

EAP-NOOB : Nimble Out-of-Band Authentication for EAP

– Bootstrapping security for
smart appliances


Tuomas Aura, Aalto University

Mohit Sethi, Ericsson Research

various other contributors

EAP-NOOB: Nimble Out-of-Band Authentication for EAP


[draft-aura-eap-noob](#)




What problems EAP-NOOB solves?

- **EAP method** for deploying IoT devices out-of-the-box, with no pre-configured identity or credentials and without professional administration
- **User-assisted out-of-band (OOB) authentication method for EAP**
 - E.g. scanning a dynamic QR code, dynamic NDEF tag
- **One-step process to get Wi-Fi access + register new device**
 - + link device to user account (optional)
 - + bootstrap application-layer security (optional)
 - Current EAP methods require peer to be pre-registered

EAP-NOOB architecture




EAP-NOOB architecture




EAP tunnel and AAA routing enable in-band communication with the authentication server *before* the device is registered


EAP-NOOB architecture




EAP-NOOB protocol




EAP-NOOB protocol



EAP-NOOB protocol



EAP-NOOB protocol: Reconnect



After successful OOB step,
persistent association is created.
OOB step is *not* repeated

EAP-NOOB security

Minimal assumptions on OOB channel:


- One OOB message in either direction
- OOB channel may provide only integrity or secrecy
 - If no secrecy, user must note failure of one endpoint to accept the OOB message and reset the other endpoint

Resist denial-of-service by man-in-the-middle:



- Avoid persistent failure caused by limited number of dropped or tampered messages

Use case: secure
bootstrapping of cloud-
managed displays

EAP-NOOB user experience example



EAP-NOOB in the background



Some security design
details

OOB message details

- Short and convenient OOB message format
- OOB message contents:

PeerId = server-allocated peer identifier

Noob = secret nonce (16 bytes)

Hoob = hash of ECDHE parameters (16 bytes)

- OOB message can be encoded as URL:

```
https://example.com/Noob?P=ZrD7qkczNoHGbGcN2bN0&N=rMinS04F4EfcU8D91jxX_A&H=QvnMp4UGxuQVFaxPW_14UW
```

- URL output e.g. in **dynamic QR code** or **NDEF tag**
- OOB security requirements:
 - **Noob confidentiality** must be protected, **or**
 - **Hoob integrity** must be protected

Identifier allocation

- Must not rely on unauthenticated identifiers provided by the device
- Need to avoid **identifier squatting**
- EAP-NOOB solution:
 - Peer is initially anonymous: fixed NAI
noob@eap-noob.net
 - Server allocates new PeerId in every Initial Exchange
 - User may name devices at server UI

Cryptosuite upgrade

- Common solution: Upgrade of long-term credentials (e.g. certificate) requires admin action
- EAP-NOOB solution:
 - Avoid user action (new OOB step) at all cost
 - Reconnect Exchange may negotiate a new cryptosuite and update the persistent association keys

but this leads to another problem...

Dropped last messages

- If last message of the Reconnect is dropped during cryptosuite upgrade, peer moves to new cryptosuite while server keeps old one
- Man-in-the-middle attacker can drop messages for DoS
- Unavoidable problem in distributed systems
 - EAP retransmission does not help
 - Adding another ack message would not help
- EAP-NOOB solution:
 - Peer willing to roll back to old cryptosuite until the next attempted rekeying when it receives confirmation that server has upgraded (or not)
 - Server never rolls back
 - Cryptosuite upgrade completes when the packet-dropping attacker goes away
 - DoS resistance verified in mCRL2 model

Multiple OOB messages

- Peer device may have **multiple OOB messages in flight**, by the same or different user
- Peer may support **both peer-to-server and server-to-peer directions** for the OOB message
 - not encouraged for usability reasons
- If peer tries to connect to multiple wireless networks in parallel, **multiple users** may deliver OOB messages to **different servers**
- EAP-NOOB solution:
 - The first delivered OOB message wins
 - If two OOB messages delivered at the same time in different directions, server-to-peer message wins
 - The first server to complete wins
 - Deadlock freedom verified in mCRL2 model

Summary

What is the trick?

- Tricks in EAP-NOOB
 - Thanks to **in-band communication over EAP**, we only need **one short OOB message**, in either peer-to-server or server-to-peer direction
 - OOB message designed so that either **secrecy** or **integrity** is sufficient for security
- Is there a catch?
 - Requires Wi-Fi with WPAx-Enterprise (better for IoT devices anyway)
 - **Network admin has to choose one AAA server for device bootstrapping in that network**

EAP-NOOB Summary

- EAP method with user-assisted OOB authentication for bootstrapping security of smart appliances
- Current version: [draft-aura-eap-noob-04](#)
- Your reviews and feedback are welcome!

Questions to SecDispatch:

- EAP-NOOB currently individual submission, needs a WG
- EMU WG is the closest match, but its charter currently does not cover EAP-NOOB

Backup slides

Comparison to...

- Configuring the peer offline with all it needs
 - Peer UI may have only output and no suitable input
- Simply transferring a secret key to/from the peer?
 - OOB channel may be vulnerable to spying. EAP-NOOB can work with only integrity
- Static QR code with hash of device public key
 - EAP-NOOB establishes two-way trust
 - EAP-NOOB assigns a network and owner to the device
- Reading and writing configuration data over NFC
 - EAP-NOOB only requires one OOB message in one direction
 - EAP-NOOB supports a variety of OOB channels incl. NFC
- Home networks with shared passphrase
 - Devices need to be managed and revoked individually; WPA-Enterprise is better

Bootstrapping application security

- Network connectivity and association with application server in one step
- AAA server may be integrated with application-layer device management
 - Can export keys to application layer
 - Can convey initial app-layer configuration to peer
- Compare with entering wireless credentials and then application-layer cloud credentials

Persistent association

- **Must avoid rerun of user-assisted authentication** (OOB step) at all cost
- EAP-NOOB solution:
 - After OOB message delivered and Completion takes place, peer and server create **persistent association**
 - Future authentication requires no user interaction
 - User reset is the only way to move back to initial state

Roaming support

- **Devices may need to roam** like personal computers, e.g. in Eduroam
 - Feature requested by Josh Howlett (Jisc.ac.uk)
- EAP-NOOB solution:
 - Server sends to peer a **list of SSIDs** where the persistent association is valid
 - Peer uses server-allocated **PeerId@Realm** for future authentications

Wireless network selection

- Out-of-the-box peer does not know the current wireless network or AAA server – how to discover?
- EAP-NOOB solution 1:
 - Peer device scans all wireless networks for EAP-NOOB support, performs Initial Exchange with all
 - Peer device outputs multiple OOB messages (e.g. alternative QR codes)
 - User typically only knows one AAA server and delivers the OOB message to/from it
- EAP-NOOB solution 2:
 - User selects SSID on peer device

Isolating devices on access network

- In typical use of EAP-NOOB:
 - users can register new peer devices to network
 - remote AAA trusted to register new devices for wireless access
 - corrupt IoT device could share its access credentials
- These devices probably should be put into a VLAN and isolated from other local network hosts
 - Local AAA can signal APs to do this
- Isolation of devices from each other on VLAN possible but not supported on most Wi-Fi networks
- Not for us to solve, but something to keep in mind