Secondary Certificates

Solving the Easier-to-Attack problem


Secondary Certs Are Easier To Attack

Misissued certs are less traceable

- Without: Attacker needs cert containing both attacker's domain and victim domain; this cert will appear in CT logs
- With: Attacker can use separate certs for the two domains, with no recorded link between them in CT logs

Compromised certs are easier to use

- Without: Attacker needs to hijack a TCP connection
 - Subvert IP routing or DNS resolution
- With: Attacker needs to induce navigation to an attacker-controlled origin




- Explicit statement of primary certificate
- Have to either:
 - Successfully predict which domain will get the first connection
 - List the full set of domains in each certificate
- Doesn't permit CDNs to coalesce across customers

Beyond the Cert's Authority

- Want a pool of server certificates which can be used on a connection
 - Require a path from a new secondary certificate to the certificate in TLS
 - Don't require listing the full set of primary certificate domains
- Use a new extension containing some property a CA can validate
 - Probably still a domain name
- Want to support multiple use cases:
 - Origins with many domains
 - CDNs which manage certificates for customers look like this
 - CDNs where customers bring certificates

Beyond Secondary-to-Primary

- Customers won't (and shouldn't) add other customers to their certificates
- CDNs want to coalesce across unrelated domains they serve
- => Need to be able to satisfy Requires from another Secondary Cert



That Light At the End of the Tunnel...?

One option

- CDN proves ownership of affiliated domain
- CDN signs token consenting to inclusion in new certificate
- Customer presents token when requesting certificate
- Customer gives certificate to CDN


Simple attack

- Premise: Customer certificate affiliated with CDN is already compromised
- Attacker signs up as customer of CDN
- Attacker keeps the certificate affiliated with the CDN
- Induced navigation sufficient to use compromised certificate, *quod erat praeventio*


David Wheeler

All problems in computer science can be solved by another level of indirection.





- Certificates indicate an affiliation which must already be proven
- Multi-cert origins put both extensions in all certificates
- CDN customers put only one extension in their certificates



- CDN customers put only one extension in their certificates
- CDNs need to prove the CDN identity before using another customer's certs
 - One additional ExpAuth

Hard Hat Warning

- Exactly what's in these extensions
 - Single value, or list of values?
 - Domains only, or same types as supported by subjectAltName?
- Chaining rules
 - BYOC doesn't work if you can't meet the requirement with a previous Secondary Cert
 - Having to search all names for all previous certs for a match is a pain
 - Particularly if the list of things to look for is any of several values
- CA Amenability