

RFC 6775 Extension

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IETF 103

Bangkok

Unmet expectations

- Solicited node multicast requires highly scalable L2 multicast
 IEEE does not provide it => turns everything into broadcast
 IPv6 ND appears to work with broadcast on 802.1 fabrics up to some scale ~10K nodes
- IPv6 ND requires reliable and cheap broadcast
 Radios do not provide that => conserving 802.1 properties over wireless is illusory
 RFC 4862 cannot operate as designed on wireless
 Address uniqueness is an unguaranteed side effect of entropy
- 802.11 expects proxy operation and broadcast domain separation 802.11 provides a registration and proxy bridging at L2 Requires the same at L3, which does not exist Implementations provide proprietary techniques based on snooping => widely imperfect
 - ⇒ RFC 6775 solves the problem for DAD in one LL
 - ⇒ This update enable establishing proxy services directly (ND for now), over a LLN, across multiple LLNs

What are the 6LoWPAN ND extensions?


Provide for draft-thubert-6lo-rfc6775-update-reqs


- draft-ietf-6lo-rfc6775-update
 - Simplifies the protocol (no DAR/DAC for LL, no secondary NC)
 - Enables proxy registration
- draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd
 - Protects addresses against theft (Crypto ID in registration)
- draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router
 - Federates 6lo meshes over a high speed backbone
 - ND proxy that mimics 802.11 association but at Layer 3




RFC 6775 Update

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CISCO

Current status

RFC 6775 Update

Draft-...-21

Past IESG review (based on -21)

IANA steps

https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml#icmpv6-parameters-codes-type-157-code-suffix

- Done RFC Editor disambiguations
- RFC Editor state: RFC-EDITOR *
 - * Awaiting final RFC Editor review before AUTH48




draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd

P.Thubert, B. Sarikaya, M Sethi, R. Struik

Unmet expectations

- First come first Serve address registration
 First registration for an address owns that address till it releases it
 The network prevents hijacking
- Source address validation
 Address must be topologically correct
 Source of the packet owns the source address
- First Hop Security only?
 Proxy ownership and routing advertisements not protected yet



Recent changes

- Published -08
- René Struik joined as contributing author
- Updated the computation of the Crypto-ID
 Crypto-Id in EARO is a truncated hash of the node's public-key Digital signature (SHA-256/NIST P-256 or SHA-512/EdDSA) in NDPSO is executed on additional material (nonces, etc..., see updated section 6.2) for proof of ownership of the private key Uses both nonces from the 6LN and 6LR
- Removed SHA-256 for EdCSA to comply with RFC 8032.

Security properties

- We made the size of the ROVR tunable so we can get high security. 64 bits seems inappropriate.
- At the moment a joining 6LN is challenged from the 6LR
 The 6LBR MUST trust the 6LR
 - A rogue 6LR may pretend that it represents a 6LN that passed the challenge
 - Should we challenge all the way from the 6LBR?
 - Can the Crypto-ID be used in routing protocols, how?

Questions to the group

- Should we RECOMMEND larger than 64 bits ROVR?
- Should we allow RFC 8032 divergence for SHA 256? This allows smaller foot print in an implementation that does both Shall we face resistance?
- What's missing before WGLC?



draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router


P.Thubert


Unmet expectations

- Scale an IOT subnet to the tens of thousands
 With device mobility (no renumbering)
 Controlled Latency and higher Reliability using a backbone
- Deterministic Address presence
 Route towards the latest location of an address
 Remove stale addresses

Recent changes

- Published -08
- Charlie Perkins joined as contributing author
- Clean up and reorg by Charlie
- Readable, ready for WGLC





6BBR Status

- Quite Stable, no recent change
- WGLC is needed to make final progress