registering endpoint and RD, where the registering endpoint is the DTLS client. Assuming that the client is provided by a certificate at manufacturing time, the certificate is uniquely identified by the CN field and the serial number. The RD can assign a unique endpoint name by using the certificate identifier as endpoint name. Proof of possession of the endpoint name by the registering endpoint is checked by encrypting the certificate identifier with the private key of the registering endpoint, which the RD can decrypt with the public key stored in the certificate. Even simpler, the authorized registering endpoint can generate a random number (or string) that identifies the endpoint. The RD can check for the improbable replication of the random value. The RD MUST check that registering endpoint uses only one random value for each authorized endpoint.

8. Security Considerations

The security considerations as described in Section 7 of [RFC5988] and Section 6 of [RFC6690] apply. The "/.well-known/core" resource may be protected e.g. using DTLS when hosted on a CoAP server as described in [RFC7252]. DTLS or TLS based security SHOULD be used on all resource directory interfaces defined in this document.
8.1. Endpoint Identification and Authentication

An Endpoint (name, sector) pair is unique within the set of endpoints registered by the RD. An Endpoint MUST NOT be identified by its protocol, port or IP address as these may change over the lifetime of an Endpoint.

Every operation performed by an Endpoint on a resource directory SHOULD be mutually authenticated using Pre-Shared Key, Raw Public Key or Certificate based security.

Consider the following threat: two devices A and B are registered at a single server. Both devices have unique, per-device credentials for use with DTLS to make sure that only parties with authorization to access A or B can do so.

Now, imagine that a malicious device A wants to sabotage the device B. It uses its credentials during the DTLS exchange. Then, it specifies the endpoint name of device B as the name of its own endpoint in device A. If the server does not check whether the identifier provided in the DTLS handshake matches the identifier used at the CoAP layer then it may be inclined to use the endpoint name for looking up what information to provision to the malicious device.

Section 7.3 specifies an example that removes this threat for endpoints that have a certificate installed.

8.2. Access Control

Access control SHOULD be performed separately for the RD registration and Lookup API paths, as different endpoints may be authorized to register with an RD from those authorized to lookup endpoints from the RD. Such access control SHOULD be performed in as fine-grained a level as possible. For example access control for lookups could be performed either at the sector, endpoint or resource level.

8.3. Denial of Service Attacks

Services that run over UDP unprotected are vulnerable to unknowingly become part of a DDoS attack as UDP does not require return routability check. Therefore, an attacker can easily spoof the source IP of the target entity and send requests to such a service which would then respond to the target entity. This can be used for large-scale DDoS attacks on the target. Especially, if the service returns a response that is order of magnitudes larger than the request, the situation becomes even worse as now the attack can be amplified. DNS servers have been widely used for DDoS amplification attacks. There is also a danger that NTP Servers could become
implicated in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks since they run on unprotected UDP, there is no return routability check, and they can have a large amplification factor. The responses from the NTP server were found to be 19 times larger than the request. A Resource Directory (RD) which responds to wild-card lookups is potentially vulnerable if run with CoAP over UDP. Since there is no return routability check and the responses can be significantly larger than requests, RDs can unknowingly become part of a DDoS amplification attack.

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. Resource Types

IANA is asked to enter the following values into the Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values sub-registry of the Constrained Restful Environments (CoRE) Parameters registry defined in [RFC6690]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>core.rd</td>
<td>Directory resource of an RD</td>
<td>RFCTHIS Section 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core.rd-lookup-res</td>
<td>Resource lookup of an RD</td>
<td>RFCTHIS Section 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core.rd-lookup-ep</td>
<td>Endpoint lookup of an RD</td>
<td>RFCTHIS Section 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core.rd-ep</td>
<td>Endpoint resource of an RD</td>
<td>RFCTHIS Section 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2. IPv6 ND Resource Directory Address Option

This document registers one new ND option type under the sub-registry "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats":

- Resource Directory address Option (38)

9.3. RD Parameter Registry

This specification defines a new sub-registry for registration and lookup parameters called "RD Parameters" under "CoRE Parameters". Although this specification defines a basic set of parameters, it is expected that other standards that make use of this interface will define new ones.

Each entry in the registry must include
o the human readable name of the parameter,
o the short name as used in query parameters or link attributes,
o indication of whether it can be passed as a query parameter at
registration of endpoints, as a query parameter in lookups, or be
expressed as a link attribute,
o validity requirements if any, and
o a description.

The query parameter MUST be both a valid URI query key [RFC3986] and
a parmname as used in [RFC5988].

The description must give details on whether the parameter can be
updated, and how it is to be processed in lookups.

The mechanisms around new RD parameters should be designed in such a
way that they tolerate RD implementations that are unaware of the
parameter and expose any parameter passed at registration or updates
on in endpoint lookups. (For example, if a parameter used at
registration were to be confidential, the registering endpoint should
be instructed to only set that parameter if the RD advertises support
for keeping it confidential at the discovery step.)

Initial entries in this sub-registry are as follows:
Table 2: RD Parameters

(Short: Short name used in query parameters or link attributes. Use: R = used at registration, L = used at lookup, A = expressed in link attribute)

The descriptions for the options defined in this document are only summarized here. To which registrations they apply and when they are to be shown is described in the respective sections of this document.

The IANA policy for future additions to the sub-registry is "Expert Review" as described in [RFC8126]. The evaluation should consider formal criteria, duplication of functionality (Is the new entry redundant with an existing one?), topical suitability (E.g. is the described property actually a property of the endpoint and not a property of a particular resource, in which case it should go into the payload of the registration and need not be registered?), and the potential for conflict with commonly used link attributes (For example, "if" could be used as a parameter for conditional registration if it were not to be used in lookup or attributes, but would make a bad parameter for lookup, because a resource lookup with an "if" query parameter could ambiguously filter by the registered endpoint property or the [RFC6690] link attribute). It is expected that the registry will receive between 5 and 50 registrations in total over the next years.
9.3.1. Full description of the "Endpoint Type" Registration Parameter

An endpoint registering at an RD can describe itself with endpoint types, similar to how resources are described with Resource Types in [RFC6690]. An endpoint type is expressed as a string, which can be either a URI or one of the values defined in the Endpoint Type sub-registry. Endpoint types can be passed in the "et" query parameter as part of extra-attrs at the Registration step, are shown on endpoint lookups using the "et" target attribute, and can be filtered for using "et" as a search criterion in resource and endpoint lookup. Multiple endpoint types are given as separate query parameters or link attributes.

Note that Endpoint Type differs from Resource Type in that it uses multiple attributes rather than space separated values. As a result, Resource Directory implementations automatically support correct filtering in the lookup interfaces from the rules for unknown endpoint attributes.

9.4. "Endpoint Type" (et=) RD Parameter values

This specification establishes a new sub-registry under "CoRE Parameters" called '"Endpoint Type" (et=) RD Parameter values’. The registry properties (required policy, requirements, template) are identical to those of the Resource Type parameters in [RFC6690], in short:

The review policy is IETF Review for values starting with "core", and Specification Required for others.

The requirements to be enforced are:

- The values MUST be related to the purpose described in Section 9.3.1.
- The registered values MUST conform to the ABNF reg-rel-type definition of [RFC6690] and MUST NOT be a URI.
- It is recommended to use the period "." character for segmentation.

The registry initially contains one value:

- "core.rd-group": An application group as described in Section 5.3.3.
9.5. Multicast Address Registration

IANA has assigned the following multicast addresses for use by CoAP nodes:

IPv4 - "all CoRE resource directories" address, from the "IPv4 Multicast Address Space Registry" equal to "All CoAP Nodes", 224.0.1.187. As the address is used for discovery that may span beyond a single network, it has come from the Internetwork Control Block (224.0.1.x, RFC 5771).

IPv6 - "all CoRE resource directories" address MCD1 (suggestions FF0X::FE), from the "IPv6 Multicast Address Space Registry", in the "Variable Scope Multicast Addresses" space (RFC 3307). Note that there is a distinct multicast address for each scope that interested CoAP nodes should listen to; CoAP needs the Link-Local and Site-Local scopes only.

10. Examples

Two examples are presented: a Lighting Installation example in Section 10.1 and a LWM2M example in Section 10.2.

10.1. Lighting Installation

This example shows a simplified lighting installation which makes use of the Resource Directory (RD) with a CoAP interface to facilitate the installation and start up of the application code in the lights and sensors. In particular, the example leads to the definition of a group and the enabling of the corresponding multicast address as described in Section 5.3.3. No conclusions must be drawn on the realization of actual installation or naming procedures, because the example only "emphasizes" some of the issues that may influence the use of the RD and does not pretend to be normative.

10.1.1. Installation Characteristics

The example assumes that the installation is managed. That means that a Commissioning Tool (CT) is used to authorize the addition of nodes, name them, and name their services. The CT can be connected to the installation in many ways: the CT can be part of the installation network, connected by WiFi to the installation network, or connected via GPRS link, or other method.

It is assumed that there are two naming authorities for the installation: (1) the network manager that is responsible for the correct operation of the network and the connected interfaces, and (2) the lighting manager that is responsible for the correct
functioning of networked lights and sensors. The result is the existence of two naming schemes coming from the two managing entities.

The example installation consists of one presence sensor, and two luminaries, luminary1 and luminary2, each with their own wireless interface. Each luminary contains three lamps: left, right and middle. Each luminary is accessible through one endpoint. For each lamp a resource exists to modify the settings of a lamp in a luminary. The purpose of the installation is that the presence sensor notifies the presence of persons to a group of lamps. The group of lamps consists of: middle and left lamps of luminary1 and right lamp of luminary2.

Before commissioning by the lighting manager, the network is installed and access to the interfaces is proven to work by the network manager.

At the moment of installation, the network under installation is not necessarily connected to the DNS infra structure. Therefore, SLAAC IPv6 addresses are assigned to CT, RD, luminaries and sensor shown in Table 3 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>IPv6 address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>luminary1</td>
<td>2001:db8:4::1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>luminary2</td>
<td>2001:db8:4::2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence sensor</td>
<td>2001:db8:4::3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource directory</td>
<td>2001:db8:4::ff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: interface SLAAC addresses

In Section 10.1.2 the use of resource directory during installation is presented.

10.1.2. RD entries

It is assumed that access to the DNS infrastructure is not always possible during installation. Therefore, the SLAAC addresses are used in this section.

For discovery, the resource types (rt) of the devices are important. The lamps in the luminaries have rt: light, and the presence sensor has rt: p-sensor. The endpoints have names which are relevant to the light installation manager. In this case luminary1, luminary2, and the presence sensor are located in room 2-4-015, where luminary1 is
located at the window and luminary2 and the presence sensor are located at the door. The endpoint names reflect this physical location. The middle, left and right lamps are accessed via path /light/middle, /light/left, and /light/right respectively. The identifiers relevant to the Resource Directory are shown in Table 4 below:

| Name          | endpoint     | resource path   | resource type |
|---------------+-------------+-----------------+---------------|
| luminary1     | lm_R2-4-015_wndw | /light/left     | light         |
| luminary1     | lm_R2-4-015_wndw | /light/middle   | light         |
| luminary1     | lm_R2-4-015_wndw | /light/right    | light         |
| luminary2     | lm_R2-4-015_door | /light/left     | light         |
| luminary2     | lm_R2-4-015_door | /light/middle   | light         |
| luminary2     | lm_R2-4-015_door | /light/right    | light         |
| Presence      | ps_R2-4-015_door | /ps             | p-sensor      |
| sensor        |              |                 |               |

Table 4: Resource Directory identifiers

It is assumed that the CT knows the RD’s address, and has performed URI discovery on it that returned a response like the one in the Section 5.2 example.

The CT inserts the endpoints of the luminaries and the sensor in the RD using the registration base URI parameter (base) to specify the interface address:

Req: POST coap://[2001:db8:4::ff]/rd
?ep=lm_R2-4-015_wndw&base=coap://[2001:db8:4::1]&d=R2-4-015
Payload:
</light/left>;rt="light",
</light/middle>;rt="light",
</light/right>;rt="light"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/4521
Req: POST coap://[2001:db8:4::ff]/rd
    ?ep=lm_R2-4-015_door&base=coap://[2001:db8:4::2]&d=R2-4-015
Payload:
    </light/left>;rt="light",
    </light/middle>;rt="light",
    </light/right>;rt="light"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/4522

Req: POST coap://[2001:db8:4::ff]/rd
    ?ep=ps_R2-4-015_door&base=coap://[2001:db8:4::3]&d=R2-4-015
Payload:
    </ps>;rt="p-sensor"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/4523

The sector name d=R2-4-015 has been added for an efficient lookup because filtering on "ep" name is more awkward. The same sector name is communicated to the two luminaries and the presence sensor by the CT.

The group is specified in the RD. The base parameter is set to the site-local multicast address allocated to the group. In the POST in the example below, the resources supported by all group members are published.

Req: POST coap://[2001:db8:4::ff]/rd
    ?ep=grp_R2-4-015&et=core.rd-group&base=coap://[ff05::1]
Payload:
    </light/left>;rt="light",
    </light/middle>;rt="light",
    </light/right>;rt="light"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/501

After the filling of the RD by the CT, the application in the luminaries can learn to which groups they belong, and enable their interface for the multicast address.

The luminary, knowing its sector and being configured to join any group containing lights, searches for candidate groups and joins them:
Req: GET coap://[2001:db8:4::ff]/rd-lookup/ep
   ?d=R2-4-015&et=core.rd-group&rt=light

Res: 2.05 Content
   </rd/501>;ep="grp_R2-4-015";et="core.rd-group";
       base="coap://[ff05::1]"

From the returned base parameter value, the luminary learns the
multicast address of the multicast group.

Alternatively, the CT can communicate the multicast address directly
to the luminaries by using the "coap-group" resource specified in
[RFC7390].

Req: POST coap://[2001:db8:4::1]/coap-group
   Content-Format: application/coap-group+json
   Payload:
       { "a": "[ff05::1]", "n": "grp_R2-4-015" }

Res: 2.01 Created
   Location-Path: /coap-group/1

Dependent on the situation, only the address, "a", or the name, "n",
is specified in the coap-group resource.

The presence sensor can learn the presence of groups that support
resources with rt=light in its own sector by sending the same
request, as used by the luminary. The presence sensor learns the
multicast address to use for sending messages to the luminaries.

10.2. OMA Lightweight M2M (LWM2M) Example

This example shows how the OMA LWM2M specification makes use of
Resource Directory (RD).

OMA LWM2M is a profile for device services based on CoAP (OMA Name
Authority). LWM2M defines a simple object model and a number of
abstract interfaces and operations for device management and device
service enablement.

An LWM2M server is an instance of an LWM2M middleware service layer,
containing a Resource Directory along with other LWM2M interfaces
defined by the LWM2M specification.

CoRE Resource Directory (RD) is used to provide the LWM2M
Registration interface.

LWM2M does not provide for registration sectors and does not currently use the rd-lookup interface.

The LWM2M specification describes a set of interfaces and a resource model used between a LWM2M device and an LWM2M server. Other interfaces, proxies, and applications are currently out of scope for LWM2M.

The location of the LWM2M Server and RD URI path is provided by the LWM2M Bootstrap process, so no dynamic discovery of the RD is used. LWM2M Servers and endpoints are not required to implement the /.well-known/core resource.

10.2.1. The LWM2M Object Model

The OMA LWM2M object model is based on a simple 2 level class hierarchy consisting of Objects and Resources.

An LWM2M Resource is a REST endpoint, allowed to be a single value or an array of values of the same data type.

An LWM2M Object is a resource template and container type that encapsulates a set of related resources. An LWM2M Object represents a specific type of information source; for example, there is a LWM2M Device Management object that represents a network connection, containing resources that represent individual properties like radio signal strength.

Since there may potentially be more than one of a given type object, for example more than one network connection, LWM2M defines instances of objects that contain the resources that represent a specific physical thing.

The URI template for LWM2M consists of a base URI followed by Object, Instance, and Resource IDs:

```
{\base-uri}\{\object-id}\{\object-instance}\{\resource-id}\{\resource-instance}
```

The five variables given here are strings. base-uri can also have the special value "undefined" (sometimes called "null" in RFC 6570). Each of the variables object-instance, resource-id, and resource-instance can be the special value "undefined" only if the values behind it in this sequence also are "undefined". As a special case, object-instance can be "empty" (which is different from "undefined") if resource-id is not "undefined".
base-uri := Base URI for LWM2M resources or "undefined" for default (empty) base URI

object-id := OMNA (OMA Name Authority) registered object ID (0-65535)

object-instance := Object instance identifier (0-65535) or "undefined"/"empty" (see above) to refer to all instances of an object ID

resource-id := OMNA (OMA Name Authority) registered resource ID (0-65535) or "undefined" to refer to all resources within an instance

resource-instance := Resource instance identifier or "undefined" to refer to single instance of a resource

LWM2M IDs are 16 bit unsigned integers represented in decimal (no leading zeroes except for the value 0) by URI format strings. For example, a LWM2M URI might be:

/1/0/1

The base uri is empty, the Object ID is 1, the instance ID is 0, the resource ID is 1, and the resource instance is "undefined". This example URI points to internal resource 1, which represents the registration lifetime configured, in instance 0 of a type 1 object (LWM2M Server Object).

10.2.2.  LWM2M Register Endpoint

LWM2M defines a registration interface based on the REST API, described in Section 5. The RD registration URI path of the LWM2M Resource Directory is specified to be "/rd".

LWM2M endpoints register object IDs, for example </1>, to indicate that a particular object type is supported, and register object instances, for example </1/0>, to indicate that a particular instance of that object type exists.

Resources within the LWM2M object instance are not registered with the RD, but may be discovered by reading the resource links from the object instance using GET with a CoAP Content-Format of application/link-format. Resources may also be read as a structured object by performing a GET to the object instance with a Content-Format of senml+json.

When an LWM2M object or instance is registered, this indicates to the LWM2M server that the object and its resources are available for management and service enablement (REST API) operations.
LWM2M endpoints may use the following RD registration parameters as defined in Table 2:

- **ep** - Endpoint Name
- **lt** - registration lifetime

Endpoint Name, Lifetime, and LWM2M Version are mandatory parameters for the register operation, all other registration parameters are optional.

Additional optional LWM2M registration parameters are defined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Query</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binding</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>&quot;{&quot;U&quot;,&quot;UQ&quot;,&quot;S&quot;,&quot;SQ&quot;,&quot;US&quot;,&quot;UQS&quot;}&quot;</td>
<td>Available Protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spec Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWM2M</td>
<td>ver</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Spec Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Version</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spec Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>sms</td>
<td></td>
<td>MSISDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MSISDN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: LWM2M Additional Registration Parameters

The following RD registration parameters are not currently specified for use in LWM2M:

- **et** - Endpoint Type
- **base** - Registration Base URI

The endpoint registration must include a payload containing links to all supported objects and existing object instances, optionally including the appropriate link-format relations.

Here is an example LWM2M registration payload:

```xml
<1>,</1/0>,</3/0>,</5>
```

This link format payload indicates that object ID 1 (LWM2M Server Object) is supported, with a single instance 0 existing, object ID 3 (LWM2M Device object) is supported, with a single instance 0 existing, and object 5 (LWM2M Firmware Object) is supported, with no existing instances.
10.2.3. LwM2M Update Endpoint Registration

The LwM2M update is really very similar to the registration update as described in Appendix A.1, with the only difference that there are more parameters defined and available. All the parameters listed in that section are also available with the initial registration but are all optional:

- lt - Registration Lifetime
- b - Protocol Binding
- sms - MSISDN
- link payload - new or modified links

A Registration update is also specified to be used to update the LwM2M server whenever the endpoint’s UDP port or IP address are changed.

10.2.4. LwM2M De-Register Endpoint

LwM2M allows for de-registration using the delete method on the returned location from the initial registration operation. LwM2M de-registration proceeds as described in Appendix A.2.

11. Acknowledgments

Oscar Novo, Srdjan Krco, Szymon Sasin, Kerry Lynn, Esko Dijk, Anders Brandt, Matthieu Vial, Jim Schaad, Mohit Sethi, Hauke Petersen, Hannes Tschofenig, Sampo Ukkola, Linyi Tian, and Jan Newmarch have provided helpful comments, discussions and ideas to improve and shape this document. Zach would also like to thank his colleagues from the EU FP7 SENSEI project, where many of the resource directory concepts were originally developed.

12. Changelog

Changes from -16 to -17

(Note that -17 is published as a direct follow-up to -16, containing a single change to be discussed at IETF103)

- Removed groups that are enumerations of registrations and have dedicated mechanism
- Add groups that are enumerations of shared resources and are a special case of endpoint registrations

Changes from -15 to -16
o Recommend a common set of resources for members of a group
o Clarified use of multicast group in lighting example
o Add note on concurrent registrations from one EP being possible but not expected
o Refresh web examples appendix to reflect current use of Modernized Link Format
o Add examples of URIs where Modernized Link Format matters
o Editorial changes
c
changes from -14 to -15
o Rewrite of section "Security policies"
o Clarify that the "base" parameter text applies both to relative references both in anchor and href
o Renamed "Registree-EP" to Registrant-EP"
o Talk of "relative references" and "URIs" rather than "relative" and "absolute" URIs. (The concept of "absolute URIs" of [RFC3986] is not needed in RD).

o Fixed examples
o Editorial changes
c
changes from -13 to -14
o Rename "registration context" to "registration base URI" (and "con" to "base") and "domain" to "sector" (where the abbreviation "d" stays for compatibility reasons)

o Introduced resource types core.rd-ep and core.rd-gp
o Registration management moved to appendix A, including endpoint and group lookup

o Minor editorial changes
  * PATCH/iPATCH is clearly deferred to another document
  * Recommend against query / fragment identifier in con=
* Interface description lists are described as illustrative
* Rewording of Simple Registration
  - Simple registration carries no error information and succeeds immediately (previously, sequence was unspecified)
  - Lookup: href are matched against resolved values (previously, this was unspecified)
  - Lookup: lt are not exposed any more
  - con/base: Paths are allowed
  - Registration resource locations can not have query or fragment parts
  - Default life time extended to 25 hours
  - clarified registration update rules
  - lt-value semantics for lookup clarified.
  - added template for simple registration
changes from -12 to -13
  - Added "all resource directory" nodes MC address
  - Clarified observation behavior
  - version identification
  - example rt= and et= values
  - domain from figure 2
  - more explanatory text
  - endpoints of a groups hosted by different RD
  - resolve RFC6690-vs-8288 resolution ambiguities:
    * require registered links not to be relative when using anchor
    * return absolute URIs in resource lookup
changes from -11 to -12

o added Content Model section, including ER diagram

o removed domain lookup interface; domains are now plain attributes of groups and endpoints

o updated chapter "Finding a Resource Directory"; now distinguishes configuration-provided, network-provided and heuristic sources

o improved text on: atomicity, idempotency, lookup with multiple parameters, endpoint removal, simple registration

o updated LWM2M description

o clarified where relative references are resolved, and how context and anchor interact

o new appendix on the interaction with RFCs 6690, 5988 and 3986

o lookup interface: group and endpoint lookup return group and registration resources as link targets

o lookup interface: search parameters work the same across all entities

o removed all methods that modify links in an existing registration (POST with payload, PATCH and iPATCH)

o removed plurality definition (was only needed for link modification)

o enhanced IANA registry text

o state that lookup resources can be observable

o More examples and improved text

changes from -09 to -10

o removed "ins" and "exp" link-format extensions.

o removed all text concerning DNS-SD.

o removed inconsistency in RDAO text.

o suggestions taken over from various sources

o replaced "Function Set" with "REST API", "base URI", "base path"
- moved simple registration to registration section

changes from -08 to -09

- clarified the "example use" of the base RD resource values /rd, /rd-lookup, and /rd-group.

- changed "ins" ABNF notation.

- various editorial improvements, including in examples

- clarifications for RDAO

changes from -07 to -08

- removed link target value returned from domain and group lookup types

- Maximum length of domain parameter 63 bytes for consistency with group

- removed option for simple POST of link data, don’t require a .well-known/core resource to accept POST data and handle it in a special way; we already have /rd for that

- add IPv6 ND Option for discovery of an RD

- clarify group configuration section 6.1 that endpoints must be registered before including them in a group

- removed all superfluous client-server diagrams

- simplified lighting example

- introduced Commissioning Tool

- RD-Look-up text is extended.

changes from -06 to -07

- added text in the discovery section to allow content format hints to be exposed in the discovery link attributes

- editorial updates to section 9

- update author information

- minor text corrections
Changes from -05 to -06
  o added note that the PATCH section is contingent on the progress of
    the PATCH method

Changes from -04 to -05
  o added Update Endpoint Links using PATCH
  o http access made explicit in interface specification
  o Added http examples

Changes from -03 to -04:
  o Added http response codes
  o Clarified endpoint name usage
  o Add application/link-format+cbor content-format

Changes from -02 to -03:
  o Added an example for lighting and DNS integration
  o Added an example for RD use in OMA LWM2M
  o Added Read Links operation for link inspection by endpoints
  o Expanded DNS-SD section
  o Added draft authors Peter van der Stok and Michael Koster

Changes from -01 to -02:
  o Added a catalogue use case.
  o Changed the registration update to a POST with optional link
    format payload. Removed the endpoint type update from the update.
  o Additional examples section added for more complex use cases.
  o New DNS-SD mapping section.
  o Added text on endpoint identification and authentication.
  o Error code 4.04 added to Registration Update and Delete requests.
- Made 63 bytes a SHOULD rather than a MUST for endpoint name and resource type parameters.

Changes from -00 to -01:
- Removed the ETag validation feature.
- Place holder for the DNS-SD mapping section.
- Explicitly disabled GET or POST on returned Location.
- New registry for RD parameters.
- Added support for the JSON Link Format.
- Added reference to the Groupcomm WG draft.

Changes from -05 to WG Document -00:
- Updated the version and date.

Changes from -04 to -05:
- Restricted Update to parameter updates.
- Added pagination support for the Lookup interface.
- Minor editing, bug fixes and reference updates.
- Added group support.
- Changed rt to et for the registration and update interface.

Changes from -03 to -04:
- Added the ins= parameter back for the DNS-SD mapping.
- Integrated the Simple Directory Discovery from Carsten.
- Editorial improvements.
- Fixed the use of ETags.
- Fixed tickets 383 and 372

Changes from -02 to -03:
Changed the endpoint name back to a single registration parameter ep= and removed the h= and ins= parameters.

Updated REST interface descriptions to use RFC6570 URI Template format.

Introduced an improved RD Lookup design as its own function set.

Improved the security considerations section.

Made the POST registration interface idempotent by requiring the ep= parameter to be present.

Changes from -01 to -02:

Added a terminology section.

Changed the inclusion of an ETag in registration or update to a MAY.

Added the concept of an RD Domain and a registration parameter for it.

Recommended the Location returned from a registration to be stable, allowing for endpoint and Domain information to be changed during updates.

Changed the lookup interface to accept endpoint and Domain as query string parameters to control the scope of a lookup.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-core-links-json]


13.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]

[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]

[I-D.silverajan-core-coap-protocol-negotiation]


This section describes how the registering endpoint can maintain the registries that it created. The registering endpoint can be the registrant-ep or the CT. An endpoint SHOULD NOT use this interface for registries that it did not create. The registries are resources of the RD.

After the initial registration, the registering endpoint retains the returned location of the Registration Resource for further operations, including refreshing the registration in order to extend the lifetime and "keep-alive" the registration. When the lifetime of the registration has expired, the RD SHOULD NOT respond to discovery queries concerning this endpoint. The RD SHOULD continue to provide access to the Registration Resource after a registration time-out occurs in order to enable the registering endpoint to eventually refresh the registration. The RD MAY eventually remove the registration resource for the purpose of garbage collection. If the Registration Resource is removed, the corresponding endpoint will need to be re-registered.

The Registration Resource may also be used to inspect the registration resource using GET, update the registration, cancel the registration using DELETE, or do an endpoint lookup.

These operations are described below.
A.1. Registration Update

The update interface is used by the registering endpoint to refresh or update its registration with an RD. To use the interface, the registering endpoint sends a POST request to the registration resource returned by the initial registration operation.

An update MAY update the lifetime- or the context- registration parameters "lt", "base" as in Section 5.3. Parameters that are not being changed SHOULD NOT be included in an update. Adding parameters that have not changed increases the size of the message but does not have any other implications. Parameters MUST be included as query parameters in an update operation as in Section 5.3.

A registration update resets the timeout of the registration to the (possibly updated) lifetime of the registration, independent of whether a "lt" parameter was given.

If the context of the registration is changed in an update, relative references submitted in the original registration or later updates are resolved anew against the new context.

The registration update operation only describes the use of POST with an empty payload. Future standards might describe the semantics of using content formats and payloads with the POST method to update the links of a registration (see Appendix A.4).

The update registration request interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: EP -> RD

Method: POST

URI Template: {+location}{?lt,con,extra-attrs*}

URI Template Variables:

location := This is the Location returned by the RD as a result of a successful earlier registration.

lt := Lifetime (optional). Lifetime of the registration in seconds. Range of 60-4294967295. If no lifetime is included, the previous last lifetime set on a previous update or the original registration (falling back to 90000) SHOULD be used.

base := Base URI (optional). This parameter updates the Base URI established in the original registration to a new value. If the parameter is set in an update, it is stored by the RD as
the new Base URI under which to interpret the relative links present in the payload of the original registration, following the same restrictions as in the registration. If the parameter is not set in the request but was set before, the previous Base URI value is kept unmodified. If the parameter is not set in the request and was not set before either, the source address and source port of the update request are stored as the Base URI.

extra-attrs := Additional registration attributes (optional). As with the registration, the RD processes them if it knows their semantics. Otherwise, unknown attributes are stored as endpoint attributes, overriding any previously stored endpoint attributes of the same key.

Content-Format: none (no payload)

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.04 "Changed" or 204 "No Content" if the update was successfully processed.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" or 400 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found" or 404 "Not Found". Registration does not exist (e.g. may have expired).

Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable" or 503 "Service Unavailable". Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: YES

If the registration update fails with a "Service Unavailable" response and a Max-Age option or Retry-After header, the registering endpoint SHOULD retry the operation after the time indicated. If the registration fails in another way, including request timeouts, or if the time indicated exceeds the remaining lifetime, the registering endpoint SHOULD attempt registration again.

The following example shows how the registering endpoint updates its registration resource at an RD using this interface with the example location value: /rd/4521.

Req: POST /rd/4521

Res: 2.04 Changed
The following example shows the registering endpoint updating its registration resource at an RD using this interface with the example location value: /rd/4521. The initial registration by the registering endpoint set the following values:

- endpoint name (ep) = endpoint1
- lifetime (lt) = 500
- Base URI (base) = coap://local-proxy-old.example.com:5683
- payload of Figure 7

The initial state of the Resource Directory is reflected in the following request:

**Req:** GET /rd-lookup/res?ep=endpoint1

**Res:** 2.01 Content
Payload:
<coap://local-proxy-old.example.com:5683/sensors/temp>;ct=41;rt="temperature"; anchor="coap://spurious.example.com:5683",
<coap://local-proxy-old.example.com:5683/sensors/light>;ct=41;rt="light-lux"; if="sensor"; anchor="coap://local-proxy-old.example.com:5683"

The following example shows the registering endpoint changing the Base URI to "coaps://new.example.com:5684":

**Req:** POST /rd/4521?base=coaps://new.example.com:5684

**Res:** 2.04 Changed

The consecutive query returns:

**Req:** GET /rd-lookup/res?ep=endpoint1

**Res:** 2.01 Content
Payload:
<coaps://new.example.com:5684/sensors/temp>;ct=41;rt="temperature"; anchor="coap://spurious.example.com:5683",
<coaps://new.example.com:5684/sensors/light>;ct=41;rt="light-lux"; if="sensor"; anchor="coaps://new.example.com:5684"

The following example shows a client performing and endpoint lookup for all groups.
A.2. Registration Removal

Although RD entries have soft state and will eventually timeout after their lifetime, the registering endpoint SHOULD explicitly remove an entry from the RD if it knows it will no longer be available (for example on shut-down). This is accomplished using a removal interface on the RD by performing a DELETE on the endpoint resource.

The removal request interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: EP -> RD
Method: DELETE
URI Template: {+location}

URI Template Variables:

location := This is the Location returned by the RD as a result of a successful earlier registration.

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.02 "Deleted" or 204 "No Content" upon successful deletion

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" or 400 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found" or 404 "Not Found". Registration does not exist (e.g. may have expired).

Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable" or 503 "Service Unavailable". Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: YES

The following examples shows successful removal of the endpoint from the RD with example location value /rd/4521.
A.3. Read Endpoint Links

Some registering endpoints may wish to manage their links as a collection, and may need to read the current set of links stored in the registration resource, in order to determine link maintenance operations.

One or more links MAY be selected by using query filtering as specified in [RFC6690] Section 4.1

If no links are selected, the Resource Directory SHOULD return an empty payload.

The read request interface is specified as follows:

Interaction: EP -> RD

Method: GET

URI Template: {+location}{?href,rel,rt,if,ct}

URI Template Variables:

location := This is the Location returned by the RD as a result of a successful earlier registration.

href,rel,rt,if,ct := link relations and attributes specified in the query in order to select particular links based on their relations and attributes. "href" denotes the URI target of the link. See [RFC6690] Sec. 4.1

The following response codes are defined for this interface:

Success: 2.05 "Content" or 200 "OK" upon success with an "application/link-format", "application/link-format+cbor", or "application/link-format+json" payload.

Failure: 4.00 "Bad Request" or 400 "Bad Request". Malformed request.

Failure: 4.04 "Not Found" or 404 "Not Found". Registration does not exist (e.g. may have expired).
Failure: 5.03 "Service Unavailable" or 503 "Service Unavailable".
Service could not perform the operation.

HTTP support: YES

The following examples show successful read of the endpoint links from the RD, with example location value /rd/4521 and example registration payload of Figure 7.

Req: GET /rd/4521
Res: 2.01 Content
Payload:
</sensors/temp>;ct=41;rt="temperature-c";if="sensor";
anchor="coap://spurious.example.com:5683",
</sensors/light>;ct=41;rt="light-lux";if="sensor"

A.4.  Update Endpoint Links

An iPATCH (or PATCH) update ([RFC8132]) can add, remove or change the links of a registration.

Those operations are out of scope of this document, and will require media types suitable for modifying sets of links.

A.5.  Endpoint lookup

Endpoint lookups result in links to registration resources. Endpoint registration resources are annotated with their endpoint names (ep), sectors (d, if present) and registration base URI (base) as well as a constant resource type (rt="core.rd-ep"); the lifetime (lt) is not reported. Additional endpoint attributes are added as link attributes to their endpoint link unless their specification says otherwise.

Serializations derived from Link Format, SHOULD present links to endpoints in path-absolute form or, if required, as absolute references. (This approach avoids the RFC6690 ambiguities.)

While Endpoint Lookup does expose the registration resources, the RD does not need to make them accessible to clients. Clients SHOULD NOT attempt to dereference or manipulate them.

A Resource Directory can report endpoints in lookup that are not hosted at the same address. Lookup clients MUST be prepared to see arbitrary URIs as registration resources in the results and treat them as opaque identifiers; the precise semantics of such links are left to future specifications.
The following example shows a client performing an endpoint type (et) lookup with the value oic.d.sensor (which is currently a registered rt value):

Req: GET /rd-lookup/ep?et=oic.d.sensor

Res: 2.05 Content
</rd/1234>;base="coap://[2001:db8:3::127]:61616";ep="node5";
et="oic.d.sensor";ct="40",
</rd/4521>;base="coap://[2001:db8:3::129]:61616";ep="node7";
et="oic.d.sensor";ct="40";d="floor-3"

Appendix B. Web links and the Resource Directory

Understanding the semantics of a link-format document and its URI references is a journey through different documents ([RFC3986] defining URIs, [RFC6690] defining link-format documents based on [RFC8288] which defines link headers, and [RFC7252] providing the transport). This appendix summarizes the mechanisms and semantics at play from an entry in ".well-known/core" to a resource lookup.

This text is primarily aimed at people entering the field of Constrained Restful Environments from applications that previously did not use web mechanisms.

At all examples in this section give compatible results for both Modernized and RFC6690 Link Format; the explanation of the steps follow Modernized Link Format.

B.1. A simple example

Let’s start this example with a very simple host, "2001:db8:f0::1". A client that follows classical CoAP Discovery ([RFC7252] Section 7), sends the following multicast request to learn about neighbours supporting resources with resource-type "temperature".

The client sends a link-local multicast:

GET coap://[ff02::fd]:5683/.well-known/core?rt=temperature

RES 2.05 Content
</temp>;rt=temperature;ct=0

where the response is sent by the server, "[2001:db8:f0::1]:5683".

While the client - on the practical or implementation side - can just go ahead and create a new request to "[2001:db8:f0::1]:5683" with
Uri-Path: "temp", the full resolution steps for insertion into and retrieval from the RD without any shortcuts are:

**B.1.1. Resolving the URIs**

The client parses the single returned record. The link’s target (sometimes called "href") is "'/temp'", which is a relative URI that needs resolving. The base URI <coap://[ff02::fd]:5683/.well-known/core> is used to resolve the reference /temp against.

The Base URI of the requested resource can be composed from the header options of the CoAP GET request by following the steps of [RFC7252] section 6.5 (with an addition at the end of 8.2) into "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/.well-known/core".

Because "'/temp'" starts with a single slash, the record’s target is resolved by replacing the path "'/well-known/core'" from the Base URI (section 5.2 [RFC3986]) with the relative target URI "'/temp'" into "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/temp".

**B.1.2. Interpreting attributes and relations**

Some more information but the record’s target can be obtained from the payload: the resource type of the target is "temperature", and its content type is text/plain (ct=0).

A relation in a web link is a three-part statement that specifies a named relation between the so-called "context resource" and the target resource, like "This page has its table of contents at /
toc.html". In [RFC6690] and modernized link-format documents, there is an implicit "host relation" specified with default parameter: rel="hosts".

In our example, the context resource of the link is the URI specified in the GET request "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/.well-known/core". A full English expression of the "host relation" is:

"coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/.well-known/core" is hosting the resource "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/temp", which is of the resource type "temperature" and can be accessed using the text/plain content format.'

**B.2. A slightly more complex example**

Omitting the "rt=temperature" filter, the discovery query would have given some more records in the payload:
GET coap://[ff02::fd]:5683/.well-known/core

RES 2.05 Content
</temp>;rt=temperature;ct=0,
</light>;rt=light-lux;ct=0,
</t>;anchor="/sensors/temp";rel=alternate,
<http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;anchor="/sensors/temp";rel="describedby"

Parsing the third record, the client encounters the "anchor" parameter. It is a URI relative to the Base URI of the request and is thus resolved to "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/sensors/temp". That is the context resource of the link, so the "rel" statement is not about the target and the Base URI any more, but about the target and the resolved URI. Thus, the third record could be read as "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/sensors/temp" has an alternate representation at "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/t".

Following the same resolution steps, the fourth record can be read as "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/sensors/temp" is described by "http://www.example.com/sensors/t123".

B.3. Enter the Resource Directory

The resource directory tries to carry the semantics obtainable by classical CoAP discovery over to the resource lookup interface as faithfully as possible.

For the following queries, we will assume that the simple host has used Simple Registration to register at the resource directory that was announced to it, sending this request from its UDP port "[2001:db8:f0:1]:6553":

POST coap://[2001:db8:f01::ff]/.well-known/core?ep=simple-host1

The resource directory would have accepted the registration, and queried the simple host’s ".well-known/core" by itself. As a result, the host is registered as an endpoint in the RD with the name "simple-host1". The registration is active for 90000 seconds, and the endpoint registration Base URI is "coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]" following the resolution steps described in Appendix B.1.1. It should be remarked that the Base URI constructed that way always yields a URI of the form: scheme://authority without path suffix.

If the client now queries the RD as it would previously have issued a multicast request, it would go through the RD discovery steps by fetching "coap://[2001:db8:f0::ff]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd-lookup-res", obtain "coap://[2001:db8:f0::ff]/rd-lookup/res" as the
resource lookup endpoint, and issue a request to
"coap://[2001:db8:f0::ff]/rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature" to receive
the following data:

<coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/temp>;rt=temperature;ct=0;
   anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]"

This is not _literally_ the same response that it would have received
from a multicast request, but it contains the equivalent statement:

'"coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]" is hosting the resource
"coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/temp", which is of the resource type
"temperature" and can be accessed using the text/plain content
format.'

(The difference is whether "/" or "/.well-known/core" hosts the
resources, which is one of the often misunderstood subtleties
Modernized Link Format addresses. Actually, /.well-known/core does
NOT host the resource but stores a URI reference to the resource.)

To complete the examples, the client could also query all resources
hosted at the endpoint with the known endpoint name "simple-host1".
A request to "coap://[2001:db8:f0::ff]/rd-lookup/res?ep=simple-host1"
would return

<coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/temp>;rt=temperature;ct=0;
   anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]",
<coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/light>;rt=light-lux;ct=0;
   anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]",
<coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/t>;
   anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/sensors/temp";rel=alternate,
   <http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;
   anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f0::1]/sensors/temp";rel="describedby"

All the target and anchor references are already in absolute form
there, which don’t need to be resolved any further.

Had the simple host done an equivalent full registration with a base=
parameter (e.g. "?ep=simple-host1&base=coap+tcp://simple-
host1.example.com"), that context would have been used to resolve the
relative anchor values instead, giving

<coap+tcp://simple-host1.example.com/temp>;rt=temperature;ct=0;
   anchor="coap+tcp://simple-host1.example.com"

and analogous records.
B.4. A note on differences between link-format and Link headers

While link-format and Link headers look very similar and are based on the same model of typed links, there are some differences between [RFC6690] and [RFC5988], which are dealt with differently:

- "Resolving the target against the anchor": [RFC6690] Section 2.1 states that the anchor of a link is used as the Base URI against which the term inside the angle brackets (the target) is resolved, falling back to the resource’s URI with paths stripped off (its "Origin"). In contrast to that, [RFC8288] Section B.2 describes that the anchor is immaterial to the resolution of the target reference.

RFC6690, in the same section, also states that absent anchors set the context of the link to the target’s URI with its path stripped off, while according to [RFC8288] Section 3.2, the context is the resource’s base URI.

In the context of a Resource Directory, the authors decided to not let this become an issue by recommending that links in the Resource Directory be _deserializable_ by either rule set to give the same results. Note that all examples of [RFC6690], [RFC8288] and this document comply with that rule.

The Modernized Link Format is introduced in Appendix D to formalize what it means to apply the ruleset of RFC8288 to Link Format documents.

- There is no percent encoding in link-format documents.

A link-format document is a UTF-8 encoded string of Unicode characters and does not have percent encoding, while Link headers are practically ASCII strings that use percent encoding for non-ASCII characters, stating the encoding explicitly when required.

For example, while a Link header in a page about a Swedish city might read

"Link: </temperature/Malm%C3%B6>;rel="live-environment-data"

a link-format document from the same source might describe the link as

"</temperature/Malmoe>;rel="live-environment-data"

Parsers and producers of link-format and header data need to be aware of this difference.
Appendix C. Syntax examples for Protocol Negotiation

[This appendix should not show up in a published version of this document.]

The protocol negotiation that is being worked on in [I-D.silverajan-core-coap-protocol-negotiation] makes use of the Resource Directory.

Until that document is updated to use the latest resource-directory specification, here are some examples of protocol negotiation with the current Resource Directory:

An endpoint could register as follows from its address [2001:db8:f1::2]:5683:

Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=node1
&at=coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";if="core.s"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/1234

An endpoint lookup would just reflect the registered attributes:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/ep

Res: 2.05 Content
</rd/1234>;ep="node1";base="coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]:5683";
at="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]"

A UDP client would then see the following in a resource lookup:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]/temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";
  if="core.s"; anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]"

while a TCP capable client could say:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature&tt=tcp

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]/temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";
   if="core.s"; anchor="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]"
Appendix D. Modernized Link Format parsing

The CoRE Link Format as described in [RFC6690] is unsuitable for some use cases of the Resource Directory, and their resolution scheme is often misunderstood by developers familiar with [RFC8288].

For the correct application of base URIs, we describe the interpretation of a Link Format document as a Modernized Link Format. In Modernized Link Format, the document is processed as in Link Format, with the exception of Section 2.1 of [RFC6690]:

- o The URI-reference inside angle brackets ("<>") describes the target URI of the link.
- o The context of the link is expressed by the "anchor" parameter. If the anchor attribute is absent, it defaults to the empty reference ("").
- o Both these references are resolved according to Section 5 of [RFC3986].

Content formats derived from [RFC6690] which inherit its resolution rules, like JSON and CBOR link format of [I-D.ietf-core-links-json], can be interpreted in analogy to that.

For where the Resource Directory is concerned, all common forms of links (e.g. all the examples of RFC6690) yield identical results. When interpreting data read from ".well-known/core", differences in interpretation only affect links where the absent anchor attribute means "coap://host/" according to RFC6690 and "coap://host/.well-known/core" according to Modernized Link format; those typically only occur in conjunction with the vaguely defined implicit "hosts" relationship.

D.1. For endpoint developers

When developing endpoints, i.e. when generating documents that will be submitted to a Resource Directory, the differences between Modernized Link Format and RFC6690 can be ignored as long as

- o all relative references start with a slash,

and any of the following applies:

- o There is no anchor attribute, and the context of the link does not matter to the application.

Example: "</sensors>;ct=40"
The anchor is a relative reference.

Example: "</t>;anchor="/sensors/temp";rel="alternate"

The target is an absolute reference.

Example: "<http://www.example.com/sensors/t123>;anchor="/sensors/temp";rel="describedby"

D.2. Examples of links with differing interpretations

Examples of links with different interpretations from either applying RFC6690 or Modernized Link Format are shown here. The example is assumed to be obtained from a </device/index> document.

- "<sensors>": The target is "/sensors" in RFC6690 and "/device/sensors" in Modernized Link Format (whereas "</sensors>" would be unambiguous).

- "<?which=these>": The target is "/<?which=these" in RFC6690 and "/device/index?which=these" in Modernized Link Format.

- "<sensors>;anchor="http://example.com/calib-proto/1234";rel="topic"" is about "http://example.com/sensors" in RFC6690 and about "/device/sensors" in Modernized Link Format.

This link can not be expressed in RFC6690 link format without the server explicitly expressing most of its own URI (which is problematic in reverse proxy scenarios or when the Uri-Host option is not sent).

- "</i>;rel="alternate";anchor="": According to RFC6690, this states that the "/" resource has an alternative representation at "/i", whereas Modernized Link Format says that "/devices/index" has an alternative representation at "/i".

The "anchor" attribute is usually left out; the link "</i>;rel="alternate"" is equivalent to the above and results in the same interpretations.
FETCH & PATCH with Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML)
draft-ietf-core-senml-etch-00

Abstract

The Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML) media type and data model can be used to send collections of resources, such as batches of sensor data or configuration parameters. The CoAP iPATCH, PATCH, and FETCH methods enable accessing and updating parts of a resource or multiple resources with one request. This document defines semantics for the CoAP iPATCH, and FETCH methods for resources represented with the SenML data model.

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1. Introduction

The Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML) media type (RFC8428) and data model can be used to transmit collections of resources, such as batches of sensor data or configuration parameters.

Example of a SenML collection is shown below:

```
[  
  {"bn":"2001:db8::2/3306/0/", "n":"5850", "vb":true},  
  {"n":"5851", "v":42},  
  {"n":"5750", "vs":"Ceiling light"}  
]
```

Here three resources "3306/0/5850", "3306/0/5851", and "3306/0/5750", of an IPSO dimmable light smart object [IPSO] are represented using a single SenML Pack with three SenML Records. All resources share the same base name "2001:db8::2/3306/0/", hence full names for resources are "2001:db8::2/3306/0/5850", etc.

The CoAP [RFC7252] iPATCH and FETCH methods [RFC8132] enable accessing and updating parts of a resource or multiple resources with one request.

This document defines semantics for the CoAP iPATCH and FETCH methods for resources represented with the SenML data model. Same semantics apply also for the CoAP PATCH method.
2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC8132] and [RFC8428]. Also the following terms are used in this document:

Fetch Record: One set of parameters that is used to match SenML Record(s).

Fetch Pack: One or more Fetch Records in an array structure. Presented using the SenML media type.

Patch Record: One set of parameters similar to Fetch Record but also containing instructions on how to change existing SenML Pack(s).

Patch Pack: One or more Patch Records in an array structure.

Target Record: A Record in a SenML Pack that is matching the selection criteria of a Fetch or Patch Record and hence is a target for a Fetch or Patch operation.

3. Using FETCH and iPATCH with SenML

The FETCH and iPATCH methods use the same SenML media type to enable re-use of existing SenML parsers and generators, in particular on constrained devices.

NOTE: it is currently under consideration whether new media types should be registered for FETCH/iPATCH instead of re-using the SenML media types.

3.1. SenML FETCH

The FETCH method can be used to select and return parts of one or more SenML Packs. The SenML Records are selected by giving the name(s) of the resources using the SenML "name" and/or "base name" Fields.

For example, to select resources "5850" and "5851" from the example in Section 1, the following Fetch Pack can be used:
The result to a FETCH request with the example above would be:

```json
[
  {"bn": "2001:db8::2/3306/0/", "n": "5850", "vb": true},
  {"n": "5851", "v": 42},
]
```

When SenML Records contain also time values, a name may no longer uniquely identify a single Record. When no time is given in a Fetch Record, all SenML Records with the given name are matched. When time is given in the Fetch Record, only a SenML Record (if any) with equal time value and name is matched.

The resolved form of records (Section 4.6 of [RFC8428]) is used when comparing the names and times of the Target and Fetch Records to accommodate for differences in use of the base values.

3.2. SenML iPATCH

The iPATCH method can be used to change the values of SenML Records, to add new Records, and to remove existing Records. The names and times of the Patch Records are given and matched in same way as for the Fetch Records, except each Patch Record can match at most one Target Record. Patch Packs can also include new values and other SenML Fields for the Records.

When the name in a Patch Record matches with the name in an existing Record, the time values are compared. If the time values do not exist or are equal in both Records, the Target Record is replaced with the contents of the Patch Record.

If a Patch Record contains a name, or combination of a time value and a name, that do not exist in any existing Record in the Pack, the given Record, with all the fields it contains, is added to the Pack.

If a Patch Record has a value field with value null, the matched Record (if any) is removed from the Pack.

For example, the following document could be given as iPATCH payload to change/set values of two SenML Records for the example in Section 1:
If the request is successful, the resulting representation of the example SenML Pack would be as follows:

```json
[
    {"bn":"2001:db8::2/3306/0/", "n":"5850", "vb":false},
    {"n":"5851", "v":10},
    {"n":"5750", "vs":"Ceiling light"}
]
```

4. Security Considerations

The security and privacy considerations of SenML apply also with the FETCH and iPATCH methods.

In FETCH and iPATCH requests, the client can pass arbitrary names to the target resource for manipulation. The resource implementer must take care to only allow access to names that are actually part of (or accessible through) the target resource.

If the client is not allowed to do a GET or PUT on the full target resource (and thus all the names accessible through it), access control rules must be evaluated for each record in the pack.

5. Acknowledgements

The use of FETCH and iPATCH methods with SenML was first introduced by the OMA SpecWorks LwM2M v1.1 specification. This document generalizes the use to any SenML representation. The authors would like to thank Carsten Bormann, Christian Amsuess, Jaime Jimenez, Klaus Hartke, and also everyone in the IETF CoRE and OMA SpecWorks DMSE working groups for their contributions and reviews.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References


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YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID)
draft-ietf-core-sid-04

Abstract

YANG Schema Item iDentifiers (SID) are globally unique 64-bit unsigned numbers used to identify YANG items. This document defines the semantics, the registration, and assignment processes of SIDs. To enable the implementation of these processes, this document also defines a file format used to persist and publish assigned SIDs.

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1. Introduction

Some of the items defined in YANG [RFC7950] require the use of a unique identifier. In both NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040], these identifiers are implemented using names. To allow the implementation of data models defined in YANG in constrained devices and constrained networks, a more compact method to identify YANG items is required. This compact identifier, called SID, is encoded using a 64-bit unsigned integer. The following items are identified using SIDs:

- identities
- data nodes (Note: including those part of a YANG template as defined by the 'yang-data' extension.)
- RPCs and associated input(s) and output(s)
- actions and associated input(s) and output(s)
- notifications and associated information
- YANG modules, submodules and features

To minimize their size, SIDs are often represented as a difference between the current SID and a reference SID. Such difference is
called "delta", shorthand for "delta-encoded SID". Conversion from SIDs to deltas and back to SIDs is a stateless process. Each protocol implementing deltas must unambiguously define the reference SID for each YANG item.

SIDs are globally unique numbers, a registration system is used in order to guarantee their uniqueness. SIDs are registered in blocks called "SID ranges".

Assignment of SIDs to YANG items can be automated, the recommended process to assign SIDs is as follows:

1. A tool extracts the different items defined for a specific YANG module.

2. The list of items is sorted in alphabetical order, ‘namespace’ in descending order, ‘identifier’ in ascending order. The ‘namespace’ and ‘identifier’ formats are described in the YANG module ‘ietf-sid-file’ defined in Section 4.

3. SIDs are assigned sequentially from the entry point up to the size of the registered SID range. This approach is recommended to minimize the serialization overhead, especially when delta encoding is implemented.

4. If the number of items exceeds the SID range(s) allocated to a YANG module, an extra range is added for subsequent assignments.

SIDs are assigned permanently, items introduced by a new revision of a YANG module are added to the list of SIDs already assigned. This process can also be automated using the same method described above, only unassigned YANG items are processed at step #3.

Section 3 provides more details about the registration process of YANG modules and associated SIDs. To enable the implementation of this registry, Section 4 defines a standard file format used to store and publish SIDs.

2. Terminology and Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The following terms are defined in [RFC7950]:

- action
3. "sid" file lifecycle

YANG is a language designed to model data accessed using one of the compatible protocols (e.g., NETCONF [RFC6241], RESCONF [RFC8040] and CoMI [I-D.ietf-core-comi]). A YANG module defines hierarchies of data, including configuration, state data, RPCs, actions and notifications.

YANG modules are not necessary created in the context of constrained applications. YANG modules can be implemented using NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040] without the need to assign SIDs.
As needed, authors of YANG modules can assign SIDs to their YANG modules. This process starts by the registration of a SID range. Once a SID range is registered, the owner of this range assigns sub-ranges to each YANG module in order to generate the associated ".sid" files. Generation of ".sid" files SHOULD be performed using an automated tool.

Registration of the .sid file associated to a YANG module is optional but recommended to promote interoperability between devices and to avoid duplicate allocation of SIDs to a single YANG module.

The following activity diagram summarizes the creation of a YANG module and its associated .sid file.
Each time a YANG module or one of its imported module(s) or included sub-module(s) is updated, the ".sid" file MAY need to be updated. This update SHOULD also be performed using an automated tool.

If a new revision requires more SIDs than initially allocated, a new SID range MUST be added to the ‘assignment-ranges’. These extra SIDs are used for subsequent assignments.
The following activity diagram summarizes the update of a YANG module and its associated .sid file.

4. "sid" file format

"sid" files are used to persist and publish SIDs assigned to the different YANG items of a specific YANG module. The following YANG module defined the structure of this file, encoding is performed using the rules defined in [RFC7951].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-sid-file@2017-11-26.yang"
module ietf-sid-file {
    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sid-file";
    prefix sid;

    import ietf-yang-types {
        prefix yang;
    }

    import ietf-comi {
        prefix comi;
    }

    organization
        "IETF Core Working Group";

    contact
        "Michel Veillette
          <mailto:michel.veillette@trilliant.com>

        Andy Bierman
          <mailto:andy@yumaworks.com>

        Alexander Pelov
          <mailto:a@ackl.io>";

    description
        "This module defines the structure of the .sid files.

        Each .sid file contains the mapping between the different
        string identifiers defined by a YANG module and a
        corresponding numeric value called SID."

    revision 2017-11-26 {
        description
            "Initial revision."
        reference
            "[I-D.ietf-core-sid] YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID)"
    }

    typedef revision-identifier {
        type string {
            pattern '\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}';
        }
        description
            "Represents a date in YYYY-MM-DD format.";
    }

Veillette & Pelov    Expires December 6, 2018
typedef schema-node-path {
  type string {
    pattern
      '/[a-zA-Z_]\[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]*:[a-zA-Z_]\[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]*\*/ +
      '(/[a-zA-Z_]\[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]*\*:[a-zA-Z_]\[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]*\*)?*';
  }
  description
    "Identifies a schema-node path string for use in the
    SID registry. This string format follows the rules
    for an instance-identifier, as defined in RFC 7959,
    except that no predicates are allowed.

    This format is intended to support the YANG 1.1 ABNF
    for a schema node identifier, except module names
    are used instead of prefixes, as specified in RFC 7951.";
  reference
    "RFC 7950, The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language;
    Section 6.5: Schema Node Identifier;
    RFC 7951, JSON Encoding of YANG Data;
    Section 6.11: The instance-identifier type";
}

leaf module-name {
  type yang:yang-identifier;
  description
    "Name of the YANG module associated with this .sid file.";
}

leaf module-revision {
  type revision-identifier;
  description
    "Revision of the YANG module associated with this .sid file.
    This leaf is not present if no revision statement is
    defined in the YANG module.";
}

list assignment-ranges {
  key "entry-point";
  description
    "SID range(s) allocated to the YANG module identified by
    'module-name' and 'module-revision'.";

  leaf entry-point {
    type comi:sid;
    mandatory true;
    description
      "Lowest SID available for assignment.";
  }
leaf size {
  type uint64;
  mandatory true;
  description
    "Number of SIDs available for assignment."
}

list items {
  key "namespace identifier";
  description
    "Each entry within this list defined the mapping between a YANG item string identifier and a SID. This list MUST include a mapping entry for each YANG item defined by the YANG module identified by ‘module-name’ and ‘module-revision’.”;

  leaf namespace {
    type enumeration {
      enum module {
        value 0;
        description
          "All module and submodule names share the same global module identifier namespace.”;
      }
      enum identity {
        value 1;
        description
          "All identity names defined in a module and its submodules share the same identity identifier namespace.”;
      }
      enum feature {
        value 2;
        description
          "All feature names defined in a module and its submodules share the same feature identifier namespace.”;
      }
      enum data {
        value 3;
        description
          "The namespace for all data nodes, as defined in YANG.”;
      }
    }
    description
      "Namespace of the YANG item for this mapping entry.”;
  }
}
leaf identifier {
  type union {
    type yang:yang-identifier;
    type schema-node-path;
  }
  description
  "String identifier of the YANG item for this mapping entry."
  
  If the corresponding ‘namespace’ field is ‘module’, 'feature', or 'identity', then this field MUST contain a valid YANG identifier string.
  
  If the corresponding ‘namespace’ field is ‘data’, then this field MUST contain a valid schema node path.";
}

leaf sid {
  type comi:sid;
  mandatory true;
  description
  "SID assigned to the YANG item for this mapping entry.";
}

5. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC7049] and [RFC7950] apply.

This document defines a new type of identifier used to encode data models defined in YANG [RFC7950]. As such, this identifier does not contribute to any new security issues in addition of those identified for the specific protocols or contexts for which it is used.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. "SID mega-range" registry

The name of this registry is "SID mega-range". This registry is used to delegate the management of block of SIDs for third party’s (e.g. SDO, registrar).

Each entry in this registry must include:

- The entry point (first entry) of the registered SID range.
o The size of the registered SID range.

o The contact information of the requesting organization including:
   * Organization name
   * Primary contact name, email address, and phone number
   * Secondary contact name, email address, and phone number

The initial entry in this registry is allocated to IANA:

+-------------+---------+-------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry Point</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Organization name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1000000</td>
<td>IANA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-------------+---------+-------------------+

The IANA policies for future additions to this registry are
"Hierarchical Allocation, Expert Review" [RFC5226]. Prior to a first
allocation, the requesting organization must demonstrate a functional
registry infrastructure. On subsequent allocation request(s), the
organization must demonstrate the exhaustion of the prior range.
These conditions need to be asserted by the assigned expert(s).

6.1.1. IANA SID Mega-Range Registry

The first million SIDs assigned to IANA is sub-divided as follow:

o The range of 0 to 999 is reserved for future extensions. The IANA
  policy for this range is "IETF review" [RFC5226].

o The range of 1000 to 59,999 is reserved for YANG modules defined
  in RFCs. The IANA policy for future additions to this sub-
  registry is "RFC required" [RFC5226]. Allocation within this
  range requires publishing of the associated ".yang" and ".sid"
  files in the YANG module registry. The allocation within this
  range is done prior to the RFC publication but should not be done
  prior to the working group adoption.

o The range of 60,000 to 99,999 is reserved for experimental YANG
  modules. This range MUST NOT be used in operational deployments
  since these SIDs are not globally unique which limit their
  interoperability. The IANA policy for this range is "Experimental
  use" [RFC5226].

o The range of 100,000 to 999,999 is reserved for standardized YANG
  modules. The IANA policy for future additions to this sub-
registry is "Specification Required" [RFC5226]. Allocation within this range requires publishing of the associated ".yang" and ".sid" files in the YANG module registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry Point</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>IANA policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>IETF review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>RFC required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Experimental use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,000,000,000</td>
<td>Specification Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The size of a SID range assigned to a YANG module should be at least 33% above the current number of YANG items. This headroom allows assignment within the same range of new YANG items introduced by subsequent revisions. A larger SID range size may be requested by the authors if this recommendation is considered insufficient. It is important to note that an extra SID range can be allocated to an existing YANG module if the initial range is exhausted.

6.1.2. IANA "RFC SID range assignment" sub-registries

The name of this sub-registry is "RFC SID range assignment". This sub-registry corresponds to the SID entry point 1000, size 59000. Each entry in this sub-registry must include the SID range entry point, the SID range size, the YANG module name, the RFC number.

Initial entries in this registry are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry Point</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Module name</th>
<th>RFC number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>ietf-comi</td>
<td>[I-D.ietf-core-comi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>ietf-yang-types</td>
<td>[RFC6021]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>ietf-inet-types</td>
<td>[RFC6021]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>iana-crypt-hash</td>
<td>[RFC7317]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>ietf-netconf-acm</td>
<td>[RFC6536]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>ietf-sid-file</td>
<td>RFCXXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>ietf-interfaces</td>
<td>[RFC7223]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>ietf-ip</td>
<td>[RFC7277]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>ietf-system</td>
<td>[RFC7317]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>iana-if-type</td>
<td>[RFC7224]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with RFC number assigned to this draft.
6.2. "YANG module assignment" registry

The name of this registry is "YANG module assignment". This registry is used to track which YANG modules have been assigned and the specific YANG items assignment. Each entry in this sub-registry must include:

- The YANG module name
- The associated ".yang" file(s)
- The associated ".sid" file

The validity of the ".yang" and ".sid" files added to this registry MUST be verified.

- The syntax of the registered ".yang" and ".sid" files must be valid.
- Each YANG item defined by the registered ".yang" file must have a corresponding SID assigned in the ".sid" file.
- Each SID is assigned to a single YANG item, duplicate assignment is not allowed.
- The SID range(s) defined in the ".sid" file must be unique, must not conflict with any other SID ranges defined in already registered ".sid" files.
- The ownership of the SID range(s) should be verified.

The IANA policy for future additions to this registry is "First Come First Served" as described in [RFC5226].

7. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Andy Bierman, Carsten Bormann, Abhinav Somaraju, Laurent Toutain and Randy Turner for their help during the development of this document and their useful comments during the review process.

8. References

8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. ".sid" file example

The following .sid file (ietf-system@2014-08-06.sid) have been generated using the following yang modules:

- ietf-system@2014-08-06.yang
- ietf-yang-types@2013-07-15.yang
- ietf-inet-types@2013-07-15.yang
- ietf-netconf-acm@2012-02-22.yang
- iana-crypt-hash@2014-04-04.yang

```json
{
    "assignment-ranges": [
        {
            "entry-point": 1700,
            "size": 100
        }
    ],
    "module-name": "ietf-system",
    "module-revision": "2014-08-06",
    "items": [
        {
            "namespace": "module",
            "identifier": "ietf-system",
            "sid": 1700
        },
        {
            "namespace": "identity",
```
"identifier": "authentication-method",
"sid": 1701
},
{
"namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "local-users",
"sid": 1702
},
{
"namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "radius",
"sid": 1703
},
{
"namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "radius-authentication-type",
"sid": 1704
},
{
"namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "radius-chap",
"sid": 1705
},
{
"namespace": "identity",
"identifier": "radius-pap",
"sid": 1706
},
{
"namespace": "feature",
"identifier": "authentication",
"sid": 1707
},
{
"namespace": "feature",
"identifier": "dns-udp-tcp-port",
"sid": 1708
},
{
"namespace": "feature",
"identifier": "local-users",
"sid": 1709
},
{
"namespace": "feature",
"identifier": "ntp",
"sid": 1710
},
{  
  "namespace": "feature",
  "identifier": "ntp-udp-port",
  "sid": 1711
},
{  
  "namespace": "feature",
  "identifier": "radius",
  "sid": 1712
},
{  
  "namespace": "feature",
  "identifier": "radius-authentication",
  "sid": 1713
},
{  
  "namespace": "feature",
  "identifier": "timezone-name",
  "sid": 1714
},
{  
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:set-current-datetime",
  "sid": 1715
},
{  
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:set-current-datetime/current-datetime",
  "sid": 1716
},
{  
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system",
  "sid": 1717
},
{  
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system-restart",
  "sid": 1718
},
{  
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system-shutdown",
  "sid": 1719
},
{  
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system-shutdown/active",
  "sid": 1720
},
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state",
"sid": 1720
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/clock",
"sid": 1721
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/clock/boot-datetime",
"sid": 1722
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/clock/current-datetime",
"sid": 1723
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/platform",
"sid": 1724
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/platform/machine",
"sid": 1725
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/platform/os-name",
"sid": 1726
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/platform/os-release",
"sid": 1727
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system-state/platform/os-version",
"sid": 1728
},
{  
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication",
"sid": 1729
}
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user",
  "sid": 1730
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/
                  user-authentication-order",
  "sid": 1731
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user/
                  authorized-key",
  "sid": 1732
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user/
                  authorized-key/algorithm",
  "sid": 1733
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user/
                  authorized-key/key-data",
  "sid": 1734
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user/
                  authorized-key/name",
  "sid": 1735
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user/
                  name",
  "sid": 1736
},
{
  "namespace": "data",
  "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/authentication/user/
                  password",
  "sid": 1737
},


```json
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/clock",
    "sid": 1738
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/clock/timezone-name",
    "sid": 1739
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/clock/timezone-utc-offset",
    "sid": 1740
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/contact",
    "sid": 1741
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver",
    "sid": 1742
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/options",
    "sid": 1743
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/options/attempts",
    "sid": 1744
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/options/timeout",
    "sid": 1745
},
{
    "namespace": "data",
    "identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/search",
    "sid": 1746
},
```
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/server",
"sid": 1747
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/server/name",
"sid": 1748
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/server/udp-and-tcp",
"sid": 1749
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/server/udp-and-tcp/address",
"sid": 1750
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/dns-resolver/server/udp-and-tcp/port",
"sid": 1751
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/hostname",
"sid": 1752
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/location",
"sid": 1753
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp",
"sid": 1754
},

{ "namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/enabled",
"sid": 1755
},

}
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server",
"sid": 1756
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/association-type",
"sid": 1757
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/iburst",
"sid": 1758
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/name",
"sid": 1759
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/prefer",
"sid": 1760
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/udp",
"sid": 1761
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/udp/address",
"sid": 1762
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/ntp/server/udp/port",
"sid": 1763
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius",
"sid": 1764
},

"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/options",
"sid": 1765
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/options/attempts",
"sid": 1766
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/options/timeout",
"sid": 1767
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server",
"sid": 1768
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server/authentication-type",
"sid": 1769
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server/name",
"sid": 1770
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server/udp",
"sid": 1771
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server/udp/address",
"sid": 1772
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server/udp/authentication-port",
"sid": 1773
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-system:system/radius/server/udp/
shared-secret",
    "sid": 1774
  }
}
}

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Too Many Requests Response Code for the Constrained Application Protocol
draft-ietf-core-too-many-reqs-05

Abstract

A Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) server can experience temporary overload because one or more clients are sending requests to the server at a higher rate than the server is capable or willing to handle. This document defines a new CoAP Response Code for a server to indicate that a client should reduce the rate of requests.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] Response Codes are used by a CoAP server to indicate the result of the attempt to understand and satisfy a request sent by a client.

CoAP Response Codes are similar to the HTTP [RFC7230] Status Codes and many codes are shared with similar semantics by both CoAP and HTTP. HTTP has the code "429" registered for "Too Many Requests" [RFC6585]. This document registers a CoAP Response Code "4.29" for similar purpose and also defines use of the Max-Age option (see Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252]) to indicate a back-off period after which a client can try the request again.

While a server may not be able to respond to one kind of request, it may be able to respond to a request of different kind, even from the same client. Therefore the back-off period applies only to similar requests. For the purpose of this response code, a request is similar if it has the same method and Request-URI. Also if a client is sending a sequence of requests that are part of the same series (e.g., a set of measurements to be processed by the server) they can be considered similar even if request URIs may be different. Because request similarity is context-dependent, it is up to the application logic to decide how the similarity of the requests should be evaluated.

The 4.29 code is similar to the 5.03 "Service Unavailable" [RFC7252] code in a way that the 5.03 code can also be used by a server to signal an overload situation. However the 4.29 code indicates that the too frequent requests from the requesting client are the reason for the overload.
2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC7252].

3. CoAP Server Behavior

If a CoAP server is unable to serve a client that is sending CoAP request messages more often than the server is capable or willing to handle, the server SHOULD respond to the request(s) with the Response Code 4.29, "Too Many Requests". The Max-Age option is used to indicate the number of seconds after which the server assumes it is OK for the client to retry the request.

An action result payload (see Section 5.5.1 of [RFC7252]) can be sent by the server to give more guidance to the client, e.g., about the details of the overload situation.

If a client repeats a request that was answered with 4.29 before Max-Age time has passed, it is possible the client did not recognize the error code and the server MAY respond with a more generic error code (e.g., 5.03). Server MAY also limit how often it answers to a client, e.g., to once every estimated RTT (if such estimate is available). However, both of these methods add per-client state to the server which may be counterproductive to reducing load.

4. CoAP Client Behavior

If a client receives the 4.29 Response Code from a CoAP server to a request, it SHOULD NOT send a similar request to the server before the time indicated in the Max-Age option has passed.

Note that a client may receive a 4.29 Response Code already on a first request to a server. This can happen, for example, if there is a proxy on the path and the server replies based on the load from multiple clients aggregated by the proxy, or if a client has restarted recently and does not remember its recent requests.

A client MUST NOT rely on a server being able to send the 4.29 Response Code in an overload situation because an overloaded server may not be able to reply at all to some requests.
5. Security Considerations

Replying to CoAP requests with a Response Code consumes resources from a server. For a server under attack it may be more appropriate to simply drop requests without responding at all. However, dropping requests is likely to cause also well-behaving clients to simply retry the requests.

As with any other CoAP reply, a client should trust this Response Code only to extent it trusts the underlying security mechanisms (e.g., DTLS [RFC6347]) for authentication and freshness. If a CoAP reply with the Too Many Requests Response Code is not authenticated and integrity protected, an attacker can attempt to spoof a reply and make the client wait for an extended period of time before trying again.

If the Response Code is sent without encryption, it may leak information about the server overload situation and client traffic patterns.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to register the following Response Code in the "CoRE Parameters Registry", "CoAP Response Codes" sub-registry:

- **Response Code**: 4.29
- **Description**: Too Many Requests
- **Reference**: [[This document]]

7. Acknowledgements

This Response Code definition was originally part of the "Publish-Subscribe Broker for CoAP" document [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub]. Author would like to thank Abhijan Bhattacharyya, Carsten Bormann, Daniel Migault, Gyorgy Rethy, Jana Iyengar, Jim Schaad, Klaus Hartke, Mohit Sethi, and Sandor Katona for their contributions and reviews.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

8.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub]


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CBOR Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG
draft-ietf-core-yang-cbor-07

Abstract

This document defines encoding rules for serializing configuration data, state data, RPC input and RPC output, Action input, Action output and notifications defined within YANG modules using the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049].

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The specification of the YANG 1.1 data modelling language [RFC7950] defines an XML encoding for data instances, i.e. contents of configuration datastores, state data, RPC inputs and outputs, action inputs and outputs, and event notifications.

A new set of encoding rules has been defined to allow the use of the same data models in environments based on the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format [RFC7159]. This is accomplished in the JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG specification [RFC7951].

The aim of this document is to define a set of encoding rules for the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049]. The resulting encoding is more compact compared to XML and JSON and more suitable for Constrained Nodes and/or Constrained Networks as defined by [RFC7228].

2. Terminology and Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The following terms are defined in [RFC7950]:

- action
- anydata
- anyxml
- data node
- data tree
- datastore
- feature
The following terms are defined in [RFC7951]:
- member name
- name of an identity
- namespace-qualified

The following terms are defined in [RFC8040]:
- yang-data (YANG extension)
- YANG data template

This specification also makes use of the following terminology:
- child: A schema node defined within a collection such as a container, a list, a case, a notification, an RPC input, an RPC output, an action input, an action output.
- delta: Difference between the current SID and a reference SID. A reference SID is defined for each context for which deltas are used.
- item: A schema node, an identity, a module, a submodule or a feature defined using the YANG modeling language.
- parent: The collection in which a schema node is defined.
- YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID): Unsigned integer used to identify different YANG items.
2.1. YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID)

Some of the items defined in YANG [RFC7950] require the use of a unique identifier. In both NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040], these identifiers are implemented using names. To allow the implementation of data models defined in YANG in constrained devices and constrained networks, a more compact method to identify YANG items is required. This compact identifier, called YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID), is encoded using an unsigned integer. The following items are identified using SIDs:

- identities
- data nodes
- RPCs and associated input(s) and output(s)
- actions and associated input(s) and output(s)
- notifications and associated information
- YANG modules, submodules and features

To minimize its size, in certain positions, SIDs are represented using a (signed) delta from a reference SID and the current SID. Conversion from SIDs to deltas and back to SIDs are stateless processes solely based on the data serialized or deserialized.

Mechanisms and processes used to assign SIDs to YANG items and to guarantee their uniqueness is outside the scope of the present specification. If SIDs are to be used, the present specification is used in conjunction with a specification defining this management. One example for such a specification is under development as [I-D.ietf-core-sid].

2.2. CBOR diagnostic notation

Within this document, CBOR binary contents are represented using an equivalent textual form called CBOR diagnostic notation as defined in [RFC7049] section 6. This notation is used strictly for documentation purposes and is never used in the data serialization. Table 1 below provides a summary of this notation.
### CBOR Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG September 2018

Table 1: CBOR diagnostic notation summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBOR content</th>
<th>CBOR type</th>
<th>Diagnostic notation</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>CBOR encoding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsigned integer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Decimal digits</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>18 7B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative integer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Decimal digits prefixed by a minus sign</td>
<td>-123</td>
<td>38 7A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byte string</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hexadecimal value enclosed between single quotes and prefixed by an ‘h’</td>
<td>h’F15C’</td>
<td>42 f15C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text string</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>String of Unicode characters enclosed between double quotes</td>
<td>&quot;txt&quot;</td>
<td>63 747874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Array</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Comma-separated list of values within square brackets</td>
<td>[ 1, 2 ]</td>
<td>82 01 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Comma-separated list of key : value pairs within curly braces</td>
<td>{ 1: 123, 2: 456 }</td>
<td>a2 01187B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>7/20</td>
<td>false</td>
<td>false</td>
<td>F4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/21</td>
<td>true</td>
<td>true</td>
<td>F5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null</td>
<td>7/22</td>
<td>null</td>
<td>null</td>
<td>F6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not assigned</td>
<td>7/23</td>
<td>undefined</td>
<td>undefined</td>
<td>F7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following extensions to the CBOR diagnostic notation are supported:

- Any text within and including a pair of slashes is considered a comment.
- Deltas are visualized as numbers preceded by a ‘+’ or ‘-’ sign. The use of the ‘+’ sign for positive deltas represents an extension to the CBOR diagnostic notation as defined by [RFC7049] section 6.

3. Properties of the CBOR Encoding

This document defines CBOR encoding rules for YANG schema trees and their subtrees.

A collection such as container, list instance, notification, RPC input, RPC output, action input and action output is serialized using

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a CBOR map in which each child schema node is encoded using a key and a value. This specification supports two types of CBOR keys; YANG Schema Item Identifier (SID) as defined in Section 2.1 and member names as defined in [RFC7951]. Each of these key types is encoded using a specific CBOR type which allows their interpretation during the deserialization process. Protocols or mechanisms implementing this specification can mandate the use of a specific key type.

In order to minimize the size of the encoded data, the proposed mapping avoids any unnecessary meta-information beyond those natively supported by CBOR. For instance, CBOR tags are used solely in the case of anyxml schema nodes and the union datatype to distinguish explicitly the use of different YANG datatypes encoded using the same CBOR major type.

Unless specified otherwise by the protocol or mechanism implementing this specification, the infinite lengths encoding as defined in [RFC7049] section 2.2 SHALL be supported by CBOR decoders.

Data nodes implemented using a CBOR array, map, byte string, and text string can be instantiated but empty. In this case, they are encoded with a length of zero.

Application payloads carrying a value serialized using the rules defined by this specification (e.g. CoAP Content-Format) SHOULD include the identifier (e.g. SID, namespace-qualified member name, instance-identifier) of this value. When SIDs are used as identifiers, the reference SID SHALL be included in the payload to allow stateless conversion of delta values to SIDs. Formats of these application payloads are not defined by the current specification and are not shown in the examples.

4. Encoding of YANG Schema Node Instances

Schema node instances defined using the YANG modeling language are encoded using CBOR [RFC7049] based on the rules defined in this section. We assume that the reader is already familiar with both YANG [RFC7950] and CBOR [RFC7049].

4.1. The ‘leaf’

A ‘leaf’ MUST be encoded accordingly to its datatype using one of the encoding rules specified in Section 6.
4.2. The ‘container’ and other collections

Collections such as containers, list instances, notification contents, rpc inputs, rpc outputs, action inputs and action outputs MUST be encoded using a CBOR map data item (major type 5). A map is comprised of pairs of data items, with each data item consisting of a key and a value. Each key within the CBOR map is set to a schema node identifier, each value is set to the value of this schema node instance according to the instance datatype.

This specification supports two type of CBOR keys; SID as defined in Section 2.1 and member names as defined in [RFC7951].

The following examples shows the encoding of a ‘system-state’ container instance using SIDs or member names.

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

typedef date-and-time {
    type string {
        pattern ‘\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d+)?(Z|\[\+\-]\d{2}:\d{2})’;
    }
}

container system-state {
    container clock {
        leaf current-datetime {
            type date-and-time;
        }
        leaf boot-datetime {
            type date-and-time;
        }
    }
}

4.2.1. SIDs as keys

CBOR map keys implemented using SIDs MUST be encoded using a CBOR unsigned integer (major type 0) or CBOR negative integer (major type 1), depending on the actual delta value. Delta values are computed as follows:

- In the case of a ‘container’, deltas are equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the parent ‘container’.
o In the case of an ‘rpc input’ or ‘rcp output’, deltas are equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the ‘rpc’.

o In the case of an ‘action input’ or ‘action output’, deltas are equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the ‘action’.

CBOR diagnostic notation:

```
{ / system-state (SID 1720) /
  +1 : { / clock (SID 1721) /
    +2 : "2015-10-02T14:47:24Z-05:00", / current-datetime (SID 1723)/
    +1 : "2015-09-15T09:12:58Z-05:00" / boot-datetime (SID 1722) /
  }
}
```

CBOR encoding:

```
A1                                      # map(1)
01                                   # unsigned(1)
A2                                   # map(2)
  02                                # unsigned(2)
  78 1A                             # text(26)
    323031352d31302d30325431343a34373a32345a2d30353a3030
  01                               # unsigned(1)
    78 1a                            # text(26)
      323031352d30392d31355430393a31323a35385a2d30353a3030
```

4.2.2. Member names as keys

CBOR map keys implemented using member names MUST be encoded using a CBOR text string data item (major type 3). A namespace-qualified member name MUST be used each time the namespace of a schema node and its parent differ. In all other cases, the simple form of the member name MUST be used. Names and namespaces are defined in [RFC7951] section 4.

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘system’ container instance using names.

Definition example from [RFC7317]:


typedef date-and-time {
  type string {
    pattern '\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:(\d+)?(Z\|\[\+\-]\d{2}:\d{2})';
  }
}

container system-state {
  container clock {
    leaf current-datetime {
      type date-and-time;
    }
    leaf boot-datetime {
      type date-and-time;
    }
  }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation:
{
  "ietf-system:clock": {
    "current-datetime": "2015-10-02T14:47:24Z-05:00",
    "boot-datetime": "2015-09-15T09:12:58Z-05:00"
  }
}

CBOR encoding:
A1                                      # map(1)
71                                   # text(17)
6965746662D73797374656D3A636C6F636B # "ietf-system:clock"
A2                                   # map(2)
70                                # text(16)
63757272656E742D6461746574696D65 # "current-datetime"
78 1A                           # text(26)
323031352D31302D30325431343A34373A32345A2D30353A3030
6D                                # text(13)
626F6F742D6461746574696D65 # "boot-datetime"
78 1A                           # text(26)
323031352D30392D31355430393A31323A35385A2D30353A3030
4.3. The ‘leaf-list’

A leaf-list MUST be encoded using a CBOR array data item (major type 4). Each entry of this array MUST be encoded accordingly to its datatype using one of the encoding rules specified in Section 6.

The following example shows the encoding of the ‘search’ leaf-list instance containing two entries, "ietf.org" and "ieee.org".

Definition example [RFC7317]:

typedef domain-name {
    type string {
        length "1..253";
        pattern '((([a-zA-Z0-9-\_]+)\{0,61}\?[a-zA-Z0-9-\_])\{0,61\}\?[a-zA-Z0-9-\_]\.)*|\.';
    }
}
leaf-list search {
    type domain-name;
    ordered-by user;
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: [ "ietf.org", "ieee.org" ]

CBOR encoding: 82 68 696574662E6F7267 68 696565652E6F7267

4.4. The ‘list’ and ‘list’ instance(s)

A list or a subset of a list MUST be encoded using a CBOR array data item (major type 4). Each list instance within this CBOR array is encoded using a CBOR map data item (major type 5) based on the encoding rules of a collection as defined in Section 4.2.

It is important to note that this encoding rule also apply to a single ‘list’ instance.

The following examples show the encoding of a ‘server’ list using SIDs or member names.

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

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list server {
    key name;

    leaf name {
        type string;
    }

    choice transport {
        case udp {
            container udp {
                leaf address {
                    type host;
                    mandatory true;
                }
                leaf port {
                    type port-number;
                }
            }
        }
    }

    leaf association-type {
        type enumeration {
            enum server;
            enum peer;
            enum pool;
        }
        default server;
    }

    leaf iburst {
        type boolean;
        default false;
    }

    leaf prefer {
        type boolean;
        default false;
    }
}

4.4.1. SIDs as keys

The encoding rules of each ‘list’ instance are defined in Section 4.2.1. Deltas of list members are equal to the SID of the current schema node minus the SID of the ‘list’.

CBOR diagnostic notation:
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[                                     / server (SID 1756) /

  {                                      
    +3 : "NRC TIC server",            / name (SID 1759) /
    +5 : (                                / udp (SID 1761) /
      +1 : "tic.nrc.ca",              / address (SID 1762) /
      +2 : 123                         / port (SID 1763) /
    ),
    +1 : 0,                               / association-type (SID 1757) /
    +2 : false,                           / iburst (SID 1758) /
    +4 : true                             / prefer (SID 1760) /
  },

  {                                      
    +3 : "NRC TAC server",            / name (SID 1759) /
    +5 : (                                / udp (SID 1761) /
      +1 : "tac.nrc.ca"                 / address (SID 1762) /
    )
  }
]

CBOR encoding:

82                                    # array(2)
A5                                 # map(5)
03                              # unsigned(3)
6E                              # text(14)
  4E52432054494320736572766572     # "NRC TIC server"
05                              # unsigned(5)
A2                                 # map(2)
  01                              # unsigned(1)
  6A                              # text(10)
    7469632E6E72632E6361          # "tic.nrc.ca"
  02                              # unsigned(2)
  18 7B                           # unsigned(123)
01                              # unsigned(1)
00                              # unsigned(0)
02                              # unsigned(2)
F4                              # primitive(20)
04                              # unsigned(4)
F5                              # primitive(21)
A2                                 # map(2)
  03                              # unsigned(3)
  6E                              # text(14)
   4E52432054414320736572766572    # "NRC TAC server"
  05                              # unsigned(5)
A1                                 # map(1)
  01                              # unsigned(1)
  6A                              # text(10)
    7461632E6E72632E6361          # "tac.nrc.ca"
4.4.2. Member names as keys

The encoding rules of each ‘list’ instance are defined in Section 4.2.2.

CBOR diagnostic notation:

```
[
   {
      "ietf-system:name" : "NRC TIC server",
      "ietf-system:udp" : {
         "address" : "tic.nrc.ca",
         "port" : 123
      },
      "ietf-system:association-type" : 0,
      "ietf-system:iburst" : false,
      "ietf-system:prefer" : true
   },
   {
      "ietf-system:name" : "NRC TAC server",
      "ietf-system:udp" : {
         "address" : "tac.nrc.ca"
      }
   }
]
```

CBOR encoding:
4.5. The ‘anydata’

An anydata serves as a container for an arbitrary set of schema nodes that otherwise appear as normal YANG-modeled data. An anydata instance is encoded using the same rules as a container, i.e., CBOR map. The requirement that anydata content can be modeled by YANG implies the following:

- CBOR map keys of any inner schema nodes MUST be set to valid deltas or member names.
The CBOR array MUST contain either unique scalar values (as a leaf-list, see Section 4.3), or maps (as a list, see Section 4.4).

CBOR map values MUST follow the encoding rules of one of the datatypes listed in Section 4.

The following example shows a possible use of an anydata. In this example, an anydata is used to define a schema node containing a notification event, this schema node can be part of a YANG list to create an event logger.

Definition example:

```ygn
module event-log {
  ...
  anydata event;                   # SID 60123
}
```

This example also assumes the assistance of the following notification.

```ygn
module example-port {
  ...
  notification example-port-fault {  # SID 60200
    leaf port-name {                 # SID 60201
      type string;
    }
    leaf port-fault {                # SID 60202
      type string;
    }
  }
}
```

CBOR diagnostic notation:

```cbor
{                                      / event (SID=60123) /
  +78 : "0/4/21",                    / port-name (SID=60201) /
  +79 : "Open pin 2"                 / port-fault (SID=60202) /
}
```

CBOR encoding:
4.6. The ‘anyxml’

An anyxml schema node is used to serialize an arbitrary CBOR content, i.e., its value can be any CBOR binary object. anyxml value MAY contain CBOR data items tagged with one of the tag listed in Section 8.1, these tags shall be supported.

The following example shows a valid CBOR encoded instance consisting of a CBOR array containing the CBOR simple values ‘true’, ‘null’ and ‘true’.

Definition example from [RFC7951]:

```xml
<anyxml>
  true
  null
  true
</anyxml>
```

CBOR diagnostic notation: [true, null, true]

CBOR encoding: 83 f5 f6 f5

5. Encoding of YANG data templates

YANG data templates are data structures defined in YANG but not intended to be implemented as part of a datastore. YANG data templates are defined using the ‘yang-data’ extension as described by RFC 8040.

YANG data templates SHOULD be encoded using the encoding rules of a collection as defined in Section 4.2.

Just like YANG containers, YANG data templates can be encoded using either SIDs or names.

Definition example from [I-D.ietf-core-comi]:

```xml
<definition>
  <anyxml>
    true
    null
    true
  </anyxml>
</definition>
```
import ietf-restconf {
  prefix rc;
}

rc:yang-data yang-errors {
  container error {
    leaf error-tag {
      type identityref {
        base error-tag;
      }
    }
    leaf error-app-tag {
      type identityref {
        base error-app-tag;
      }
    }
    leaf error-data-node {
      type instance-identifier;
    }
    leaf error-message {
      type string;
    }
  }
}

5.1. SIDs as keys

This example shows a serialization example of the yang-errors template using SIDs as CBOR map key. The reference SID of a YANG data template is zero, this imply that the CBOR map keys of the top level members of the template are set to SIDs.

CBOR diagnostic notation:

```
1024 : {                      / error  (SID 1024) /
  +4 : 1011,                  / error-tag (SID 1028) /
    / = invalid-value (SID 1011) /
  +1 : 1018,                  / error-app-tag (SID 1025) /
    / = not-in-range (SID 1018) /
  +2 : 1740,                  / error-data-node (SID 1026) /
    / = timezone-utc-offset (SID 1740) /
  +3 : "Maximum exceeded"    / error-message (SID 1027) /
}
```

CBOR encoding:
5.2. Member names as keys

This example shows a serialization example of the yang-errors template using member names as CBOR map key.

CBOR diagnostic notation:

```json
{
    "ietf-comi:error" : {
        "error-tag" : "invalid-value",
        "error-app-tag" : "not-in-range",
        "error-data-node" : "timezone-utc-offset",
        "error-message" : "Maximum exceeded"
    }
}
```

CBOR encoding:
6. Representing YANG Data Types in CBOR

The CBOR encoding of an instance of a leaf or leaf-list schema node depends on the built-in type of that schema node. The following subsection defined the CBOR encoding of each built-in type supported by YANG as listed in [RFC7950] section 4.2.4. Each subsection shows an example value assigned to a schema node instance of the discussed built-in type.

6.1. The unsigned integer Types

Leafs of type uint8, uint16, uint32 and uint64 MUST be encoded using a CBOR unsigned integer data item (major type 0).

The following example shows the encoding of a 'mtu' leaf instance set to 1280 bytes.

Definition example from [RFC7277]:

```yaml
leaf mtu {
  type uint16 {
    range "68..max";
  }
}
```

CBOR diagnostic notation: 1280
CBOR encoding: 19 0500

6.2. The integer Types

Leafs of type int8, int16, int32 and int64 MUST be encoded using either CBOR unsigned integer (major type 0) or CBOR negative integer (major type 1), depending on the actual value.

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘timezone-utc-offset’ leaf instance set to -300 minutes.

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

leaf timezone-utc-offset {
  type int16 {
    range "-1500 .. 1500";
  }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: -300

CBOR encoding: 39 012B

6.3. The ‘decimal64’ Type

Leafs of type decimal64 MUST be encoded using a decimal fraction as defined in [RFC7049] section 2.4.3.

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘my-decimal’ leaf instance set to 2.57.

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

leaf my-decimal {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 2;
    range "1 .. 3.14 | 10 | 20..max";
  }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: 4([-2, 257])

CBOR encoding: C4 82 21 19 0101
6.4. The ‘string’ Type

Leafs of type string MUST be encoded using a CBOR text string data item (major type 3).

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘name’ leaf instance set to "eth0".

Definition example from [RFC7223]:

leaf name {
  type string;
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: "eth0"

CBOR encoding: 64 65746830

6.5. The ‘boolean’ Type

Leafs of type boolean MUST be encoded using a CBOR simple value ‘true’ (major type 7, additional information 21) or ‘false’ (major type 7, additional information 20).

The following example shows the encoding of an ‘enabled’ leaf instance set to ‘true’.

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

leaf enabled {
  type boolean;
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: true

CBOR encoding: F5

6.6. The ‘enumeration’ Type

Leafs of type enumeration MUST be encoded using a CBOR unsigned integer (major type 0) or CBOR negative integer (major type 1), depending on the actual value. Enumeration values are either explicitly assigned using the YANG statement ‘value’ or automatically assigned based on the algorithm defined in [RFC7950] section 9.6.4.2.

The following example shows the encoding of an ‘oper-status’ leaf instance set to ‘testing’.
Definition example from [RFC7317]:

leaf oper-status {
  type enumeration {
    enum up { value 1; }
    enum down { value 2; }
    enum testing { value 3; }
    enum unknown { value 4; }
    enum dormant { value 5; }
    enum not-present { value 6; }
    enum lower-layer-down { value 7; }
  }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: 3
CBOR encoding: 03

6.7. The 'bits' Type

Leafs of type bits MUST be encoded using a CBOR byte string data item (major type 2). Bits position are either explicitly assigned using the YANG statement ‘position’ or automatically assigned based on the algorithm defined in [RFC7950] section 9.7.4.2.

Bits position 0 to 7 are assigned to the first byte within the byte string, bits 8 to 15 to the second byte, and subsequent bytes are assigned similarly. Within each byte, bits are assigned from least to most significant.

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘mybits’ leaf instance with the ‘disable-nagle’ and ‘10-Mb-only’ flags set.

Definition example from [RFC7950]:

leaf mybits {
  type bits {
    bit disable-nagle {
      position 0;
    }
    bit auto-sense-speed {
      position 1;
    }
    bit 10-Mb-only {
      position 2;
    }
  }
}
6.8. The ‘binary’ Type

Leafs of type binary MUST be encoded using a CBOR byte string data item (major type 2).

The following example shows the encoding of an ‘aes128-key’ leaf instance set to 0x1f1ce6a3f42660d888d92a4d8030476e.

Definition example:

leaf aes128-key {
    type binary {
        length 16;
    }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: h’1F1CE6A3F42660D888D92A4D8030476E’

CBOR encoding: 50 1F1CE6A3F42660D888D92A4D8030476E

6.9. The ‘leafref’ Type

Leafs of type leafref MUST be encoded using the rules of the schema node referenced by the ‘path’ YANG statement.

The following example shows the encoding of an ‘interface-state-ref’ leaf instance set to “eth1”.

Definition example from [RFC7223]:
typedef interface-state-ref {
    type leafref {
        path "/interfaces-state/interface/name";
    }
}

container interfaces-state {
    list interface {
        key "name";
        leaf name {
            type string;
        }
        leaf-list higher-layer-if {
            type interface-state-ref;
        }
    }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: "eth1"

CBOR encoding: 64 65746831

6.10. The ‘identityref’ Type

This specification supports two approaches for encoding identityref, a YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID) as defined in Section 2.1 or a name as defined in [RFC7951] section 6.8.

6.10.1. SIDs as identityref

When schema nodes of type identityref are implemented using SIDs, they MUST be encoded using a CBOR unsigned integer data item (major type 0). (Note that no delta mechanism is employed for SIDs as identityref.)

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘type’ leaf instance set to the value ‘iana-if-type:ethernetCsmacd’ (SID 1880).

Definition example from [RFC7317]:
identity interface-type {
}

identity iana-interface-type {
  base interface-type;
}

identity ethernetCsmacd {
  base iana-interface-type;
}

leaf type {
  type identityref {
    base interface-type;
  }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: 1880
CBOR encoding: 19 0758

6.10.2. Name as identityref

Alternatively, an identityref MAY be encoded using a name as defined in [RFC7951] section 6.8. When names are used, identityref MUST be encoded using a CBOR text string data item (major type 3). If the identity is defined in different module than the leaf node containing the identityref value, the namespace-qualified form MUST be used. Otherwise, both the simple and namespace-qualified forms are permitted. Names and namespaces are defined in [RFC7951] section 4.

The following example shows the encoding of the identity ‘iana-if-type:ethernetCsmacd’ using its name. This example is described in Section 6.10.1.

CBOR diagnostic notation: "iana-if-type:ethernetCsmacd"

CBOR encoding: 78 1b 69616E12D69662D747970656553A65746865726E65744373616364616364616364

6.11. The ‘empty’ Type

Leafs of type empty MUST be encoded using the CBOR null value (major type 7, additional information 22).

The following example shows the encoding of a ‘is-router’ leaf instance when present.
Definition example from [RFC7277]:

leaf is-router {
    type empty;
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: null

CBOR encoding: F6

6.12. The ‘union’ Type

Leafs of type union MUST be encoded using the rules associated with one of the types listed. When used in a union, the following YANG datatypes are prefixed by CBOR tag to avoid confusion between different YANG datatypes encoded using the same CBOR major type.

- bits
- enumeration
- identityref
- instance-identifier

See Section 8.1 for the assigned value of these CBOR tags.

The following example shows the encoding of an ‘ip-address’ leaf instance when set to "2001:db8:a0b:12f0::1".

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

```c
typedef ipv4-address {
  type string {
    pattern '(([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])\.){3}
      ([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])('%\p{N}\p{L})+?';
  }
}

typedef ipv6-address {
  type string {
    pattern '((:[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}):)\([0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}:){0,5}(((:[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}:)?(:|\[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}))|(((25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|0\d|0)(?:\.[0-9]+)){3}(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|0\d|0)):0)(%\p{N}\p{L})+?';
    pattern '([^:\]+:){6}(([^:\]+:[^:\]+)|([^:*].*))|(((^:)+[^:*]+(\.|\d+))|((^:)+[^:*]+))(([^:]+)*)([^:]+)?(\%+)?';
  }
}

typedef ip-address {
  type union {
    type ipv4-address;
    type ipv6-address;
  }
}

leaf address {
  type inet:ip-address;
}
```

CBOR diagnostic notation: "2001:db8:a0b:12f0::1"

CBOR encoding: 74 323030313A6462383A6130623A313266303A3A31

6.13. The ‘instance-identifier’ Type

This specification supports two approaches for encoding an instance-
identifier, one based on YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID) as defined
in Section 2.1 and one based on names as defined in [RFC7951] section
6.11.

6.13.1. SIDs as instance-identifier

SIDs uniquely identify a schema node. In the case of a single
instance schema node, i.e. a schema node defined at the root of a
YANG module or submodule or schema nodes defined within a container,
the SID is sufficient to identify this instance.
In the case of a schema node member of a YANG list, a SID is combined with the list key(s) to identify each instance within the YANG list(s).

Single instance schema nodes MUST be encoded using a CBOR unsigned integer data item (major type 0) and set to the targeted schema node SID.

Schema nodes member of a YANG list MUST be encoded using a CBOR array data item (major type 4) containing the following entries:

- The first entry MUST be encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer data item (major type 0) and set to the targeted schema node SID.
- The following entries MUST contain the value of each key required to identify the instance of the targeted schema node. These keys MUST be ordered as defined in the ‘key’ YANG statement, starting from top level list, and follow by each of the subordinate list(s).

Examples within this section assume the definition of a schema node of type ‘instance-identifier’:

Definition example from [RFC7950]:

```yml
container system {
  ...  
  leaf reporting-entity {
    type instance-identifier;
  }

leaf contact { type string; }

leaf hostname { type inet:domain-name; } ----
```

*First example:*  
The following example shows the encoding of the ‘reporting-entity’ value referencing data node instance "/system/contact" (SID 1741).

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

```yml
```
container system {
    leaf contact {
        type string;
    }
    leaf hostname {
        type inet:domain-name;
    }
}

CBOR diagnostic notation: 1741
CBOR encoding: 19 06CD

*Second example:*

The following example shows the encoding of the ‘reporting-entity’ value referencing list instance "/system/authentication/user/authorized-key/key-data" (SID 1734) for user name "bob" and authorized-key "admin".

Definition example from [RFC7317]:

list user {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
    }
    leaf password {
        type ianach:crypt-hash;
    }
    list authorized-key {
        key name;
        leaf name {
            type string;
        }
        leaf algorithm {
            type string;
        }
        leaf key-data {
            type binary;
        }
    }
}
CBOR diagnostic notation: [1734, "bob", "admin"]

CBOR encoding:

```
83    # array(3)
  19 06C6  # unsigned(1734)
  63     # text(3)
     626F62 # "bob"
  65     # text(5)
     61646D696E # "admin"
```

*Third example:*

The following example shows the encoding of the ‘reporting-entity’ value referencing the list instance "/system/authentication/user" (SID 1730) corresponding to user name "jack".

CBOR diagnostic notation: [1730, "jack"]

CBOR encoding:

```
82    # array(2)
  19 06C2  # unsigned(1730)
  64     # text(4)
     6A61636B # "jack"
```

6.13.2. Names as instance-identifier

The use of names as instance-identifier is defined in [RFC7951] section 6.11. The resulting xpath MUST be encoded using a CBOR text string data item (major type 3).

*First example:*

This example is described in Section 6.13.1.

CBOR diagnostic notation: "/ietf-system:system/contact"

CBOR encoding:

```
78 1c 2F696574662D73797374656D3A73797374656D2F636F6E74616374
```

*Second example:*

This example is described in Section 6.13.1.

CBOR diagnostic notation:
"/ietf-system:system/authentication/user[name='bob']/authorized-key[name='admin']/key-data"

CBOR encoding:
78 59
2F696574662D737973746566D3A737973746566D2F617574686566E74696361
74696F62F757365725B6E616D653D276F6662275D2F617574686566F72697A
65642D6B65790D0A5B6E616D653D27616466696E275D2F6B65792D64617461

*Third example:*

This example is described in Section 6.13.1.

CBOR diagnostic notation:
"/ietf-system:system/authentication/user[name='bob']"

CBOR encoding:
78 33
2F696574662D737973746566D3A737973746566D2F617574686566E74696361
74696F62F757365725B6E616D653D27616466696E275D2F6B65792D64617461

7. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC7049] and [RFC7950] apply.

This document defines an alternative encoding for data modeled in the YANG data modeling language. As such, this encoding does not contribute any new security issues in addition of those identified for the specific protocol or context for which it is used.

To minimize security risks, software on the receiving side SHOULD reject all messages that do not comply to the rules of this document and reply with an appropriate error message to the sender.

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Tags Registry

This specification requires the assignment of CBOR tags for the following YANG datatypes. These tags are added to the Tags Registry as defined in section 7.2 of [RFC7049].
9. Acknowledgments

This document has been largely inspired by the extensive works done by Andy Bierman and Peter van der Stok on [I-D.ietf-core-comi]. [RFC7951] has also been a critical input to this work. The authors would like to thank the authors and contributors to these two drafts.

The authors would also like to acknowledge the review, feedback, and comments from Ladislav Lhotka and Juergen Schoenwaelder.

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-core-comi]

[I-D.ietf-core-sid]


Authors’ Addresses
Abstract

This document specifies an alternative retransmission timeout and congestion control back off algorithm for the CoAP protocol, called Fast-Slow RTO (FASOR).

The algorithm specified in this document employs an appropriate and large enough back off of Retransmission Timeout (RTO) as the major congestion control mechanism to allow acquiring unambiguous RTT samples with high probability and to prevent building a persistent queue when retransmitting. The algorithm also aims to retransmit quickly using an accurately managed retransmission timeout when link-errors are occurring, basing RTO calculation on unambiguous round-trip time (RTT) samples.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
1. Introduction

CoAP senders use retransmission timeout (RTO) to infer losses that have occurred in the network. For such a heuristic to be correct, the RTT estimate used for calculating the retransmission timeout must match to the real end-to-end path characteristics. Otherwise, unnecessary retransmission may occur. Both default RTO mechanism for CoAP [RFC7252] and CoCoA [I-D.ietf-core-cocoa] have issues in dealing with unnecessary retransmissions and in the worst-case the situation can persist causing congestion collapse [JRCK18a].
This document specifies FASOR retransmission timeout and congestion control algorithm [JRCK18b]. FASOR algorithm ensures unnecessary retransmissions that a sender may have sent due to an inaccurate RTT estimate will not persist avoiding the threat of congestion collapse. FASOR also aims to quickly restore the accuracy of the RTT estimate. Armed with an accurate RTT estimate, FASOR not only handles congestion robustly but also can quickly infer losses due to link errors.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Problems with Existing CoAP Congestion Control Algorithms

Correctly inferring losses requires the retransmission timeout (RTO) to be longer than the real RTT in the network. Under certain circumstances the RTO may be incorrectly small. If the real end-to-end RTT is larger than the retransmission timeout, it is impossible for the sender to avoid making unnecessary retransmissions that duplicate data still existing in the network because the sender cannot receive any feedback in time. Unnecessary retransmissions cause two basic problems. First, they increase the perceived end-to-end RTT if the bottleneck has buffering capacity, and second, they prevent getting unambiguous RTT samples. Making unnecessary retransmissions is also a pre-condition for the congestion collapse [RFC0896], which may occur in the worst case if retransmissions are not well controlled [JRCK18a]. Therefore, the sender retransmission timeout algorithm should actively attempt to prevent unnecessary retransmissions from persisting under any circumstance.

Karn’s algorithm [KP87] has prevented unnecessary retransmission from turning into congestion collapse for decades due to robust RTT estimation and retransmission timeout backoff handling. The recent CoAP congestion control algorithms, however, diverge from the principles of Karn’s algorithm in significant ways and may pose a threat to the stability of the Internet due to those differences.

The default RTO mechanism for CoAP [RFC7252] uses only an initial RTO dithered between 2 and 3 seconds, while CoCoA [I-D.ietf-core-cocoa] measures RTT both from unambiguous and ambiguous RTT samples and applies a modified version of the TCP RTO algorithm [RFC6298]. The algorithm in RFC 7252 lacks solution to persistent congestion. The binary exponential back off used for the retransmission timeout does not properly address unnecessary retransmissions when RTT is larger.
than the default RTO (ACK_TIMEOUT). If the CoAP sender performs exchanges over an end-to-end path with such a high RTT, it persistently keeps making unnecessary retransmissions for every exchange wasting some fraction of the used resources (network capacity, battery power).

CoCoA [I-D.ietf-core-cocoa] attempts to improve scenarios with link-error related losses and solve persistent congestion by basing its RTO value on an estimated RTT. However, there are couple of exceptions when the RTT estimation is not available:

- At the beginning of a flow where initial RTO of 2 seconds is used.

- When RTT suddenly jumps high enough to trigger the rule in CoCoA that prevents taking RTT samples when more than two retransmissions are needed. This may also occur when the packet drop rate on the path is high enough.

When RTT estimate is too small, unnecessary retransmission will occur also with CoCoA. CoCoA being unable to take RTT samples at all is a particularly problematic phenomenon as it is similarly persisting state as with the algorithm outlined in RFC 7252 and the network remains in a congestion collapsed state due to persisting unnecessary retransmissions.

4. FASOR Algorithm

FASOR [JRCK18b] is composed of three key components: RTO computation, Slow RTO, and novel retransmission timeout back off logic.

4.1. Computing Normal RTO (FastRTO)

The FASOR algorithm measures the RTT for a CoAP message exchange over an end-to-end path and computes the RTO value using the TCP RTO algorithm specified in [RFC6298]. We call this normal RTO or FastRTO. In contrast to the TCP RTO mechanism, FASOR SHOULD NOT use 1 second lower-bound when setting the RTO because RTO is only a backup mechanisms for loss detection with TCP, whereas with CoAP RTO is the primary and only loss detection mechanism. A lower-bound of 1 second would impact timeliness of the loss detection in low RTT environments. The RTO value MAY be upper-bounded by at least 60 seconds. A CoAP sender using the FASOR algorithm SHOULD set initial RTO to 2 seconds. The computed RTO value as well as the initial RTO value is subject to dithering; they are dithered between RTO + 1/4 x SRTT and RTO + SRTT. For dithering initial RTO, SRTT is unset; therefore, SRTT is replaced with initial RTO / 3 which is derived from the RTO formula and equals to a hypothetical initial RTT that
would yield the initial RTO using the SRTT and RTTVAR initialization rule of RFC 6298. That is, for initial RTO of 2 seconds we use SRTT value of 2/3 seconds.

FastRTO is updated only with unambiguous RTT samples. Therefore, it closely tracks the actual RTT of the network and can quickly trigger a retransmission when the network state is not dubious. Retransmitting without extra delay is very useful when the end-to-end path is subject to losses that are unrelated to congestion. When the first unambiguous RTT sample is received, the RTT estimator is initialized with that sample as specified in [RFC6298] except RTTVAR that is set to R/2K.

4.2. Slow RTO

We introduce Slow RTO as a safe way to ensure that only a unique copy of message is sent before at least one RTT has elapsed. To achieve this the sender must ensure that its retransmission timeout is set to a value that is larger than the path end-to-end RTT that may be inflated by the unnecessary retransmission themselves. Therefore, whenever a message needs to be retransmitted, we measure Slow RTO as the elapsed time required for getting an acknowledgement. That is, Slow RTO is measured starting from the original transmission of the request message until the receipt of the acknowledgement, regardless of the number of retransmissions. In this way, Slow RTO always covers the worst-case RTT during which a number of unnecessary retransmissions were made but the acknowledgement is received for the original transmission. In contrast to computing normal RTO, Slow RTO is not smoothed because it is derived from the sending pattern of the retransmissions (that may turn out unnecessary). In order to drain the potential unnecessary retransmissions successfully from the network, it makes sense to wait for the time used for sending them rather than some smoothed value. However, Slow RTO is multiplied by a factor to allow some growth in load without making Slow RTO too aggressive (by default the factor of 1.5 is used). FASOR then applies Slow RTO as one of the backed off timer values used with the next request message.

Slow RTO allows rapidly converging towards stable operating point because 1) it lets the duplicate copies sent earlier to drain from the network reducing the perceived end-to-end RTT, and 2) allows enough time to acquire an unambiguous RTT sample for the RTO computation. Robustly acquiring the RTT sample ensures that the next RTO is set according to the recent measurement and further unnecessary retransmissions are avoided. Slow RTO itself is a form of back off because it includes the accumulated time from the retransmission timeout back off of the previous exchange. FASOR uses this for its advantage as the time included into Slow RTO is what is
needed to drain all unnecessary retransmissions possibly made during the previous exchange. Assuming a stable RTT and that all of the retransmissions were unnecessary, the time to drain them is the time elapsed from the original transmission to the sending time of the last retransmission plus one RTT. When the acknowledgement for the original transmission arrives, one RTT has already elapsed, leaving only the sending time difference still unaccounted for which is at minimum the value for Slow RTO (when an RTT sample arrives immediately after the last retransmission). Even if RTT would be increasing, the draining still occurs rapidly due to exponentially backed off frequency in sending the unnecessary retransmissions.

4.3. Retransmission Timeout Back Off Logic

4.3.1. Overview

FASOR uses normal RTO as the base for binary exponential back off when no retransmission were needed for the previous CoAP message exchange. When retransmission were needed for the previous CoAP message exchange, the algorithm rules, however, are more complicated than with the traditional RTO back off because Slow RTO is injected into the back off series to reduce high impact of using Slow RTO. FASOR logic chooses from three possible back off series alternatives:

FAST back off: Perform traditional RTO back off with the normal RTO as the base. Applied when the previous message was not retransmitted.

FAST_SLOW_FAST back off: First perform a probe using the normal RTO for the original transmission of the request message to improve cases with losses unrelated to congestion. If the probe for the original transmission of the request message is successful without retransmissions, continue with FAST back off for the next message exchange. If the request message needs to be retransmitted, continue by using Slow RTO for the first retransmission in order to respond to congestion and drain the network from the unnecessary retransmissions that were potentially sent for the previous exchange. If still further RTOs are needed, continue by backing off the normal RTO further on each timeout. FAST_SLOW_FAST back off is applied just once when the previous request message using FAST back off required one or more retransmissions.

SLOW_FAST back off: Perform Slow RTO first for the original transmission to respond to congestion and to acquire an unambiguous RTT sample with high probability. Then, if the original request needs to be retransmitted, continue with the normal RTO-based RTO back off serie by backing off the normal RTO
on each timeout. SLOW_FAST back off is applied when the previous request message using FAST_SLOW_FAST or SLOW_FAST back off required one or more retransmissions. Once an acknowledgement for the original transmission with unambiguous RTT sample is received, continue with FAST back off for the next message exchange.

For the initial message, FAST is used with INITIAL_RTO as the FastRTO value. From there on, state is updated when an acknowledgement arrives. Following unambiguous RTT samples, FASOR always uses FAST. Whenever retransmissions are needed, the back off series selection is first downgraded to FAST_SLOW_FAST back off and then to SLOW_FAST back off if further retransmission are needed in FAST_SLOW_FAST.

When Slow RTO is used as the first RTO value, the sender is likely to acquire unambiguous RTT sample even when the network has high delay due to congestion because Slow RTO is based on a very recent measurement of the worst-case RTT. However, using Slow RTO may negatively impact the performance when losses unrelated to congestion are occurring. Due to its potential high cost, FASOR algorithm attempts to avoid using Slow RTO unnecessarily.

The CoAP protocol is often used by devices that are connected through a wireless network where non-congestion related losses are much more frequent than in their wired counterparts. This has implications for the retransmission timeout algorithm. While it would be possible to implement FASOR such that it immediately uses Slow RTO when a dubious network state is detected, which would handle congestion very well, it would do significant harm for performance when RTOs occur due to non-congestion related losses. Instead, FASOR uses first normal RTO for one transmission and only responds using Slow RTO if RTO expires also for that request message. Such a pattern quickly probes if the losses were unrelated to congestion and only slightly delays response if real congestion event is taking place. To ensure that an unambiguous RTT sample is also acquired on a congested network path, FASOR then needs to use Slow RTO for the original transmission of the subsequent packet if the probe was not successful.

4.3.2. Retransmission State Machine

FASOR consists of the three states discussed above while making retransmission decisions, FAST, FAST_SLOW_FAST and SLOW_FAST. The state machine of the FASOR algorithm is depicted in Figure 1.
In the FAST state, if the original transmission of the message has not been acknowledged by the receiver within the time defined by FastRTO, the sender will retransmit it. If there is still no acknowledgement of the retransmitted packet within 2*FastRTO, the sender performs the second retransmission and if necessary, each further retransmission applying binary exponential back off of FastRTO. The retransmission interval in this state is defined as FastRTO, 2^1 * FastRTO, ..., 2^i * FastRTO.

When there is an acknowledgement after any retransmission, the sender will calculate SlowRTO value based on the algorithm defined in Section 4.2.

When there is an acknowledgement after any retransmission, the sender will also switch to the second state, FAST_FLOW_FAST. In this state, the retransmission interval is defined as FastRTO, Max(SlowRTO, 2*FastRTO), FastRTO * 2^1, ..., 2^i * FastRTO. The state will be switched back to the FAST state once an acknowledgement is returned within FastRTO, i.e., no retransmission happens for a message. This is reasonable because it shows the network has recovered from congestion or bloated queue.

If some retransmission has been made before the acknowledged arrives in the FAST_SLOW_FAST state, the sender updates the SlowRTO value, and moves to the third state, SLOW_FAST. The retransmission interval in the SLOW_FAST state is defined as SlowRTO, FastRTO, FastRTO * 2^1, ..., 2^i * FastRTO.

In SLOW_FAST state, the sender switches back to the FAST state if an unambiguous acknowledgement arrives. Otherwise, the sender stays in the SLOW_FAST state if retransmission happens again.
4.4. Retransmission Count Option

When retransmissions are needed to deliver a CoAP message, it is not possible to measure RTT for the RTO computation as the RTT sample becomes ambiguous. Therefore, it would be beneficial to be able to distinguish whether an acknowledgement arrives for the original transmission of the message or for a retransmission of it. This would allow reliably acquiring an RTT sample for every CoAP message exchange and thereby compute a more accurate RTO even during periods of congestion and loss.

The Retransmission Count Option is used to distinguish whether an Acknowledgement message arrives for the original transmission or one of the retransmissions of a Confirmaable message. However, the Retransmission Count Option cannot be used with an Empty Acknowledgement (or Reset) message because the CoAP protocol specification [RFC7252] does not allow adding options to an Empty message. Therefore, Retransmission Count Option is useful only for the common case of Piggybacked Response. In case of Empty Acknowledgements the operation of FASOR is the same as without the option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rexmit-Cnt</td>
<td>uint</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=NoCacheKey, R=Repeatable

Table 1: Retransmission Count Option

Implementation of the Retransmission Count option is optional and it is identified as elective. However, when it is present in a CoAP message and a CoAP endpoint processes it, it MUST be processed as described in this document. The Retransmission Count option MUST NOT occur more than once in a single message.

The value of the Retransmission Count option is a variable-size (0 to 1 byte) unsigned integer. The default value for the option is the number 0 and it is represented with an empty option value (a zero-length sequence of bytes). However, when a client intents to use Retransmit Count option, it MUST reserve space for it by limiting the request message size also when the value is empty in order to fit the full-sized option into retransmissions.

The Retransmission Count option can be present in both the request and response message. When the option is present in a request it
indicates the ordinal number of the transmission for the request message.

If the server supports (implements) the Retransmission Count option and the option is present in a request, the server MUST echo the option value in its Piggybacked Response unmodified. If the server replies with an Empty Acknowledgement the server MUST silently ignore the option and MUST NOT include it in a later separate response to that request.

When Piggybacked Response carrying the Retransmission Count option arrives, the client uses the option to match the response message to the corresponding transmission of the request. In order to measure a correct RTT, the client must store the timestamp for the original transmission of the request as well as the timestamp for each retransmission, if any, of the request. The resulting RTT sample is used for the RTO computation. If the client retransmitted the request without the option but the response includes the option, the client MUST silently ignore the option.

The original transmission of a request is indicated with the number 0, except when sending the first request to a new destination endpoint. The first original transmission of the request to a new endpoint carries the number 255 (0xFF) and is interpreted the same as an original transmission carrying the number 0. Retransmissions, if any, carry the ordinal number of the retransmission. Once the first Piggybacked Response from the new endpoint arrives the client learns whether or not the other endpoint implements the option. If the first response includes the echoed option, the client learns that the other endpoint supports the option and may continue including the option to each retransmitted request. From this point on the original transmissions of requests implicitly include the option number 0 and a zero-byte integer will be sent according to the CoAP uint-encoding rules. If the first Piggybacked Response does not include the option, the client SHOULD stop including the option into the requests to that endpoint.

When the Retransmission Count option is in use, the client bases the retransmission timeout for the normal RTO in the back off series as follows:

\[ \text{max}(\text{RTO}, \text{Previous-RTT-Sample}) \]

Previous-RTT-Sample is the RTT sample acquired from the previous message exchange. If no RTT sample was available with the previous message exchange (e.g., the server replied with an Empty Acknowledgement), RTO computed earlier is used like in case the Retransmission Count option is not in use.
4.5. Alternatives for Exchanging Retransmission Count Information

An alternative way of exchanging the retransmission count information between a client and server is to encode it in the Token. The Token is a client-local identifier and a client solely decides how it generates the Token. Therefore, including a varying Token value to retransmissions of the same request is all possible as long as the client can use the Token to differentiate between requests and match a response to the corresponding request. The server is required to make no assumptions about the content or structure of a Token and always echo the Token unmodified in its response.

How exactly a client encodes the retransmission count into a Token is an implementation issue. Note that the original transmission of a request may carry a zero-length Token given that the rules for generating a Token as specified in RFC 7252 [RFC7252] are followed. This allows reducing the overhead of including the Token into the requests in such cases where Token could otherwise be omitted. However, similar to Retransmit Count option the maximum request message size MUST be limited to accommodate the Token with retransmit count into the retransmissions of the request.

5. Security Considerations

6. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Pseudocode for Basic FASOR without Dithering

```plaintext
var state = NORMAL_RTO

rfc6298_init(var fastrto, 2 secs)

var slowrto
SLOWRTO_FACTOR = 1.5

var original_sendtime
var retransmit_count

/*
* Sending Original Copy and Retransmitting ‘req’
*/
send_request(req) {
  original_sendtime = time.now
  retransmit_count = 0
  arm_rto(calculate_rto())
  send(req)
}

rto_for(req) {
  retransmit_count += 1
  arm_rto(calculate_rto())
  send(req)
}

/*
* ACK Processings
*/
ack() {
  sample = time.now - original_sendtime
  if (retransmit_count == 0)
    unambiguous_ack(sample)
  else
    ambiguous_ack(sample)
}

unambiguous_ack(sample) {
  k = 4
  if (rfc6298_is_first_sample(fastrto))
    k = 1
  rfc6298_update(fastrto, k, sample)
  state = NORMAL_RTO
}
```

ambiguous_nextstate = {
  [NORMAL_RTO] = FAST_SLOW_FAST_RTO,
  [FAST_SLOW_FAST_RTO] = SLOW_FAST_RTO,
  [SLOW_FAST_RTO] = SLOW_FAST_RTO
}

ambiguous_ack(sample) {
  slowrto = sample * SLOWRTO_FACTOR
  state = ambiguous_nextstate[state]
}

/*
  * RTO Calculations
  */
calculate_rto() {
  return <state>_rtoseries()
}

normal_rtoseries() {
  switch (retransmit_count) {
    case 0: return fastrto_series_init()
    default: return fastrto_series_backoff()
  }
}

fastslowfast_rtoseries() {
  switch (retransmit_count) {
    case 0: return fastrto_series_init()
    case 1: return MAX(slowrto, 2*fastrto)
    default: return fastrto_series_backoff()
  }
}

slowfast_rtoseries() {
  switch (retransmit_count) {
    case 0: return slowrto
    case 1: return fastrto_series_init()
    default: return fastrto_series_backoff()
  }
}

var backoff_series_timer

fastrto_series_init() {
  backoff_series_timer = fastrto
  return backoff_series_timer
}
fastrto_series_backoff() {
    backoff_series_timer *= 2
    return backoff_series_timer
}

Figure 2

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Abstract

As the Internet of Things (IoT) technology grows with the development of wireless communication and sensors, many people are interested in Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), which is the representative protocol of the IoT. In addition, attempts have been made to apply CoAP to sensors that support existing real-time streaming services. However, the CoAP is not suitable for services to support streaming services such as smart band and CCTV. To overcome this drawback, there is an extension called CoAP Observe, but streaming services using CoAP Observe imposes a load on the server, which is not suitable for environments where low power devices act as servers, such as data transfer between sensors and gateways. In this specification, we are considering the situation in which the sensor acts as a server, and in this environment, we define one mechanism to provide efficient streaming service.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is the most widely used protocol in constrained environments such as sensor networks. Along with the growth of the Internet of Things services (IoT), a variety of real-time streaming services (e.g., CCTV) are provided by using the CoAP.

However, how to effectively use CoAP for real-time streaming services is still under study. Since the CoAP has been basically designed to support RESTful services, it may not be suitable to use for streaming services. To overcome these drawbacks, the CoAP Observe Extension [RFC7641] has been studied. This extension supports the well-known CoAP observer design pattern. But, in case that a sensor acts as a server, the extension needs to be enhanced, because a lot of loads may be given to the server.

In this document, the CoAP Observe extension [RFC7641] will be extended to support real-time streaming services so as to deal with packet error appropriately and to reduce the load on the sensor. To achieve this goal, a new option "Buffer-Control" of the CoAP Observe extension is additionally defined. This option is used to control the buffer in sensor for real-time streaming service.

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.3. Overview of the proposed scheme

The main purpose of this document is to propose a new mechanism for real-time streaming. This mechanism will be effective when the sensor device periodically transmits the sensing data to the gateway, such as CCTV or smart band. In this document, a sensor device acts as a CoAP server, and a gateway acts as a client that requests data transmission to the sensor. Our description will be based on the terms defined in RFC 7641. The entity that transmits data periodically is called the subject, and the entity that receives the data is called the observer.
The receiver who wants streaming service MUST go through the registration procedure. The receiver sends a POST message to request the creation of a streaming service to the subject. Various parameters for the streaming service (e.g., authentication information, the interval between messages, or the buffer size) are transmitted with the POST message. The subject receiving the message checks the parameters and returns a 4.xx error code with an error message if it cannot create a resource for streaming. When the resource is successfully created, the subject returns the URL of the generated resource. The observer then issues a GET request with the Observe Option to the received URL, and if the resource representative is normally received, the registration procedure for the streaming service is completed. Figure 1 shows an example flow of registration process.
When the registration process is completed, the subject periodically transmits the sensing information to the observer, until it receives a DELETE message or until the buffer is full. The subject transmits only non-confirmable messages and stores them in the buffer. If an observer receives the message, it performs reordering with Observe option value as a sequence number. Then, it transmits a PUT message to clear the buffer to avoid that the sensor buffer is full. A PUT message is transmitted for each number of messages of 'sensor buffer.
size / 2 - 1’. For instance, if the buffer size is 8, when the observer receives 3 messages from the subject, it transmits a PUT message. Therefore, two PUT messages can be transmitted before the buffer is full, and even if one PUT message is lost, the transmission of the message continues without block time. The PUT message MUST include Buffer-Control option. The last sequence number received as option value until now The PUT message MUST be confirmable. The Subject receiving the PUT message deletes messages from the buffer which have a smaller sequence number than the sequence number included in the message. In other words, the PUT message acts as a cumulative ACK of TCP.

Figure 2 shows a simple example of transferring data. If a message sent by a subject is lost, the observer can send a GET request to request a message of a specific sequence number. The GET request MUST include Buffer-Control and the positive integer number meaning the specific sequence number as. The observer can also stop the streaming service by sending a DELETE message, and the subject deletes the URL when it receives a delete.
Figure 2: Transferring Data Example
2. The Buffer-Control Option

The Buffer-Control option has different meanings, depending on the request’s method, Option Value, whether it is included in the request for the message, or included in the response.

2.1. Buffer-Control Option meaning in request

Table 1 shows the meaning of the options depending on the method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Option Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>Positive Integer</td>
<td>Sequence number of message to request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Buffer size to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Positive Integer</td>
<td>Sequence number of the last message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Buffer size to change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1: Meaning of Buffer-Control Option

When included in a GET request, the Buffer-Control Option identifies the specific sequence number of the message. A GET request with the Buffer-Control option is a message that the observer transmits to the subject to request a message that was lost during transmission. In this case, the Buffer-Control option indicates the sequence number of the message to be re-requested, and the option value is a positive integer.

When the option is included in a PUT request, the Buffer-Control option has a different meaning depending on the Option value as follows:

- If the option value is 0, the Buffer-Control option is used to change the buffer size. The buffer size to be changed is included in the payload.
- If the option value is a positive integer number, the Buffer-Control option is used to empty the subject’s buffer. In this
case, the option value includes the sequence number of the recently received message, and the Buffer-Control option is used like TCP's cumulative ack. The subject that receives the message containing this option deletes messages whose sequence number is less than or equal to the sequence number contained in the option value of the Buffer-Control option in its buffer.

The Buffer-Control option is included in the PUT message and has the same meaning as when the option value is 0. In POST messages, the Buffer-Control option has an option value of only 0.

2.2. Buffer-Control Option meaning in a notification

When the Buffer-Control option is included in a notification sent from the subject to the observer, that option indicates the size of the buffer that is left over.

3. Subject Side Operation

3.1. Register

The subject who supports streaming service MUST have the resource to make a resource for streaming service. In this specification, the URL of the resource is "/streaming". Also subject MUST be able to handle CoAP Observe Option.

3.2. Caching

The Subject MUST have a buffer to support Error Control. The buffer size is determined according to the parameters included in the POST message when the POST message for creating the resource for the streaming service is received.

3.3. Change the buffer size

The Subject MUST have a buffer for error control and be able to change its buffer size. The buffer size is very important in this mechanism. If the size of the buffer is large, the number of PUT messages issued to empty the buffer can be reduced. In addition, the subject maintains the message transmission until the buffer is exhausted without considering other factors, so the observer can perform congestion control by changing the buffer size of the subject. The buffer size is transmitted until the buffer is full and the transmitted message is stored in the buffer. Through the PUT message containing the Buffer-Control option received from the Observer, the messages confirmed to arrive well are deleted from the buffer.
3.4. Unregister

Since this mechanism basically applies between the sensor and the gateway, the resources created for the streaming service can be observed by only one Observer. Therefore, when a DELETE message is received from the Observer, the corresponding resource should be deleted and the buffer allocated for the streaming service should be released.

4. Observer Side Operation

4.1. Register

An observer who wants streaming service MUST request the creation of a resource for receiving the streaming service. In the extension defined in this specification, a resource for streaming is generated and serviced. Therefore, the observer MUST generate a streaming resource by transmitting a POST message to the subject containing various parameters such as the data resource to be streamed, the buffer size, and the interval between messages. When the resource is successfully created, it receives the resource URL to be streamed from the subject.

4.2. Buffer Control

For the stability of streaming services, the observer should remove the received message from the subject’s buffer. This mechanism minimizes the burden on the subject as much as possible, so the observer MUST be able to manage both the error control and the state of the subject buffer. In addition, it MUST be able to change the subject’s buffer size based on network conditions. For example, if the error rate is high, it is possible to control the error by transmitting the PUT message more frequently by reducing the buffer size. If the error rate is low, the buffer size can be increased to reduce the number of control messages issued.

4.3. Reordering

Since the CoAP message is basically UDP-based, the transmission order and reception order of messages may be different. Therefore, the observer MUST be able to re-order the message using the sequence number included in the CoAP Observe Option.
5. Security consideration

The security consideration will apply to Section 11 of [RFC7252], the CoAP specification, and Section 7 of [RFC7641], Observing resources in the CoAP.

6. IANA Considerations

TBD

7. References

7.1. Normative References


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Controlling Actuators with CoAP
draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-06

Abstract

Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control actuators are essential in a world of connected and networking things interacting with the physical world. In this memo we show that just using CoAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE is not enough. We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can do, and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks. While this document is focused on actuators, some of the attacks apply equally well to sensors.

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1. Introduction

Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control actuators are essential in a world of connected and networking things interacting with the physical world. One protocol used to interact with sensors and actuators is the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252]. Any Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployment valuing security and privacy would use a security protocol such as DTLS [RFC6347], TLS [RFC5246], or OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] to protect CoAP, where the choice of security protocol depends on the transport protocol and the presence of intermediaries. The use of CoAP over UDP and DTLS is specified in [RFC6347] and the use of CoAP over TCP and TLS is specified in [RFC8323]. OSCORE protects CoAP end-to-end with the use of COSE [RFC8152] and the CoAP Object-Security option [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and can therefore be used over any transport.

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] was designed with the assumption that security could be provided on a separate
layer, in particular by using DTLS [RFC6347]. The four properties traditionally provided by security protocols are:

- Data confidentiality
- Data origin authentication
- Data integrity checking
- Replay protection

In this document we show that protecting CoAP with a security protocol on another layer is not nearly enough to securely control actuators (and in many cases sensors) and that secure operation often demands far more than the four properties traditionally provided by security protocols. We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker (i.e. not only "trusted intermediaries) can do and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks. In general, secure operation of actuators also requires the three properties:

- Data-to-Data binding
- Data-to-space binding
- Data-to-time binding

"Data-to-Data binding" is e.g. binding of responses to a request or binding of data fragments to each other. "Data-to-space binding" is the binding of data to an absolute or relative point in space (i.e. a location) and may in the relative case be referred to as proximity. "Data-to-time binding" is the binding of data to an absolute or relative point in time and may in the relative case be referred to as freshness. The two last properties may be bundled together as "Data-to-spacetime binding".

The request delay attack (valid for DTLS, TLS, and OSCORE and described in Section 2.2) lets an attacker control an actuator at a much later time than the client anticipated. The response delay and mismatch attack (valid for DTLS and TLS and described in Section 2.3) lets an attacker respond to a client with a response meant for an older request. The request fragment rearrangement attack (valid for DTLS, TLS, and OSCORE and described in Section 2.5) lets an attacker cause unauthorized operations to be performed on the server, and responses to unauthorized operations to be mistaken for responses to authorized operations.
Mechanisms mitigating some of the attacks discussed in this document can be found in [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] and [I-D.liu-core-coap-delay-attacks]

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Attacks

Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments valuing security and privacy, MUST use a security protocol such as DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE to protect CoAP. This is especially true for deployments of actuators where attacks often (but not always) have serious consequences. The attacks described in this section are made under the assumption that CoAP is already protected with a security protocol such as DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE, as an attacker otherwise can easily forge false requests and responses.

2.1. The Block Attack

An on-path attacker can block the delivery of any number of requests or responses. The attack can also be performed by an attacker jamming the lower layer radio protocol. This is true even if a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE is used. Encryption makes selective blocking of messages harder, but not impossible or even infeasible. With DTLS and TLS, proxies have access to the complete CoAP message, and with OSCORE, the CoAP header and several CoAP options are not encrypted. In both security protocols, the IP-addresses, ports, and CoAP message lengths are available to all on-path attackers, which may be enough to determine the server, resource, and command. The block attack is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

```
Client    Foe    Server
-----------
|          | Code: 0.03 (PUT)
|          | Token: 0x47
|          | Uri-Path: lock
|          | Payload: 1 (Lock)
```

Figure 1: Blocking a request
Where ‘X’ means the attacker is blocking delivery of the message.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Foe</th>
<th>Server</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PUT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+-------+</td>
<td>Code: 0.03 (PUT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Token: 0x47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: lock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: 1 (Lock)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X&lt;-----+</td>
<td>Code: 2.04 (Changed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>Token: 0x47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Blocking a response

While blocking requests to, or responses from, a sensor is just a denial of service attack, blocking a request to, or a response from, an actuator results in the client losing information about the server’s status. If the actuator e.g. is a lock (door, car, etc.), the attack results in the client not knowing (except by using out-of-band information) whether the lock is unlocked or locked, just like the observer in the famous Schrodinger’s cat thought experiment. Due to the nature of the attack, the client cannot distinguish the attack from connectivity problems, offline servers, or unexpected behavior from middle boxes such as NATs and firewalls.

Remedy: Any IoT deployment of actuators where confirmation is important MUST notify the user upon reception of the response, or warn the user when a response is not received.

2.2. The Request Delay Attack

An on-path attacker may not only block packets, but can also delay the delivery of any packet (request or response) by a chosen amount of time. If CoAP is used over a reliable and ordered transport such as TCP with TLS or OSCORE, no messages can be delivered before the delayed message. If CoAP is used over an unreliable and unordered transport such as UDP with DTLS, or OSCORE, other messages can be delivered before the delayed message as long as the delayed packet is delivered inside the replay window. When CoAP is used over UDP, both DTLS and OSCORE allow out-of-order delivery and uses sequence numbers together with a replay window to protect against replay attacks. The replay window has a default length of 64 in DTLS and 32 in OSCORE. The attacker can control the replay window by blocking some or all other packets. By first delaying a request, and then later, after delivery, blocking the response to the request, the client is not made aware of the delayed delivery except by the missing response. The server has in general, no way of knowing that the request was
delayed and will therefore happily process the request. Note that delays can also happen for other reasons than a malicious attacker.

If some wireless low-level protocol is used, the attack can also be performed by the attacker simultaneously recording what the client transmits while at the same time jamming the server. The request delay attack is illustrated in Figure 3.

![Figure 3: Delaying a request](image)

Where ‘@’ means the attacker is storing and later forwarding the message (@ may alternatively be seen as a wormhole connecting two points in time).

While an attacker delaying a request to a sensor is often not a security problem, an attacker delaying a request to an actuator performing an action is often a serious problem. A request to an actuator (for example a request to unlock a lock) is often only meant to be valid for a short time frame, and if the request does not reach the actuator during this short timeframe, the request should not be fulfilled. In the unlock example, if the client does not get any response and does not physically see the lock opening, the user is likely to walk away, calling the locksmith (or the IT-support).

If a non-zero replay window is used (the default when CoAP is used over UDP), the attacker can let the client interact with the actuator before delivering the delayed request to the server (illustrated in Figure 4). In the lock example, the attacker may store the first "unlock" request for later use. The client will likely resend the request with the same token. If DTLS is used, the resent packet will...
have a different sequence number and the attacker can forward it. If
OSCORE is used, resent packets will have the same sequence number and
the attacker must block them all until the client sends a new message
with a new sequence number (not shown in Figure 4). After a while
when the client has locked the door again, the attacker can deliver
the delayed "unlock" message to the door, a very serious attack.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Foe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code: 0.03 (PUT)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Token: 0x9c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: lock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: 0 (Unlock)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>++-----&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: lock</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: 0 (Unlock)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+--------&gt;</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code: 2.04 (Changed)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x9c</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Token: 0x7a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: lock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: 1 (Lock)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>+--------&gt;</td>
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<table>
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<th>Foe</th>
<th>Server</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code: 2.04 (Changed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x7a</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Token: 0x9c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: lock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: 0 (Unlock)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@------</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Foe</th>
<th>Server</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code: 2.04 (Changed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x9c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Delaying request with reordering

While the second attack (Figure 4) can be mitigated by using a replay
window of length zero, the first attack (Figure 3) cannot. A
solution must enable the server to verify that the request was
received within a certain time frame after it was sent or enable the
server to securely determine an absolute point in time when the

request is to be executed. This can be accomplished with either a challenge-response pattern, by exchanging timestamps between client and server, or by only allowing requests a short period after client authentication.

Requiring a fresh client authentication (such as a new TLS/DTLS handshake or an EDHOC key exchange [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]) mitigates the problem, but requires larger messages and more processing than a dedicated solution. Security solutions based on exchanging timestamps require exactly synchronized time between client and server, and this may be hard to control with complications such as time zones and daylight saving. Wall clock time SHOULD NOT be used as it is not monotonic, may reveal that the endpoints will accept expired certificates, or reveal the endpoint’s location. Use of non-monotonic clocks is not secure as the server will accept requests if the clock is moved backward and reject requests if the clock is moved forward. Even if the clocks are synchronized at one point in time, they may easily get out-of-sync and an attacker may even be able to affect the client or the server time in various ways such as setting up a fake NTP server, broadcasting false time signals to radio controlled clocks, or expose one of them to a strong gravity field. As soon as client falsely believes it is time synchronized with the server, delay attacks are possible. A challenge response mechanism where the server does not need to synchronize its time with the client is easier to analyze but require more roundtrips. The challenges, responses, and timestamps may be sent in a CoAP option or in the CoAP payload.

Remedy: The mechanisms specified in [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] or [I-D.liu-core-coap-delay-attacks] SHALL be used for controlling actuators unless another application specific challenge-response or timestamp mechanism is used.

2.3. The Response Delay and Mismatch Attack

The following attack can be performed if CoAP is protected by a security protocol where the response is not bound to the request in any way except by the CoAP token. This would include most general security protocols, such as DTLS, TLS, and IPsec, but not OSCORE. CoAP [RFC7252] uses a client generated token that the server echoes to match responses to request, but does not give any guidelines for the use of token with DTLS and TLS, except that the tokens currently "in use" SHOULD (not SHALL) be unique. The attacker performs the attack by delaying delivery of a response until the client sends a request with the same token, the response will be accepted by the client as a valid response to the later request. If CoAP is used over a reliable and ordered transport such as TCP with TLS, no messages can be delivered before the delayed message. If CoAP is
used over an unreliable and unordered transport such as UDP with DTLS, other messages can be delivered before the delayed message as long as the delayed packet is delivered inside the replay window. Note that mismatches can also happen for other reasons than a malicious attacker, e.g. delayed delivery or a server sending notifications to an uninterested client.

The attack can be performed by an attacker on the wire, or an attacker simultaneously recording what the server transmits while at the same time jamming the client. The response delay and mismatch attack is illustrated in Figure 5.

![Figure 5: Delaying and mismatching response to PUT](image)

If we once again take a lock as an example, the security consequences may be severe as the client receives a response message likely to be interpreted as confirmation of a locked door, while the received response message is in fact confirming an earlier unlock of the door. As the client is likely to leave the (believed to be locked) door unattended, the attacker may enter the home, enterprise, or car protected by the lock.

The same attack may be performed on sensors, also this with serious consequences. As illustrated in Figure 6, an attacker may convince the client that the lock is locked, when it in fact is not. The "Unlock" request may be also be sent by another client authorized to control the lock.
As illustrated in Figure 7, an attacker may even mix responses from different resources as long as the two resources share the same (D)TLS connection on some part of the path towards the client. This can happen if the resources are located behind a common gateway, or are served by the same CoAP proxy. An on-path attacker (not necessarily a (D)TLS endpoint such as a proxy) may e.g. deceive a client that the living room is on fire by responding with an earlier delayed response from the oven (temperatures in degree Celsius).
Figure 7: Delaying and mismatching response from other resource

Remedy: If CoAP is protected with a security protocol not providing bindings between requests and responses (e.g. DTLS and TLS) the client MUST NOT reuse any tokens until the traffic keys have been replaced. The easiest way to accomplish this is to implement the Token as a counter, this approach SHOULD be followed.

2.4. The Relay Attack

Yet another type of attack can be performed in deployments where actuator actions are triggered automatically based on proximity and without any user interaction, e.g. a car (the client) constantly polling for the car key (the server) and unlocking both doors and engine as soon as the car key responds. An attacker (or pair of attackers) may simply relay the CoAP messages out-of-band, using for examples some other radio technology. By doing this, the actuator (i.e. the car) believes that the client is close by and performs actions based on that false assumption. The attack is illustrated in Figure 8. In this example the car is using an application specific challenge-response mechanism transferred as CoAP payloads.
The consequences may be severe, and in the case of a car, lead to the attacker unlocking and driving away with the car, an attack that unfortunately is happening in practice.

Remedy: Getting a response over a short-range radio MUST NOT be taken as proof of proximity and therefore MUST NOT be used to take actions based on such proximity. Any automatically triggered mechanisms relying on proximity MUST use other stronger mechanisms to guarantee proximity. Mechanisms that MAY be used are: measuring the round-trip time and calculate the maximum possible distance based on the speed of light, or using radio with an extremely short range like NFC (centimeters instead of meters) that cannot be relayed through e.g. clothes. Another option is to including geographical coordinates (from e.g. GPS) in the messages and calculate proximity based on these, but in this case the location measurements MUST be very precise and the system MUST make sure that an attacker cannot influence the location estimation, something that is very hard in practice.

2.5. The Request Fragment Rearrangement Attack

These attack scenarios show that the Request Delay and Block Attacks can be used against blockwise transfers to cause unauthorized operations to be performed on the server, and responses to unauthorized operations to be mistaken for responses to authorized operations. The combination of these attacks is described as a separate attack because it makes the Request Delay Attack relevant to systems that are otherwise not time-dependent, which means that they could disregard the Request Delay Attack.

This attack works even if the individual request/response pairs are encrypted, authenticated and protected against the Response Delay and Mismatch Attack, provided the attacker is on the network path and can correctly guess which operations the respective packages belong to.

Figure 8: Relay attack (the client is the actuator)
2.5.1. Completing an Operation with an Earlier Final Block

In this scenario (illustrated in Figure 9), blocks from two operations on a POST-accepting resource are combined to make the server execute an action that was not intended by the authorized client. This works only if the client attempts a second operation after the first operation failed (due to what the attacker made appear like a network outage) within the replay window. The client does not receive a confirmation on the second operation either, but, by the time the client acts on it, the server has already executed the unauthorized action.

Client  Foe  Server
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| +------------> POST "incarcerate" (Block1: 0, more to come)
| | | |
| <------------ 2.31 Continue (Block1: 0 received, send more)
| | | |
| +-----@ POST "valjean" (Block1: 1, last block)
| | | |
| +----->X All retransmissions dropped
| | | |

(Client: Odd, but let’s go on and promote Javert)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| +------------> POST "promote" (Block1: 0, more to come)
| | | |
| | X<----- 2.31 Continue (Block1: 0 received, send more)
| | | |
| @------> POST "valjean" (Block1: 1, last block)
| | | |
| | X<----- 2.04 Valjean Promoted
| | | |

Figure 9: Completing an operation with an earlier final block

Remedy: If a client starts new blockwise operations on a security context that has lost packages, it needs to label the fragments in such a way that the server will not mix them up.

A mechanism to that effect is described as Request-Tag [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]. Had it been in place in the example and used for body integrity protection, the client would have set the Request-Tag option in the "promote" request. Depending on the server’s capabilities and setup, either of four outcomes could have occurred:
1. The server could have processed the reinjected POST "valjean" as belonging to the original "incarcerate" block; that’s the expected case when the server can handle simultaneous block transfers.

2. The server could respond 5.03 Service Unavailable, including a Max-Age option indicating how long it prefers not to take any requests that force it to overwrite the state kept for the "incarcerate" request.

3. The server could decide to drop the state kept for the "incarcerate" request’s state, and process the "promote" request. The reinjected POST "valjean" will then fail with 4.08 Request Entity incomplete, indicating that the server does not have the start of the operation any more.

2.5.2. Injecting a Withheld First Block

If the first block of a request is withheld by the attacker for later use, it can be used to have the server process a different request body than intended by the client. Unlike in the previous scenario, it will return a response based on that body to the client.

Again, a first operation (that would go like "Homeless stole apples. What shall we do with him?" - "Set him free.") is aborted by the proxy, and a part of that operation is later used in a different operation to prime the server for responding leniently to another operation that would originally have been "Hitman killed someone. What shall we do with him?" - "Hang him.". The attack is illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Injecting a withheld first block

3. Security Considerations

The whole document can be seen as security considerations for CoAP.

4. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

5. References

5.1. Normative References


Mattsson, et al. Expires March 21, 2019
5.2. Informative References

[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,

[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]

[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]

[I-D.liu-core-coap-delay-attacks]

[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]


<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
Acknowledgements

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CoAP Protocol Negotiation
draft-silverajan-core-coap-protocol-negotiation-09

Abstract

CoAP has been standardised as an application-level REST-based protocol. When multiple transport protocols exist for exchanging CoAP resource representations, this document introduces a way forward for CoAP endpoints as well as intermediaries to agree upon alternate transport and protocol configurations as well as URIs for CoAP messaging. Several mechanisms are proposed: Extending the CoRE Resource Directory with new parameter types, introducing a new CoAP Option with which clients can interact directly with servers without needing the Resource Directory, and finally a new CoRE Link Attribute allowing exposing alternate locations on a per-resource basis.

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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] allows clients, origin servers and proxies, to exchange and manipulate resource representations using REST-based methods over UDP or DTLS. CoAP messaging however can use other alternative underlying transports [I-D.silverajan-core-coap-alternative-transports].
When CoAP-based endpoints and proxies possess the ability to perform CoAP messaging over multiple transports, significant benefits can be obtained if communicating client endpoints can discover that multiple transport bindings may exist on an origin server over which CoAP resources can be retrieved. This allows a client to understand and possibly substitute a different transport protocol configuration for the same CoAP resources on the origin server, based on the preferences of the communicating peers. Inevitably, if two CoAP endpoints reside in distinctly separate networks with orthogonal transports, a CoAP proxy node is needed between the two networks so that CoAP Requests and Responses can be exchanged properly.

A URI in CoAP, however, serves two purposes simultaneously. It firstly functions as a locator, by specifying the network location of the endpoint hosting the resource, and the underlying transport used by CoAP for accessing the resource representation. It secondly identifies the name of the specific resource found at that endpoint together with its namespace, or resource path. A single CoAP URI cannot be used to express the identity of the resource independently of alternate underlying transports or protocol configuration.

Multiple URIs can result for a single CoAP resource representations if:

- the authority components of the URI differ, owing to the same physical host exposing several network endpoints. For example, "coap://example.org/sensors/temperature" and "coap://example.net/sensors/temperature"

- the scheme components of the URI differ, owing to the origin server exposing several underlying transport alternatives. For example, "coap://example.org/sensors/temperature" and "coap+tcp://example.org/sensors/temperature"

Without a priori knowledge, clients would be unable to ascertain if two or more URIs provided by an origin server are associated to the same representation or not. Consequently, a communication mechanism needs to be conceived to allow an origin server to properly capture the relationship between these alternate representations or locations and then subsequently supply this information to clients. This also goes some way in limiting URI aliasing [WWWArchv1].

In order to support CoAP clients, proxies and servers wishing to use CoAP over multiple transports, this draft proposes the following:

- An ability for servers to register supported CoAP transports to a CoRE Resource Directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] with optional registration lifetime values
o A means for CoAP clients to interact with a CoRE resource
directory interface for requesting and discovering alternative
transports and locations of CoAP resources

o New Resource Directory parameter types enabling the above-
mentioned features.

o A new CoAP Option called Alternative-Transport that can be used by
CoAP clients to discover and retrieve the types of alternative
transports available at the origin server, as well as the links
describing the transport-specific endpoint address at which CoAP
resources are exposed from.

o A new CoRE Link attribute for exposing transports and endpoint
locations on an origin server on a per-resource basis.

2. Aim

The following simple scenarios aim to better portray how CoAP
protocol negotiation benefits communicating nodes

2.1. Overcoming Middlebox Issues

Discovering which transports are available is important for a client
to determine the optimal alternative to perform CoAP messaging
according to its needs, particularly when separated from a CoAP
server via a NAT. It is well-known that some firewalls as well as
many NATs, particularly home gateways, hinder the proper operation of
UDP traffic. NAT bindings for UDP-based traffic do not have as long
timeouts as TCP-based traffic.

Figure 1: CoAP Client initially accesses CoAP Server over UDP and
then switching to TCP
Figure 1 depicts such a scenario, where a CoAP client residing behind a NAT uses UDP initially for accessing a CoAP Server, and engages in discovering alternative transports offered by the server. The client subsequently decides to use TCP for CoAP messaging instead of UDP to set up an Observe relationship for a resource at the CoAP Server, in order to avoid incoming packets containing resource updates being discarded by the NAT.

2.2. Better resource caching and serving in proxies

Figure 2 outlines a more complex example of intermediate nodes such as CoAP-based proxies to intelligently cache and respond to CoAP or HTTP clients with the same resource representation requested over alternative transports or server endpoints. As with the earlier example, the CoAP Server registers its transports to a Resource Directory (This is assumed to be performed beforehand and not depicted in the figure, for brevity)

In this example, a CoAP over WebSockets client successfully obtains a response from a CoAP forward proxy to retrieve a resource representation from an origin server using UDP, by supplying the CoAP server's endpoint address and resource in a Proxy-URI option. Arrow 1 represents a GET request to "coap+ws://proxy.example.com" which subsequently retrieves the resource from the CoAP server using the URI "coap://example.org/sensors/temperature", shown as arrow 2.

Figure 2: Proxying and returning a resource's alternate cached representations to multiple clients

Subsequently, assume an HTTP client requests the same resource, but instead specifies a CoAP over TCP alternative URI instead. Arrow 3 represents this event, where the HTTP client performs a GET request to "http://proxy.example.com/coap+tcp://example.org/sensors/temperature". When the proxy receives the request, instead of immediately retrieving the temperature resource again over TCP, it
first verifies either from the Resource Directory or directly from the server, whether the cached resource retrieved over UDP is a valid equivalent representation of the resource requested by the HTTP client over TCP. Upon confirmation, the proxy is able to supply the same cached representation to the HTTP client as well (arrow 4).

2.3. Interaction with Energy-constrained Servers

Figure 3 illustrates discovery and communication between a CoAP client and an energy-constrained CoAP Server. Such a server aims at conserving its energy unless a need arises otherwise. The figure first depicts the server registering itself to a Resource Directory over IP, and also supplies its alternative CoAP transport endpoints (in this case, SMS), in steps 1 and 2. The server can subsequently disable communication radio interfaces requiring greater energy (such as for IP-based communication), powering it up sporadically for maintenance activities like registration renewals. At other times, it maintains communication in a low-power state by listening only for incoming SMS messages.

Figure 3: CoAP client interacting with RD to discover a server’s SMS-based endpoint

A CoAP client wishing to perform CoAP operations with an energy-constrained CoAP server may query a resource directory for the SMS-based endpoint of the server (steps 3 and 4). Subsequently, SMS-based CoAP communication can occur between the endpoints as shown by arrows 5 and 6. Alternatively, the incoming SMS can be also used by the server as a triggering event to temporarily power up its radio
interface so that UDP or other transport-based CoAP communication can
instead be employed for low latency communication with the client.

3. Node Types based on Transport Availability

In [RFC7228], Tables 1, 3 and 4 introduced classification schemes for
devices, in terms of their resource constraints, energy limitations
and communication power. For this document, in addition to these
capabilities, it seems useful to also identify devices based on their
transport capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Transport Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T0</td>
<td>Single transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Multiple transports, with one or more active at any point in time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Multiple active and persistent transports at all times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Classes of Available Transports

Type T0 nodes possess the capability of exactly 1 type of transport channel for CoAP, at all times. These include both active and sleepy nodes, which may choose to perform duty cycling for power saving.

Type T1 nodes possess multiple different transports, and can retrieve or expose CoAP resources over any or all of these transports. However, not all transports are constantly active and certain transport channels and interfaces could be kept in a mostly-off state for energy-efficiency, such as when using CoAP over SMS.

Type T2 nodes possess more than 1 transport, and multiple transports are simultaneously active at all times in a persistent manner. CoAP proxy nodes which allow CoAP endpoints from disparate transports to communicate with each other, are a good example of this.

In order to allow resource interactions between clients and servers with multiple locations or transports, the registration, update and lookup interfaces of the CoRE Resource Directory need to be extended. In this section two new RD parameters, "at" and "tt" are introduced. Both are optional CoAP features. If supported, they occur at the granularity level of an origin server, i.e. they cannot be applied selectively on some resources only. When absent, it is assumed that the server does not support multiple transports or locations.

4.1. The ‘at’ RD parameter

A CoAP server wishing to advertise its resources over multiple transports does so by using one or more "at" parameters to register CoAP alternative transport URIs with a Resource Directory. Such a URI would contain the scheme, address as well as any port or paths at which the server is available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Query</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoAP</td>
<td>at</td>
<td>URI</td>
<td>URI scheme, address port and path on the server</td>
<td>xsd:string</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>URI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The "at" RD parameter

The "at" parameter extends the Resource Directory’s Registration and Update interfaces.

The following example shows a type T1 endpoint registering its resources and advertising its ability to use TCP and WebSockets as alternative transports:

Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=node1
    &at=coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]&at=coap+ws://server.example.com
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
"/temperature';ct=0;rt="temperature';if="core.s"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location: /rd/1234
An endpoint lookup would just reflect the registered attributes:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/ep

Res: 2.05 Content
</rd/1234>;ep="node1";base="coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]:5683";
at="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]";at="coap+ws://server.example.com"

The next example shows the same endpoint updating its registration with a new lifetime and the availability of a single alternative transport for CoAP (in this case TCP):

Req: POST /rd/1234?lt=600
  &at=coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";if="core.s"

Res: 2.04 Changed

If a lookup is performed on the same endpoint only 1 alternative transport is indicated:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/ep

Res: 2.05 Content
</rd/1234>;ep="node1";base="coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]:5683";
at="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]"

A resource lookup for UDP client would be returned as the following:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]/temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";if="core.s";
anchor="coap://[2001:db8:f1::2]"

A resource lookup for TCP client would be returned as the following:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]/temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";if="core.s";
anchor="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]"
4.2. The ‘tt’ RD parameter

A CoAP client wishing to perform a look-up on the Resource Directory for CoAP servers supporting multiple transports does so by using one or more "tt" parameters to query for CoAP alternative transport URIs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Query</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoAP</td>
<td>tt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transport type</td>
<td>xsd:string</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>requested by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the client</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: The "tt" RD parameter

The "tt" parameter extends the Resource Directory’s rd-lookup interface. The "tt" parameter queries existing registrations, and MUST NOT be used with the Resource Directory’s registration and update interfaces.

The following example shows a client performing a lookup for endpoints supporting TCP:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/ep?tt="coap+tcp"

Res: 2.05 Content
</rd/1234>;at="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]";ep="node1";ct="40"

The following example shows a client performing a resource lookup for endpoints supporting TCP:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temperature&tt="coap+tcp"

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]/temperature>;ct=0;rt="temperature";
  if="core.s";anchor="coap+tcp://[2001:db8:f1::2]"

The following example shows a client performing a lookup for endpoints supporting SMS i.e. discovering SMS transports for sleepy nodes and using SMS to communicate with the endpoint:
5. CoAP Alternative-Transport Option

The CoAP Alternative-Transport Option can be used by CoAP clients and CoAP servers in both Request and Response messages in constrained environments where a CoRE Resource Directory is not present.

Figure 4 depicts the properties of the Alternative-Transport Option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Alternative-Transport</td>
<td>string</td>
<td>0-1034</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=No-Cache-Key, R=Repeatable

When included in a Request message, this option is used by the client in 2 possible ways. In the first case, a CoAP client can include the Option with Length 0 to retrieve all alternative transports from a CoAP server. In response to the client, the server includes base URI for each transport in its own Option. In the second case, a CoAP client can include the Option with a specific value in a CoAP Request, and the CoAP server returns the base URI(s) for the specified transport. If the specified transport by a CoAP client returns multiple results on a CoAP server, the server returns all base URIs of the transport in the response, each base URI in its own Option.

A CoAP client can also use this Option to retrieve several transports at once by including multiple Options in the request to a CoAP server. If any of the specified transports is supported by the
server, the server returns all base URIs in its own option. There can be more than 1 result for any of the transports so that each transport base URI is still included in the response in its own option.

Figure 5 describes a simple interaction between a client and a server, in which the client uses an Alternative-Transports Option with a null value to discover and retrieve all the available transports from the server, as part of a GET operation to retrieve a resource representation. The server responds with a CoAP Response message which contains the resource representation as a payload. In addition, the server also supplies multiple Alternative-Transport Options in the message, with each Option containing the base URI for an available transport. In this case the base URIs returned for TCP-based and WebSocket transports indicate their availability over a non-standard port.

```
Client                                  Server
+                                       |
|  GET /temperature                      |
|    Token: 0x64                         |
|    Alternative-Transport: (null)       |
+-------------------------------------->|
    2.05 Content                        |
    Token: 0x64                         |
    Payload: 21.0 Cel                   |
    Alternative-Transport:              |
    coap+tcp://example.org:5555/        |
    Alternative-Transport:              |
    coaps+tcp://example.org:6666/       |
    Alternative-Transport:              |
    coap+sms://0015105550101/           |
    Alternative-Transport:              |
    coap+ws://example.org:8080/         |
<--------------------------------------+
```

Figure 5: Requesting all available alternative transports on the server, and their locations
Alternatively, a client can also request for the availability of a specific transport on the server, as shown in Figure 6. Here, the CoAP Request contains Alternative-Transport Options with values set to request the Base URIs for TCP-based endpoints.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Client} \\
+ \\
| \text{GET /temperature} \\
| \text{Token: 0x64} \\
| \text{Alternative-Transport: coap+tcp} \\
| \text{Alternative-Transport: coaps+tcp} \\
\hline
\text{Server} \\
\hline
| 2.05 Content \\
| \text{Token: 0x64} \\
| \text{Payload: 21.0 Cel} \\
| \text{Alternative-Transport:} \\
| \text{coap+tcp://example.org:5555/} \\
| \text{Alternative-Transport:} \\
| \text{coaps+tcp://example.org:6666/} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Figure 6: Requesting TCP-based alternative transports on the server, and their locations

A client may also request a subset of available transports on the server, by providing multiple Options, each having a single transport identifier. The server likewise responds to the client request by supplying the requested transport information. This is shown in Figure 7.
6. The ‘ol’ CoRE Link Attribute

In the majority of cases, it is expected that an origin server would expose all its resources uniformly on its available transports or endpoint addresses. Exceptions can exist however, where alternate locations are made available on a per-resource basis. For such cases, a new ‘ol’ ("other locations") attribute is provided. One or more ‘ol’ attributes are used to provide base URIs from which a specific resource can be reached. Allowing per-resource endpoint or transport availability enables specific functions such as firmware updates or hardware-specific operations. It also facilitates mapping to and from OCF-based resource-specific endpoint descriptions. Note that the use of ‘ol’ is orthogonal to using ‘at’ as shown in Section 6.2.

6.1. Using /.well-known/core
REQ: GET /.well-known/core

RES: 2.05 Content
</sensors/temp>;ct=41;rt="temperature-f";if="sensor",</sensors/door>;ct=41;rt="door";if="sensor",</sensors/light>;if="sensor"; ol="http://[FDFD::123]:61616";
ol="coap://server2.example.com"


Req: POST coap:/rd.example.com/rd ?ep=node1&at=coap+tcp://server.example.com&at=coap+ws://server.example.com:5683/ws/
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</sensors/temp>;ct=41;rt="temperature-f";if="sensor",</sensors/door>;ct=41;rt="door";if="sensor",</sensors/light>;if="sensor"; ol="http://[FDFD::123]:61616";
ol="coap://server2.example.com"

Res: 2.01 Created
Location: /rd/4521

7. IANA Considerations

This document requests the registration of new RD parameter types "at" and "tt".

The following entry needs to be added to the CoAP Option Numbers Registry:

+--------+------------------------+------------------+
| Number | Name                   | Reference        |
+--------+------------------------+------------------+
|       66  | Alternative-Transports | (this document)  |

8. Security Considerations

When multiple transports, locations and representations are used, some obvious risks are present both at the origin server as well as by requesting clients.
When a client is presented with alternate URIs for retrieving resources, it presents an opportunity for attackers to mount a series of attacks, either by hijacking communication and masquerading as an alternate location or by using a man-in-the-middle attack on TLS-based communication to a server and redirecting traffic to an alternate location. A malicious or compromised server could also be used for reflective denial-of-service attacks on innocent third parties. Moreover, clients may obtain web links to alternate URIs containing weaker security properties than the existing session.

9. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Christian Amsuess, Klaus Hartke, Jaime Jimenez and Jim Schaad for comments and reviewing this draft. Teemu Savolainen was involved in initial discussions about protocol negotiations and lifetime values. Zach Shelby provided significant suggestions on how the Resource Directory can be employed and extended in place of link attributes and relation types.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.silverajan-core-coap-alternative-transports]

Appendix A. Change Log

A.1. From -08 to -09

Using "tt" and "Alternative Transports" updated.

A.2. From -07 to -08

Added example of energy constrained CoAP server

Updated examples of using "at" and "tt"

"at" and "ol" are no longer comma-separated URI lists.

A.3. From -06 to -07

Added support for ‘ol’ Link attribute

A.4. From -05 to -06

Added support for CoAP Alternative-Transports Option

A.5. From -04 to -05

Freshness update

A.6. From -03 to -04

Removed previously introduced link attribute and relation types

Initial foray with Resource Directory support

A.7. From -02 to -03

Added new author

Rewrite of "Introduction" section

Added new Aims Section
Added new Section on Node Types

Introduced "al" Active Lifetime link attribute

Added new Section on Observing transports and resources

Security and IANA considerations sections populated

A.8. From -01 to -02

Freshness update.

A.9. From -00 to -01

Reworked "Introduction" section, added "Rationale", and "Goals" sections.

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Abstract

Group communication over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) can be secured by means of Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE). At deployment time, devices may not know the exact OSCORE groups to join, the respective Group Manager, or other information required to perform the joining process. This document describes how CoAP endpoints can use the CoRE Resource Directory to discover OSCORE groups and acquire information to join them through their respective Group Manager. This approach is consistent with, but not limited to, the joining of OSCORE groups based on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization.

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 12, 2019.

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1. Introduction


A CoAP endpoint joins an OSCORE group by interacting with the responsible Group Manager (GM) to get the required keying material. As described in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining], the joining process can be based on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization in constrained environments [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], with the joining endpoint and the GM as ACE Client and ACE Resource Server, respectively. That is, the joining endpoint accesses the join resource associated to the OSCORE group of interest and exported by the GM.
Devices are typically equipped with a static Manufacturer Identity installed at manufacturing time. This identity is used at deployment time during an enrollment process which provides the device with an Operational Identity, possibly updated during the device lifetime. In the presence of secure group communication for CoAP, such an Operational Identity should also comprise information required for the device to join OSCORE groups. This especially includes a reference to the join resources to access at the respective GMs.

However, it can be infeasible or inconvenient to provide such precise information to freshly deployed devices as part of their (early) Operational Identity. This can be due to a number of reasons: the Manufacturer Identity has to be minimal and as small as possible in size; the OSCORE group(s) to join and the responsible GM(s) are unknown at manufacturing time; an OSCORE group of interest is created, or the responsible GM is deployed, only after the device is enrolled and fully operative in the network; information related to existing OSCORE groups or their GMs has been changed. This requires a method for CoAP endpoints to dynamically discover OSCORE groups and their GM, and to retrieve updated information about those groups.

This specification describes how CoAP endpoints use the CoRE Resource Directory (RD) [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] for discovering an OSCORE group and retrieving the information required to join that group through the responsible GM. In principle, the GM registers as an endpoint with the RD. The corresponding registration resource includes one link for each OSCORE group under that GM, specifying the path to the related join resource. More information about the OSCORE group is stored in the target attributes of the respective link.

When querying the RD for OSCORE groups, a CoAP endpoint can further benefit of observation [RFC7641]. This enables convenient notifications about the creation of new OSCORE groups or the updates of information concerning existing ones. As a consequence, it facilitates the early deployment of CoAP endpoints, i.e. even before the GM is deployed and the OSCORE groups of interest are created.

The approach described in this specification is consistent with, although not limited to, the joining of OSCORE groups described in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This specification requires readers to be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] and [RFC6690]. Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC7252], [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscoap-joining].

Terminology for constrained environments, such as "constrained device", "constrained-node network", is defined in [RFC7228].

This document refers also to the following terminology.

- Zeroed-epoch Group ID: this refers to the Group ID of an OSCORE group as stored in the RD. The structure of such a stored Group ID is as per Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], with the "Group Epoch" immutable and set to zero.

2. Registration Resource for Group Managers

With reference to Figure 4 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], a Group Manager (GM) registers as an endpoint with the CoRE Resource Directory (RD). The registration includes the links to the join resources at the GM, associated to the OSCORE groups under that GM.

In particular, each link to a join resource includes:

- "target": URI of the join resource at the GM.
- target attributes, including:
  * Resource Type (rt) with the value "core.osc.j" defined in Section 7.1 of this specification.
  * The zeroed-epoch Group ID of the OSCORE group.
  * One target attribute for each multicast IP address associated to the OSCORE group.

3. Registration of Group Manager Endpoints

Upon deployment, a GM finds the RD as described in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]. After that, a GM registers as an endpoint with the RD, as described in Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]. When doing so, the GM MUST also register all the join resources it is exporting at that point in time, i.e. one for each of its OSCORE groups. The GM SHOULD NOT use the Simple Registration approach described in Section 5.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].
The example below shows a GM with endpoint name "gml" and address 2001:db8::ab that registers with the RD. The GM specifies the link to one join resource for accessing the OSCORE group with zeroed-epoch Group ID "feedca570000" and one associated multicast IP address ff35:30:2001:db8::23.

Interaction: GM -> RD

Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=gml
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</join/feedca570000>;ct=41;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="feedca570000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::23"

Interaction: RD -> GM

Res: 2.01 Created
Location-Path: /rd/4521

4. Addition and Update of OSCORE Groups

The GM is responsible to keep its registration with the RD up to date with links to all its join resources. This means that the GM has to update the registration within its lifetime as per Appendix A.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], and has to change the content of the registration when a join resource is added/removed or if its target attributes have to be changed, such as in the following cases.

- The GM creates a new OSCORE group and starts exporting the related join resource.
- The GM dismisses an OSCORE group and stops exporting the related join resource.
- Information related to an existing OSCORE group changes, e.g. the list of associated multicast IP addresses.

In order to perform an update to the set of links in its registration, the GM can re-register with the RD and fully specify all links to its join resources and their target attributes in the payload of the POST request.

The example below shows the same GM from Section 3 that re-registers with the RD, including the same join resource associated to the OSCORE group with zeroed-epoch Group ID "feedca570000", plus a second join resource associated to the OSCORE group with zeroed-epoch Group ID "ech0ech00000" and one multicast IP address ff35:30:2001:db8::45.
Interaction: GM -> RD

Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=gml
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<!join/feedca570000>;ct=41;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="feedca570000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::23",
<!join/ech0ech00000>;ct=41;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="ech0ech00000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::45"

Interaction: RD -> GM

Res: 2.04 Changed
Location-Path: /rd/4521

Alternatively, the GM can perform a PATCH/iPATCH [RFC8132] request to the RD, as per Appendix A.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]. This requires semantics to be defined in future standards, in order to apply a link-format document as a patch to a different one.

5. Discovery of OSCORE Groups

A CoAP endpoint that wants to join an OSCORE group might not have all the necessary information at deployment time. Also, it might want to know about possible new OSCORE groups created afterwards by the respective Group Managers.

To this end, the CoAP endpoint can perform a resource lookup at the RD as per Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], in order to retrieve the missing pieces of information needed to join the OSCORE group(s) of interest. The CoAP endpoint can find the RD as described in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

The lookup filtering MUST consider the following search criteria.

- ‘rt’ = "osc.j" (see Section 7.1).

The lookup filtering MAY additionally consider the following search criteria, depending on the information already available to the CoAP endpoint.

- ‘oscore-gid’, specifying the zeroed-epoch Group ID of the OSCORE group of interest.

- ‘ep’, specifying the identifier of the GM as endpoint registered with the RD.
Consistently with the examples in Section 3 and Section 4, the example below shows a CoAP endpoint that wants to join the OSCORE group with zeroed-epoch Group ID "feedca570000", but that does not know the responsible GM and the join resource to access.

The example below also shows how the CoAP endpoint uses observation [RFC7641], in order to be notified of possible changes in the join resource’s target attributes. This is also useful to handle the case where the OSCORE group of interest has not been created yet, so that the CoAP endpoint can receive the requested information when available at a later point in time.

Interaction: Joining node -> RD

Req: GET coap://rd.example.com/lookup/res?rt=osc.j&
osc-core-gid=feedca570000
Observe: 0

Interaction: RD -> Joining node

Res: 2.05 Content
Observe: 24
Payload:
<coap://[2001:db8::ab]/join/feedca570000>;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="feedca570000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::23";
anchor="coap://[2001:db8::ab]"

Depending on the used search criteria, the CoAP endpoint performing the resource lookup can get a response whose payload is quite large in size. This can happen, for instance, in case the lookup request targets all the join resources at a specified GM, or all the join resources of all the registered GMs, as in the example below.

Interaction: Joining node -> RD

Req: GET coap://rd.example.com/lookup/res?rt=osc.j

Interaction: RD -> Joining node
Res: 2.05 Content
Payload:
<coap://[2001:db8::ab]/join/feedca570000>;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="feedca570000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::23";
anchor="coap://[2001:db8::ab]",
<coap://[2001:db8::ab]/join/ech0ech00000>;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="ech0ech00000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::45";
anchor="coap://[2001:db8::ab]",
<coap://[2001:db8::cd]/join/abcdef120000>;rt="osc.j";
oscore-gid="abcdef120000";oscore-group-ip="ff35:30:2001:db8::67";
anchor="coap://[2001:db8::cd]"

Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that a CoAP endpoint performing a
resource lookup to discover OSCORE groups uses observation only when
including the fine-grained search criterion ‘oscore-gid’ in its GET
request sent to the RD.

6. Security Considerations

The security considerations as described in Section 8 of
[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] apply here as well.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

7.1. Resource Types

IANA is asked to enter the following value into the Resource Type
(rt=) Link Target Attribute Values subregistry within the Constrained
Restful Environments (CoRE) Parameters registry defined in [RFC6690].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>core.osc.j</td>
<td>Join resource of an OSCORE Group Manager</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. References

8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]

[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Acknowledgments

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Abstract

The goal of the blockchain transaction protocol for constraint nodes is to enable the generation of blockchain transactions by constraint nodes, according to the following principles:
- transactions are triggered by Provisioning-Messages that include the needed blockchain parameters.
- binary encoded transactions are returned in Transaction-Messages, which include sensors/actuators data. Constraint nodes, associated with blockchain addresses, compute the transaction signature.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Status of this Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2019.
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1 Overview

In the context of this draft sensors/actuators are powered by microcontrollers comprising about 10KB of RAM and 100KB of non volatile memory. The node electronic board may include a radio SoC (System On Chip) or the micro-controller can be part of the SoC. The radio chip manages IP connectivity with another device, typically acting as a controller, which provides a full internet access with standard computing resources.

A constraint node driving sensors and/or actuators may deliver critical data dealing with safety (fire detection, ...) or legacy (pollution measurement, ...) information.

Blockchain infrastructure provides two important features in an Internet of Things (IoT) context:

- Authentication of data in P2P context. Blockchain signed transactions are checked by numerous nodes.
- Information publication. Transactions are stored in duplicated and distributed databases.
- Dating information. Transactions are dated during the mining process.

The goal of the blockchain transaction protocol for constraint nodes is to enable the generation of blockchain transactions by constraint nodes, according to the following principles:

- transactions are triggered by controllers. Needed blockchain parameters are included in provisioning messages.
- binary encoded transaction messages are returned by constraint nodes. A node has the ability to compute the transaction signature.

2 Overview of the Blockchain Transaction Protocol for Constraint Nodes

2.1 Architecture

```
<--Provisioning-Message
+-----------------+  IP  +-----------------+  +----------+
|  Constraint Node| link |  Controller     |  | Blockchain |
+ Blockchain Address +---- Full IP connectivity +-- Network |
+ Private Key       | Access to blockchain |
+-----------------+  +-----------------+  +----------+
Transaction-Message-->
```

Figure 1. Functional architecture for the Blockchain Transaction Protocol for Constraint Nodes

A constraint node holds a blockchain address (BA). The blockchain address is computed from a private key (Pk). Most of today blockchain infrastructures deal with ECDSA signatures, generated
Blockchain Transaction Protocol for Constraint Nodes  September 2018

over the Secp256k1 elliptic curve. The private key is a 32 bytes number, stored in the constraint node. The computation of hash procedures such a SHA2 or KECCAK-256 can be handled by microcontrollers. Although ECDSA signature may be generated by a microcontroller, a tamper resistant resource could be used, either embedded in the CPU, or in a chip such as a secure element [ISO7816]. As an illustration an architecture based on micro-controller, radio SoC and secure element was demonstrated in [IEEE-CCNC2018].

The controller is a device with full IP connectivity. It typically communicates with the constraint node thanks to the CoAP [RFC7252] protocol, or other legacy protocols such as HTTPS. The controller has access to the blockchain infrastructure, to which it is able to forward a binary encoded transaction, signed by the constraint node.

2.2 An Ethereum Use Case.

The following figure 2, illustrates an Ethereum transaction generated by a constraint node, whose total length is 118 bytes.

F8 74 // RLP List, length= 116 bytes
0C // nonce 1 byte =12 decimal
85 06FC23AC00 // gasPrice = 30 GWei
83 013880 // gasLimit = 80000 gas
// recipient address 20 bytes
94 6BAC1B75185D9051AF740AB909F81C71BBB221A6
80 // Null Ether Value
// Data 15 bytes "Temperature=25C"
8F 54656D70657261747572653D323543
1B // recovery parameter, 1 byte
A0 // r, 32 bytes, ECDSA r parameter
A9B58980F76EE628480B82A28B013E45887EC0CF426A5E5D6A738EB1784ED
A0 // s, 32 bytes, ECDSA s parameter
629633C6A3ED5FEE0FB40E2D1CF251345B8B85D372B57B1A6C4762C98E914281F

Figure 2. Illustration of an Ethereum transaction, generated by a constraint node.

The identifier (TxId) of this transaction (i.e. its KECCAK-256 digest) is:

0xd6904d832462ae17718c69e9caa0c3f3bed458382ac1f4e43b1aadd8e94744ad

Given this TxId, the transaction can be retrieved in any Ethereum blockchain database, like for example:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd6904d832462ae17718c69e9caa0c3f3bed458382ac1f4e43b1aadd8e94744ad

The transaction date (20-2018 09:52:42 PM +UTC) is published and certified by the blockchain.
The binary encoded transaction comprises two parts,
- information relying on the Ethereum blockchain context, such as
  the nonce, the gasPrice, the gasLimit, the recipient address, and an
  Ether value.
- information delivered by the constraint node, data (a temperature
  measurement), and the ECDSA signature computed from the 32 bytes
  private key.

Parameters relying on the Ethereum blockchain context MUST be
included in the Provisioning-Message.
The signed transaction MUST be included in the Transaction-Message.

3 Blockchain Transaction Protocol Messages Definition

The Blockchain Transaction Protocol comprises two messages, to be
included in transport protocols, such as CoAP or HTTP.

3.1 Provisioning Message

This message includes the following attributes:
- A type, an integer value, specifying the message content.
- An ordered list of values, storing the parameters of the
  blockchain context.

3.1.1 Encoding example in JSON syntax

Here is an illustration of the provisioning message associated to
the Ethereum blockchain.

```
{
  "type": 1,
  "nonce": 12,
  "gasPrice": 30,
  "gasLimit": 80000,
  "address": "6BAC1B75185D9051AF740AB909F81C71BBB221A6",
  "value": 0
}
```

3.2 Transaction Message

This message include the following attributes
- A type, an integer value, specifying the message content. The zero
  value indicates an error.
- The binary encoded transaction, including the signature.

3.2.1 Encoding example in JSON syntax

Here is an illustration of the transaction message associated to the
Ethereum blockchain.
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{  
  "type": 1,  
  "transaction":  
  "F8740C8506FC23AC0083013880946BAC1B75185D9051AF740AB909F81C71BBB221A6808F54656D70657261747572653D3235431BA0A9B58980F76EE6284800B82A2B5DF13E456887EC0CF426A5E5D6A738EB1784EDA0629633C6A3ED5EEE0FB40E2D1CF251345B885D372857B1A6C4762C9BE914281F"
}

4. Blockchain Transaction Protocol Messages Binary Encoding

4.1 CoAP messages
To be Done

4.2 HTTP Messages
To be Done

5 IANA Considerations
TODO

6 Security Considerations
TODO

6 References

6.1 Normative References


6.2 Informative References


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Urien Expires March 2019 [Page 7]
Identity Modules for CoAP
draft-urien-core-identity-module-coap-04.txt

Abstract

This document defines identity modules based on Secure Elements processing DTLS/TLS stacks for CoAP devices. The expected benefits of these secure microcontrollers are the following:
- Secure storage of pre-share keys or private keys
- Trusted simple or mutual authentication between CoAP devices and CoAP clients.
- The device identity is enforced by a non cloneable chip.
- Trusted cryptographic support.
- Low power consumption for DTLS/TLS processing.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 2018.
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Identity Modules for CoAP

1 Overview

The CoAP [CoAP] protocol MAY be secured by the DTLS protocol [DTLS] over an UDP/IP stack; the TLS support [TLS] is also under definition [CoAP-TLS] over a TCP/IP stack.

According to [CoAP] four security modes are available, NoSec, PreSharedKey, RawPublicKey, and Certificate. When DTLS is used with the PreShareKey or Certificate modes there is a need to store secrets such as symmetric or asymmetric keys, which authenticate the CoAP device.

In that case a Secure Element (SE) MAY be used in order to fully run the DTLS or TLS protocol. According to the data throughput or other security considerations the DTLS/TLS session MAY be exported from the secure element after the exchange of the finished messages.

This class of Secure Element is referred by this draft as an identity module (IdMod).

The expected benefits of identity modules are the following:

- Secure storage of pre-share keys or private keys
- Trusted simple or mutual authentication between the CoAP device and the CoAP client.
- The device identity is enforced by a non cloneable identity module.
- Trusted cryptographic support.
- Low power consumption for DTLS/TLS processing.

2 What is a Secure Element

A Secure Element (SE) is a tamper resistant microcontroller (see figure 1) equipped with host interfaces such as [ISO7816], SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) or I2C (Inter Integrated Circuit).

The typical area size of these electronic chips is about 5x5 mm². They comprise CPU (8, 16, 32 bits), ROM (a few hundred KB), non volatile memory (EEPROM, FLASH, a few hundred KB) and RAM (a few ten KB). Security is enforced by multiple hardware and logical countermeasures.

According to the [EUROSMART] association height billion of such secure devices were shipped in 2013. Secure elements are widely deployed for electronic payment (EMV cards), telecommunication (SIM modules), identity (electronic passports), ticketing, and access control (PKCS15 cards).

Most of secure elements include a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and therefore are able to execute embedded program written in the JAVACARD language. Because these devices are dedicated to security
purposes they support numerous cryptographic resources such as
digest functions (MD5, SHA1, SHA2...), symmetric cipher (3xDES, AES)
or asymmetric procedures (RSA, ECC).

A set of Global Platform [GP] standards control the lifecycle of
embedded software, i.e. application downloading, activation and
deletion.

As an illustration a typical low cost Secure Element has the
following characteristics:

- JAVACARD operating system;
- Compliant with the GP (Global Platform) standards;
- 160 KB of ROM;
- 72 KB of EEPROM;
- 4KB of RAM;
- Embedded crypto-processor;
- 3DES, AES, RSA, ECC;
- Certification according to Common Criteria (CC) EAL5+ level;
- Security Certificates from payment operators.

According to the state of art, TLS/DTLS stacks may run in secure
elements, for example written as a javacard applications.

Figure 1. A typical hardware architecture of a Secure Element
3 Identity Module for CoAP

ISO7816 interface for Secure Elements providing TLS/DTLS stacks are detailed in [DTLS/TLS-SM]. The Identity module MUST support two commands Reset and Process.

TLS/DTLS packets are transported by the EAP protocol over ISO7816 messages. This mechanism previously detailed by [EAPSC] provides a double segmentation procedure thanks to EAP and ISO7816 facilities.

A DTLS/TLS-ISO7816 software agent sends and receives DTLS/TLS flights to/from sockets over EAP/ISO7816 messages to/from the identity module. Conceptually this component interface SHOULD have four procedures Open, Close, Encrypt and Decrypt.

A socket software agent extracts and send DTLS/TLS flights from/to UDP/TCP packets. Conceptually this component interface SHOULD have four procedures Open, Close, Recv-Flight, Send-Flight.

4 DTLS/TLS profile for CoAP security modules

To be done.

5 IANA Considerations

This draft does not require any action from IANA.
6 References

6.1 Normative References


6.2 Informative References


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Remote APDU Call Secure (RACS)
draft-urien-core-racs-11.txt

Abstract

This document describes the Remote APDU Call Protocol Secure (RACS) protocol, dedicated to Grid of Secure Elements (GoSE). These servers host Secure Elements (SE), i.e. tamper resistant chips offering secure storage and cryptographic resources.

Secure Elements are microcontrollers whose chip area is about 25mm²; they deliver trusted computing services in constrained environments.

RACS supports commands for GoSE inventory and data exchange with secure elements. It is designed according to the representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. RACS resources are identified by dedicated URIs. An HTTP interface is also supported.

An open implementation [OPENRACS] is available (https://github.com/purien) for various OS.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

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1 Overview

This document describes the Remote APDU Call Protocol Secure (RACS) protocol, dedicated to Grids of Secure Elements (GoSE). These servers host Secure Elements (SE), i.e. tamper resistant chips offering secure storage and cryptographic resources.

Secure Elements are microcontrollers whose chip area is about 25mm²; they deliver trusted computing services in constrained environments.

RACS supports commands for GoSE inventory and data exchange with secure elements.

RACS is designed according to the representational State Transfer (REST) architecture [REST], which encompasses the following features:
- Client-Server architecture.
- Stateless interaction.
- Cache operation on the client side.
- Uniform interface.
- Layered system.
- Code On Demand.

1.1 What is a Secure Element

A Secure Element (SE) is a tamper resistant microcontroller equipped with host interfaces such as [ISO7816], SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) or I²C (Inter Integrated Circuit).

The typical area size of these electronic chips is about 25mm². They comprise CPU (8, 16, 32 bits), ROM (a few hundred KB), nonvolatile memory (EEPROM, FLASH, a few hundred KB) and RAM (a few ten KB). Security is enforced by multiple hardware and logical countermeasures.

According to the [EUROSMART] association height billion of such secure devices were shipped in 2013. Secure elements are widely deployed for electronic payment (EMV cards), telecommunication (SIM modules), identity (electronic passports), ticketing, and access control.

Most of secure elements include a Java Virtual Machine and therefore are able to execute embedded program written in the JAVACARD language. Because these devices are dedicated to security purposes they support numerous cryptographic resources such as digest functions (MD5, SHA1, SHA2...), symmetric cipher (3DES, AES) or asymmetric procedures (RSA, ECC).

A set of Global Platform [GP] standards control the lifecycle of embedded software, i.e. application downloading, activation and deletion.
As an illustration a typical Secure Element has the following characteristics:

- JAVACARD operating system;
- Compliant with the GP (Global Platform) standards;
- 160 KB of ROM;
- 72 KB of EEPROM;
- 4KB of RAM;
- Embedded crypto-processor;
- 3xDES, AES, RSA, ECC;
- Certification according to Common Criteria (CC) EAL5+ level;
- Security Certificates from payment operators.

1.2 Grid Of Secure Elements (GoSE)

Figure 1. Architecture of a Grid of Secure Elements

Figure 2. Illustration of an ISO7816 Secure Element

A grid of Secure Elements (GoSE) is a server hosting a set of secure elements.
The goal of these platforms is to deliver trusted services over the Internet. These services are available in two functional planes,
- The user plane, which provides trusted computing and secure storage.
- The management plane, which manages the lifecycle (downloading, activation, deletion) of applications hosted by the Secure Element.

A grid of Secure Elements offers services similar to HSM (Hardware Secure Module), but may be managed by a plurality of administrators, dealing with specific secure microcontrollers.

According to this draft all accesses to a GoSE require the TCP transport and are secured by the TLS [TLS 1.0] [TLS 1.1] [TLS 2.0] protocol.

The RACS protocol provides all the features needed for the remote use of secure elements, i.e.
- Inventory of secure elements
- Information exchange with the secure elements

1.3 Secure Element Identifier (SEID)

Every secure element needs a physical slot that provides electrical feeding and communication resources. This electrical interface is for example realized by a socket soldered on an electronic board, or a CAD (Card Acceptance Device, i.e. a reader) supporting host buses such as USB.

Within the GoSE each slot is identified by a SlotID (slot identifier) attribute, which may be a socket number or a CAD name.

The SEID (Secure Element IDentifier) is a unique identifier indicating that a given SE is hosted by a GoSE. It also implicitly refers the physical slot (SlotID) to which the SE is plugged.

The GoSE manages an internal table that establishes the relationship between SlotIDs and SEIDs.

Therefore three parameters are needed for remote communication with secure element, the IP address of the GoSE, the associated TCP port, and the SEID.

1.3.1 SlotID example

According to the PC/SC (Personal Computer/Smart Card) standard [PS/SC], a smart card reader MAY include a serial number. This attribute (VENDOR-IFD-serial) is associated to the tag 0x0103 in the class VENDOR-INFO.
1.3.2 SEID for Secure Elements

According to the Global Platform standard [GP] the Issuer Security Domain (ISD) manages applications lifecycle (downloading, activation, deletion). The command ‘initialize update’ is used to start a mutual authentication between the administration entity and the secure element; it collects a set of data whose first ten bytes are called the ‘key diversification data’. This information is used to compute symmetric keys, and according for example to [EMV] MAY comprise a serial number.
1.4 APDUs

According to the [ISO7816] standards secure element process ISO7816 request messages and return ISO7816 response messages, named APDUs (application protocol data unit).

1.4.1 ISO7816 APDU request

An APDU request comprises two parts: a header and an optional body.

The header is a set of four or five bytes noted CLA INS P1 P2 P3

- CLA indicates the class of the request, and is usually bound to standardization committee (00 for example means ISO request).
- INS indicates the type of request, for example B0 for reading or D0 for writing.
- P1 P2 gives additional information for the request (such index in a file or identifier of cryptographic procedures).
- P3 indicates the length of the request body (from P3=01 to P3=FF), or the size of the expected response body (a null value meaning 256 bytes). Short ISO7816 requests may comprise only 4 bytes.
- The body may be empty. Its maximum size is 255 bytes.

1.4.2 ISO7816 APDU response

An APDU response comprises two parts an optional body and a mandatory status word.

- The optional body is made of 256 bytes at the most.
- The response ends by a two byte status noted SW. SW1 refers the most significant byte and SW2 the less significant byte.

An error free operation is usually associated to the 9000 status word. Following are some interpretations of the tuple SW1, SW2 according to various standards:

- ‘61’ ‘xx’, indicates that xx bytes (modulus 256) are ready for reading. Operation result MUST be fetched by the ISO Get Response APDU (CLA=00, INS=C0, P1=P2=00, P3=XX)
- ‘9F’ ‘xx’, indicates that xx bytes (modulus 256) are ready for reading. Operation result MUST be fetched by the ISO Get Response APDU (CLA=00, INS=C0, P1=P2=00, P3=XX)
- ‘6C’ ‘XX’, the P3 value is wrong, request must be performed again with the LE parameter value set to ‘XX’
- ‘6E’ ‘XX’, wrong instruction class (CLA) given in the request
- ‘6D’ ‘XX’, unknown instruction code (INS) given in the request
- ‘6B’ ‘XX’, incorrect parameter P1 or P2
- ‘67’ ‘XX’, incorrect parameter P3
- ‘6F’ ‘XX’, technical problem, not implemented...
2 The RACS protocol

The RACS protocol works over the TCP transport layer and is secured by the TLS protocol. The TLS client (i.e. the RACS client) MUST be authenticated by a certificate.

One of the main targets of the RACS protocol is to efficiently push a set of ISO7816 requests towards a secure element in order to perform cryptographic operations in the user’s plane. In that case a RACS request typically comprises a prefix made with multiple ISO7816 requests and a suffix that collects the result of a cryptographic procedure.

The mandatory use of TLS with mutual authentication based on certificate provides a simple and elegant way to establish the credentials of a RACS client over the GoSE. It also enables an easy splitting between users’ and administrators’ privileges.

2.1 Structure of RACS request

A RACS request is a set of command lines, encoded according to the ASCII format. Each line ends by the Cr (carriage return) and line feed (Lf) characters. The RACS protocol is case sensitive.

Each command is a set of tokens (i.e. words) separated by space (0x20) character(s).

The first token of each line is the command to be executed.

A command line MAY comprise other tokens, which are called the command parameters.

A RACS request MUST start by a BEGIN command and MUST end by an END command.

Each command line is associated to an implicit line number. The BEGIN line is associated to the zero line number.
The processing of a RACS request is stopped after the first error. In that case the returned response contained the error status induced by the last executed command.

2.2 Structure of a RACS response

A RACS response is a set of lines, encoded according to the ASCII format. Each line ends by the Cr (carriage return) and line feed (Lf) characters. The RACS protocol is case sensitive.

Each line is a set of tokens (i.e. words) separated by space (0x20) character(s).

The first token of each line is the header.

The second token of response each line is associated command line number

A response line MAY comprise other tokens, which are called the response parameters.

Three classes of headers are defined BEGIN, END and Status.

A RACS response MUST start by a BEGIN header and MUST end by an END header. It comprises one or several status lines.

2.2.1 BEGIN Header

This header starts a response message.

It comprises an optional parameter, an identifier associated to a previous request message.

2.2.2 END Header

This header ends a response message.

2.2.3 Status line

A status header indicates a status line.

It begins by the character ‘+’ in case of success or ‘-’ if an error occurred during the RACS request execution. It is followed by an ASCII encoded integer, which is the value of the status.

The second mandatory token of a status line is the command line number (starting from zero)
A status line MAY comprise other tokens, which are called the response parameters.

2.2.4 Examples of RACS responses:

BEGIN CrLf
+001 000 Success CrLf
END CrLf

BEGIN moon1969 CrLf
-301 007 Illegal command, BEGIN condition not satisfied at line 7
END CrLf

BEGIN Asterix237 CrLf
+006 001 [ISO7816-Response] CrLf
END CrLf

BEGIN CrLf
-100 002 Unknown command at line 2 CrLf
END CrLf

BEGIN CrLf
-606 001 Unauthorized command APDU command at line 1
END CrLf

BEGIN CrLf
-706 001 SEID Already in use, APDU command at line 1
END CrLf

2.3 RACS request commands

2.3.1 BEGIN

This command starts a request message. A response message is returned if an error is detected.

An optional parameter is the request identifier, which MUST be echoed in the parameter of the first response line (i.e. starting by the BEGIN header).

2.3.2 END

This command ends a request message. It returns the response message triggered by the last command.
Example1
========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+001 000 Success CrLf
END CrLf

Example2
========
Request:
BEGIN Marignan1515 CrLf
APDU ASTERIX-CRYPTO-MODULE [ISO7816-Request] CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN Marignan1515 CrLf
+006 001 [ISO7816-Response] CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.3 The APPEND parameter

The APPEND parameter MAY be used in all command lines, excepted BEGIN and END. The APPEND parameter MUST be the last parameter of a command line.

By default a response message returns only the last status line. When APPEND is inserted, the command line, if executed, MUST produce a status line.

Example

Request:
BEGIN SanchoPanza CrLf
APDU 100 [ISO7816-Request-1] CrLf
APDU 100 [ISO7816-Request-2] CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN SanchoPanza CrLf
+006 002 [ISO7816-Response-2] CrLf
END CrLf

Request:
BEGIN DonQuichotte CrLf
APDU 100 [ISO7816-Request-1] APPEND CrLf
APDU 100 [ISO7816-Request-2] APPEND CrLf
END CrLf
2.3.4 GET-VERSION

This command requests the current version of the RACS protocol. The returned response is the current version encoded by two integer separated by the ‘.’ character. The first integer indicates the major version and the second integer gives the minor version.

This draft version is 0.2

Example
========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
GET-VERSION CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+002 001 1.0 CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.5 SET-VERSION

This command sets the version to be used for the RACS request. An error status is returned by the response if an error occurred.

Example 1
=========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
SET-VERSION 2.0 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-403 001 Error line 1 RACS 2.0 is not supported CrLf
END CrLf

Example 2
=========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
SET-VERSION 1.0 CrLf
END CrLf
Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+003 001 RACS 1.0 has been activated CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.6 LIST

This command requests the list of SEID plugged in the GoSE.

It returns a list of SEIDs separated by space (0x20) character(s).

Some SEID attributes MAY be built from a prefix and an integer suffix (such as SE#100 in which SE# is the suffix and 100 is the integer suffix. A list of non-consecutive SEID MAY be encoded as prefix[i1;i2;..;ip] where i1,i2,ip indicates the integer suffix. A list of consecutive SEID could be encoded as prefix[i1-ip] where i1,i2,ip indicates the integer suffix.

Example 1
=======
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
LIST CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+004 001 SEID1 SEID2 CR LF
END CrLf

Example 2
=======
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
LIST CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+004 001 Device[1000-2000] SerialNumber[567;789;243] CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.7 RESET

This command resets a secure element. The first parameter gives the secure element identifier (SEID). An optional second parameter specifies a warm reset. The default behavior is a cold reset. The response status indicates the success or the failure of this operation.
Syntax: RESET SEID [WARM] CrLf

Example 1
==========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
RESET device#45 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+005 001 device#45 Reset Done
END CrLf

Example 2
==========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
RESET device#45 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-705 001 error device#45 is already in use
END CrLf

Example 3
==========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
RESET device#45 WARM CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+005 001 device#45 Warm Reset Done CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.8 APDU

This command sends an ISO7816 request to a secure element or a set of ISO7816 commands.

The first parameter specifies the SEID. The second parameter is an ISO7816 request. Three optional parameters are available; they MUST be located after the second parameter.
CONTINUE=value, indicates that the next RACS command will be executed only if the ISO7816 status word (SW) is equal to a given value. Otherwise an error status is returned.

MORE=value, indicates that a FETCH request will be performed (i.e. a new ISO7816 request will be sent) if the first byte of the ISO7816 status word (SW1) is equal to a given value.

FETCH=value fixes the four bytes of the ISO7816 FETCH request (i.e. CLA INS P1 P2). The default value (when FETCH is omitted) is 00C00000 (CLA=00, INS=C0, P1=00, P2=00)

When the options CONTINUE and MORE are simultaneously set the SW1 byte is first checked. If there is no match then the SW word is afterwards checked.

The ISO7816 6Cxx status MUST be autonomously processed by the GoSE.

SYNTAX

APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST [CONTINUE=SW] [MORE=SW1] [FETCH=CMD] CrLf

The returned response is the ISO7816 response. If multiple ISO7816 requests are executed (due to the MORE option), the bodies are concatenated in the response, which ends by the last ISO7816 status word.

The pseudo code of the APDU command is the following:

1. BODY = empty;
2. SW = empty;
3. DoIt = true;
4. Do
5. iso7816-response = send(iso7816-request);
6. body || sw1 || sw2 = iso7816-response;
7. If ( (first request) && (iso7816-request.size==5) && (body==empty) && (sw1==6C) )
8. iso7816-request.P3 = sw2;
9. Else
10. SW = sw1 || sw2
11. BODY = BODY || body;
12. If (sw1 == MORE)
13. iso7816-request = FETCH || sw2;
14. Else
15. DoIt=false;
16. While (DoIt == true)
17. iso7816-response = BODY || SW;
18. If (SW != CONTINUE) Error;
19. Else
20. No Error;
Example 1
=======
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+006 001 ISO7816-RESPONSE CrLf
END CrLf

Example 2
=======
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-706 001 error SEID is already used CrLf
END CrLf

Example 3
=======
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-606 001 error access unauthorized access CrLf
END CrLf

Example 4
=======
BEGIN CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST-1 CONTINUE=9000 CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST-2 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+006 002 ISO7816-RESPONSE-2 CrLf
END CrLf
Example 5
=========
BEGIN CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST-1 CONTINUE=9000 CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQUEST-2 CrLf
END CrLf
Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-006 001 Request Error line 1 wrong SW CrLf
END CrLf

Example 6
=========
BEGIN CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQ-1 CONTINUE=9000 CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQ-2 CONTINUE=9000 CrLf
APDU SEID ISO7816-REQ-3 CONTINUE=9000 MORE=61 FETCH=00C00000 CrLf
END CrLf
Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+006 003 ISO7816-RESP-3 CrLf
END CrLf

Multiple ISO7816 requests have been performed by the third APDU command according to the following scenario:
- the ISO7816-REQ-3 request has been forwarded to the secure element (SEID)
- the ISO 7816 response comprises a body (body-0) and a status word (SW-0) whose first byte is 0x61, and the second byte is SW2-0
- the FETCH command CLA=00, INS=00, P1=00, P2=00, P3=SW2-0 is sent to the secure element
- the ISO 7816 response comprises a body (body-1) and a status word (SW-1) set to 9000

The RACS response is set to
+006 003 body-0 || body-1 || SW-1 CrLf
where || indicates a concatenation operation.

2.3.9 SHUTDOWN

This command powers down a secure element. The first parameter gives the secure element identifier (SEID).

Syntax: SHUTDOWN SEID CrLf
Example
==========
Request:
BEGIN Goodbye CrLf
SHUTDOWN device#45 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN Goodbye CrLf
+007 001 device#45 has been powered down CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.10 POWERON

This command powers up a secure element. The first parameter gives the secure element identifier (SEID).

Syntax: POWERON SEID CrLf

Example 1
==========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
POWERON device#45 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
+008 001 device#45 Has been powered up CrLf
END CrLf

Example 2
==========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
POWERON device#45 CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-708 001 error device#45 is already in use CrLf
END CrLf

Example 3
==========
Request:
BEGIN CrLf
POWERON device#45 CrLf
END CrLf
Response:
BEGIN CrLf
-608 001 error unauthorized access CrLf
END CrLf

2.3.11 ECHO

This command echoes a token. The first parameter is the token (word) to be echoed by the response.

Syntax: ECHO SEID CrLf

Example 1
==========
Request:
BEGIN TestEcho CrLf
ECHO Hello CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN TestEcho CrLf
+009 001 Hello CrLf
END CrLf

Example 2
==========
Request:
BEGIN ResetSEID CrLf
POWERON device#45 CrLf
ECHO Done CrLf
END CrLf

Response:
BEGIN ResetSEID CrLf
+009 001 Done CrLf
END CrLf

2.4 Status header encoding

The first token of a response line is the status header. It begins by a ‘+’ or a ‘-’ character, and comprises three decimal digits (xyz).

The first digit (x) MUST indicates an event class. The second and third digits (yz) MAY indicate a command class.
2.4.1 Event class

This draft only defines the meaning of the first digit located at the left most side.

+0yz: No error
-0yz: Command execution error
-1yz: Unknown command, the command is not defined by this draft
-2yz: Not implemented command
-3yz: Illegal command, the command can't be executed
-4yz: Not supported parameter or parameter illegal value
-5yz: Parameter syntax error or parameter missing
-6yz: Unauthorized command
-7yz: Already in use, a session with this SE is already opened
-8yz: Hardware error
-9yz: System error

2.4.2 Command class

The second and third digits (yz) MAY indicates the command that trigged the current line status

01 BEGIN
02 GET-VERSION
03 SET-VERSION
04 LIST
05 RESET
06 APDU
07 SHUTDOWN
08 POWERON
09 ECHO
3 URI for the GoSE

The URI addressing the resources hosted by the GoSE is represented by the string:

RACS://GoSE-Name:port/?request

where request is the RACS request to be forwarded to a the GoSE.

RACS command lines are encoded in a way similar to the INPUT field of an HTML form. Each command is associated to an INPUT name, the remaining of the command line i.e. a set of ASCII characters, is written according to the URL encoding rules. End of line characters, i.e. carriage return (Cr) and line feed (Lf) are omitted.

As a consequence a request is written to the following syntax

cmd1=cmd1-parameters&cmd2=cmd2-parameters

Example:
RACS://GoSE-Name:port/?BEGIN=&APDU=SEID%20[ISO7816-REQUEST]&END=

4 HTTP interface

A GoSE SHOULD support an HTTP interface. RACS requests/responses are transported by HTTP messages. The use of TLS is mandatory.

4.1 HTTPS Request

https://GoSE-Name:port/RACS?request

where request is the RACS request to be forwarded to a secure element (SEID)

The RACS request is associated to an HTML form whose name is "RACS". The request command lines are encoded as the INPUT field of an HTML form. Each command is associated to an INPUT name, the remaining of the command line i.e. a set of ASCII characters is written according to the URL encoding rules. End of line characters, i.e. carriage return (Cr) and line feed (Lf) are omitted.

As a consequence a RACS request is written as

https://GoSE-Name/RACS?cmd1=cmd1-parameters&cmd2=cmd2-parameters

Example:

https://GoSE-Name/RACS?BEGIN=&APDU=SEID%20[ISO7816-REQUEST]&END=
4.2 HTTPS response

The RACS response is returned in an XML document.

The root element of the document is `<RACS-Response>`

The optional parameter of the BEGIN header, is the content of the `<begin>` element.

Each status line is the content of the `<Cmd-Response>` element, which includes the following information:

- The status header is the content of the `<status>` element.
- The line number is the content of the `<line>` element.
- The other parameters of the status line are the content of the `<parameters>` element.

The END header is associated to the element `<end>`

End of line, i.e. carriage return (Cr) and line feed (Lf) characters are omitted.

As a consequence a RACS response is written as:

```
<RACS-Response>
<begin>Optional-ID</begin>
<Cmd-Response>
<status>+000</status>
<line>001</line>
<parameters>other parameters of the RACS response</parameters>
</Cmd-Response>
<end></end>
</RACS-Response>
```

5 Security Considerations

5.1 Authorization

A RACS client MUST be authenticated by an X509 certificate.

The GoSE software MUST provide a mean to establish a list of SEIDs that can be accessed from a client whose identity is the CommonName (CN) attribute of its certificate. It MAY allocate a UserID (UID), i.e. an integer index from the certificate common name.

5.2 Secure Element access

The GoSE MUST manage a unique session identifier (SID) for each TLS session. The SID is bound to the client’s certificate CommonName (SID(CN))
A secure element has two states, unlocked and locked. In the locked state the secure element may be only used by the SID that previously locked it.

The first authorized command that successfully accesses to a SEID (either POWERON, RESET, APDU) locks a secure element (SEID) with the current session (SID).

The SHUTDOWN command MUST unlock a secure element (SEID).

The end of a TLS session MUST unlock all the secure elements locked by the session.

5.3 Applications security policy

According to the [ISO7816] standards each Application embedded within a secure element (associated to a SEID) is identified by an AID parameter (16 bytes at the most)

The RACS server SHOULD support the following facilities

5.3.1 Users-Table

Each CN (the Users-Table primary key) is associated to a list of SEIDs whose access is authorized.

5.3.2 SEID-Table

Each AID (the SEID-Table primary key) is associated to a list of CNs whose access is authorized.

5.3.3 APDU-Table

For a given AID and an authorized CN, an APDU-Table MAY be available. This table acts as a firewall, which defined a set of forbidden ISO7816 commands.

For example this filter could be expressed as a set of the four first bytes of an APDU-Prefix (CLA INS P1 P2) and a four bytes Mask

An ISO7816-Request is firewall if:

ISO7816-Request AND Mask IsEQUAL to APDU-Prefix
5.4 Overview of the security policy

The summary of the security policy is illustrated by the figure 3.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{CN(uid)} & \quad / \quad \text{TLS-Session} & \quad / \quad \text{sid} & \quad / \quad \text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU} \\
\text{sid} & \quad / \quad \text{sid} & \quad / \quad \text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU} \\
\text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{aid} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU} \\
\text{APDU} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU} & \quad / \quad \text{APDU}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 3. Summary of the security policy

6 IANA Considerations

This draft does not require any action from IANA.

7 References

7.1 Normative References


[ISO7816] ISO 7816, "Cards Identification - Integrated Circuit Cards with Contacts", The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

7.2 Informative References


[OPENRACS] https://github.com/purien, open RACS implementation for Win32, Ubuntu, Raspberrypi

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Constrained YANG Module Library
draft-veillette-core-yang-library-03

Abstract

This document describes a constrained version of the YANG library that provides information about the YANG modules, datastores, and datastore schemas used by a constrained network management server (e.g., a CoMI server).

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

There is a need for a standard mechanism to expose which YANG modules, datastores and datastore schemas are in use by a constrained network management server. This document defines the YANG module ‘ietf-constrained-yang-library’ that provides this information.

YANG module ‘ietf-constrained-yang-library’ shares the same data model and objectives as ‘ietf-yang-library’, only datatypes and mandatory requirements have been updated to minimize its size to allow its implementation by Constrained Nodes and/or Constrained Networks as defined by [RFC7228]. To review the list of objectives and proposed data model, please refer to [I-D.ietf-netconf-rfc7895bis] section 2 and 3.

2. Terminology and Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The following terms are defined in [RFC7950]: client, deviation, feature, module, submodule and server.

The following term is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]: YANG Schema Item IDentifier (SID).

The following terms are defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-rfc7895bis]: YANG library and YANG library checksum.
3. Overview

The conceptual model of the YANG library is depicted in Figure 1.

```
+-----------+
| datastore |
+-----------+
  has a
  +-----------+
  | datastore |
  |  schema   |
  V
  +-----------+
  | union of  |
  | module set|
  | consists of |
  | modules + |
  | submodules|
```

Figure 1: Abstract CoMI architecture

It’s expected that most constrained network management servers have one datastore (e.g. a unified datastore). However, some servers may have multiples datastore as described by NMDA [RFC8342]. The YANG library data model supports both cases.

In this model, every datastore has an associated datastore schema, which is the union of module sets, which is a collection of modules. Multiple datastores may refer to the same datastore schema and individual datastore schemas may share module sets.

For each module, the YANG library provide:

- the YANG module identifier (i.e. SID)
- its revision
- its list of submodules
- its list of imported modules
- its set of features and deviations

YANG module namespace and location are also supported, but their implementation is not recommended for constrained servers.

3.1. Tree diagram

The tree diagram of YANG module ietf-constrained-yang-library is provided below. This graphical representation of a YANG module is defined in [RFC8340].
module: ietf-constrained-yang-library
  +--ro yang-library
    +--ro module-set* [index]
      +--ro index            uint8
    +--ro module* [identifier]
      +--ro identifier      comi:sid
      +--ro revision?       revision-identifier
      +--ro namespace?      inet:uri
      +--ro location*       inet:uri
      +--ro submodule* [identifier]
        +--ro identifier    comi:sid
        +--ro revision?     revision-identifier
        +--ro location*     inet:uri
      +--ro feature*        comi:sid
      +--ro deviation*      -> ../../module/identifier
    +--ro import-only-module* [identifier revision]
      +--ro identifier      comi:sid
      +--ro revision        union
      +--ro namespace       inet:uri
      +--ro location*       inet:uri
      +--ro submodule* [identifier]
        +--ro identifier    comi:sid
        +--ro revision?     revision-identifier
        +--ro location*     inet:uri
    +--ro schema* [index]
      +--ro index         uint8
      +--ro module-set*   -> ../../module-set/index
    +--ro datastore* [identifier]
      +--ro identifier    ds:datastore-ref
      +--ro schema        -> ../../schema/index
    +--ro checksum      binary

notifications:
  +---n yang-library-update
    +--ro checksum    -> /yang-library/checksum

3.2. Major differences between ietf-constrained-yang-library and ietf-yang-library

The list of changes between the reference data model ‘ietf-yang-library’ and its constrained version ‘ietf-constrained-yang-library’ are listed below:

o module-set ‘name’ and schema ‘name’ are implemented using an 8 bits unsigned integer and renamed ‘index’.
module 'name', submodule 'name' and datastore 'name' are
implemented using a SID (i.e. an unsigned integer) and renamed
‘identifier’.

‘feature’ and ‘deviation’ are implemented using a SID (i.e. an
unsigned integer).

‘revision’ fields are implemented using a 4 bytes binary string.

the mandatory requirement of the ‘namespace’ fields is removed,
and implementation is not recommended. SIDs used by constrained
devices and protocols doesn’t require namespaces.

the implementation of the ‘location’ fields are not recommended,
the use of the module SID as the handle to retrieve the associated
YANG module is proposed instead.

4. YANG Module "ietf-constrained-yang-library"

RFC Ed.: update the date below with the date of RFC publication and
remove this note.

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-yang-library@2018-01-20.yang"
module ietf-constrained-yang-library {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-yang-library";
  prefix "yanglib";

  import ietf-comi {
    prefix comi;
    reference "I-D.ietf-core-comi";
  }
  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
  }
  import ietf-datastores {
    prefix ds;
    reference "RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA).";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:  <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/core/>"
This module provides information about the YANG modules, datastores, and datastore schemas implemented by a constrained network management server.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.


revision 2018-09-21 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "I-D.veillette-core-yang-library";
}

*/
* Typedefs
*/

typedef revision-identifier {
  type binary {
    length "4";
  }
  description
    "Revision date encoded as a binary string, each nibble representing
a digit of the revision date. For example, revision 2018-09-21 is encoded as 0x20 0x18 0x09 0x21."

/*
* Groupings
*/

grouping module-identification-leafs {
    description
    "Parameters for identifying YANG modules and submodules."

    leaf identifier {
        type comi:sid;
        mandatory true;
        description
        "SID assigned to this module or submodule.";
    }

    leaf revision {
        type revision-identifier;
        description
        "The YANG module or submodule revision date. If no revision statement is present in the YANG module or submodule, this leaf is not instantiated.";
    }
}

grouping location-leaf-list {
    description
    "Common location leaf list parameter for modules and submodules."

    leaf-list location {
        type inet:uri;
        description
        "Contains a URL that represents the YANG schema resource for this module or submodule.

        This leaf is present in the model to keep the alignment with 'ietf-yang-library'. Support of this leaf in constrained devices is not necessarily required, nor expected. It is recommended that clients used the module or sub-module SID as the handle used to retrieve the corresponding YANG module";
    }
}

grouping implementation-parameters {
    description

"Parameters for describing the implementation of a module."

leaf-list feature {
  type comi:sid;
  description
  "List of all YANG feature names from this module that are
  supported by the server, regardless whether they are defined
  in the module or any included submodule.";
}

leaf-list deviation {
  type leafref {
    path "../../module/identifier";
  }
  description
  "List of all YANG deviation modules used by this server to
  modify the conformance of the module associated with this
  entry. Note that the same module can be used for deviations
  for multiple modules, so the same entry MAY appear within
  multiple 'module' entries.

  This reference MUST NOT (directly or indirectly)
  refer to the module being deviated.

  Robust clients may want to make sure that they handle a
  situation where a module deviates itself (directly or
  indirectly) gracefully.";
}

grouping module-set-parameters {
  description
  "A set of parameters that describe a module set."

  leaf index {
    type uint8;
    description
    "An arbitrary number assigned of the module set.";
  }

  list module {
    key "identifier";
    description
    "An entry in this list represents a module implemented by the
    server, as per RFC 7950 section 5.6.5, with a particular set
    of supported features and deviations.";
    reference
    "RFC 7950: The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language.";

    uses module-identification-leafs;
  }
}
leaf namespace {
    type inet:uri;
    description
    "The XML namespace identifier for this module.
    This leaf is present in the model to keep the alignment
    with 'ietf-yang-library'. Support of this leaf in
    constrained devices is not required, nor expected.";
}

uses location-leaf-list;

list submodule {
    key "identifier";
    description
    "Each entry represents one submodule within the parent
    module.";
    uses module-identification-leafs;
    uses location-leaf-list;
}

uses implementation-parameters;

list import-only-module {
    key "identifier revision";
    description
    "An entry in this list indicates that the server imports
    reusable definitions from the specified revision of the
    module, but does not implement any protocol accessible
    objects from this revision.

    Multiple entries for the same module name MAY exist. This
    can occur if multiple modules import the same module, but
    specify different revision-dates in the import statements.";

    leaf identifier {
        type comi:sid;
        description
        "The YANG module name.";
    }

    leaf revision {
        type union {
            type revision-identifier;
            type string {
                length 0;
            }
        }
    }

    description
    "The YANG module revision date.";
}
leaf namespace {
    type inet:uri;
    mandatory true;
    description
        "The XML namespace identifier for this module.
        This leaf is present in the model to keep the alignment
        with 'ietf-yang-library'. Support of this leaf in
        constrained devices is not required, nor expected."
}

uses location-leaf-list;

list submodule {
    key "identifier";
    description
        "Each entry represents one submodule within the
        parent module."
    uses module-identification-leafs;
    uses location-leaf-list;
}

grouping yang-library-parameters {
    description
        "The YANG library data structure is represented as a grouping
        so it can be reused in configuration or another monitoring
        data structure."
    list module-set {
        key index;
        description
            "A set of modules that may be used by one or more schemas.
            A module set does not have to be referentially complete,
            i.e., it may define modules that contain import statements
            for other modules not included in the module set."
        uses module-set-parameters;
    }
    list schema {
        key "index";
        description
            "A datastore schema that may be used by one or more
            datastores."
The schema must be valid and referentially complete, i.e., it must contain modules to satisfy all used import statements for all modules specified in the schema."

leaf index {
  type uint8;
  description
    "An arbitrary reference number assigned to the schema.";
}
leaf-list module-set {
  type leafref {
    path "../../module-set/index";
  }
  description
    "A set of module-sets that are included in this schema. If a non import-only module appears in multiple module sets, then the module revision and the associated features and deviations must be identical.";
}

list datastore {
  key "identifier";
  description
    "A datastore supported by this server.
    Each datastore indicates which schema it supports.
    The server MUST instantiate one entry in this list per specific datastore it supports.
    Each datastore entry with the same datastore schema SHOULD reference the same schema.";
  leaf identifier {
    type ds:datastore-ref;
    description
      "The identity of the datastore.";
  }
  leaf schema {
    type leafref {
      path "../../schema/index";
    }
    mandatory true;
    description
      "A reference to the schema supported by this datastore.
      All non import-only modules of the schema are implemented with their associated features and deviations.";
  }
}
/*
 * Top-level container
 */

container yang-library {
  config false;
  description
    "Container holding the entire YANG library of this server."
  
  uses yang-library-parameters;

  leaf checksum {
    type binary;
    mandatory true;
    description
      "A server-generated checksum or digest of the contents of the
       ‘yang-library’ tree. The server MUST change the value of
       this leaf if the information represented by the
       ‘yang-library’ tree, except ‘yang-library/checksum’, has
       changed."
  }
}

/*
 * Notifications
 */

notification yang-library-update {
  description
    "Generated when any YANG library information on the
     server has changed."

  leaf checksum {
    type leafref {
      path "/yanglib:yang-library/yanglib:checksum";
    } mandatory true;
    description
      "Contains the YANG library checksum or digest for the updated
       YANG library at the time the notification is generated."
  }
}

<CODE ENDS>
5. IANA Considerations

5.1. YANG Module Registry

This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC7950].

name: ietf-constrained-yang-library
prefix: lib
reference: RFC XXXX
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with RFC number and remove this note

6. Security Considerations

This YANG module is designed to be accessed via the CoMI protocol [I-D.ietf-core-comi]. Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access to these data nodes.

Specifically, the ‘module’ list may help an attacker to identify the server capabilities and server implementations with known bugs. Server vulnerabilities may be specific to particular modules, module revisions, module features, or even module deviations. This information is included in each module entry. For example, if a particular operation on a particular data node is known to cause a server to crash or significantly degrade device performance, then the module list information will help an attacker identify server implementations with such a defect, in order to launch a denial of service attack on the device.

7. Acknowledgments

The YANG module defined by this memo have been derived from an already existing YANG module, ietf-yang-library [I-D.ietf-netconf-rfc7895bis], we will like to thanks to the authors of this YANG module. A special thank also to Andy Bierman for his initial recommendations for the creation of this YANG module.
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Requirements Analysis for OPC UA over CoAP
draft-wang-core-opcua-transmition-requirements-03

Abstract

Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is an application protocol proposed for constrained nodes and constrained networks. Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is an attractive scenario for CoAP. OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) defines a semantic-based information model and a service-oriented architecture for IIoT, which can satisfy the requirements of Industry 4.0. This document analyses requirements for transmitting OPC UA over CoAP.

Status of this Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2019.
1. Introduction

CoAP is a web application protocol designed for resource constrained devices and constrained networks which has been widely used in machine-to-machine (M2M) communications [RFC7252]. The purpose of applying CoAP to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is to provide connectivity for the devices. Whereas the communication of Industry 4.0 not only requires data value transmission, but also requires semantic information exchange. According to the definition of Industry 4.0 for communication, CoAP needs to support the exchange of semantic information, namely the semantic information model. For current protocols supporting semantic information model in the IIoT, the information model defined by OPC UA [IEC TR 62541-1] is very promising and its interactive model is similar to the
interactive model of CoAP, so it can be applied as a branch of the CoAP message payload.

2. Architecture of OPC UA over CoAP

To meet the needs of IIoT, the architecture of OPC UA over CoAP can be mainly divided into the following two patterns:

1) Figure 1 presents a logical layered structure of OPC UA Information Model over CoAP. In the transport layer, DTLS runs on top of UDP to secure transmission. Then, the middle layer utilizes the message mode defined in the CoAP protocol. Lastly, the information model of OPC UA [IEC TR 62541-5] is defined as an application of CoAP at the top. In such a hierarchical structure, the semantic-based data information in OPC UA can be transmitted in resources-constrained scenarios, so that CoAP can meet the requirements of semantic information transmission.

![Figure 1: OPC UA Information Model over CoAP](image)

2) In order to take full advantage of the service sets defined by OPC UA, this document proposes the other architecture for OPC UA.

![Figure 2: OPC UA Information Model and Services over CoAP](image)
transmission over CoAP. As shown in Figure 2, the information model of OPC UA is defined as the application of CoAP, moreover, the connection establishment, creating session, publish/subscribe and other functions related to data information interaction are all implemented by the service sets defined by OPC UA. CoAP is mainly responsible for the definition of message format and runs over UDP to keep the implementation lightweight.

3. Requirements for OPC UA over CoAP

3.1. Encoding

CoAP messages are encoded in a simple binary format that starts with a fixed-size 4-byte header. The header is followed by a variable-length Token value, which can be between 0 and 8 bytes long. Following the Token value comes a sequence of zero or more CoAP Options in Type-Length-Value (TLV) format, optionally followed by a payload that takes up the rest of the datagram. In addition, the OPC UA protocol coding mainly includes two ways that are binary and XML. Therefore, in order to transmit the information model of OPC UA over CoAP, specific frame formats of CoAP need to be designed to support two kinds of coding modes of OPC UA.

3.2. Application Sublayer Optimization

For information exchange, the document [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub] defines the corresponding application sublayer, OPC UA also defines a number of specific communication patterns. For example, in the new specification defined by OPC UA, there are two publish/subscribe modes. one is the Broker-less mode, another is Broker-based mode. Correspondingly, in the publish/subscribe specification of CoAP, it introduces broker mechanism in which the client sends the state information to the Broker and the Broker provides storage and forwarding function to implement the publish/subscribe function. Comparing above two protocols, they are achieved the publish/subscribe function by the Broker. But it is still necessary to optimize the application sublayer of CoAP to support some particular communication modes of OPC UA.

3.3. Consistency

The interactive model of CoAP is the client/server model. However, in M2M scenarios, CoAP entities often act as both servers and clients. Compared to OPC UA, though the interactive model is also the client/server model, there is a set of supported services in the OPC UA server. Consequently, for the great difference of the server definition of these two protocols, we need to tackle with the
consistency and integration issues between the CoAP server and the OPC UA server.

3.4. Reliability

One of the main design goals of CoAP is to satisfy some special requirements such as communication in the constrained scenarios that address power consumption. Hence, in order to reduce network overhead and avoid network congestion, CoAP is designed to run over UDP, which is a good choice to achieve inter-network data exchange in use of the IP architecture. However, UDP is a connectionless transport layer protocol that provides unreliable information transmission services. In the field of IIoT, we need to ensure the reliability of data transmission to avoid losing some important data information. Moreover, CoAP addresses transmission reliability by defining a message as requiring acknowledgment, obviously this is not enough to meet the high reliability requirements in the field of IIoT, so the reliability of CoAP remains to be optimized.

3.5. Transmission Methods

For OPC UA over CoAP, one of the important issues that needs to be addressed is how to transmit messages. The connection between OPC UA client and server is stateful, the connection status need to be maintained in the process of message interaction, while CoAP is a stateless connection, so that the message transmission of the two protocols is different. Fortunately, the transport layer protocol of OPC UA supports TCP and HTTP, in addition, the CoAP protocol can be considered that it is improved for constrained scenarios based on HTTP. Therefore, a solution can be found for the messages transmission by using the similarity of two protocols in HTTP.

3.6. Cache

In order to reduce response time and network bandwidth consumption, CoAP provides caching responses in the endpoints. When the endpoint gets the request, it may use the old message to reply the request. It is meaningful for the resource-constrained devices to save resource. However, the information model of OPC UA does not support the mechanism that should be solved by proposing some ways.

3.7. Usability

For OPC UA over CoAP, it contain the key technologies of two different protocols. It is difficult for application developers to master the two protocols at the same time. Moreover, application developers usually focus on the implementation of the function, and do not care about the specific implementation process of the
underlying protocol. So, OPC UA over CoAP need to remain independent from the application. On the other hand, it should maintain the flexibility of configuration so that application developers can set it to satisfy different needs.

4. Security Considerations

The security of CoAP includes four modes in which three modes implemented based on the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) except the non-security mode. However, the security architecture of OPC UA is built on the application layer and the communication layer above the transport layer. Specifically, the application layer adopts the authentication and authorization, and the communication layer achieves the security of OPC UA [IEC TR 62541-2] through secure channel encryption. Though OPC UA has four modes, the security model of OPC UA is realized based on Transport Layer Security (TLS). Actually, DTLS is an addition to TLS to solve the unreliable transmission feature of UDP. Currently, some documents show that CoAP needs to support TLS. Therefore, the security of the two protocols can be implemented jointly.

5. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References

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Abstract

This draft mainly focuses on the scalable architecture and publishing protocol standard of REST-based SAAS cloud model Web software in non-programming mode, stipulates the data structure pattern and data exchange protocol for the construction and release of REST-based scalable Web cloud service software systems. Using the standardized framework and protocol, users can easily and quickly design their own software systems in the cloud, transfer and release data, which may make conventional software development so easy to improve the efficiency of complex database construction and server management. Without having to write codes under the standard framework, users can get consistent style background to create service, rapidly develop web application systems with the function of standard data management and data maintenance, and directly publish the software system to the end users of the Internet for access and use. And provide RESTful APIs to facilitate external access to required service resources. The framework can thus greatly shorten the software development life cycle, and save a great deal of development cost and maintenance overhead.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

With the rise of the Internet (especially the mobile Internet), Internet-oriented Web services become the mainstream of software architecture in the information age, but sophisticated web database construction and system management bring great increase of cost of software development, operation and maintenance. Whenever a system needs to be upgraded or updated, a large amount of coding workload is inevitable. With the rapid development of cloud computing and the growing popularity of SAAS, more and more users intend to migrate their software systems and deploy them to the cloud to get the cloud service resources they need. At the same time, there exists a common abstract model in the web information system, the system takes data management and maintenance as the core content, we can therefore extract its common features and provide a series of standards and requirements for the flexible construction and agile release of web software. In conclusion, cloud-oriented software migration and deployment technology has very important theoretical and practical significance. This draft focuses on the implementation standard of a cloud-oriented software migration and deployment technology, through which users can generate their own software system and migrate and
deploy to the cloud by simple operation. At the same time, it also provides an open RESTful API for users to obtain the required service resources through requests. From the development point of view, this kind of technology can transfer and deploy the software system conveniently and quickly, subtract the tedious and large number of coding work, and avoid repeated development. From the perspective of use, the convenient operation of this technology reduces the learning cost of users, has a strong usability, and has a unified front-end style. Users can access their own proprietary software system through the Internet, which is easy to promote. It also provides an expressive RESTful API that gives users the flexibility to adapt to complex and changing needs.

2. Definitions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

The following definitions are for terms used in the context of this document.

- "SAAS": SAAS is an abbreviation of Software-as-a-Service. It is a model for providing software over the Internet. The manufacturer deploys the application software on its own server, and customers can purchase the required application services according to their actual needs through the Internet, pay the cost to the manufacturers according to the quantity of service and the length of the order, and obtain the services provided by the manufacturers through the Internet.

- "Cloud Computing": Cloud computing is a pay-per-use model that provides available, convenient, on-demand network access, the user enters a configurable computing resource sharing pool (resources include network, server, storage, application software, services), these resources can be provided quickly, with little administrative effort or little interaction with service providers.

- "Cloud Services": Cloud services are models of the addition, use, and delivery of Internet-based related services, often involving the provision of dynamically scalable and often virtualized resources over the Internet.

- "Cloud Storage": Cloud storage is a network computer data storage model. Data is stored on multiple virtual hosts and is generally held by a third party rather than on a dedicated server.
o "Cloud Migration": Cloud migration refers to the migration of enterprises from traditional platforms to cloud platforms. Compared with traditional application platforms, cloud computing platforms have the advantages of powerful computing power, storage capacity, diverse services and high cost performance.

o "Software Migration": This draft is aimed at migrating existing software systems that meet user requirements to a lightweight information management software migration cloud service platform. Systems migrated to the platform can be accessed over the Internet.

o "Software Deployment": This draft is aimed at rapidly deploying a new software system that meets user requirements on the lightweight information management software migration cloud service platform. The software system can be accessed through the Internet.

o "Content Management": Using advanced information technology to help users create, store, transmit, publish, apply and analyze content, and use computer technology to evolve and extract it to create more valuable content for enterprises and individuals.

o "NoSQL": Do not use SQL database. Such databases refer to other types of databases other than traditional relational databases. This type of database is more consistent and can handle very large and high concurrent data. The techniques in this draft use NoSQL to provide storage.

o "Distributed Database": It is a distributed file storage-based database designed to provide a scalable, high-performance data storage solution for web applications.

o "Web API": Web Application Programming Interface. An application programming interface is an interface that allows users to access information from another service and integrate the service into its own application.

o "REST": Representational State Transfer. A software architecture style, the service is abstracted into a set of discrete resources. Through the HTTP protocol, different request methods (POST, DELETE, PUT, GET) add, delete, modify, and query the resources specified by the URI.

o "Restlet Framework": The Restlet project provides a lightweight and comprehensive framework for "building a mapping between REST concepts and Java classes". It can be used to implement any kind of RESTful system, not just RESTful web services.
o "Multi-Tenant Technology": A software architecture technology, whose key goal is to share the same system or program components in a multi-user environment and to ensure logical isolation of data between users.

o "Privilege Control": The permission control used in this draft refers to adopting the role-based access control principle and the group configuration permission template method to achieve the separation of the authority control from the business logic.

o "Certification Security": Authentication security is part of the security of the system. The authentication security system used in this draft adopts the Cookie mechanism on the client side and the Session mechanism on the server side, and uses the MD5 message digest algorithm to achieve the authentication security of the entire session.

o "Non-Programming Mode": Non-Programming Mode is defined as a kind of software development mode in this draft, referring to develop a software without any codes.

3. Technical Specific Implementation Standards

The main goal of this software migration deployment technology is to help users quickly deploy a specific software system of their own on a designated lightweight information management software development and migration cloud service platform, or to migrate the user’s traditional software systems to the designated lightweight information management software migration cloud service platform. We propose an implementation standard for this technology so that users who need it can use it for software development, migration, and deployment.

Note: The cloud platforms described in the draft are all designated lightweight information management software development and migration cloud service platforms. The cloud platform administrator refers to the administrator of the cloud service platform for the designated lightweight information management software. The system administrator is the administrator of the software system on the cloud platform, also known as the tenant. The user is a normal user under each software system, and is lower than the system administrator level user.

3.1. System Architecture Diagram
Figure 1 shows the working diagram of the framework.

Step (1) Requirements Submission: The user fills in the software system requirements information in the software system requirements table, and submits the request to GWDI through the browser.

Step (2) Demand Acquisition: GWDI obtains the software system requirements table submitted by the user, and reads the relevant information related to the requirements in the software system requirements table.

Step (3) Information Verification: GWDI analyzes and verifies the relevant information about the system requirements obtained.

Step (4) System Generation: Automatically construct a Web software system based on the verified requirements related information, and inject the system into the cloud platform.

Figure 1: Reference Architecture

The standard requires a general Web Data Interface (GWDI). The system workflow is as follows:

- Step (1) Requirements Submission: The user fills in the software system requirements information in the software system requirements table, and submits the request to GWDI through the browser.
- Step (2) Demand Acquisition: GWDI obtains the software system requirements table submitted by the user, and reads the relevant information related to the requirements in the software system requirements table.
- Step (3) Information Verification: GWDI analyzes and verifies the relevant information about the system requirements obtained.
- Step (4) System Generation: Automatically construct a Web software system based on the verified requirements related information, and inject the system into the cloud platform.
3.2. SAAS Cloud Platform Related Implementation Standards

The technology MUST build a SAAS cloud platform that provides content management and data storage capabilities that can be rented to multiple tenants who are application developers. The platform includes the following modules:

- Application Management Module
- End User Management Module
- Relationship Management Module between the End User and the Application
- Resource Management Module
- Fine-grained Access Rights Management Module

3.2.1. Application Management Module

The application management module of the platform MUST support applications developed by management tenants, including:

- Adding application
- Deleting application

3.2.2. End User Management Module

The end-user management module of the platform MUST support the management of end-user information for all applications of the tenant, including:

- End-user registration
- The end user changes the password
- End-user logout

3.2.3. Relationship Management Module between the End User and the Application

The relationship management module between the end user of the platform and the application MUST support the management of the use relationship between the end user and the application, including:

- Establishment of user relationship
3.2.4. Resource Management Module

The resource management module of the platform MUST include at least:

- Structured data resource management module

  The structured data resource management module is used to manage the tenant’s structured data in the cloud platform, including management of structured data table information, management of structured data table data resources. Each row of structured data resources will belong to a unique table, and will also belong to a unique user.

- File resource management module

  The file resource management module is used to manage the file resources of the tenant in the cloud platform. Each file resource will belong to the only application and the only user.

3.2.5. Fine-grained Access Rights Management Module

The fine-grained access authority management module of the platform MUST support the management of end-user access rights to fine-grained resources within the tenant, including:

- Structured form row data resource authority management module

  The structured form row data resource authority management module includes:

  + For each structured table, configure the application of the structured table;

  + For each structured table, configure the access rights of the end user of the application to which the structured table belongs;

  + For each structured table, configure the access rights of the end user of the application that does not use the structured table;

  + For each structured table, configure the access rights of the end user to the single-row data resources that do not belong to the structured table.

- Single file resource authority management module
The single file resource authority management module includes:

+ For each application, configure the access rights of the end user using the application to file resources within the application;

+ For each application, configure the access rights of the end user who does not use the application to the file resources within the application;

+ For each application, configure end-user access to files that are not part of the application.

3.2.6. Ways of Accessing Cloud Storage Resources

The platform SHOULD be able to access cloud storage resources in the following ways:

o Through the POST, DELETE, PUT, GET requests initiated by REST API, the structured data resources specified by structured data URI are added, deleted, modified and queried.

o Through the POST, DELETE and GET requests initiated by REST API, the file resources specified by file URI are uploaded, deleted and downloaded.

3.2.7. Format of Describing the Structured Data URI

The platform adopts the access method of the resources of the cloud storage platform described in 3.2.6, and it SHOULD be able to describe the structured data URI in the following format:

o /{structure table name}\[/{filtered fields + combined form}/(conditions for filtered fields)];

Where, the structure table name is equivalent to the table name to be operated in the SQL statement. The contents in the brackets ([ ]) are optional: "NONE", which means all resources in the collection are manipulated. "YES", it represents an operation on a particular resource in the collection, equivalent to the WHERE clause in SQL.

3.2.8. Contents of the Ways of Accessing Cloud Storage Resources

The platform adopts a cloud storage platform resource access method described in 3.2.6, which SHOULD include:

o Initiate PUT requests for structured data resources to modify the data resources specified by the URI, including: overwrite and
modify the specified fields, incremental changes to specified fields.

- Initiate GET requests for structured data resources to query the data resources specified by the URI. Specific return formats can be set for the data resources that are queried, including: return by the specified field, return by the specified information page, and return by the specified field filtering.

3.3. Web Software Framework Related Implementation Standards

The standard MUST support a Web software framework that supports the software-as-a-service SAAS cloud pattern, where the software systems generated by the Web software framework are automatically deployed and distributed.

The Web software framework should specifically include the following views:

3.3.1. System Administrator View

- User Management
  This view SHOULD be able to manage the user information of the Web software system, including the functions of adding users, removing users, adding user group information for users, and deleting user group information for users.

- User Group Management
  This view SHOULD be able to manage the user group information of the Web software system, including adding user groups, deleting user groups, adding user information for user groups, and deleting user information for user groups.

- Model Management
  This view SHOULD be able to manage the model information of the Web software system, including adding model information, deleting model information, adding model field information, deleting model field information, modifying model field information, and assigning different access rights to different user groups for the model.
3.3.2. User View

- **Data Management**
  
  This view SHOULD be able to manage the data table records of the Web software system, including adding data records, deleting data records, modifying data records, searching data records, and obtaining all data records.

- **Data Statistics**
  
  This view SHOULD be able to make statistics on the data table records of the Web software system, including functions such as record statistics, maximum statistics, minimum statistics, and average statistics for data table integral fields.

- **Import Excel and Other Format Tables**
  
  This view SHOULD be able to import data from Excel tables (sheets) and other format tables into the corresponding tables of the Web software system.

- **Export Excel and Other Formats**

  This view SHOULD be able to export data from the table of the Web software system to Excel tables (sheets) and tables in other formats.

- **Advanced Search**

  This view SHOULD be able to perform multiple logical combinatorial searches for multiple fields of the table to query the record information that satisfies the search criteria.

3.4. Implementation Standards on Construction Methods of Web Software

This standard SHALL support a table-driven software system automatic construction method within cloud mode, which is characterized by table submission, reading and verification, a Web software generation framework and a set of Web software generation workflow, in which the Web software generation framework should be the framework described in requirement 3.3.
3.4.1. System Requirements Table and Data Record Exchange Table

The table described in this method MUST include the system requirements table and the data record exchange table:

3.4.1.1. System Requirements Table

The system requirements table MUST include the following parts:

- System Administrator Information Section
  - System administrator ID
  - System administrator password
  - System title

- User Group Information Section (multiple user groups can be customized in this table according to requirements)
  - User group ID

- User Information Section (multiple users can be customized in this table according to requirements)
  - User ID
  - The user name
  - User password
  - The user belongs to the group (if filled in, it must be the item contained in the user group ID of the user group information section)

- Model Information Section (multiple models can be customized in this table according to requirements)
  - Read and write permission of the user group to which it belongs
    Permissions include: readable and writable, readable and unwritable, unreadable and unwritable
  - Other users’ read and write rights
    Permissions include: readable and writable, readable and unwritable, unreadable and unwritable
* Model name

* Subscriber ID (must be the item contained in the user ID in the user information section)

* Group ID (must be the item contained in the user group ID of the user group information section)

* Field type
  
  Field types include: Text, Float, Integer, Link, Date, Datetime, Boolean.

* Field name

* Whether empty is allowed
  
  Values include: TRUE and FALSE. Where TRUE means allowed to be empty;

3.4.1.2. Data Record Exchange Table

The data record exchange table MUST include the following parts:

  o Field information section (all field names of the model to be exchanged for data records can be set according to requirements)

  o Data records section (all data records that need to be injected into the model can be added as required)

3.4.2. Steps of Reading System Requirements Table

In the workflow of the Web software generation principle of this method, it MUST include the following steps:

1. Using the traversal unit of system requirements table to read through each cell of the system requirements table.

2. Using the reading unit of system administrator information to read system administrator ID, system administrator password, system title and other information when traversing system administrator information.

3. Using the reading unit of user group information to read user group ID information when traversing user group information.

4. Using the reading unit of user information to read user ID, user name, user password, user group ID (the user group ID must be
3.4.3. Steps of Analyzing System Requirements Table

In the workflow of Web software generation of this method, it MUST include the analysis and verification flow of the relevant information about the system requirements acquired by the Web software framework, including the following parts:

1. Data type and format validation for information related to system requirements obtained.

2. As for the user information part of the system requirements table, if the user’s group item is not empty, the framework should judge whether the filled value is included in the user group information part of the system requirements table.

3.4.4. Contents of Modules for Users

The workflow of the Web software generation principle of this method MUST include the module for users to use in the cloud environment where the corresponding Web software framework is located, which must include the following contents:

1. The framework should use the API of dealing with system administrator information in the Read_Demand class to read the system administrator section in the software system requirement table, each cell of which will be read successively, and then register the software system using the super administrator privileges with its ID and password and the system name, and further create relevant database entities of the software system in the underlying database of the Web software framework. At the same time, such four collections should be create in the database as user group, user, schema, and data.

2. The framework should use the API of dealing with user group information in the Read_Demand class to read the user group information in the software system requirement table, each cell of which be read successfully, and generate json-formatted strings based on the group ID information obtained, and then
3. The framework should use the API of dealing with user information in the Read_Demand class to read the user information in the software system requirement table, each cell of each row of which be read successfully, and generate json-formatted strings according to the user information obtained, and then insert them into the user set of database entities created in 1.

4. The framework should read the model information section of the system requirements table through the API used to process model information in the requirements table reading class (Read_Demand class), read through the filled content in the model information cells, generate json-formatted strings based on model information, and insert them into the schema set of database entities created in 1.

5. The framework should operate the user group data in the group set of database entities in the underlying database through the user group management class (Manage_Group) and return the results to the interface of the Web software framework. The Manage_Group class implements the GManage_Group interface defined in the Web software framework.

6. The framework should operate the user data in the user set of the database entity in the underlying database through the user management class (Manage_User) and return the results to the interface of the Web software framework. The Manage_User class implements the GManage_User interface defined in the Web software framework.

7. The framework should operate the model data in the schema set of database entities in the underlying database through the model management class (Manage_Schema) and return the results to the interface of the Web software framework. The Manage_Schema class implements the GManage_Schema interface defined in the Web software framework.

8. The framework should operate the data records in the data set of database entities in the underlying database through the data management class (Manage_Data) and return the results to the interface of the Web software framework. The Manage_Data class implements the GManage_Data interface defined in the Web software framework.
3.4.5. Steps of Principle of Constructing Web Software System

This method MUST satisfy the working principle of constructing Web software system automatically according to the system demand table. The principle includes the following steps:

1. The customer shall fill in the system requirements form described in 3.4.1.1 according to the requirements.

2. The Web software framework obtains the system requirements table uploaded by the customer in 1, and verifies whether the system requirements table conforms to the verification standard. If it does not conform to the verification standard, it prompts the user to have the wrong format, please re-upload it.

3. The Web software framework reads the system administrator information in the system requirements table.

4. Create a new system in the corresponding Web software framework according to the information read in 3, in which the administrator of the system is the system administrator in 3, and the system name is the system name in 3.

5. The Web software framework determines whether there is any part of user group information in the system requirements table. If not, it jumps to 8; if there is, it goes 6.

6. The Web software framework reads information about user groups in the system requirements table, including user group IDs.

7. According to the user group information read in 6, the user group is generated in the system created in 4, and the relevant information of the user group is the relevant information read in 6.

8. The Web software framework determines whether there is any relevant information about users in the system requirements table. If there is no information about users, it will jump to 11; if there is, it will go to 9.

9. The Web software framework reads relevant information of users in the system requirements table, including user ID, user name, user password, and user group.

10. The Web software framework generates users in the system created in 4 according to the user information read in 9, and the relevant information of the users is the information read in 9.
11. The Web software framework determines whether the relevant information of the model part exists in the system requirements table. If it does not, it will jump to 20, and if it does, it will go to 12.

12. The Web software framework reads the number of models in the system requirements table and assigns a current count of 0, then go to 13.

13. The Web software framework reads the relevant information of the model in the system requirements table, including the model name, model entry person, model group ID, group permissions, other user rights and other information.

14. According to the information related to the model read in 13, the model is generated in the system created in 4. The model name, model entry person, group ID of the model, group permission and other user rights are the information read in 13.

15. The Web software framework determines whether there is any information related to the structural fields in the model in the system requirements table. If there is no information, it will jump to 18; if there is, it will go to 16.

16. The Web software framework reads the relevant information of structural fields in the model in the system requirements table, including obtaining the name of structural fields of the model, field types, whether to allow null identification, default values and alternative values, etc.

17. The Web software framework creates model fields in the specified model according to the relevant information of structural fields in the model read in 16, and the field information is the information read in 16.


19. The Web software framework determines whether the current count is less than the number of models read in 12; if it is less than, it will jump back to 13; if it is not less than, it will go to 20.

20. The Web software framework generates the target Web software system.
3.4.6. Steps of Injecting Data Records into Web Software System

The workflow of the Web software generation principle of this method MUST include the workflow of automatically injecting data records into the Web software system according to the data record exchange table, including the following steps:

1. The customer shall fill in the data record exchange form as required.

2. The Web software framework gets the data record exchange table uploaded by the customer, and verifies whether the data record exchange form meets the requirements of the data record exchange form. If it does not meet the requirements, it prompts the user to have the wrong format, please re-upload it.

3. The Web software framework reads the model field information in the data record exchange table.

4. The Web software framework determines the required data exchange model according to the model field information read in 3.

5. The Web software framework reads the data record information in the data record exchange table line by line and injects it into the model determined in 4 successively.

3.4.7. Submission of System Requirements Table

The submission of the system requirements table SHALL include:

1. Online submission: according to the Web form format provided by the Web software generation framework, users fill in the system requirements information online and submit it to the Web software generation framework;

2. Offline submission: according to the offline form format template agreed by the Web software generation framework, users fill in the required software system demand information offline and submit it to the Web software generation framework by file upload.

3.4.8. Submission of Data Exchange Table

The submission of the data exchange table SHALL include:

1. Online submission: after the user constructs a new Web software system according to the Web software generation framework, the user enters data into the Web page through the newly generated...
Web software system, enters data information online and delivers it to the generated software system;

2. Offline submission: after the user constructs a new Web software system according to the Web software generation framework, the user enters the data record information offline and submits it to the generated software system through the data record exchange table template format provided by the newly generated Web software system by means of file upload.

3. Implementation Standards on Web Software Deployment

This framework MUST support the rapid deployment of a new set of software systems that meet the requirements on the cloud platform, where the deployment of software systems should support the deployment of the following modules:

3.5.1. System Deployment

This framework SHOULD support two ways to deploy a system:

- Supports registering users’ own systems through cloud platform administrators to create system administrators belonging to users.
- Supports users to register their own system through cloud platform and register their own system administrator.

3.5.2. Model Deployment

This framework SHOULD enable system administrator users to enter their own software system and deploy the created models on the cloud platform, where the created models are configured as follows:

- Model name, input personnel, and user group read and write permission are necessary when the model is created.
- Field name, field type, whether the field is allowed to be empty, field default value, and field alternative value in the model are optional fields for creating the model.

3.5.3. User Deployment

This framework SHOULD support to create new users affiliated to the software system created by a system administrator user on the cloud platform, where the creation of users is configured with user ID, user nickname, and user password.
3.5.4. User Group Deployment

This framework SHOULD support to create new users affiliated to the software system created by a system administrator user on the cloud platform, where the creation of user groups is configured as follows:

- The user group ID is necessary.
- It is optional to select many users into the user group, but one user group must have one use at least.

3.6. Implementation Standards on Web Software Migration

This framework SHOULD support the migration of existing software systems that meet the given requirements to the cloud platform, where the migration of software systems should support the migration of the following modules:

3.6.1. Model Migration

This framework SHOULD support the migration of the specified model from the source system to the target software system, where the source container of the model includes at least one of the following:

1. Relational Database
   - SQLSERVER
   - MYSQL
   - ORACLE

2. Excel File. Here, the model migration may support two modes:
   - Migrating data from source to specify model structure
   - Migrating data from source to specify the model structure and migrating data within the model

3.6.2. User Migration

This framework SHOULD support the migration of users in the source system and their access rights to the target software system, where the user’s source container includes at least one of the following:

1. Relational Database
   - SQLSERVER
3.6.3. User Group Migration

This framework SHOULD support the migration of user groups in the source system and their access rights to the target software system, where the user group’s source container includes at least one of the following:

1. Relational Database
   * SQLSERVER
   * MYSQL
   * ORACLE

2. Excel File

3.6.4. User Group Deployment

This framework SHOULD enable system administrator users to enter their own software systems and create user groups on the cloud platform, where the creation of user groups is configured as follows:

1. A user group ID created for identifying the user group is of necessity.

2. It is optional to select many users into a user group, but one user group must have one user at least.

4. Security Considerations

This draft proposes an implementation standard for software migration deployment technology for cloud environments, and does not make special requirements for the security of the technology itself. However, the security of the cloud platform and the security between different users in the software system are required. The security of the cloud platform is mainly authentication security, and can also be considered as session security to ensure the security of the user during using software. The security of different users in the system is called permission control. Data isolation between different systems, different user groups in the same system, and different resource access rights between different users should be considered.
5. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References

6.3. URL References


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