

# Security Classes For Software Updates for IoT

draft-urien-suit-security-classes-00.txt

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# Scope


- This draft attempts to define security classes for devices targeted by SUIP protocols.
- A device security is characterized by five boolean security attributes: firmware loader (FLD), one time programmable memory (OTP), secure firmware loader (FLD-SEC), tamper resistant key (TRT-KEY) and diversified key (DIV-KEY).
  - More Attributes needed ?
- This classification creates 18 device classes.
- {FLD, OTP, FLD-SEC, TRT-KEY, DIV-KEY}

# Goal


- This draft attempts to define security classes for devices targeted by SUIP protocols.
- The goal is to provide a qualitative estimation of *risks* induced by firmware remote updates according to device logical and hardware security resources.

# Device Architecture

Main Processor




Communication Processor



Non Volatile Memory

One Time Programmable Memory

Physical Protocols



FML=1  
Firmware Loader  
"BootLoader"

One Time Programmable Memory, OTP=0/1

Secure Firmware Loader, FLD-SEC = 0/1

Tamper Resistant Key, TRT-KEY= 0/1

Diversified Key, DIV-KEY =0/1

Exemple Bank Card = { 1,1,1,1,1}

Is it possible to erase  
the bootloader ?

Symmetric  
Asymmetric  
Certificate  
Post -Quantum Crypto  
Side Channel Attacks  
enable key recovery

The use of diversified secrets keys limits  
the side channel attack effect to a single  
device

# Questions