Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) concept refers to the usage of standard Internet protocols to allow for human-to-thing and thing-to-thing communication. The security needs are well-recognized but the design space of IoT applications and systems is complex and exposed to multiple types of threats. In particular, threats keep evolving at a fast pace while many IoT systems are rarely updated and still remain operational for decades.

This document describes a comprehensive agile security framework to integrate existing security processes such as risk assessment or vulnerability assessment in the lifecycle of a smart object in an IoT application. The core of our agile security approach relies on two protocols: the Protocol for Automatic Security Configuration (PASC) and the Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA). PASC is executed during the onboarding phase of a smart object in an IoT system and is in charge of automatically performing a risk assessment and assigning a security configuration - applicable to the device or the system - to defeat the identified risks. The assigned security configuration fits the specific environment and threat model of the application in which the device has been deployed. PAVA is executed during the operation of the IoT object and ensures that vulnerabilities in the smart object and IoT system are discovered in a proactive way.

These two protocols can benefit users, manufactures and operators by automating IoT security.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
1. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].
2. Integrating automated security processes in the IoT lifecycle

The lifecycle of many smart objects in IoT applications such as building automation follows the design and manufacturing processes of traditional hardware components. This means that devices go through a number of phases in their lifecycles that are predefined and rigid, namely design, manufacturing, installation, commissioning, or operation, to name a few of them [IOTSec]. This implies that security is often pre-configured, and this pre-configuration leads to a number of security problems for manufacturers, users, and system operators.

To deal with these problems, we propose the definition of two protocols, PASC and PAVA. PASC aims at automating the security configuration based on information provided by devices, users, manufacturers, and system operators. PAVA aims at automating the discovery of new bugs, potential vulnerabilities, and security misconfigurations by gathering information from the actual system, analyzing it, and updating security settings.

2.1. Automated Security Processes for Manufacturers

A manufacturer cannot be aware at design place about the security risks that might appear in the future. Also, often a manufacturer cannot be absolutely certain how his product will be used later on and in what function. A famous example is the newspaper which can also be used as fly swat. Thus, it is very hard for the manufacturer to foresee and implement all security mechanisms and policies that would be applicable to its devices in a wide variety of use cases.

This document introduces security automation into the IoT ecosystem by pursuing a Test Driven Development (TDD) approach as explained in [TDD]. The benefit of TDD for the manufacturer is that products, which pass all the tests, are ready to be shipped. Additionally, manufacturers benefit from this automation approach since they do not need to decide which security mitigations they require on a product. Instead of it, they just need to describe the expected usage of the product, e.g., via MUD files, the PASC and PAVA protocols will then automatically configure the security settings in the system.

2.2. Automated Security Processes for Users

A user is often interested in buying, combining, and running devices from multiple manufacturers. Uses might also have different security and privacy needs. From this point of view, users might have issues making sure that the security settings of his purchased devices and subsystems work together.
Users benefit from integrating security into the full IoT lifecycle since security configuration is transparently done in an automatic way by means of the PASC and PAVA protocols - they need to do nothing. Security settings are automatically configured according to the specific deployment environment that a user only needs to confirm.

2.3. Automated Security Processes for System Integrators

System integrators and operators have to make sure that the overall system - including multiple devices from different manufactures and interacting with many users - is deployed and executed in a secure way. Sometimes, it is also necessary or desired to use products not according to their original purpose, but to repurpose them for a more beneficial use case. Fixed configurations hinder those tasks and make it also difficult to rapidly act in the event of security vulnerabilities.

System operators benefit of PASC and PAVA since they minimize operational cost while ensuring that the system remains secure at any moment: PASC allows them to configure security automatically; PAVA allows for automated vulnerability detection. A potential instantiation of part of these protocols follows a Software Defined Network methodology in which network interactions are enabled/disabled by the network controller depending on the information available in the collected MUD files from the devices. Operators can also adopt the TDD approach and proof compliance with existing security policies for any IoT device by running continuous PAVA tests against the existing IoT installation. If events like software updates introduce an unexpected behavior, the SDN infrastructure will immediately catch and report it.

3. Integrating security workflows in the IoT lifecycle

This section first discusses existing security workflows and how they are usually applied and then it explains how to integrate those security workflows in the IoT lifecycle.

3.1. Security workflows: which ones and how they are traditionally applied.

Dealing with security threats and finding suitable security mitigations is challenging: there are very sophisticated threats that a very powerful attacker could use; also, new threats and exploits appear in a daily basis. Therefore, the existence of proper secure product creation processes that allow managing and minimizing risks during the lifecycle of the IoT devices is at least as important as
being aware of the threats. A non-exhaustive list of relevant processes include:

1. A Business Impact Analysis (BIA) assesses the consequences of loss of basic security attributes, namely, confidentiality, integrity and availability in an IoT system. These consequences might include impact on data lost, sales lost, increased expenses, regulatory fines, customer dissatisfaction, etc. Performing a business impact analysis allow determining the business relevance of having a proper security design placing security in the focus.

2. A Risk Assessment (RA) analyzes security threats to the IoT system, considering their likelihood and impact, and deriving for each of them a risk level. Risks classified as moderate or high must be mitigated, i.e., security architecture should be able to deal with that threat bringing the risk to a low level. Note that threats are usually classified according to their goal: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For instance, a specific threat to recover a symmetric-key used in the system relates to confidentiality.

3. A privacy impact assessment (PIA) aims at assessing Personal Identifiable Information (PII) that is collected, processed, or used in the IoT system. By doing so, the goals is to fulfill applicable legal requirements, determine risks and effects of the manipulation of PII, and evaluate proposed protections.

4. Procedures for vulnerability assessment (VA) aim at assessing whether the IoT system is secure or any vulnerabilities are present. This can be due to changes in the context information such as people involved in the IoT system or new software vulnerabilities discovered.

5. Procedures for incident reporting (IR) and mitigation refer to the methodologies that allow becoming aware of any security issues that affect an IoT system.

Traditionally, BIA, RA, PIA or VA are to be realized during the creation of a new IoT system, introduction of new technologies in the IoT system, or deployment of significant system upgrades. In general, it is recommended to re-assess them on a regular basis taking into account new use cases or threats. VA is also often realized before deployment, e.g., by performing a penetration test before the new product release is deployed. Incident reporting is done during operation of the IoT system, when a vulnerability is discovered.
All these processes, namely BIA, RA, PIA, VA, and IR, are a must in the design of any IoT system. If they are not performed, the risk of not having a secure enough system is very high. However, even if these procedures are in place, the IoT systems can still have an unsatisfactory security level because of two main reasons: fixed design decisions do not necessarily apply to all deployments due to specific requirements of users and operators or the nature of the final system. New vulnerabilities might appear.

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Figure 1: Security workflows integrated in the lifecycle of a thing in the Internet of Things.

3.2. Automating security workflows

Automating IoT security means integrating IoT security workflows in the IoT lifecycle. Figure 1 depicts this concept: on the top part of that figure, we see the traditional steps in the lifecycle of a device: manufacturing, installation, commissioning, application running, etc. Usually, the security workflows discussed in Section 2.1 would only happen at the beginning. The goal is to move integrate them during the lifecycle - as shown on the bottom part of the figure. With this we aim at:

1. making sure that the security settings, methods and policies applied to a given IoT deployment fit the requirements and threats in that specific deployment.

2. ensuring fast reaction in case of new vulnerabilities or changes in the security requirements.

In the figure, we observe that RA and PIA are moved from the design phase to the installation and commissioning phases of the devices.
since it is then when the actual environment in which smart objects are deployed is really known. At this point of time, it is possible to gather information about the security requirements of the users, other devices in the system that may pose a threat to the new devices or even new vulnerabilities that might have appeared since the manufacturing of the device till the installation phase.

The VA is executed not only during implementation, but it keeps running during the operation of the IoT system. Information gathered during VA is fed into the RA and PIA processes to update security settings. Similarly, security incidents found out during continuous VA lead to IR. When smart objects are sold or the system updated, this triggers again RA and PIA.

4. Automated IoT security protocols: PASC and PAVA

This section introduces the two protocols for automated IoT security that this document proposes: Protocol for Automatic Security Configuration (PASC) and Protocol for Automated Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA).

The underlying idea of the protocols is shown at a very high level in Figure 2. PASC is used initially when a device first joins the IoT system to adjust the system and device security settings. Then PAVA starts its operation monitoring potential vulnerabilities. If changes in security settings are required, those are then applied by means of PASC messages.
In the event of a PAVA_VULNERABILITY being received from an INFORMATION SOURCE which is not already patched in the IoT device, the CONTROLLER SHOULD aim to mitigate this PAVA_VULNERABILITY by blocking access to the vulnerable IoT device temporary until the device can be updated.

4.1. PASC: Protocol for Automatic Security Configuration

Figure 1 depicts the main parties involved in an IoT system: an IoT DEVICE, a device controlling the IoT domain called CONTROLLER, a ROUTER towards the IoT domain, and an INFORMATION SOURCE such as it might be a local user, the manufacturer of the IoT device or a cloud IoT management system.

The protocol flow is as follows:

- The IoT DEVICE performs a PASC ONBOARDING exchange in which the system CONTROLLER obtains information about the device from the IoT DEVICE itself.
o The CONTROLLER can also receive PASC DEVICE INFO from other INFORMATION SOURCES such as a local user, the manufacturer, vulnerability cloud,

o The CONTROLLER automatically performs a RISK ASSESSMENT and PRIVACY IMPACT ANALYSIS based on the information about the new IOT DEVICE, system, and information

o Finally, the CONTROLLER configures the system security by means of PASC SECURITY CONFIGURATION MESSAGE. Configuration can apply to the new IoT DEVICES, existing IoT devices, or networking infrastructure such as the ROUTER.

In certain IoT environments, a simple practical instantiation of PASC can be created by extending and combining a number of protocols. PASC ONBOARDING resemble steps of the Manufacturer Usage Descriptor (MUD) protocol by explicitly listing any internal and external accesses the device needs to make, and/or clearly specify if there’s an intentionally open server (e.g., HTTPS port exposed) and might be reused after potential enhancements. Additionally the PASC ONBOARDING needs to include the security policy of the environment the IoT devices are deployed within, for example by verifying the exposed HTTPS server includes a non-vulnerable TLS 1.2 implementation with the desired cipher suites. PASC SECURITY CONFIGURATION MESSAGE might be instantiated in a SDN fashion by means of influencing the routing flows. PASC SECURITY CONFIGURATION MESSAGES might also apply to end devices, and they might realized with extensions of ACE. Another alternative consists in changing actual software configurations in the end devices although this is a less realistic approach for IoT use cases.

The Test Specification must therefore be a description of the expected behavior of the IoT device that can be used to adjust tests accordingly. For example, the specification should explicitly list any internal and external accesses the device needs to make, and/or clearly specify if there’s an intentionally open server (e.g., HTTPS port exposed). This Thing description SHOULD come from Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD). Additionally the Test Specification needs to include the security policy of the environment the IoT devices are deployed within, for example additional tests to verify the exposed HTTPS server includes a non-vulnerable TLS 1.2 implementation with the desired cipher suites.

Network Services modules on the SDN Controller provide for core network services (such as DHCP, DNS, NTP) and mediated access to external resources (e.g., cloud services). A set of "foundational tests" (e.g., DHCP timeouts) SHOULD be part of any Test Specification. The system can capture a packet trace for the
individual device, which can be analyzed during the RISK ASSESSMENT as described in point 3 of section 3.1.

4.2. Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA)

The Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA) aims at assessing for vulnerability when the IoT DEVICES are operational. PAVA is designed to be a key factor for Test Driven Development (TDD) [TDD]. The main aspects of PAVA are as follows:

1. PAVA relies on each IoT DEVICE sending standardized reports PAVA_LOG of potential vulnerabilities to CONTROLLER, e.g., the SDN controller managing the IoT security domain. Such reports would build on RFC5424 (Syslog protocol), RFC5425 (TLS for Syslog) and RFC5426 (Syslog over UDP).

2. The CONTROLLER can also perform PAVA_ACTIVE_MONITORING that refers to messages aiming at verifying that the IoT DEVICE does not suffer known vulnerabilities.

3. The CONTROLLER can also receive PAVA_VULNERABILITIES messages from any INFORMATION SOURCE.

4. Based on the above information, the CONTROLLER can update RISK and PRIVACY ASSESSMENTS. The CONTROLLER reports and methodology can be based on related work such as RFC6872.

5. If needed, the controller can update security settings with a PASC_SECURITY_CONFIGURATION message. Output of this decision can result in 4 different actions:
   * incident report towards the user
   * update of security profiles in IoT DEVICES of the IoT security domain.
   * automatic incident reporting towards the manufacturer
   * automatic incident reporting towards the platform provider

5. Conclusions and security considerations

Security is a key factor in the acceptance and long-term success of IoT systems. Non-smart versions of physical objects in the real word, for example light switches or door locks, can benefit from the modern approach to software engineering. The building and manufacturing industry for example are relatively slowly changing industry sectors due to high demands and regulations on safety and...
security of the physical products they produce, e.g. bridges or houses, however, the IT and Web industry are one of the most dynamic industry sectors currently existing and can bring capabilities to make products even safer.

Additionally, there is a fundamental difference of traditional connected and networked devices "for people" vs. IoT devices which are typically headless. E.g., many standard application layer authentication mechanisms like OAuth assume a person is there to "do something" in a challenge response sequence. Also, people have an identity, that typically links to authorization of resources, while an IoT device is more single-purpose and typically has no intrinsic sense of other resources it might/should communicate with. This distinction between devices lends itself to a number of considerations in terms of authentication, access control, manageability, and other challenges that will take time to properly normalize in a modern IoT enabled world.

From a security perspective, it is important to ensure that IoT devices can be trusted. There are simply too many of them, and due to their constrained nature there are often compromises that weaken security overall.

The main contribution of this document is to describe and propose protocols to automate IoT security to deal with the complex IoT security design space. This is done in two steps. First, the PASC protocol allows to automatically configure devices and deploying security profiles - sets of security configurations - to the devices and system infrastructure. Most IoT devices are typically focused on their physical task rather than on being general purpose computing platforms. Therefore, the security profiles described in this document aim to bridge the initial risk analysis gap between the involved industry sectors and put a higher emphasis on the minimizing risk and containing the blast radius factors. Second, the PAVA protocol allows to automatically monitor and audit the operation of the network and system. This ensures fast reaction to any potential vulnerabilities and attacks.

6. Next steps

This draft proposes to automate IoT security by means of PASC & PAVA protocols. IoT security automation would have clear benefits for manufactures, users, and system operators.

If this direction is attractive and supported, we envision the following IETF work:
1. Definition of IoT use cases, overall architecture for IoT security automation, and applicable techniques (e.g., MUD, SDN, ACE,...) to realize PASC & PAVA.

2. Define minimum viable PASC & PAVA protocols, i.e., protocols that allow realizing the concept of automated security with the smallest amount of work. This definition will target building automation use cases. This work requires the following:

* specifying the information required during onboarding: (1) general provisioning information, for example QR codes containing information like MAC address of the IoT device for easy ingestion of those information into hardware databases; (2) a description of the expected behavior of the IoT device from Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD); (3) environment specific requirements, for example a security policy that is machine-readable; (4) network & application specific information including the definition of the supported protocols, e.g., IPv4, IPv6, application specific networking information, e.g., SSID, and authentication and authorization methodology, e.g., using WPA2 or 802.1X.

* describing the required input for the automation part: (1) end-users should be allowed to enter security and privacy preferences that should be easily convertible into a machine readable policy; (2) manufacturers provide MUD files potentially with some extensions to support automated security uses cases; (3) system integrators provide the environment specific network and security specifications as listed above.

* defining the output required or desired by users, routing infrastructure and end devices. This includes routing and firewalling policies for routing infrastructure; security policies and configurations for the end devices including blocked services, whitelist of services in other devices; security configurations and security reports for end users, system operators, and manufacturers (see Section 3.2 point #5).

* standardizing the PASC Messages, message fields, and interactions between new device, controller, and routing infrastructure including transport protocol for PASC and PAVA messages as well as encoding of security configuration using YANG.

* creating the RA and PIA logic to generate the (SDN) security configuration in controller and deploy to routers. This can include individual pre-computed flow tables per routing device.
determining which end-devices can talk to each other and which services are available to each other. Non-allowed communication patterns are blocked.

* standardizing the PAVA policy and messages for vulnerability assessment as well as messages/Information required from services to perform PAVA. This involves the definition of a policy that determines the behaviour of PAVA regarding the monitoring capabilities (active vs passive), data collection capabilities, and reporting capabilities.

There are several groups within IETF and IRTF working on aspects related to the ideas presented in this group and for which this work can be interesting:

1. IRRF Thing to Thing Research Group (T2TRG) [T2TRG] investigates open research issues in turning a true "Internet of Things" into reality, an Internet where low-resource nodes ("things", "constrained nodes") can communicate among themselves and with the wider Internet, in order to partake in permissionless innovation.

2. IETF Automated Networking Integrated Model and Approach (ANIMA) [ANIMA] develops a system of autonomic functions that carry out the intentions of the network operator without the need for detailed low-level management of individual devices.

3. IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group (OPSAWG) [OPSAWG] receives occasional proposals for the development and publication of RFCs dealing with operational and management topics that are not in scope of an existing working group and do not justify the formation of a new working group.

4. IETF Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) [I2RS] facilitates real-time or event driven interaction with the routing system through a collection of protocol-based control or management interfaces. These allow information, policies, and operational parameters to be injected into and retrieved (as read or by notification) from the routing system while retaining data consistency and coherency across the routers and routing infrastructure.

5. IETF Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) [SACM]. In their charter, they write: "Securing information and the systems that store, process, and transmit that information is a challenging task for enterprises of all sizes, and many security practitioners spend much of their time on manual processes. Standardized protocols and models aiding collection and
evaluation of endpoint elements enable automation, thus freeing practitioners to focus on high priority tasks. Due to the breadth of this work, the working group will address enterprise use cases pertaining to the assessment of endpoint posture (using the definitions of Endpoint and Posture from RFC 5209).

An open question for the authors is where this work could be done best.

7. Informative References


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Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Architecture
draft-ietf-sacm-arch-13

Abstract

This document defines an architecture enabling a cooperative Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) ecosystem. This work is predicated upon information gleaned from SACM Use Cases and Requirements ([RFC7632] and [RFC8248] respectively), and terminology as found in [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology].

WORKING GROUP: The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at https://github.com/sacmwg/ietf-mandm-sacm-arch/. Instructions are on that page as well.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this draft is to define an architectural approach for a SACM Domain, based on the spirit of use cases found in [RFC7632] and requirements found in [RFC8248]. This approach gains the most advantage by supporting a variety of collection systems, and intends to enable a cooperative ecosystem of tools from disparate sources with minimal operator configuration.

1.1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119, BCP 14 [RFC2119].

2. Terms and Definitions

Assessment: Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall) such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture against compliance policy."

Asset: Is a system resource, as defined in [RFC4949], that may be composed of other assets.

Examples of Assets include: Endpoints, Software, Guidance, or X.509 public key certificates. An asset is not necessarily owned by an organization.

Asset Management: The IT process by which assets are provisioned, updated, maintained and deprecated.

Attribute: Is a data element, as defined in [RFC5209], that is atomic.

In the context of SACM, attributes are "atomic" information elements and an equivalent to attribute-value-pairs. Attributes can be components of Subjects.

Capability: A set of features that are available from a SACM Component.

See also "capability" in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology].

Collector: A piece of software that acquires information about one or more target endpoints by conducting collection tasks.
A collector can be distributed across multiple endpoints, e.g. across a target endpoint and a SACM component. The separate parts of the collector can communicate with a specialized protocol, such as PA-TNC [RFC5792]. At least one part of a distributed collector has to take on the role of a provider of information by providing SACM interfaces to propagate capabilities and to provide SACM content in the form of collection results.

Configuration: A non-volatile subset of the endpoint attributes of a endpoint that is intended to be unaffected by a normal reboot-cycle.

Configuration is a type of imperative guidance that is stored in files (files dedicated to contain configuration and/or files that are software components), directly on block devices, or on specific hardware components that can be accessed via corresponding software components. Modification of configuration can be conducted manually or automatically via management (plane) interfaces that support management protocols, such as SNMP or WMI. A change of configuration can occur during both run-time and down-time of an endpoint. It is common practice to scheduled a change of configuration during or directly after the completion of a boot-cycle via corresponding software components located on the target endpoint itself.

Consumer: A SACM Role that requires a SACM Component to include SACM Functions enabling it to receive information from other SACM Components.

Endpoint: Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be connected to a network."

Additional Information - The [RFC5209] definition continues, "Such devices normally are associated with a particular link layer address before joining the network and potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes: laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may have an IP address."

To further clarify the [RFC5209] definition, an endpoint is any physical or virtual device that may have a network address. Note that, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be endpoints within this document.

Physical endpoints are always composites that are composed of
hardware components and software components. Virtual endpoints are composed entirely of software components and rely on software components that provide functions equivalent to hardware components.

The SACM architecture differentiates two essential categories of endpoints: Endpoints whose security posture is intended to be assessed (target endpoints) and endpoints that are specifically excluded from endpoint posture assessment (excluded endpoints).

Based on the definition of an asset, an endpoint is a type of asset.

Endpoint Attribute: Is a discreet endpoint characteristic that is computably observable.

Endpoint Attributes typically constitute Attributes that can be bundled into Subject (e.g. information about a specific network interface can be represented via a set of multiple AVP).

Endpoint Characteristics: The state, configuration and composition of the software components and (virtual) hardware components a target endpoint is composed of, including observable behavior, e.g. sys-calls, log-files, or PDU emission on a network.

In SACM work-flows, (Target) Endpoint Characteristics are represented via Information Elements.

Posture: Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization’s security policy."

This term is used within the scope of SACM to represent the configuration and state information that is collected from a target endpoint in the form of endpoint attributes (e.g. software/hardware inventory, configuration settings, dynamically assigned addresses). This information may constitute one or more posture attributes.

Posture Attributes: Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. A Posture Attribute represents a single property of an observed state. For example, a Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating system installed on the system."

Within this document this term represents a specific assertion
about endpoint configuration or state (e.g. configuration setting, installed software, hardware) represented via endpoint attributes. The phrase "features of the endpoint" highlighted above refers to installed software or software components.

Provider: A provider is a SACM role assigned to a SACM component that provides role-specific functions to provide information to other SACM components.

Repository: A repository is a controller that contains functions to consume, store and provide information of a particular kind.

Such information is typically data transported on the data plane, but potentially also data and metadata from the control and management plane. A single repository may provide the functions of more than one specific repository type (i.e. configuration baseline repository, assessment results repository, etc.)

Security Automation: The process of which security alerts can be automated through the use of different components to monitor, analyze and assess endpoints and network traffic for the purposes of detecting misconfigurations, misbehaviors or threats.

Security Automation is intended to identify target endpoints that cannot be trusted (see "trusted" in [RFC4949]). This goal is achieved by creating and processing evidence (assessment statements) that a target endpoint is not a trusted system [RFC4949].

SIEM: TBD

SOAR: TBD

State: A volatile set of endpoint attributes of a (target) endpoint that is affected by a reboot-cycle.

Local state is created by the interaction of components with other components via the control plane, via processing data plane payload, or via the functional properties of local hardware and software components. Dynamic configuration (e.g. IP address distributed dynamically via an address distribution and management services, such as DHCP) is considered state that is the result of the interaction with another component (e.g. provided by a DHCP server with a specific configuration).

Target Endpoint: Is an endpoint that is under assessment at some point in, or region of, time.
Every endpoint that is not specifically designated as an excluded endpoint is a target endpoint. A target endpoint is not part of a SACM domain unless it contains a SACM component (e.g. a SACM component that publishes collection results coming from an internal collector).

A target endpoint is similar to a device that is a Target of Evaluation (TOE) as defined in Common Criteria and as referenced by [RFC4949].

Vulnerability Assessment: An assessment specifically tailored to determining whether a set of endpoints is vulnerable according to the information contained in the vulnerability description information.

Workflow: A workflow is a modular composition of tasks that can contain loops, conditionals, multiple starting points and multiple endpoints.

The most prominent workflow in SACM is the assessment workflow.

3. Architectural Overview

The generic approach proposed herein recognizes the need to obtain information from existing and future state collection systems, and makes every attempt to respect [RFC7632] and [RFC8248]. At the foundation of any architecture are entities, or components, that need to communicate. They communicate by sharing information, where, in a given flow, one or more components are consumers of information and one or more components are providers of information. Different roles within a cooperative ecosystem may act as both Producers and Consumers of SACM-relevant information.
3.1. Producer

A Producer can be described as an abstraction that refers to an entity capable of sending SACM-relevant information to one or many Consumers. In general, information (a "payload") is produced to a particular topic, subscribed to by one or more Consumers. Producers need not be concerned about any specifics of the payload it is providing to a given topic. A Producer may, for example, publish posture collection instructions to collector topics.

3.2. Consumer

A Consumer can be described as an abstraction that refers to an entity capable of receiving SACM-relevant information from one or many Producers. A Consumer acts as a subscriber to a given topic (or set of topics), enabling it to receive event notifications when a Producer provides a payload to that topic or topics. Consumers receive payloads and act upon them according to their capabilities. A Consumer may, for example, subscribe to a posture collection topic to receive and act upon, collection instructions.

3.3. Integration Service

The Integration Service acts as the broker between Producers and Consumers; acting as the destination for Producers to publish payloads, and as the source for Consumers subscribing to those payloads.
SACM Components are intended to interact with other SACM Components. These interactions can be thought of, at the architectural level, as the combination of interfaces with their supported operations. Each interaction will convey a classified payload of information. This classification of payload information allows Consumers to subscribe to only the classifications to which they are capable of handling. The payload information should contain subdomain-specific characteristics and/or instructions.

3.4. Payload/Message

The payload (sometimes referred to as a "message" or "message payload") is the unit of data involved in any given interaction between two SACM components. The payload MAY be used to convey the semantic meaning of the operation to be performed. Protocols such as [RFC6120] achieves this meaning through XML namespace identification within a "<message/>" or "<iq/>" stanza. Topic-centric protocols such as [MQTT] convey the meaning of payloads through topic naming techniques. Both methods require connected components to verify message payloads according to their respective capabilities.

With respect to the Integration Service, the payload is simply an array of bytes, so the data contained within it is not required to convey a specific format or meaning to the Integration Service. The serialization of the payload combined with the payload categorization provides meaning within the SACM context.

3.5. Payload Categorization

Within the SACM ecosystem, categorization of payloads and their transport provide the context through which various capabilities are achieved. Two types of payload categorization can be described.

3.5.1. Topic-centric

Topic-centric payload categorization allows for a broad spectrum of payloads by characterizing those payloads through the Integration Service topic. In this categorization, the topic name becomes a label attached to the payload to which the Integration Service matches against known subscriptions. The topic becomes the operational context for the payload. Topic-centric categorization allows for any payload to be sent to any topic, but requires that SACM consumers parse the payloads to determine whether or not they have the capability to act on those payloads.

When interacting using a topic-centric payload categorization, topic naming conventions SHOULD provide an adequate amount of information to be deterministic regarding the purpose of the interaction.
example, a topic named "/notification/collection/oval" would indicate that (a) the topic is a broadcast/notification (publish/subscribe) topic, (b) subscribers to this topic are performing a "collection" action, and (c) the payloads published to the topic are represented using the OVAL serialization format.

3.5.2. Payload-centric

Payload-centric categorization encapsulates the intent of an interaction within the message payload itself, using an identifying token, tag, or namespace identifier. This method allows for the limitation of message types, and therefore increases the extensibility of message payloads.

Payload-centric categorization allows for modularization and specification of extensions, and for plugin-based support of capabilities based the categorization. XMPP is an example of utilization of payload-centric categorization, allowing only three distinct "stanzas" ("<message/>", "<presence/>", and "<iq/>"), using payloads defined by the various extension protocols maintained by the XMPP standards foundation.

3.6. Capabilities

SACM components interact with each other based on their capacity to perform specific actions. In advertising its capabilities, a SACM component indicates its competence to understand message payloads, perform any payload translation or normalization, and act upon that message. For example, an Orchestration component receives a message to initiate posture attribute collection. The Orchestrator may then normalize those instructions to a particular collection system’s serialization. The normalized instructions are then published to the Integration Service, notifying the appropriate subscribers.

Capabilities are described using Uniform Resource Names (URNs), which will be maintained and enhanced via IANA tables (IANA Considerations). Using topic-centric categorization of message payloads, capability URNs SHOULD be associated with Integration Service topics to which publishers, subscribers, and service handlers, will interact. Topic naming conventions are considered implementation details and are not considered for standardization. Given a payload-centric categorization of message payloads, capability URNs SHOULD be used as the identifying token, tag, or namespace in order to distinguish specific payloads.
3.7. Interaction Categories

Two categories of interactions SHOULD be supported by the Integration Service: broadcast and directed. Broadcast interactions are asynchronous by default, and directed interactions may be invoked either synchronously or asynchronously.

3.7.1. Broadcast

A broadcast interaction, commonly referred to as publish/subscribe, allows for a wider distribution of a message payload. When a payload is published to the Integration Service, all subscribers to that payload are alerted and may consume the message payload. This category of interaction can also be described as a "unicast" interaction when only a single subscriber exists. An example of a broadcast interaction could be to publish Linux OVAL objects to a posture collection topic. Subscribing consumers receive the notification, and proceed to collect endpoint configuration posture based on the supplied message payload.

3.7.2. Directed

The intent of a directed interaction is to enable point-to-point communications between a producer and consumer, through the standard interfaces provided by the Integration Service. The provider component indicates which consumer is intended to receive the payload, and the Integration Service routes the payload directly to that consumer. Two "styles" of directed interaction exist, differing only by the response from the consumer.

3.7.2.1. Synchronous

Synchronous, request/response style interaction requires that the requesting component block and wait for the receiving component to respond, or to time out when that response is delayed past a given time threshold. A synchronous interaction example may be querying a CMDB for posture attribute information in order to perform an evaluation.

3.7.2.2. Asynchronous

An asynchronous interaction involves the payload producer directing the message to a consumer, but not blocking or waiting for an immediate response. This style of interaction allows the producer to continue on to other activities without the need to wait for responses. This style is particularly useful when the interaction payload invokes a potentially long-running task, such as data collection, report generation, or policy evaluation. The receiving
component may reply later via callbacks or further interactions, but it is not mandatory.

4. SACM Role-based Architecture

Within the cooperative SACM ecosystem, a number of roles act in coordination to provide relevant policy/guidance, perform data collection, storage, evaluation, and support downstream analytics and reporting.

```
+-------------------------------------------+
|                 Manager                   |
+-------------------^-----------------------+
|                       |  +--------------------+
| Orchestrator(s)   | |  |  Repository(-ies) |
|---------^-------+ |  +----------^---------+
|             |             |                +--------------------+
|             |             |                |  Downstream Uses   |
|             |             |                | +----------------+ |
|             |             |                | |   Analytics    | |
|             |             |                | +----------------+ |
|             |             |                |           +--------------------+
|             |             |                |  Collection Sub-Architecture  |
|             |             |                | +-------------------------------+
|             |             |                |  Evaluation Sub-Architecture  |
+---------------v---------------+      |
|  Integration Service           <------> +----------------+ |
+-----------^--------------------------^----+      | +----------------+ |
|                          |           | |   Reporting    | |
|                          |           | +----------------+ |
+-----------v-------------------+      |           +--------------------+
|  Evaluation Sub-Architecture  |
+-------------------------------+
```

Figure 2: Notional Role-based Architecture

As shown in Figure 2, the SACM role-based architecture consists of some basic SACM Components communicating using an integration service. The integration service is expected to maximally align with the requirements described in [RFC8248], which means that the integration service will support brokered (i.e. point-to-point) and proxied data exchange.
4.1. Architectural Roles/Components

This document suggests a variety of players in a cooperative ecosystem; known as SACM Components. SACM Components may be composed of other SACM Components, and each SACM Component plays one, or more, of several roles relevant to the ecosystem. Roles may act as providers of information, consumers of information, or both provider and consumer. Figure 2 depicts a number of SACM components which are architecturally significant and therefore warrant discussion and clarification. Each role depicted in Figure 2 represents the interface to the component(s) fulfilling that role, not necessarily any specific implementation. For example, the "Repository" figure represents the interface to persistent storage, and not any particular persistent storage mechanism.

4.1.1. Manager

The Manager acts as the control plane for the SACM ecosystem; a sort of high level component capable of coordinating the actions, notifications, and events between components. The manager controls the administrative interfaces with the various components of the ecosystem, acting as the central point to which all other components will register and advertise their capabilities. It is the responsibility of the manager to control a component’s access to the ecosystem, maintain an inventory of components attached to the ecosystem, and to initiate the various workflows involved in the collection and/or evaluation of posture attributes.

The manager should maintain the master set of capabilities that can be supported within the ecosystem. These are the various collection, evaluation, and persistence capabilities with which components may register. The manager MAY be responsible for assigning topics for each of the capabilities that are supported, as registering components subsequently subscribe to, or configure service handlers for, those topics.

The manager may act as the user interface to the ecosystem, providing user dashboards, inventories, component management, or operational controls within the boundary of responsibility.

4.1.2. Orchestrator(s)

Orchestration components provide the manager with resources for delegating work across the SACM ecosystem. Orchestrators are responsible for receiving messages from the manager, e.g. posture attribute collection instructions, and routing those messages to the appropriate "actions". For example, an orchestrator may support the capability of translating posture collection instructions using the
Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) and providing those instructions to OVAL collectors. An orchestrator may support the capability of initiating policy evaluation. Where the Manager is configured to ask a particular set of questions, those questions are delegated to Orchestrators, who are then capable of asking those questions using specific dialects.

4.1.3. Repositories

Figure 2 only includes a single reference to "Repository(-ies)", but in practice, a number of separate data repositories may exist, including posture attribute repositories, policy repositories, local vulnerability definition data repositories, and state assessment results repositories. The diagrammed notion of a repository within the SACM context represents an interface in which payloads are provided (based on the capabilities of the producer), normalized, and persisted.

These data repositories may exist separately or together in a single representation, and the design of these repositories may be as distinct as their intended purpose, such as the use of relational database management systems (RDBMS), filesystem-based storage, or graph/map implementations. Each implementation of a SACM repository should focus on the relationships between data elements and implement the SACM information and data model(s).

4.1.4. Integration Service

If each SACM component represents a set of capabilities, then the Integration Service represents the "fabric" by which SACM components are woven together. The Integration Service acts as a message broker, combining a set of common message categories and infrastructure to allow SACM components to communicate using a shared set of interfaces. The Integration Service’s brokering capabilities enable the exchange of various information payloads, orchestration of component capabilities, message routing and reliable delivery. The Integration Service minimizes the dependencies from one system to another through the loose coupling of applications through messaging. SACM components will "attach" to the Integration Service either through native support for the integration implementation, or through the use of "adapters" which provide a proxied attachment.

The Integration Service should provide mechanisms for both synchronous and asynchronous request/response-style messaging, and a publish/subscribe mechanism to implement an event-based architecture. It is the responsibility of the Integration Service to coordinate and manage the sending and receiving of messages. The Integration Service should allow components to directly connect and produce or
consume messages, or connect via message translators which can act as a proxy, transforming messages from a component format to one implementing a SACM data model.

The Integration Service MUST provide routing capabilities for payloads between producers and consumers. The Integration Service MAY provide further capabilities within the payload delivery pipeline. Examples of these capabilities include, but are not limited to, intermediate processing, message transformation, type conversion, validation, or other enterprise integration patterns.

4.2. Downstream Uses

As depicted by Figure 2, a number of downstream uses exist in the cooperative ecosystem. Each notional SACM component represents distinct sub-architectures which will exchange information via the integration services, using interactions described in this draft.

4.2.1. Reporting

The Reporting component represents capabilities outside of the SACM architecture scope dealing with the query and retrieval of collected posture attribute information, evaluation results, etc. in various display formats that are useful to a wide range of stakeholders.

4.2.2. Analytics

The Analytics component represents capabilities outside of the SACM architecture scope dealing with the discovery, interpretation, and communication of any meaningful patterns of data in order to inform effective decision making within the organization.

4.3. Sub-Architectures

Figure 2 shows two components representing sub-architectural roles involved in a cooperative ecosystem of SACM components for the purpose of posture assessment: Collection and Evaluation.

4.3.1. Collection Sub-Architecture

The Collection sub-architecture is, in a SACM context, the mechanism by which posture attributes are collected from applicable endpoints and persisted to a repository, such as a configuration management database (CMDB). Control plane functions initiated by the Manager will coordinate the necessary orchestration components, who will choreograph endpoint data collection via defined interactions, using the Integration Service as a message broker. Instructions to perform endpoint data collection are directed to a Posture Collection Service.
capable of performing collection activities utilizing any number of protocols, such as SNMP, NETCONF/RESTCONF, SCAP, SSH, WinRM, packet capture, or host-based. Instructions are orchestrated with the appropriate Posture Collection Services using serializations supported according to the collector's capabilities.

Figure 3: Decomposed Collection Sub-Architecture
4.3.1.1. Posture Collection Service

The Posture Collection Service (PCS) is a SACM component responsible for the collection of posture attributes from an endpoint or set of endpoints. A single PCS MAY be responsible for management of posture attribute collection from many endpoints. The PCS will interact with the Integration Service to receive collection instructions, and to provide collected posture attributes for persistence to one or more Posture Attribute Repositories. Collection instructions may be supplied in a variety of forms, including subscription to a publish/subscribe topic to which the Integration Service has published instructions, or via request/response-style messaging (either synchronous or asynchronous).

Four classifications of posture collections MAY be supported.

4.3.1.1.1. Ad-Hoc

Ad-Hoc collection is defined as a single collection of posture attributes, collected at a particular time. An example of ad-hoc collection is the single collection of a specific registry key.

4.3.1.1.2. Continuous/Scheduled

Continuous/Scheduled collection is defined as the ongoing, periodic collection of posture attributes. An example of scheduled collection is the collection of a specific registry key value every day at a given time.

4.3.1.1.3. Observational

This classification of collection is triggered by the observation, external to an endpoint, of information asserting posture attribute values for that endpoint. An example of observational collection is examination of netflow data for particular packet captures and/or specific information within those captures.

4.3.1.1.4. Event-based

Event-based collection may be triggered either internally or externally to the endpoint. Internal event-based collection is triggered when a posture attribute of interest is added, removed, or modified on an endpoint. This modification indicates a change in the current state of the endpoint, potentially affecting its adherence to some defined policy. Modification of the endpoint’s minimum password length is an example of an attribute change which could trigger collection.
External event-based collection can be described as a collector being subscribed to an external source of information, receiving events from that external source on a periodic or continuous basis. An example of event-based collection is subscription to YANG Push notifications.

4.3.1.2. Endpoint

Building upon [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], the SACM Collection Sub-Architecture augments the definition of an Endpoint as a component within an organization’s management domain from which a Posture Collection Service will collect relevant posture attributes.

4.3.1.3. Posture Attribute Repository

The Posture Attribute Repository is a SACM component responsible for the persistent storage of posture attributes collected via interactions between the Posture Collection Service and Endpoints.

4.3.1.4. Posture Collection Workflow

Posture collection may be triggered from a number of components, but commonly begin either via event-based triggering on an endpoint or through manual orchestration, both illustrated in Figure 3 above. Once orchestration has provided the directive to perform collection, posture collection services consume the directives. Posture collection is invoked for those endpoints overseen by the respective posture collection services. Collected data is then provided to the Integration Service, with a directive to store that information in an appropriate repository.

4.3.2. Evaluation Sub-Architecture

The Evaluation Sub-Architecture, in the SACM context, is the mechanism by which policy, expressed in the form of expected state, is compared with collected posture attributes to yield an evaluation result, that result being contextually dependent on the policy being evaluated.
4.3.2.1. Posture Evaluation Service

The Posture Evaluation Service (PES) represents the SACM component responsible for coordinating the policy to be evaluated and the collected posture attributes relevant to that policy, as well as the comparison engine responsible for correctly determining compliance with the expected state.

4.3.2.2. Policy Repository

The Policy Repository represents a persistent storage mechanism for the policy to be assessed against collected posture attributes to determine if an endpoint meets the desired expected state. Examples of information contained in a Policy Repository would be Vulnerability Definition Data or configuration recommendations as part of a CIS Benchmark or DISA STIG.
4.3.2.3. Evaluation Results Repository

The Evaluation Results Repository persists the information representing the results of a particular posture assessment, indicating those posture attributes collected from various endpoints which either meet or do not meet the expected state defined by the assessed policy. Consideration should be made for the context of individual results. For example, meeting the expected state for a configuration attribute indicates a correct configuration of the endpoint, whereas meeting an expected state for a vulnerable software version indicates an incorrect configuration.

4.3.2.4. Posture Evaluation Workflow

Posture evaluation is orchestrated through the Integration Service to the appropriate Posture Evaluation Service (PES). The PES will, using interactions defined by the applicable taxonomy, query both the Posture Attribute Repository and the Policy Repository to obtain relevant state data for comparison. If necessary, the PES may be required to invoke further posture collection. Once all relevant posture information has been collected, it is compared to expected state based on applicable policy. Comparison results are then persisted to an evaluation results repository for further downstream use and analysis.

5. Ecosystem Interactions

Ecosystem interactions describe the various functions between SACM components, including manager requirements, the onboarding of components, capability advertisement, administrative actions, and status updates, among others. The Manager component acts as the administrative "lead" for the SACM ecosystem, and must maintain records of registered components, manage capabilities, and more.

5.1. Manager

The Manager, being a specialized role in the architecture, enables the onboarding and capability management of the various SACM component roles. The Manager must support the set of capabilities needed to operate the SACM ecosystem.

With this in mind, the Manager must first authenticate to the Integration Service. Once authentication has succeeded, the Manager MUST establish a service handler capable of performing SACM component registration/onboarding activities (Component Registration Operation). The Manager MUST also establish a subscription to an ecosystem-wide status notification mechanism, in order to receive published status updates from other SACM components.
The following requirements exist for the Manager to establish service handlers supporting the component registration taxonomy (Component Registration Operation):

* The Manager MUST enable the capability to receive onboarding requests,

* The Manager MUST have the capability to generate, manage, and persist unique identifiers for all registered components,

* The Manager MUST maintain the relationships between capabilities and payload categorizations (such as topic names or specific payload identifiers),

* The Manager MUST have the capability to inventory and manage its "roster" (the list of registered components),

* The Manager MUST have the capability to manage its roster’s advertised capabilities, including those endpoints to which those capabilities apply.

* In addition to supporting component registration, the Manager is responsible for many of the operational functions of the architecture, including initiating collection or evaluation, queries for repository data, or the assembly of information for downstream use.

* The Manager MUST support making directed requests to registered components over the component’s administrative interface. Administrative interface functions are described by their taxonomy, below.

* The Manager MUST support each of the interaction categories as described above.

5.2. Component Registration

Component registration describes how an individual component becomes part of the SACM ecosystem; authenticating to the Integration Service, registering and establishing its administrative interface with, the Manager.

The component onboarding workflow involves multiple steps:

* The component first authenticates to the Integration Service.
* The component initiates registration with the Manager, per the component registration operation (Component Registration Operation).

* The component handles the response from the Manager to configure a service handler allowing the component to receive directed messages over the administrative interface with the Manager.

5.3. Administrative Interface

The administrative interface represents a direct communication channel between the Manager and any registered Component. This interface allows the Manager to make directed requests to a component in order to perform specific actions.

5.3.1. Capability Advertisement Handshake

Capability Advertisement is the mechanism by which components initially indicate their capabilities to the Manager. This handshake is completed using the administrative interface with the Manager. It becomes the Manager’s responsibility to persist component/capability relationships, and to provide the component the information necessary to receive and process message payloads specific to the supported capabilities.

5.3.2. Health Check

The administrative "health check" is a mechanism by which the Manager queries for the "liveness" of its roster of components, and to possibly alert users or other systems when components are no longer present. The Manager MAY enable a periodic message to each component to determine if that component is still listening to the Administrative Interface. The Health Check interaction MAY include a request for "Capability Refresh", to reinitiate the Capability Advertisement Handshake. This interaction is similar to the "Heartbeat" interaction, but is initiated by the Manager.

5.3.3. Heartbeat

The administrative "heartbeat" is a mechanism by which a Component indicates to the Manager that the Component remains connected to the ecosystem. The Heartbeat differs from the Health Check interaction in that the Component initiates the interaction, and that no response from the Manager is required.
5.3.4. Capability-specific Requests

Any number of capability-specific requests can be enabled through the administrative interface that allow the Manager to direct actions to be performed by a specific component. Utilizing the interface from a component to the Manager, this interface can be used to indicate a component has come back online, or to provide an updated capability advertisement, potentially resulting in updates to subscriptions or service handlers.

5.4. Status Notifications

A generic status notifications mechanism SHOULD be configured to which (a) the Manager is subscribed, and (b) all onboarded components can publish. Status notifications may be used by the Manager to update user interfaces, to provide notification of the start, finish, success or failure of ecosystem operations, or as events to trigger subsequent activities.

5.5. Component Interactions

Component interactions describe functionality between components relating to collection, evaluation, or other downstream processes. The following component interactions begin with the Manager providing a set of instructions to an Orchestrator or set of Orchestrators that have registered with the SACM ecosystem indicating the appropriate capabilities, such as collection or evaluation. Subscribing Orchestrator(s) MAY translate, manipulate, filter, augment, or otherwise transform the Manager’s instructions into content supported through the Orchestrator’s capabilities.

5.5.1. Initiate Ad-Hoc Collection

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of collection instructions to a Posture Collection Service either through direct or broadcast mechanisms. The receiving PCS components perform the required collection based on their capabilities. Each PCS then forms a payload of collected posture attributes (including endpoint identifying information) and provides that payload to the Posture Attribute Repository interface, for persistence.

5.5.2. Coordinate Periodic Collection

Similar to ad-hoc collection, the Orchestrator supplies a payload of collection instructions similar to those of ad-hoc collection. Additional information elements containing collection identification and periodicity are included.
5.5.2.1. Schedule Periodic Collection

To enable operations on periodic collection, the scheduling payload MUST include both a unique identifier for the set of collection instructions, as well as a periodicity expression to enable the collection schedule. An optional "immediate collection" flag will indicate to the collection component that, upon receipt of the collection instructions, a collection will automatically be initiated prior to engagement of the scheduled collection.

5.5.2.2. Cancel Periodic Collection

The Orchestrator disables the periodic collection of posture attributes by supplying collector(s) the unique identifier of previously scheduled collection instructions. An optional "final collection" flag will indicate to the collection component that, upon receipt of the cancellation instructions, a final ad-hoc collection is to take place.

5.5.3. Coordinate Observational/Event-based Collection

In these scenarios, the Posture Collection Service acts as the "observer". Interactions with the observer could specify a time period of observation and potentially information intended to filter observed posture attributes to aid the PCS in determining those attributes that are applicable for collection and persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository.

5.5.3.1. Initiate Observational/Event-based Collection

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of instructions to a topic or set of topics to which Posture Collection Services (observers) are subscribed. This payload could include specific instructions based on the observer’s capabilities to determine specific posture attributes to observe and collect.

5.5.3.2. Cancel Observational/Event-based Collection

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of instructions to a topic or set of topics to which Posture Collection Services are subscribed. The receiving PCS components cancel the identified observational/event-based collection executing on those PCS components.
5.5.4. Persist Collected Posture Attributes

Following successful collection, Posture Collection Services (PCS) will supply the payload of collected posture attributes to the interface(s) supporting the persistent storage of those attributes to the Posture Attribute Repository. Information in this payload should include identifying information of the computing resource(s) for which attributes were collected.

5.5.5. Initiate Ad-Hoc Evaluation

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of evaluation instructions to a Posture Evaluation Services (PES) either through direct or broadcast mechanisms. The receiving PES components perform the required evaluation based on their capabilities. The PES generates a payload of posture evaluation results and publishes that payload to the Evaluation Results Repository interface, for persistence.

5.5.6. Coordinate Periodic Evaluation

Similar to ad-hoc evaluation, the Orchestrator supplies a payload of evaluation instructions similar to those of ad-hoc evaluation. Additional information elements containing evaluation identification and periodicity are included.

5.5.6.1. Schedule Periodic Evaluation

To enable operations on periodic evaluation, the scheduling payload MUST include both a unique identifier for the set of evaluation instructions, as well as a periodicity expression to enable the evaluation schedule. An optional "immediate evaluation" flag will indicate to the Posture Evaluation Service (PES) that, upon receipt of the evaluation instructions, an evaluation will automatically be initiated prior to engagement of the scheduled evaluation.

5.5.6.2. Cancel Periodic Evaluation

The Orchestrator disables the periodic evaluation of posture attributes by supplying Posture Evaluation Service(s) the unique identifier of previously scheduled evaluation instructions. An optional "final evaluation" flag will indicate to the PES that, upon receipt of the cancellation instructions, a final ad-hoc evaluation is to take place.
5.5.7. Coordinate Change-based Evaluation

A more fine-grained approach to periodic evaluation may be enabled through the triggering of Posture Evaluation based on changes to posture attribute values at the time of their collection and persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository.

5.5.7.1. Identify Attributes

The Orchestrator enables change-based evaluation through a payload published to Posture Attribute Repository component(s). This payload includes appropriate information elements describing the posture attributes on which changes in value will trigger posture evaluation.

5.5.7.2. Cancel Change-based Evaluation

An Orchestrator may disable change-based evaluation through a payload published to Posture Attribute Repository component(s), including those information elements necessary to identify those posture attributes for which change-based evaluation no longer applies.

5.5.8. Queries

Queries should allow for a "freshness" time period, allowing the requesting entity to determine if/when posture attributes must be re-collected prior to performing evaluation. This freshness time period can be "zeroed out" for the purpose of automatically triggering re-collection regardless of the most recent collection.

6. Operations

The following sections describe a number of operations required to enable a cooperative ecosystem of posture attribute collection and evaluation functions.

6.1. Component Registration

Component registration describes how an individual component becomes part of the SACM ecosystem; registering with the Manager, and establishing the administrative interface.

* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response)

* Source Component: Any component wishing to join the ecosystem, such as Posture Collection Services, Repository Interfaces, Posture Evaluation Services and more.

* Target Component(s): Manager
6.1.1. Request Payload

When a component onboards with the ecosystem, it must identify itself to the Manager, using either descriptive information or an already-existing component unique identifier.

component-registration-request:
  {:component-identification:}

component-identification:
  component-unique-identifier (if re-establishing communication)
  #-OR-#
  component-type {:component-type:}
  component-name
  component-description (optional)

component-type:
  enumeration:
  - posture-collection-service
  - posture-evaluation-service
  - repository-interface
  - orchestrator
  - others?

When registering for the first time, the component will send identifying information including the component type and a name. If the component is re-establishing communications, for example after a restart of the component or deployment of a new version, the component only needs to supply its previously generated (and persisted) [component-unique-identifier].

6.1.2. Request Processing

When the Manager receives the component’s request for onboarding, it will:

* Generate a unique identifier, "[component-unique-identifier]", for the onboarding component,
* Persist identifying information, including the "[component-unique-identifier]" to its component inventory, enabling an up-to-date roster of components being managed,
* Establish the administrative interface to the onboarded component by enabling a service handler to listen for directed messages from the component.
6.1.3. Response Payload

The Manager will respond to the component with a payload including the component’s unique identifier. At this point, the Manager is aware of the component’s existence in the ecosystem, and the component can self-identify by virtue of receiving its unique identifier.

```plaintext
component-registration-response:
  component-unique-identifier: [component-unique-identifier]
```

6.1.4. Response Processing

Successful receipt of the Manager’s response, including the "[component-unique-identifier]", indicates the component is onboarded to the ecosystem. Using the response payload, the component can then establish it’s end of the administrative interface with the Manager. The component must then persist it’s unique identifier for use when re-establishing communication with the Manager after failure recovery or restart.

6.2. Administrative Interface

A number of functions may take place which, instead of being published to multiple subscribers, may require direct interaction between the Manager and a registered component (and vice-versa). During component onboarding, this direct channel, known as the Administrative Interface, is established first by the Manager and subsequently complemented by the component onboarding the SACM ecosystem. Three operations are defined for the administrative interface, but any number of application or capability-specific operations MAY be enabled using the directed messaging provided by this interface.

6.2.1. Capability Advertisement Handshake

Capability advertisement represents the ability of any registered component to inform the Manager of that component’s capacity for performing certain operations. For example, a Posture Collection Service component may advertise its capability to perform collection using a particular collection system/serialization. This capability advertisement is important for the Manager to persist in order for the Manager to correctly classify components registered within the SACM ecosystem, and therefore provide the ability to publish messages to components in accordance with their capabilities.

* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response)
* Source Component: Any registered component, such as Posture Collection Services, Repository Interfaces, Posture Evaluation Services and more.

* Target Component(s): Manager

6.2.1.1. Request Payload

The component’s capability advertisement request payload will include a list of "Capability URNs" (TBD IANA SECTION) that represent it’s supported operational capabilities.

capability-advertisement:
  capabilities:
    capability-urn: [urn]
    capability-urn: [urn]
    capability-urn: [urn]
    ...

6.2.1.2. Request Processing

Upon receipt of the component’s capability advertisement, the Manager SHOULD:

* Persist the component’s capabilities to the Manager’s inventory

* Coordinate, based on the supplied capabilities, the service handlers (for directed messages) and/or event listeners (for broadcast messages) to which the component should support.

6.2.1.3. Response Payload

The response payload delivered to the component should include the appropriate service handling/event listening information required for the component to handle further interactions based on each advertised capability. If a capability was not registered successfully, appropriate error messages SHOULD be supplied to inform the component of the failure(s).
capability-advertisement-response:
capabilities:
capability:
capability-urn: [urn]
registration-status: (success | failure)
service-handler-or-event-listener: [info]
messages: [messages]
capability:
capability-urn: [urn]
registration-status: (success | failure)
service-handler-or-event-listener: [info]
messages: [messages]

6.2.1.4.  Response Processing

Once the component has received the response to its capability advertisement, it should configure the capability-specific service handler(s) or event listener(s). Once these handlers/listeners have been configured, the component is considered fully onboarded to the SACM ecosystem.

6.2.2.  Health Check

As time passes, it is important that the Manager maintains knowledge of all registered component’s current operational status. The health check operation describes the efforts taken by the Manager to maintain the most up-to-date inventory of it’s component roster, and to potentially trigger events to users or outside systems (e.g. a SIEM or SOAR) indicating unavailable components.

* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response)

* Source Component: Manager

* Target Component(s): Any registered component, such as Posture Collection Services, Repository Interfaces, Posture Evaluation Services and more.

6.2.2.1.  Request Payload

The request for the health check is a simple "ping".

health-check-request:
  action: ping
6.2.2.2. Request Processing

When the target component receives the health check request, the target component need only respond that it is operational and connected to the integration service. This is a simple "Hello component, are you listening? Yes, I am" interaction. The health check request from the Manager should be made with an appropriately small timeout indicator; only an operational component will be able to respond to the request, so if that component is offline and cannot respond, the Manager should not be kept waiting for an extended amount of time.

6.2.2.3. Response Payload

When responding to the health check request, the response payload will simply indicate success: 

```
health-check-response: response: success
```

6.2.2.4. Response Processing

Upon receipt of the "health-check-response" payload, the Manager will update its inventory of currently operational components with the timestamp of the receipt. Manager implementations may raise alerts, inform users, or take other actions when health checks are unsuccessful, at their discretion.

6.2.3. Heartbeat

As time passes and SACM ecosystem components which have previously registered are brought offline (perhaps for maintenance or redeployment) and back online, it is important that registered components maintain administrative contact with the Manager. The heartbeat operation describes the efforts taken by a registered component to determine the status of contact with the Manager, and to take appropriate action if such contact cannot be made.

* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response)

* Source Component: Any registered component, such as Posture Collection Services, Repository Interfaces, Posture Evaluation Services and more.

* Target Component(s): Manager

6.2.3.1. Request Payload

The request payload simply defines the heartbeat action:
heartbeat-request:
action: pulse

6.2.3.2. Request Processing

When the Manager receives the heartbeat request, it need only respond that it is operational and connected to the integration service. This is a simple "Hello Manager, are you listening? Yes, I am" interaction. The heartbeat request from the component should be made with an appropriately small timeout indicator; only an operational Manager will be able to respond to the request, so if it is offline and cannot respond, the component should not be kept waiting for an extended amount of time.

6.2.3.3. Response Payload

When responding to the heartbeat request, the response payload will simply indicate success:

heartbeat-response: response: success

6.2.3.4. Response Processing

Upon receipt of the "heartbeat-response" payload, the component may reset its heartbeat timer and continue normal operations, awaiting incoming message payloads. Component implementations may raise alerts, inform users, or take other actions when heartbeat requests are unsuccessful (potentially indicating a downed Manager), at their discretion.

6.3. Status Notification

From time to time during the performance of any given operation, a component may need to supply status information to the Manager (or any other concerned component), for use in display to users, or to trigger other events within the SACM ecosystem. The status notification operation is designed to allow any component to broadcast status message payloads to any subscribers with the need to know. For example, a collection component could broadcast to the Manager that it has initiated collection, subsequent collection progress updates, and finally completion or error conditions.

* Interaction Type: Broadcast (Publish/Subscribe)

* Source Component: Any registered component, such as Posture Collection Services, Repository Interfaces, Posture Evaluation Services and more.
* Target Component(s): Typically the Manager, but any registered component may subscribe to status notifications.

6.3.1. Request Payload

At a minimum, the payload broadcast for a status notification MUST include the status message and the publishing component’s "component-unique-identifier". Further identifying information, such as status codes, operation indicators, etc., MAY be provided by implementing components.

status-notification:
  publisher: [component-unique-identifier]
  message: [message]
  [additional information]

6.3.2. Request Processing

When subscribers are notified of the status message, respective components may act upon them in component/application-specific ways, including persisting those messages to repositories, forwarding to log aggregation tools, displaying on user interfaces, and so on. Potential for use of component status notifications is only limited by application implementations.

6.3.3. Response Payload

N/A

6.3.4. Response Processing

N/A

6.4. Initiate Ad-Hoc Collection

The Ad-hoc collection workflow MAY be initiated by the Manager, via user interaction, or through a Posture Evaluation Service, and represents a single, point-in-time operation to collect posture attributes from applicable endpoints. The SACM Producer initiates a message payload, either through directed channels (such as the administrative interface) or through broadcast notifications to multiple subscribers, to Orchestrator components. Orchestrators MAY manipulate the Manager’s collection instructions according to various collection capabilities, prior to providing those instructions to Posture Collection Service (PCS) components. Once collection instructions are received by the PCS, it will collect the requested posture attributes from the designated endpoints, using its advertised collection capabilities. The following diagram

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illustrates this workflow with the Manager as the initiating SACM Producer:

1. The Manager initiates a request to one or more Orchestrators to perform collection,

2. The Orchestrator receives collection instructions and potentially manipulates them according to one or more collection capabilities,

3. The Orchestrator publishes a notification to subscribed Posture Collection Service components, indicating the posture attributes to be collected,

4. The Posture Collection Service receives the collection instructions and performs the actual collection of posture attributes from an endpoint or endpoints.

5. The Posture Collection Service publishes a notification(s) containing the collected posture attributes to be persisted to the Posture Attribute Repository,

6. The Posture Attribute Repository persists the collected posture attributes, potentially performing normalization of the data as part of its process.

Interactions labeled (S) indicate the capability of each component to publish status notifications, subscribed to by the Manager.
6.4.1. SACM Producer to Orchestrator

The Ad-hoc collection workflow MAY be initiated by a number of SACM components, such as the Manager, a Posture Evaluation Service, or other events outside the scope of this document.

* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response) or Broadcast (Publish/Subscribe)
* Source Component: Various
* Target Component(s): Orchestrator

6.4.1.1. Request Payload

A request to orchestrate posture attribute collection MUST include enough information to describe those attributes being collected, and MAY include endpoint targeting information.

```
6.4.1.2. Request Processing

When the Orchestrator receives the collection instructions, it may be required to manipulate them according to the capabilities it’s collector(s) support. For example, generic collection instructions could be transformed to the appropriate OVAL serialization for collection via OVAL-compliant collectors.

6.4.1.3. Response Payload

Orchestrators have the option to provide broadcast status update messages to indicate success, failure, or other error messages when receiving posture collection orchestration payloads.

6.4.1.4. Response Processing

N/A

6.4.2. Orchestrator to Posture Collection Service

Once the Orchestrator has received collection instructions from the initiating SACM component, and has performed any manipulation of the instructions to conform to it’s capabilities, it will provide those instructions to relevant Posture Collection Services.
* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response) or Broadcast (Publish/Subscribe)

* Source Component: Orchestrator

* Target Component(s): Posture Collection Service

6.4.2.1. Request Payload

The payload exchanged between the Orchestrator and it’s associated Posture Collection Services will be collection instructions adhering to a data model supported by the PCS based on its advertised capabilities.

```
collection-instructions:
  TBD
```

6.4.2.2. Request Processing

Upon receipt of the payload containing collection instructions, the Posture Collection Service should parse and validate them, indicating any errors in the process. If the payload does not conform to any serialization or data model to which the PCS’ capabilities correspond, status messages indicating such nonconformance SHOULD be provided to both the Orchestrator and the initiating SACM producer.

Once successfully parsed and validated, the PCS MUST perform collection of posture attributes according to the collection instructions, from any endpoint to which the PCS has access, or from the list of endpoints described in any targeting information included in the collection instructions.

6.4.2.3. Response Payload

Posture Collection Service components will respond using the generic status update mechanisms to indicate success, failure, or any errors that occur. Errors may occur parsing collection instructions, verifying them, targeting indicated endpoints, or from the act of collecting the indicated posture attributes.

6.4.2.4. Response Processing

Any messages received by components regarding the success, failure, or errors involved in the collection of posture attributes MAY be processed according to the receiving components’ capabilities.
6.4.3. Posture Collection Service to Posture Attribute Repository

Upon completion of posture attribute collection, the PCS constructs the payload of collected attributes based on its advertised capabilities, e.g., OVAL system characteristics. This payload is provided to either a specific posture attribute repository via directed messages or to subscribed repository interfaces via broadcast messages.

* Interaction Type: Directed (Request/Response) or Broadcast (Publish/Subscribe)
* Source Component: Posture Collection Service
* Target Component(s): Posture Attribute Repository

6.4.3.1. Request Payload

The payload supplied by the Posture Collection Service SHOULD conform to information and data models supported by its advertised capabilities. These data models, at a minimum, SHOULD include name/value pairs for each collected attribute.

```plaintext
collection-results:
  [attribute-name, attribute-value]
```

6.4.3.2. Request Processing

As the Posture Attribute Repository interface receives the payload of collected posture attributes, some data normalization MAY occur in order to persist the information most efficiently based on the persistence technology. This normalization is dependent on the implementation of the repository interface as well as the persistence technology. For example, OVAL system characteristics, an XML payload, could be normalized to a property graph representation when persisted to a Neo4j database.

6.4.3.3. Response Payload

Once the Posture Attribute Repository has received, it MAY respond to the Posture Collection Service that it has successfully received the collected posture attributes. This response would only be applicable when receiving payloads via directed requests. If payloads are received via broadcast interactions, there may not be a PCS to which a response can be sent. The Posture Attribute Repository MAY utilize
the generic status update interactions to provide response messages to appropriate subscribers.

6.4.3.4. Response Processing

Any messages received by components regarding the success, failure, or errors involved in the persistence of collected posture attributes MAY be processed according to the receiving components’ capabilities. For example, a generic status update message could be processed by a Manager component, correlated with the initial posture collection instructions in order to "close the loop" on the posture attribute collection workflow.

6.5. Initiate Ad-Hoc Evaluation

### Manager to Orchestrator ### Orchestrator to Evaluator ###
Evaluator to Posture Evaluation Repository

7. Privacy Considerations

[TBD]

8. Security Considerations

[TBD]

9. IANA Considerations

[TBD] Some boilerplate code...

9.1. Component Types

URI: "urn:ietf:sacm:component-type" Description: The allowed enumeration of the various component types permitted to utilize the SACM ecosystem.

* Manager
* Orchestrator
* Collector
* Evaluator
* Repository Interface
* [MORE]
9.2. Component Capabilities

### Health Check A URN representing a component’s capability to initiate Health Check operations and to process any provided response payloads.

URN: "urn:ietf:sacm:capability:action:health-check"

9.2.1. Heartbeat

A URN representing a component’s capability to initiate Heartbeat operations and to process any provided response payloads.

URN: "urn:ietf:sacm:capability:action:heartbeat"

9.2.2. Status Notification (Publish)

A URN representing a component’s capability to publish status notifications.

URN: "urn:ietf:sacm:capability:publish:status-notification"

9.2.3. Status Notification (Subscribe)

A URN representing a component’s capability to subscribe to status notification events.

URN: "urn:ietf:sacm:capability:subscribe:status-notification"

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References

[CISCONTROLS]

[draft-birkholz-sacm-yang-content]


[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]

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[RFC3444]

[RFC4949]

[RFC5023]
Appendix A. Security Domain Workflows

This section describes three primary information security domains from which workflows may be derived: IT Asset Management, Vulnerability Management, and Configuration Management.

A.1. IT Asset Management

Information Technology asset management is easier said than done. The [CISCONTROLS] have two controls dealing with IT asset management. Control 1, Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets, states, "Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all hardware devices on the network so that only authorized devices are given access, and unauthorized and unmanaged devices are found and prevented from gaining access." Control 2, Inventory and Control of Software Assets, states, "Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all software on the network so that only authorized software is installed and can execute, and that unauthorized and unmanaged software is found and prevented from installation or execution."
In spirit, this covers all of the processing entities on your network (as opposed to things like network cables, dongles, adapters, etc.), whether physical or virtual, on-premises or in the cloud.

A.1.1. Components, Capabilities and Workflow(s)

TBD

A.1.1.1. Components

TBD

A.1.1.2. Capabilities

An IT asset management capability needs to be able to:

* Identify and catalog new assets by executing Target Endpoint Discovery Tasks

* Provide information about its managed assets, including uniquely identifying information (for that enterprise)

* Handle software and/or hardware (including virtual assets)

* Represent cloud hybrid environments

A.1.1.3. Workflow(s)

TBD

A.2. Vulnerability Management

Vulnerability management is a relatively established process. To paraphrase the [CISCONTROLS], continuous vulnerability management is the act of continuously acquiring, assessing, and taking subsequent action on new information in order to identify and remediate vulnerabilities, therefore minimizing the window of opportunity for attackers.

A vulnerability assessment (i.e. vulnerability detection) is performed in two steps:

* Endpoint information collected by the endpoint management capabilities is examined by the vulnerability management capabilities through Evaluation Tasks.
* If the data possessed by the endpoint management capabilities is insufficient, a Collection Task is triggered and the necessary data is collected from the target endpoint.

Vulnerability detection relies on the examination of different endpoint information depending on the nature of a specific vulnerability. Common endpoint information used to detect a vulnerability includes:

* A specific software version is installed on the endpoint
* File system attributes
* Specific state attributes

In some cases, the endpoint information needed to determine an endpoint’s vulnerability status will have been previously collected by the endpoint management capabilities and available in a Repository. However, in other cases, the necessary endpoint information will not be readily available in a Repository and a Collection Task will be triggered to perform collection from the target endpoint. Of course, some implementations of endpoint management capabilities may prefer to enable operators to perform this collection even when sufficient information can be provided by the endpoint management capabilities (e.g. there may be freshness requirements for information).

A.2.1. Components, Capabilities and Workflow(s)

TBD

A.2.1.1. Components

TBD

A.2.1.2. Capabilities

TBD

A.2.1.3. Workflow(s)

TBD
A.3. Configuration Management

Configuration management involves configuration assessment, which requires state assessment. The [CISCONTROLS] specify two high-level controls concerning configuration management (Control 5 for non-network devices and Control 11 for network devices). As an aside, these controls are listed separately because many enterprises have different organizations for managing network infrastructure and workload endpoints. Merging the two controls results in the following paraphrasing: Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the security configuration of systems using a rigorous configuration management and change control process in order to prevent attackers from exploiting vulnerable services and settings.

Typically, an enterprise will use configuration guidance from a reputable source, and from time to time they may tailor the guidance from that source prior to adopting it as part of their enterprise standard. The enterprise standard is then provided to the appropriate configuration assessment tools and they assess endpoints and/or appropriate endpoint information.

A preferred flow follows:

* Reputable source publishes new or updated configuration guidance
* Enterprise configuration assessment capability retrieves configuration guidance from reputable source
* Optional: Configuration guidance is tailored for enterprise-specific needs
* Configuration assessment tool queries asset inventory repository to retrieve a list of affected endpoints
* Configuration assessment tool queries configuration state repository to evaluate compliance
* If information is stale or unavailable, configuration assessment tool triggers an ad hoc assessment

The SACM architecture needs to support varying deployment models to accommodate the current state of the industry, but should strongly encourage event-driven approaches to monitoring configuration.
A.3.1. Components, Capabilities and Workflow(s)

This section provides more detail about the components and capabilities required when considering the aforementioned configuration management workflow.

A.3.1.1. Components

The following is a minimal list of SACM Components required to implement the aforementioned configuration assessment workflow.

* Configuration Policy Feed: An external source of authoritative configuration recommendations.

* Configuration Policy Repository: An internal repository of enterprise standard configurations.

* Configuration Assessment Orchestrator: A component responsible for orchestrating assessments.

* Posture Attribute Collection Subsystem: A component responsible for collection of posture attributes from systems.

* Posture Attribute Repository: A component used for storing system posture attribute values.

* Configuration Assessment Evaluator: A component responsible for evaluating system posture attribute values against expected posture attribute values.

* Configuration Assessment Results Repository: A component used for storing evaluation results.

A.3.1.2. Capabilities

Per [RFC8248], solutions MUST support capability negotiation. Components implementing specific interfaces and operations (i.e. interactions) will need a method of describing their capabilities to other components participating in the ecosystem; for example, "As a component in the ecosystem, I can assess the configuration of Windows, MacOS, and AWS using OVAL".
A.3.1.3. Configuration Assessment Workflow

This section describes the components and interactions in a basic configuration assessment workflow. For simplicity, error conditions are recognized as being necessary and are not depicted. When one component messages another component, the message is expected to be handled appropriately unless there is an error condition, or other notification, messaged in return.

Figure 5: Configuration Assessment Component Interactions

Figure 5 depicts configuration assessment components and their interactions, which are further described below.

1. A policy feed provides a configuration assessment policy payload to the Integration Service.

2. The Policy Repository, a consumer of Policy Feed information, receives and persists the Policy Feed’s payload.

3. Orchestration component(s), either manually invoked, scheduled, or event-based, publish a payload to begin the configuration assessment process.
4. If necessary, Collection Sub-Architecture components may be invoked to collect needed posture attribute information.

5. If necessary, the Collection Sub-Architecture will provide collected posture attributes to the Integration Service for persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository.

6. The Posture Attribute Repository will consume a payload querying for relevant posture attribute information.

7. The Posture Attribute Repository will provide the requested information to the Integration Service, allowing further orchestration payloads requesting the Evaluation Sub-Architecture perform evaluation tasks.

8. The Evaluation Sub-Architecture consumes the evaluation payload and performs component-specific state comparison operations to produce evaluation results.

9. A payload containing evaluation results are provided by the Evaluation Sub-Architecture to the Integration Service

10. Evaluation results are consumed by/persisted to the Evaluation Results Repository

In the above flow, the payload information is expected to convey the context required by the receiving component for the action being taken under different circumstances. For example, a directed message sent from an Orchestrator to a Collection sub-architecture might be telling that Collector to watch a specific posture attribute and report only specific detected changes to the Posture Attribute Repository, or it might be telling the Collector to gather that posture attribute immediately. Such details are expected to be handled as part of that payload, not as part of the architecture described herein.

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Concise Software Identification Tags
draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-21

Abstract

ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 Software Identification (SWID) tags provide an extensible XML-based structure to identify and describe individual software components, patches, and installation bundles. SWID tag representations can be too large for devices with network and storage constraints. This document defines a concise representation of SWID tags: Concise SWID (CoSWID) tags. CoSWID supports a similar set of semantics and features as SWID tags, as well as new semantics that allow CoSWIDs to describe additional types of information, all in a more memory efficient format.

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1. Introduction

SWID tags, as defined in ISO-19770-2:2015 [SWID], provide a standardized XML-based record format that identifies and describes a specific release of software, a patch, or an installation bundle, which are referred to as software components in this document. Different software components, and even different releases of a particular software component, each have a different SWID tag record associated with them. SWID tags are meant to be flexible and able to express a broad set of metadata about a software component.

SWID tags are used to support a number of processes including but not limited to:

* Software Inventory Management, a part of a Software Asset Management [SAM] process, which requires an accurate list of discernible deployed software components.

* Vulnerability Assessment, which requires a semantic link between standardized vulnerability descriptions and software components installed on IT-assets [X.1520].

* Remote Attestation, which requires a link between reference integrity measurements (RIM) and Attester-produced event logs that complement attestation Evidence [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].
While there are very few required fields in SWID tags, there are many optional fields that support different uses. A SWID tag consisting of only required fields might be a few hundred bytes in size; however, a tag containing many of the optional fields can be many orders of magnitude larger. Thus, real-world instances of SWID tags can be fairly large, and the communication of SWID tags in usage scenarios, such as those described earlier, can cause a large amount of data to be transported. This can be larger than acceptable for constrained devices and networks. Concise SWID (CoSWID) tags significantly reduce the amount of data transported as compared to a typical SWID tag through the use of the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949].

Size comparisons between XML SWID and CoSWID mainly depend on domain-specific applications and the complexity of attributes used in instances. While the values stored in CoSWID are often unchanged and therefore not reduced in size compared to an XML SWID, the scaffolding that the CoSWID encoding represents is significantly smaller by taking up 10 percent or less in size. This effect is visible in representation sizes, which in early experiments benefited from a 50 percent to 85 percent reduction in generic usage scenarios. Additional size reduction is enabled with respect to the memory footprint of XML parsing/validation.

In a CoSWID, the human-readable labels of SWID data items are replaced with more concise integer labels (indices). This approach allows SWID and CoSWID to share a common implicit information model, with CoSWID providing an alternate data model [RFC3444]. While SWID and CoSWID are intended to share the same implicit information model, this specification does not define this information model, or a mapping between the two data formats. While an attempt to align SWID and CoSWID tags has been made here, future revisions of ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 or this specification might cause this implicit information model to diverge, since these specifications are maintained by different standards groups.

The use of CBOR to express SWID information in CoSWID tags allows both CoSWID and SWID tags to be part of an enterprise security solution for a wider range of endpoints and environments.

1.1. The SWID and CoSWID Tag Lifecycle

In addition to defining the format of a SWID tag record, ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 defines requirements concerning the SWID tag lifecycle. Specifically, when a software component is installed on an endpoint, that software component’s SWID tag is also installed. Likewise, when the software component is uninstalled or replaced, the SWID tag is deleted or replaced, as appropriate. As a result, ISO/IEC
19770-2:2015 describes a system wherein there is a correspondence between the set of installed software components on an endpoint, and the presence of the corresponding SWID tags for these components on that endpoint. CoSWIDs share the same lifecycle requirements as a SWID tag.

The SWID specification and supporting guidance provided in NIST Internal Report (NISTIR) 8060: Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable SWID Tags [SWID-GUIDANCE] defines four types of SWID tags: primary, patch, corpus, and supplemental. The following text is paraphrased from these sources.

1. Primary Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that identifies and describes an installed software component on an endpoint. A primary tag is intended to be installed on an endpoint along with the corresponding software component.

2. Patch Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that identifies and describes an installed patch that has made incremental changes to a software component installed on an endpoint. A patch tag is intended to be installed on an endpoint along with the corresponding software component patch.

3. Corpus Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that identifies and describes an installable software component in its pre-installation state. A corpus tag can be used to represent metadata about an installation package or installer for a software component, a software update, or a patch.

4. Supplemental Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that allows additional information to be associated with a referenced SWID tag. This allows tools and users to record their own metadata about a software component without modifying CoSWID primary or patch tags created by a software provider.

The type of a tag is determined by specific data elements, which are discussed in Section 3, which also provides normative language for CoSWID semantics that implement this lifecycle. The following information helps to explain how these semantics apply to use of a CoSWID tag.

Corpus, primary, and patch tags have similar functions in that they describe the existence and/or presence of different types of software components (e.g., software installers, software installations, software patches), and, potentially, different states of these software components. Supplemental tags have the same structure as other tags, but are used to provide information not contained in the referenced corpus, primary, and patch tags.
All four tag types come into play at various points in the software lifecycle and support software management processes that depend on the ability to accurately determine where each software component is in its lifecycle.

```
+------------+
\|            |
| Software   |
| Deployment | Installation | Patching | Upgrading | Removal |
\|           |
```

![Diagram showing the use of tag types in the software lifecycle](image)

**Figure 1: Use of Tag Types in the Software Lifecycle**

Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the software lifecycle and the relationships among those lifecycle events supported by the four types of SWID and CoSWID tags. A detailed description of the four tag types is provided in Section 2.3. The figure identifies the types of tags that are used in each lifecycle event.

There are many ways in which software tags might be managed for the host the software is installed on. For example, software tags could be made available on the host or to an external software manager when storage is limited on the host.

In these cases the host or external software manager is responsible for management of the tags, including deployment and removal of the tags as indicated by the above lifecycle. Tags are deployed and previously deployed tags that are typically removed (indicated by an "x" prefix) at each lifecycle stage, as follows:

- **Software Deployment.** Before the software component is installed (i.e., pre-installation), and while the product is being deployed, a corpus tag provides information about the installation files and distribution media (e.g., CD/DVD, distribution package).

  Corpus tags are not actually deployed on the target system but are intended to support deployment procedures and their dependencies at install-time, such as to verify the installation media.

- **Software Installation.** A primary tag will be installed with the software component (or subsequently created) to uniquely identify and describe the software component. Supplemental
tags are created to augment primary tags with additional site-specific or extended information. While not illustrated in the figure, patch tags can also be installed during software installation to provide information about software fixes deployed along with the base software installation.

- Software Patching. A new patch tag is provided, when a patch is applied to the software component, supplying details about the patch and its dependencies. While not illustrated in the figure, a corpus tag can also provide information about the patch installer and patching dependencies that need to be installed before the patch.

- Software Upgrading. As a software component is upgraded to a new version, new primary and supplemental tags replace existing tags, enabling timely and accurate tracking of updates to software inventory. While not illustrated in the figure, a corpus tag can also provide information about the upgrade installer and dependencies that need to be installed before the upgrade.

Note: In the context of software tagging software patching and updating differ in an important way. When installing a patch, a set of file modifications are made to pre-installed software which do not alter the version number or the descriptive metadata of an installed software component. An update can also make a set of file modifications, but the version number or the descriptive metadata of an installed software component are changed.

- Software Removal. Upon removal of the software component, relevant SWID tags are removed. This removal event can trigger timely updates to software inventory reflecting the removal of the product and any associated patch or supplemental tags.

As illustrated in the figure, supplemental tags can be associated with any corpus, primary, or patch tag to provide additional metadata about an installer, installed software, or installed patch respectively.

Understanding the use of CoSWIDs in the software lifecycle provides a basis for understanding the information provided in a CoSWID and the associated semantics of this information. Each of the different SWID and CoSWID tag types provide different sets of information. For example, a "corpus tag" is used to describe a software component’s installation image on an installation media, while a "patch tag" is meant to describe a patch that modifies some other software component.
1.2. Concise SWID Format

This document defines the CoSWID tag format, which is based on CBOR. CBOR-based CoSWID tags offer a more concise representation of SWID information as compared to the XML-based SWID tag representation in ISO-19770-2:2015. The structure of a CoSWID is described via the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610]. The resulting CoSWID data definition is aligned to the information able to be expressed with the XML schema definition of ISO-19770-2:2015 [SWID]. This alignment allows both SWID and CoSWID tags to represent a common set of software component information and allows CoSWID tags to support the same uses as a SWID tag.

The vocabulary, i.e., the CDDL names of the types and members used in the CoSWID CDDL specification, are mapped to more concise labels represented as small integer values (indices). The names used in the CDDL specification and the mapping to the CBOR representation using integer indices is based on the vocabulary of the XML attribute and element names defined in ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015.

1.3. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Concise SWID Data Definition

The following describes the general rules and processes for encoding data using CDDL representation. Prior familiarity with CBOR and CDDL concepts will be helpful in understanding this CoSWID specification.

This section describes the conventions by which a CoSWID is represented in the CDDL structure. The CamelCase [CamelCase] notation used in the XML schema definition is changed to a hyphen-separated notation [KebabCase] (e.g., ResourceCollection is named resource-collection) in the CoSWID CDDL specification. This deviation from the original notation used in the XML representation reduces ambiguity when referencing certain attributes in corresponding textual descriptions. An attribute referred to by its name in CamelCase notation explicitly relates to XML SWID tags; an attribute referred to by its name in KebabCase notation explicitly relates to CBOR CoSWID tags. This approach simplifies the composition of further work that reference both XML SWID and CBOR CoSWID documents.
In most cases, mapping attribute names between SWID and CoSWID can be done automatically by converting between CamelCase and KebabCase attribute names. However, some CoSWID CDDL attribute names show greater variation relative to their corresponding SWID XML Schema attributes. This is done when the change improves clarity in the CoSWID specification. For example, the "name" and "version" SWID fields correspond to the "software-name" and "software-version" CoSWID fields, respectively. As such, it is not always possible to mechanically translate between corresponding attribute names in the two formats. In such cases, a manual mapping will need to be used.

XPath expressions [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214] need to use SWID names, see Section 5.2.

The 57 human-readable text labels of the CDDL-based CoSWID vocabulary are mapped to integer indices via a block of rules at the bottom of the definition. This allows a more concise integer-based form to be stored or transported, as compared to the less efficient text-based form of the original vocabulary.

Through use of CDDL-based integer labels, CoSWID allows for future expansion in subsequent revisions of this specification and through extensions (see Section 2.2). New constructs can be associated with a new integer index. A deprecated construct can be replaced by a new construct with a new integer index. An implementation can use these integer indexes to identify the construct to parse. The CoSWID Items registry, defined in Section 6.1, is used to ensure that new constructs are assigned a unique index value. This approach avoids the need to have an explicit CoSWID version.

In a number of places, the value encoding admits both integer values and text strings. The integer values are defined in a registry specific to the kind of value; the text values are not intended for interchange and exclusively meant for private use as defined in Section 6.2.2. Encoders SHOULD NOT use string values based on the names registered in the registry, as these values are less concise than their index value equivalent; a decoder MUST however be prepared to accept text strings that are not specified in this document (and ignore the construct if that string is unknown). In the rest of the document, we call this an "integer label with text escape".

The root of the CDDL specification provided by this document is the rule coswid (as defined in Section 8):

\[
\text{start} = \text{coswid}
\]

In CBOR, an array is encoded using bytes that identify the array, and the array's length or stop point (see [RFC8949]). To make items that support 1 or more values, the following CDDL notation is used.
_name_ = (_label_ => _data_ / [ 2* _data_ ])

The CDDL rule above allows either a single data item or an array of 2 or more data values to be provided. When a singleton data value is provided, the CBOR markers for the array, array length, and stop point are not needed, saving bytes. When two or more data values are provided, these values are encoded as an array. This modeling pattern is used frequently in the CoSWID CDDL specification to allow for more efficient encoding of singleton values.

Usage of this construct can be simplified using

one-or-more<T> = T / [ 2* T ]

simplifying the above example to

_name_ = (_label_ => one-or-more<_data_>)

The following subsections describe the different parts of the CoSWID model.

2.1.  Character Encoding

The CDDL "text" type is represented in CBOR as a major type 3, which represents "a string of Unicode characters that [are] encoded as UTF-8 [RFC3629]" (see Section 3.1 of [RFC8949]). Thus both SWID and CoSWID use UTF-8 for the encoding of characters in text strings.

To ensure that UTF-8 character strings are able to be encoded/decoded and exchanged interoperably, text strings in CoSWID MUST be encoded consistent with the Net-Unicode definition defined in [RFC5198].

All names registered with IANA according to requirements in Section 6.2 also MUST be valid according to the XML Schema NMTOKEN data type (see [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20041028] Section 3.3.4) to ensure compatibility with the SWID specification where these names are used.

2.2. Concise SWID Extensions

The CoSWID specification contains two features that are not included in the SWID specification on which it is based. These features are:

* The explicit definition of types for some attributes in the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML representation that are typically represented by the "any attribute" in the SWID model. These are covered in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.
* The inclusion of extension points in the CoSWID specification using CDDL sockets (see [RFC8610] Section 3.9). The use of CDDL sockets allow for well-formed extensions to be defined in supplementary CDDL descriptions that support additional uses of CoSWID tags that go beyond the original scope of ISO-19770-2:2015 tags. This extension mechanism can also be used to update the CoSWID format as revisions to ISO-19770-2 are published.

The following CDDL sockets (extension points) are defined in this document, which allow the addition of new information structures to their respective CDDL groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map Name</th>
<th>CDDL Socket</th>
<th>Defined in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>concise-swid-tag</td>
<td>$$coswid-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entity-entry</td>
<td>$$entity-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link-entry</td>
<td>$$link-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>software-meta-entry</td>
<td>$$software-meta-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resource-collection</td>
<td>$$resource-collection-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file-entry</td>
<td>$$file-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>directory-entry</td>
<td>$$directory-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process-entry</td>
<td>$$process-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resource-entry</td>
<td>$$resource-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>payload-entry</td>
<td>$$payload-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evidence-entry</td>
<td>$$evidence-extension</td>
<td>Section 2.9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: CoSWID CDDL Group Extension Points

The CoSWID Items Registry defined in Section 6.1 provides a registration mechanism allowing new items, and their associated index values, to be added to the CoSWID model through the use of the CDDL sockets described in the table above. This registration mechanism provides for well-known index values for data items in CoSWID extensions, allowing these index values to be recognized by implementations supporting a given extension.
The following additional CDDL sockets are defined in this document to allow for adding new values to corresponding type-choices (i.e. to represent enumerations) via custom CDDL specifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enumeration Name</th>
<th>CDDL Socket</th>
<th>Defined in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>version-scheme</td>
<td>$version-scheme</td>
<td>Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role</td>
<td>$role</td>
<td>Section 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownership</td>
<td>$ownership</td>
<td>Section 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rel</td>
<td>$rel</td>
<td>Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use</td>
<td>$use</td>
<td>Section 4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: CoSWID CDDL Enumeration Extension Points

A number of CoSWID value registries are also defined in Section 6.2 that allow new values to be registered with IANA for the enumerations above. This registration mechanism supports the definition of new well-known index values and names for new enumeration values used by CoSWID, which can also be used by other software tagging specifications. This registration mechanism allows new standardized enumerated values to be shared between multiple tagging specifications (and associated implementations) over time.

2.3. The concise-swid-tag Map

The CDDL specification for the root concise-swid-tag map is as follows and this rule and its constraints MUST be followed when creating or validating a CoSWID tag:
concise-swid-tag = {
  tag-id => text / bstr .size 16,
  tag-version => integer,
  ? corpus => bool,
  ? patch => bool,
  ? supplemental => bool,
  software-name => text,
  ? software-version => text,
  ? version-scheme => $version-scheme,
  ? media => text,
  ? software-meta => one-or-more<software-meta-entry>,
  entity => one-or-more<entity-entry>,
  ? link => one-or-more<link-entry>,
  ? payload-or-evidence,
  * $$coswid-extension,
  global-attributes,
}

payload-or-evidence //= ( payload => payload-entry )
payload-or-evidence //= ( evidence => evidence-entry )

tag-id = 0
software-name = 1
entity = 2
evidence = 3
link = 4
software-meta = 5
payload = 6
corpus = 8
patch = 9
media = 10
supplemental = 11
tag-version = 12
software-version = 13
version-scheme = 14

$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix
$version-scheme /= alphanumeric
$version-scheme /= decimal
$version-scheme /= semver
$version-scheme /= int / text
multipartnumeric = 1
multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
alphanumeric = 3
decimal = 4
semver = 16384
The following describes each member of the concise-swid-tag root map.

* **global-attributes**: A list of items including an optional language definition to support the processing of text-string values and an unbounded set of any-attribute items. Described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.

* **tag-id (index 0)**: A 16-byte binary string, or a textual identifier, uniquely referencing a software component. The tag identifier MUST be globally unique. Failure to ensure global uniqueness can create ambiguity in tag use since the tag-id serves as the global key for matching and lookups. If represented as a 16-byte binary string, the identifier MUST be a valid universally unique identifier as defined by [RFC4122]. There are no strict guidelines on how the identifier is structured, but examples include a 16-byte GUID (e.g., class 4 UUID) [RFC4122], or a DNS domain name followed by a "/" and a text string, where the domain name serves to ensure uniqueness across organizations. A textual tag-id MUST NOT contain a sequence of two underscores ("__", see Section 6.7).

* **tag-version (index 12)**: An integer value that indicates the specific release revision of the tag. Typically, the initial value of this field is set to 0 and the value is increased for subsequent tags produced for the same software component release. This value allows a CoSWID tag producer to correct an incorrect tag previously released without indicating a change to the underlying software component the tag represents. For example, the tag version could be changed to add new metadata, to correct a broken link, to add a missing payload entry, etc. When producing a revised tag, the new tag-version value MUST be greater than the old tag-version value.

* **corpus (index 8)**: A boolean value that indicates if the tag identifies and describes an installable software component in its pre-installation state. Installable software includes an installation package or installer for a software component, a software update, or a patch. If the CoSWID tag represents installable software, the corpus item MUST be set to "true". If not provided, the default value MUST be considered "false".
* patch (index 9): A boolean value that indicates if the tag identifies and describes an installed patch that has made incremental changes to a software component installed on an endpoint. If a CoSWID tag is for a patch, the patch item MUST be set to "true". If not provided, the default value MUST be considered "false". A patch item's value MUST NOT be set to "true" if the installation of the associated software package changes the version of a software component.

* supplemental (index 11): A boolean value that indicates if the tag is providing additional information to be associated with another referenced SWID or CoSWID tag. This allows tools and users to record their own metadata about a software component without modifying SWID primary or patch tags created by a software provider. If a CoSWID tag is a supplemental tag, the supplemental item MUST be set to "true". If not provided, the default value MUST be considered "false".

* software-name (index 1): This textual item provides the software component’s name. This name is likely the same name that would appear in a package management tool. This item maps to ‘/SoftwareIdentity/@name’ in [SWID].

* software-version (index 13): A textual value representing the specific release or development version of the software component. This item maps to ‘/SoftwareIdentity/@version’ in [SWID].

* version-scheme (index 14): An integer or textual value representing the versioning scheme used for the software-version item, as an integer label with text escape (Section 2, for the "Version Scheme" registry Section 4.1. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 65535. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see Section 6.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 65535 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "Software Tag Version Scheme Values" registry (see Section 6.2.4).

* media (index 10): This text value is a hint to the tag consumer to understand what target platform this tag applies to. This item MUST be formatted as a query as defined by the W3C Media Queries Recommendation (see [W3C.REC-css3-mediaqueries-20120619]). Support for media queries are included here for interoperability with [SWID], which does not provide any further requirements for media query use. Thus, this specification does not clarify how a media query is to be used for a CoSWID.
* software-meta (index 5): An open-ended map of key/value data pairs. A number of predefined keys can be used within this item providing for common usage and semantics across the industry. Use of this map allows any additional attribute to be included in the tag. It is expected that industry groups will use a common set of attribute names to allow for interoperability within their communities. Described in Section 2.8. This item maps to '/SoftwareIdentity/Meta' in [SWID].

* entity (index 2): Provides information about one or more organizations responsible for producing the CoSWID tag, and producing or releasing the software component referenced by this CoSWID tag. Described in Section 2.6.

* link (index 4): Provides a means to establish relationship arcs between the tag and another items. A given link can be used to establish the relationship between tags or to reference another resource that is related to the CoSWID tag, e.g., vulnerability database association, ROLIE feed [RFC8322], MUD resource [RFC8520], software download location, etc). This is modeled after the HTML "link" element. Described in Section 2.7.

* payload (index 6): This item represents a collection of software artifacts (described by child items) that compose the target software. For example, these artifacts could be the files included with an installer for a corpus tag or installed on an endpoint when the software component is installed for a primary or patch tag. The artifacts listed in a payload may be a superset of the software artifacts that are actually installed. Based on user selections at install time, an installation might not include every artifact that could be created or executed on the endpoint when the software component is installed or run. This item is mutually exclusive to evidence, as payload can only be provided by an external entity. Described in Section 2.9.3.

* evidence (index 3): This item can be used to record the results of a software discovery process used to identify untagged software on an endpoint or to represent indicators for why software is believed to be installed on the endpoint. In either case, a CoSWID tag can be created by the tool performing an analysis of the software components installed on the endpoint. This item is mutually exclusive to payload, as evidence is always generated on the target device ad-hoc. Described in Section 2.9.4.

* $$coswid-extension: This CDDL socket is used to add new information structures to the concise-swid-tag root map. See Section 2.2.
2.4. concise-swid-tag Co-Constraints

The following co-constraints apply to the information provided in the concise-swid-tag group. If any of these constraints is not met, a signed tag cannot be used anymore as a signed statement.

* The patch and supplemental items MUST NOT both be set to "true".

* If the patch item is set to "true", the tag SHOULD contain at least one link item (see Section 2.7) with both the rel item value of "patches" and an href item specifying an association with the software that was patched. Without at least one link item the target of the patch cannot be identified and the patch tag cannot be applied without external context.

* If the supplemental item is set to "true", the tag SHOULD contain at least one link item with both the rel item value of "supplemental" and an href item specifying an association with the software that is supplemented. Without at least one link item the target of supplement tag cannot be identified and the patch tag cannot be applied without external context.

* If all of the corpus, patch, and supplemental items are "false", or if the corpus item is set to "true", then a software-version item MUST be included with a value set to the version of the software component. This ensures that primary and corpus tags have an identifiable software version.

2.5. The global-attributes Group

The global-attributes group provides a list of items, including an optional language definition to support the processing of text-string values, and an unbounded set of any-attribute items allowing for additional items to be provided as a general point of extension in the model.

The CDDL for the global-attributes follows:

global-attributes = (  
   ? lang => text,  
   * any-attribute,  
)  

any-attribute = (  
   label => one-or-more<text> / one-or-more<int>  
)  

label = text / int
The following describes each child item of this group.

* lang (index 15): A textual language tag that conforms with IANA "Language Subtag Registry" [RFC5646]. The context of the specified language applies to all sibling and descendant textual values, unless a descendant object has defined a different language tag. Thus, a new context is established when a descendant object redefines a new language tag. All textual values within a given context MUST be considered expressed in the specified language.

* any-attribute: This sub-group provides a means to include arbitrary information via label/index ("key") value pairs. Labels can be either a single integer or text string. Values can be a single integer, a text string, or an array of integers or text strings.

2.6. The entity-entry Map

The CDDL for the entity-entry map follows:

entity-entry = {
  entity-name => text,
  ? reg-id => any-uri,
  role => one-or-more<$role>,
  ? thumbprint => hash-entry,
  * $$entity-extension,
  global-attributes,
}

entity-name = 31
reg-id = 32
role = 33
thumbprint = 34

$role /= tag-creator
$role /= software-creator
$role /= aggregator
$role /= distributor
$role /= licensor
$role /= maintainer
$role /= int / text
tag-creator=1
software-creator=2
aggregator=3
distributor=4
licensor=5
maintainer=6
The following describes each child item of this group.

* global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.

* entity-name (index 31): The textual name of the organizational entity claiming the roles specified by the role item for the CoSWID tag. This item maps to '/SoftwareIdentity/Entity/@name' in [SWID].

* reg-id (index 32): The registration id value is intended to uniquely identify a naming authority in a given scope (e.g., global, organization, vendor, customer, administrative domain, etc.) for the referenced entity. The value of a registration ID MUST be a RFC 3986 URI; it is not intended to be dereferenced. The scope will usually be the scope of an organization.

* role (index 33): An integer or textual value (integer label with text escape, see Section 2) representing the relationship(s) between the entity, and this tag or the referenced software component. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 255. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see Section 6.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 255 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "Software Tag Entity Role Values" registry (see Section 6.2.5).

The following additional requirements exist for the use of the "role" item:

- An entity item MUST be provided with the role of "tag-creator" for every CoSWID tag. This indicates the organization that created the CoSWID tag.

- An entity item SHOULD be provided with the role of "software-creator" for every CoSWID tag, if this information is known to the tag creator. This indicates the organization that created the referenced software component.

* thumbprint (index 34): The value of the thumbprint item provides a hash (i.e. the thumbprint) of the signing entity’s public key certificate. This provides an indicator of which entity signed the CoSWID tag, which will typically be the tag creator. See Section 2.9.1 for more details on the use of the hash-entry data structure.

* entity-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the entity-entry group model. See Section 2.2.
2.7. The link-entry Map

The CDDL for the link-entry map follows:

```
link-entry = {
  ? artifact => text,
  href => any-uri,
  ? media => text,
  ? ownership => $ownership,
  rel => $rel,
  ? media-type => text,
  ? use => $use,
  * $$link-extension,
  global-attributes,
}
```

```
media = 10
artifact = 37
href = 38
ownership = 39
rel = 40
media-type = 41
use = 42

$ownership /= shared
$ownership /= private
$ownership /= abandon
$ownership /= int / text
abandon=1
private=2
shared=3

$rel /= ancestor
$rel /= component
$rel /= feature
$rel /= installationmedia
$rel /= packageinstaller
$rel /= parent
$rel /= patches
$rel /= requires
$rel /= see-also
$rel /= supersedes
$rel /= supplemental
$rel /= -356..65536 / text
ancestor=1
component=2
feature=3
installationmedia=4
```
packageinstaller=5
parent=6
patches=7
requires=8
see-also=9
supersedes=10
supplemental=11

$use /= optional
$use /= required
$use /= recommended
$use /= int / text
optional=1
required=2
recommended=3

The following describes each member of this map.

* global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.

* artifact (index 37): To be used with rel="installation-media", this item’s value provides the absolute filesystem path to the installer executable or script that can be run to launch the referenced installation. Links with the same artifact name MUST be considered mirrors of each other, allowing the installation media to be acquired from any of the described sources.

* href (index 38): A URI-reference [RFC3986] for the referenced resource. The "href" item’s value can be, but is not limited to, the following (which is a slightly modified excerpt from [SWID]):

  - If no URI scheme is provided, then the URI-reference is a relative reference relative to the base URI of the CoSWID tag, i.e., the URI under which the CoSWID tag was provided. For example, "./folder/supplemental.coswid".

  - a physical resource location with any acceptable URI scheme (e.g., file:// http:// https:// ftp://)

  - a URI with "swid:" as the scheme refers to another SWID or CoSWID by the referenced tag’s tag-id. This URI needs to be resolved in the context of the endpoint by software that can lookup other SWID or CoSWID tags. For example, "swid:2df9de35-0aff-4a86-ace6-f7dddlade4c" references the tag with the tag-id value "2df9de35-0aff-4a86-ace6-f7dddlade4c".
- a URI with "swidpath:" as the scheme, which refers to another software tag via an XPATH query [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214] that matches items in that tag (Section 5.2). This scheme is provided for compatibility with [SWID]. This specification does not define how to resolve an XPATH query in the context of CBOR, see Section 5.2.

* media (index 10): A hint to the consumer of the link to what target platform the link is applicable to. This item represents a query as defined by the W3C Media Queries Recommendation (see [W3C.REC-css3-mediaqueries-20120619]). As highlighted in media defined in Section 2.3, support for media queries are included here for interoperability with [SWID], which does not provide any further requirements for media query use. Thus, this specification does not clarify how a media query is to be used for a CoSWID.

* ownership (index 39): An integer or textual value (integer label with text escape, see Section 2, for the "Software Tag Link Ownership Values" registry Section 4.3) used when the "href" item references another software component to indicate the degree of ownership between the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag and the software component referenced by the link. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 255. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see Section 6.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 255 correspond to registered entries in the "Software Tag Link Ownership Values" registry.
* rel (index 40): An integer or textual value that (integer label with text escape, see Section 2, for the "Software Tag Link Link Relationship Values" registry Section 4.3) identifies the relationship between this CoSWID and the target resource identified by the "href" item. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 65535. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see Section 6.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 65535 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "Software Tag Link Relationship Values" registry (see Section 6.2.2). If a string value is used it MUST be either a private use name as defined in Section 6.2.2 or a "Relation Name" from the IANA "Link Relation Types" registry: https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link-relations.xhtml as defined by [RFC8288]. When a string value defined in the IANA "Software Tag Link Relationship Values" registry matches a Relation Name defined in the IANA "Link Relation Types" registry, the index value in the IANA "Software Tag Link Relationship Values" registry MUST be used instead, as this relationship has a specialized meaning in the context of a CoSWID tag. String values correspond to registered entries in the "Software Tag Link Relationship Values" registry.

* media-type (index 41): A link can point to arbitrary resources on the endpoint, local network, or Internet using the href item. Use of this item supplies the resource consumer with a hint of what type of resource to expect. (This is a _hint_: There is no obligation for the server hosting the target of the URI to use the indicated media type when the URI is dereferenced.) Media types are identified by referencing a "Name" from the IANA "Media Types" registry: http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml. This item maps to '/SoftwareIdentity/Link/@type' in [SWID].

* use (index 42): An integer or textual value (integer label with text escape, see Section 2, for the "Software Tag Link Link Relationship Values" registry Section 4.3) used to determine if the referenced software component has to be installed before installing the software component identified by the COSWID tag. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 255. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see Section 6.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 255 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "Link Use Values" registry (see Section 6.2.8. If a string value is used it MUST be a private use name as defined in Section 6.2.2. String values correspond to registered entries in the "Software Tag Link Use Values" registry.
* $$link-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the link-entry map model. See Section 2.2.

2.8. The software-meta-entry Map

The CDDL for the software-meta-entry map follows:

```cddl
software-meta-entry = {
    ? activation-status => text,
    ? channel-type => text,
    ? colloquial-version => text,
    ? description => text,
    ? edition => text,
    ? entitlement-data-required => bool,
    ? entitlement-key => text,
    ? generator => text / bstr .size 16,
    ? persistent-id => text,
    ? product => text,
    ? product-family => text,
    ? revision => text,
    ? summary => text,
    ? unspsc-code => text,
    ? unspsc-version => text,
    * $$software-meta-extension,
    global-attributes,
}
```

activation-status = 43
channel-type = 44
colloquial-version = 45
description = 46
edition = 47
entitlement-data-required = 48
entitlement-key = 49
generator = 50
persistent-id = 51
product = 52
product-family = 53
revision = 54
summary = 55
unspsc-code = 56
unspsc-version = 57

The following describes each child item of this group.

* global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.
* activation-status (index 43): A textual value that identifies how the software component has been activated, which might relate to specific terms and conditions for its use (e.g., Trial, Serialized, Licensed, Unlicensed, etc) and relate to an entitlement. This attribute is typically used in supplemental tags as it contains information that might be selected during a specific install.

* channel-type (index 44): A textual value that identifies which sales, licensing, or marketing channel the software component has been targeted for (e.g., Volume, Retail, OEM, Academic, etc). This attribute is typically used in supplemental tags as it contains information that might be selected during a specific install.

* colloquial-version (index 45): A textual value for the software component’s informal or colloquial version. Examples may include a year value, a major version number, or similar value that are used to identify a group of specific software component releases that are part of the same release/support cycle. This version can be the same through multiple releases of a software component, while the software-version specified in the concise-swid-tag group is much more specific and will change for each software component release. This version is intended to be used for string comparison (byte-by-byte) only and is not intended to be used to determine if a specific value is earlier or later in a sequence.

* description (index 46): A textual value that provides a detailed description of the software component. This value MAY be multiple paragraphs separated by CR LF characters as described by [RFC5198].

* edition (index 47): A textual value indicating that the software component represents a functional variation of the code base used to support multiple software components. For example, this item can be used to differentiate enterprise, standard, or professional variants of a software component.

* entitlement-data-required (index 48): A boolean value that can be used to determine if accompanying proof of entitlement is needed when a software license reconciliation process is performed.

* entitlement-key (index 49): A vendor-specific textual key that can be used to identify and establish a relationship to an entitlement. Examples of an entitlement-key might include a serial number, product key, or license key. For values that relate to a given software component install (i.e., license key), a supplemental tag will typically contain this information. In
other cases, where a general-purpose key can be provided that applies to all possible installs of the software component on different endpoints, a primary tag will typically contain this information. Since CoSWID tags are not intended to contain confidential information, tag authors are advised not to record unprotected, private software license keys in this field.

* generator (index 50): The name (or tag-id) of the software component that created the CoSWID tag. If the generating software component has a SWID or CoSWID tag, then the tag-id for the generating software component SHOULD be provided.

* persistent-id (index 51): A globally unique identifier used to identify a set of software components that are related. Software components sharing the same persistent-id can be different versions. This item can be used to relate software components, released at different points in time or through different release channels, that may not be able to be related through use of the link item.

* product (index 52): A basic name for the software component that can be common across multiple tagged software components (e.g., Apache HTTPD).

* product-family (index 53): A textual value indicating the software components overall product family. This should be used when multiple related software components form a larger capability that is installed on multiple different endpoints. For example, some software families may consist of server, client, and shared service components that are part of a larger capability. Email systems, enterprise applications, backup services, web conferencing, and similar capabilities are examples of families. Use of this item is not intended to represent groups of software that are bundled or installed together. The persistent-id or link items SHOULD be used to relate bundled software components.

* revision (index 54): A string value indicating an informal or colloquial release version of the software. This value can provide a different version value as compared to the software-version specified in the concise-swid-tag group. This is useful when one or more releases need to have an informal version label that differs from the specific exact version value specified by software-version. Examples can include SP1, RC1, Beta, etc.

* summary (index 55): A short description of the software component. This MUST be a single sentence suitable for display in a user interface.
* unspsc-code (index 56): An 8 digit UNSPSC classification code for the software component as defined by the United Nations Standard Products and Services Code (UNSPSC, [UNSPSC]).

* unspsc-version (index 57): The version of UNSPSC used to define the unspsc-code value.

* $$\text{meta-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the software-meta-entry group model. See Section 2.2.}$$

2.9. The Resource Collection Definition

2.9.1. The hash-entry Array

CoSWID adds explicit support for the representation of hash entries using algorithms that are registered in the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" [IANA.named-information] using the hash member (index 7) and the corresponding hash-entry type. This is the equivalent of the namespace qualified "hash" attribute in [SWID].

hash-entry = [  
  hash-alg-id: int,  
  hash-value: bytes,  
]

The number used as a value for hash-alg-id is an integer-based hash algorithm identifier who’s value MUST refer to an ID in the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" [IANA.named-information] with a Status of "current" (at the time the generator software was built or later); other hash algorithms MUST NOT be used. If the hash-alg-id is not known, then the integer value "0" MUST be used. This allows for conversion from ISO SWID tags [SWID], which do not allow an algorithm to be identified for this field.

The hash-value MUST represent the raw hash value as a byte string (as opposed to, e.g., base64 encoded) generated from the representation of the resource using the hash algorithm indicated by hash-alg-id.

2.9.2. The resource-collection Group

A list of items both used in evidence (created by a software discovery process) and payload (installed in an endpoint) content of a CoSWID tag document to structure and differentiate the content of specific CoSWID tag types. Potential content includes directories, files, processes, or resources.

The CDDL for the resource-collection group follows:
path-elements-group = ( ? directory => one-or-more<directory-entry>,
    ? file => one-or-more<file-entry>,
  )

resource-collection = (path-elements-group,
    ? process => one-or-more<process-entry>,
    ? resource => one-or-more<resource-entry>,
    * $resource-collection-extension,
  )

filesystem-item = (?
    key => bool,
    ? location => text,
    fs-name => text,
    ? root => text,
  )

file-entry = {
    filesystem-item,
    ? size => uint,
    ? file-version => text,
    ? hash => hash-entry,
    * $file-extension,
    global-attributes,
  }

directory-entry = {
    filesystem-item,
    ? path-elements => { path-elements-group },
    * $directory-extension,
    global-attributes,
  }

process-entry = {
    process-name => text,
    ? pid => integer,
    * $process-extension,
    global-attributes,
  }

resource-entry = {
    type => text,
    * $resource-extension,
    global-attributes,
  }

directory = 16
The following describes each member of the groups and maps illustrated above.

* filesystem-item: A list of common items used for representing the filesystem root, relative location, name, and significance of a file or directory item.

* global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.

* directory (index 16): A directory item allows child directory and file items to be defined within a directory hierarchy for the software component.

* file (index 17): A file item allows details about a file to be provided for the software component.

* process (index 18): A process item allows details to be provided about the runtime behavior of the software component, such as information that will appear in a process listing on an endpoint.

* resource (index 19): A resource item can be used to provide details about an artifact or capability expected to be found on an endpoint or evidence collected related to the software component. This can be used to represent concepts not addressed directly by the directory, file, or process items. Examples include: registry keys, bound ports, etc. The equivalent construct in [SWID] is currently under specified. As a result, this item might be further defined through extension in the future.

* size (index 20): The file’s size in bytes.
* file-version (index 21): The file’s version as reported by querying information on the file from the operating system (if available). This item maps to ‘/SoftwareIdentity/(Payload|Evidence)/File/@version’ in [SWID].

* hash (index 7): A hash of the file as described in Section 2.9.1.

* key (index 22): A boolean value indicating if a file or directory is significant or required for the software component to execute or function properly. These are files or directories that can be used to affirmatively determine if the software component is installed on an endpoint.

* location (index 23): The filesystem path where a file is expected to be located when installed or copied. The location MUST be either relative to the location of the parent directory item (preferred), or relative to the location of the CoSWID tag (as indicated in the location value in the evidence entry map) if no parent is defined. The location MUST NOT include a file’s name, which is provided by the fs-name item.

* fs-name (index 24): The name of the directory or file without any path information. This aligns with a file "name" in [SWID]. This item maps to ‘/SoftwareIdentity/(Payload|Evidence)/(File|Directory)/@name’ in [SWID].

* root (index 25): A host-specific name for the root of the filesystem. The location item is considered relative to this location if specified. If not provided, the value provided by the location item is expected to be relative to its parent or the location of the CoSWID tag if no parent is provided.

* path-elements (index 26): This group allows a hierarchy of directory and file items to be defined in payload or evidence items. This is a construction within the CDDL definition of CoSWID to support shared syntax and does not appear in [SWID].

* process-name (index 27): The software component’s process name as it will appear in an endpoint’s process list. This aligns with a process "name" in [SWID]. This item maps to ‘/SoftwareIdentity/(Payload|Evidence)/Process/@name’ in [SWID].

* pid (index 28): The process ID identified for a running instance of the software component in the endpoint’s process list. This is used as part of the evidence item.
* type (index 29): A human-readable string indicating the type of resource.

* $$resource-collection-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the resource-collection group model. This can be used to add new specialized types of resources. See Section 2.2.

* $$file-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the file-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

* $$directory-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the directory-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

* $$process-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the process-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

* $$resource-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the resource-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

2.9.3. The payload-entry Map

The CDDL for the payload-entry map follows:

```
payload-entry = {
  resource-collection,
  * $$payload-extension,
  global-attributes,
}
```

The following describes each child item of this group.

* global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.

* resource-collection: The resource-collection group described in Section 2.9.2.

* $$payload-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the payload-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

2.9.4. The evidence-entry Map

The CDDL for the evidence-entry map follows:
evidence-entry = {
    resource-collection,
    ? date => integer-time,
    ? device-id => text,
    ? location => text,
    * $$evidence-extension,
    global-attributes,
}

date = 35
device-id = 36

The following describes each child item of this group.

* global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.4, Paragraph 2.

* resource-collection: The resource-collection group described in Section 2.9.2.

* date (index 35): The date and time the information was collected pertaining to the evidence item.

* device-id (index 36): The endpoint’s string identifier from which the evidence was collected.

* location (index 23): The absolute filepath of the location of the CoSWID tag generated as evidence. (Location values in filesystem-items in the payload can be expressed relative to this location.)

* $$evidence-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the evidence-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

2.10. Full CDDL Specification

In order to create a valid CoSWID document the structure of the corresponding CBOR message MUST adhere to the following CDDL specification.

<CODE BEGINS>
concise-swid-tag = {
    tag-id => text / bstr .size 16,
    tag-version => integer,
    ? corpus => bool,
    ? patch => bool,
    ? supplemental => bool,
    software-name => text,
    ? software-version => text,
</CODE BEGINS>
? version-scheme => $version-scheme,
? media => text,
? software-meta => one-or-more<software-meta-entry>,
entity => one-or-more<entity-entry>,
? link => one-or-more<link-entry>,
? payload-or-evidence,
  * $coswid-extension,
  global-attributes,
}

payload-or-evidence //= ( payload => payload-entry )
payload-or-evidence //= ( evidence => evidence-entry )

any-uri = uri
label = text / int

$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix
$version-scheme /= alphanumeric
$version-scheme /= decimal
$version-scheme /= semver
$version-scheme /= int / text

any-attribute = (
  label => one-or-more<text> / one-or-more<int>
)

one-or-more<T> = T / [ 2* T ]

global-attributes = (
  ? lang => text,
  * any-attribute,
)

hash-entry = [
  hash-alg-id: int,
  hash-value: bytes,
]

entity-entry = {
  entity-name => text,
  ? reg-id => any-uri,
  role => one-or-more<$role>,
  ? thumbprint => hash-entry,
  * $entity-extension,
  global-attributes,
}
$role /= tag-creator
$role /= software-creator
$role /= aggregator
$role /= distributor
$role /= licensor
$role /= maintainer
$role /= int / text

link-entry = {  
  ? artifact => text,
  href => any-uri,
  ? media => text,
  ? ownership => $ownership,
  rel => $rel,
  ? media-type => text,
  ? use => $use,
  * $$link-extension,
  global-attributes,
}

$ownership /= shared
$ownership /= private
$ownership /= abandon
$ownership /= int / text

$rel /= ancestor
$rel /= component
$rel /= feature
$rel /= installationmedia
$rel /= packageinstaller
$rel /= parent
$rel /= patches
$rel /= requires
$rel /= see-also
$rel /= supersedes
$rel /= supplemental
$rel /= -256..64436 / text

$use /= optional
$use /= required
$use /= recommended
$use /= int / text

software-meta-entry = {  
  ? activation-status => text,
  ? channel-type => text,
  ? colloquial-version => text,
  ? description => text,
? edition => text,
? entitlement-data-required => bool,
? entitlement-key => text,
? generator => text / bstr .size 16,
? persistent-id => text,
? product => text,
? product-family => text,
? revision => text,
? summary => text,
? unspsc-code => text,
? unspsc-version => text,
* $$software-meta-extension,
global-attributes,
}

path-elements-group = ( ? directory => one-or-more<directory-entry>,
  ? file => one-or-more<file-entry>,
  )

resource-collection = (path-elements-group,
  ? process => one-or-more<process-entry>,
  ? resource => one-or-more<resource-entry>,
  * $$resource-collection-extension,
  )

file-entry = {filesystem-item,
  ? size => uint,
  ? file-version => text,
  ? hash => hash-entry,
  * $$file-extension,
  global-attributes,
  }

directory-entry = {filesystem-item,
  ? path-elements => { path-elements-group },
  * $$directory-extension,
  global-attributes,
  }

process-entry = {
  process-name => text,
  ? pid => integer,
  * $$process-extension,
  global-attributes,
  }
resource-entry = {
    type => text,
    * $resource-extension,
    global-attributes,
}

filesystem-item = {
    ? key => bool,
    ? location => text,
    fs-name => text,
    ? root => text,
}

payload-entry = {
    resource-collection,
    * $payload-extension,
    global-attributes,
}

evidence-entry = {
    resource-collection,
    ? date => integer-time,
    ? device-id => text,
    ? location => text,
    * $evidence-extension,
    global-attributes,
}

integer-time = #6.1(int)

; "global map member" integer indexes
tag-id = 0
software-name = 1
entity = 2
evidence = 3
link = 4
software-meta = 5
payload = 6
hash = 7
corpus = 8
patch = 9
media = 10
supplemental = 11
tag-version = 12
software-version = 13
version-scheme = 14
lang = 15
directory = 16
file = 17
process = 18
resource = 19
size = 20
file-version = 21
key = 22
location = 23
fs-name = 24
root = 25
path-elements = 26
process-name = 27
pid = 28
type = 29
entity-name = 31
reg-id = 32
role = 33
thumbprint = 34
date = 35
device-id = 36
artifact = 37
href = 38
ownership = 39
rel = 40
media-type = 41
use = 42
activation-status = 43
channel-type = 44
colloquial-version = 45
description = 46
description = 46
edition = 47
entitlement-data-required = 48
entitlement-key = 49
generator = 50
persistent-id = 51
product = 52
product-family = 53
revision = 54
summary = 55
unspsc-code = 56
unspsc-version = 57

; "version-scheme" integer indexes
multipartnumeric = 1
multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
alphanumeric = 3
decimal = 4
semver = 16384
3. Determining the Type of CoSWID

The operational model for SWID and CoSWID tags was introduced in Section 1.1, which described four different CoSWID tag types. The following additional rules apply to the use of CoSWID tags to ensure that created tags properly identify the tag type.

The first matching rule MUST determine the type of the CoSWID tag.

1. Primary Tag: A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a primary tag if the corpus, patch, and supplemental items are "false".

2. Supplemental Tag: A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a supplemental tag if the supplemental item is set to "true".
3. Corpus Tag: A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a corpus tag if the corpus item is "true".

4. Patch Tag: A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a patch tag if the patch item is "true".

Note: Multiple of the corpus, patch, and supplemental items can have values set as "true". The rules above provide a means to determine the tag’s type in such a case. For example, a SWID or CoSWID tag for a patch installer might have both corpus and patch items set to "true". In such a case, the tag is a "Corpus Tag". The tag installed by this installer would have only the patch item set to "true", making the installed tag type a "Patch Tag".

4. CoSWID Indexed Label Values

This section defines a number of kinds of indexed label values that are maintained in a registry each (Section 6). These values are represented as positive integers. In each registry, the value 0 is marked as Reserved.

4.1. Version Scheme

The following table contains a set of values for use in the concise-swid-tag group’s version-scheme item. Version Scheme Name strings match the version schemes defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. Index value indicates the value to use as the version-scheme item’s value. The Version Scheme Name provides human-readable text for the value. The Definition describes the syntax of allowed values for each entry.
Table 3: Version Scheme Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Version Scheme Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>multipartnumeric</td>
<td>Numbers separated by dots, where the numbers are interpreted as decimal integers (e.g., 1.2.3, 1.2.3.4.5.6.7, 1.4.5, 1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>multipartnumeric+suffix</td>
<td>Numbers separated by dots, where the numbers are interpreted as decimal integers with an additional textual suffix (e.g., 1.2.3a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>alphanumeric</td>
<td>Strictly a string, no interpretation as number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>decimal</td>
<td>A single decimal floating point number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16384</td>
<td>semver</td>
<td>A semantic version as defined by [SWID]. Also see the [SEMVER] specification for more information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

multipartnumeric and the numbers part of multipartnumeric+suffix are interpreted as a sequence of numbers and are sorted in lexicographical order by these numbers (i.e., not by the digits in the numbers) and then the textual suffix (for multipartnumeric+suffix). Alphanumeric strings are sorted lexicographically as character strings. Decimal version numbers are interpreted as a single floating point number (e.g., 1.25 is less than 1.3).

The values above are registered in the IANA "Software Tag Version Scheme Values" registry defined in Section Section 6.2.4. Additional entries will likely be registered over time in this registry.
A CoSWID producer that is aware of the version scheme that has been used to select the version value, SHOULD include the optional version-scheme item to avoid semantic ambiguity. If the CoSWID producer does not have this information, it SHOULD omit the version-scheme item. The following heuristics can be used by a CoSWID consumer, based on the version schemes' partially overlapping value spaces:

* "decimal" and "multipartnumeric" partially overlap in their value space when a value matches a decimal number. When a corresponding software-version item’s value falls within this overlapping value space, the "decimal" version scheme SHOULD be assumed.

* "multipartnumeric" and "semver" partially overlap in their value space when a "multipartnumeric" value matches the semantic versioning syntax. When a corresponding software-version item’s value falls within this overlapping value space, the "semver" version scheme SHOULD be assumed.

* "alphanumeric" and other version schemes might overlap in their value space. When a corresponding software-version item’s value falls within this overlapping value space, the other version scheme SHOULD be assumed instead of "alphanumeric".

Note that these heuristics are imperfect and can guess wrong, which is the reason the version-scheme item SHOULD be included by the producer.

4.2. Entity Role Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the entity-entry group’s role item (see Section 2.6). These values match the entity roles defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the role item’s value. The "Role Name" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Role Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>tagCreator</td>
<td>The person or organization that created the containing SWID or CoSWID tag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>softwareCreator</td>
<td>The person or organization entity that created the software component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>aggregator</td>
<td>From [SWID], &quot;An organization or system that encapsulates software from their own and/or other organizations into a different distribution process (as in the case of virtualization), or as a completed system to accomplish a specific task (as in the case of a value added reseller).&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>distributor</td>
<td>From [SWID], &quot;An entity that furthers the marketing, selling and/or distribution of software from the original place of manufacture to the ultimate user without modifying the software, its packaging or its labelling.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>licensor</td>
<td>From [SAM] as &quot;software licensor&quot;, a &quot;person or organization who owns or holds the rights to issue a software license for a specific software [component]&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>maintainer</td>
<td>The person or organization that is responsible for coordinating and making updates to the source code for the software component. This SHOULD be used when the &quot;maintainer&quot; is a different person or organization than the original &quot;softwareCreator&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Entity Role Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "Software Tag Entity Role Values" registry defined in Section 6.2.5. Additional values will likely be registered over time.
4.3. Link Ownership Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the link-entry group’s ownership item (see Section 2.7). These values match the link ownership values defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the link-entry group ownership item’s value. The "Ownership Type" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Ownership Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>abandon</td>
<td>If the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag is uninstalled, then the referenced software SHOULD NOT be uninstalled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>private</td>
<td>If the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag is uninstalled, then the referenced software SHOULD be uninstalled as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>shared</td>
<td>If the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag is uninstalled, then the referenced software SHOULD be uninstalled if no other components sharing the software.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Link Ownership Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "Software Tag Link Ownership Values" registry defined in Section 6.2.6. Additional values will likely be registered over time.

4.4. Link Rel Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the link-entry group’s rel item (see Section 2.7). These values match the link rel values defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the link-entry group ownership item’s value. The "Relationship Type" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Relationship Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ancestor</td>
<td>The link references a software tag for a previous release of this software. This can be useful to define an upgrade path.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>component</td>
<td>The link references a software tag for a separate component of this software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>feature</td>
<td>The link references a configurable feature of this software that can be enabled or disabled without changing the installed files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>installationmedia</td>
<td>The link references the installation package that can be used to install this software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>packageinstaller</td>
<td>The link references the installation software needed to install this software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>parent</td>
<td>The link references a software tag that is the parent of the referencing tag. This relationship can be used when multiple software components are part of a software bundle, where the &quot;parent&quot; is the software tag for the bundle, and each child is a &quot;component&quot;. In such a case, each child component can provide a &quot;parent&quot; link relationship to the bundle’s software tag, and the bundle can provide a &quot;component&quot; link relationship to each child software component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>patches</td>
<td>The link references a software tag that the referencing software patches. Typically only used for patch tags (see Section 1.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>requires</td>
<td>The link references a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
prerequisite for installing this software. A patch tag (see Section 1.1) can use this to represent base software or another patch that needs to be installed first.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>see-also</th>
<th>The link references other software that may be of interest that relates to this software.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>supersedes</th>
<th>The link references another software that this software replaces. A patch tag (see Section 1.1) can use this to represent another patch that this patch incorporates or replaces.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>supplemental</th>
<th>The link references a software tag that the referencing tag supplements. Used on supplemental tags (see Section 1.1).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Link Relationship Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "Software Tag Link Relationship Values" registry defined in Section 6.2.7. Additional values will likely be registered over time.

4.5. Link Use Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the link-entry group’s use item (see Section 2.7). These values match the link use values defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the link-entry group use item’s value. The "Use Type" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Use Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>optional</td>
<td>From [SWID], &quot;Not absolutely required; the [Link]'d software is installed only when specified.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>required</td>
<td>From [SWID], &quot;The [Link]'d software is absolutely required for an operation software installation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>recommended</td>
<td>From [SWID], &quot;Not absolutely required; the [Link]'d software is installed unless specified otherwise.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Link Use Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "Software Tag Link Use Values" registry defined in Section 6.2.8. Additional values will likely be registered over time.

5. URI Schemes

This specification defines the following URI schemes for use in CoSWID and to provide interoperability with schemes used in [SWID].

Note: These URI schemes are used in [SWID] without an IANA registration. The present specification ensures that these URI schemes are properly defined going forward.

// RFC Ed.: throughout this section, please replace RFC-AAAA with the // RFC number of this specification and remove this note.

5.1. "swid" URI Scheme

There is a need for a scheme name that can be used in URIs that point to a specific software tag by that tag’s tag-id, such as the use of the link entry as described in Section 2.7. Since this scheme is used both in a standards track document and an ISO standard, this scheme needs to be used without fear of conflicts with current or future actual schemes. In Section 6.6.1, the scheme "swid" is registered as a ‘permanent’ scheme for that purpose.

URIs specifying the "swid" scheme are used to reference a software tag by its tag-id. A tag-id referenced in this way can be used to identify the tag resource in the context of where it is referenced.
from. For example, when a tag is installed on a given device, that
tag can reference related tags on the same device using URIs with
this scheme.

For URIs that use the "swid" scheme, the scheme specific part MUST
consist of a referenced software tag's tag-id. This tag-id MUST be
URI encoded according to [RFC3986] Section 2.1.

The following expression is a valid example:

swid:2df9de35-0aff-4a86-ace6-f7d3dd1ade4c

5.2. "swidpath" URI Scheme

There is a need for a scheme name that can be used in URIs to
identify a collection of specific software tags with data elements
that match an XPath expression, such as the use of the link entry as
described in Section 2.7. The scheme named "swidpath" is used for
this purpose in [SWID], but not registered. To enable usage without
fear of conflicts with current or future actual schemes, the present
document registers it as a 'permanent' scheme for that purpose (see
Section 6.6.2).

URIs specifying the "swidpath" scheme are used to filter tags out of
a base collection, so that matching tags are included in the
identified tag collection. The XPath expression
[W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214] references the data that must be found in
a given software tag out of base collection for that tag to be
considered a matching tag. Tags to be evaluated (the base
collection) include all tags in the context of where the "swidpath
URI" is referenced from. For example, when a tag is installed on a
given device, that tag can reference related tags on the same device
using a URI with this scheme.

For URIs that use the "swidpath" scheme, the following requirements
apply:

* The scheme specific part MUST be an XPath expression as defined by
  [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214]. The included XPath expression will be
  URI encoded according to [RFC3986] Section 2.1.

* This XPath is evaluated over SWID tags, or COSWID tags transformed
  into SWID tags, found on a system. A given tag MUST be considered
  a match if the XPath evaluation result value has an effective
  boolean value of "true" according to [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214]
  Section 2.4.3.
6. IANA Considerations

This document has a number of IANA considerations, as described in the following subsections. In summary, 6 new registries are established with this request, with initial entries provided for each registry. New values for 5 other registries are also requested.

6.1. CoSWID Items Registry

This registry uses integer values as index values in CBOR maps.

This document defines a new registry titled "CoSWID Items". Future registrations for this registry are to be made based on [BCP26] as follows:

+==================+=====================================+
| Range            | Registration Procedures             |
+==================+=====================================+
| 0-32767          | Standards Action with Expert Review |
| 32768-4294967295 | Specification Required              |
+------------------+-------------------------------------+

Table 8: CoSWID Items Registration Procedures

All negative values are reserved for Private Use.

Initial registrations for the "CoSWID Items" registry are provided below. Assignments consist of an integer index value, the item name, and a reference to the defining specification.

+==================+===========================+===============+
<p>| Index             | Item Name                 | Specification |
| 0                 | tag-id                    | RFC-AAAA      |
| 1                 | software-name             | RFC-AAAA      |
| 2                 | entity                    | RFC-AAAA      |
| 3                 | evidence                  | RFC-AAAA      |
| 4                 | link                      | RFC-AAAA      |
| 5                 | software-meta             | RFC-AAAA      |
| 6                 | payload                   | RFC-AAAA      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>RFC-AAAA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>hash</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>corpus</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>patch</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>media</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>supplemental</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>tag-version</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>software-version</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>version-scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>lang</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>directory</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>file</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>process</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>resource</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>size</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>file-version</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>key</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>location</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>fs-name</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>root</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>path-elements</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>process-name</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>pid</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>type</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>entity-name</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>reg-id</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>role</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>thumbprint</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>date</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>device-id</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>artifact</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>href</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>ownership</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>rel</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>media-type</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>use</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>activation-status</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>channel-type</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>colloquial-version</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>description</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>edition</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>entitlement-data-required</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>entitlement-key</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>generator</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>persistent-id</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>product</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>product-family</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>revision</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.2. Software Tag Values Registries

The following IANA registries provide a mechanism for new values to be added over time to common enumerations used by SWID and CoSWID. While neither the CoSWID nor SWID specification is subordinate to the other and will evolve as their respective standards group chooses, there is value in supporting alignment between the two standards. Shared use of common code points, as spelled out in these registries, will facilitate this alignment, hence the intent for shared use of these registries and the decision to use "swid" (rather than "coswid") in registry names.

#### 6.2.1. Registration Procedures

The following registries allow for the registration of index values and names. New registrations will be permitted through either a Standards Action with Expert Review policy or a Specification Required policy [BCP26].

The following registries also reserve the integer-based index values in the range of -1 to -256 for private use as defined by [BCP26] in Section 4.1. This allows values -1 to -24 to be expressed as a single uint_8t in CBOR, and values -25 to -256 to be expressed using an additional uint_8t in CBOR.

#### 6.2.2. Private Use of Index and Name Values

The integer-based index values in the private use range (-1 to -256) are intended for testing purposes and closed environments; values in other ranges SHOULD NOT be assigned for testing.

For names that correspond to private use index values, an Internationalized Domain Name prefix MUST be used to prevent name conflicts using the form:

```plaintext
domainprefix/name
```

---

Table 9: CoSWID Items Initial Registrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>55</th>
<th>summary</th>
<th>RFC-AAAA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>unspsc-code</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>unspsc-version</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58-4294967295</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Where both "domainprefix" and "name" MUST each be either an NR-LDH label or a U-label as defined by [RFC5890], and "name" also MUST be a unique name within the namespace defined by the "domainprefix". Use of a prefix in this way allows for a name to be used in the private use range. This is consistent with the guidance in [BCP178].

6.2.3. Expert Review Criteria

Designated experts MUST ensure that new registration requests meet the following additional criteria:

* The requesting specification MUST provide a clear semantic definition for the new entry. This definition MUST clearly differentiate the requested entry from other previously registered entries.

* The requesting specification MUST describe the intended use of the entry, including any co-constraints that exist between the use of the entry’s index value or name, and other values defined within the SWID/CoSWID model.

* Index values and names outside the private use space MUST NOT be used without registration. This is considered squatting and MUST be avoided. Designated experts MUST ensure that reviewed specifications register all appropriate index values and names.

* Standards track documents MAY include entries registered in the range reserved for entries under the Specification Required policy. This can occur when a standards track document provides further guidance on the use of index values and names that are in common use, but were not registered with IANA. This situation SHOULD be avoided.

* All registered names MUST be valid according to the XML Schema NMTOKEN data type (see [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20041028] Section 3.3.4). This ensures that registered names are compatible with the SWID format [SWID] where they are used.

* Registration of vanity names SHOULD be discouraged. The requesting specification MUST provide a description of how a requested name will allow for use by multiple stakeholders.

6.2.4. Software Tag Version Scheme Values Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "Software Tag Version Scheme Values". This registry provides index values for use as version-scheme item values in this document and version scheme names for use in [SWID].
This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 6.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Registration Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-16383</td>
<td>Standards Action with Expert Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16384-65535</td>
<td>Specification Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: CoSWID Version Scheme Registration Procedures

Assignments MUST consist of an integer Index value, the Version Scheme Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "Software Tag Version Scheme Values" registry are provided below, which are derived from the textual version scheme names defined in [SWID].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Version Scheme Name</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>multipartnumeric</td>
<td>See Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>multipartnumeric+suffix</td>
<td>See Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>alphanumeric</td>
<td>See Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>decimal</td>
<td>See Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16383</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16384</td>
<td>semver</td>
<td>See Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16385-65535</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: CoSWID Version Scheme Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review criteria defined in Section 6.2.3.
Designated experts MUST also ensure that newly requested entries define a value space for the corresponding version item that is unique from other previously registered entries. Note: The initial registrations violate this requirement, but are included for backwards compatibility with [SWID]. See also Section 4.1.

6.2.5. Software Tag Entity Role Values Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "Software Tag Entity Role Values". This registry provides index values for use as entity-entry role item values in this document and entity role names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 6.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Range          | Registration Procedures                                      |
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0-127           | Standards Action with Expert Review                         |
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| 128-255         | Specification Required                                      |
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+

Table 12: CoSWID Entity Role Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, a Role Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "Software Tag Entity Role Values" registry are provided below, which are derived from the textual entity role names defined in [SWID].
Table 13: CoSWID Entity Role Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review criteria defined in Section 6.2.3.

6.2.6. Software Tag Link Ownership Values Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "Software Tag Link Ownership Values". This registry provides index values for use as link-entry ownership item values in this document and link ownership names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 6.2.1 with the following associated ranges:
Table 14: CoSWID Link Ownership Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, an Ownership Type Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "Software Tag Link Ownership Values" registry are provided below, which are derived from the textual entity role names defined in [SWID].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Ownership Type Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>abandon</td>
<td>See Section 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>private</td>
<td>See Section 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>shared</td>
<td>See Section 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-255</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: CoSWID Link Ownership Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review criteria defined in Section 6.2.3.

6.2.7. Software Tag Link Relationship Values Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "Software Tag Link Relationship Values". This registry provides index values for use as link-entry rel item values in this document and link ownership names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid]
This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 6.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Registration Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-32767</td>
<td>Standards Action with Expert Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32768-65535</td>
<td>Specification Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: CoSWID Link Relationship Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, the Relationship Type Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "Software Tag Link Relationship Values" registry are provided below, which are derived from the link relationship values defined in [SWID].
### Table 17: CoSWID Link Relationship Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review criteria defined in Section 6.2.3.

Designated experts MUST also ensure that a newly requested entry documents the URI schemes allowed to be used in an href associated with the link relationship and the expected resolution behavior of these URI schemes. This will help to ensure that applications processing software tags are able to interoperate when resolving resources referenced by a link of a given type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Relationship Type Name</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ancestor</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>component</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>feature</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>installationmedia</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>packageinstaller</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>parent</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>patches</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>requires</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>see-also</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>supersedes</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>supplemental</td>
<td>See Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-65535</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.8. Software Tag Link Use Values Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "Software Tag Link Use Values". This registry provides index values for use as link-entry use item values in this document and link use names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 6.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Registration Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-127</td>
<td>Standards Action with Expert Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128-255</td>
<td>Specification Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: CoSWID Link Use Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, the Link Use Type Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "Software Tag Link Use Values" registry are provided below, which are derived from the link relationship values defined in [SWID].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Link Use Type Name</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>optional</td>
<td>See Section 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>required</td>
<td>See Section 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>recommended</td>
<td>See Section 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-255</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: CoSWID Link Use Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review criteria defined in Section 6.2.3.
6.3. swid+cbor Media Type Registration

IANA is requested to add the following to the IANA "Media Types"
registry [IANA.media-types].

Type name: application

Subtype name: swid+cbor

Required parameters: none

Optional parameters: none

Encoding considerations: Binary (encoded as CBOR [RFC8949]). See
RFC-AAAA for details.

Security considerations: See Section 9 of RFC-AAAA.

Interoperability considerations: Applications MAY ignore any key
value pairs that they do not understand. This allows backwards
compatible extensions to this specification.

Published specification: RFC-AAAA

Applications that use this media type: The type is used by software
asset management systems, vulnerability assessment systems, and in
applications that use remote integrity verification.

Fragment Identifier Considerations: The syntax and semantics of
fragment identifiers specified for "application/swid+cbor" are as
specified for "application/cbor". (At publication of RFC-AAAA, there
is no fragment identification syntax defined for "application/cbor".)

Additional information:

Magic number(s): if tagged, first five bytes in hex: da 53 57 49 44
(see Section 8 in RFC-AAAA)

File extension(s): coswid

Macintosh file type code(s): none

Macintosh Universal Type Identifier code: org.ietf.coswid conforms to
public.data

Person & email address to contact for further information: IESG
<iesg@ietf.org>
Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: None

Author: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>

Change controller: IESG

6.4. CoAP Content-Format Registration

IANA is requested to assign a CoAP Content-Format ID for the CoSWID media type in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-registry, from the "IETF Review or IESG Approval" space (256..999), within the "CoRE Parameters" registry [RFC7252] [IANA.core-parameters]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media type</th>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>application/swid+cbor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>TBD1</td>
<td>RFC-AAAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: CoAP Content-Format IDs

6.5. CBOR Tag Registration

IANA is requested to allocate a tag in the "CBOR Tags" registry [IANA.cbor-tags], preferably with the specific value requested:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Data Item</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1398229316</td>
<td>map</td>
<td>Concise Software Identifier (CoSWID) [RFC-AAAA]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: CoSWID CBOR Tag

6.6. URI Scheme Registrations

The ISO 19770-2:2015 SWID specification describes use of the "swid" and "swidpath" URI schemes, which are currently in use in implementations. This document continues this use for CoSWID. The following subsections provide registrations for these schemes in to ensure that a permanent registration exists for these schemes that is suitable for use in the SWID and CoSWID specifications.

URI schemes are registered within the "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes" registry maintained at [IANA.uri-schemes].
6.6.1. URI-scheme swid

IANA is requested to register the URI scheme "swid". This registration request complies with [RFC7595].

Scheme name:
swid

Status:
Permanent

Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
Applications that require Software-IDs (SWIDs) or Concise Software-IDs (CoSWIDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC-AAAA.

Contact:
IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>

Change controller:
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>

Reference:
Section 5.1 in RFC-AAAA

6.6.2. URI-scheme swidpath

IANA is requested to register the URI scheme "swidpath". This registration request complies with [RFC7595].

Scheme name:
swidpath

Status:
Permanent

Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
Applications that require Software-IDs (SWIDs) or Concise Software-IDs (CoSWIDs); see Section 5.2 of RFC-AAAA.

Contact:
IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>

Change controller:
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>

Reference:
Section 5.2 in RFC-AAAA
6.7. CoSWID Model for use in SWIMA Registration

The Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC specification [RFC8412] defines a standardized method for collecting an endpoint device's software inventory. A CoSWID can provide evidence of software installation which can then be used and exchanged with SWIMA. This registration adds a new entry to the IANA "Software Data Model Types" registry defined by [RFC8412] [IANA.pa-tnc-parameters] to support CoSWID use in SWIMA as follows:

Pen: 0

Integer: TBD2

Name: Concise Software Identifier (CoSWID)

Reference: RFC-AAAA

Deriving Software Identifiers:

A Software Identifier generated from a CoSWID tag is expressed as a concatenation of the form in [RFC5234] as follows:

TAG_CREATOR_REGID "_" "_" UNIQUE_ID

Where TAG_CREATOR_REGID is the reg-id item value of the tag’s entity item having the role value of 1 (corresponding to "tag creator"), and the UNIQUE_ID is the same tag’s tag-id item. If the tag-id item’s value is expressed as a 16-byte binary string, the UNIQUE_ID MUST be represented using the UUID string representation defined in [RFC4122] including the "urn:uuid:" prefix.

The TAG_CREATOR_REGID and the UNIQUE_ID are connected with a double underscore (_), without any other connecting character or whitespace.

7. Signed CoSWID Tags

SWID tags, as defined in the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema, can include cryptographic signatures to protect the integrity of the SWID tag. In general, tags are signed by the tag creator (typically, although not exclusively, the vendor of the software component that the SWID tag identifies). Cryptographic signatures can make any modification of the tag detectable, which is especially important if the integrity of the tag is important, such as when the tag is providing reference integrity measurements for files. The ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema uses XML DSIG to support cryptographic signatures.
Signing CoSWID tags follows the procedures defined in CBOR Object Signing and Encryption [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]. A CoSWID tag MUST be wrapped in a COSE Signature structure, either COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Sign. In the first case, a Single Signer Data Object (COSE_Sign1) contains a single signature and MUST be signed by the tag creator. The following CDDL specification defines a restrictive subset of COSE header parameters that MUST be used in the protected header in this case.

<CODE BEGINS>
COSE-Sign1-coswid<payload> = [
  protected: bstr .cbor protected-signed-coswid-header,
  unprotected: unprotected-signed-coswid-header,
  payload: bstr .cbor payload,
  signature: bstr,
]
cose-label = int / tstr
cose-values = any

protected-signed-coswid-header = {
  1 => int, ; algorithm identifier
  3 => "application/swid+cbor",
  * cose-label => cose-values,
}

unprotected-signed-coswid-header = {
  * cose-label => cose-values,
}
<CODE ENDS>

The COSE_Sign structure allows for more than one signature, one of which MUST be issued by the tag creator, to be applied to a CoSWID tag and MAY be used. The corresponding usage scenarios are domain-specific and require well-specified application guidance.
Additionally, the COSE Header counter signature MAY be used as an attribute in the unprotected header map of the COSE envelope of a CoSWID [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]. The application of counter signing enables second parties to provide a signature on a signature allowing for a proof that a signature existed at a given time (i.e., a timestamp).

A CoSWID MUST be signed, using the above mechanism, to protect the integrity of the CoSWID tag. See the security considerations (in Section 9) for more information on why a signed CoSWID is valuable in most cases.
8. CBOR-Tagged CoSWID Tags

This specification allows for tagged and untagged CBOR data items that are CoSWID tags. Consecutively, the CBOR tag for CoSWID tags defined in Table 21 SHOULD be used in conjunction with CBOR data items that are a CoSWID tags. Other CBOR tags MUST NOT be used with a CBOR data item that is a CoSWID tag. If tagged, both signed and unsigned CoSWID tags MUST use the CoSWID CBOR tag. In case a signed CoSWID is tagged, a CoSWID CBOR tag MUST be appended before the COSE envelope whether it is a COSE_Untagged_Message or a COSE_Tagged_Message. In case an unsigned CoSWID is tagged, a CoSWID CBOR tag MUST be appended before the CBOR data item that is the CoSWID tag.

<CODE BEGINS>
coswid = unsigned-coswid / signed-coswid
unsigned-coswid = concise-swid-tag / tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>
signed-coswid1 = signed-coswid-for<unsigned-coswid>
signed-coswid = signed-coswid1 / tagged-coswid<signed-coswid1>
tagged-coswid<T> = #6.1398229316(T)
signed-coswid-for<payload> = #6.18(COSE-Sign1-coswid<payload>)
   / #6.98(COSE-Sign-coswid<payload>)
<CODE ENDS>

This specification allows for a tagged CoSWID tag to reside in a COSE envelope that is also tagged with a CoSWID CBOR tag. In cases where a tag creator is not a signer (e.g., hand-offs between entities in a trusted portion of a supply-chain), retaining CBOR tags attached to unsigned CoSWID tags can be of great use. Nevertheless, redundant use of tags SHOULD be avoided when possible.

9. Security Considerations

The following security considerations for use of CoSWID tags focus on:

* ensuring the integrity and authenticity of a CoSWID tag
* the application of CoSWID tags to address security challenges related to unmanaged or unpatched software
* reducing the potential for unintended disclosure of a device’s software load
A tag is considered "authoritative" if the CoSWID tag was created by the software provider. An authoritative CoSWID tag contains information about a software component provided by the supplier of the software component, who is expected to be an expert in their own software. Thus, authoritative CoSWID tags can represent authoritative information about the software component. The degree to which this information can be trusted depends on the tag’s chain of custody and the ability to verify a signature provided by the supplier if present in the CoSWID tag. The provisioning and validation of CoSWID tags are handled by local policy and is outside the scope of this document.

A signed CoSWID tag (see Section 7) whose signature has been validated can be relied upon to be unchanged since it was signed. By contrast, the data contained in unsigned tags can be altered by any user or process with write-access to the tag. To support signature validation, there is the need to associate the right key with the software provider or party originating the signature in a secure way. This operation is application specific and needs to be addressed by the application or a user of the application; a specific approach for which is out-of-scope for this document.

When an authoritative tag is signed, the originator of the signature can be verified. A trustworthy association between the signature and the originator of the signature can be established via trust anchors. A certification path between a trust anchor and a certificate including a public key enabling the validation of a tag signature can realize the assessment of trustworthiness of an authoritative tag. Verifying that the software provider is the signer is a different matter. This requires an association between the signature and the tag’s entity item associated corresponding to the software provider. No mechanism is defined in this draft to make this association; therefore, this association will need to be handled by local policy. As always, the validity of a signature does not imply veracity of the signed statements: anyone can sign assertions such that the software is from a specific software-creator or that a specific persistent-id applies; policy needs to be applied to evaluate these statements and to determine their suitability for a specific use.

Loss of control of signing credentials used to sign CoSWID tags would create doubt about the authenticity and integrity of any CoSWID tags signed using the compromised keys. In such cases, the legitimate tag signer (namely, the software provider for an authoritative CoSWID tag) can employ uncompromised signing credentials to create a new signature on the original tag. The tag version number would not be incremented since the tag itself was not modified. Consumers of CoSWID tags would need to validate the tag using the new credentials and would also need to make use of revocation information available
for the compromised credentials to avoid validating tags signed with them. The process for doing this is beyond the scope of this specification.

The CoSWID format allows the use of hash values without an accompanying hash algorithm identifier. This exposes the tags to some risk of cross-algorithm attacks. We believe that this can become a practical problem only if some implementations allow the use of insecure hash algorithms. Since it may not become known immediately when an algorithm becomes insecure, this leads to a strong recommendation to only include support for hash algorithms that are generally considered secure, and not just marginally so.

CoSWID tags are intended to contain public information about software components and, as such, the contents of a CoSWID tag (as opposed to the set of tags that apply to the endpoint, see below) does not need to be protected against unintended disclosure on an endpoint. Converse, generators of CoSWID tags need to ensure that only public information is disclosed. Entitlement Keys are an example for information where particular care is required; tag authors are advised not to record unprotected, private software license keys in this field.

CoSWID tags are intended to be easily discoverable by authorized applications and users on an endpoint in order to make it easy to determine the tagged software load. Access to the collection of an endpoint’s CoSWID tags needs to be appropriately controlled to authorized applications and users using an appropriate access control mechanism.

Since the tag-id of a CoSWID tag can be used as a global index value, failure to ensure the tag-id’s uniqueness can cause collisions or ambiguity in CoSWID tags that are retrieved or processed using this identifier. CoSWID is designed to not require a registry of identifiers. As a result, CoSWID requires the tag creator to employ a method of generating a unique tag identifier. Specific methods of generating a unique identifier are beyond the scope of this specification. A collision in tag-ids may result in false positives/negatives in software integrity checks or mis-identification of installed software, undermining CoSWID use cases such as vulnerability identification, software inventory, etc. If such a collision is detected, then the tag consumer may want to contact the maintainer of the CoSWID to have them issue a correction addressing the collision; however, this also discloses to the maintainer that the consumer has the other tag with the given tag-id in their database. More generally speaking, a tag consumer needs to be robust against such collisions lest the collision become a viable attack vector.
CoSWID tags are designed to be easily added and removed from an endpoint along with the installation or removal of software components. On endpoints where addition or removal of software components is tightly controlled, the addition or removal of CoSWID tags can be similarly controlled. On more open systems, where many users can manage the software inventory, CoSWID tags can be easier to add or remove. On such systems, it can be possible to add or remove CoSWID tags in a way that does not reflect the actual presence or absence of corresponding software components. Similarly, not all software products automatically install CoSWID tags, so products can be present on an endpoint without providing a corresponding CoSWID tag. As such, any collection of CoSWID tags cannot automatically be assumed to represent either a complete or fully accurate representation of the software inventory of the endpoint. However, especially on endpoint devices that more strictly control the ability to add or remove applications, CoSWID tags are an easy way to provide a preliminary understanding of that endpoint’s software inventory.

As CoSWID tags do not expire, inhibiting new CoSWID tags from reaching an intended consumer would render that consumer stuck with outdated information, potentially leaving associated vulnerabilities or weaknesses unmitigated. Therefore, a CoSWID tag consumer should actively check for updated tag-versions via more than one means.

This specification makes use of relative paths (e.g., filesystem paths) in several places. A signed COSWID tag cannot make use of these to derive information that is considered to be covered under the signature. Typically, relative file system paths will be used to identify targets for an installation, not sources of tag information.
Any report of an endpoint’s CoSWID tag collection provides information about the software inventory of that endpoint. If such a report is exposed to an attacker, this can tell them which software products and versions thereof are present on the endpoint. By examining this list, the attacker might learn of the presence of applications that are vulnerable to certain types of attacks. As noted earlier, CoSWID tags are designed to be easily discoverable by authorized applications and users on an endpoint, but this does not present a significant risk since an attacker would already need to have access to the endpoint to view that information. However, when the endpoint transmits its software inventory to another party, or that inventory is stored on a server for later analysis, this can potentially expose this information to attackers who do not yet have access to the endpoint. For this reason, it is important to protect the confidentiality of CoSWID tag information that has been collected from an endpoint in transit and at rest, not because those tags individually contain sensitive information, but because the collection of CoSWID tags and their association with an endpoint reveals information about that endpoint’s attack surface.

Finally, both the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema SWID definition and the CoSWID CDDL specification allow for the construction of "infinite" tags with link item loops or tags that contain malicious content with the intent of creating non-deterministic states during validation or processing of those tags. While software providers are unlikely to do this, CoSWID tags can be created by any party and the CoSWID tags collected from an endpoint could contain a mixture of vendor and non-vendor created tags. For this reason, a CoSWID tag might contain potentially malicious content. Input sanitization, loop detection, and signature verification are ways that implementations can address this concern.

More generally speaking, the security considerations of [RFC8949], [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct], and [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign] apply.

10. Privacy Consideration

As noted in Section 9, collected information about an endpoint’s software load, such as what might be represented by an endpoint’s CoSWID tag collection, could be used to identify vulnerable software for attack. Collections of endpoint software information also can have privacy implications for users. The set of application a user installs can give clues to personal matters such as political affiliation, banking and investments, gender, sexual orientation, medical concerns, etc. While the collection of CoSWID tags on an endpoint wouldn’t increase the privacy risk (since a party able to view those tags could also view the applications themselves), if
those CoSWID tags are gathered and stored in a repository somewhere, visibility into the repository now also gives visibility into a user’s application collection. For this reason, repositories of collected CoSWID tags not only need to be protected against collection by malicious parties, but even authorized parties will need to be vetted and made aware of privacy responsibilities associated with having access to this information. Likewise, users should be made aware that their software inventories are being collected from endpoints. Furthermore, when collected and stored by authorized parties or systems, the inventory data needs to be protected as both security and privacy sensitive information.

11. Change Log

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

[THIS SECTION TO BE REMOVED BY THE RFC EDITOR.]

Changes from version 12 to version 14:

* Moved key identifier to protected COSE header
* Fixed index reference for hash
* Removed indirection of CDDL type definition for filesystem-item
* Fixed quantity of resource and process
* Updated resource-collection
* Renamed socket name in software-meta to be consistent in naming
* Aligned excerpt examples in I-D text with full CDDL
* Fixed titles where title was referring to group instead of map
* Added missing date in SEMVER
* Fixed root cardinality for file and directory, etc.
* Transformed path-elements-entry from map to group for re-usability
* Scrubbed IANA Section
* Removed redundant supplemental rule
* Aligned discrepancy with ISO spec.
* Addressed comments on typos.
* Fixed kramdown nits and BCP reference.
* Addressed comments from WGLC reviewers.

Changes in version 12:
* Addressed a bunch of minor editorial issues based on WGLC feedback.
* Added text about the use of UTF-8 in CoSWID.
* Adjusted tag-id to allow for a UUID to be provided as a bstr.
* Cleaned up descriptions of index ranges throughout the document, removing discussion of 8 bit, 16 bit, etc.
* Adjusted discussion of private use ranges to use negative integer values and to be more clear throughout the document.
* Added discussion around resolving overlapping value spaces for version schemes.
* Added a set of expert review criteria for new IANA registries created by this document.
* Added new registrations for the "swid" and "swidpath" URI schemes, and for using CoSWID with SWIMA.

Changes from version 03 to version 11:
* Reduced representation complexity of the media-entry type and removed the Section describing the older data structure.
* Added more signature schemes from COSE
* Included a minimal required set of normative language
* Reordering of attribute name to integer label by priority according to semantics.
* Added an IANA registry for CoSWID items supporting future extension.
* Cleaned up IANA registrations, fixing some inconsistencies in the table labels.
* Added additional CDDL sockets for resource collection entries providing for additional extension points to address future SWID/CoSWID extensions.

* Updated Section on extension points to address new CDDL sockets and to reference the new IANA registry for items.

* Removed unused references and added new references to address placeholder comments.

* Added table with semantics for the link ownership item.

* Clarified language, made term use more consistent, fixed references, and replacing lowercase RFC2119 keywords.

Changes from version 02 to version 03:

* Updated core CDDL including the CDDL design pattern according to RFC 8428.

Changes from version 01 to version 02:

* Enforced a more strict separation between the core CoSWID definition and additional usage by moving content to corresponding appendices.

* Removed artifacts inherited from the reference schema provided by ISO (e.g., NMTOKEN(S))

* Simplified the core data definition by removing group and type choices where possible

* Minor reordering of map members

* Added a first extension point to address requested flexibility for extensions beyond the any-element

Changes from version 00 to version 01:

* Ambiguity between evidence and payload eliminated by introducing explicit members (while still

* allowing for "empty" SWID tags)

* Added a relatively restrictive COSE envelope using cose_sign1 to define signed CoSWID (single signer only, at the moment)
* Added a definition how to encode hashes that can be stored in the any-member using existing IANA tables to reference hash-algorithms

Changes since adopted as a WG I-D -00:

* Removed redundant any-attributes originating from the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema definition

* Fixed broken multi-map members

* Introduced a more restrictive item (any-element-map) to represent custom maps, increased restriction on types for the any-attribute, accordingly

* Fixed X.1520 reference

* Minor type changes of some attributes (e.g., NMTOKENS)

* Added semantic differentiation of various name types (e.g. fs-name)

Changes from version 06 to version 07:

* Added type choices/enumerations based on textual definitions in 19770-2:2015

* Added value registry request

* Added media type registration request

* Added content format registration request

* Added CBOR tag registration request

* Removed RIM appendix to be addressed in complementary draft

* Removed CWT appendix

* Flagged firmware resource collection appendix for revision

* Made use of terminology more consistent

* Better defined use of extension points in the CDDL

* Added definitions for indexed values

* Added IANA registry for Link use indexed values
Changes from version 05 to version 06:
* Improved quantities
* Included proposals for implicit enumerations that were NMTOKENS
* Added extension points
* Improved exemplary firmware-resource extension

Changes from version 04 to version 05:
* Clarified language around SWID and CoSWID to make more consistent use of these terms.
* Added language describing CBOR optimizations for single vs. arrays in the model front matter.
* Fixed a number of grammatical, spelling, and wording issues.
* Documented extension points that use CDDL sockets.
* Converted IANA registration tables to markdown tables, reserving the 0 value for use when a value is not known.
* Updated a number of references to their current versions.

Changes from version 03 to version 04:
* Re-index label values in the CDDL.
* Added a Section describing the CoSWID model in detail.
* Created IANA registries for entity-role and version-scheme

Changes from version 02 to version 03:
* Updated CDDL to allow for a choice between a payload or evidence
* Re-index label values in the CDDL.
* Added item definitions
* Updated references for COSE, CBOR Web Token, and CDDL.

Changes from version 01 to version 02:
* Added extensions for Firmware and CoSWID use as Reference Integrity Measurements (CoSWID RIM)

* Changes meta handling in CDDL from use of an explicit use of items to a more flexible unconstrained collection of items.

* Added Sections discussing use of COSE Signatures and CBOR Web Tokens

Changes from version 00 to version 01:

* Added CWT usage for absolute SWID paths on a device

* Fixed cardinality of type-choices including arrays

* Included first iteration of firmware resource-collection

12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


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Acknowledgments

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Abstract

This document specifies the Endpoint Posture Collection Profile, which describes the best practices for the application of IETF, TNC, and ISO/IEC data models, protocols, and interfaces to support the on-going collection and communication of endpoint posture to a centralized server where it can be stored and made available to other tools. This document is an extension of the Trusted Computing Group’s Endpoint Compliance Profile Version 1.0 specification [ECP].
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1. Introduction

The Endpoint Posture Collection Profile (EPCP) builds on prior work from the IETF NEA WG, the IETF NETCONF WG, IETF NETMOD WG, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Network Communications [TNC] WG, and the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1, Subcommittee (SC) 7, WG 21 (ISO/IEC JTC 1, SC7, WG21) to describe the best practices for the collection and communication of posture information from network-connected endpoints to a centralized server.

This document focuses on reducing the security exposure of a network by enabling event-driven posture collection, standardized querying of additional posture information as needed, and the communication of that data to a centralized server where it can made available to other components. Thus, eliminating the need for redundant collection and agents on endpoints. Future revisions of this document may include support for the collection of posture information from other endpoint types as well as a standardized interface for storing and querying data in repositories among other capabilities. Additional information about this future work can be found in Section 6 of this document.

To support the collection of posture information from new endpoint types, this document is organized such that it first provides a high-level overview of EPCP as well as its abstract architectural components and transactions that will be realized by implementations (Section 3). This is followed by individual sections that discuss the best practices for specific implementations of the EPCP for a given endpoint type (e.g., traditional, network device, etc.) along with any extensions for supported use cases (software asset management, vulnerability management, etc.).
that lower case instances of must, should, etc. do not indicate normative requirements.

Furthermore, this document uses terms as defined in [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology] unless otherwise specified.

3. Endpoint Posture Collection Profile

The EPCP describes how IETF, TCG, and ISO/IEC data models, protocols, and interfaces can be used to support the posture assessment of endpoints on a network. This profile does not generate new data models, protocols, or interfaces; rather, it offers best practices for a full end-to-end solution for posture assessment, as well as a fresh perspective on how existing standards can be leveraged against vulnerabilities. Rationale for the EPCP solution as well as the supported and non-supported use cases is available in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.

The EPCP makes it possible to perform posture assessments against all network-connected endpoints by:

1. uniquely identifying the endpoint;

2. collecting and evaluating posture based on data from the endpoint (asset management, software asset management, vulnerability management, and configuration management);

3. creating a secure, authenticated, confidential channel between the endpoint and the posture manager;

4. enabling the endpoint to notify the posture manager about changes to its configuration;

5. enabling the posture manager to request information about the configuration of the endpoint; and

6. storing the posture information in a repository linked to the identifier for the endpoint.

Furthermore, the EPCP aims to support data storage and data sharing capabilities to make the collected posture information available to authorized parties and components in support of other processes (analytic, access control, remediation, reporting, etc.).
3.1. Components

To perform posture assessment, data storage, and data sharing, the EPCP defines several components. Some of these components reside on the target endpoint. Others reside on a posture manager that manages communications with the target endpoint and stores the target endpoint’s posture information in a repository.

It should be noted that the primary focus of this document is on the communication between the posture manager and endpoints. While the orchestrator, evaluator, repository, and administrative interface and API will be discussed in the context of the broader EPCP architecture, these components are not strictly defined nor are best practices provided for them at this time. As a result, vendors are free to implement these components and interfaces in a way that makes the most sense for their products.
3.1.1. Endpoint

An endpoint is defined in [RFC6876]. In the EPCP, the endpoint is monitored by the enterprise and is the target of posture assessments. To support these posture assessments, posture information is collected via a posture collection engine.

3.1.1.1. Posture Collection Engine

The posture collection engine is located on the target endpoint and can either receive queries for data from the posture collection manager (see Section 3.2.4) or can push data to the posture collection manager.
collection manager (see Section 3.2.3). The posture collection engine sends collected posture information to the posture manager.
where it can be sanity checked and stored in the repository. The posture collection engine also contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target endpoint and posture manager. This capability makes the posture collection engine responsible for performing the client-side portion of encryption handshakes, and for locating authorized posture managers with which to communicate.

3.1.2. Posture Manager

The posture manager is an endpoint that collects, validates, and enriches posture information received about a target endpoint. It also stores the posture information it receives in the repository where it can be evaluated. The posture manager does not evaluate the posture information.

3.1.2.1. Posture Collection Manager

A posture collection manager is a lightweight and extensible component that facilitates the coordination and execution of posture collection requests using collection mechanisms deployed across the enterprise. The posture collection manager may query and retrieve guidance from the repository to guide the collection of posture information from the target endpoint.

The posture collection manager also contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target endpoint and the posture manager, and manages data sent to and from posture collection engine. It is also responsible for performing the server-side portion of encryption handshakes.

If the posture manager wants to register for continuous collection of endpoint posture changes with the endpoint, then it must do so in a scalable way. Specifically, it will need to create subscriptions with endpoints in a way which allows the posture data to be securely pushed. Effectively this means that the endpoint must be able to establish secure transport connectivity to the posture collection manager as needed, and the collection manager must be able to periodically collect the current state of the endpoint to verify the expected state of that endpoint.

3.1.3. Repository

The repository hosts guidance, endpoint identification information, and posture information reported by target endpoints where it is made available to authorized components and persisted over a period of time set by the administrator. Information stored in the repository will be accessible to authorized parties via a standard administrative interface as well as through a standardized API.
 repository may be a standalone component or may be located on the posture manager. Furthermore, an implementation is not restricted to a single repository and may leverage several repositories to provide this functionality.

3.1.4. Evaluator

The evaluator assesses the posture status of a target endpoint by comparing collected posture information against the desired state of the target endpoint specified in guidance. The evaluator queries and retrieves the appropriate guidance from the repository as well as queries and retrieves the posture information required for the assessment from the repository. If the required posture information is not available in the repository, the evaluator may request the posture information from the posture collection manager, which will result in the collection of additional posture information from the target endpoint. This information is subsequently stored in the repository where it is made available to the evaluator and other components. The results of the assessment are stored in the repository where they are available to tools and administrators for follow-up actions, further evaluation, and historical purposes.

3.1.5. Orchestrator

The orchestrator provides a publish/subscribe interface for the repository so that infrastructure endpoints can subscribe to and receive published posture assessment results from the repository regarding endpoint posture changes.

3.1.6. Administrative Interface and API

The administrative interface allows administrators to query the repository and manage the endpoints and software used in the EPCP via the posture manager. Similarly, an API is necessary to allow infrastructure endpoints and software access to the information stored in the repository and to manage the endpoints and software used in the EPCP. The administrative interface and API provide authorized users, infrastructure endpoints, and software with the ability to query the repository for data, send commands to the posture collection managers requesting information from the associated posture collection engines residing on endpoints, and establish and update the policy that resides on the posture manager.

3.2. Transactions

The following sections describe the transactions associated with the components of the EPCP architecture and may be provided in an implementation.
3.2.1. Provisioning

An endpoint is provisioned with one or more attributes that will serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components and data models necessary to interact with the posture manager. Examples of such identifiers include MAC addresses, serial numbers, hardware certificates compliant with [IEEE-802-1ar], and the identities of hardware cryptographic modules among others. Once provisioning is complete, the endpoint is deployed on the network. Over time, components and data models may need to be added to the endpoint or updated to support the collection needs of an enterprise.

3.2.2. Discovery and Validation

If necessary, the target endpoint finds and validates the posture manager. The posture collection engine on the target endpoint and posture collection manager on the posture manager complete an encryption handshake, during which endpoint identity information is exchanged.

3.2.3. Event Driven Collection

The posture assessment is initiated when the posture collector engine on the target endpoint notices that relevant posture information on the endpoint has changed. Then, the posture collection engine initiates a posture assessment information exchange with the posture collection manager.

3.2.4. Querying the Endpoint

The posture assessment is initiated by the posture collection manager. This can occur because:

1. policy states that a previous assessment has aged out or become invalid, or

2. the posture collection manager is alerted by a sensor or an administrator (via the posture manager’s administrative interface) that an assessment must be completed.

3.2.5. Data Storage

Once posture information is received by the posture manager, it is forwarded to the repository. The repository could be co-located with the posture manager, or there could be direct or brokered communication between the posture manager and the repository. The posture information is stored in the repository along with past posture information collected about the target endpoint.
3.2.6. Data Sharing

Because the target endpoint posture information was sent in standards-based data models over secure, standardized protocols, and then stored in a centralized repository linked to unique endpoint identifiers, authorized parties are able to access the posture information. Such authorized parties may include, but are not limited to, administrators or endpoint owners (via the posture manager’s administrative interface), evaluators that access the repository directly, and orchestrators that rely on publish/subscribe communications with the repository.

4. IETF NEA EPCP Implementation for Traditional Endpoints

When EPCP is used, posture collectors running on the target endpoint gather posture information as changes occur on the endpoint. The data is aggregated by the posture broker client and forwarded to a posture manager, over a secure channel, via the posture transport client. Once received by the posture transport server on the posture manager, the posture information is directed by the posture broker server to the appropriate posture validators where it can be processed and stored in a repository. There the posture information can be used by other tools to carry out assessment tasks. Posture collectors can also be queried by posture validators to refresh posture information about the target endpoint or to ask a specific question about posture information. This is shown in Figure 2.
These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture assessment on an endpoint; as the EPCP grows and evolves, these requirements will be expanded to address issues that arise. Note that these requirements refer to defined components of the NEA architecture [RFC5209]. As with the NEA architecture, vendors have discretion as to how these NEA components map to separate pieces of software or endpoints.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the posture broker client and posture transport client components of the posture collection engine and the posture broker server and posture transport server components of the posture collection manager would likely need to be implemented by a single vendor because there are no standardized interfaces between the respective components and would not be interoperable.

Examples of the EPCP as implemented using the components from the NEA architecture are provided in Appendix C.
4.1. Endpoint Provisioning

An endpoint is provisioned with a machine certificate that will serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components necessary to interact with the posture manager. This includes a posture collection engine to manage requests from the posture manager and the posture collectors necessary to collect the posture information of importance to the enterprise. The endpoint is deployed on the network.

The target endpoint SHOULD authenticate to the posture manager using a machine certificate during the establishment of the outer tunnel achieved with the posture transport protocol defined in [RFC6876]. [IF-IMV] specifies how to pull an endpoint identifier out of a machine certificate. An endpoint identifier SHOULD be created in conformance with [IF-IMV] from a machine certificate sent via [RFC6876].

In the future, the identity could be a hardware certificate compliant with [IEEE-802-1ar]; ideally, this identifier SHOULD be associated with the identity of a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], if present on the endpoint. The enterprise SHOULD stand up a certificate root authority; install its root certificate on endpoints and on the posture manager; and provision the endpoints and the posture manager with machine certificates. The target endpoint MAY authenticate to the posture manager using a combination of the machine account and password; however, this is less secure and not recommended.

4.2. Endpoint

The endpoint MUST conform to [RFC5793], which levies several requirements against the endpoint. An endpoint that complies with these requirements will be able to:

1. attempt to initiate a session with the posture manager if the posture makes a request to send an update to posture manager;

2. notify the posture collector if no PT-TLS session with the posture manager can be created;

3. notify the posture collector when a PT-TLS session is established; and

4. receive information from the posture collectors, forward this information to the posture manager via the posture collection engine.
4.2.1. Posture Collector

Any posture collector used in an EPCP solution MUST be conformant with the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement Collector interface [IF-IMC].

4.2.2. Posture Broker Client

The posture broker client MUST conform to [IF-IMC] to enable communications between the posture broker client and the posture collectors on the endpoint.

4.2.3. Posture Transport Client

The posture transport client MUST implement PT-TLS.

The posture transport client MUST support the use of machine certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].

The posture transport client MUST be able to locate an authorized posture manager, and switch to a new posture manager when required by the network, in conformance with [Server-Discovery].

4.3. Posture Manager

The posture manager MUST conform to all requirements in the [RFC5793].

4.3.1. Posture Validator

Any posture validator used in an EPCP solution MUST be conformant with the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement Verifier interface [IF-IMV].

4.3.2. Posture Broker Server

The posture broker server MUST conform to [IF-IMV]. Conformance to [IF-IMV] enables the posture broker server to obtain endpoint identity information from the posture transport server, and pass this information to any posture validators on the posture manager.

4.3.3. Posture Transport Server

The posture transport server MUST implement PT-TLS.

The posture transport server MUST support the use of machine certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].
4.4. Repository

EPCP requires a simple administrative interface for the repository. Posture validators on the posture manager receive the target endpoint posture information via PA-TNC [RFC5792] messages sent from corresponding posture collectors on the target endpoint. The posture validators store this information in the repository linked to the identity of the target endpoint where the posture collectors are located.

4.5. IETF SACM SWAM Extension to the IETF NEA EPCP Implementation

This section defines the requirements associated with the software asset management extension [RFC8412] to the IETF NEA EPCP implementation.

4.5.1. Endpoint Pre-Provisioning

This section defines the requirements associated with implementing SWIMA.

The following requirements assume that the platform or OS vendor supports the use of SWID tags and has identified a standard directory location for the SWID tags to be located as specified by [SWID].

4.5.2. SWID Tags

The primary content for the EPCP is the information conveyed in the elements of a SWID tag.

The endpoint MUST have SWID tags stored in a directory specified in [SWID]. The tags SHOULD be provided by the software vendor; they MAY also be generated by:

- o the software installer; or
- o third-party software that creates tags based on the applications it sees installed on the endpoint.

The elements in the SWID tag MUST be populated as specified in [SWID]. These tags, and the directory in which they are stored, MUST be updated as software is added, removed, or updated.

4.5.3. SWID Posture Collectors and Posture Validators
4.5.3.1. The SWID Posture Collector

For the EPCP, the SWID posture collector MUST be conformant with [RFC8412], which includes requirements for:

1. Collecting SWID tags from the SWID directory;
2. Monitoring the SWID directory for changes;
3. Initiating a session with the posture manager to report changes to the directory;
4. Maintaining a list of changes to the SWID directory when updates take place and no PT-TLS connection can be created with the posture manager;
5. Responding to a request for SWID tags from the SWID Posture Validator on the posture manager; and
6. Responding to a query from the SWID posture validator as to whether all updates have been sent.

The SWID posture collector is not responsible for detecting that the SWID directory was not updated when an application was either installed or uninstalled.

4.5.3.2. The SWID Posture Validator

Conformance to [RFC8412] enables the SWID posture validator to:

1. Send messages to the SWID posture collector (at the behest of the administrator at the posture manager console) requesting updates for SWID tags located on endpoint;
2. Ask the SWID posture collector whether all updates to the SWID directory located at the posture manager have been sent; and
3. Perform any validation and processing on the collected SWID posture information prior to storage.

In addition to these requirements, a SWID posture validator used in conformance with this profile MUST be capable of passing this SWID posture information as well as the associated endpoint identity to the repository for storage.
4.5.4. Repository

The administrative interface SHOULD enable an administrator to:

1. Query which endpoints have reported SWID tags for a particular application
2. Query which SWID tags are installed on an endpoint; and
3. Query tags based on characteristics, such as vendor, publisher, etc.

5. IETF NETCONF EPCP Implementation for Network Device Endpoints

When EPCP is used, a NETCONF client that implements the posture collection manager sends a query to target network device endpoint requesting posture information over a secure channel. Once the NETCONF server on the endpoint receives the request, it queries one or more datastores for the posture information. The NETCONF server then reports the information back to the NETCONF client where it can be stored in a repository for use by other tools. This is shown in Figure 3.

These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture assessment on network device endpoints (routers, switches, etc.); as the EPCP grows and evolves, these requirements will be expanded to address issues that arise.
Note that these requirements refer to defined components of the NETCONF architecture and map back to EPCP. As with the NETCONF architecture, vendors have discretion as to how these NETCONF components map to separate pieces of software or endpoints.

5.1. Endpoint Provisioning

For the posture manager to be able to query the datastores on the endpoint, the endpoint MUST be configured to grant the posture manager access to its datastores as described in [RFC6241]. The posture manager is identified by its NETCONF username. The endpoint is deployed on the network.

5.2. Posture Manager Provisioning

For the posture manager to be able to query the datastores on the endpoint, the posture manager MUST be provisioned with a NETCONF username that will be used to authenticate the posture manager to the endpoint as described in [RFC6241]. The username generated will be determined by the selected transport protocol. The posture manager is deployed on the network.

5.3. Endpoint

An endpoint MUST conform to the requirements outlined for servers in the NETCONF protocol as defined in [RFC6241]. This requires the implementation of NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]. An endpoint MAY support the NETCONF protocol over other transports such as TLS [RFC7589] as well as the RESTCONF protocol as defined in [RFC8040].

5.3.1. Datastore

A NETCONF datastore on an endpoint MUST support the operations outlined in [RFC6241], but, the actual implementation of the datastore is left to the endpoint vendor.

Datastores MUST support the YANG data modeling language [RFC7950] for expressing endpoint posture information in a structured format. In addition, datastores MAY support other data models such as XML (via YIN) for representing posture information.

Datastores MUST support the compliance posture information specified in [RFC7317]. Datastores MAY support other models standardized or proprietary as deemed appropriate by the endpoint vendor.
5.4. Posture Manager

A posture manager MUST conform to the requirements specified for clients in the NETCONF protocol as defined in [RFC6241]. This requires the implementation of NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]. A posture manager MAY also support the NETCONF protocol over other transports such as TLS [RFC7589]. In addition, a posture manager MAY support the RESTCONF protocol as defined in [RFC8040].

While ad-hoc fetch/polling via NETCONF and RESTCONF is useful for assessing endpoint compliance, such solutions by themselves are not able to detect changes as they occur on the endpoint. As a result, a future revision of this document will support [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push] to receive updates on YANG-modeled posture information. Similarly, because not all posture information is modeled in YANG, a future revision of this document will reference [I-D.ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications] once it is a standard to support continuous streams of unstructured data from the endpoint to the posture manager.

5.5. Repository

EPCP requires a simple administrative interface for the repository. The posture collection manager on the posture manager receives the target endpoint posture information via NETCONF [RFC6241] messages sent from posture collection engine on the target endpoint. The posture collection manager stores this information in the repository linked to the identity of the target endpoint from which it was collected.

6. Future Work

This section captures ideas for future work related to EPCP that might be of interest to the IETF SACM WG. These ideas are listed in no particular order.

- The [I-D.ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push] which have been submitted to IESG for publication could be leveraged for an HTTP-based subscription for EPCP. Specifically, it could be used for the posture collection manager to continuously receive posture changes as they happen from the posture collection engine. At this point, it seems like [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-notif] would be a good match to these requirements. However further investigation into the applicability of supporting a RESTCONF server capability on to handle subscription requests needs to be made. Specific questions which should be examined include:
* Number of endpoints which can be continuously tracked by a single posture collection manager. Scalability questions to be considered include elements from the number of transport connects maintained to the volume of volume and churn of posture evidence which will be continuously pushed to the posture collection manager manager.

* Ability of the posture collection manager to establish and maintain a continuous state of endpoint posture during failures. This includes failures/reboots on either side of the interface.

* Ability to support for the full set of functions described for NETCONF within Section 5.

  o Add support endpoint types beyond workstations, servers, and network infrastructure devices.

  o Examine the integration of [I-D.ietf-mile-xmpp-grid].

  o Define a standard interface and API for interacting with the repository. Requirements to consider include: creating a secure channel between a publisher and the repository, creating a secure channel between a subscriber and the repository, and the types of interactions that must be supported between publishers and subscribers to a repository.

  o Define a standard interface for communications between the posture broker client and posture transport client(s) as well as the posture broker server and posture transport server(s).

  o Retention of posture information on the target endpoint.

  o Define an orchestrator component as well as publish/subscribe interface for it.

  o Define an evaluator component as well as an interface for it.

  o Reassess the use of MAC addresses, including market research to determine if MAC addresses continue to be a widely implemented device identifier among network tools.

7. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank all of those in the TCG TNC work group who contributed to development of the TNC ECP specification upon which this document is based.
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Table 1: Members of the TNC Work Group that Contributed to the Document

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Special thanks also to Dan Ehrlich, Kathleen Moriarty, David Oliva and Eric Voit for their thoughtful comments and edits.

8. IANA Considerations

This document does not define any new IANA registries. However, this document does reference other documents that do define IANA registries. As a result, the IANA Considerations section of the referenced documents should be consulted.

9. Security Considerations

This Security Considerations section includes an analysis of the attacks that may be mounted against systems that implement the EPCP (Section 9.1) and the countermeasures that may be used to prevent or mitigate these attacks (Section 9.2). Overall, a substantial reduction in cyber risk can be achieved.

9.1. Threat Model

This section lists the attacks that can be mounted on a NEA implementation of an EPCP environment. The following section (Section 9.2) describes countermeasures.

Because the EPCP describes a specific use case for NEA components, many security considerations for these components are addressed in more detail in the technical specifications: [RFC8412], [IF-IMC], [RFC5793], [Server-Discovery], [RFC6876], [IF-IMV].
9.1.1. Endpoint Attacks

While the EPCP provides substantial improvements in endpoint security, endpoints can still be compromised. For this reason, all parties must regard data coming from endpoints as potentially unreliable or even malicious. An analogy can be drawn with human testimony in an investigation or trial. Human testimony is essential but must be regarded with suspicion.

- **Compromise of endpoint**: A compromised endpoint may report false information to confuse or even provide maliciously crafted information with a goal of infecting others.

- **Putting bad information in SWID directory**: Even if an endpoint is not completely compromised, some of the software running on it may be unreliable or even malicious. This software, potentially including the SWID generation or discovery tool, or malicious software pretending to be a SWID generation or discovery tool, can place incorrect or maliciously crafted information into the SWID directory. Endpoint users may even place such information in the directory, whether motivated by curiosity or confusion or a desire to bypass restrictions on their use of the endpoint.

- **Identity spoofing (impersonation)**: A compromised endpoint may attempt to impersonate another endpoint to gain its privileges or to besmirch the reputation of that other endpoint. This is of particular concern when using MAC addresses to identify endpoints, which, while widely used in endpoint behavior monitoring and threat assessment tools, are easy to spoof.

9.1.2. Network Attacks

Generally, the network cannot be trusted. A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network, including:

- **Eavesdropping, modification, injection, replay, deletion**;

- **Traffic analysis**; and

- **Denial of service and blocking traffic**.

9.1.3. Posture Manager Attacks

The posture manager is a critical security element and therefore merits considerable scrutiny. A variety of attacks can be leveraged against the Posture Manager.
o Compromised trusted manager: A compromised posture manager or a malicious party that is able to impersonate a posture manager can incorrectly grant or deny access to endpoints, place incorrect information into the repository, or send malicious messages to endpoints.

o Misconfiguration of posture manager: Accidental or purposeful misconfiguration of a trusted posture manager can cause effects that are similar to those listed for compromised trusted posture manager.

o Malicious untrusted posture manager: An untrusted posture manager cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented endpoints will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog with such a posture manager.

9.1.4. Repository Attacks

The repository is also an important security element and therefore merits careful scrutiny.

o Putting bad information into trusted repository: An authorized repository client such as a server may be able to put incorrect information into a trusted repository or delete or modify historical information, causing incorrect decisions about endpoint security. Placing maliciously crafted data in the repository could even lead to compromise of repository clients, if they fail to carefully check such data.

o Compromised trusted repository: A compromised trusted repository or a malicious untrusted repository that is able to impersonate a trusted repository can lead to effects similar to those listed for "Putting bad information into trusted repository". Further, a compromised trusted repository can report different results to different repository clients or deny access to the repository for selected repository clients.

o Misconfiguration of trusted repository: Accidental or purposeful misconfiguration of a trusted repository can deny access to the repository or result in loss of historical data.

o Malicious untrusted repository: An untrusted repository cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented repository clients will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog with such a repository.
9.2. Countermeasures

This section lists the countermeasures that can be used in a NEA implementation of an EPCP environment.

9.2.1. Countermeasures for Endpoint Attacks

This profile is in and of itself a countermeasure for a compromised endpoint. A primary defense for an endpoint is to run up to date software configured to be run as safely as possible.

Ensuring that anti-virus signatures are up to date and that a firewall is configured are also protections for an endpoint that are supported by the current NEA specifications.

For secure device identification and to correlate device identifiers if the MAC address is randomized, MAC addresses should be collected along with other, more secure endpoint identifiers. Endpoints that have hardware cryptographic modules that are provisioned by the enterprise, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], can protect the private keys used for authentication and help prevent adversaries from stealing credentials that can be used for impersonation. Future versions of the EPCP may want to discuss in greater detail how to use a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], to protect credentials and to protect the integrity of the code that executes during the bootstrap process by hashing or recording indicators of compromise.

9.2.2. Countermeasures for Network Attacks

To address network attacks, [RFC6876] includes required encryption, authentication, integrity protection, and replay protection. [Server-Discovery] also includes authorization checks to ensure that only authorized servers are trusted by endpoints. Any unspecified or not yet specified network protocols employed in the EPCP (e.g. the protocol used to interface with the repository) should include similar protections.

These protections reduce the scope of the network threat to traffic analysis and denial of service. Countermeasures for traffic analysis (e.g. masking) are usually impractical but may be employed. Countermeasures for denial of service (e.g. detecting and blocking particular sources) SHOULD be used when appropriate to detect and block denial of service attacks. These are routine practices in network security.
9.2.3. Countermeasures for Posture Manager Attacks

Because of the serious consequences of posture manager compromise, posture managers SHOULD be especially well hardened against attack and minimized to reduce their attack surface. They SHOULD be monitored using the NEA protocols to ensure the integrity of the behavior and analysis data stored on the posture manager and SHOULD utilize an [IEEE-802-1ar]-compliant hardware cryptographic module for identity and/or integrity measurements of the posture manager. They should be well managed to minimize vulnerabilities in the underlying platform and in systems upon which the posture manager depends. Network security measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems may be used to monitor and limit traffic to and from the posture manager. Personnel with administrative access to the posture manager should be carefully screened and monitored to detect problems as soon as possible. Posture manager administrators should not use password-based authentication but should instead use non-reusable credentials and multi-factor authentication (where available). Physical security measures should be employed to prevent physical attacks on posture managers.

To ease detection of posture manager compromise, should it occur, posture manager behavior should be monitored to detect unusual behavior (such as a server reboot, unusual traffic patterns, or other odd behavior). Endpoints should log and/or notify users and/or administrators when peculiar posture manager behavior is detected. To aid forensic investigation, permanent read-only audit logs of security-relevant information pertaining to posture manager (especially administrative actions) should be maintained. If posture manager compromise is detected, the posture manager’s certificate should be revoked and careful analysis should be performed of the source and impact of this compromise. Any reusable credentials that may have been compromised should be reissued.

Endpoints can reduce the threat of server compromise by minimizing the number of trusted posture managers, using the mechanisms described in [Server-Discovery].

9.2.4. Countermeasures for Repository Attacks

If the host for the repository is located on its own endpoint, it should be protected with the same measures taken to protect the posture manager. In this circumstance, all messages between the posture manager and repository should be protected with a mature security protocol such as TLS or IPsec.

The repository can aid in the detection of compromised endpoints if an adversary cannot tamper with its contents. For instance, if an
endpoint reports that it does not have an application with a known vulnerability installed, an administrator can check whether the endpoint might be lying by querying the repository for the history of what applications were installed on the endpoint.

To help prevent tampering with the information in the repository:

1. Only authorized parties should have privilege to run code on the endpoint and to change the repository.

2. If a separate endpoint hosts the repository, then the functionality of that endpoint should be limited to hosting the repository. The firewall on the repository should only allow access to the posture manager and to any endpoint authorized for administration.

3. The repository should ideally use "write once" media to archive the history of what was placed in the repository, to include a snapshot of the current status of applications on endpoints.

10. Privacy Considerations

The EPCP specifically addresses the collection of posture data from enterprise endpoints by an enterprise network. As such, privacy is not going to often arise as a concern for those deploying this solution.

A possible exception may be the concerns a user may have when attempting to connect a personal endpoint (such as a phone or mobile endpoint) to an enterprise network. The user may not want to share certain details, such as an endpoint identifier or SWID tags, with the enterprise. The user can configure their NEA client to reject requests for this information; however, it is possible that the enterprise policy will not allow the user’s endpoint to connect to the network without providing the requested data.

An enterprise network should limit access to endpoint posture and identification information to authorized users.

11. References

11.1. Informative References


Haynes, et al. Expires December 23, 2019


[IEEE-802-1ar] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE 802.1ar", December 2009.


11.2. Normative References


[I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]


Appendix A. Rationale for an EPCP Solution

A.1. Preventative Posture Assessments

The value of continuous endpoint posture assessment is well established. Security experts have identified asset management and vulnerability remediation as a critical step for preventing intrusions. Application whitelisting, patching applications and operating systems, and using the latest versions of applications top the Defense Signals Directorate's "Top 4 Mitigations to Protect Your ICT System". [DSD] "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Endpoints", "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software", and "Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation" are Controls 1, 2, and 3, respectively, of the CIS Controls [CIS]. While there are commercially available solutions that attempt to address these security controls, these solutions do not run on all types of endpoints; consistently interoperate with other tools that could make use of the data collected; collect posture information from all types of endpoints in a consistent, standardized schema; or require vetted,
standardized protocols that have been evaluated by the international community for cryptographic soundness.

As is true of most solutions offered today, the solution found in the EPCP does not attempt to solve the lying endpoint problem, or detect infected endpoints; rather, it focuses on ensuring that healthy endpoints remain healthy by keeping software up-to-date and patched.

A.2. All Network-Connected Endpoints are Endpoints

As defined by [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], an endpoint is any physical or virtual computing endpoint that can be connected to a network. Posture assessment against policy is equally, if not more, important for continuously connected endpoints, such as enterprise workstations and infrastructure endpoints, as it is for sporadically connected endpoints. Continuously connected endpoints are just as likely to fall out of compliance with policy, and a standardized posture assessment method is necessary to ensure they can be properly handled.

A.3. All Endpoints on the Network Must be Uniquely Identified

Many administrators struggle to identify what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time. By requiring a standardized method of endpoint identity, the EPCP will enable administrators to answer the basic question, "What is on my network?" In [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], SACM defines this set of endpoints on the network as the SACM domain. Unique endpoint identification also enables the comparison of current and past endpoint posture assessments, by allowing administrators to correlate assessments from the same endpoint. This makes it easier to flag suspicious changes in endpoint posture for manual or automatic review, and helps to swiftly identify malicious changes to endpoint applications.

A.4. Standardized Data Models

Meeting EPCP best practices requires the use of standardized data models for the exchange of posture information. This helps to ensure that the posture information sent from endpoints to the repository can be easily stored, due to their known format, and shared with authorized endpoints and users.

Posture information must be sent over standardized protocols to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of this data while in transit. Implementations of the EPCP include [RFC6876] and [RFC6241] for communication between the target endpoint and the posture manager. These protocols allow networks that implement this solution to collect large amounts of posture information from an endpoint to

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make decisions about that endpoint’s compliance with some policy. The EPCP offers a solution for all endpoints already connected to the network. Periodic assessments and automated reporting of changes to endpoint posture allow for instantaneous identification of connected endpoints that are no longer compliant to some policy.

A.5. Posture Information Must Be Stored

Posture information must be stored by the repository and must be exposed to an interface at the posture manager. Standard data models enable standard queries from an interface exposed to an administrator at the posture manager console. A repository must retain any current posture information retrieved from the target endpoint and store it indexed by the unique identifier for the endpoint. Any posture collection manager specified by this profile must be able to ascertain from its corresponding posture collection engine whether the posture information is up to date. An interface on the posture manager must support a request to obtain up-to-date information when an endpoint is connected. This interface must also support the ability to make a standard set of queries about the posture information stored by the repository. In the future, some forms of posture information might be retained at the endpoint. The interface on the posture manager must accommodate the ability to make a request to the corresponding posture collection engine about the posture of the target endpoint. Standard data models and protocols also enable the security of posture assessment results. By storing these results indexed under the endpoint’s unique identification, secure storage itself enables endpoint posture information correlation, and ensures that the enterprise’s repositories always offer the freshest, most up-to-date view of the enterprise’s endpoint posture information possible.

A.6. Posture Information Can Be Shared

By exposing posture information using a standard interface and API, other security and operational components have a high level of insight into the enterprise’s endpoints and the software installed on them. This will support innovation in the areas of asset management, vulnerability scanning, and administrative interfaces, as any authorized infrastructure endpoint can interact with the posture information.

A.7. Enterprise Asset Posture Information Belongs to the Enterprise

Owners and administrators must have complete control of posture information, policy, and endpoint mitigation. Standardized data models, protocols and interfaces help to ensure that this posture information is not locked in proprietary databases, but is made
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available to its owners. This enables administrators to develop as nuanced a policy as necessary to keep their networks secure. Of course, there may be exceptions to this such as the case with privacy-related information (e.g., personally identifiable information).

Appendix B.  EPCP Supported Use Cases and Non-Supported Use Cases

B.1.  Supported Use Cases

The following sections describe the different use cases supported by the EPCP.

B.1.1.  Hardware Asset Management

Using the administrative interface on the posture manager, an authorized user can learn:

- what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time; and
- what SWID tags were reported for the endpoints.

The ability to answer these questions offers a standards-based approach to asset management, which is a vital part of enterprise processes such as compliance report generation for the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), etc.

B.1.2.  Software Asset Management

The administrative interface on the posture manager provides the ability for authorized users and infrastructure to know which software is installed on which endpoints on the enterprise’s network. This allows the enterprise to answer questions about what software is installed to determine if it is licensed or prohibited. This information can also drive other use cases as:

- vulnerability management: knowing what software is installed supports the ability to determine which endpoints contain vulnerable software and need to be patched.
- configuration management: knowing which security controls need to be applied to harden installed software and better protect endpoints.
B.1.3. Vulnerability Management

The administrative interface also provides the ability for authorized users or infrastructure to locate endpoints running software for which vulnerabilities have been announced. Because of

1. the unique IDs assigned to each endpoint; and

2. the rich application data provided in the endpoints’ posture information,

the repository can be queried to find all endpoints running a vulnerable application. Endpoints suspected of being vulnerable can be addressed by the administrator or flagged for further scrutiny.

B.1.4. Threat Detection and Analysis

The repository’s standardized API allows authorized infrastructure endpoints and software to search endpoint posture assessment information for evidence that an endpoint’s software inventory has changed, and can make endpoint software inventory data available to other endpoints. This automates security data sharing in a way that expedites the correlation of relevant network data, allowing administrators and infrastructure endpoints to identify odd endpoint behavior and configuration using secure, standards-based data models and protocols.

B.2. Non-Supported Use Cases

Several use cases, including but not limited to these, are not covered by the EPCP:

- Gathering non-standardized types of posture information: The EPCP does not prevent administrators from collecting posture information in proprietary formats from the endpoint; however it does not set requirements for doing so.

- Solving the lying endpoint problem: The EPCP does not address the lying endpoint problem; the Profile makes no assertions that it can catch an endpoint that is, either maliciously or accidentally, reporting false posture information to the posture manager. However, other solutions may be able to use the posture information collected using the capabilities described in this profile to catch an endpoint in a lie. For example, a sensor may be able to compare the posture information it has collected on an endpoint’s activity on the network to what the endpoint reported to the server and flag discrepancies. However, these capabilities are not described in this profile.
Appendix C. Endpoint Posture Collection Profile Examples

The following subsections provide examples of the EPCP as implemented using components from the NEA architecture.

C.1. Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint

```
+---------------+        +---------------+
|               |        |               |
| +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
| | SWID      | |        | | SWID      | |
| | Posture   | |        | | Posture   | |
| | Collector | |        | | Validator | |
| +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
|      |        |        |      |        |
|      | IF-IMC |        |      | IF-IMV |
|      |        |        |      |        |
| +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
| | PB Client | |        | | PB Server | |
| +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
|               |        |               |
+---------------+        +---------------+
```

Figure 4: Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint

C.1.1. Change on Endpoint Triggers Posture Assessment

A new application is installed on the endpoint, and the SWID directory is updated. This triggers an update from the SWID posture collector to the SWID posture validator. The message is sent down the NEA stack, encapsulated by NEA protocols until it is sent by the posture transport client to the posture transport server. The posture transport server then forwards it up through the stack, where the layers of encapsulation are removed until the SWID Message arrives at the SWID posture validator.
The SWID posture validator stores the new tag information in the repository. If the tag indicates that the endpoint is compliant to the policy, then the process is complete until the next time an update is needed (either because policy states that the endpoint must submit posture assessment results periodically or because an install/uninstall/update on the endpoint triggers a posture assessment).
If the endpoint has fallen out of compliance with a policy, the posture manager can alert the administrator via the posture manager’s administrative interface. The administrator can then take steps to address the problem. If the administrator has already established a policy for automatically addressing this problem, that policy will be followed.
C.2. Administrator Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

An announcement is made that a particular version of a piece of software has a vulnerability. The administrator uses the administrative interface on the server to search the repository for endpoints that reported the SWID tag for the vulnerable software.
Figure 8: Admin Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

The repository returns a list of entries in the matching the administrator’s search. The administrator can then address the vulnerable endpoints by taking some follow-up action such as removing it from the network, quarantining it, or updating the vulnerable software.

Appendix D. Change Log

D.1. -04 to -05

Updated the diagram so the Evaluator and Repository are "current work".

Clarified how the Posture Collection Engine can push data, respond to queries, and establish secure transport connectivity for fulfilling subscriptions.

Expanded on the future work around leveraging NETCONF, RESTCONF, and YANG Push for network devices.

Haynes, et al. Expires December 23, 2019
Documented the need to reassess MAC addresses as a device identifier.

Made various typographical and editorial changes.

D.2. -03 to -04

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Refactored the document to better focus it on the communications between endpoints and the posture manager and the best practices for EPCP implementations.

Made other editorial changes and improved consistency throughout the document.

D.3. -02 to -03

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Added a reference to TCG ECP 1.0.

Removed text in the "SWID Posture Validator" section that states it performs evaluation. This was removed because it contradicts the posture manager not performing any evaluations.

Expanded the "Provisioning" section of the "EPCP Transactions" section to include examples of endpoint identifiers and the need to provision endpoints with components and data models.

Combined text for the capabilities of the Administrative Interface and API.

Removed superfluous and introductory text from the "Security Considerations" section.

Renamed section "Vulnerability Searches" to Vulnerability Management".

Changed I-D category to BCP.

Changed references to the NETMOD architecture to the NETCONF architecture because NETCONF represents the management protocol whereas NETMOD is focused on the definition of data models.

Addressed various editorial suggestions.
D.4. -01 to -02

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Added a section for the collection of posture information from network devices using standards from the NETMOD WG.

Updated EPCP component diagrams so they were not specific to a NEA-based implementation.

Updated EPCP NEA example diagrams to reflect all the components in the NEA architecture.

D.5. -00 to -01

There are no textual changes associated with this revision. This revision simply reflects a resubmission of the document so that it remains in active status.

D.6. -01 to -02

Added references to the Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC I-D.

Replaced references to PC-TNC with IF-IMC.

Removed erroneous hyphens from a couple of section titles.

Made a few minor editorial changes.

D.7. -02 to -00

Draft adopted by IETF SACM WG.

D.8. -00 to -01

Significant edits to up-level the draft to describe SACM collection over multiple different protocols.

Replaced references to SANS with CIS.

Made other minor editorial changes.

Authors’ Addresses
Definition of the ROLIE Software Descriptor Extension
draft-ietf-sacm-rolie-softwaredescriptor-08

Abstract

This document uses the "information-type" extension point as defined in the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) [RFC8322] Section 7.1.2 to better support Software Record and Software Inventory use cases. This specification registers a new ROLIE information-type, "software-descriptor", that allows for the categorization of information relevant to software description activities and formats. In particular, the usage of the ISO 19770-2:2015 Software Identification Tag (SWID Tag) and the Concise SWID (COSWID) formats in ROLIE are standardized. Additionally, this document discusses requirements and usage of other ROLIE elements in order to best syndicate software description information.

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1. Introduction

This document defines an extension to the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) [RFC8322] to support the publication of software descriptor information. Software descriptor information is information that characterizes static software components, packages, and installers; including identification, version, software creation and publication, and file artifact information.

Software descriptor information provides data about what might be installed, but doesn’t describe a specific software installation’s
configuration or execution. This static approach to software
description is a tightly limited scope that still covers the majority
of current use cases for software inventory and record keeping.

Some possible use cases for software descriptor information ROLIE
Feeds (Section 6.1 of [RFC8322]) include:

- Software providers can publish software descriptor information so
  that software researchers, enterprises, and users of software can
  understand the collection of software produced by that software
  provider.

- Organizations can aggregate and syndicate collections of software
descriptor information provided by multiple software providers to
  support software-related analysis processes (e.g., vulnerability
  analysis) and to provide downstream services (e.g., software
  configuration checklist repositories).

- End user organizations can consume software descriptor information
  along with related software vulnerability and configuration
  information to provide the data needed to automate software asset,
  patch, and configuration management practices.

- Organizations can use software descriptors to support verification
  of other entities through integrity measurement mechanisms.

This document supports these use cases by describing the content
requirements for Feeds and Entries of software descriptor information
that are to be published to or retrieved from a ROLIE repository.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT,"
"SHOULD," "SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

As an extension of [RFC8322], this document refers to many terms
defined in that document. In particular, the use of "Entry" and
"Feed" are aligned with the definitions presented in RFC8322.

Several places in this document refer to the "information-type" of a
Resource (Entry or Feed). This refers to the "term" attribute of an
"atom:category" element whose scheme is
"urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:information-type". For an Entry,
this value can be inherited from it’s containing Feed as per
[RFC8322].
3. Background

In order to effectively protect and secure an endpoint, it is vital to know what the software load of that endpoint is. Software load, the combination of software, patches and installers on a device, represents a significant portion of the endpoint's attack surface. Unfortunately, without a reliable and secure package manager, or a secured and managed operating system with strict software whitelisting, tracking what software is installed on an endpoint is currently not feasible without undue effort. Even attempting to whitelist software is difficult without a way of identifying software and its editions, versions and hotfixes.

Software descriptor information, such as that standardized in the ISO 19770-2:2015 Software Identification Tag (SWID) format or expressed in proprietary enterprise databases, attempts to provide as much data about this software as possible.

Once this information is expressed, it needs to be stored and shared to internal and external parties. ROLIE provides a mechanism to handle this sharing in an automation-friendly way.

4. The "software-descriptor" information type

When an "atom:category" element has a "scheme" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:information-type", the "term" attribute defines the information type of the associated resource. A new valid value for this "term": "software-descriptor", is described in this section and registered in Section 8.1. When this value is used, the resource in question is considered to have an information-type of "software-descriptor" as per [RFC8322] Section 7.1.2.

The "software-descriptor" information type represents any static information that describes a piece of software. This document uses the definition of software provided by [RFC4949]. Note that as per this definition, this information type pertains to static software, that is, code on the disc. The "software-descriptor" information type is intended to provide a category for information that does one or more of the following:

- identifies and characterizes software: information that provides quantitative and qualitative data describing software. This information identifies and characterizes a given instance of software.

- provides software installer metadata: information about software used to install other software. This metadata identifies, and characterizes a software installation package or media.
describes stateless installation metadata: information that
describes the software post-deployment, such as files that may be
deployed during an installation. It is expected that this
metadata is produced generally for a given installation, and may
not exactly match the actual installed files on a given endpoint.

Provided below is a non-exhaustive list of information that may be
considered to be of a software-descriptor information type.

- Naming information: IDs and names that aid in the identification
  of a piece of software
- Version and patching information: Version numbers, patch
  identifiers, or other information that relates to software updates
  and patches.
- Vendor and source information: Includes where the software was
developed or distributed, as well as where the software
  installation media may be located.
- Payload and file information: information that describes or
  enumerates the files and folders that make up the piece of
  software, and information about those files.
- Descriptive information and data: Any information that otherwise
  characterizes a piece of software, such as libraries, runtime
  environments, target operating systems, intended purpose or
  audience, etc.

It is important to note that software descriptor information is
static for a given piece of software. That is, the information
expressed is the data that doesn’t change from the publication of the
software to its final install. Information about the current status
(e.g. install location, memory usage, CPU usage, launch parameters,
job progress, etc.), is out of scope of this information type.

5. rolie:property Extensions

This document registers new valid rolie:property names as follows:

5.1. urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:sname

This property provides an exposure point for the plain text name of
the software being described. Naming of software is not a well
standardized process, and software names can change between product
versions or editions. As such, care should be taken that this value
is set as consistently as possible by generating it directly from an
attached software descriptor resource.
5.2. urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swversion

This property provides an exposure point for the version of the software being described. This value should be generated or taken from the software descriptor linked to by the entry. This helps avoid, but does not prevent, inconsistent versioning schemes being shared.

5.3. urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swcreator

This property provides an exposure point for a plain text name of the creator of the software being described. This is in many cases an organization or company, but certainly could be a single person. Most software descriptor formats include this information, and where possible, this property should be set equal to that value.

6. Data format requirements

This section defines usage guidance and additional requirements related to data formats above and beyond those specified in [RFC8322]. The following formats are expected to be commonly used to express software descriptor information. For this reason, this document specifies additional requirements to ensure interoperability.

6.1. The ISO SWID 2015 format

6.1.1. Description

ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 defines a software record data format referred to as a "SWID Tag". It provides several tag types:

- primary: provides descriptive and naming information about software,
- patch: describes non-standalone software meant to patch existing software,
- corpus: describes the software installation media that installs a given piece of software,
- supplemental: provides additional metadata to be deployed alongside a tag.

For a more complete overview as well as normative requirements, refer to ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID].
For additional requirements and guidance around creation of SWID Tags, consult NIST Internal Report 8060 [NISTIR8060].

6.1.2. Requirements

For an Entry to be considered as a "SWID Tag Entry", it MUST fulfill the following conditions:

- The information-type of the Entry is "software-descriptor". For a typical Entry, this is derived from the information type of the Feed it is contained in. For a standalone Entry, this is provided by an "atom:category" element.

- The document linked to by the "href" attribute of the "atom:content" element is a 2015 SWID Tag per ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015.

A "SWID Tag Entry" MUST conform to the following requirements:

- The value of the "type" attribute of the "atom:content" element MUST be "application/xml".

- There MUST be one "rolie:property" with the "name" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:content-id" and the "value" attribute exactly equal to the "<tagid>" element in the attached SWID Tag. This allows ROLIE consumers to more easily search for SWID tags without needing to download the tag itself.

- There MUST be one "rolie:property" with the "name" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swname", and the "value" attribute equal to the value of the "<name>" element in the attached SWID Tag. As above, this helps ROLIE consumers search and filter Entries.

- There MAY be a property element with the "name" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swversion". When this property appears, its value MUST be equal to the value of the "version" element in the attached SWID Tag.

6.2. The Concise SWID format

6.2.1. Description

The Concise SWID (COSWID) format is an alternative representation of the SWID Tag format using a Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) encoding. CBOR provides the format with a reduced size that is more suitable for constrained devices. COSWID provides the same features and attributes as are specified in ISO 19770-2:2015, plus:
o a straightforward method to sign and encrypt using COSE, and

o additional attributes that provide an improved structure to include file hashes intended to be used as Reference Integrity Measurements (RIM).

For more information and the complete specification, refer to the COSWID internet draft [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid].

6.2.2. Requirements

For an Entry to be considered as a "COSWID Tag Entry", it MUST fulfill the following conditions:

o The information-type of the Entry is "software-descriptor". For a typical Entry, this is derived from the information-type of the Feed it is contained in. For a standalone Entry, this is provided by an "atom:category" element.

o The document linked to by the "href" attribute of the "atom:content" element is a COSWID Tag per [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]

A "COSWID Tag Entry" MUST conform to the following requirements:

o The value of the "type" attribute of the atom:content element MUST be "application/swid+cbor".

o There MUST be one "rolie:property" with the "name" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:content-id" and the "value" attribute exactly equal to the decoded "tag-id" element in the attached COSWID Tag (mapped to the integer 0). This allows ROLIE consumers to more easily search for COSWID tags without needing to download the tag itself.

o There MUST be one "rolie:property" with the "name" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swname", and the "value" attribute equal to the decoded value of the "swid-name" element in the attached COSWID Tag (mapped to the integer 1). As above, this helps ROLIE consumers search and filter Entries.

o There MAY be a property element with the "name" attribute equal to "urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swversion". When this property appears, it's value MUST be equal to the decoded value of the tag-version element in the attached COSWID Tag (mapped to the integer 12).
7. atom:link Extensions

This section defines additional link relationships that implementations MUST support. These relationships are not registered in the Link Relation IANA table as their use case is too narrow. Each relationship is named and described.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ancestor</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines an ancestor of the software being described by this Entry. This is usually a previous version of the software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>descendent</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines an descendent of the software being described by this Entry. This is usually a more recent version or edition of the software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patches</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines the software being patched by this software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patchedby</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines the patch or update itself that can be or has been applied to this software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requires</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines a piece of software required for this software to function properly, i.e., a dependency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requiredBy</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines a piece of software that requires this software to function properly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>installs</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines the software that is installed by this software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>installedBy</td>
<td>Links to a software descriptor resource that defines the software package that installs this software.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. IANA Considerations

8.1. software-descriptor information-type

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE Security Resource Information Type Sub-Registry" registry located at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/category/information-type>.

The entry is as follows:

name: software-descriptor
index: TBD
reference: This document, Section 4

8.2. swd:swname property

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE URN Parameters" registry located in <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/>.

The entry is as follows:

name: property:swd:swname
Reference: This document, Section 5.1
Subregistry: None
8.3. swd:swversion property

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE URN Parameters" registry located in <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/>.

The entry is as follows:

name: property:swd:swversion


Reference: This document, Section 5.1

Subregistry: None

8.4. swd:swcreator property

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE URN Parameters" registry located in <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/>.

The entry is as follows:

name: property:swd:swcreator


Reference: This document, Section 5.1

Subregistry: None

9. Security Considerations

Use of this extension implies dealing with the security implications of both ROLIE and of software descriptors in general. As with any data, care should be taken to verify the trustworthiness and veracity of the descriptor information to the fullest extent possible.

Ideally, software descriptors should be signed by the software manufacturer, or signed by whichever agent processed the source code. Software descriptor documents from these sources are more likely to be accurate than those generated by scraping installed software.

These "authoritative" sources of software descriptor content should consider additional security for their ROLIE repository beyond the typical recommendations, as the central importance of the repository is likely to make it a target.
Version information is often represented differently across manufacturers and even across product releases. If using software version information for low fault tolerance comparisons and searches, care should be taken that the correct version scheme is being used.

10. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]
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Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", draft-

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Waltermire, D., Cheikes, B., Feldman, L., and G. Witte,
"Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags", NISTIR 8060, April 2016,
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

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[RFC8322] Field, J., Banghart, S., and D. Waltermire, "Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE)",
RFC 8322, DOI 10.17487/RFC8322, February 2018,


Appendix A. Schema

This document does not require any schema extensions.
Appendix B. Examples of Use

Use of this extension in a ROLIE repository will not typically change that repository’s operation. As such, the general examples provided by the ROLIE core document would serve as examples. Provided below is a sample software descriptor ROLIE entry:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
  xmlns:rolie="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rolie-1.0">
  <id>dd786dba-88e6-440b-9158-b8fae67ef67c</id>
  <title>Sample Software Descriptor</title>
  <published>2015-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published>
  <updated>2015-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated>
  <summary>A descriptor for a piece of software published by this organization. </summary>
  <link rel="self" href="http://www.example.org/rolie/SWD/123456"/>
  <link rel="feed" href="http://www.example.org/rolie/SWD/">
  <link rel="requires" href="http://www.example.org/rolie/SWD/78430"/>
  <rolie:property name="urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:swd:swname" value="Example Software Name"/>
  <category
    scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:information-type"
    term="software-descriptor"/>
  <rolie:format
    ns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"/>
  <content type="application/xml"
    src="http://www.example.org/rolie/SWD/123456/data"/>
</entry>
```

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Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Terminology
draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-16

Abstract

This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring).

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we’re trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use.

2. Terms and Definitions

This section describes terms that have been defined by other RFC’s and defines new ones. The predefined terms will reference the RFC and where appropriate will be annotated with the specific context by which the term is used in SACM. Note that explanatory or informational augmentation to definitions are segregated from the definitions themselves. The definition for the term immediately follows the term on the same line, whereas expositional text is contained in subsequent paragraphs immediately following the definition.

Assertion: Defined by the ITU in [X.1252] as "a statement made by an entity without accompanying evidence of its validity".

In the context of SACM, an assertion is the output of a SACM Component in the form of a SACM Statement (including metadata about the data source and data origin, e.g. timestamps). While the validity of an assertion about Content and Content Metadata cannot be verified without, for example, Integrity Proofing of the
Data Source, an assertion (and therefore a SACM statement, respectively) of the validity of Statement Metadata can be enabled by including corresponding Integrity Evidence created by the Data Origin.

Assessment: Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall) such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture against compliance policy."

Attribute: Is a data element, as defined in [RFC5209], that is atomic.

In the context of SACM, attributes are "atomic" information elements and an equivalent to attribute-value-pairs. Attributes can be components of Subjects, the basic composite definitions that are defined in the SACM Information Model.

Capability: A set of features that are available from a SACM Component.

See also "capability" in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology].

In the context of SACM, the extent of a SACM component’s ability is enabled by the functions it is composed of. Capabilities are registered at a SACM broker (potentially also at a proxy or a repository component if it includes broker functions) by a SACM component via the SACM component registration task and can be discovered by or negotiated with other SACM components via the corresponding tasks. For example, the capability of a SACM provider may be to provide target endpoint records (declarative guidance about well-known or potential target endpoints), or only a subset of that data.

A capability’s description is in itself imperative guidance on what functions are exposed to other SACM components in a SACM domain and how to use them in workflows.

The SACM Vulnerability Assessment Scenario [I-D.ietf-sacm-vuln-scenario] defines the terms Endpoint Management Capabilities, Vulnerability Management Capabilities, and Vulnerability Assessment Capabilities, which illustrate specific sets of SACM capabilities on an enterprise IT department’s point of view and therefore compose sets of declarative guidance.
Collection Result: Is a composition of one or more content elements carrying information about a target endpoint, that is produced by a collector when conducting a collection task.

Collection Task: A targeted task that collects attributes and/or corresponding attribute values from target endpoint.

There are four types of frequency collection tasks can be conducted with:

- ad-hoc, e.g. triggered by a unsolicited query
- conditional, e.g. triggered in accordance with policies included in the compositions of workflows
- scheduled, e.g. in regular intervals, such as every minute or weekly
- continuously, e.g. a network behavior observation

There are three types of collection methods, each requiring an appropriate set of functions to be included in the SACM component conducting the collection task:

Self-Reporting: A SACM component located on the target endpoint itself conducts the collection task.

Remote-Acquisition: A SACM component located on an Endpoint different from the target endpoint conducts the collection task via interfaces available on the target endpoint, e.g. SNMP/NETCONF or WMI.

Behavior-Observation: A SACM component located on an Endpoint different from the target endpoint observes network traffic related to the target endpoint and conducts the collection task via interpretation of that network traffic.

Collector: A piece of software that acquires information about one or more target endpoints by conducting collection tasks.

A collector can be distributed across multiple endpoints, e.g. across a target endpoint and a SACM component. The separate parts of the collector can communicate with a specialized protocol, such as PA-TNC [RFC5792]. At least one part of a distributed collector has to take on the role of a provider of information by providing SACM interfaces to propagate capabilities and to provide SACM content in the form of collection results.
Configuration: A non-volatile subset of the endpoint attributes of an endpoint that is intended to be unaffected by a normal reboot-cycle.

Configuration is a type of imperative guidance that is stored in files (files dedicated to contain configuration and/or files that are software components), directly on block devices, or on specific hardware components that can be accessed via corresponding software components. Modification of configuration can be conducted manually or automatically via management (plane) interfaces that support management protocols, such as SNMP or WMI. A change of configuration can occur during both run-time and down-time of an endpoint. It is common practice to schedule a change of configuration during or directly after the completion of a boot-cycle via corresponding software components located on the target endpoint itself.

Examples: The static association of an IP address and a MAC address in a DHCP server configuration, a directory-path that identifies a log-file directory, a registry entry.

Configuration Drift: The disposition of endpoint characteristics to change over time.

Configuration drift exists for both hardware components and software components. Typically, the frequency and scale of configuration drift of software components is significantly higher than the configuration drift of hardware components.

Consumer: A SACM Role that requires a SACM Component to include SACM Functions enabling it to receive information from other SACM Components.

Content Element: Content elements constitute the payload data (SACM content) transferred via statement Subjects emitted by providers of information. Every content element Subject includes a specific content Subject and a corresponding content metadata Subject.

Content Metadata: Data about content Subjects. Every content-element includes a content metadata Subject. The Subject can include any information element that can annotate the content transferred. Examples include time stamps or data provenance Subjects.

Control Plane: An architectural component that provides common control functions to all SACM components.
Typically used as a term in the context of routing, e.g. [RFC6192]. SACM components may include authentication, authorization, (capability) discovery or negotiation, registration and subscription. The control plane orchestrates the flow on the data plane according to imperative guidance (i.e. configuration) received via the management plane. SACM components with interfaces to the control plane have knowledge of the capabilities of other SACM components within a SACM domain.

Controller: A controller is a SACM Role that is assigned to a SACM component containing control plane functions managing and facilitating information sharing or execute on security functions.

There are three types of SACM controllers: Broker, Proxy, and Repository. Depending on its type, a controller can also contain functions that have interfaces on the data plane.

Data Confidentiality: Defined in [RFC4949] as "the property that data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been authorized to know the data."

Data In Motion: Data that is being transported via a network; also referred to as "Data in Transit" or "Data in Flight".

Data in motion requires a data model to transfer the data using a specific encoding. Typically, data in motion is serialized (marshalling) into a transport encoding by a provider of information and deserialized (unmarshalling) by a consumer of information. The termination points of provider of information and consumer of information data is transferred between are interfaces. In regard to data in motion, the interpretation of the roles consumer of information and provider of information depends on the corresponding OSI layer (e.g. on layer2: between interfaces connected to a broadcast domain, on layer4: between interfaces that maintain a TCP connection). In the context of SACM, consumer of information and provider of information are SACM components.

Data At Rest: Data that is stored.

Data at rest requires a data model to encode the data to be stored. In the context of SACM, data at rest located on a SACM component can be provided to other SACM components via discoverable capabilities.

Data Integrity: Defined in [RFC4949] as "the property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner."
Data Origin: The SACM Component that initially acquired or produced
data about an endpoint.

Data Origin enables a SACM component to identify the SACM
component that initially acquired or produced data about a
(target) endpoint (e.g. via collection from a data source) and
made it available to a SACM domain via a SACM statement. Data
Origin can be expressed by an endpoint label information element
(e.g. to be used as metadata in statement).

Data Plane: Is an architectural component providing operational
functions enabling information exchange that is not command and
control or management related.

Typically used as a term in the context of routing (and used as a
synonym for forwarding plane, e.g. [RFC6192]). In the context of
SACM, the data plane is an architectural component providing
operational functions to enable a SACM component to provide and
consume SACM statements and therefore SACM content, which composes
the actual SACM content. The data plane in a SACM domain is used
to conduct distributed SACM tasks by transporting SACM content via
specific transport encodings and corresponding operations defined
by SACM data models.

Data Provenance: An historical record of the sources, origins and
evolution, as it pertains to data, that is influenced by inputs,
entities, functions and processes.

Additional Information - In the context of SACM, data provenance
is expressed as metadata that identifies SACM statements and
corresponding content elements a new statement is created from.
In a downstream process, this references can cascade, creating a
data provenance tree that enables SACM components to trace back
the original data sources involved in the creation of SACM
statements and take into account their characteristics and
trustworthiness.

Data Source: Is an endpoint from which a particular set of
attributes and/or attribute values have been collected.

Data Source enables a SACM component to identify – and potentially
characterize – a (target) endpoint that is claimed to be the
original source of endpoint attributes in a SACM statement. Data
Source can be expressed as metadata by an endpoint label
information element or a corresponding subject of identifying
endpoint attributes.
Endpoint: Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be connected to a network."

Additional Information - The [RFC5209] definition continues, "Such devices normally are associated with a particular link layer address before joining the network and potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes: laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may have an IP address."

To further clarify the [RFC5209] definition, an endpoint is any physical or virtual device that may have a network address. Note that, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be endpoints within this document.

Physical endpoints are always composites that are composed of hardware components and software components. Virtual endpoints are composed entirely of software components and rely on software components that provide functions equivalent to hardware components.

The SACM architecture differentiates two essential categories of endpoints: Endpoints whose security posture is intended to be assessed (target endpoints) and endpoints that are specifically excluded from endpoint posture assessment (excluded endpoints).

Based on the definition of an asset, an endpoint is a type of asset.

Endpoint Attribute: Is a discreet endpoint characteristic that is computably observable.

Endpoint Attributes typically constitute Attributes that can be bundled into Subject (e.g. information about a specific network interface can be represented via a set of multiple AVP).

Endpoint Characteristics: The state, configuration and composition of the software components and (virtual) hardware components a target endpoint is composed of, including observable behavior, e.g. sys-calls, log-files, or PDU emission on a network.

In SACM work-flows, (Target) Endpoint Characteristics are represented via Information Elements.

Endpoint Characterization Task: The task of endpoint characterization that uses endpoint attributes that represent distinct endpoint characteristics.
Endpoint Classification: The categorization of the endpoint into one or more taxonomic structures.

Endpoint classification requires declarative guidance in the form of an endpoint profile, discovery results and potentially collection results. Types, classes or the characteristics of an individual target endpoint are defined via endpoint profiles.

Endpoint Classification Task: The task of endpoint classification that uses an endpoint’s characteristics to determine how to categorize the given endpoint into one or more taxonomic structures.

Endpoint Label: A unique label associated with a unique endpoint.

Endpoint specializations have corresponding endpoint label specializations. For example, an endpoint label used on a SACM Component is a SACM Component Label.

Endpoint Management Capabilities: Enterprise IT management capabilities that are tailored to manage endpoint identity, endpoint information, and associated metadata.

Evaluation Task: A task by which an endpoint’s asserted attribute value is evaluated against a policy-compliant attribute value.

Evaluation Result: The resulting value from having evaluated a set of posture attributes.

Expected Endpoint Attribute State: The policy-compliant state of an endpoint attribute that is to be compared against.

Sets of expected endpoint attribute states are transported as declarative guidance in target endpoint profiles via the management plane. This, for example, can be a policy, but also a recorded past state. An expected state is represented by an Attribute or a Subject that represents a set of multiple attribute value pairs.

Guidance: Machine-processable input directing SACM processes or tasks.

Examples of such processes/tasks include automated device management, remediation, collection, evaluation. Guidance influences the behavior of a SACM Component and is considered content of the management plane. In the context of SACM, guidance is machine-readable and can be manually or automatically generated.
or provided. Typically, the tasks that provide guidance to SACM components have a low-frequency and tend to be sporadic.

There are two types of guidance:

Declarative Guidance: Guidance that defines the configuration or state an endpoint is supposed to be in, without providing specific actions or methods to produce that desired state. Examples include Target Endpoint Profiles or network topology based requirements.

Imperative Guidance: Guidance that prescribes specific actions to be conducted or methods to be used in order to achieve an outcome. Examples include a targeted Collection Task or the IP-Address of a SACM Component that provides a registration function.

Prominent examples include: modification of the configuration of a SACM component or updating a target endpoint profile that resides on an evaluator. In essence, guidance is transported via the management plane.

Endpoint Hardware Inventory: The set of hardware components that compose a specific endpoint representing its hardware configuration.

Hardware Component: A distinguishable physical component used to compose an endpoint.

The composition of an endpoint can be changed over time by adding or removing hardware components. In essence, every physical endpoint is potentially a composite of multiple hardware components, typically resulting in a hierarchical composition of hardware components. The composition of hardware components is based on interconnects provided by specific hardware types (e.g. FRU in a chassis are connected via redundant busses). In general, a hardware component can be distinguished by its serial number. Occasionally, hardware components are referred to as power sucking aliens.

Information Element: A representation of information about physical and virtual "objects of interest".

Information elements are the building blocks that constitute the SACM information model. In the context of SACM, an information element that expresses a single value with a specific name is referred to as an Attribute (analogous to an attribute-value-pair). A set of attributes that is bundled into a more complex composite information element is referred to as a Subject. Every
information element in the SACM information model has a unique
name. Endpoint attributes or time stamps, for example, are
represented as information elements in the SACM information model.

Information Model: An abstract representation of data, their
properties, relationships between data and the operations that can
be performed on the data.

While there is some overlap with a data model, [RFC3444]
distinguishes an information model as being protocol and
implementation neutral whereas a data model would provide such
details. The purpose of the SACM information model is to ensure
interoperability between SACM data models (that are used as
transport encoding) and to provide a standardized set of
information elements for communication between SACM components.

Interaction Model: The definition of specific sequences regarding
the exchange of messages (data in motion), including, for example,
conditional branching, thresholds and timers.

An interaction model, for example, can be used to define
operations, such as registration or discovery, on the control
plane. A composition of data models for data in motion and a
corresponding interaction model is a protocol.

Internal Collector: A collector that runs on a target endpoint to
acquire information from that target endpoint.

Management Plane: An architectural component providing common
functions to steer the behavior of SACM components, e.g. their
behavior on the control plane.

Typically, a SACM component can fulfill its purpose without
continuous input from the management plane. In contrast, without
continuous availability of control plane functions a typical SACM
component could not function properly. In general, interaction on
the management plane is less frequent and less regular than on the
control plane. Input via the management plane can be manual (e.g.
via a CLI), or can be automated via management plane functions
that are part of other SACM components.

Network Address: A layer-specific address that follows a layer-
specific address scheme.

The following characteristics are a summary derived from the
Common Information Model and ITU-T X.213. Each Network Interface
of a specific layer can be associated with one or more addresses
appropriate for that layer. There is no guarantee that a network
address is globally unique. A dedicated authority entity can provide a level of assurance that a network address is unique in its given scope. In essence, there is always a scope to a network address, in which it is intended to be unique.

Examples include: physical Ethernet port with a MAC address, layer 2 VLAN interface with a MAC address, layer 3 interface with multiple IPv6 addresses, layer 3 tunnel ingress or egress with an IPv4 address.

Network Interface: An Endpoint is connected to a network via one or more Network Interfaces. Network Interfaces can be physical (Hardware Component) or logical (virtual Hardware component, i.e. a dedicated Software Component). Network Interfaces of an Endpoint can operate on different layers, most prominently what is now commonly called layer 2 and 3. Within a layer, interfaces can be nested.

In SACM, the association of Endpoints and Network Addresses via Network Interfaces is vital to maintain interdependent autonomous processes that can be targeted at Target Endpoints, unambiguously.

Examples include: physical Ethernet port, layer 2 VLAN interface, a MC-LAG setup, layer 3 Point-to-Point tunnel ingress or egress.

Metadata: Data about data.

In the SACM information model, data is referred to as Content. Metadata about the content is referred to as Content-Metadata, respectively. Content and Content-Metadata are combined into Subjects called Content-Elements in the SACM information model. Some information elements defined by the SACM information model can be part of the Content or the Content-Metadata. Therefore, if an information element is considered data or data about data depends on which kind of Subject it is associated with. The SACM information model also defines metadata about the data origin via the Subject Statement-Metadata. Typical examples of metadata are time stamps, data origin or data source.

Posture: Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization’s security policy."

This term is used within the scope of SACM to represent the configuration and state information that is collected from a target endpoint in the form of endpoint attributes (e.g. software/hardware inventory, configuration settings, dynamically assigned
addresses). This information may constitute one or more posture attributes.

Posture Attributes: Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. A Posture Attribute represents a single property of an observed state. For example, a Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating system installed on the system."

Within this document this term represents a specific assertion about endpoint configuration or state (e.g. configuration setting, installed software, hardware) represented via endpoint attributes. The phrase "features of the endpoint" highlighted above refers to installed software or software components.

Provider: A provider is a SACM role assigned to a SACM component that provides role-specific functions to provide information to other SACM components.

Repository: A repository is a controller that contains functions to consume, store and provide information of a particular kind.

Such information is typically data transported on the data plane, but potentially also data and metadata from the control and management plane. A single repository may provide the functions of more than one specific repository type (i.e. configuration baseline repository, assessment results repository, etc.)

SACM Broker Controller: A SACM Broker Controller is a controller that contains control plane functions to provide and/or connect services on behalf of other SACM components via interfaces on the control plane.

A broker may provide, for example, authorization services and find, upon request, SACM components providing requested services.

SACM Component: Is a component, as defined in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology], that is composed of SACM capabilities.

In the context of SACM, a set of SACM functions composes a SACM component. A SACM component conducts SACM tasks, acting on control plane, data plane and/or management plane via corresponding SACM interfaces. SACM defines a set of standard components (e.g. a collector, a broker, or a data store). A SACM component contains at least a basic set of control plane functions and can contain data plane and management plane functions. A SACM component residing on an endpoint assigns one or more SACM roles.
to the corresponding endpoint due to the SACM functions it is composed of. A SACM component "resides on" an endpoint and an endpoint "contains" a SACM component, correspondingly. For example, a SACM component that is composed solely of functions that provide information would only take on the role of a provider.

SACM Component Discovery: The task of discovering the capabilities provided by SACM components within a SACM domain.

This is likely to be performed via an appropriate set of control plane functions.

SACM Component Label: A specific endpoint label that is used to identify a SACM component.

In content-metadata, this label is called data origin.

SACM Content: The payload provided by SACM components to the SACM domain on the data plane.

SACM content includes the SACM data models.

SACM Domain: Endpoints that include a SACM component compose a SACM domain.

(To be revised, additional definition content TBD, possible dependencies to SACM architecture)

SACM Function: A behavioral aspect of a SACM component that provides external SACM Interfaces or internal interfaces to other SACM Functions.

For example, a SACM Function with SACM Interfaces on the Control Plane can provide a brokering function to other SACM Components. Via Data Plane interfaces, a SACM Function can act as a provider and/or as a consumer of information. SACM Functions can be propagated as the Capabilities of a SACM Component and can be discovered by or negotiated with other SACM Components.

SACM Interface: An interface, as defined in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology], that provides SACM-specific operations.

[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] defines interface as a "set of operations one object knows it can invoke on, and expose to, another object," and further defines interface by stating that an interface "decouples the implementation of the operation from its
specification. An interface is a subset of all operations that a
given object implements. The same object may have multiple types
of interfaces to serve different purposes."

In the context of SACM, SACM Functions provide SACM Interfaces on
the management, control, or data plane. Operations a SACM
Interface provides are based on corresponding data model defined
by SACM. SACM Interfaces are used for communication between SACM
components.

SACM Proxy Controller: A SACM Proxy Controller is a controller that
provides data plane and control plane functions, information, or
services on behalf of another component, which is not directly
participating in the SACM architecture.

SACM Role: Is a role, as defined in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology],
that requires the SACM Component assuming the role to bear a set
of SACM functions or interfaces.

SACM Roles provide three important benefits. First, it enables
different behavior to be supported by the same Component for
different contexts. Second, it enables the behavior of a
Component to be adjusted dynamically (i.e., at runtime, in
response) to changes in context, by using one or more Roles to
define the behavior desired for each context. Third, it decouples
the Roles of a Component from the Applications that use that
Component."

In the context of SACM, SACM roles are associated with SACM
components and are defined by the set of functions and interfaces
a SACM component includes. There are three SACM roles: provider,
consumer, and controller. The roles associated with a SACM
component are determined by the purpose of the SACM functions and
corresponding SACM interfaces the SACM component is composed of.

SACM Statement: Is an assertion that is made by a SACM Component.

Security Automation: The process of which security alerts can be
automated through the use of different components to monitor,
analyze and assess endpoints and network traffic for the purposes
of detecting misconfigurations, misbehaviors or threats.

Security Automation is intended to identify target endpoints that
cannot be trusted (see "trusted" in [RFC4949]). This goal is
achieved by creating and processing evidence (assessment
statements) that a target endpoint is not a trusted system
[RFC4949].
Software Package: A generic software package (e.g. a text editor).

Software Component: A software package installed on an endpoint.

The software component may include a unique serial number (e.g. a text editor associated with a unique license key).

Software Instance: A running instance of a software component.

For example, on a multi-user system, one logged-in user has one instance of a text editor running and another logged-in user has another instance of the same text editor running, or on a single-user system, a user could have multiple independent instances of the same text editor running.

State: A volatile set of endpoint attributes of a (target) endpoint that is affected by a reboot-cycle.

Local state is created by the interaction of components with other components via the control plane, via processing data plane payload, or via the functional properties of local hardware and software components. Dynamic configuration (e.g. IP address distributed dynamically via an address distribution and management services, such as DHCP) is considered state that is the result of the interaction with another component (e.g. provided by a DHCP server with a specific configuration).

Examples: The static association of an IP address and a MAC address in a DHCP server configuration, a directory-path that identifies a log-file directory, a registry entry.

Statement: A statement is the root/top-level subject defined in the SACM information model.

A statement is used to bundle Content Elements into one subject and includes metadata about the data origin.

Subject: A semantic composite information element pertaining to a system entity that is a target endpoint.

Like Attributes, subjects have a name and are composed of attributes and/or other subjects. Every IE that is part of a subject can have a quantity associated with it (e.g. zero-one, none-unbounded). The content IE of a subject can be an unordered or an ordered list.

In contrast to the definitions of subject provided by [RFC4949], a subject in the scope of SACM is neither "a system entity that
causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state" nor "a name of a system entity that is bound to the data items in a digital certificate".

In the context of SACM, a subject is a semantic composite of information elements about a system entity that is a target endpoint. Every acquirable subject—as defined in the scope of SACM—about a target endpoint represents and therefore identifies every subject—as defined by [RFC4949]—that is a component of that target endpoint. The semantic difference between both definitions can be subtle in practice and is in consequence important to highlight.

Supplicant: A component seeking to be authenticated via the control plane for the purpose of participating in a SACM domain.

System Resource: Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system; or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); or a facility that houses system operations and equipment."

Target Endpoint: Is an endpoint that is under assessment at some point in, or region of, time.

Every endpoint that is not specifically designated as an excluded endpoint is a target endpoint. A target endpoint is not part of a SACM domain unless it contains a SACM component (e.g. a SACM component that publishes collection results coming from an internal collector).

A target endpoint is similar to a device that is a Target of Evaluation (TOE) as defined in Common Criteria and as referenced by {{RFC4949}}.

Target Endpoint Address: An address that is layer specific and which follows layer specific address schemes.

Each interface of a specific layer can be associated with one or more addresses appropriate for that layer. There is no guarantee that an address is globally unique. In general, there is a scope to an address in which it is intended to be unique.

Examples include: physical Ethernet port with a MAC address, layer 2 VLAN interface with a MAC address, layer 3 interface with multiple IPv6 addresses, layer 3 tunnel ingress or egress with an IPv4 address.
Target Endpoint Characterization: The description of the distinctive nature of a target endpoint, that is based on its characteristics.

Target Endpoint Characterization Record: A set of endpoint attributes about a target endpoint that was encountered in a SACM domain, which are associated with that target endpoint as a result of a Target Endpoint Characterization Task.

A characterization record is intended to be a representation of an endpoint. It cannot be assured that a record distinctly represents a single target endpoint unless a set of one or more endpoint attributes that compose a unique set of identifying endpoint attributes are included in the record. Otherwise, the set of identifying attributes included in a record can match more than one target endpoints, which are - in consequence - indistinguishable to a SACM domain until more qualifying endpoint attributes can be acquired and added to the record. A characterization record is maintained over time in order to assert that acquired endpoint attributes are either about an endpoint that was encountered before or an endpoint that has not been encountered before in a SACM domain. A characterization record can include, for example, acquired configuration, state or observed behavior of a specific target endpoint. Multiple and even conflicting instances of this information can be included in a characterization record by using timestamps and/or data origins to differentiate them. The endpoint attributes included in a characterization record can be used to re-identify a distinct target endpoint over time. Classes or profiles can be associated with a characterization record via the Classification Task in order to guide collection, evaluation or remediation tasks.

Target Endpoint Characterization Task: An ongoing task of continuously adding acquired endpoint attributes to a corresponding record. The TE characterization task manages the representation of encountered target endpoints in the SACM domain in the form of characterization records. For example, the output of a target endpoint discovery task or a collection task can be processed by the characterization task and added to the record. The TE characterization Task also manages these representations of target endpoints encountered in the SACM domain by splitting or merging the corresponding records as new or more refined endpoint attributes become available.

Target Endpoint Classification Task: The task of associating a class from an extensible list of classes with an endpoint characterization record. TE classes function as imperative and declarative guidance for collection, evaluation, remediation and security posture assessment in general.
Target Endpoint Discovery Task: The ongoing task of detecting previously unknown interaction of a potential target endpoint in the SACM domain. TE Discovery is not directly targeted at a specific target endpoint and therefore an un-targeted task. SACM Components conducting the discovery task as a part of their function are typically distributed and located, for example, on infrastructure components or collect from those remotely via appropriate interfaces. Examples of infrastructure components that are of interest to the discovery task include routers, switches, VM hosting or VM managing components, AAA servers, or servers handling dynamic address distribution.

Target Endpoint Identifier: The target endpoint discovery task and the collection tasks can result in a set of identifying endpoint attributes added to a corresponding Characterization Record. This subset of the endpoint attributes included in the record is used as a target endpoint identifier, by which a specific target endpoint can be referenced. Depending on the available identifying attributes, this reference can be ambiguous and is a "best-effort" mechanism. Every distinct set of identifying endpoint attributes can be associated with a target endpoint label that is unique in a SACM domain.

Target Endpoint Label: An endpoint label that identifies a specific target endpoint.

Target Endpoint Profile: A bundle of expected or desired component composition, configurations and states that is associated with a target endpoint.

The corresponding task by which the association with a target endpoint takes places is the endpoint classification task. The task by which an endpoint profile is created is the endpoint characterization task. A type or class of target endpoints can be defined via a target endpoint profile. Examples include: printers, smartphones, or an office PC.

In respect to [RFC4949], a target endpoint profile is a protection profile as defined by Common Criteria (analogous to the target endpoint being the target of evaluation).

SACM Task: Is a task conducted within the scope of a SACM domain by one or more SACM functions that achieves a SACM-defined outcome.

A SACM task can be triggered by other operations or functions (e.g. a query from another SACM component or an unsolicited push on the data plane due to an ongoing subscription). A task is part of a SACM process chain. A task starts at a given point in time.
and ends in a deterministic state. With the exception of a
collection task, a SACM task consumes SACM statements provided by
other SACM components. The output of a task is a result that can
be provided (e.g. published) on the data plane.

The following tasks are defined by SACM:

Target Endpoint Discovery
Target Endpoint Characterization
Target Endpoint Classification
Collection
Evaluation [TBD]
Information Sharing [TBD]
SACM Component Discovery
SACM Component Authentication [TBD]
SACM Component Authorization [TBD]
SACM Component Registration [TBD]

Timestamps: Defined in [RFC4949] as "with respect to a data object,
a label or marking in which is recorded the time (time of day or
other instant of elapsed time) at which the label or marking was
affixed to the data object".

A timestamp always requires context, i.e. additional information
elements that are associated with it. Therefore, all timestamps
wrt information elements are always metadata. Timestamps in SACM
Content Elements may be generated outside a SACM Domain and may be
encoded in an unknown representation. Inside a SACM domain the
representation of timestamps is well-defined and unambiguous.

Virtual Endpoint: An endpoint composed entirely of logical system
components (see [RFC4949]).

The most common example is a virtual machine/host running on a
target endpoint. Effectively, target endpoints can be nested and
at the time of this writing the most common example of target
endpoint characteristics about virtual components is the
EntLogicalEntry in [RFC6933].
Vulnerability Assessment: An assessment specifically tailored to determining whether a set of endpoints is vulnerable according to the information contained in the vulnerability description information.

Vulnerability Description Information: Information pertaining to the existence of a flaw or flaws in software, hardware, and/or firmware, which could potentially have an adverse impact on enterprise IT functionality and/or security.

Vulnerability description information should contain enough information to support vulnerability detection.

Vulnerability Detection Data: A type of imperative guidance extracted or derived from vulnerability description information that describes the specific mechanisms of vulnerability detection that is used by an enterprise’s vulnerability management capabilities to determine if a vulnerability is present on an endpoint.

Vulnerability Management Capabilities: An IT management capability tailored toward managing endpoint vulnerabilities and associated metadata on an ongoing basis by ingesting vulnerability description information and vulnerability detection data, and performing vulnerability assessments.

Vulnerability assessment capabilities: An assessment capability that is tailored toward determining whether a set of endpoints is vulnerable according to vulnerability description information.

Workflow: A workflow is a modular composition of tasks that can contain loops, conditionals, multiple starting points and multiple endpoints.

The most prominent workflow in SACM is the assessment workflow.

3. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

4. Security Considerations

This memo documents terminology for security automation. While it is about security, it does not affect security.
5. Acknowledgements

6. Change Log

Changes from version 00 to version 01:

- Added simple list of terms extracted from UC draft -05. It is expected that comments will be received on this list of terms as to whether they should be kept in this document. Those that are kept will be appropriately defined or cited.

Changes from version 01 to version 02:

- Added Vulnerability, Vulnerability Management, xposure, Misconfiguration, and Software flaw.

Changes from version 02 to version 03:

- Removed Section 2.1. Cleaned up some editing nits; broke terms into 2 sections (predefined and newly defined terms). Added some of the relevant terms per the proposed list discussed in the IETF 89 meeting.

Changes from version 03 to version 04:

- TODO

Changes from version 04 to version 05:

- TODO

Changes from version 05 to version 06:

- Updated author information.

- Combined "Pre-defined Terms" with "New Terms and Definitions".

- Removed "Requirements language".

- Removed unused reference to use case draft; resulted in removal of normative references.

- Removed introductory text from Section 1 indicating that this document is intended to be temporary.

- Added placeholders for missing change log entries.

Changes from version 06 to version 07:
Added Contributors section.

Updated author list.

Changed title from "Terminology for Security Assessment" to "Secure Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Terminology".

Changed abbrev from "SACM-Terms" to "SACM Terminology".

Added appendix The Attic to stash terms for future updates.

Added Authentication, Authorization, Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Data Origin, Data Provenance, SACM Component, SACM Component Discovery, Target Endpoint Discovery.

Major updates to Building Block, Function, SACM Role, Target Endpoint.

Minor updates to Broker, Capability, Collection Task, Evaluation Task, Posture.

Relabeled Role to SACM Role, Endpoint Target to Target Endpoint, Endpoint Discovery to Endpoint Identification.

Moved Asset Targeting, Client, Endpoint Identification to The Attic.

Endpoint Attributes added as a TODO.

Changed the structure of the Change Log.

Changes from version 07 to version 08:

Added Assertion, Collection Result, Collector, Excluded Endpoint, Internal Collector, Network Address, Network Interface, SACM Domain, Statement, Target Endpoint Identifier, Target Endpoint Label, Timestamp.

Major updates to Attributes, Broker, Collection Task, Consumer, Controller, Control Plane, Endpoint Attributes, Expected Endpoint State, SACM Function, Provider, Proxy, Repository, SACM Role, Target Endpoint.

Minor updates to Asset, Building Block, Data Origin, Data Source, Data Provenance, Endpoint, Management Plane, Posture, Posture Attribute, SACM Component, SACM Component Discovery, Target Endpoint Discovery.
Changes from version 08 to version 09:

- Updated author list.
- Removed Building Block.
- Major updates to Control Plane, Endpoint Attribute, Expected Endpoint State, Information Model, Management Plane.
- Minor updates to Attribute, Capabilities, SACM Function, SACM Component, Collection Task.
- Moved Asset Characterization to The Attic.

Changes from version 09 to version 10:

- Added Configuration Drift, Data in Motion, Data at Rest, Endpoint Management Capability, Hardware Component, Hardware Inventory, Hardware Type, SACM Interface, Target Endpoint Characterization Record, Target Endpoint Characterization Task, Target Endpoint Classification Task, Target Endpoint Discovery Task, Vulnerability Description Information, Vulnerability Detection Data, Vulnerability Management Capability, Vulnerability Assessment.
- Added references to i2nsf definitions in Capability, SACM Component, SACM Interface, SACM Role.
- Added i2nsf Terminology I-D Reference.
- Major Updates to Endpoint, SACM Task, Target Endpoint Identifier.
- Minor Updates to Guidance, SACM Component Discovery, Target Endpoint Label, Target Endpoint Profile.
- Relabeled SACM Task
- Removed Target Endpoint Discovery

Changes from version 10 to version 11:
o Added Content Element, Content Metadata, Endpoint Label, Information Element, Metadata, SACM Component Label, Workflow.

o Major Updates to Assessment, Capability, Collector, Endpoint Management Capabilities, Guidance, Vulnerability Assessment Capabilities, Vulnerability Detection Data, Vulnerability Assessment Capabilities.

o Minor updates to Collection Result, Control Plane, Data in Motion, Data at Rest, Data Origin, Network Interface, Statement, Target Endpoint Label.

o Relabeled Endpoint Management Capability, Vulnerability Management Capability, Vulnerability Assessment.

Changes from version 11 to version 12:

o Added Configuration, Endpoint Characteristic, Event, SACM Content, State, Subject.

o Major Updates to Assertion, Data in Motion, Data Provenance, Data Source, Interaction Model.

o Minor Updates to Attribute, Control Plane, Data Origin, Data Provenance, Expected Endpoint State, Guidance, Target Endpoint Classification Task, Vulnerability Detection Data.

Changes from version 12 to version 13:

o Added Virtual Component.

o Major Updates to Capability, Collection Task, Hardware Component, Hardware Type, Security Automation, Subject, Target Endpoint, Target Endpoint Profile.

o Minor Updates to Assertion, Data Plane, Endpoint Characteristics.

Changes from version 13 to version 14:

o Handled a plethora of issues listed in GitHub.

o Pruned some commonly understood terms.

o Narrowing term labels per their definitions.

o In some cases, excised expositional text.
Where expositional text was left intact, it has been separated from the actual definition of a term.

Changes from version 14 to version 16:

- moved obsolete definitions into the Appendix (attic).

7. Contributors
8. References
8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. The Attic

The following terms are stashed for now and will be updated later:

**Asset:** Is a system resource, as defined in [RFC4949], that may be composed of other assets.

Examples of Assets include: Endpoints, Software, Guidance, or X.509 public key certificates. An asset is not necessarily owned by an organization.

**Asset Management:** The IT process by which assets are provisioned, updated, maintained and deprecated.

**Asset Characterization:** Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that describe properties of an identified asset.

**Asset Targeting:** Asset targeting is the use of asset identification and categorization information to drive human-directed, automated decision making for data collection and analysis in support of endpoint posture assessment.

**Client:** An architectural component receiving services from another architectural component.

**Endpoint Identification (TBD per list; was "Endpoint Discovery"):** The process by which an endpoint can be identified.

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draft-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline-04

Abstract

This document provides security baseline for network device management plane, which is represented by YANG data model. The corresponding configuration values and status values of the YANG data model can be transported between Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) components and used for network device security posture assessment.

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1. Introduction

Besides user devices and servers, network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls are crucial to enterprise network security. The security baseline defined in this document refers to a minimal set of security controls that are essential to provide network security. Organizations can define additional security controls based on the security baseline. Then the security posture of network
devices can be assessed by comparing the configuration values and status values with the required security controls.

Network devices typically perform three planes of operation: management plane, control plane and data plane. All the planes should be protected and monitored. This document focuses on security baseline for management plane. Management plane provides configuration and monitoring services to network administrators or device owners. Unauthorized access, insecure access channels, weak cryptographic algorithms are common security issues that break management plane security. A number of security best practices have been proposed to deal with these security issues, such as disabling unused services and ports, discarding insecure access channels, and enforcing strong user authentication and authorization. In this document, we provide a minimal set of security controls that are effective on network devices and the current status of the network devices will be compared with the reference values defined by an organization or a third party.

YANG data model is used to describe the security baseline defined in this document. [I-D.birkholz-sacm-yang-content] defines a method to construct the YANG data model scheme for network device security posture assessment by brokering YANG push telemetry through SACM statements. In this document, we follow the same way to define the YANG output for network device security posture based on the [I-D.ietf-sacm-information-model].

Besides management plane, the security baselines for control plane, data plane, and infrastructure layer of network infrastructure devices are described in [I-D.dong-sacm-nid-cp-security-baseline], [I-D.xia-sacm-nid-dp-security-baseline] and [I-D.dong-sacm-nid-infra-security-baseline] respectively.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

This document uses the terms defined in [RFC7950] and [RFC8342].
4. Tree Diagrams

Tree diagram defined in [RFC8340] is used to represent the YANG data model of network device management plane security. The meaning of the symbols used in the tree diagram and the syntax are as follows:

- A module is identified by "module:" followed the module-name. The top-level data nodes defined in the module, offset by 2 spaces. Submodules are represented in the same fashion as modules, but are identified by "submodule:" followed the (sub)module-name.

- Groupings, offset by 2 spaces, and identified by the keyword "grouping" followed by the name of the grouping and a colon (":") character.

- Each node in the tree is prefaces with "+-". Schema nodes that are children of another node are offset from the parent by 3 spaces.

- Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.

- Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write) and "ro" means state data (read-only), and "-u" indicates the use of a predefined grouping.

- Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional leaf, choice, anydata, or anyxml, "!" means a presence container, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list".

- Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").

- At times when the composition of the nodes within a module schema is not important in the context of the presented tree, sibling nodes and their children can be collapsed using the notation "..." in place of the text lines used to represent the summarized nodes.

- Curly brackets and a question mark "{(..)??}" are combined to represent the features that node depends on.

5. Data Model Structure

The security baseline defined in this document consists of security configuration and runtime security status for administration, system management, port management, log, files.

- Administration security
A multitude of YANG modules for network devices and network protocols have been defined in IETF. Several RFCs and drafts model some parts of management plane security. But an overall data model of management plane security is still missing. New modules, groupings, and nodes are defined in this document as supplements. And the existing YANG modules are reused. Appendix A provides a summary of existing YANG modules and the relationship to the security baseline defined in this document.

5.1. Administration Security

5.1.1. Administrative Account Security

In order to provide administrative accounts, security controls on account properties and passwords should be applied. The commonly applied security controls include limiting the length of account name, checking the password complied to the complexity policy, forbidding the use of some strings in password, blocking accounts after several login fails, etc. The following data model illustrates these kinds of security controls.
5.1.2. Administrator Access Security

Network devices typically can be managed through command line interface (CLI) or web user interface. Insecure access channels (e.g., Telnet), can expose the devices to threats and attacks. Therefore, SSH-based access channels and HTTPS-based web channels should be used. Besides, the right version of the protocols should be chosen. For example, SSHv1 is considered not secure, SSHv2 is recommended. And draft [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate] will formally deprecates Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves these documents to the historic state.
module: ietf-admin-access-security
  --rw ietf-admin-access-security
    --rw console
      --rw auth-mode?     auth-mode-type
      --rw privilege-level?  uint8
    --rw vty*
      --rw vty-number     uint8
      --rw auth-mode      auth-mode-type
      --rw privilege-level  uint8
      --rw acl-name-list*  string
      --rw ip-block-enable  boolean
      --rw ip-block-limit {ip-block-config}?
        --rw failed-times?  uint64
        --rw period?        uint64
        --rw reactive-time? uint64
    --rw ssh
      --rw ssh-enable?   boolean
      --u ssh-server-attribute-grouping
      --u ssh-security-harden-grouping
      --rw ip-block-enable  boolean
      --rw ip-block-limit {ip-block-config}?
        --rw failed-times?  uint64
        --rw period?        uint64
        --rw reactive-time? uint64
    --rw web  {web-interface}?
      --rw privilege-level?  uint8
      --rw http-server-interface?  string
      --rw https-ipv4-enable?  boolean
      --rw https-ipv6-enable?  boolean
      --rw https-source-port?  inet:port-number
      --rw https-timeout?  uint32
      --rw acl-name-list*?  string
      --rw ip-block-enable  boolean
      --rw ip-block-limit {ip-block-config}?
        --rw failed-times?  uint64
        --rw period?        uint64
        --rw reactive-time? uint64
      --u tls-server-attribute-grouping

[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] defines "ssh-server-grouping" for configuring SSH server and does not consider the underlying transport parameters. And it reuses the groupings defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]. Because this document focuses on the security configurations that are actively in use when the network device acts as a SSH server, the "ssh-server-attribute-grouping" defined here tailors the "private-key" node and the "certificate-
expiration" notification of "ssh-server-grouping". The tree diagram of grouping "ssh-server-attribute-grouping":

```plaintext
grouping ssh-server-attribute-grouping:
  +--rw server-identity
    | +--rw host-key* [name]
    +--rw name string
    +--rw (host-key-type)
      +-- :(public-key)
      |  +--rw (local-or-keystore)
      |     +-- :(local)
      |     | +--u ks:public-key-grouping
      |     | +-- :(keystore) (ks:keystore-implemented)?
      |     |     +--rw ref? ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref
      |     |     +-- :(certificate) {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?  
      |     +--rw (local-or-keystore)
      |     | +-- :(local)
      |     | | +--u ks:public-key-grouping
      |     | | +--u ks:trust-anchor-cert-grouping
      |     | | +-- :(keystore) (ks:keystore-implemented)?
      |     | |     +--rw ref? ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref
      |     +--rw client-cert-auth {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?  
      | | +--rw pinned-ca-certs? ta:pinned-certificates-ref
      | +--rw pinned-client-certs? ta:pinned-certificates-ref
      +--rw transport-params {ssh-server-transport-params-config}?
        +--u sshcmn:transport-params-grouping
```

Besides the security configurations defined "ssh-server-attribute-grouping", there are several other features related the secure use and configuration of SSH, such as which SSH version is used, whether the network device support to be compatible with earlier SSH versions, whether the port number has been changed, etc. The "ssh-security-harden-grouping" includes these kind of security configurations and state. The tree diagram of grouping "ssh-security-harden-grouping":

```plaintext
grouping ssh-security-harden-grouping:
  +--ro ssh-version uint32
  +--rw ssh-server-port? inet:port-number
  +--rw ssh-rekey-interval? uint32
  +--rw ssh-timeout? uint32
  +--rw ssh-retry-times? uint32
  +--rw ssh1x-compatible? boolean
  +--rw ssh-server-interface? string
```

[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] defines "tls-server-grouping" for configuring TLS server and does not consider the underlying transport parameters. And it reuses the groupings defined in
Because this document focuses on the security configurations that are actively in use when the network device acts as a web server and build connections through HTTPS, the "tls-server-attribute-grouping" defined here tailors the "private-key" node and the "certificate-expiration" notification of "tls-server-grouping". The tree diagram of grouping "tls-server-attribute-grouping":

```
grouping tls-server-attribute-security-grouping:  
  +--rw server-identity  
    |  +--rw (local-or-keystore)  
    |     +--:(local)  
    |     |  +--u ks:public-key-grouping  
    |     |     +--u ks:trust-anchor-cert-grouping  
    |     +--:(keystore) {ks:keystore-implemented)?  
    |        +--rw ref?   ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref  
    +--rw client-auth  
     |  +--rw pinned-ca-certs?       ta:pinned-certificates-ref  
     |  +--rw pinned-client-certs?   ta:pinned-certificates-ref  
     +--rw hello-params {tls-server-hello-params-config)?  
       +--rw tls-versions  
       |  +--rw tls-version* identityref  
       +--rw cipher-suites  
       +--rw cipher-suite* identityref
```

5.1.3. AAA

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) provides user management for network devices. RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) and TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access Control System) are the commonly used AAA mechanisms. In order to implement AAA, network devices act as AAA clients to communicate with AAA servers. [RFC7317] defined YANG module for client to configure the RADIUS authentication server information. In this document, authentication, authorization and accounting schemes, as well as AAA server lists are all included.
module: ietf-aaa-security
   +--rw ietf-aaa-security
      |   |   +--rw authentication-scheme* [authen-scheme-name]
      |   |      |   +--rw authen-scheme-name   string
      |   |      |   +--rw authen-mode*         aaa-authen-mode
      |   |      |   +--rw authen-type?        radius-authen-type
      |   |      |   +--rw authen-fail-policy?  boolean
      |   |   +--rw authorization-scheme* [author-scheme-name]
      |   |      |   +--rw author-scheme-name   string
      |   |      |   +--rw author-mode*         aaa-author-mode
      |   |      |   +--rw cmd-author-mode*     aaa-cmd-author-mode
      |   |   +--rw accounting-scheme* [account-scheme-name]
      |   |      |   +--rw account-scheme-name  string
      |   |      |   +--rw account-mode?        aaa-account-name
      |   +--rw radius-security
      |      |   +--rw radius-authen-servers* [address]
      |      |      |   |   +--rw address         inet:host
      |      |      |   |   +--rw port?           inet:port-number
      |      |      |   +--rw radius-author-servers*? [address]
      |      |      |      |   +--rw address         inet:host
      |      |      |      |   +--rw port?           inet:port-number
      |      |      |   +--rw radius-account-servers* [address]
      |      |      |      |   +--rw address         inet:host
      |      |      |      |   +--rw port?           inet:port-number
      |      +--rw tacacs-security {tacacs-supported}?
      |         |   +--rw tacacs-authen-servers* [address]
      |         |      |   |   +--rw address         inet:host
      |         |      |   |   +--rw port?           inet:port-number
      |         |      |   +--rw tacacs-author-servers*? [address]
      |         |      |      |   +--rw address         inet:host
      |         |      |      |   +--rw port?           inet:port-number
      |         |      |   +--rw tacacs-account-servers* [address]
      |         |      |      |   +--rw address         inet:host
      |         |      |      |   +--rw port?           inet:port-number

5.1.4. Administrator Access Statistics

The statistics of the current online administrators, the failed login attempts and the blocked addresses are useful for the monitoring of network infrastructure devices.
module: ietf-admin-access-statistics
  +--ro ietf-admin-access-statistics
  +--ro online
    +--ro total-online-users uint32
    +--ro online-admin-list {display-online-info}?
      +--ro online-users* [account-name]
        +--ro account-name string
        +--ro ip-address inet:ip-address-no-zone
        +--ro mac-address yang:mac-address
    +--ro ip-block-list
      +--ro blocked-ip* [ip-address]
        +--ro ip-address inet:ip-address-no-zone
        +--ro vpn-instance string
        +--ro state ip-block-state-type
        +--ro authen-fail-account uint32

5.2. System Management Security

5.2.1. SNMP Management Security

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a network management standard to monitor network devices. Three SNMP versions are available: SNMPv1, SNMPv2c, and SNMPv3. [RFC7407] defines community-based security model for SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, view-based access control model and user-based security model, transport security model for SNMPv3. SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c are lack of authentication and message encryption, which could facilitate unauthorized access to network devices. SNMPv3 needs to be used to authenticate and encrypt payloads. The "ietf-snmp-security" module defined in this section reuses the definitions in [RFC7407], but some modifications and eliminations are made. As this module only focuses on security controls and status of SNMP, the detailed transport information such as IP address and port are not included, while the transport protocol used is under consideration. And the subtree for key configuration is also not needed for user-based security model, but the authentication protocol or encryption protocol used is included.

module: ietf-snmp-security
  +--rw ietf-snmp-security
    +--rw snmp-enable? boolean
    +--rw engine
      +--rw enabled? boolean
    +--rw listen* [name]
      +--rw name snmp:identifier
      +--rw transport snmp-transport-type
      +--rw version snmp-version-type
    +--rw enable-authen-traps? boolean
    +--rw target* [name]
The tree diagram of grouping "user-auth-priv":

grouping user-auth-priv:
  +--rw user* [name]
    +--rw name            snmp:identifier
    +--rw auth-protocol   auth-pro-type
    +--rw priv-protocol   priv-pro-type
5.2.2.  NETCONF Management Security

The NETCONF server model defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] supports both the SSH and TLS transport protocols. The "ietf-netconf-security" module defined in this section only reused the security related subtrees and replaces the SSH and TLS related groupings with those defined in "ietf-admin-access-security" module.

module: ietf-netconf-security
  +++-rw ietf-netconf-security
      +++-rw netconf-enable? boolean
      +++-rw listen {ncs:listen}?  
          +++-rw endpoint* [name]
              +++-rw name string
              +++-rw (transport)
                  +++:(ssh) {ssh-listen}?
                      +++-rw port inet:port-number
                      +++-u accsec:ssh-server-attribute-grouping
                  +++:(tls) {tls-listen}?
                      +++-rw port inet:port-number
                      +++-u accsec:tls-server-attribute-grouping
          +++-rw call-home {call-home}?
              +++-rw netconf-client* [name]
                  +++-rw name string
                  +++-rw endpoints
                      +++-rw endpoint* [name]
                          +++-rw name string
                          +++-rw (transport)
                              +++:(ssh) {ssh-call-home}?
                                  +++-rw port inet:port-number
                                  +++-u accsec:ssh-server-attribute-grouping
                              +++:(tls) {tls-call-home}?
                                  +++-rw port inet:port-number
                                  +++-u accsec:tls-server-attribute-grouping

5.3.  Port Management Security

As it is suggested to disable unused service and ports, the current status (open or shut-down) of the ports that are available on the network devices can be retrieved and compared with the communication matrix to check the device security posture.

module: ietf-port-management-security
  +++-rw ietf-port-management-security
      +++-rw port-list* [port-number]
          +++-rw port-number inet:port-number
          +++-rw port-status boolean
5.4. Log Security

To monitor the running status and diagnose faults or attacks on network devices, the activities of network administrators, the operations conducted on devices, and the security notification of abnormal events need to be recorded. Besides, policy should be defined to deal with log overflow. Log records can be outputted to console, or stored locally, or outputted to remote Syslog server. The following defined "ietf-log-security" module reuses the security configuration of log remote transfer in [I-D.ietf-netmod-syslog-model], and adds access control for locally stored log files.

module: ietf-log-security
    +--rw ietf-log-security
        +--rw alert-notification
            |   +--rw login-fail-threshold         uint8
            |   +--rw system-abnormal              boolean
            |   +--rw attack                       boolean
            |   +--rw log-overflow-lost            boolean
        +--rw (log-overflow-action)
            |   +--:(rewrite-when-overflow)        boolean
            |       +--ro rewrite-numbers           uint16
            |   +--:(discard-new-logs)             boolean
            |       +--ro discard-numbers           uint16
        +--rw (log-mode)
            |   +--:(file) {file-action}?          
            |       +--rw user-level-for-read       uint8
            |       +--rw user-level-for-delete     uint8
            |   +--:(remote) {remote-action}?       [I-D.ietf-netmod-syslog-model]
            |       +--rw destination* [name]
            |           +--rw name                   string
            |       +--rw (transport)
            |           ...
            |       +--rw signing! {signed-messages}? ...

5.5. File Security

Patches, packages, configuration files, password files are critical system files for network infrastructure devices. Only administrators with certain security privilege levels are allowed to access or operate on these files. For file transfer security, secure protocol should be used.
module: ietf-file-security
   +--rw ietf-file-security
   |   +--rw role-based-access-control   boolean
   |   +--rw transport-protocol          file-pro-type
   |   +--rw (transport)
   |   |   +--:(sftp) (sftp)?
   |   |   |   +--rw sftp-enable              boolean
   |   |   |   +--rw sftp-server-port         inet:port-number
   |   |   |   +---u accsec:ssh-server-attribute-grouping
   |   |   |   +---u accsec:ssh-security-harden-grouping
   |   |   +--:(scp) (scp)?
   |   |   |   +--rw scp-enable               boolean
   |   |   |   +--rw scp-server-port          inet:port-number
   |   |   |   +---u accsec:ssh-server-attribute-grouping
   |   |   |   +---u accsec:ssh-security-harden-grouping
   |   |   +--:(ftps) (ftps)?
   |   |   |   +--rw ftps-enable              boolean
   |   |   |   +--rw ftps-server-port         inet:port-number
   |   |   |   +---u accsec:tls-server-attribute-grouping
   |   |   +--rw ip-block-enable                boolean
   |   +--rw ip-block-limit {ip-block-config}?
   |   |   +--rw failed-times                uint64
   |   +--rw period                      uint64
   +--rw reactive-time               uint64


6.1. Module 'ietf-admin-account-security'

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-admin-account-security@2018-10-16.yang"
module ietf-admin-account-security {  
  yang-version 1.1;  
  prefix acsec;  
  organization  "IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";  
  contact  "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sacm/  
  WG List: sacm@ietf.org  
  Editor: Qiushi Lin  
  linqiushi@huawei.com;  
  Editor: Liang Xia  
  frank.xialiang@huawei.com  
  Editor: Henk Birkholz  
  henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de";  

This YANG module defines ietf-admin-account-security YANG module, which contains configurations that are actively in use for account security control, password security control and administrative account block.

revision 2018-10-16 {
    description "Initial version."
    reference
        "draft-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline-04: The Data Model of Network Infrastructure Device Management Plane Security Baseline"
}

feature account-security {
    description
        "If the network device supports this feature, then several security controls on administrative accounts can be conducted."
}

feature pwd-security {
    description
        "If the network device supports this feature, then several security controls on password can be conducted."
}

feature login-failed-block {
    description
        "If the network device supports this feature, an administrative account will be blocked for a certain time range when this account login failed several times in a certain period."
}

container account-security-policy {
    if-feature account-security;
    leaf policy-status {
        type boolean;
        description
            "The status of account security policy: enabled, or disabled."
    }
    leaf account-aging-period {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The aging period of an administrative account."
    }
    leaf account-name-minlen {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The minimum length of an administrative account name."
    }
}
description

"If the network device supports some security controls on administrative accounts, the configuration that is actively in use will be collected.";
}

container pwd-security-policy {
  if-feature pwd-security;
  leaf expire-days {
    type uint64;
    description
    "The password validity period.";
  }
  leaf prompt-days {
    type uint64;
    description
    "The period for warning before the password expires.";
  }
  leaf change-check {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Whether it is mandatory to change the password when logging in for the first time: enabled, or disabled.";
  }
  leaf complexity-check {
    type boolean;
    description
    "The status of password complexity check: enabled, or disabled.";
  }
  leaf history-pwd-num {
    type uint64;
    config false;
    description
    "The newly configured password should not be the same as the several past passwords.";
  }
  leaf pwd-minlen {
    type uint64;
    description
    "The minimum length of a password.";
  }
  container forbidden-word-rules {
    list forbidden-word-rule {
      key "forbidden-word";
      leaf forbidden-word {
        type string;
        description
        "A forbidden word in password.";
      }
      description
      "A list of forbidden words that are not allowed to be used in password.
    }
  }
}
description
    "Password blacklist.";
}  

description
    "If the network device supports some security controls on administrative passwords, the configuration that is actively in use will be collected.";

container login-failed-limit {
    if-feature login-failed-block;
    leaf failed-times {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The failed time in a certain period.";
    }
    leaf period {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The certain period in which the failed times are counted.";
    }
    leaf reactive-time {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The reactive time after which the account is not blocked.";
    }
    description
        "If the network device support this feature, an account will be blocked for a certain time range when it failed to login for several times in a certain period.";
}

6.2. Module 'ietf-admin-access-security'

module ietf-admin-access-security {
    yang-version 1.1;
    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-admin-access-security";
    prefix accsec;

    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix inet;
        reference
            "RFC 6991 - Common YANG Data Types.";
    }

    import ietf-ssh-common {
        prefix sshcmn;
        reference
            "draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server - YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers";
    }
}

import ietf-tls-common {
  prefix tlscmn;
  reference
    "draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server - YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and SSH Servers";
}

import ietf-keystore {
  prefix ks;
  reference
    "draft-ietf-netconf-keystore - YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism";
}

import ietf-trust-anchors {
  prefix ta;
  reference
    "draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors - YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
}

organization
  "IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";

contact
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  "Editor: Qiushi Lin      linqiushi@huawei.com"
  "Editor: Liang Xia      frank.xialiang@huawei.com"
  "Editor: Henk Birkholz  henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de";

description
  "This YANG module defines ietf-admin-access-security YANG module, which contains security configurations that are actively in use for different access channels."

revision 2018-10-16 {
  description "Initial version.";
  reference
}

*/
* features
*/

feature web-interface {
  description
    "If the network device supports web interface for administration, then administrative account can access this device through web interface."
}
feature ip-block-config {
    description
        "If the network device supports the configuration of ip block function, then it can be configured to block the access from a list of IP addresses.";
}

feature ssh-server-transport-params-config {
    description
        "SSH transport layer parameters are configurable on an SSH server.";
}

feature tls-server-hello-params-config {
    description
        "TLS hello message parameters are configurable on a TLS server.";
}

/*
 * typedefs
 */

typedef auth-mode-type {
    type enumeration {
        enum "none" {
            description
                "Authentication mode: none.";
        }
        enum "password" {
            description
                "Authentication mode: password.";
        }
        enum "aaa" {
            description
                "Authentication mode: aaa.";
        }
    }
    description
        "The Authentication mode of console and vty interface.";
}

/*
 * groupings
 */
grouping ssh-server-attribute-grouping {
    container server-identity {
        list host-key {
            key "name";
            leaf name {
                type string;
                description
                    "The name of the host-key.";
            }
        }
    }
}
choice host-key-type {
  mandatory true;
  case public-key {
    choice local-or-keystore {
      case local {
        uses ks:public-key-grouping;
        description
          "The public key and the corresponding algorithm.";
      }
      case keystore {
        if-feature ks:keystore-implemented;
        leaf ref {
          type ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref;
          description
            "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
        }
        description
          "The reference of the key pair that stored in the keystore.";
      }
      description
        "The key pair is locally stored or can be referenced from the keystore.";
    }
    description
      "The host key type is asymmetric key pair.";
  }
  case certificate {
    if-feature sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs;
    choice local-or-keystore {
      case local {
        uses ks:public-key-grouping;
        uses ks:trust-anchor-cert-grouping;
        description
          "The certificate and the corresponding public key are stored locally.";
      }
      case keystore {
        if-feature ks:keystore-implemented;
        leaf ref {
          type ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref;
          description
            "The certificate is referenced by a value that exists in the keystore.";
        }
        description
          "The reference of the certificate that stored in the keystore.";
      }
      description
        "The certificate is stored locally or can be referenced from the keystore.";
    }
    description
      "The host key type is certificate.";
  }
}
description  
"The host key type is certificate.";
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}
leaf ssh-server-port {
  type inet:port-number;
  description
    "The port number of SSH server.";
}
leaf ssh-rekey-interval {
  type uint32;
  description
    "The interval for updating the key pair of the SSH server.";
}
leaf ssh-timeout {
  type uint32;
  description
    "The authentication timeout period of SSH.";
}
leaf ssh-retry-times {
  type uint32;
  description
    "The authentication retry times.";
}
leaf ssh1x-compatible {
  type boolean;
  description
    "The status of version-compatible function on the SSH server: enabled, disabled.";
}
leaf ssh-server-interface {
  type string;
  description
    "The source interface of SSH server.";
}

grouping tls-server-attribute-grouping {
  container server-identity {
    choice local-or-keystore {
      case local {
        uses ks:public-key-grouping;
        uses ks:trust-anchor-cert-grouping;
        description
          "The certificate and the corresponding public key are stored locally.";
      }
      case keystore {
        if-feature ks:keystore-implemented;
        leaf ref {
          type ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref;
        }
      }
    }
  }
  description
    "A set of SSH configuration status to enhance security.";
}
description
  "The reference of the certificate that stored in the keystore.";
}
description
  "The certificate is stored locally or can be referenced from the key store.";
}
description
  "A locally-defined or referenced end-entity certificate, including any configured intermediate certificates, the TLS server will present when establishing a TLS connection in its Certificate message, as defined in Section 7.4.2 in RFC5246.";
)
)
container client-auth {
  leaf pinned-ca-certs {
    type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
    description
      "A reference to a list of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by the TLS server to authenticate TLS client certificates.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
  }
  leaf pinned-client-certs {
    type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
    description
      "A reference to a list of client certificates used by the TLS server to authenticate TLS client certificates.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
  }
}
description
  "A reference to a list of pinned certificate authority (CA) certificates and a reference to a list of pinned client certificates.";
)
container hello-params {
  if-feature tls-server-hello-params-config;
  uses tlscmn:hello-params-grouping;
  description
    "Configurable parameters for the TLS hello message.";
}
description
  "A reusable grouping of configurations that are actively in use for network devices which act as TLS servers.";
)
/*
* containers
*/
container console {
  leaf auth-mode {
    type auth-mode-type;
    description

"The authentication mode used when administrative accounts login through console interface: none, password, AAA.;

leaf privilege-level {
  type uint8;
  description
    "User privilege level.";
}
description
  "Security configurations that are actively in use for console interface.";
}

container vtys {
  list vty {
    key "vty-number";
    leaf vty-number {
      type uint8;
      description
        "The number of the vty interface.";
    }
    leaf auth-mode {
      type auth-mode-type;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "The authentication mode used when administrator login through vty interface: none, password, AAA.";
    }
    leaf privilege-level {
      type uint8;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "User privilege level.";
    }
    leaf-list acl-name-list {
      type string;
      description
        "The name of the acl.";
    }
    leaf ip-block-enable {
      type boolean;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "The status of ip block function: enabled, or disabled.";
    }
    container ip-block-limit {
      if-feature ip-block-config;
      leaf failed-times {
        type uint64;
        description
          "The failed times in a certain period.";
      }
    }

leaf peroid {
    type uint64;
    description
    "The certain period in which the failed times are counted.";
}
leaf reactive-time {
    type uint64;
    description
    "The reactive time after which the address is not blocked.";
}
description
"If the login from an address failed several times in a certain period, this address will be blocked for a certain time range.";
} description
"Security configurations that are actively in use for a vty interface.";
} description
"A list of security configurations that are actively in use for each vty interface.";
}
container ssh {
    uses ssh-server-attribute-grouping;
    uses ssh-security-harden-grouping;
    leaf ssh-enable {
        type boolean;
        description
        "The status of SSH server: enabled, or disabled.";
    }
    leaf ip-block-enable {
        type boolean;
        description
        "The status of ip block function: enabled, or disabled.";
    }
    container ip-block-limit {
        if-feature ip-block-config;
        leaf failed-times {
            type uint64;
            description
            "The failed times in a certain period.";
        }
        leaf peroid {
            type uint64;
            description
            "The certain period in which the failed times are counted.";
        }
        leaf reactive-time {
            type uint64;
            description
            "The reactive time after which the address is not blocked.";
        }
    }
}
description
"The reactive time after which the address is not blocked.";
}
description
"If the login from an address failed several times in a certain period, this address will be blocked for a certain time range.";
}
description
"Security configurations that are actively in use for SSH-based access channel.";
}

container web {
  if-feature web-interface;
  uses tls-server-attribute-grouping;
  leaf auth-mode {
    type auth-mode-type;
    description
    "The authentication mode used when administrator login through web interface: none, password, AAA.";
  }
  leaf privilege-level {
    type uint8;
    description
    "User privilege level.";
  }
  leaf http-server-interface {
    type string;
    description
    "The source interface of web server.";
  }
  leaf https-ipv4-enable {
    type boolean;
    description
    "The status of ipv4 https server: enabled, disabled.";
  }
  leaf https-ipv6-enable {
    type boolean;
    description
    "The status of ipv6 https server: enabled, disabled.";
  }
  leaf https-source-port {
    type inet:port-number;
    description
    "The port number of web server.";
  }
  leaf https-timeout {
    type uint32;
    description
    "The authentication timeout period of https.";
  }
}
leaf ip-block-enable {
    type boolean;
    description
        "The status of ip block function: enabled, or disabled.";
}

container ip-block-limit {
    if-feature ip-block-config;
    leaf failed-times {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The failed times in a certain period.";
    }
    leaf peroid {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The certain period in which the failed times are counted.";
    }
    leaf reactive-time {
        type uint64;
        description
            "The reactive time after which the address is not blocked.";
    }
    description
        "If the login from an address failed several times in a certain period,
        this address will be blocked for a certain time range.";
}

6.3. Module 'ietf-aaa-security'

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-aaa-security@2018-10-16.yang"
module ietf-aaa-security {
    yang-version 1.1;
    prefix aaasec;

    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix inet;
        reference "RFC 6991 - Common YANG Data Types.";
    }

    organization
        "IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";

    contact

description
"This YANG module defines ietf-aaa-security YANG module, which contains configurations of AAA."

revision 2018-10-16 {
  description "Initial version.";
  reference
}

/*@ */
* features
*/
feature tacacs-supported {
  description
    "Whether the device supports TACACS+ based Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting.";
}

/*@ */
* typedefs
*/
typedef aaa-authen-mode {
  type enumeration {
    enum "invalid" {
      description
        "Invalid authentication mode.";
    }
    enum "local" {
      description
        "Local authentication mode.";
    }
    enum "tacacs" {
      description
        "TACACS authentication mode. ";
    }
    enum "radius" {
      description
        "RADIUS authentication mode. ";
    }
}
enum "none" {
    description
    "In this mode, users can pass with authentication.";
}
enum "radius-proxy" {
    description
    "RADIUS proxy authentication mode.";
}
description
"Different types of authentication modes.";
}
typedef radius-authen-type {
    type enumeration {
        enum "pap" {
            description
            "PAP authentication.";
        }
        enum "chap" {
            description
            "CHAP authentication.";
        }
    description
    "Different authentication types of RADIUS authentication.";
}
typedef aaa-author-mode {
    type enumeration {
        enum "invalid" {
            description
            "Invalid authorization mode.";
        }
        enum "local" {
            description
            "Local authorization mode.";
        }
        enum "tacacs" {
            description
            "TACACS authorization mode.";
        }
        enum "if-authenticated" {
            description
            "If-authenticated mode: If users pass the authentication and the authentication is not in this mode, it indicates that the user authorization is passed. Otherwise, the authorization is not passed.";
        }
        enum "none" {
            description

"Users can pass without authorization."
}

description
"Different types of AAA authorization modes."
}

typedef aaa-cmd-author-mode {
  type enumeration {
    enum "invalid" {
      description
      "Invalid command line authorization mode.";
    } enum "local" {
      description
      "Local command line authorization mode.";
    } enum "tacacs" {
      description
      "Specifies that the TACACS mode is applied.";
    }
  }
  description
  "Different types of command line authorization modes."
}

typedef aaa-account-mode {
  type enumeration {
    enum "invalid" {
      description
      "invalid accounting mode.";
    } enum "radius" {
      description
      "RADIUS accounting mode. ";
    } enum "tacacs" {
      description
      "TACACS accounting mode. ";
    } enum "none" {
      description
      "In this mode, users do not be accounting.";
    }
  }
  description
  "Different types of accounting modes."
}
/*
 * lists & containers
 */

list authentication-scheme {
  key "authen-scheme-name";
  leaf authen-scheme-name {
    type string;
    description "The name of the authentication scheme.";
  }
  leaf-list authen-mode {
    type aaa-authen-mode;
    description "A list of authentication modes with different preference level. The second, third, and the following authentication mode is used only when the first authentication mode does not respond.";
  }
  leaf authen-type {
    type radius-authen-type;
    description "Authentication type of RADIUS: PAP, CHAP.";
  }
  leaf authen-fail-policy {
    type boolean;
    description "The policy to be adopted after user authentication fail: force the user to be offline, allow user login to a domain with access control.";
  }
  description "Authentication scheme list.";
}

list authorization-scheme {
  key "author-scheme-name";
  leaf author-scheme-name {
    type string;
    description "The name of the authorization scheme.";
  }
  leaf-list auhtor-mode {
    type aaa-author-mode;
    description "A list of authorization modes with different preference level. The second, third, and the following authorization mode is used only when the first authorization mode does not respond.";
  }
  leaf-list cmd-auhtor-mode {
    type aaa-cmd-author-mode;
    description "A list of command line authorization modes with different preference level. The second, third, and the following command line authorization mode is used only when the first command line authorization mode does not respond.";
  }
  description "Authorization scheme list.";
}
list accounting-scheme {
    key "account-scheme-name";
    leaf account-scheme-name {
        type string;
        description
            "The name of the accounting scheme.";
    }
    leaf account-mode {
        type aaa-account-mode;
        description
            "Accounting mode.";
    }
    description
        "Accounting scheme list.";
}

container radius-security {
    list radius-authen-servers {
        key "address";
        leaf address {
            type inet:host;
            description
                "The ip address of the authentication server.";
        }
        leaf port {
            type inet:port-number;
            description
                "The port number of the authentication server.";
        }
        description
            "A list of RADIUS authentication servers";
    }
    list radius-author-servers {
        key "address";
        leaf address {
            type inet:host;
            description
                "The ip address of the authorization server.";
        }
        leaf port {
            type inet:port-number;
            description
                "The port number of the authorization server.";
        }
        description
            "A list of RADIUS authorization servers";
}
list radius-account-servers {
    key "address";
    leaf address {
        type inet:host;
        description "The ip address of the accounting server.";
    }
    leaf port {
        type inet:port-number;
        description "The port number of the accounting server.";
    }
    description "A list of RADIUS accounting servers";
}

container tacacs-security {
    if-feature tacacs-supported;
    list tacacs-authen-servers {
        key "address";
        leaf address {
            type inet:host;
            description "The ip address of the authentication server.";
        }
        leaf port {
            type inet:port-number;
            description "The port number of the authentication server.";
        }
        description "A list of TACACS+ and TACACS+ compatible authentication servers";
    }
    list tacacs-author-servers {
        key "address";
        leaf address {
            type inet:host;
            description "The ip address of the authorization server.";
        }
        leaf port {
            type inet:port-number;
            description "The port number of the authorization server.";
        }
    }
}

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6.4. Module 'ietf-admin-access-statistics'

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-admin-access-statistics@2018-10-16.yang"
module ietf-admin-access-statistics {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-admin-access-statistics";
  prefix stat;

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference
      "RFC 6991 - Common YANG Data Types.";
  }

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference
      "RFC 6991 - Common YANG Data Types.";
  }

  organization
    "IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";
}
Internet-Draft  Network Device Management Plane Security    October 2018

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description
  "This YANG module defines ietf-admin-access-statistics YANG module, which
  contains online administrator lists, ip addresses authentication failure or
  blocked ip addresses."

  revision 2018-10-16 {
    description "Initial version.";
    reference
      "draft-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline-04: The Data Model of Network
       Infrastructure Device Management Plane Security Baseline"
  }

  /*
  * features
  */
  feature display-online-info {
    description
      "If the device supports reporting the details of administrative accounts that
       are currently online."
  }

  /*
  * typedef
  */
  typedef ip-block-state-type {
    type enumeration {
      enum "authenfail" {
        description
          "Authentication failed State";
      }
      enum "blocked" {
        description
          "BLOCKED State";
      }
    }
  }
  description
    "The status of an login failed IP address."

  /*
  * containers
  */
container online {
    leaf total-online-users {
        type uint32;
        config false;
        description "The number of administrators that are current online."
    }
    container online-admin-list {
        if-feature display-online-info;
        list online-users {
            key "account-name";
            leaf account-name {
                type string;
                description "The account name of the online account."
            }
            leaf ip-address {
                type inet:ip-address-no-zone;
                config false;
                description "The ip address of the online account."
            }
            leaf mac-address {
                type yang:mac-address;
                config false;
                description "The MAC address of the online account."
            }
        }
        description "Online administrator list."
    }
    description "If the device supports providing information of online administrators, a list of account details are provided."
    description "Online administrator statistics and details."
}

container ip-block-list {
    list blocked-ip {
        key "ip-address";
        leaf ip-address {
            type inet:ip-address-no-zone;
            description "The blocked IP address."
        }
        leaf vpn-instance {
        }
    }
}
type string;
  config false;
  description
   "The VPN instance of the blocked IP address.";
}
leaf state {
  type ip-block-state-type;
  config false;
  description
   "The status of an login failed IP address.";
}
leaf authen-fail-account {
  type uint32;
  config false;
  description
   "The number of the login failed attempts.";

description
   "The list of blocked IP addresses and related information.";
}
description
   "The information of blocked IP addresses and related information.";
}</CODE ENDS>

6.5. Module ‘ietf-snmp-security’

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-snmp-security@2018-10-16.yang"
module ietf-snmp-security {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix snmpsec;

  import ietf-snmp {
    prefix snmp;
    reference
     "RFC 7407.";
  }

  organization
   "IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";
  contact
   "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sacm/
   WG list: sacm@ietf.org

   Editor: Qiushi Lin

typedef snmp-transport-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "udp" {
      description
      "SNMP over UDP.";
    }
    enum "ssh" {
      description
      "SNMP over SSH.";
    }
    enum "tls" {
      description
      "SNMP over TLS.";
    }
    enum "dtls" {
      description
      "SNMP over DTLS.";
    }
  }
  description
  "The transport channels on which the SNMP engine listens.";
}
typedef snmp-version-type {
  type enumeration {
  }
enum "v1" {
    description
    "SNMPv1";
}
enum "v2c" {
    description
    "SNMPv2c";
}
enum "v3" {
    description
    "SNMPv3";
}

description
"The version of SNMP protocol";
}
typedef auth-pro-type {
    type enumeration {
        enum "none" {
            description
            "Do not enable the authentication of messages sent on behalf of the user.";
        }
        enum "md5" {
            description
            "HMAC-MD5-96 authentication protocol";
        }
        enum "sha" {
            description
            "HMAC-SHA-96 authentication protocol";
        }
    }
    description
    "An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user can be authenticated, and if so, the type of authentication protocol which is used: MD5, SHA.";
    reference
    "RFC 3414";
}
typedef priv-pro-type {
    type enumeration {
        enum "none" {
            description
            "Do not enable the encryption of messages sent on behalf of the user.";
        }
        enum "des" {
            description
            "DES is used to encrypt messages sent on behalf of the user.";
        }
    }
}
enum "aes" {
    description
    "AES is used to encrypt messages sent on behalf of the user.";
}

description
"An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user can be protected from disclosure, and if so, the type of privacy protocol which is used: DES, AES.";
reference
"RFC 3414 & RFC 3826";
}

/*
* grouping
*/
grouping user-auth-priv {
    list user {
        key "name";
        leaf name {
            type snmp:identifier;
            description
            "The identifier that represents a user.";
        }
        leaf auth-protocol {
            type auth-pro-type;
            description
            "The type of authentication protocol: none, md5, sha.";
        }
        leaf priv-protocol {
            type priv-pro-type;
            description
            "The type of encryption protocol: none, des, aes.";
        }
    }
    description
    "A list of users and their corresponding authProtocol, privProtocol.";
    reference
    "RFC 3414";
}

leaf snmp-enable {
    type boolean;
    description
    "whether SNMP is used.";
}

/*
* containers
*/

container engine {
    leaf enabled {
        type boolean;
        description
        "The status of the SNMP engine: enabled, disabled.";
    }

    list listen {
        key "name";
        leaf name {
            type snmp:identifier;
            description
            "The name of a transport channel on which the SNMP engine listens.";
        }
        leaf transport {
            type snmp-transport-type;
            description
            "The transport protocol that SNMP uses.";
        }
        description
        "A list of transport channels on which the SNMP engine listens.";
    }

    leaf version {
        type snmp-version-type;
        description
        "SNMP version used by the SNMP engine.";
    }

    leaf enable-authen-traps {
        type boolean;
        description
        "Whether the SNMP entity is permitted to generate authenticationFailure traps.";
        reference
        "RFC 3418: Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) SNMPv2-MIB.snmpEnableAuthenTraps";
        description
        "The security configurations for SNMP engine.";
    }

    list target {
        key name;
        leaf name {
            type snmp:identifier;
            description
            "The name identifies the target.";
        }
        leaf transport {
            type snmp-transport-type;
        }
    }
description
  "The transport protocol used."
}
leaf target-parmas {
  type snmp:identifier;
  description
  "Parameters for the target."
}
description
  "The list of targets."
reference
  "RFC 3413 & RFC 7407"
}
list target-params {
  key name;
  leaf name {
    type snmp:identifier;
    description
    "The name identifies the target params."
  }
  choice params {
    case usm {
      uses snmp:usm-target-params;
      description
      "Reuse the grouping defined in ietf-snmp-usm"
    }
    case tsm {
      if-feature snmp:tsm;
      uses snmp:tsm-target-params;
      description
      "Reuse the grouping defined in ietf-snmp-tsm"
    }
    description
    "The parameters specific to each security model."
  }
  description
  "List of target parameters."
}
container vacm {
  leaf vacm-enable {
    type boolean;
    config false;
    description
    "Whether VACM based security configurations are used."
  }
  list group {

key name;
leaf name {
  type snmp:group-name;
  description
    "The name of this VACM group.";
}
list member {
  key "security-name";
  leaf security-name {
    type snmp:security-name;
    description
      "The securityName of a group member.";
  }
  leaf-list security-model {
    type snmp:security-model;
    min-elements 1;
    description
      "The security models under which this security-name is a member of this group.";
  }
  description
    "A member of this VACM group.";
}
list access {
  key "context security-model security-level";
  leaf context {
    type snmp:context-name;
    description
      "The context under which the access rights apply.";
  }
  leaf context-match {
    type enumeration {
      enum exact {
        value 1;
        description
          "The context match type: exact.";
      }
      enum prefix {
        value 2;
        description
          "The context match type: prefix";
      }
    }
    description
      "The match type of the context.";
  }
  leaf security-model {
    type snmp:security-model-or-any;
    description
      "The security models to which the access rights apply.";
  }
  description
      "A set of access rights to which the access rights apply.";
}
"The security model under which the access rights apply."
}
leaf security-level {
  type snmp:security-level;
  description
    "The minimum security level under which the access rights apply.";
}
leaf read-view {
  type snmp:view-name;
  description
    "The name of the MIB view of the SNMP context authorizing read access. If this leaf does not exist in a configuration, it maps to a zero-length vacm AccessReadWriteViewName.";
}
leaf write-view {
  type snmp:view-name;
  description
    "The name of the MIB view of the SNMP context authorizing write access. If this leaf does not exist in a configuration, it maps to a zero-length vacmAccessWriteViewName.";
}
leaf notify-view {
  type snmp:view-name;
  description
    "The name of the MIB view of the SNMP context authorizing notify access. If this leaf does not exist in a configuration, it maps to a zero-length vacmAccessNotifyViewName.";
}
"Definition of MIB views."

}  
  description  
  "The security configurations for View-based Access Control Model (VACM).";  

}  

container usm {  
  leaf usm-enable {  
    type boolean;  
    config false;  
    description  
    "Whether USM based security configurations are used.";  
  }  

}  

container local {  
  uses user-auth-priv;  
  description  
  "A list of local users and their corresponding authentication and privacy protocols.";  

}  

container remote {  
  uses user-auth-priv;  
  description  
  "A list of remote users and their corresponding authentication and privacy protocols.";  

}  
  description  
  "Configuration of the User-based Security Model.";  

}  

container tsm {  
  if-feature tsm;  
  leaf tsm-enable {  
    type boolean;  
    config false;  
    description  
    "Whether TSM based security configurations are used.";  
  }  
  description  
  "Configuration of Transport Security Model.";  

}  

<CODE ENDS>

6.6. Module 'ietf-netconf-security'

module ietf-netconf-security {  
  yang-version 1.1;  
  prefix netsec;  

import ietf-admin-access-security {  
  prefix accsec;
}

import ietf-inet-types {  
  prefix inet;
  reference
    "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}

organization  
"IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";

contact  
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sacm/
WG List: sacm@ietf.org
Editor: Qiushi Lin
  linqiushi@huawei.com;
Editor: Liang Xia
  frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Editor: Henk Birkholz
  henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de";

description  
"This YANG module defines ietf-netconf-security YANG module.";

revision 2018-10-16 {  
  description "Initial version.";
  reference
}

/*@  
* features  
*/

feature listen {  
  description
    "The ‘listen’ feature indicates that the NETCONF server supports opening a port to accept NETCONF client connections using at least one transport (e.g., SSH, TLS, etc.).";
}

feature ssh-listen {  
  description
    "The ‘ssh-listen’ feature indicates that the NETCONF server supports opening a port to accept NETCONF over SSH client connections.";
  reference
    "RFC 6242: Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
feature tls-listen {
    description
        "The 'tls-listen' feature indicates that the NETCONF server supports opening a port to accept NETCONF over TLS client connections.";
    reference
        "RFC 7589: Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Mutual X.509 Authentication";
}

feature call-home {
    description
        "The 'call-home' feature indicates that the NETCONF server supports initiating NETCONF call home connections to NETCONF clients using at least one transport (e.g., SSH, TLS, etc.).";
    reference
        "RFC 8071: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home";
}

feature ssh-call-home {
    description
        "The 'ssh-call-home' feature indicates that the NETCONF server supports initiating a NETCONF over SSH call home connection to NETCONF clients.";
    reference
        "RFC 8071: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home";
}

feature tls-call-home {
    description
        "The 'tls-call-home' feature indicates that the NETCONF server supports initiating a NETCONF over TLS call home connection to NETCONF clients.";
    reference
        "RFC 8071: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home";
}

leaf netconf-enable {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Whether the NETCONF protocol is used.";
}

container listen {
    if-feature listen;
    list endpoint {
        key name;
        leaf name {
            type string;
            description
                "The name of the NETCONF listen endpoint.";
        }
        choice transport {
            /*
             * leaf & containers
             */
        }
    }

    list transport {
        key name;
        leaf name {
            type string;
            description
                "The name of the NETCONF transport.";
        }
    }
}
case ssh {
    if-feature ssh-listen;
    leaf port {
        type inet:port-number;
        description
            "The local port number to listen on.";
    }
    uses accsec:ssh-server-attribute-grouping;
    description
        "SSH based listening.";
}
case tls {
    if-feature tls-listen;
    leaf port {
        type inet:port-number;
        description
            "The local port number to listen on.";
    }
    uses accsec:tls-server-attribute-grouping;
    description
        "TLS based listening.";
    description
        "The transport protocol used.";
}
description
    "List of endpoints to listen for NETCONF connections.";
} description
    "Configurations related the listen behavior.";
}

container call-home {
    if-feature call-home;
    list netconf-client {
        key name;
        leaf name {
            type string;
            description
                "The name of the remote NETCONF client.";
        }
    }
    container endpoints {
        list endpoint {
            key name;
            leaf name {
                type string;
                description
                    "The name for this endpoint.";
            }
        }

}  
choice transport {  
case ssh {  
   if-feature ssh-call-home;  
   leaf port {  
      type inet:port-number;  
      description  
         "The IP port for this endpoint.";
   }  
   uses accsec:ssh-server-attribute-grouping;  
   description  
         "SSH based call-home.";
}  
case tls {  
   if-feature tls-call-home;  
   leaf port {  
      type inet:port-number;  
      description  
         "The IP port for this endpoint.";
   }  
   uses accsec:tls-server-attribute-grouping;  
   description  
         "TLS based call-home.";
}  
   description  
         "The used transport protocol.";
}  
   description  
         "A list of endpoints for this NETCONF server to try to connect in se  
quence.";
}  
   description  
         "List of endpoints";
}  
   description  
         "List of NETCONF clients the NETCONF server is to initiate call-home con  
nexctions to in parallel.";
}  
   description  
         "Configurations related to call-home behavior.";
}  
}  

6.7. Module 'ietf-port-management-security'

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-port-management-security@2018-10-16.yang"  
module ietf-port-management-security {  
   yang-version 1.1;  
   prefix acsec;

import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference
        "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}

organization
    "IETF SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring) Working Group";

contact
    "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sacm/
    WG List: sacm@ietf.org
    Editor: Qiushi Lin
    linqiushi@huawei.com;
    Editor: Liang Xia
    frank.xialiang@huawei.com
    Editor: Henk Birkholz
    henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de";

description
    "This YANG module defines ietf-port-management-security YANG module.";

revision 2018-10-16 {
    description "Initial version.";
    reference
}

list port-list {
    key port-number;
    leaf port-number {
        type inet:port-number;
        description
            "The port number.";
    }
    leaf port-status {
        type boolean;
        description
            "The status of the port: open or shut-down.";
    }
    description
        "The status of all the ports in the device.";
}

<CODE ENDS>
7. Acknowledgements

8. IANA Considerations

This document requires no IANA actions.

9. Security Considerations

Secure transport should be used to retrieve the current status of management plane security baseline.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.birkholz-sacm-yang-content]

[I-D.dong-sacm-nid-cp-security-baseline]

[I-D.dong-sacm-nid-infra-security-baseline]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism", draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-06 (work in progress), September 2018.

[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]

[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]

[I-D.ietf-netmod-syslog-model]

[I-D.ietf-sacm-information-model]

[I-D.xia-sacm-nid-dp-security-baseline]


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate]
Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1", draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00 (work in progress), September 2018.

The following is the whole structure of the YANG tree diagram for network infrastructure device management plane. The existed RFCs and drafts that related this document are listed at the right side.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modules</th>
<th>Related RFCs/Drafts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ietf-admin-account-security</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-admin-access-security</td>
<td>draft-ietf-netconf-keystore, draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server, draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-aaa-security</td>
<td>RFC7317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-admin-access-statistics</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-snmp-security</td>
<td>RFC7407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-netconf-security</td>
<td>draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-port-management-security</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-log-security</td>
<td>draft-ietf-netmod-syslog-model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The modules defined in this document and related RFCs/drafts

Draft [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] and draft [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] focus on YANG models for TLS-specific configuration and SSH-specific configuration respectively. The transport-level configuration, such as what ports to listen-on or connect-to, is not included. Besides, as these grouping focus on configurations, the configuration of private-key and "certificate-expiration" notification are not needed. Draft [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] defines NETCONF YANG model based on the data models defined in the above two documents.
[RFC7317] defines a YANG data model for system management of device containing a NETCONF sever. It summarizes data modules for NETCONF user authentication, and defined YANG module for client to configure the RADIUS authentication server information. Three methods are defined for user authentication: public key for local users over SSH, password for local users over any secure transport, password for RADIUS users over any secure transport.

[RFC7407] defines a YANG model for SNMP configuration it is not limited security related configurations and status.

Draft [I-D.ietf-netmod-syslog-model] defines a YANG model for Syslog configuration, including TLS based transport security and syslog messages signing.

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The Data Model of Network Infrastructure Device Data Plane Security Baseline
draft-xia-sacm-nid-dp-security-baseline-03

Abstract

This document proposes one part of the security baseline YANG for network infrastructure device (i.e., router, switch, firewall, etc.): data plane security baseline. The companion documents [I-D.ietf-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline], [I-D.ietf-dong-sacm-nid-infra-security-baseline] cover other parts of the security baseline YANG for network infrastructure device respectively: management plane security baseline, infrastructure layer security baseline.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Objective

Network security is an essential part of the overall network deployment and operation. Due to the following reasons, network infrastructure devices (e.g., switch, router, firewall) are always the objective and exploited by the network attackers, which bring damages to the victim network:

- The existence of a lot of unsafe access channels: for the history reason, some old and unsafe protocols still run in the network devices, like: SNMP v1/v2, Telnet, etc., and are not mandatory to be replaced by the according safer protocols (SNMP v3, SSH). Attackers easily exploit them for attack (e.g., invalid login, message eavesdropping);
- The openness nature of TCP/IP network: despite the benefits of network architecture design and connectivity brought by the network openness, a lot of threats exist at the same time. Spoofing address, security weakness for various protocols, traffic flooding, and other kinds of threat are originated from the network openness;

- The security challenge by the network complexity: network are becoming more complex, with massive nodes, various protocols and flexible topology. Without careful design and strict management, as well as operation automation, the policy consistency of network security management cannot be ensured. It’s common that part of the network infrastructure is subject to attack;

- The complex functionality of device: the complexity of device itself increases the difficulty of carrying out the security hardening measurements, as well as the skill requirements to the network administrator. As a result, the network administrator may not be capable of or willing to realize all the security measurements, in addition to implementing the other basic functionalities;

- The capacity and capability mismatching between the data plane and the control plane: there are a large mismatching of the traffic processing capacity and capability between different planes. Without effective control, the large volume of traffic from the data plane will flooding attack the other planes easily.

Therefore, the importance of ensuring the security of the network infrastructure devices is out of question. To secure the network infrastructure devices, one important task is to identify as far as possible the threats and vulnerabilities in the device itself, such as: unnecessary services, insecure configurations, abnormal status, etc., then enforce the corresponding security hardening measurements, such as: update the patch, modify the security configuration, enhance the security mechanism, etc.. We call this task the developing and deploying the security baseline for the network infrastructure, which provides a solid foundation for the overall network security. This document aims to describe the security baseline for the network infrastructure, which is called security baseline in short in this document.

1.2. Security Baseline

Basically, security baseline can be designed and deployed into different layers of the devices:
application layer: refers to the application platform security solution and the typical application security mechanisms it provided like: identity authentication, access control, permission management, encryption and decryption, auditing and tracking, privacy protection, to ensure secure application data transmission/exchange, secure storage, secure processing, ensuring the secure operation of the application system. Specific examples may be: web application security, software integrity protection, encryption of sensitive data, privacy protection, and lawful interception interfaces and secure third-party component;

network layer: refers to a series of security measures, to protect the network resources and network services running on the device network platform. Network layer security over network product is complicated. Therefore, it is divided into data plane, control plane, management plane to consider:

* data plane: focus on the security hardening configuration and status to protect the data plane traffic against eavesdropping, tampering, forging and flooding attacking the network;

* control plane: focus on the control signaling security of the network infrastructure device, to protect their normal exchange against various attacks (i.e., eavesdropping, tampering, forging and flooding attack) and restrict the malicious control signaling, for ensuring the correct network topology and forwarding behavior;

* management plane: focus on the management information and platform security. More specific, it includes all the security configuration and status involved in the network OAM process;

infrastructure layer: refers to all the security design about the device itself and its running OS. As the foundation of the upper layer services, the secure infrastructure layer must be assured. The specific mechanisms include: OS security, key management, cryptography security, certificate management, software integrity.

1.3. Security Baseline Data Model Design

The security baseline varies according to many factors, like: different device types (i.e., router, switch, firewall), the supporting security features of device, the specific security requirements of network operator. It’s impossible to design a complete set for it, so this document and the companion ones are going to propose the most important and universal points of them. More baseline contents can be added in future following the data model scheme specified.
[I-D.ietf-birkholz-sacm-yang-content] defines a method of constructing the YANG data model scheme for the security posture assessment of the network infrastructure device by brokering of YANG push telemetry via SACM statements. The basic steps are:

- use YANG push mechanism [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push] to collect the created streams of notifications (telemetry) [I-D.ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications] providing SACM content on SACM data plane, and the filter expressions used in the context of YANG subscriptions constitute SACM content that is imperative guidance consumed by SACM components on SACM management plane;

- then encapsulate the above YANG push output into a SACM Content Element envelope, which is again encapsulated in a SACM statement envelope;

- lastly, publish the SACM statement into a SACM domain via xmpp-grid publisher.

In this document, we follow the same way as [I-D.ietf-birkholz-sacm-yang-content] to define the YANG output for network infrastructure device security baseline posture based on the SACM information model definition [I-D.ietf-sacm-information-model].

1.4. Summary

The following contents propose part of the security baseline YANG output for network infrastructure device: data plane security baseline. The companion documents [I-D.ietf-dong-sacm-nid-cp-security-baseline], [I-D.ietf-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline], [I-D.ietf-xia-sacm-nid-app-infr-layers-security-baseline] cover other parts of the security baseline YANG output for network infrastructure device respectively: control plane security baseline, management plane security baseline, application layer and infrastructure layer security baseline.

2. Terminology

2.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Definition of Terms

This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-sacm-terminology].

3. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the data model is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as follows:

- Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
- Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write) and "ro" state data (read-only).
- Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node and "*" denotes a "list" and "leaf-list".
- Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").
- Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

4. Data Model Structure

As the network infrastructure device, it makes decision of the forwarding path based on the IP/MAC address and sends the packet in data plane. The NP or ASIC are the main components for the data plane functions.

This section describes the key data plane security baseline of the network infrastructure devices, and defines their specific data models.

4.1. Layer 2 protection

Mac table is the key resource in terms of layer 2 forwarding, also easily attacked by learning massive invalid mac address. The mac limit function is to protect the mac table by limiting the maximum number of learned mac address in appointed interfaces. The mac address is not learned and the packet is discarded when the up-limit is reached, and the alarm is created possibly.

If the broadcast traffic is not suppressed in layer 2 network (i.e., Ethernet), a great amount of network bandwidth is consumed by a great deal of broadcast traffic. The network performance is degraded, even
interrupting the communication. In such a case, configuring the broadcast traffic suppression on the device to ensure some bandwidth can be reserved for unicast traffic forwarding when broadcast traffic bursts across the network. It’s flexible to configure the device to suppress broadcast, multicast, and unknown unicast traffic on an interface, a specified interface in a VLAN, a sub-interface, and over a virtual switch instance (VSI) pseudo wire (PW).

module: ietf-layer2-protection

++-rw mac-limit
  |  +++-rw vlan-mac-limits
  |     |  |  +++-rw vlan-mac-limit* [vlan-id]
  |     |     |  +++-rw vlan-id mac-vlan-id
  |     |     |  +++-rw maximum uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw rate? uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw action? mac-limit-forward
  |     |     |  +++-rw alarm? mac-enable-status
  |  |  +++-rw bd-mac-limits
  |     |  |  |  +++-rw bd-mac-limit* [bd-id]
  |     |     |  +++-rw bd-id uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw maximum uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw rate? uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw action? mac-limit-forward
  |     |     |  +++-rw alarm? mac-enable-status
  |  |  +++-rw vsi-mac-limits
  |     |  |  |  +++-rw vsi-mac-limit* [vsi-name]
  |     |     |  +++-rw vsi-name string
  |     |     |  +++-rw maximum uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw rate? uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw action? mac-limit-forward
  |     |     |  +++-rw alarm? mac-enable-status
  |  |  +++-rw pw-mac-limits
  |     |  |  |  +++-rw pw-mac-limit* [vsi-name pw-name]
  |     |     |  +++-rw vsi-name string
  |     |     |  +++-rw pw-name string
  |     |     |  +++-rw maximum uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw rate? uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw action? mac-limit-forward
  |     |     |  +++-rw alarm? mac-enable-status
  |  |  +++-rw if-mac-limits
  |     |  |  |  +++-rw if-mac-limit* [if-name]
  |     |     |  +++-rw if-name string
  |     |     |  +++-rw maximum uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw rate? uint32
  |     |     |  +++-rw action? mac-limit-forward
  |     |     |  +++-rw alarm? mac-enable-status
  |  |  +++-rw subif-mac-limits
  |     |  |  |  +++-rw subif-mac-limit* [if-name]
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        +--rw if-name       string
        +--rw maximum       uint32
        +--rw rate?         uint32
        +--rw action?       mac-limit-forward
        +--rw alarm?        mac-enable-status

++-rw traffic-suppress

++-rw vlan-suppresses
++-rw vlan-suppress* [vlan-id suppress-type direction]
  +--rw vlan-id          mac-vlan-id
  +--rw suppress-type    suppress-type
  +--rw direction        direction-type
  +--rw cir?             uint64
  +--rw cbs?             uint64

++-rw bd-suppresses
++-rw bd-suppress* [bd-id suppress-type direction]
  +--rw bd-id           uint32
  +--rw suppress-type    suppress-type
  +--rw direction        direction-type
  +--rw cir?             uint64
  +--rw cbs?             uint64

++-rw vsi-suppresses
++-rw vsi-suppress* [vsi-name suppress-type direction]
  +--rw vsi-name         string
  +--rw suppress-type    suppress-type
  +--rw direction        direction-type
  +--rw cir?             uint64
  +--rw cbs?             uint64

++-rw pw-suppresses
++-rw pw-suppress* [vsi-name pw-name suppress-type direction]
  +--rw vsi-name         string
  +--rw pw-name          string
  +--rw suppress-type    suppress-type
  +--rw direction        direction-type
  +--rw cir?             uint64
  +--rw cbs?             uint64

++-rw if-suppresses
++-rw if-suppress* [if-name suppress-type direction]
  +--rw if-name          string
  +--rw suppress-type    suppress-type
  +--rw direction        direction-type
  +--rw percent?         uint64
  +--rw packets?         uint64
  +--rw cir?             uint64
  +--rw cbs?             uint64

++-rw sub-if-suppresses
++-rw sub-if-suppress* [if-name suppress-type direction]
  +--rw if-name          string
  +--rw suppress-type    suppress-type
4.2. ARP

ARP security is a set of functions to protect the ARP protocol and networks against malicious attacks so that the network communication keeps stable and important user information is protected, which mainly includes:

ARP anti-spoofing functions: protect devices against spoofing ARP attack packets, improving the security and reliability of network communication.

ARP anti-flooding functions: relieve CPU load and prevent the ARP table overflow, ensuring normal network operation.
+--rw send-gratuitous-enable  boolean
+--rw receive-gratuitous-enable  boolean

++--rw arp-learning-control
  +--rw global-strict-learning-enable  boolean
  +--rw if-learning-rule* [if-name]
    +--rw if-name  string
    +--rw learning-disable  boolean
    +--rw strict-learning-enable  boolean

++--rw arp-entry-limit
  +--rw if-limit-rule* [if-name]
    +--rw if-name  string
    +--rw entry-maximum  uint32
  +--rw if-vlan-limit-rule* [if-name vlan-begin]
    +--rw if-name  string
    +--rw vlan-begin  mac-vlan-id
    +--rw vlan-end  mac-vlan-id
    +--rw entry-maximum  uint32

++--rw arp-rate-limit
  +--rw global-rate-limit  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-source-mac
    +--rw rate-limit-per-source-mac  uint32
    +--rw source-mac-rule* [source-mac]
      +--rw source-mac  mac-address
      +--rw rate-limit  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-source-ip
    +--rw rate-limit-per-source-ip  uint32
    +--rw source-ip-rule* [source-ip]
      +--rw source-ip  inet:ip-address
      +--rw rate-limit  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-destination-ip
    +--rw rate-limit-per-destination-ip  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-interface
    +--rw rate-limit-per-interface  uint32
    +--rw interface-rule* [if-name]
      +--rw if-name  string
      +--rw rate-limit  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-vlan
    +--rw vlan-rule* [vlan-id]
      +--rw vlan-id  mac-vlan-id
      +--rw rate-limit  uint32

++--rw arp-miss-rate-limit
  +--rw global-rate-limit  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-source-ip
    +--rw rate-limit-per-source-ip  uint32
    +--rw source-ip-rule* [source-ip]
      +--rw source-ip  inet:ip-address
      +--rw rate-limit  uint32
  +--rw limit-by-interface
4.3. URPF

Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (URPF) is a technology used to defend against network attacks based on source address spoofing. Generally, upon receiving a packet, a router first obtains the destination IP address of the packet and then searches the forwarding table for a route to the destination address. If the router finds such a route, it forwards the packet; otherwise, it discards the packet. A URPF-enabled router, however, obtains the source IP address of a received packet and searches for a route to the source address. If the router fails to find the route, it considers that the source address is a forged one and discards the packet. In this manner, URPF can effectively protect against malicious attacks that are launched by changing the source addresses of packets.

URPF can be performed in strict or loose mode. The strict mode checks both the existence of source address in the route table and the interface consistency, while loose mode only checks if the source address is in the route table. In some case, the router may have only one default route to the router of the ISP. Therefore, matching the default route entry needs to be supported.

URPF can be performed over interface, defined flow and traffic sent to local CPU.
4.4. DHCP Snooping

DHCP, which is widely used on networks, dynamically assigns IP addresses to clients and manages configuration information in a centralized manner. During DHCP packet forwarding, some attacks may occur, such as bogus DHCP server attacks, DHCP exhaustion attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and DHCP flooding attacks.

DHCP snooping is a DHCP security feature that functions in a similar way to a firewall between DHCP clients and servers. A DHCP-snooping-capable device intercepts DHCP packets and uses information carried in the packets to create a DHCP snooping binding table. This table records hosts’ MAC addresses, IP addresses, IP address lease time, VLAN, and interface information. The device uses this table to check the validity of received DHCP packets. If a DHCP packet does not match any entry in this table, the device discards the packet.

Besides the binding table, DHCP snooping has other security features such as trusted interface, max DHCP user limit and whitelist to defend against the bogus DHCP server, DHCP flooding and other fine-grained DHCP attacks.
| ++--rw enable-vlan* [vlan-id] |
|   +--rw vlan-id               uint16 |
|   +--rw dhcp-snp-enable       boolean |
| ++--rw enable-vlan-interface* [vlan-id if-name] |
|   +--rw vlan-id               uint16 |
|   +--rw if-name               string |
|   +--rw dhcp-snp-enable       boolean |
| ++--rw enable-interface* [if-name] |
|   +--rw if-name               string |
|   +--rw dhcp-snp-enable       boolean |
| ++--rw enable-bd* [bd-id] |
|   +--rw bd-id                 uint32 |
|   +--rw dhcp-snp-enable       boolean |
| ++--rw dhcp-snooping-trust |
|   ++--rw trust-vlan* [vlan-id] |
|     +--rw vlan-id             uint16 |
|     +--rw dhcp-snp-trust      boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-enable boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-threshold uint32 |
|   ++--rw trust-vlan-interface* [vlan-id if-name] |
|     +--rw vlan-id             uint16 |
|     +--rw if-name             string |
|     +--rw dhcp-snp-trust      boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-enable boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-threshold uint32 |
|   ++--rw trust-interface* [if-name] |
|     +--rw if-name             string |
|     +--rw dhcp-snp-trust      boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-enable boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-threshold uint32 |
|   ++--rw trust-bd* [bd-id] |
|     +--rw bd-id               uint32 |
|     +--rw dhcp-snp-trust      boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-enable boolean |
|     +--rw untrust-reply-alarm-threshold uint32 |
| ++--rw dhcp-snooping-packet-check |
|   ++--rw check-vlan* [vlan-id] |
|     +--rw vlan-id             uint16 |
|     +--rw check-vlan-rule* [check-type] |
|       +--rw check-type         check-type |
|       +--rw check-enable       boolean |
|       +--rw alarm-enable       boolean |
|       +--rw alarm-threshold    uint32 |
|   ++--rw check-vlan-interface* [vlan-id if-name] |
|     +--rw vlan-id             uint16 |
|     +--rw if-name             string |
|   ++--rw check-vlan-if-rule* [check-type] |
|     +--rw check-type           check-type |
++-rw check-enable
|  |  |  | boolean
|  |  ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  | boolean
|  |  ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  | ++-rw check-interface* [if-name]
|  |  |  |  | ++-rw if-name
|  |  |  |  |  | string
|  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-if-rule* [check-type]
|  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-type
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | check-type
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-bd* [bd-id]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw bd-id
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-bd-rule* [check-type]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-type
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | check-type
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw dhcp-snooping-max-user-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw user-limit-vlan* [vlan-id]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw vlan-id
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint16
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw max-user-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw user-limit-vlan-interface* [vlan-id if-name]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw vlan-id
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint16
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw if-name
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | string
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw max-user-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw user-limit-interface* [if-name]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw if-name
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | string
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw max-user-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw user-limit-bd* [bd-id]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw bd-id
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw max-user-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw dhcp-snooping-rate-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw global-check-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw global-rate-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw global-alarm-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw global-alarm-threshold
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw rate-limit-vlan* [vlan-id]
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw vlan-id
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint16
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw check-enable
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | boolean
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ++-rw rate-limit
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | uint32
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| +---rw alarm-enable     | boolean |
| +---rw alarm-threshold  | uint32  |
| +---rw rate-limit-vlan-interface* [vlan-id if-name] |
|   +---rw vlan-id        | uint16  |
|   +---rw if-name        | string  |
|   +---rw check-enable   | boolean |
|   +---rw rate-limit     | uint32  |
|   +---rw alarm-enable   | boolean |
|   +---rw alarm-threshold| uint32  |
| +---rw rate-limit-interface* [if-name] |
|   +---rw if-name        | string  |
|   +---rw check-enable   | boolean |
|   +---rw rate-limit     | uint32  |
|   +---rw alarm-enable   | boolean |
|   +---rw alarm-threshold| uint32  |
| +---rw rate-limit-bd* [bd-id] |
|   +---rw bd-id          | uint32  |
|   +---rw check-enable   | boolean |
|   +---rw rate-limit     | uint32  |
|   +--- rw alarm-enable  | boolean |
|   +---rw alarm-threshold| uint32  |
| +---rw dhcp-snooping-static-binding-table |
|   +---rw vlan-static-bind-tbl* [vlan-id ip-address ce-vlan] |
|     +---rw vlan-id      | uint16  |
|     +---rw ip-address   | inet:ip-address |
|     +---rw mac-address? | mac-address |
|     +---rw if-name?     | string  |
|     +--- rw ce-vlan     | uint16  |
|   +---rw if-static-bind-tbl* [if-name ip-address pe-vlan ce-vlan] |
|     +---rw if-name      | string  |
|     +---rw ip-address   | inet:ip-address |
|     +---rw mac-address? | mac-address |
|     +--- rw pe-vlan     | uint16  |
|     +---rw ce-vlan      | uint16  |
|   +---rw bd-static-bind-tbl* [bd-id ip-address pe-vlan ce-vlan] |
|     +---rw bd-id        | uint32  |
|     +---rw ip-address   | inet:ip-address |
|     +---rw mac-address? | mac-address |
|     +--- rw pe-vlan     | uint16  |
|     +---rw ce-vlan      | uint16  |
| +---rw dhcp-snp-white-lists |
|   +---rw dhcp-snp-white-list* [wht-lst-name] |
|     +---rw wht-lst-name  | string  |
|     +--- rw apply-flag  | boolean |
|     +---rw dhcp-snp-white-rules |
|       +---rw dhcp-snp-white-rule* [rule-id] |
|          +---rw rule-id  | uint16  |
|          +---rw src-ip?  | inet:ip-address |
4.5. CPU Protection

For the network device, there are maybe a large number of packets to be sent to its CPU, or malicious packets attempt to attack the device CPU. If the CPU receives excessive packets, it will be overloaded and support the normal services with very poor performance; in extreme cases, the system fails.

More specifically, services are negatively affected when the CPU is attacked because of the following reasons:

- Valid protocol packets are not distinguished from invalid protocol packets. The CPU is busy in processing a large number of invalid protocol packets. Consequently, the CPU usage rises sharply and valid packets cannot be processed properly.

- Packets of some protocols are sent to the CPU through the same channel. When excessive packets of a certain type of protocol packet block the channel, the transmission of other protocol packets is affected.

- The bandwidth of a channel is not set appropriately. When an attack occurs, processing of protocol packets on other channels is affected.

Accordingly, the following countermeasures can be taken by the network device for CPU protection:

- Collect and classify protocols related to various services running on equipment.

- Use ACLs to filter the packets. Valid protocol packets are put into the whitelist and a user-defined flow, other packets are put into the blacklist.

- Plan the priorities, channel bandwidth, length of packets, and alarm function of the preceding three lists.

- Disable services that are not deployed on the equipment, and control the total forwarding bandwidth.
In this manner, the number of packets sent to the CPU is under control, and the bandwidth is ensured preferentially for services with higher priorities. In addition, CPU overload is prevented and an alarm is generated when an attack occurs.

module: ietf-cpu-defend
  +--rw cpu-defend
    +--rw cpu-defend-policies
      +--rw cpu-defend-policy* [policy-id]
        +--rw policy-id                      uint32
        +--rw description?                   string
        +--rw white-list-acl-number?         uint32
        +--rw black-list-acl-number?         uint32
        +--rw user-defined-flows
          +--rw user-defined-flow* [flow-id]
            +--rw flow-id                  uint32
            +--rw acl-number               uint32
          +--rw cpu-defend-car-rules
            +--rw cpu-defend-car-rule* [rule-type pkt-index flow-id protocol -type tcp-ip-type]
              +--rw rule-type                rule-type
              +--rw pkt-index?               uint16
              +--rw flow-id?                 uint32
              +--rw protocol?                protocol-type
              +--rw tcp-ip-type?             tcp-ip-type
              +--rw car-attr
                |  +--rw cir?                  uint32
                |  +--rw cbs?                  uint32
                |  +--rw pir?                  uint32
                |  +--rw pbs?                  uint32
                |  +--rw min-pkt-len?          uint32
                |  +--rw pkt-rate?             uint32
                |  +--rw weight?               uint16
              +--rw priority?                priority-type
              +--rw drop-alarm
                +--rw enable                boolean
                +--rw packets-threshold?     uint32
                +--rw interval?              uint16
                +--rw speed-threshold?       uint32
          +--rw cpu-defend-policy-bindings
            +--rw cpu-defend-policy-binding* [slot-id]
              +--rw slot-id                        string
              +--rw policy-id                      uint32
          +--ro cpu-defend-cars-cfgs
            +--ro cpu-defend-cars-cfg* [slot-id pkt-index]
              +--ro slot-id                        string
              +--ro pkt-index                       uint16
              +--ro cir?                            uint32
              +--ro cbs?                            uint32
+--ro min-pkt?  uint32
+--ro priority?  priority-type
+--ro protocol  protocol-type
+--ro protocol-stats
  +--ro protocol-stat* [slot-id protocol]
    +--ro slot-id  string
    +--ro protocol  protocol-type
    +--ro default-act  action-type
    +--ro default-cir  uint32
    +--ro default-cbs  uint32
+--ro sec-non-car-stats
  +--ro sec-non-car-stat* [slot-id policy-type protocol]
    +--ro slot-id  string
    +--ro policy-type  policy-type
    +--ro protocol  protocol-type
    +--ro total-packets?  uint64
    +--ro passed-packets?  uint64
    +--ro dropped-packets?  uint64
+--ro sec-car-stats
  +--ro sec-car-stat* [slot-id policy-type policy-index]
    +--ro slot-id  string
    +--ro policy-type  policy-type
    +--ro policy-index  uint32
    +--ro app-enable?  boolean
    +--ro app-default-act?  action-type
    +--ro proto-enable?  boolean
    +--ro passed-packets?  uint64
    +--ro dropped-packets?  uint64
    +--ro cfg-cir?  uint32
    +--ro cfg-cbs?  uint32
    +--ro actual-cir?  uint32
    +--ro actual-cbs?  uint32
    +--ro priority?  priority-type
    +--ro min-pkt-len?  uint32
    +--ro acl-deny-packets?  uint64
    +--ro hist-pps?  uint64
    +--ro hist-pps-time?  yang:date-and-time
    +--ro average-drop-rate?  uint64
    +--ro drop-begin-time?  yang:date-and-time
    +--ro drop-end-time?  yang:date-and-time
    +--ro total-dropped-packets?  uint64
+--ro total-packet-stats
  +--ro total-packet-stat* [slot-id]
    +--ro slot-id  string
    +--ro total-packets?  uint64
    +--ro passed-packets?  uint64
    +--ro dropped-packets?  uint64
+--rw hostcar-policies
4.6. TCP/IP Attack Defense

Defense against TCP/IP attacks is applied to the router on the edge of the network or other routers that are easily to be attacked by illegal TCP/IP packets. Defense against TCP/IP attacks can protect the CPU of the router against malformed packets, fragmented packets, TCP SYN packets, and UDP packets, ensuring that normal services can be processed.
5. Network Infrastructure Device Security Baseline Yang Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-mac-limit@2018-06-04.yang"

module ietf-mac-limit {
  prefix mac-limit;
  organization "IETF SACM Working Group";
  contact "Liang Xia: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com;
           Guangying Zheng: Zhengguangying@huawei.com";
  description "MAC address limit.";
}

revision 2018-06-04 {
  description "Init revision";
  reference "xxx.";
}

/*
 * Typedefs
*/
typedef mac-limit-forward {
  type enumeration {
    enum "forward" {
      
typedef mac-enable-status {
  type enumeration {
    enum "enable" {
      description "Enable.";
    }
    enum "disable" {
      description "Disable.";
    }
  }
  description "MAC Enable Status";
}
typedef mac-vlan-id {
  type uint16 {
    range "1..4094";
  }
  description "MAC Vlan Id";
}
typedef mac-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "static" {
      description "Static MAC address entry.";
    }
    enum "dynamic" {
      description "Dynamic MAC address entry.";
    }
    enum "black-hole" {
      description "Blackhole MAC address entry";
    }
    enum "sticky" {
      description
"sticky MAC address entry";
}
enum "security" {
  description
  "security MAC address entry";
}
enum "evn" {
  description
  "EVN MAC address entry.";
}
enum "mux" {
  description
  "MUX MAC address entry.";
}
enum "snooping" {
  description
  "SNOOPING MAC address entry.";
}
enum "tunnel" {
  description
  "TUNNEL MAC address entry.";
}
enum "authen" {
  description
  "AUTHEN MAC address entry.";
}
}
description
  "MAC Type";
}
typedef suppress-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "broadcast" {
      description
      "Broadcast.";
    }
    enum "multicast" {
      description
      "Multicast.";
    }
    enum "unknown-unicast" {
      description
      "Unknown unicast.";
    }
    enum "unicast" {
      description
      "Unicast.";
    }
  }
}
typedef limit-type {
    type enumeration {
        enum "-mac-limit" {
            description
                "Interface MAC rule limit.";
        }
        enum "mac-apply" {
            description
                "Interface MAC rule application.";
        }
    }
    description
        "Limit Type";
}

typedef mac-pw-encap-type {
    type enumeration {
        enum "ethernet" {
            description
                "Ethernet.";
        }
        enum "vlan" {
            description
                "VLAN.";
        }
    }
    description
        "MAC PW Encapsulation Type";
}

typedef suppress-style {
    type enumeration {
        enum "percent" {
            description
                "Percent.";
        }
        enum "absolute-value" {
            description
                "Absolute value.";
        }
    }
    description
        "Suppress Style";
}
typedef direction-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "inbound" {
      description "Inbound.";
    }
    enum "outbound" {
      description "Outbound.";
    }
  }
  description "Direction Type";
}

typedef storm-ctrl-action-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "normal" {
      description "Normal.";
    }
    enum "error-down" {
      description "Error down.";
    }
    enum "block" {
      description "Block.";
    }
    enum "suppress" {
      description "Suppress";
    }
  }
  description "Storm Ctrl Action Type";
}

typedef enable-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "disable" {
      description "Disable.";
    }
    enum "enable" {
      description "Enable.";
    }
  }
}
typedef storm-ctrl-type {
type enumeration {
  enum "broadcast" {
    description "Broadcast.";
  }
  enum "multicast" {
    description "Multicast.";
  }
  enum "unicast" {
    description "Unicast.";
  }
  enum "unknown-unicast" {
    description "Unknown unicast.";
  }
} description "Storm Ctrl Type";
}

typedef storm-ctrl-rate-type {
type enumeration {
  enum "pps" {
    description "Packets per second.";
  }
  enum "percent" {
    description "Percent.";
  }
  enum "kbps" {
    description "Kilo bits per second.";
  }
} description "Storm Ctrl Rate Type";
}
container mac {
  description
  "MAC address forwarding. ";
  container mac-limit-rules {
    description
    "Global MAC address learning limit rule.";
    list mac-limit-rule {
      key "rule-name";
      description
      "Global MAC address learning limit.";
      leaf rule-name {
        type string {
          length "1..31";
        }
        description
        "Global MAC address learning limit rule name.";
      }
      leaf maximum {
        type uint32 {
          range "0..131072";
        }
        mandatory true;
        description
        "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned.";
      }
      leaf rate {
        type uint16 {
          range "0..1000";
        }
        default "0";
        description
        "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned.";
      }
      leaf action {
        type mac-limit-forward;
        default "discard";
        description
        "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
      }
      leaf alarm {
        type mac-enable-status;
        default "enable";
        description
        "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
      }
    }
  }
}

container vlan-mac-limits {

description
"VLAN MAC address limit list.";
list vlan-mac-limit {
  key "vlan-id";
  description
  "VLAN MAC address limit.");
  leaf vlan-id {
    type mac-vlan-id;
    description
    "VLAN ID.";
  }
  leaf maximum {
    type uint32 {
      range "0..130048";
    }
    mandatory true;
    description
    "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a VLAN.";
  }
  leaf rate {
    type uint16 {
      range "0..1000";
    }
    default "0";
    description
    "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a VLAN.";
  }
  leaf action {
    type mac-limit-forward;
    default "discard";
    description
    "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VLAN.";
  }
  leaf alarm {
    type mac-enable-status;
    default "enable";
    description
    "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VLAN.";
  }
}

container vsi-mac-limits {
  description
  "VSI MAC address limit list.";
  list vsi-mac-limit {
    key "vsi-name";
    description
    "VSI MAC address limit.";
  }
}
leaf vsi-name {
    type string {
        length "1..31";
    }
    description
    "VSI name.";
}
leaf maximum {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..524288";
    }
    mandatory true;
    description
    "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a VSI.";
}
leaf rate {
    type uint16 {
        range "0..1000";
    }
    default "0";
    description
    "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a VSI.";
}
leaf action {
    type mac-limit-forward;
    default "discard";
    description
    "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VSI.";
}
leaf alarm {
    type mac-enable-status;
    default "disable";
    description
    "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a VSI.";
}
leaf up-threshold {
    type uint8 {
        range "80..100";
    }
    mandatory true;
    description
    "Upper limit for the number of MAC addresses.";
}
leaf down-threshold {
    type uint8 {
        range "60..100";
    }
    mandatory true;
description
    "Upper limit for the number of MAC addresses.";
}
}
}
}
}
container bd-mac-limits {
    description
        "BD MAC address limit list."
    list bd-mac-limit {
        key "bd-id";
        description
            "BD MAC address limit."
        leaf bd-id {
            type uint32 {
                range "1..16777215";
            }
        }
        description
            "Specifies the ID of a bridge domain."
        leaf maximum {
            type uint32 {
                range "0..130048";
            }
        }
        mandatory true;
        description
            "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a BD."
        leaf rate {
            type uint16 {
                range "0..1000";
            }
        }
        description
            "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a BD."
        leaf action {
            type mac-limit-forward;
            default "discard";
        }
        description
            "Forward or discard the packet."
    }
    leaf alarm {
        type mac-enable-status;
        default "enable";
        description
            "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
    }
}
container pw-mac-limits {
  description "PW MAC address limit list.";
list pw-mac-limit {
  key "vsi-name pw-name";
  description "PW MAC address limit.";
leaf vsi-name {
  type string {
    length "1..31";
  }
  description "VSI name.";
}
leaf pw-name {
  type string {
    length "1..15";
  }
  description "PW name.";
}
leaf maximum {
  type uint32 {
    range "0..130048";
  }
  mandatory true;
  description "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned in a PW.";
}
leaf rate {
  type uint16 {
    range "0..1000";
  }
  default "0";
  description "Interval at which MAC addresses are learned in a PW.";
}
leaf action {
  type mac-limit-forward;
  default "discard";
  description "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a PW.";
}
leaf alarm {
  type mac-enable-status;
  default "enable";
}
"Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number in a PW.";
}
}

container if-mac-limits {
  description
  "Interface MAC address limit list."
  list if-mac-limit {
    key "if-name limit-type";
    description
    "Interface MAC address limit."
    leaf if-name {
      type string;
      description
      "Interface name."
    }
    leaf limit-type {
      type limit-type;
      description
      "Interface MAC limit type."
    }
    leaf rule-name {
      type leafref {
        path "/mac/mac-limit-rules/mac-limit-rule/rule-name";
      }
      description
      "Rule name."
    }
    leaf maximum {
      type uint32 {
        range "0..131072";
      }
      mandatory true;
      description
      "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned on an interface."
    }
    leaf rate {
      type uint16 {
        range "0..1000";
      }
      default "0";
      description
      "Interval (ms) at which MAC addresses are learned on an interface."
    }
    leaf action {
      type mac-limit-forward;
      default "discard";
    }
  }
}

description
"Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on an interface";
}
leaf alarm {
  type mac-enable-status;
  default "enable";
  description
  "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on an interface.";
}
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}
}
range "0..131072";
} mandatory true;
description "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned on an interface.";
}

leaf rate {
type uint16 {
  range "0..1000";
} mandatory true;
description "Interval (ms) at which MAC addresses are learned on an interface.";
}

leaf action {
type mac-limit-forward;
default "discard";
description "Discard or forward the packet.";
}

leaf alarm {
type mac-enable-status;
default "enable";
description "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number.";
}

}

} container subif-mac-limits {
description "Sub-interface MAC address limit list.";
list subif-mac-limit {
  key "if-name limit-type";
description "Sub-interface MAC address limit.";
leaf if-name {
type string;
description "-name of a sub-interface. ";
}
leaf limit-type {
type limit-type;
description "Sub-interface MAC limit type.";
}
leaf vsi-name {
type string {
  length "1..36";
}
config false;
mandatory true;
description
"VSI name, EVPN name or bridge domain ID."
}
leaf rule-name {
  type string {
    length "1..31"
  }
  mandatory true;
description
  "Rule name."
}
leaf maximum {
  type uint32 {
    range "0..131072"
  }
  mandatory true;
description
  "Maximum number of MAC addresses that can be learned on a sub-interface."
}
leaf rate {
  type uint16 {
    range "0..1000"
  }
  default "0";
description
  "Interval (ms) at which MAC addresses are learned on a sub-interface."
}
leaf action {
  type mac-limit-forward;
default "discard";
description
  "Discard or forward after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on a sub-interface."
}
leaf alarm {
  type mac-enable-status;
default "enable";
description
  "Whether an alarm is generated after the number of learned MAC addresses reaches the maximum number on a sub-interface."
}
}
}
container vsi-storm-supps {
  description
  "VSI Suppression List."
  list vsi-storm-supp {

key "vsi-name suppress-type";
description
  "VSI Suppression.";
leaf vsi-name {
  type string {
    length "1..31";
  }
description
  "VSI name.";
}
leaf suppress-type {
  type suppress-type;
description
  "Traffic suppression type.";
}
leaf cir {
  type uint64 {
    range "0..4294967295";
  }
default "0";
description
  "CIR value.";
}
leaf cbs {
  type uint64 {
    range "0..4294967295";
  }
description
  "CBS value.";
}
}
container vlan-storm-supps {
  description
  "VLAN Suppression List.";
list vlan-storm-supp {
  key "vlan-id suppress-type";
description
  "VLAN Suppression.";
leaf vlan-id {
  type mac-vlan-id;
description
  "VLAN ID.";
}
leaf suppress-type {
  type suppress-type;
description
  "Traffic suppression type.";
}
leaves cir {
    type uint64 {
        range "64..4294967295";
    }
    default "64";
    description
    "CIR value.";
}
leaf cbs {
    type uint64 {
        range "10000..4294967295";
    }
    description
    "CBS value.";
}

container sub-if-suppresss {
    description
    "Sub-interface traffic suppression list.";
    list sub-if-suppress {
        key "if-name suppress-type direction";
        description
        "Sub-Interface traffic suppression.";
        leaf if-name {
            type string;
            description
            "Sub-interface name.";
        }
        leaf suppress-type {
            type suppress-type;
            description
            "Suppression type.";
        }
        leaf direction {
            type direction-type;
            description
            "Suppression direction.";
        }
        leaf cir {
            type uint64 {
                range "0..4294967295";
            }
            default "0";
            description
            "CIR value.";
        }
    }
}
leaf cbs {
  type uint64 {
    range "0..4294967295";
  }
  description
  "CBS value.";
}

container pw-suppresss {
  description
  "PW traffic suppress list.";
  list pw-suppress {
    key "vsi-name pw-name suppress-type";
    description
    "PW traffic suppression.";
    leaf vsi-name {
      type string {
        length "1..31";
      }
      description
      "VSI name.";
    }
    leaf pw-name {
      type string {
        length "1..15";
      }
      description
      "PW name.";
    }
    leaf suppress-type {
      type suppress-type;
      description
      "Traffic suppression type.";
    }
    leaf cir {
      type uint64 {
        range "100..4294967295";
      }
      default "100";
      description
      "CIR value.";
    }
    leaf cbs {
      type uint64 {
        range "100..4294967295";
      }
      description
      "CBS value.";
    }
  }
}
"CBS value."
};
)
)

container vsi-in-suppressions {
  description
    "VSI inbound traffic suppression list.";
  list vsi-in-suppression {
    key "vsi-name";
    description
      "VSI inbound traffic suppression.";
    leaf vsi-name {
      type string {
        length "1..31"
      }
      description
        "VSI name.";
    }
    leaf inbound-supp {
      type mac-enable-status;
      default "enable";
      description
        "Inbound suppression.";
    }
  }
}

container vsi-out-suppressions {
  description
    "VSI outbound traffic suppression list.";
  list vsi-out-suppression {
    key "vsi-name";
    description
      "VSI outbound traffic suppression.";
    leaf vsi-name {
      type string {
        length "1..31"
      }
      description
        "VSI name.";
    }
    leaf out-bound-supp {
      type mac-enable-status;
      default "enable";
      description
        "Outbound suppression.";
    }
  }
}
container vsi-suppresss {
    description "VSI traffic suppression list.";
list vsi-suppress {
    key "sub-if-name";
    description "VSI traffic suppression.";
leaf vsi-name {
    type string {
        length "1..31";
    }
    mandatory true;
    description "VSI name.";
}
leaf sub-if-name {
    type string;
    description "Sub-interface name.";
}
leaf is-enable {
    type boolean;
    default "true";
    description "Enable status.";
}
leaf suppress-type {
    type suppress-style;
    default "percent";
    description "Traffic suppression type.";
}
leaf broadcast {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..200000000";
    }
    default "64";
    description "Broadcast suppression (kbit/s)";
}
leaf broadcast-percent {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..100";
    }
    default "1";
    description "Broadcast suppression percentage (in percent)";
}
"Broadcast suppression."

leaf unicast {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..200000000"
    }
    default "64";
    description
        "Unknown unicast suppression (kbit/s)."
}

leaf unicast-percent {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..100"
    }
    default "1";
    description
        "Unknown unicast suppression."
}

leaf multicast {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..200000000"
    }
    default "64";
    description
        "Multicast suppression (kbit/s)."
}

leaf multicast-percent {
    type uint32 {
        range "0..100"
    }
    default "1";
    description
        "Multicast suppression."
}

container vsi-total-numbers {
    description
        "List of MAC address total numbers in a VSI."
    list vsi-total-number {
        key "vsi-name slot-id mac-type";
        config false;
        description
            "Total number of MAC addresses in a VSI."
        leaf vsi-name {
            type string {
                length "1..31";
            }
        }
    }
}
leaf slot-id {
    type string {
        length "1..24";
    }
    description
        "Slot ID.";
}

leaf mac-type {
    type mac-type;
    description
        "MAC address type.";
}

leaf number {
    type uint32;
    mandatory true;
    description
        "Number of MAC addresses.";
}

container if-storm-supps {
    description
        "Interface traffic suppression list.";
    list if-storm-supp {
        key "if-name suppress-type";
        description
            "Interface traffic suppression.";
        leaf if-name {
            type string;
            description
                "-name of an interface. ";
        }
        leaf suppress-type {
            type suppress-type;
            description
                "Suppression type.";
        }
        leaf percent {
            type uint64 {
                range "0..99";
            }
            description
                "Percent.";
        }
    }
}
leaf packets {
    type uint64 {
        range "0..148810000";
    } 
    description
    "Packets per second.";
}
leaf cir {
    type uint64 {
        range "0..100000000";
    } 
    description
    "CIR(Kbit/s).";
}
leaf cbs {
    type uint64 {
        range "10000..4294967295";
    } 
    description
    "CBS(Bytes).";
}
}
container if-storm-blocks {
    description
    "Interface traffic block list.";
list if-storm-block {
    key "if-name block-type direction";
    description
    "Interface traffic suppression.";
    leaf if-name {
        type string;
        description
        "-name of an interface.";
    }
    leaf block-type {
        type suppress-type;
        description
        "Block type.";
    }
    leaf direction {
        type direction-type;
        description
        "Direction.";
    }
}
}
description
  "Interface storm control list.";
list if-storm-contrl {
  key "if-name";
  description
    "Interface storm control.";
leaf if-name {
    type string;
    description
      "-name of an interface. ";
  }
leaf action {
    type storm-ctrl-action-type;
    default "normal";
    description
      "Action type.";
  }
leaf trap-enable {
    type enable-type;
    default "disable";
    description
      "Trap state.";
  }
leaf log-enable {
    type enable-type;
    default "disable";
    description
      "Log state.";
  }
leaf interval {
    type uint64 {
      range "1..180";
    }
    default "5";
    description
      "Detect interval.";
  }
container if-packet-contrl-attributes {
  description
    "Storm control rate list.";
  list if-packet-contrl-attribute {
    key "packet-type";
    description
      "Storm control rate.";
    leaf packet-type {
      type storm-ctrl-type;
      description
    }
  }
}
"Packet type."
}
leaf rate-type {
  type storm-ctrl-rate-type;
  default "pps";
  description
    "Storm control rate type."
}
leaf min-rate {
  type uint32 {
    range "1..148810000";
  }
  mandatory true;
  description
    "Storm control min rate."
}
leaf max-rate {
  type uint64 {
    range "1..148810000";
  }
  mandatory true;
  description
    "Storm control max rate."
}
}
}
container ifstorm-contrl-infos {
  description
    "Storm control info list."
list ifstorm-contrl-info {
  key "packet-type";
  config false;
  description
    "Storm control info";
leaf packet-type {
  type storm-ctrl-type;
  description
    "Packet type."
}
leaf punish-status {
  type storm-ctrl-action-type;
  description
    "Storm control status."
}
leaf last-punish-time {
  type string {
    length "1..50";
  }
6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

7. Security Considerations

To be added.

8. Acknowledgements

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


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