Abstract

This document describes a network architecture that provides low-latency, low-jitter and high-reliability packet delivery. It combines a high-speed powered backbone and subnetworks using IEEE 802.15.4 time-slotted channel hopping (TSCH) to meet the requirements of LowPower wireless deterministic applications.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 2, 2019.

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# Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Terms and References ........................................... 4
   2.1. Terminology ............................................. 4
   2.2. Abbreviations ............................................ 10
   2.3. References ............................................... 11
3. High Level Architecture ........................................ 12
   3.1. A Non-Broadcast Multi-Access Radio Mesh Network .......... 12
   3.2. A Multi-Link Subnet Model ............................... 13
   3.3. TSCH: A Deterministic MAC Layer ........................ 15
   3.4. Scheduling TSCH ......................................... 15
   3.5. Distributed vs. Centralized Routing ....................... 17
   3.6. Forwarding Over TSCH .................................... 18
   3.7. 6TiSCH Stack ............................................ 19
4. Architecture Components ......................................... 21
   4.1. 6LoWPAN (and RPL) ....................................... 21
   4.1.1. RPL-Unaware Leaves and 6LoWPAN ND ................. 21
   4.1.2. RPL Root And 6LBR .................................... 21
   4.2. Network Access and Addressing ............................ 22
   4.2.1. Join Process ......................................... 22
   4.2.2. Registration .......................................... 24
   4.3. TSCH and 6top ............................................ 26
   4.3.1. 6top .................................................. 26
   4.3.2. Scheduling Functions and the 6top protocol .......... 27
   4.3.3. 6top and RPL Objective Function operations .......... 29
   4.3.4. Network Synchronization ................................ 29
   4.3.5. SlotFrames and CDU matrix ............................ 31
   4.3.6. Distributing the reservation of cells ............... 32
   4.4. Communication Paradigms and Interaction Models ......... 33
4.5. Schedule Management Mechanisms ............................. 34
   4.5.1. Static Scheduling ..................................... 34
   4.5.2. Neighbor-to-neighbor Scheduling ....................... 34
   4.5.3. Remote Monitoring and Schedule Management ........... 35
   4.5.4. Hop-by-hop Scheduling ................................ 37
4.6. On Tracks .................................................. 37
   4.6.1. General Behavior of Tracks ............................ 38
   4.6.2. Serial Track .......................................... 38
   4.6.3. Complex Track with Replication and Elimination .... 39
   4.6.4. DetNet End-to-end Path ............................... 39
   4.6.5. Cell Reuse ............................................ 40
4.7. Forwarding Models ........................................... 41
   4.7.1. Track Forwarding ...................................... 41
   4.7.2. IPv6 Forwarding ....................................... 44
   4.7.3. Fragment Forwarding ................................... 44
4.8. Advanced 6TiSCH Routing ..................................... 46
   4.8.1. Packet Marking and Handling ........................... 46
   4.8.2. Replication, Retries and Elimination ................. 47
1. Introduction

Wireless Networks enable a wide variety of devices of any size to get interconnected, often at a very low marginal cost per device, at any range, and in circumstances where wiring may be impractical, for instance on fast-moving or rotating devices.

On the other hand, Deterministic Networking maximizes the packet delivery ratio within a bounded latency so as to enable mission-critical machine-to-machine (M2M) operations. Applications that need such networks are presented in [I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases]. They include Professional Media and Operation Technology (OT) Industrial Automation Control Systems (IACS).

The Timeslotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) [RFC7554] mode of the IEEE Std 802.15.4 [IEEE802154] Medium Access Control (MAC) was introduced with the IEEE Std 802.15.4e [IEEE802154e] amendment and is now retrofitted in the main standard. For all practical purposes, this document is expected to be insensitive to the revisions of that standard, which is thus referenced undated. TSCH is both a Time-Division Multiplexing and a Frequency-Division Multiplexing technique whereby a different channel can be used for each transmission, and that allows to schedule transmissions for deterministic operations.

Proven Deterministic Networking standards for use in Process Control, including ISA100.11a [ISA100.11a] and WirelessHART [WirelessHART], have demonstrated the capabilities of the IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH MAC for high reliability against interference, low-power consumption on well-known flows, and its applicability for Traffic Engineering (TE) from a central controller.

In order to enable the convergence of IT and OT in Low-Power Lossy Networks (LLNs), the 6TiSCH Architecture supports an IETF suite of protocols over the TSCH MAC to provide IP connectivity for energy and otherwise constrained wireless devices.
6TiSCH provides large scaling capabilities, which, in a number of scenarios, require the addition of a high-speed and reliable backbone and the use of IP version 6 (IPv6).

The 6TiSCH Architecture introduces an IPv6 Multi-Link subnet model that is composed of a federating backbone, e.g., an Ethernet bridged network, and a number of IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH low-power wireless networks federated and synchronized by Backbone Routers.

Centralized routing refers to a model where routes are computed and resources are allocated from a central controller. This is particularly helpful to schedule deterministic multihop transmissions. Distributed is a concurrent model that relies in more classical peer to peer protocols for TSCH resource allocation and routing operations.

The architecture defines mechanisms to establish and maintain routing and scheduling in a centralized, distributed, or mixed fashion, for use in multiple OT environments. It is applicable in particular to highly scalable solutions such as Advance metering that leverage distributed routing to address multipath over a large number of hops and nodes.

Other use cases includes industrial control systems, building automation, in-vehicle command and control, commercial automation and asset tracking with mobile scenarios, and home automation applications. The determinism provides for a more reliable experience which can be used to monitor and manage resources, e.g., energy and water, in a more efficient fashion.

2. Terms and References

2.1. Terminology

The draft does not reuse terms from the IEEE Std 802.15.4 [IEEE802154] standard such as "path" or "link" which bear a meaning that is quite different from classical IETF parlance.

This document adds the following terms:

6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e): 6TiSCH defines an adaptation sublayer for IPv6 over TSCH called 6top, a set of protocols for setting up a TSCH schedule in distributed approach, and a security solution. 6TiSCH may be extended in the future for other MACPHY pairs providing a service similar to TSCH.
6top (6TiSCH Operation Sublayer): The next higher layer of the IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH MAC layer. 6top provides the abstraction of an IP link over a TSCH MAC, schedules packets over TSCH cells, and exposes a management interface to schedule TSCH cells.

6P (6top Protocol): The protocol defined in [RFC8480]. 6P enables Layer-2 peers to allocate, move or deallocate cells in their respective schedules in order to communicate. 6P operates at the 6top layer.

6P Transaction: A 2-way or 3-way sequence of 6P messages used by Layer-2 peers to modify their communication schedule.

ASN (Absolute Slot Number): The total number of timeslots that have elapsed since the PAN coordinator has started the TSCH network. Incremented by one at each timeslot. It is wide enough to not roll over in practice.

bundle: A group of equivalent scheduled cells, i.e. cells identified by different [slotOffset, channelOffset], which are scheduled for a same purpose, with the same neighbor, with the same flags, and the same slotframe. The size of the bundle refers to the number of cells it contains. For a given slotframe length, the size of the bundle translates directly into bandwidth. A bundle is a local abstraction that represents a half-duplex link for either sending or receiving, with bandwidth that amounts to the sum of the cells in the bundle.

Layer-2 vs. Layer-3 bundle: Bundles are associated for either Layer-2 (switching) or Layer-3 (routing) forwarding operations. A pair of Layer-3 bundles (one for each direction) maps to an IP Link with a neighbor, whereas a set of Layer-2 bundles (a number per neighbor, either from or to the neighbor) corresponds to the relation of one or more incoming bundle(s) from the previous-hop neighbor(s) with one or more outgoing bundle(s) to the next-hop neighbor(s) along a Track.

CCA (Clear Channel Assessment): A mechanism defined in [IEEE802154] whereby nodes listen to the channel before sending, in order to detect ongoing transmissions from other parties. Because the network is synchronized, CCA cannot be used to detect colliding transmissions within the same network, but it can be used to detect other radio networks in vicinity.
cell: A unit of transmission resource in the CDU matrix, a cell is identified by a slotOffset and a channelOffset. A cell can be scheduled or unscheduled.

Channel Distribution/Usage (CDU) matrix: A matrix of cells \((i,j)\) representing the spectrum (channel) distribution among the different nodes in the 6TiSCH network. The CDU matrix has width in timeslots, equal to the period of the network scheduling operation, and height equal to the number of available channels. Every cell \((i,j)\) in the CDU, identified by \((\text{slotOffset}, \text{channelOffset})\), belongs to a specific chunk.

channelOffset: Identifies a row in the TSCH schedule. The number of channelOffset values is bounded by the number of available frequencies. The channelOffset translates into a frequency with a function that depends on the absolute time when the communication takes place, resulting in a channel hopping operation.

chunk: A well-known list of cells, distributed in time and frequency, within a CDU matrix. A chunk represents a portion of a CDU matrix. The partition of the CDU matrix in chunks is globally known by all the nodes in the network to support the appropriation process, which is a negotiation between nodes within an interference domain. A node that manages to appropriate a chunk gets to decide which transmissions will occur over the cells in the chunk within its interference domain (i.e., a parent node will decide when the cells within the appropriated chunk are used and by which node, among its children.

CoJP (Constrained Join Protocol): The Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) enables a pledge to securely join a 6TiSCH network and obtain network parameters over a secure channel. In the minimal setup with pre-shared keys defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], CoJP can operate with a single round trip exchange.

dedicated cell: A cell that is reserved for a given node to transmit to a specific neighbor.

deterministic network: The generic concept of deterministic network is defined in [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture]. When applied to 6TiSCH, it refers to the reservation of Tracks which guarantee an end-to-end latency and optimize the PDR for well-characterized flows.
distributed cell reservation: A reservation of a cell done by one or more in-network entities.

distributed Track reservation: A reservation of a Track done by one or more in-network entities.

EB (Enhanced Beacon): A special frame defined in [IEEE802154] used by a node, including the JP, to announce the presence of the network. It contains enough information for a pledge to synchronize to the network.

hard cell: A scheduled cell which the 6top sublayer may not relocate.

hopping sequence: Ordered sequence of frequencies, identified by a Hopping_Sequence_ID, used for channel hopping when translating the channel offset value into a frequency.

IE (Information Element): Type-Length-Value containers placed at the end of the MAC header, used to pass data between layers or devices. Some IE identifiers are managed by the IEEE [IEEE802154]. Some IE identifiers are managed by the IETF [RFC8137].

join process: The overall process that includes the discovery of the network by pledge(s) and the execution of the join protocol.

join protocol: The protocol that allows the pledge to join the network. The join protocol encompasses authentication, authorization and parameter distribution. The join protocol is executed between the pledge and the JRC.

joined node: The new device, after having completed the join process, often just called a node.

JP (Join Proxy): Node already part of the 6TiSCH network that serves as a relay to provide connectivity between the pledge and the JRC. The JP announces the presence of the network by regularly sending EB frames.

JRC (Join Registrar/Coordinator): Central entity responsible for the authentication, authorization and configuration of the pledge.

link: A communication facility or medium over which nodes can communicate at the Link-Layer, the layer immediately below IP. In 6TiSCH, the concept is implemented as a
collection of Layer-3 bundles. Note: the IETF parlance for the term "Link" is adopted, as opposed to the IEEE Std 802.15.4 terminology.

pledge: A new device that attempts to join a 6TiSCH network.

(to) relocate a cell: The action operated by the 6top sublayer of changing the slotOffset and/or channelOffset of a soft cell.

(to) schedule a cell: The action of turning an unscheduled cell into a scheduled cell.

scheduled cell: A cell which is assigned a neighbor MAC address (broadcast address is also possible), and one or more of the following flags: TX, RX, shared, timeskeeping. A scheduled cell can be used by the IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH implementation to communicate. A scheduled cell can either be a hard or a soft cell.

SF (6top Scheduling Function): The cell management entity that adds or deletes cells dynamically based on application networking requirements. The cell negotiation with a neighbor is done using 6P.

SFID (6top Scheduling Function Identifier): A 4-bit field identifying an SF.

shared cell: A cell marked with both the "TX" and "shared" flags. This cell can be used by more than one transmitter node. A back-off algorithm is used to resolve contention.

slotframe: A collection of timeslots repeating in time, analogous to a superframe in that it defines periods of communication opportunities. It is characterized by a slotframe_ID, and a slotframe_size. Multiple slotframes can coexist in a node’s schedule, i.e., a node can have multiple activities scheduled in different slotframes, based on the priority of its packets/traffic flows. The timeslots in the Slotframe are indexed by the SlotOffset; the first timeslot is at SlotOffset 0.

slotOffset: A column in the TSCH schedule, i.e. the number of timeslots since the beginning of the current iteration of the slotframe.

soft cell: A scheduled cell which the 6top sublayer can relocate.
time source neighbor: A neighbor that a node uses as its time reference, and to which it needs to keep its clock synchronized.

timeslot: A basic communication unit in TSCH which allows a transmitter node to send a frame to a receiver neighbor, and that receiver neighbor to optionally send back an acknowledgment.

Track: A Track is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that is used as a complex multi-hop path to the destination(s) of the path. In the case of unicast traffic, the Track is a Destination Oriented DAG (DODAG) where the root of the DODAG is the destination of the unicast traffic. A Track enables replication, elimination and reordering functions on the way (more on those functions in the Deterministic Networking Architecture [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture]). A Track reservation locks physical resources such as cells and buffers in every node along the DODAG. A Track is associated with a owner that can be for instance the destination of the Track.

TrackID: A TrackID is either globally unique, or locally unique to the Track owner, in which case the identification of the owner must be provided together with the TrackID to provide a full reference to the Track. If the Track owner is the destination of the Track then the destination IP address of packets along the Track can be used as identification of the owner and a local InstanceID [RFC6550] can be used as TrackID. In that case, a RPL Packet Information [RFC6550] in an IPv6 packet can unambiguously identify the Track and can be expressed in a compressed form using [RFC8138].

TSCH: A medium access mode of the IEEE Std 802.15.4 [IEEE802154] standard which uses time synchronization to achieve ultra-low-power operation, and channel hopping to enable high reliability.

TSCH Schedule: A matrix of cells, each cell indexed by a slotOffset and a channelOffset. The TSCH schedule contains all the scheduled cells from all slotframes and is sufficient to qualify the communication in the TSCH network. The number of channelOffset values (the "height" of the matrix) is equal to the number of available frequencies.

Unscheduled Cell: A cell which is not used by the IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH implementation.
2.2. Abbreviations

This document uses the following abbreviations:

6BBR: 6LoWPAN Backbone Router (router with a proxy ND function)

6LBR: 6LoWPAN Border Router (authoritative on DAD)

6LN: 6LoWPAN Node

6LR: 6LoWPAN Router (relay to the registration process)

6CIO: Capability Indication Option

(E)ARO: (Extended) Address Registration Option

(E)DAR: (Extended) Duplicate Address Request

(E)DAC: (Extended) Duplicate Address Confirmation

DAD: Duplicate Address Detection

DODAG: Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph

LLN: Low-Power and Lossy Network (a typical IoT network)

NA: Neighbor Advertisement

NCE: Neighbor Cache Entry

ND: Neighbor Discovery

NDP: Neighbor Discovery Protocol

NS: Neighbor Solicitation

ROVR: Registration Ownership Verifier (pronounced rover)

RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for LLNs (pronounced ripple)

RA: Router Advertisement

RS: Router Solicitation

TSCH: timeslotted Channel Hopping

TID: Transaction ID (a sequence counter in the EARO)
The draft also conforms to the terms and models described in
[RFC3444] and [RFC5889] and uses the vocabulary and the concepts
defined in [RFC4291] for the IPv6 Architecture and refers [RFC4080]
for reservation

The draft uses domain-specific terminology defined or referenced in:

"Neighbor Discovery Optimization for Low-power and Lossy Networks"
[RFC6775],

"Registration Extensions for 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery"
[RFC8505],

"Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs)"
[RFC7102],

"Objective Function Zero for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power
and Lossy Networks (RPL)" [RFC6552], and

"RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks"
[RFC6550].

Other terms in use in LLNs are found in "Terminology for Constrained-
Node Networks" [RFC7228].

Readers are expected to be familiar with all the terms and concepts
that are discussed in

- "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6" [RFC4861], and
- "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration" [RFC4862].

In addition, readers would benefit from reading:

- "Problem Statement and Requirements for IPv6 over Low-Power
  Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Routing" [RFC6606],
- "Multi-Link Subnet Issues" [RFC4903], and
- "IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
  Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals" [RFC4919]

prior to this specification for a clear understanding of the art in
ND-proxying and binding.
3. High Level Architecture

3.1. A Non-Broadcast Multi-Access Radio Mesh Network

A 6TiSCH network is an IPv6 [RFC8200] subnet which, in its basic configuration illustrated in Figure 1, is a single Low-Power Lossy Network (LLN) operating over a synchronized TSCH-based mesh.

```
    +-----+   +-----+   +-----+   +-----+
    | NME |   | PCE |   |     |   |     |
    |     |   |     |   |     |   |     |
    +-----+   +-----+   +-----+   +-----+
       |  o  o  o  o  |
       | o  o  o  o  |
       | o  o  o  o  |
       | o  o  o  o  |
       +-----+   +-----+

Figure 1: Basic Configuration of a 6TiSCH Network
```

Inside a 6TiSCH LLN, nodes rely on 6LoWPAN Header Compression (6LoWPAN HC) [RFC6282] to encode IPv6 packets. From the perspective of the network layer, a single LLN interface (typically an IEEE Std 802.15.4-compliant radio) may be seen as a collection of Links with different capabilities for unicast or multicast services.

In a mesh network, 6TiSCH nodes are not necessarily reachable from one another at Layer-2 and an LLN may span over multiple links.

This forms an homogeneous non-broadcast multi-access (NBMA) subnet, which is beyond the scope of IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (IPv6 ND) [RFC4861][RFC4862]. Extensions to IPv6 ND were introduced with 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery (6LoWPAN ND) [RFC6775][RFC8505]. Within an NBMA subnet, 6LoWPAN ND enables an address registration to avoid address duplication, and RPL [RFC6550] enables routing in the so-called Route Over fashion, either in storing (stateful) or non-storing (stateless, with routing headers) mode.

6TiSCH nodes join the mesh by attaching to nodes that are already members of the mesh. Some nodes act as routers for 6LoWPAN ND and RPL operations, as detailed in Section 4.1. Security aspects of the join process by which a device obtains access to the network are discussed in Section 6.
With TSCH, devices are time-synchronized at the MAC level. The use of a particular RPL Instance for time synchronization is discussed in Section 4.3.4. With this mechanism, the time synchronization starts at the RPL root and follows the RPL loopless routing topology.

RPL forms Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAGs) within Instances of the protocol, each Instance being associated with an Objective Function (OF) to form a routing topology. A particular 6TiSCH node, the LLN Border Router (6LBR), acts as RPL root, 6LoWPAN HC terminator, and Border Router for the LLN to the outside. The 6LBR is usually powered. More on RPL Instances can be found in section 3.1 of RPL [RFC6550], in particular "3.1.2. RPL Identifiers" and "3.1.3. Instances, DODAGs, and DODAG Versions". RPL adds artifacts in the data packets that are compressed with a 6LoWPAN addition 6LoRH [RFC8138].

Additional routing and scheduling protocols may be deployed to establish on-demand Peer-to-Peer routes with particular characteristics inside the 6TiSCH network. This may be achieved in a centralized fashion by a PCE [PCE] that programs both the routes and the schedules inside the 6TiSCH nodes, or by in a distributed fashion using a reactive routing protocol and a Hop-by-Hop scheduling protocol.

This architecture expects that a 6LoWPAN node can connect as a leaf to a RPL network, where the leaf support is the minimal functionality to connect as a host to a RPL network without the need to participate to the full routing protocol. The architecture also expects that a 6LoWPAN node that is not aware at all of the RPL protocol may also connect as described in [I-D.thubert-roll-unaware-leaves].

3.2. A Multi-Link Subnet Model

An extended configuration of the subnet comprises multiple LLNs as illustrated in Figure 2. In the extended configuration, a Routing Registrar [RFC8505] may be connected to the node that acts as RPL root and / or 6LoWPAN 6LBR and provides connectivity to the larger campus / factory plant network over a high-speed backbone or a backhaul link. The Routing registrar may perform IPv6 ND proxy operations, or redistribute the registration in a routing protocol such as OSPF [RFC5340] or BGP [RFC2545], or inject a route in a mobility protocol such as MIPv6 [RFC6275], NEMO [RFC3963], or LISP [RFC6830].

Multiple LLNs can be interconnected and possibly synchronized over a backbone, which can be wired or wireless. The backbone can operate with IPv6 ND [RFC4862] procedures or an hybrid of IPv6 ND and 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775] [RFC8505].
A Routing Registrar that performs proxy IPv6 ND operations over the backbone on behalf of the 6TiSCH nodes is called a Backbone Router (6BBR) [I-D.ietf-6lo-backbone-router]. The 6BBRs are placed along the wireless edge of a Backbone, and federate multiple wireless links to form a single MultiLink Subnet. The 6BBRs synchronize with one another over the backbone, so as to ensure that the multiple LLNs that form the IPv6 subnet stay tightly synchronized.

A 6LBR located on the backbone may contribute to Duplicate Address Detection as well as Address Lookup and save multicast operations [I-D.thubert-6lo-unicast-lookup].

As detailed in Section 4.1 the 6LBR that serves the LLN and the root of the RPL network need to share information about the devices that are learned through either protocol but not both. The preferred way of achieving this is to collocate/combine them. The combined RPL root and 6LBR may be collocated with the 6BBR, or directly attached to the 6BBR. In the latter case, it leverages the extended registration process defined in [RFC8505] to proxy the 6LoWPAN ND registration to the 6BBR on behalf of the LLN nodes, so that the 6BBR may in turn perform proxy classical ND operations over the backbone.

The DetNet Architecture [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture] studies Layer-3 aspects of Deterministic Networks, and covers networks that span multiple Layer-2 domains. If the Backbone is Deterministic (such as defined by the Time Sensitive Networking WG at IEEE), then the Backbone Router ensures that the end-to-end deterministic behavior is maintained between the LLN and the backbone.
3.3. TSCH: A Deterministic MAC Layer

Though at a different time scale (several orders of magnitude), both IEEE Std 802.1TSN and IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH standards provide deterministic capabilities to the point that a packet that pertains to a certain flow may traverse a network from node to node following a precise schedule, as a train that enters and then leaves intermediate stations at precise times along its path.

With TSCH, time is formatted into timeslots, and individual communication cells are allocated to unicast or broadcast communication at the MAC level. The time-slotted operation reduces collisions, saves energy, and enables to more closely engineer the network for deterministic properties. The channel hopping aspect is a simple and efficient technique to combat multipath fading and co-channel interference.

6TiSCH builds on the IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH MAC and inherits its advanced capabilities to enable them in multiple environments where they can be leveraged to improve automated operations. The 6TiSCH Architecture also inherits the capability to perform a centralized route computation to achieve deterministic properties, though it relies on the IETF DetNet Architecture [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture], and IETF components such as the Path Computation Element (PCE) [PCE], for the protocol aspects.

On top of this inheritance, 6TiSCH adds capabilities for distributed routing and scheduling operations based on the RPL routing protocol and capabilities to negotiate schedule adjustments between peers. These distributed routing and scheduling operations simplify the deployment of TSCH networks and enable wireless solutions in a larger variety of use cases from operational technology in general. Examples of such use-cases in industrial environments include plant setup and decommissioning, as well as monitoring of lots of lesser importance measurements such as corrosion and events and mobile workers accessing local devices.

3.4. Scheduling TSCH

A scheduling operation attributes cells in a Time-Division-Multiplexing (TDM) / Frequency-Division Multiplexing (FDM) matrix called the Channel distribution/usage (CDU) to either individual transmissions or as multi-access shared resources. The CDU matrix can be formatted in chunks that can be allocated exclusively to particular nodes to enable distributed scheduling without collision. More in Section 4.3.5.
From the standpoint of a 6TiSCH node (at the MAC layer), its schedule is the collection of the timeslots at which it must wake up for transmission, and the channels to which it should either send or listen at those times. The schedule is expressed as one or more slotframes that repeat over and over. Slotframes may collide and require a device to wake up at a same time, in which case the slotframe with the highest priority is actionable.

The 6top sublayer (see Section 4.3 for more) hides the complexity of the schedule from the upper layers. The Link abstraction that IP traffic utilizes is composed of a pair of Layer-3 cell bundles, one to receive and one to transmit. Some of the cells may be shared, in which case the 6top sublayer must perform some arbitration.

Scheduling enables multiple communications at a same time in a same interference domain using different channels; but a node equipped with a single radio can only either transmit or receive on one channel at any point of time. Scheduled cells that play an equal role, e.g., receive IP packets from a peer, are grouped in bundles.

The 6TiSCH architecture identifies four ways a schedule can be managed and CDU cells can be allocated: Static Scheduling, Neighbor-to-Neighbor Scheduling, Remote Monitoring and Schedule Management, and Hop-by-hop Scheduling.

Static Scheduling: This refers to the minimal 6TiSCH operation whereby a static schedule is configured for the whole network for use in a slotted-Aloha fashion. The static schedule is distributed through the native methods in the TSCH MAC layer and does not preclude other scheduling operations to co-exist on a same 6TiSCH network. A static schedule is necessary for basic operations such as the join process and for interoperability during the network formation, which is specified as part of the Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration [RFC8180].

Neighbor-to-Neighbor Scheduling: This refers to the dynamic adaptation of the bandwidth of the Links that are used for IPv6 traffic between adjacent routers. Scheduling Functions such as the "6TiSCH Minimal Scheduling Function (MSF)" [I-D.ietf-6tisch-msf] influence the operation of the MAC layer to add, update and remove cells in its own, and its peer’s schedules using 6P [RFC8480], for the negotiation of the MAC resources.

Centralized (or Remote) Monitoring and Schedule Management: This refers to the central computation of a schedule and the capability to forward a frame based on the cell of arrival. In that case, the related portion of the device schedule as well as other device resources are managed by an abstract Network Management Entity.
(NME), which may cooperate with the PCE in order to minimize the interaction with and the load on the constrained device. This model is the TSCH adaption of the "DetNet Architecture" [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture], and it enables Traffic Engineering with deterministic properties.

Hop-by-hop Scheduling: This refers to the possibility to reserve cells along a path for a particular flow using a distributed mechanism.

It is not expected that all use cases will require all those mechanisms. Static Scheduling with minimal configuration one is the only one that is expected in all implementations, since it provides a simple and solid basis for convergecast routing and time distribution.

A deeper dive in those mechanisms can be found in Section 4.5.

3.5. Distributed vs. Centralized Routing

6TiSCH enables a mixed model of centralized routes and distributed routes. Centralized routes can for example be computed by an entity such as a PCE. 6TiSCH leverages the RPL [RFC6550] routing protocol for interoperable distributed routing operations.

Both methods may inject routes in the Routing Tables of the 6TiSCH routers. In either case, each route is associated with a 6TiSCH topology that can be a RPL Instance topology or a Track. The 6TiSCH topology is indexed by a Instance ID, in a format that reuses the RPLInstanceID as defined in RPL.

RPL [RFC6550] is applicable to Static Scheduling and Neighbor-to-Neighbor Scheduling. The architecture also supports a centralized routing model for Remote Monitoring and Schedule Management. It is expected that a routing protocol that is more optimized for point-to-point routing than RPL [RFC6550], such as the "Asymmetric AODV-P2P-RPL in Low-Power and Lossy Networks" [I-D.ietf-roll-aodv-rpl] (AODV-RPL), which derives from the Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) [I-D.ietf-manet-aodv] will be selected for Hop-by-hop Scheduling.

Both RPL and PCE rely on shared sources such as policies to define Global and Local RPLInstanceIDs that can be used by either method. It is possible for centralized and distributed routing to share a same topology. Generally they will operate in different slotFrames, and centralized routes will be used for scheduled traffic and will have precedence over distributed routes in case of conflict between the slotFrames.
3.6. Forwarding Over TSCH

The 6TiSCH architecture supports three different forwarding models. One is the classical IPv6 Forwarding, where the node selects a feasible successor at Layer-3 on a per packet basis and based on its routing table. The second derives from Generic MPLS (G-MPLS) for so-called Track Forwarding, whereby a frame received at a particular timeslot can be switched into another timeslot at Layer-2 without regard to the upper layer protocol. The third model is the 6LoWPAN Fragment Forwarding, which allows to forward individual 6LoWPAN fragments along a route that is setup by the first fragment.

In more details:

IPv6 Forwarding: This is the classical IP forwarding model, with a Routing Information Based (RIB) that is installed by the RPL routing protocol and used to select a feasible successor per packet. The packet is placed on an outgoing Link, that the 6top layer maps into a (Layer-3) bundle of cells, and scheduled for transmission based on QoS parameters. Besides RPL, this model also applies to any routing protocol which may be operated in the 6TiSCH network, and corresponds to all the distributed scheduling models, Static, Neighbor-to-Neighbor and Hop-by-Hop Scheduling.

G-MPLS Track Forwarding: This model corresponds to the Remote Monitoring and Schedule Management. In this model, a central controller (hosting a PCE) computes and installs the schedules in the devices per flow. The incoming (Layer-2) bundle of cells from the previous node along the path determines the outgoing (Layer-2) bundle towards the next hop for that flow as determined by the PCE. The programmed sequence for bundles is called a Track and can assume DAG shapes that are more complex than a simple direct sequence of nodes.

6LoWPAN Fragment Forwarding: This is an hybrid model that derives from IPv6 forwarding for the case where packets must be fragmented at the 6LoWPAN sublayer. The first fragment is forwarded like any IPv6 packet and leaves a state in the intermediate hops to enable forwarding of the next fragments that do not have a IP header without the need to recompose the packet at every hop.

A deeper dive on these operations can be found in Section 4.7.

The following table summarizes how the forwarding models apply to the various routing and scheduling possibilities:
3.7. 6TiSCH Stack

The IETF proposes multiple techniques for implementing functions related to routing, transport or security.

In order to control the complexity of possible deployments and device interactions, and to limit the size of the resulting object code, the 6TiSCH architecture limits the possible variations of the stack and recommends a number of base elements for LLN applications. In particular, UDP [RFC0768], IPv6 [RFC8200] and the Constrained Application Protocol [RFC7252] (CoAP) are used as the transport / binding of choice for applications and management as opposed to TCP and HTTP.

The resulting protocol stack is represented in Figure 4:
RPL is the routing protocol of choice for LLNs. So far, there was no identified need to define a 6TiSCH specific Objective Function. The Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration [RFC8180] describes the operation of RPL over a static schedule used in a slotted aloha fashion, whereby all active slots may be used for emission or reception of both unicast and multicast frames.

The 6LoWPAN Header Compression [RFC6282] is used to compress the IPv6 and UDP headers, whereas the 6LoWPAN Routing Header (6LoRH) [RFC8138] is used to compress the RPL artifacts in the IPv6 data packets, including the RPL Packet Information (RPI), the IP-in-IP encapsulation to/from the RPL root, and the Source Route Header (SRH) in non-storing mode. "When to use RFC 6553, 6554 and IPv6-in-IPv6" [I-D.ietf-roll-useofrplinfo] provides the details on when headers or encapsulation are needed.

The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], is leveraged by the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) and is expected to be the primary protocol for the protection of the application payload as well. The application payload may also be protected by the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] sitting either under CoAP or over CoAP so it can traverse proxies.

An overview of the initial steps of a device in a network can be found in Section 4.2.1; the security aspects of the join process are further detailed in Section 6.

The 6TiSCH Operation sublayer (6top) is a sublayer of a Logical Link Control (LLC) that provides the abstraction of an IP link over a TSCH MAC and schedules packets over TSCH cells, as further discussed in the next sections, providing in particular dynamic cell allocation with the 6top Protocol (6P) [RFC8480].

The reference stack that the 6TiSCH architecture presents was implemented and interop tested by a conjunction of opensource, IETF and ETSI efforts. One goal is to help other bodies to adopt the stack as a whole, making the effort to move to an IPv6-based IoT stack easier.

For a particular environment, some of the choices that are made in this architecture may not be relevant. For instance, RPL is not required for star topologies and mesh-under Layer-2 routed networks, and the 6LoWPAN compression may not be sufficient for ultra-constrained cases such as some Low-Power Wide Area (LPWA) networks. In such cases, it is perfectly doable to adopt a subset of the selection that is presented hereafter and then select alternate components to complete the solution wherever needed.
4. Architecture Components

4.1. 6LoWPAN (and RPL)

A RPL DODAG is formed of a root, a collection of routers, and leaves that are hosts. Hosts are nodes which do not forward packets that they did not generate. RPL-aware leaves will participate to RPL in order to advertise their own addresses, whereas RPL-unaware leaves depend on a connected RPL router to do so. RPL interacts with 6LoWPAN ND at multiple levels, in particular at the root and in the RPL-unaware leaves.

4.1.1. RPL-Unaware Leaves and 6LoWPAN ND

RPL needs a set of information in order to advertise a leaf node through a DAO message and establish reachability.

"Routing for RPL Leaves" [I-D.thubert-roll-unaware-leaves] details the basic interaction of 6LoWPAN ND and RPL and enables a plain 6LN that supports [RFC8505] to obtain return connectivity via the RPL network as an RPL-unaware leaf. The leaf indicates that it requires reachability services for the Registered Address from a Routing Registrar by setting a ‘R’ flag in the Extended Address Registration Option [RFC8505], and it provides a TID that maps to a sequence number in section 7 of RPL [RFC6550].

The RPL InstanceID that the leaf wants to participate to may be signaled in the Opaque field of the EARO. On the backbone, the InstanceID is expected to be mapped to an overlay that matches the RPL Instance, e.g., a Virtual LAN (VLAN) or a virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) instance.

Though at the time of this writing the above specification enables a model where the separation is possible, this architecture recommends to collocate the functions of 6LBR and RPL root.

4.1.2. RPL Root And 6LBR

With the 6LowPAN ND [RFC6775], information on the 6LBR is disseminated via an Authoritative Border Router Option (ABRO) in RA messages. [RFC8505] extends [RFC6775] to enable a registration for routing and proxy ND. The capability to support [RFC8505] is indicated in the 6LoWPAN Capability Indication Option (6CIO). The discovery and liveliness of the RPL root are obtained through RPL [RFC6550] itself.

When 6LoWPAN ND is coupled with RPL, the 6LBR and RPL root functionalities are co-located in order that the address of the 6LBR
be indicated by RPL DIO messages and to associate the unique ID from the EDAR/EDAC [RFC8505] exchange with the state that is maintained by RPL.

Section 5 of [I-D.thubert-roll-unaware-leaves] details how the DAO messages are used to reconfirm the registration, thus eliminating a duplication of functionality between DAO and EDAR/EDAC messages.

Even though the root of the RPL network is integrated with the 6LBR, it is logically separated from the Backbone Router (6BBR) that is used to connect the 6TiSCH LLN to the backbone. This way, the root has all information from 6LoWPAN ND and RPL about the LLN devices attached to it.

This architecture also expects that the root of the RPL network (proxy-)registers the 6TiSCH nodes on their behalf to the 6BBR, for whatever operation the 6BBR performs on the backbone, such as ND proxy, or redistribution in a routing protocol. This relies on an extension of the 6LoWPAN ND registration described in [I-D.ietf-6lo-backbone-router].

This model supports the movement of a 6TiSCH device across the Multi-Link Subnet, and allows the proxy registration of 6TiSCH nodes deep into the 6TiSCH LLN by the 6LBR / RPL root. This is why in [RFC8505] the Registered Address is signaled in the Target Address field of the NS message as opposed to the IPv6 Source Address, which, in the case of a proxy registration, is that of the 6LBR / RPL root itself.

4.2. Network Access and Addressing

4.2.1. Join Process

A new device, called the pledge, undergoes the join protocol to become a node in a 6TiSCH network. This usually occurs only once when the device is first powered on. The pledge communicates with the Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC) of the network through a Join Proxy (JP): a radio neighbor of the pledge.

The join protocol provides the following functionality:

- Mutual authentication
- Authorization
- Parameter distribution to the pledge over a secure channel

Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] defines the minimal mechanisms
required for this join process to occur in a secure manner. The specification defines the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) that is used to distribute the parameters to the pledge over a secure session established through OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and a secure configuration of the network stack. In the minimal setting with pre-shared keys (PSKs), CoJP allows the pledge to join after a single round-trip exchange with the JRC. The provisioning of the PSK to the pledge and the JRC needs to be done out of band, through a ‘one-touch’ bootstrapping process, which effectively enrolls the pledge into the domain managed by the JRC.

In certain use cases, the ‘one touch’ bootstrapping is not feasible due to the operational constraints and the enrollment of the pledge into the domain needs to occur in-band. This is handled through a ‘zero-touch’ extension of the Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH. Zero touch [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join] extension leverages the ‘Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)’ [[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] work to establish a shared secret between a pledge and the JRC without necessarily having them belong to a common (security) domain at join time. This happens through inter-domain communication occurring between the JRC of the network and the domain of the pledge, represented by a fourth entity, Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA). Once the zero-touch exchange completes, the CoJP exchange defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] is carried over the secure session established between the pledge and the JRC.

Figure 5 depicts the join process.
4.2.2. Registration

Once the pledge successfully completes the CoJP protocol and becomes a network node, it obtains the network prefix from neighboring routers and registers its IPv6 addresses. As detailed in Section 4.1, the combined 6LoWPAN ND 6LBR and root of the RPL network learn information such as the device Unique ID (from 6LoWPAN ND) and the updated Sequence Number (from RPL), and perform 6LoWPAN ND proxy registration to the 6BBR of behalf of the LLN nodes.
Figure 6 illustrates the initial IPv6 signaling that enables a 6LN to form a global address and register it to a 6LBR using 6LoWPAN ND [RFC8505], is then carried over RPL to the RPL root, and then to the 6BBR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6LoWPAN Node (RPL leaf)</th>
<th>6LR (router)</th>
<th>6LBR (root)</th>
<th>6BBR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6LoWPAN ND LLN link</td>
<td>6LoWPAN ND+RPL Route-Over mesh</td>
<td>6LoWPAN ND Ethernet/serial</td>
<td>IPv6 ND Backbone</td>
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<td>IPv6 ND RS</td>
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<td>IPv6 ND RA</td>
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<tr>
<td>6LoWPAN ND</td>
<td>Extended DAR</td>
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<td>NS(EARO)</td>
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<td>NS-DAD</td>
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<td>Extended DAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA(EARO)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Initial Registration Flow over Multi-Link Subnet

Figure 7 illustrates the repeating IPv6 signaling that enables a 6LN to keep a global address alive and registered to its 6LBR using 6LoWPAN ND [RFC8505], using 6LoWPAN ND at the 6LR, RPL to the RPL root, and then 6LoWPAN ND again to the 6BBR.
### Figure 7: Next Registration Flow over Multi-Link Subnet

As the network builds up, a node should start as a leaf to join the RPL network, and may later turn into both a RPL-capable router and a 6LR, so as to accept leaf nodes to recursively join the network.

#### 4.3. TSCH and 6top

**4.3.1. 6top**

6TiSCH expects a high degree of scalability together with a distributed routing functionality based on RPL. To achieve this goal, the spectrum must be allocated in a way that allows for spatial reuse between zones that will not interfere with one another. In a large and spatially distributed network, a 6TiSCH node is often in a good position to determine usage of the spectrum in its vicinity.

With 6TiSCH, the abstraction of an IPv6 link is implemented as a pair of bundles of cells, one in each direction. IP Links are only enabled between RPL parents and children. The 6TiSCH operation is optimal when the size of a bundle is such that both the energy wasted in idle listening and the packet drops due to congestion loss are minimized, while packets are forwarded within an acceptable latency.
Use cases for distributed routing are often associated with a statistical distribution of best-effort traffic with variable needs for bandwidth on each individual link. The 6TiSCH operation can remain optimal if RPL parents can adjust dynamically, and with enough reactivity to match the variations of best-effort traffic, the amount of bandwidth that is used to communicate between themselves and their children, in both directions. In turn, the agility to fulfill the needs for additional cells improves when the number of interactions with other devices and the protocol latencies are minimized.

6top is a logical link control sitting between the IP layer and the TSCH MAC layer, which provides the link abstraction that is required for IP operations. The 6top protocol, 6P, which is specified in [RFC8480], is one of the services provided by 6top. In particular, the 6top services are available over a management API that enables an external management entity to schedule cells and slotFrames, and allows the addition of complementary functionality, for instance a Scheduling Function that manages a dynamic schedule management based on observed resource usage as discussed in Section 4.5.2.

4.3.1.1. Hard Cells

The architecture defines "soft" cells and "hard" cells. "Hard" cells are owned and managed by an separate scheduling entity (e.g. a PCE) that specifies the slotOffset/channelOffset of the cells to be added/moved/deleted, in which case 6top can only act as instructed, and may not move hard cells in the TSCH schedule on its own.

4.3.1.2. Soft Cells

6top contains a monitoring process which monitors the performance of cells, and can move a cell in the TSCH schedule when it performs poorly. This is only applicable to cells which are marked as "soft". To reserve a soft cell, the higher layer does not indicate the exact slotOffset/channelOffset of the cell to add, but rather the resulting bandwidth and QoS requirements. When the monitoring process triggers a cell reallocation, the two neighbor devices communicating over this cell negotiate its new position in the TSCH schedule.

4.3.2. Scheduling Functions and the 6top protocol

In the case of soft cells, the cell management entity that controls the dynamic attribution of cells to adapt to the dynamics of variable rate flows is called a Scheduling Function (SF).

There may be multiple SFs with more or less aggressive reaction to the dynamics of the network.
An SF may be seen as divided between an upper bandwidth adaptation logic that is not aware of the particular technology that is used to obtain and release bandwidth, and an underlying service that maps those needs in the actual technology, which means mapping the bandwidth onto cells in the case of TSCH using the 6top protocol as illustrated in Figure 8.

```
+------------------------+          +------------------------+
|  Scheduling Function  |          |  Scheduling Function   |
|  Bandwidth adaptation |          |  Bandwidth adaptation  |
+------------------------+          +------------------------+
|  Scheduling Function  |          |  Scheduling Function   |
|  TSCH mapping to cells|          |  TSCH mapping to cells  |
+------------------------+          +------------------------+
|  6top cells negotiation| <- 6P -> |  6top cells negotiation |
+------------------------+          +------------------------+
Device A                             Device B
```

Figure 8: SF/6P stack in 6top

The SF relies on 6top services that implement the 6top Protocol (6P) [RFC8480] to negotiate the precise cells that will be allocated or freed based on the schedule of the peer. It may be for instance that a peer wants to use a particular time slot that is free in its schedule, but that timeslot is already in use by the other peer for a communication with a third party on a different cell. 6P enables the peers to find an agreement in a transactional manner that ensures the final consistency of the nodes state.

MSF [I-D.ietf-6tisch-msf] is one of the possible scheduling functions. MSF uses the rendez-vous slot from [RFC8180] for network discovery, neighbor discovery, and any other broadcast.

For basic unicast communication with any neighbor, each node uses a receive cell at a well-known slotOffset/channelOffset, derived from a hash of their own MAC address. Nodes can reach any neighbor by installing a transmit (shared) cell with slotOffset/channelOffset derived from the neighbor’s MAC address.

For child-parent links, MSF continuously monitors the load to/from parents and children. It then uses 6P to install/remove unicast cells whenever the current schedule appears to be under-/over-provisioned.
4.3.3. 6top and RPL Objective Function operations

An implementation of a RPL [RFC6550] Objective Function (OF), such as the RPL Objective Function Zero (OF0) [RFC6552] that is used in the Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration [RFC8180] to support RPL over a static schedule, may leverage, for its internal computation, the information maintained by 6top.

An OF may require metrics about reachability, such as the ETX. 6top creates and maintains an abstract neighbor table, and this state may be leveraged to feed an OF and/or store OF information as well. A neighbor table entry may contain a set of statistics with respect to that specific neighbor.

The neighbor information may include the time when the last packet has been received from that neighbor, a set of cell quality metrics (e.g. RSSI or LQI), the number of packets sent to the neighbor or the number of packets received from it. This information can be made available through 6top management APIs and used for instance to compute a Rank Increment that will determine the selection of the preferred parent.

6top provides statistics about the underlying layer so the OF can be tuned to the nature of the TSCH MAC layer. 6top also enables the RPL OF to influence the MAC behaviour, for instance by configuring the periodicity of IEEE Std 802.15.4 Extended Beacons (EBs). By augmenting the EB periodicity, it is possible to change the network dynamics so as to improve the support of devices that may change their point of attachment in the 6TiSCH network.

Some RPL control messages, such as the DODAG Information Object (DIO) are ICMPv6 messages that are broadcast to all neighbor nodes. With 6TiSCH, the broadcast channel requirement is addressed by 6top by configuring TSCH to provide a broadcast channel, as opposed to, for instance, piggybacking the DIO messages in Layer-2 Enhanced Beacons (EBs), which would produce undue timer coupling among layers, packet size issues and could conflict with the policy of production networks where EBs are mostly eliminated to conserve energy.

4.3.4. Network Synchronization

Nodes in a TSCH network must be time synchronized. A node keeps synchronized to its time source neighbor through a combination of frame-based and acknowledgment-based synchronization. In order to maximize battery life and network throughput, it is advisable that RPL ICMP discovery and maintenance traffic (governed by the trickle timer) be somehow coordinated with the transmission of time synchronization packets (especially with enhanced beacons).
This could be achieved through an interaction of the 6top sublayer and the RPL objective Function, or could be controlled by a management entity.

Time distribution requires a loop-free structure. Nodes taken in a synchronization loop will rapidly desynchronize from the network and become isolated. It is expected that a RPL DAG with a dedicated global Instance is deployed for the purpose of time synchronization. That Instance is referred to as the Time Synchronization Global Instance (TSGI). The TSGI can be operated in either of the 3 modes that are detailed in section 3.1.3 of RPL [RFC6550], "Instances, DODAGs, and DODAG Versions". Multiple uncoordinated DODAGs with independent roots may be used if all the roots share a common time source such as the Global Positioning System (GPS).

In the absence of a common time source, the TSGI should form a single DODAG with a virtual root. A backbone network is then used to synchronize and coordinate RPL operations between the backbone routers that act as sinks for the LLN. Optionally, RPL’s periodic operations may be used to transport the network synchronization. This may mean that 6top would need to trigger (override) the trickle timer if no other traffic has occurred for such a time that nodes may get out of synchronization.

A node that has not joined the TSGI advertises a MAC level Join Priority of 0xFF to notify its neighbors that is not capable of serving as time parent. A node that has joined the TSGI advertises a MAC level Join Priority set to its DAGRank() in that Instance, where DAGRank() is the operation specified in section 3.5.1 of [RFC6550], "Rank Comparison".

A root is configured or obtains by some external means the knowledge of the RPLInstanceID for the TSGI. The root advertises its DagRank in the TSGI, that must be less than 0xFF, as its Join Priority in its IEEE Std 802.15.4 Extended Beacons (EB). We’ll note that the Join Priority is now specified between 0 and 0x3F leaving 2 bits in the octet unused in the IEEE Std 802.15.4e specification. After consultation with IEEE authors, it was asserted that 6TiSCH can make a full use of the octet to carry an integer value up to 0xFF.

A node that reads a Join Priority of less than 0xFF should join the neighbor with the lesser Join Priority and use it as time parent. If the node is configured to serve as time parent, then the node should join the TSGI, obtain a Rank in that Instance and start advertising its own DagRank in the TSGI as its Join Priority in its EBs.
4.3.5. SlotFrames and CDU matrix

6TiSCH enables IPv6 best effort (stochastic) transmissions over a MAC layer that is also capable of scheduled (deterministic) transmissions. In order to ensure that the medium is free of contending packets when time comes for a scheduled transmission, a window of time is defined around the scheduled transmission where the medium must, as much as practically feasible, be free of contending energy. One simple way to obtain such a window is to format time and frequencies in cells of transmission of equal duration. This is the method that is adopted in IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH as well as the Long Term Evolution (LTE) of cellular networks.

In order to describe that formatting of time and frequencies, the 6TiSCH architecture defines a global concept that is called a Channel Distribution and Usage (CDU) matrix.

A CDU matrix is defined centrally as part of the network definition. It is a matrix of cells with an height equal to the number of available channels (indexed by ChannelOffsets) and a width (in timeslots) that is the period of the network scheduling operation (indexed by slotOffsets) for that CDU matrix. There are different models for scheduling the usage of the cells, which place the responsibility of avoiding collisions either on a central controller or on the devices themselves, at an extra cost in terms of energy to scan for free cells (more in Section 4.5).

The size of a cell is a timeslot duration, and values of 10 to 15 milliseconds are typical in 802.15.4 TSCH to accommodate for the transmission of a frame and an ack, including the security validation on the receive side which may take up to a few milliseconds on some device architecture.

A CDU matrix iterates over and over with a well-known channel rotation called the hopping sequence. In a given network, there might be multiple CDU matrices that operate with different width, so they have different durations and represent different periodic operations. It is recommended that all CDU matrices in a 6TiSCH domain operate with the same cell duration and are aligned, so as to reduce the chances of interferences from slotted-aloha operations. The knowledge of the CDU matrices is shared between all the nodes and used in particular to define slotFrames.

A slotFrame is a MAC-level abstraction that is common to all nodes and contains a series of timeslots of equal length and precedence. It is characterized by a slotFrame_ID, and a slotFrame_size. A slotFrame aligns to a CDU matrix for its parameters, such as number and duration of timeslots.
Multiple slotFrames can coexist in a node schedule, i.e., a node can have multiple activities scheduled in different slotFrames. A slotframe is associated with a priority that may be related to the precedence of different 6TiSCH topologies. The slotFrames may be aligned to different CDU matrices and thus have different width. There is typically one slotFrame for scheduled traffic that has the highest precedence and one or more slotFrame(s) for RPL traffic. The timeslots in the slotFrame are indexed by the SlotOffset; the first cell is at SlotOffset 0.

When a packet is received from a higher layer for transmission, 6top inserts that packet in the outgoing queue which matches the packet best (Differentiated Services [RFC2474] can therefore be used). At each scheduled transmit slot, 6top looks for the frame in all the outgoing queues that best matches the cells. If a frame is found, it is given to the TSCH MAC for transmission.

4.3.6. Distributing the reservation of cells

The 6TiSCH architecture introduces the concept of chunks (Section 2.1) to distribute the allocation of the spectrum for a whole group of cells at a time. The CDU matrix is formatted into a set of chunks, possibly as illustrated in Figure 9, each of the chunks identified uniquely by a chunk-ID. The knowledge of this formatting is shared between all the nodes in a 6TiSCH network.

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+     +-----+
| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| ... | chnk |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+     +-----+
| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| ... | chnk |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+     +-----+
...                                           
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+     +-----+
| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| chnk| ... | chnk |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+     +-----+

Figure 9: CDU matrix Partitioning in Chunks
```

The 6TiSCH Architecture expects that a future protocol will enable a chunk ownership appropriation whereby a RPL parent discovers a chunk that is not used in its interference domain, claims the chunk, and then defends it in case another RPL parent would attempt to appropriate it while it is in use. The chunk is the basic unit of ownership that is used in that process.
As a result of the process of chunk ownership appropriation, the RPL parent has exclusive authority to decide which cell in the appropriated chunk can be used by which node in its interference domain. In other words, it is implicitly delegated the right to manage the portion of the CDU matrix that is represented by the chunk.

Initially, those cells are added to the heap of free cells, then dynamically placed into existing bundles, in new bundles, or allocated opportunistically for one transmission.

Note that a PCE is expected to have precedence in the allocation, so that a RPL parent would only be able to obtain portions that are not in-use by the PCE.

4.4. Communication Paradigms and Interaction Models

Section 2.1 provides the terms of Communication Paradigms and Interaction Models, which can be placed in parallel to the Information Models and Data Models that are defined in [RFC3444].

A Communication Paradigms would be an abstract view of a protocol exchange, and would come with an Information Model for the information that is being exchanged. In contrast, an Interaction Models would be more refined and could point on standard operation such as a Representational state transfer (REST) "GET" operation and would match a Data Model for the data that is provided over the protocol exchange.

Section 2.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-roll-rpl-industrial-applicability] and next sections discuss application-layer paradigms, such as Source-sink (SS) that is a Multipeer to Multipeer (MP2MP) model primarily used for alarms and alerts, Publish-subscribe (PS, or pub/sub) that is typically used for sensor data, as well as Peer-to-peer (P2P) and Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) communications. Additional considerations on Duocast and its N-cast generalization are also provided. Those paradigms are frequently used in industrial automation, which is a major use case for IEEE Std 802.15.4 TSCH wireless networks with [ISA100.11a] and [WirelessHART], that provides a wireless access to [HART] applications and devices.

This specification focuses on Communication Paradigms and Interaction Models for packet forwarding and TSCH resources (cells) management. Management mechanisms for the TSCH schedule at Link-Layer (one-hop), Network-layer (multithop along a Track), and Application-layer (remote control) are discussed in Section 4.5. Link-Layer frame forwarding interactions are discussed in Section 4.7, and Network-layer Packet routing is addressed in Section 4.8.
4.5. Schedule Management Mechanisms

6TiSCH uses 4 paradigms to manage the TSCH schedule of the LLN nodes: Static Scheduling, neighbor-to-neighbor Scheduling, remote monitoring and scheduling management, and Hop-by-hop scheduling. Multiple mechanisms are defined that implement the associated Interaction Models, and can be combined and used in the same LLN. Which mechanism(s) to use depends on application requirements.

4.5.1. Static Scheduling

In the simplest instantiation of a 6TiSCH network, a common fixed schedule may be shared by all nodes in the network. Cells are shared, and nodes contend for slot access in a slotted aloha manner. A static TSCH schedule can be used to bootstrap a network, as an initial phase during implementation, or as a fall-back mechanism in case of network malfunction. This schedule is pre-established, for instance decided by a network administrator based on operational needs. It can be pre-configured into the nodes, or, more commonly, learned by a node when joining the network using standard IEEE Std 802.15.4 Information Elements (IE). Regardless, the schedule remains unchanged after the node has joined a network. RPL is used on the resulting network. This "minimal" scheduling mechanism that implements this paradigm is detailed in [RFC8180].

4.5.2. Neighbor-to-neighbor Scheduling

In the simplest instantiation of a 6TiSCH network described in Section 4.5.1, nodes may expect a packet at any cell in the schedule and will waste energy idle listening. In a more complex instantiation of a 6TiSCH network, a matching portion of the schedule is established between peers to reflect the observed amount of transmissions between those nodes. The aggregation of the cells between a node and a peer forms a bundle that the 6top layer uses to implement the abstraction of a link for IP. The bandwidth on that link is proportional to the number of cells in the bundle.

If the size of a bundle is configured to fit an average amount of bandwidth, peak traffic is dropped. If the size is configured to allow for peak emissions, energy is be wasted idle listening.

As discussed in more details in Section 4.3, the 6top Protocol [RFC8480] specifies the exchanges between neighbor nodes to reserve soft cells to transmit to one another, possibly under the control of a Scheduling Function (SF). Because this reservation is done without global knowledge of the schedule of other nodes in the LLN, scheduling collisions are possible.
And as discussed in Section 4.3.2, an optional Scheduling Function (SF) is used to monitor bandwidth usage and perform requests for dynamic allocation by the 6top sublayer. The SF component is not part of the 6top sublayer. It may be collocated on the same device or may be partially or fully offloaded to an external system. The "6TiSCH Minimal Scheduling Function (MSF)" [I-D.ietf-6tisch-msf] provides a simple scheduling function that can be used by default by devices that support dynamic scheduling of soft cells.

Monitoring and relocation is done in the 6top layer. For the upper layer, the connection between two neighbor nodes appears as a number of cells. Depending on traffic requirements, the upper layer can request 6top to add or delete a number of cells scheduled to a particular neighbor, without being responsible for choosing the exact slotOffset/channelOffset of those cells.

4.5.3. Remote Monitoring and Schedule Management

The work at the 6TiSCH WG is focused on non-deterministic traffic and does not provide the generic data model that would be necessary to monitor and manage resources of the 6top sublayer. It is recognized that CoAP can be appropriate to interact with the 6top layer of a node that is multiple hops away across a 6TiSCH mesh.

The entity issuing the CoAP requests can be a central scheduling entity (e.g. a PCE), a node multiple hops away with the authority to modify the TSCH schedule (e.g. the head of a local cluster), or an external device monitoring the overall state of the network (e.g. NME). It is also possible that a mapping entity on the backbone transforms a non-CoAP protocol such as PCEP into the RESTful interfaces that the 6TiSCH devices support.

With respect to Centralized routing and scheduling, it is envisioned that the related component of the 6TiSCH Architecture would be an extension of the Deterministic Networking Architecture [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture], which studies Layer-3 aspects of Deterministic Networks, and covers networks that span multiple Layer-2 domains.

The DetNet architecture is a form of Software Defined Networking (SDN) Architecture and is composed of three planes, a (User) Application Plane, a Controller Plane (where the PCE operates), and a Network Plane which can represent a 6TiSCH LLN.

Software-Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology [RFC7426] proposes a generic representation of the SDN architecture that is reproduced in Figure 10.
The PCE establishes end-to-end Tracks of hard cells, which are described in more details in Section 4.7.1.
The DetNet work is expected to enable end to end Deterministic Path across heterogeneous network. This can be for instance a 6TiSCH LLN and an Ethernet Backbone.

This model fits the 6TiSCH extended configuration, whereby a 6BBR federates multiple 6TiSCH LLN in a single subnet over a backbone that can be, for instance, Ethernet or Wi-Fi. In that model, 6TiSCH 6BBRs synchronize with one another over the backbone, so as to ensure that the multiple LLNs that form the IPv6 subnet stay tightly synchronized.

If the Backbone is Deterministic, then the Backbone Router ensures that the end-to-end deterministic behavior is maintained between the LLN and the backbone. It is the responsibility of the PCE to compute a deterministic path and to end across the TSCH network and an IEEE Std 802.1 TSN Ethernet backbone, and that of DetNet to enable end-to-end deterministic forwarding.

4.5.4. Hop-by-hop Scheduling

A node can reserve a Track (Section 4.6) to one or more destination(s) that are multiple hops away by installing soft cells at each intermediate node. This forms a Track of soft cells. A Track Scheduling Function above the 6top sublayer of each node on the Track is needed to monitor these soft cells and trigger relocation when needed.

This hop-by-hop reservation mechanism is expected to be similar in essence to [RFC3209] and/or [RFC4080]/[RFC5974]. The protocol for a node to trigger hop-by-hop scheduling is not yet defined.

4.6. On Tracks

The architecture introduces the concept of a Track, which is a directed path from a source 6TiSCH node to one or more destination(s) 6TiSCH node(s) across a 6TiSCH LLN.

A Track is the 6TiSCH instantiation of the concept of a Deterministic Path as described in [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture]. Constrained resources such as memory buffers are reserved for that Track in intermediate 6TiSCH nodes to avoid loss related to limited capacity. A 6TiSCH node along a Track not only knows which bundles of cells it should use to receive packets from a previous hop, but also knows which bundle(s) it should use to send packets to its next hop along the Track.
4.6.1. General Behavior of Tracks

A Track is associated with Layer-2 bundles of cells with related schedules and logical relationships and that ensure that a packet that is injected in a Track will progress in due time all the way to destination.

Multiple cells may be scheduled in a Track for the transmission of a single packet, in which case the normal operation of IEEE Std 802.15.4 Automatic Repeat-reQuest (ARQ) can take place; the acknowledgment may be omitted in some cases, for instance if there is no scheduled cell for a possible retry.

There are several benefits for using a Track to forward a packet from a source node to the destination node.

1. Track forwarding, as further described in Section 4.7.1, is a Layer-2 forwarding scheme, which introduces less process delay and overhead than Layer-3 forwarding scheme. Therefore, LLN Devices can save more energy and resource, which is critical for resource constrained devices.

2. Since channel resources, i.e. bundles of cells, have been reserved for communications between 6TISCH nodes of each hop on the Track, the throughput and the maximum latency of the traffic along a Track are guaranteed and the jitter is maintained small.

3. By knowing the scheduled time slots of incoming bundle(s) and outgoing bundle(s), 6TISCH nodes on a Track could save more energy by staying in sleep state during in-active slots.

4. Tracks are protected from interfering with one another if a cell belongs to at most one Track, and congestion loss is avoided if at most one packet can be presented to the MAC to use that cell. Tracks enhance the reliability of transmissions and thus further improve the energy consumption in LLN Devices by reducing the chances of retransmission.

4.6.2. Serial Track

A Serial (or simple) Track is the 6TISCH version of a circuit; a bundle of cells that are programmed to receive (RX-cells) is uniquely paired to a bundle of cells that are set to transmit (TX-cells), representing a Layer-2 forwarding state which can be used regardless of the network layer protocol. A Serial Track is thus formed end-to-end as a succession of paired bundles, a receive bundle from the previous hop and a transmit bundle to the next hop along the Track.
For a given iteration of the device schedule, the effective channel of the cell is obtained by adding a pseudo-random number to the channelOffset of the cell, which results in a rotation of the frequency that used for transmission. The bundles may be computed so as to accommodate both variable rates and retransmissions, so they might not be fully used in the iteration of the schedule.

4.6.3. Complex Track with Replication and Elimination

The art of Deterministic Networks already include PRE techniques. Example standards include the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and the High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) [IEC62439]. Similarly, and as opposed to a Serial Track that is a sequence of nodes and links, a Complex Track is shaped as a directed acyclic graph towards one or more destination(s) to support multi-path forwarding and route around failures.

A Complex Track may branch off over non congruent branches for the purpose of multicasting, and/or redundancy, in which case it reconverts later down the path. This enables the DetNet Packet Replication, Elimination and Ordering Functions (PREOF). PRE may be used to complement Layer-2 ARQ to meet industrial expectations in Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), in particular when the Track extends beyond the 6TiSCH network in a larger DetNet network.

In the art of TSCH, a path does not necessarily support PRE but it is almost systematically multi-path. This means that a Track is scheduled so as to ensure that each hop has at least two forwarding solutions, and the forwarding decision is to try the preferred one and use the other in case of Layer-2 transmission failure as detected by ARQ. Similarly, at each 6TiSCH hop along the Track, the PCE may schedule more than one timeslot for a packet, so as to support Layer-2 retries (ARQ). It is also possible that the field device only uses the second branch if sending over the first branch fails.

4.6.4. DetNet End-to-end Path

Ultimately, DetNet [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture] should enable to extend a Track beyond the 6TiSCH LLN as illustrated in Figure 11. In that example, a Track that is laid out from a field device in a 6TiSCH network to an IoT gateway that is located on an 802.1 Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) backbone. A 6TiSCH-Aware DetNet Service Layer handles the Packet Replication, Elimination, and Ordering Functions over the DODAG that forms a Track.

The Replication function in the 6TiSCH Node sends a copy of each packet over two different branches, and the PCE schedules each hop of both branches so that the two copies arrive in due time at the
In case of a loss on one branch, hopefully the other copy of the packet still makes it in due time. If two copies make it to the IoT gateway, the Elimination function in the gateway ignores the extra packet and presents only one copy to upper layers.

![Diagram of a DetNet Track]

Figure 11: Example End-to-End DetNet Track

4.6.5. Cell Reuse

The 6TiSCH architecture provides means to avoid waste of cells as well as overflows in the transmit bundle of a Track, as follows:

A TX-cell that is not needed for the current iteration may be reused opportunistically on a per-hop basis for routed packets. When all of the frame that were received for a given Track are effectively transmitted, any available TX-cell for that Track can be reused for upper layer traffic for which the next-hop router matches the next hop along the Track. In that case, the cell that is being used is effectively a TX-cell from the Track, but the short address for the destination is that of the next-hop router.

It results in a frame that is received in a RX-cell of a Track with a destination MAC address set to this node as opposed to broadcast must be extracted from the Track and delivered to the upper layer (a frame with an unrecognized destination MAC address is dropped at the lower MAC layer and thus is not received at the 6top sublayer).

On the other hand, it might happen that there are not enough TX-cells in the transmit bundle to accommodate the Track traffic, for instance if more retransmissions are needed than provisioned. In that case,
and if the frame transports an IPv6 packet, then it can be placed for transmission in the bundle that is used for Layer-3 traffic towards the next hop along the Track. The MAC address should be set to the next-hop MAC address to avoid confusion.

It results in a frame that is received over a Layer-3 bundle may be in fact associated to a Track. In a classical IP link such as an Ethernet, off-Track traffic is typically in excess over reservation to be routed along the non-reserved path based on its QoS setting. But with 6TiSCH, since the use of the Layer-3 bundle may be due to transmission failures, it makes sense for the receiver to recognize a frame that should be re-Tracked, and to place it back on the appropriate bundle if possible. A frame should be re-Tracked if the Per-Hop-Behavior group indicated in the Differentiated Services Field of the IPv6 header is set to Deterministic Forwarding, as discussed in Section 4.8.1. A frame is re-Tracked by scheduling it for transmission over the transmit bundle associated to the Track, with the destination MAC address set to broadcast.

4.7. Forwarding Models

By forwarding, this specification means the per-packet operation that allows to deliver a packet to a next hop or an upper layer in this node. Forwarding is based on pre-existing state that was installed as a result of a routing computation Section 4.8. 6TiSCH supports three different forwarding model, G-MPLS Track Forwarding, 6LoWPAN Fragment Forwarding and classical IPv6 Forwarding.

4.7.1. Track Forwarding

Forwarding along a Track can be seen as a Generalized Multi-protocol Label Switching (G-MPLS) operation in that the information used to switch a frame is not an explicit label, but rather related to other properties of the way the packet was received, a particular cell in the case of 6TiSCH. As a result, as long as the TSCH MAC (and Layer-2 security) accepts a frame, that frame can be switched regardless of the protocol, whether this is an IPv6 packet, a 6LoWPAN fragment, or a frame from an alternate protocol such as WirelessHART or ISA100.11a.

A data frame that is forwarded along a Track normally has a destination MAC address that is set to broadcast - or a multicast address depending on MAC support. This way, the MAC layer in the intermediate nodes accepts the incoming frame and 6top switches it without incurring a change in the MAC header. In the case of IEEE Std 802.15.4, this means effectively broadcast, so that along the Track the short address for the destination of the frame is set to 0xFFFF.
There are 2 modes for a Track, transport mode and tunnel mode.

4.7.1.1. Transport Mode

In transport mode, the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is associated with flow-dependant meta-data that refers uniquely to the Track, so the 6top sublayer can place the frame in the appropriate cell without ambiguity. In the case of IPv6 traffic, this flow identification is transported in the Flow Label of the IPv6 header. Associated with the source IPv6 address, the Flow Label forms a globally unique identifier for that particular Track that is validated at egress before restoring the destination MAC address (DMAC) and punting to the upper layer.

Figure 12 illustrates the Track Forwarding operation which happens at the 6top sublayer, below IP.

```
+------------+                  +---------------+                  +---------------+
|            | Packet flowing across the network ^  |      | Packet flowing across the network ^  |      | Packet flowing across the network ^  |
|            | IP 6 |                  | 6LoWPAN HC  |                  | 6LoWPAN HC  |                  | 6LoWPAN HC  |
|            +------------+      | 6top ingress |      | 6top egress |      | 6top egress |      | 6top egress |
|            +------------+      | 6top sets DMAC to dest  |      | 6top sets DMAC to dest  |      | 6top sets DMAC to dest  |
|            +------------+      | TSCH MAC brdcst  |      | TSCH MAC brdcst  |      | TSCH MAC brdcst  |
|            +------------+      | LLN PHY  |      | LLN PHY  |      | LLN PHY  |      | LLN PHY  |
+------------+      +-------+    +-------+    +-------+    +-------+    +-------+    +-------+
          | Stack Layer  Ingress Relay Relay Egress|
          |   Node       Node       Node       Node   |
```

Figure 12: Track Forwarding, Transport Mode

4.7.1.2. Tunnel Mode

In tunnel mode, the frames originate from an arbitrary protocol over a compatible MAC that may or may not be synchronized with the 6TISCH network. An example of this would be a router with a dual radio that is capable of receiving and sending WirelessHART or ISA100.11a frames with the second radio, by presenting itself as an access Point or a Backbone Router, respectively. In that mode, some entity (e.g. PCE) can coordinate with a WirelessHART Network Manager or an ISA100.11a System Manager to specify the flows that are to be transported transparently over the Track.
In that case, the flow information that identifies the Track at the ingress 6TiSCH router is derived from the RX-cell. The DMAC is set to this node but the flow information indicates that the frame must be tunneled over a particular Track so the frame is not passed to the upper layer. Instead, the DMAC is forced to broadcast and the frame is passed to the 6top sublayer for switching.

At the egress 6TiSCH router, the reverse operation occurs. Based on tunneling information of the Track, which may for instance indicate that the tunneled datagram is an IP packet, the datagram is passed to the appropriate Link-Layer with the destination MAC restored.

### 4.7.1.3. Tunneling Information

Tunneling information coming with the Track configuration provides the destination MAC address of the egress endpoint as well as the tunnel mode and specific data depending on the mode, for instance a service access point for frame delivery at egress.

If the tunnel egress point does not have a MAC address that matches the configuration, the Track installation fails.

---

**Figure 13: Track Forwarding, Tunnel Mode**

Packet flowing across the network
In transport mode, if the final Layer-3 destination is the tunnel termination, then it is possible that the IPv6 address of the destination is compressed at the 6LoWPAN sublayer based on the MAC address. It is thus mandatory at the ingress point to validate that the MAC address that was used at the 6LoWPAN sublayer for compression matches that of the tunnel egress point. For that reason, the node that injects a packet on a Track checks that the destination is effectively that of the tunnel egress point before it overwrites it to broadcast. The 6top sublayer at the tunnel egress point reverts that operation to the MAC address obtained from the tunnel information.

4.7.2. IPv6 Forwarding

As the packets are routed at Layer-3, traditional QoS and Active Queue Management (AQM) operations are expected to prioritize flows; the application of Differentiated Services is further discussed in [I-D.svshah-tsvwg-lln-diffserv-recommendations].

![Figure 14: IP Forwarding](image)

4.7.3. Fragment Forwarding

Considering that 6LoWPAN packets can be as large as 1280 bytes (the IPv6 MTU), and that the non-storing mode of RPL implies Source Routing that requires space for routing headers, and that a IEEE Std 802.15.4 frame with security may carry in the order of 80 bytes of effective payload, an IPv6 packet might be fragmented into more than 16 fragments at the 6LoWPAN sublayer.
This level of fragmentation is much higher than that traditionally experienced over the Internet with IPv4 fragments, where fragmentation is already known as harmful.

In the case to a multihop route within a 6TiSCH network, Hop-by-Hop recomposition occurs at each hop in order to reform the packet and route it. This creates additional latency and forces intermediate nodes to store a portion of a packet for an undetermined time, thus impacting critical resources such as memory and battery.

[I-D.ietf-6lo-minimal-fragment] describes a framework for forwarding fragments end-to-end across a 6TiSCH route-over mesh. Within that framework, [I-D.ietf-lwig-6lowpan-virtual-reassembly] details a virtual reassembly buffer mechanism whereby the datagram tag in the 6LoWPAN Fragment is used as a label for switching at the 6LoWPAN sublayer. Building on this technique, [I-D.ietf-6lo-fragment-recovery] introduces a new format for 6LoWPAN fragments that enables the selective recovery of individual fragments, and allows for a degree of flow control based on an Explicit Congestion Notification.

In that model, the first fragment is routed based on the IPv6 header that is present in that fragment. The 6LoWPAN sublayer learns the next hop selection, generates a new datagram tag for transmission to the next hop, and stores that information indexed by the incoming MAC address and datagram tag. The next fragments are then switched based on that stored state.
4.8. Advanced 6TiSCH Routing

4.8.1. Packet Marking and Handling

All packets inside a 6TiSCH domain must carry the Instance ID that identifies the 6TiSCH topology that is to be used for routing and forwarding that packet. The location of that information must be the same for all packets forwarded inside the domain.

For packets that are routed by a PCE along a Track, the tuple formed by the IPv6 source address and a local RPLInstanceID in the packet identify uniquely the Track and associated transmit bundle.

For packets that are routed by RPL, that information is the RPLInstanceID which is carried in the RPL Packet Information (RPI), as discussed in section 11.2 of [RFC6550], "Loop Avoidance and Detection". The RPI is transported by a RPL option in the IPv6 Hop-By-Hop Header [RFC6553].

A compression mechanism for the RPL packet artifacts that integrates the compression of IP-in-IP encapsulation and the Routing Header type 3 [RFC6554] with that of the RPI in a 6LoWPAN dispatch/header type is specified in [RFC8025] and [RFC8138].
Either way, the method and format used for encoding the RPLInstanceID is generalized to all 6TiSCH topological Instances, which include both RPL Instances and Tracks.

4.8.2. Replication, Retries and Elimination

6TiSCH supports the PREOF operations of elimination and reordering of packets along a complex Track, but has no requirement about whether a sequence number would be tagged in the packet for that purpose. With 6TiSCH, the schedule can tell when multiple receive timeslots correspond to copies of a same packet, in which case the receiver may avoid listening to the extra copies once it had received one instance of the packet.

The semantics of the configuration will enable correlated timeslots to be grouped for transmit (and respectively receive) with a ‘OR’ relations, and then a ‘AND’ relation would be configurable between groups. The semantics is that if the transmit (and respectively receive) operation succeeded in one timeslot in a ‘OR’ group, then all the other timeslots in the group are ignored. Now, if there are at least two groups, the ‘AND’ relation between the groups indicates that one operation must succeed in each of the groups.

On the transmit side, timeslots provisioned for retries along a same branch of a Track are placed a same ‘OR’ group. The ‘OR’ relation indicates that if a transmission is acknowledged, then retransmissions of that packet should not be attempted for remaining timeslots in that group. There are as many ‘OR’ groups as there are branches of the Track departing from this node. Different ‘OR’ groups are programmed for the purpose of replication, each group corresponding to one branch of the Track. The ‘AND’ relation between the groups indicates that transmission over any of branches must be attempted regardless of whether a transmission succeeded in another branch. It is also possible to place cells to different next-hop routers in a same ‘OR’ group. This allows to route along multi-path Tracks, trying one next-hop and then another only if sending to the first fails.

On the receive side, all timeslots are programmed in a same ‘OR’ group. Retries of a same copy as well as converging branches for elimination are converged, meaning that the first successful reception is enough and that all the other timeslots can be ignored. A ‘AND’ group denotes different packets that must all be received and transmitted over the associated transmit groups within their respected ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ rules.
As an example say that we have a simple network as represented in Figure 17, and we want to enable PREOF between an ingress node I and an egress node E.

```
+---+  +---+  
| A |--| C |--
 | \ /  \   \  
 ---+   ++   +---
 | \  |   |   |
 ++ | I |   | E |
| +---+   +---+
|
---| B |----| D |
+---+   +---+
```

Figure 17: Scheduling PREOF on a Simple Network

The assumption for this particular problem is that a 6TiSCH node has a single radio, so it cannot perform 2 receive and/or transmit operations at the same time, even on 2 different channels.

Say we have 6 possible channels, and at least 10 timeslots per slotframe. Figure 18 shows a possible schedule whereby each transmission is retried 2 or 3 times, and redundant copies are forwarded in parallel via A and C on the one hand, and B and D on the other, providing time diversity, spatial diversity though different physical paths, and frequency diversity.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>slotOffset</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>channelOffset 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B-&gt;D</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>channelOffset 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I-&gt;A</td>
<td>A-&gt;C</td>
<td>B-&gt;D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>channelOffset 2</td>
<td>I-&gt;A</td>
<td></td>
<td>I-&gt;B</td>
<td>C-&gt;E</td>
<td>D-&gt;E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>channelOffset 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A-&gt;C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>channelOffset 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I-&gt;B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B-&gt;D</td>
<td></td>
<td>D-&gt;E</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>channelOffset 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A-&gt;C</td>
<td></td>
<td>C-&gt;E</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 18: Example Global Schedule
This translates in a different slotframe for every node that provides the waking and sleeping times, and the channelOffset to be used when awake. Figure 19 shows the corresponding slotframe for node A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>slotOffset</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| operation  | rcv | rcv | xmit | xmit | xmit | none | none | none | none | ...
| channelOffset | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | ...

Figure 19: Example Slotframe for Node A

The logical relationship between the timeslots is given by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>rcv slotOffset</th>
<th>xmit slotOffset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(0 OR 1) AND (2 OR 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>(0 OR 1)</td>
<td>(2 OR 3 OR 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>(2 OR 3)</td>
<td>(4 OR 5 OR 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>(2 OR 3 OR 4)</td>
<td>(5 OR 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>(4 OR 5 OR 6)</td>
<td>(7 OR 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>(5 OR 6 OR 7 OR 8)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.8.3. Differentiated Services Per-Hop-Behavior

Additionally, an IP packet that is sent along a Track uses the Differentiated Services Per-Hop-Behavior Group called Deterministic Forwarding, as described in [I-D.svshah-tsvwg-deterministic-forwarding].

5. IANA Considerations

This specification does not require IANA action.

6. Security Considerations

This architecture operates on IEEE Std 802.15.4 and expects Link-Layer security to be enabled at all times between connected devices, except for the very first step of the device join process, where a
joining device may need some initial, unsecured exchanges so as to obtain its initial key material.

As detailed in Section 4.2.1, a pledge that wishes to join the 6TiSCH network must use a join protocol to obtain its security keys. The join protocol used in 6TiSCH is the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP). In the minimal setting defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], the authentication requires a pre-shared key, based on which a secure session is derived. The CoJP exchange may also be preceded with a zero-touch handshake [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join] in order to enable pledge joining based on certificates and/or inter-domain communication.

In order to join, the pledge is helped by a Join Proxy (JP) that relays the link-scope Join Request over the IP network to the Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC) that can authenticate the pledge and validate that it is attached to the appropriate network. As a result of this exchange the pledge is in possession of a Link-Layer material including a key and a short address, and all traffic is secured at the Link-Layer.

7. Acknowledgments

7.1. Contributors

The co-authors of this document are listed below:

Robert Assimiti for his breakthrough work on RPL over TSCH and initial text and guidance;

Kris Pister for creating it all and his continuing guidance through the elaboration of this design;

Maria Rita Palattella for managing the Terminology document merged into this through the work of 6TiSCH;

Michael Richardson for his leadership role in the Security Design Team and his contribution throughout this document;

Rene Struik for the security section and his contribution to the Security Design Team;

Malisa Vucinic for the work on the one-touch join process and his contribution to the Security Design Team;

Xavier Vilajosana who lead the design of the minimal support with RPL and contributed deeply to the 6top design and the G-MPLS operation of Track switching;
Qin Wang for leading the design of the 6top sublayer and contributed related text that was moved and/or adapted in this document;

Thomas Watteyne for his contribution to the whole design, in particular on TSCH and security, and to the open source community with openWSN that he created.

Simon Duquennoy for his contribution to the open source community with the 6TiSCH implementation of contiki, and for his contribution to MSF and autonomous unicast cells.

7.2. Special Thanks

Special thanks to Tero Kivinen, Jonathan Simon, Giuseppe Piro, Subir Das and Yoshihiro Ohba for their deep contribution to the initial security work, to Yasuyuki Tanaka for his work on implementation and simulation that tremendously helped build a robust system, to Diego Dujovne for starting and leading the SF0 effort and to Tengfei Chang for evolving it in the MSF.

Special thanks also to Pat Kinney for his support in maintaining the connection active and the design in line with work happening at IEEE Std 802.15.4.

Special thanks to Ted Lemon who was the INT Area A-D while this specification was developed for his great support and help throughout.

Also special thanks to Ralph Droms who performed the first INT Area Directorate review, that was very deep and through and radically changed the orientations of this document.

7.3. And Do not Forget

This specification is the result of multiple interactions, in particular during the 6TiSCH (bi)Weekly Interim call, relayed through the 6TiSCH mailing list at the IETF.

The authors wish to thank: Alaeddine Weslati, Chonggang Wang, Georgios Exarchakos, Zhuo Chen, Alfredo Grieco, Bert Greevenbosch, Cedric Adjih, Deji Chen, Martin Turon, Dominique Barthel, Elvis Vogli, Geraldine Texier, Malisa Vucinic, Guillaume Gaillard, Herman Storey, Kazushi Muraoka, Ken Bannister, Kuor Hsin Chang, Laurent Toutain, Maik Seewald, Maria Rita Palattella, Michael Behringer, Nancy Cam Winget, Nicola Accettura, Nicolas Montavont, Oleg Hahn, Patrick Wetterwald, Paul Duffy, Peter van der Stock, Rahul Sen, Pieter de Mil, Pouria Zand, Rouollah Nabati, Rafa Marin-Lopez, Raghuram Sudhaakar, Sedat Gormus, Shitanshu Shah, Steve Simlo,
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Appendix A. Dependencies on Work In Progress

In order to control the complexity and the size of the 6TiSCH work, the architecture and the associated IETF work are staged and the WG is expected to recharter multiple times. This document is been incremented as the work progressed following the evolution of the WG charter and the availability of dependent work. The intent was to publish when the WG concludes on the covered items.

At the time of publishing:

- The need of a reactive routing protocol to establish on-demand constraint-optimized routes and a reservation protocol to establish Layer-3 Tracks is being discussed at 6TiSCH but not chartered for.

- The operation of the Backbone Router [I-D.ietf-6lo-backbone-router] is stable but the RFC is not published yet. The protection of registered addresses against impersonation and take over will be guaranteed by Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks [I-D.ietf-6lo-ap-nd], which is not yet published either.

- The work on centralized Track computation is deferred to a subsequent work, not necessarily at 6TiSCH. A Predictatable and Available Wireless (PAW) bar-BoF took place; PAW may form as a WG and take over that work. The 6TiSCH Architecture should thus inherit from the DetNet [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture] architecture and thus depends on it. The Path Computation Element (PCE) should be a core component of that architecture. Around the PCE, a protocol such as an extension to a TEAS [TEAS] protocol will be required to expose the 6TiSCH node capabilities and the network peers to the PCE, and a protocol such as a lightweight PCEP or an adaptation of CCAMP [CCAMP] G-MPLS formats and procedures will be used to publish the Tracks, as computed by the PCE, to the 6TiSCH nodes.

- BIER-TE-based OAM, Replication and Elimination [I-D.thubert-bier-replication-elimination] leverages Bit Index Explicit Replication - Traffic Engineering to control in the data plane the DetNet Replication and Elimination activities, and to provide traceability on links where replication and loss happen, in a manner that is abstract to the forwarding information,
whereas a 6loRH for BitStrings [I-D.thubert-6lo-bier-dispatch] proposes a 6LoWPAN compression for the BIER Bitstring based on 6LoWPAN Routing Header [RFC8138].

- The security model and in particular the join process depends on the ANIMA [ANIMA] Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] in order to enable zero-touch security provisioning; for highly constrained nodes, a minimal model based on pre-shared keys (PSK) is also available.

- The current charter positions 6TiSCH on IEEE Std 802.15.4 only. Though most of the design should be portable on other link types, 6TiSCH has a strong dependency on IEEE Std 802.15.4 and its evolution. The impact of changes to TSCH on this Architecture should be minimal to non-existent, but deeper work such as 6top and security may be impacted. A 6TiSCH Interest Group at the IEEE maintains the synchronization and helps foster work at the IEEE should 6TiSCH demand it.

- Work is being proposed at IEEE (802.15.12 PAR) for an LLC that would logically include the 6top sublayer. The interaction with the 6top sublayer and the Scheduling Functions described in this document are yet to be defined.

- ISA100 [ISA100] Common Network Management (CNM) is another external work of interest for 6TiSCH. The group, referred to as ISA100.20, defines a Common Network Management framework that should enable the management of resources that are controlled by heterogeneous protocols such as ISA100.11a [ISA100.11a], WirelessHART [WirelessHART], and 6TiSCH. Interestingly, the establishment of 6TiSCH Deterministic paths, called Tracks, are also in scope, and ISA100.20 is working on requirements for DetNet.

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Abstract

This document describes a Zero-touch Secure Join (ZSJ) mechanism to enroll a new device (the "pledge") into a IEEE802.15.4 TSCH network using the 6tisch signaling mechanisms. The resulting device will obtain a domain specific credential that can be used with either 802.15.9 per-host pair keying protocols, or to obtain the network-wide key from a coordinator. The mechanism described here is an augmentation to the one-touch mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], and a constrained version of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................... 4
   1.1. Prior Bootstrapping Approaches ...................... 6
   1.2. Terminology ......................................... 6
   1.3. Scope of solution .................................... 7
      1.3.1. Support environment ............................. 8
      1.3.2. Constrained environments ....................... 8
      1.3.3. Network Access Controls ........................ 8
   1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps ... 8
      1.4.1. Key Distribution Process ........................ 8
   1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) devices ........................................... 8
2. Architectural Overview .................................... 8
   2.1. Behavior of a Pledge ................................. 9
   2.2. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers ..................... 10
   2.3. Initial Device Identifier ............................ 10
      2.3.1. Identification of the Pledge .................... 11
      2.3.2. MASA URI extension ............................... 12
   2.4. Protocol Flow ........................................ 12
   2.5. Architectural Components .............................. 13
      2.5.1. Pledge ........................................... 13
      2.5.2. Stateless IPIP Join Proxy ....................... 13
      2.5.3. Domain Registrar ................................. 13
      2.5.4. Manufacturer Service ............................. 14
      2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) .................. 14
   2.6. Certificate Time Validation .......................... 14
      2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock ........................... 14
      2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID ..................... 14
   2.7. Cloud Registrar ...................................... 14
   2.8. Determining the MASA to contact ...................... 15
3. Voucher-Request artifact .................................. 15
4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) ............. 15
5. Proxy details ............................................. 15
   5.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy ............................ 15
   5.2. CoAP connection to Registrar ........................ 16
   5.3. HTTPS proxy connection to Registrar ................ 16
   5.4. Proxy discovery of Registrar ........................ 16
6. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA) ............... 16
   6.1. BR SKI-EST (D)TLS establishment details ............ 17
      6.1.1. BR SKI-EST CoAP/DTLS establishment details .... 17
      6.1.2. BR SKI-EST CoAP/EDHOC establishment details .... 17
   6.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar .......... 19
Appendix A. Extra text ................................. 32
A.1. Assumptions ..................................... 32
A.1.1. One-Touch Assumptions ....................... 32
A.1.2. Factory provided credentials (if any) ........ 33
A.1.3. Credentials to be introduced ................ 33
A.2. Network Assumptions ............................ 33
A.2.1. Security above and below IP ................. 33
A.2.2. Join network assumptions .................... 34
A.2.3. Number and cost of round trips ............. 34
A.2.4. Size of packets, number of fragments ....... 35
A.3. Target end-state for join process ............. 35
Appendix B. Join Protocol .......................... 35
B.1. Key Agreement process ........................ 36
B.2. Provisional Enrollment process ............... 36
Appendix C. IANA Considerations ................... 37
Appendix D. Protocol Definition .................... 37
D.1. Discovery ..................................... 37
D.1.1. Proxy Discovery Protocol Details ............ 38
D.1.2. Registrar Discovery Protocol Details ......... 38
Author’s Address ................................. 38

1. Introduction

Enrollment of new nodes into LLNs present unique challenges. The constrained nodes has no user interfaces, and even if they did, configuring thousands of such nodes manually is undesirable from a human resources issue, as well as the difficulty in getting consistent results.

This document is about a standard way to introduce new nodes into a 6tisch network that does not involve any direct manipulation of the nodes themselves. This act has been called "zero-touch" provisioning, and it does not occur by chance, but requires coordination between the manufacturer of the node, the service operator running the LLN, and the installers actually taking the devices out of the shipping boxes.

This document is a constrained profile of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. The above document/protocol is referred by by it’s acronym: BRSKI. The pronunciation of which is "brew-ski", a common north american slang for beer with a pseudo-polish ending. This constrained protocol is called ZSJ (pronounced zees-Jay).

This document follows the same structure as BRSKI in order to emphasize the similarities, but specializes a number of things to constrained networks of constrained devices. Like [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], the networks which are in
scope for this protocol are deployed by a professional operator. The
deterministic mechanisms which have been designed into 6tisch have
been created to satisfy the operational needs of industrial settings
where such an operator exists.

This document builds upon the "one-touch" provisioning described in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], reusing the OSCOAP Join Request
mechanism when appropriate, but preceding it with either the EDHOC
key agreement protocol, or a DTLS setup process. The [RFC7030] EST
protocol extended in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], has been
mapped by [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] into CoAP, and has the same
security profile as this protocol.

Whenever possible, this document does not introduce new protocols or
mechanisms, but rather integrates them from other documents.

Otherwise, this document follows BRSKI with the following high-level
changes:

- HTTP is replaced with CoAP.
- TLS (HTTPS) is replaced with either DTLS+CoAP, or EDHOC/
  OSCOAP+CoAP
- the domain-registrar anchor certificate is replaced with a Raw
  Public Key (RPK) using [RFC7250].
- the PKCS7 signed JSON voucher format is replaced with CWT
- the GRASP discovery mechanism for the Proxy is replaced with an
  announcement in the Enhanced Beacon
  [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon]
- the TCP circuit proxy mechanism is not used. The IPIP mechanism
  if mandatory to implement when deployed with DTLS, while the CoAP
  based stateless proxy mechanism is used for OSCOAP/EDHOC.
- real time clocks are assumed to be unavailable, so expiry dates in
  ownership vouchers are never used
- nonce-full vouchers are encouraged, but off-line nonce-less
  operation is also supported, however, the resulting vouchers have
  infinite life.
- 802.1AR Client Certificates (IDevID) are retained, but optionally are
  specified by reference rather than value.
It is expected that the back-end network operator infrastructure would be able to bootstrap ANIMA BRSKI-type devices over ethernet, while also being able bootstrap 6tisch devices over 802.15.4 with few changes.

NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: during production of this document, it was matched against [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section by section. This results in a few sections, such as IANA Considerations where there is no requested activity. Those sections are marked "NO ACTION, PLEASE REMOVE" and should be removed (along with this paragraph) from the final document. Some sections are marked as "no changes" and should be left in place so that the section numbering remains consistent with [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].

1.1. Prior Bootstrapping Approaches

Constrained devices as used in industrial control systems are usually installed (or replaced) by technicians with expertise in the equipment being serviced, not in secure enrollment of devices.

Devices therefore are typically pre-configured in advance, marked for a particular factory, assembly line, or even down to the specific machine. It is not uncommon for manufacturers to have a product code (stock keeping unit -SKU) for each part, and for each customer as the part will be loaded with customer specific security configuration. The resulting customer-specific parts are hard to inventory and spare, and should parts be delivered to the wrong customer, determining the reason for inability to configure is difficult and time consuming.

End-user actions to configure the part at the time of installation, aside from being error prone, also suffer from requiring a part that has an interface.

1.2. Terminology

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD implementations.

The reader is expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology], [RFC7252], [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. The following terms are imported: drop ship, imprint, enrollment, pledge, join proxy, ownership voucher, join registrar/coordinator. The following terms
are repeated here for readability, but this document is not authoritative for their definition:

pledge  the prospective device, which has the identity provided to at the factory. Neither the device nor the network knows if the device yet knows if this device belongs with this network.

Joined Node  the prospective device, after having completing the join process, often just called a Node.

Join Proxy (JP):  a stateless relay that provides connectivity between the pledge and the join registrar/coordinator.

Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC):  central entity responsible for authentication and authorization of joining nodes.

Audit Token  A signed token from the manufacturer authorized signing authority indicating that the bootstrapping event has been successfully logged. This has been referred to as an "authorization token" indicating that it authorizes bootstrapping to proceed.

Ownership Voucher  A signed voucher from the vendor vouching that a specific domain "owns" the new entity as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].

MIC  manufacturer installed certificate. An [ieee802-1AR] identity. Not to be confused with a (cryptographic) "Message Integrity Check"

1.3.  Scope of solution

The solution described in this document is appropriate to enrolling between hundreds to hundreds of thousands of diverse devices into a network without any prior contact with the devices. The devices could be shipped by the manufacturer directly to the customer site without ever being seen by the operator of the network. As described in BRSKI, in the audit-mode of operation the device will be claimed by the first network that sees it. In the tracked owner mode of operation, sales channel integration provides a strong connection that the operator of the network is the legitimate owner of the device.

BRSKI describes a more general, more flexible approach for bootstrapping devices into an ISP or Enterprise network.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] provides an extremely streamlined approach to enrolling from hundreds to thousands of devices into a
network, provided that a unique secret key can be installed in each device.

1.3.1. Support environment

TBD

1.3.2. Constrained environments

TBD

1.3.3. Network Access Controls

TBD

1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps

In constrained networks, it is unlikely that an ACP be formed. This document does not preclude such a thing, but it is not mandated.

The resulting secure channel MAY be used just to distribute network-wide keys using a protocol such as [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. (XXX - do we need to signal this somehow?)

The resulting secure channel MAY be instead used to do an enrollment of an LDevID as in BRSKI, but the resulting certificate is used to do per-pair keying such as described by ([ieee802159]).

1.4.1. Key Distribution Process

In addition to being used for the initial enrollment process, the secure channel may be kept open (and reversed) to use for network rekeying. Such a process is out of scope of this document, please see future work such as [I-D.richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey].

1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) devices

TBD

2. Architectural Overview

Section 2 of BRSKI has a diagram with all of the components shown together. There are no significant changes to the diagram.

The use of a circuit proxy is not mandated. Instead the IPIP mechanism described in appendix C ("IPIP Join Proxy mechanism")
SHOULD be used instead as it supports both DTLS, EDHOC and OSCOAP protocols.

The CoAP proxy mechanism MAY be implemented instead: the decision depends upon the capabilities of the Registrar and the proxy. A mechanism is included for the Registrar to announce its capabilities (XXX)

2.1. Behavior of a Pledge

The pledge goes through a series of steps which are outlined here at a high level.

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State descriptions for the pledge are as follows:

1. Discover a communication channel to a Registrar. This is done by listening for beacons as described by [I-D.richardson-anima-6join-discovery]

2. Identify itself. This is done by presenting an X.509 IDevID credential to the discovered Registrar (via the Proxy) in a DTLS or EDHOC handshake. (The Registrar credentials are only provisionally accepted at this time).

   The registrar identifies itself using a raw public key, while the pledge identifies itself to the registrar using an IDevID credential.

3. Requests to Join the discovered Registrar. A unique nonce can be included ensuring that any responses can be associated with this particular bootstrapping attempt.

4. Imprint on the Registrar. This requires verification of the vendor service (MASA) provided voucher. A voucher contains sufficient information for the Pledge to complete authentication of a Registrar. The voucher is signed by the vendor (MASA) using a raw public key, previously installed into the pledge at manufacturing time.

5. Optionally Enroll. By accepting the domain specific information from a Registrar, and by obtaining a domain certificate from a Registrar using a standard enrollment protocol, e.g. Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030].

6. The Pledge is now a member of, and can be managed by, the domain and will only repeat the discovery aspects of bootstrapping if it is returned to factory default settings.

2.2. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers

   As in BRSKI, the format and cryptographic mechanism of vouchers is described in detail in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]. As described in section YYY, the physical format for vouchers in this document differs from that of BRSKI, in that it uses [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] to encode the voucher and to sign it.

2.3. Initial Device Identifier

   The essential component of the zero-touch operation is that the pledge is provisioned with an 802.1AR (PKIX) certificate installed during the manufacturing process.
It is expected that constrained devices will use a signature algorithm corresponding to the hardware acceleration that they have, if they have any. The anticipated algorithms are the ECDSA P-256 (secp256p1), and SHOULD be supported. Newer devices SHOULD begin to appear using EdDSA curves using the 25519 curves.

The manufacturer will always know what algorithms are available in the Pledge, and will use an appropriate one. The other components that need to evaluate the IDevID (the Registrar and MASA) are expected to support all common algorithms.

There are a number of simplifications detailed later on in this document designed to eliminate the need for an ASN.1 parser in the pledge.

The pledge should consider it’s 802.1AR certificate to be an opaque blob of bytes, to be inserted into protocols at appropriate places. The pledge SHOULD have access to it’s public and private keys in the most usable native format for computation.

The pledge MUST have the public key of the MASA built in a manufacturer time. This is a seemingly identical requirement as for BRSKI, but rather than being an abstract trust anchor that can be augmented with a certificate chain, the pledge MUST be provided with the Raw Public Key that the MASA will use to sign vouchers for that pledge.

There are a number of security concerns with use of a single MASA signing key, and section Section 10.1 addresses some of them with some operational suggestions.

BRSKI places some clear requirements upon the contents of the IDevID, but leaves the exact origin of the voucher serial-number open. This document restricts the process to being the hwSerialNum OCTET STRING. As CWT can handle binary formats, no base64 encoding is necessary.

The use of the MASA-URL extension is encouraged if the certificate is sent at all.

EDNOTE: here belongs text about sending only a reference to the IDevID rather than the entire certificate

2.3.1. Identification of the Pledge

TBD
2.3.2. MASA URI extension

TBD

2.4. Protocol Flow

The diagram from BRSKI is reproduced with some edits:

```
+--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+
| Pledge |         | IPIP    |    | Domain     |     | Vendor     |
|        |         | Proxy   |    | Registrar  |     | Service    |
|        |         |         |    | (JRC)      |     | (MASA)     |
+--------+         +---------+    +------------+     +------------+
   |                     |                   |                    |
   |<---RFC4862 IPv6 addr |                   |                    |
   |----------------------|                   |                    |
   | Enhanced Beacon      |                   |                    |
   | periodic broadcast   |                   |                    |
   |<---------------------|                   |                    |
   | DTLS via the IPIP    |                   |                    |
   | Proxy                |                   |                    |
   |<---Registrar DTLS server authentication--|
   |[PROVISIONAL accept of server cert]         |
   |P----X.509 client authentication-----------|
   |P    |
   |P----Voucher Request (include nonce)------|
   |P    |
   |P    [accept device?]|
   |P    [contact Vendor]|
   |P    --Pledge ID------>
   |P    --Domain ID------>
   |P    --nonce-------->
   |P    [extract DomainID]|
   |P    [update audit log]|
   |P    |
   |P    |
   |P    |
   |P    |
   |P    <-device audit log--|
   |P    <- voucher --------|
   |P    |
   |P    |
   |P    [verify audit log and voucher]|
```
Notable changes are:

1. no IPv4 support/options.
2. no mDNS steps, 6tisch only uses Enhanced Beacon
3. nonce-full option is always mandatory

2.5. Architectural Components

The bootstrap process includes the following architectural components:

2.5.1. Pledge

The Pledge is the device which is attempting to join. Until the pledge completes the enrollment process, it has network connectivity only to the Proxy.

2.5.2. Stateless IPIP Join Proxy

The stateless CoAP or DTLS Proxy provides CoAP or DTLS connectivity (respectively) between the pledge and the registrar. The stateless CoAP proxy mechanism is described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] section 5.1.

The stateless DTLS mechanism is not yet described (TBD).

2.5.3. Domain Registrar

The Domain Registrar (having the formal name Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC)), operates as a CMC Registrar, terminating the EST and BRSKI connections. The Registrar is manually configured or distributed with a list of trust anchors necessary to authenticate any Pledge device expected on the network. The Registrar communicates with the Vendor supplied MASA to establish ownership.
The JRC is typically located on the 6LBR/DODAG root, but it may be located elsewhere, provided IP level connectivity can be established. The 6LBR may also provide a proxy or relay function to connect to the actual registrar in addition to the IPIP proxy described above. The existence of such an additional proxy is a private matter, and this document assumes without loss of generality that the registrar is co-located with the 6LBR.

2.5.4. Manufacturer Service

The Manufacturer Service provides two logically separate functions: the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), and an ownership tracking/auditing function. This function is identical to that used by BRSKI, except that a different format voucher is used.

2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

TBD

2.6. Certificate Time Validation

2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock

For the constrained situation it is assumed that devices have no real time clock. These nodes do have access to a monotonically increasing clock that will not go backwards in the form of the Absolute Sequence Number. Synchronization to the ASN is required in order to transmit/receive data and most nodes will maintain it in hardware.

The heuristic described in BRSKI under this section SHOULD be applied if there are dates in the CWT format voucher.

Voucher requests SHOULD include a nonce. For devices intended for off-line deployment, the vouchers will have been generated in advance and no nonce-ful operation will not be possible.

2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID

TBD

2.7. Cloud Registrar

In 6tisch, the pledge never has network connectivity until it is enrolled, so no alternate registrar is ever possible.
2.8. Determining the MASA to contact

There are no changes from BR斯基: the IDevID provided by the pledge will contain a MASA URL extension.

3. Voucher-Request artifact

The voucher-request artifact is defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] section 6.1.

For the 6tisch ZSJ protocol defined in this document, only COSE signed vouchers as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] section 6.3.2 are supported.

4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar)

The voucher-request artifact is defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].

The 6tisch use of the constrained version differs from the non-constrained version in two ways:

1. it does not include the pinned-domain-cert, but rather than pinned-domain-subjct-public-key-info entry. This accommodates the use of a raw public key to identify the registrar.

2. the pledge voucher-request is never signed.

An appendix shows detailed examples of COSE format voucher requests.

5. Proxy details

The role of the Proxy is to facilitate communication. In the constrained situation the proxy needs to be stateless as there is very little ram to begin with, and none can be allocated to keep state for an unlimited number of potential pledges.

5.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy

In BR斯基, the pledge discovers the proxy via use of a GRASP M_FLOOD messages sent by the proxy. In 6tisch ZSJ, the existence of the proxy is announced by the Enhanced Beacon message described in [I-D.richardson-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon]. The proxy as described by [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] section 10 is to be used in an identical fashion when EDHOC and OSCOAP are used.

When DTLS security is provided, then the proxy mechanism described in TBD must be used.
5.2. CoAP connection to Registrar

In BRISKI CoAP is future work. This document represents this work.

5.3. HTTPS proxy connection to Registrar

HTTPS connections are not used between the Pledge, Proxy and Registrar. The Proxy relays CoAP or DTLS packets and does not interpret or terminate either CoAP or DTLS connections. (HTTPS is still used between the Registrar and MASA)

5.4. Proxy discovery of Registrar

In BRISKI, the proxy autonomically discovers the Registrar by listening for GRASP messages.

In the constrained network, the proxies are optionally configured with the address of the JRC by the Join Response in in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] section 9.3.2. (As described in that section, the address of the registrar otherwise defaults to be that of the DODAG root)

Whether or not a 6LR will announce itself as a possible Join Proxy is outside the scope of this document.

6. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA)

BRISKI is specified to run over HTTPS. This document respecifies it to run over CoAP with either DTLS or EDHOC-provided OSCOAP security.

BRISKI introduces the concept of a provisional state for EST.

The same situation must also be added to DTLS: a situation where the connection is active but the identity of the Registrar has not yet been confirmed. The DTLS MUST validate that the exchange has been signed by the Raw Public Key that is presented by the Server, even though there is as yet no trust in that key. Such a key is often available through APIs that provide for channel binding, such as described in [RFC5056].

There is an emerging (hybrid) possibility of DTLS-providing the OSCOAP security, but such a specification does not yet exist, and this document does at this point specify it.

[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] specifies that CoAP specifies the use of CoAP Block-Wise Transfer ("Block") [RFC7959] to fragment EST messages at the application layer.
BRSKI introduces the concept of a provisional state for EST. The same situation must also be added to DTLS: a situation where the connection is active but the identity of the Registrar has not yet been confirmed.

The DTLS MUST validate that the exchange has been signed by the Raw Public Key that is presented by the Server, even though there is as yet no trust in that key. Such a key is often available through APIs that provide for channel binding, such as described in [RFC5056].

As in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est], support for Observe CoAP options [RFC7641] with BRSKI is not supported in the current BRSKI/EST message flows.

Observe options could be used by the server to notify clients about a change in the cacerts or csr attributes (resources) and might be an area of future work.

Redirection as described in [RFC7030] section 3.2.1 is NOT supported.

6.1. BRSKI-EST (D)TLS establishment details

6tisch ZSJ does not use TLS. The connection is either CoAP over DTLS, or CoAP with EDHOC security.

6.1.1. BRSKI-EST CoAP/DTLS establishment details

The details in the BRSKI document apply directly to use of DTLS.

The registrar SHOULD authenticate itself with a raw public key. A 256 bit ECDSA raw public key is RECOMMENDED. Pledges SHOULD support EDDSA keys if they contain hardware that supports doing so efficiently.

TBD: the Pledge needs to signal what kind of Raw Public Key it supports before the Registrar sends its ServerCertificate. Can SNI be used to do this?

The pledge SHOULD authenticate itself with the built-in IDevID certificate as a ClientCertificate.

6.1.2. BRSKI-EST CoAP/EDHOC establishment details

[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] details how to use EDHOC. The EDHOC description identifiers a party U (the initiator), and a party V. The Pledge is the party U, and the JRC is the party V.
The communication from the Pledge is via CoAP via the Join Proxy. The Join proxy relays traffic to the JRC, and using the mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] section 5.1. This is designed so that the Join Proxy does not need to know if it is performing the one-touch enrollment described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] or the zero-touch enrollment protocol described in this document. A network could consist of a mix of nodes of each type.

As generating ephemeral keys is expensive for a low-resource Pledge, the use of a common E_U by the Pledge for multiple enrollment attempts (should the first turn out to be the wrong network) is encouraged.

The first communication detailed in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] is to query the "/.well-known/core" resource to request the Link for EST. This is where the initial CoAP request is to sent.

The JRC MAY replace its E_V ephemeral key on a periodic basis, or even for every communication session.

The Pledge’s ID_U is the Pledge’s IDevID. It is transmitted in an x5bag [I-D.schaad-cose-x509]. An x5u (URL) MAY be used. An x5t (hash) MAY also be used and would be the smallest, but the Registrar may not know where to find the Pledge’s IDevID unless the JRC has been preloaded with all the IDevIDs via out-of-band mechanism. It is impossible for the Pledge to know if the JRC has been loaded in such a way so x5t is discouraged for general use.

The JRC’s ID_V is the JRC’s Raw Public Key. It is transmitted as a key in COSE’s YYY parameter.

The initial Mandatory to Implement (MTI) of an HKDF of SHA2-256, an AEAD based upon AES-CCM-16-64-128, a signature verification of BBBB, and signature generation of BBBB. The Pledge proposes a set of algorithms that it supports, and Pledge need not support more than one combination.

JRCs are expected to run on non-constrained servers, and are expected to support the above initial MTI, and any subsequent ones that become common. A JRC SHOULD support all available algorithms for a significant amount of time. Even when algorithms become weak or suspect, it is likely that it will still have to perform secure join for older devices. A JRC that responds to such an older device might not in the end accept the device into the network, but it is important that it be able to audit the event and communicate the event to an operator.
While EDHOC supports sending additional data in the message_3, in the constrained network situation, it is anticipated that the size of the this message will already be large, and no additional data is to be sent.

A COAP confirmable message SHOULD be used.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] section 6 details how to setup OSCORE context given a shared key derived by EDHOC.

The registrar SHOULD authenticate itself with a raw public key.

The pledge SHOULD authenticate itself with the built-in IDevID certificate.

6.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar

The voucher request and response as defined by BRSKI is modified slightly.

In order to simplify the pledge, the use of a certificate (and chain) for the Registrar is not supported. Instead the newly defined pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info must contain the (raw) public key info for the Registrar. It MUST be byte for byte identical to that which is transmitted by the Registrar during the TLS ServerCertificate handshake.

BRSKI permits the voucher request to be signed or unsigned. This document defines the voucher request to be unsigned.

6.3. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details

There are no changes. The connection from the Registrar to MASA is still HTTPS.

6.4. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA

There are no change from BRSKI, as this step is between two non-constrained devices.

The format of the voucher is COSE, which implies changes to both the Registrar and the MASA, but semantically the content is the same.

The manufacturer will know what algorithms are supported by the pledge, and will issue a 406 (Conflict) error to the Registrar if the
Registrar’s public key format is not supported by the pledge. It is however, too late for the Registrar to use a different key, but at least it can log a reason for a failure. It is likely that the ZSJ-BRSKI-EST connection has already failed, and this step is never reached.

6.4.1. MASA renewal of expired vouchers

There are assumed to be no useful real-time clocks on constrained devices, so all vouchers are in effect infinite duration. Pledges will use nonces for freshness, and a request for a new voucher with a new voucher for the same Registrar is not unusual. A token-bucket system SHOULD be used such that no more than 24 vouchers are issued per-day, but more than one voucher can be issued in a one hour period. Tokens should not accumulate for more than one day!

6.4.2. MASA verification of voucher-request signature consistency

The voucher-request is signed by the Registrar using it’s Raw Public Key. There is no additional certificate authority to sign this key. The MASA MAY have this key via sales-channel integration, but in most cases it will be seeing the key for the first time.

XXX—should the TLS connection from Registrar to MASA have a ClientCertificate? If so, then should it use the same Public Key? Or a different one?

6.4.3. MASA authentication of registrar (certificate)

IDEA: The MASA SHOULD pin the Raw Public Key (RPK) to the IP address that was first used to make a request with it. Should the RPK <-> IP address relationship be 1:1, 1:N, N:1? Should we take IP address to mean, "IP subnet", essentially the IPv4/24, and IPv6/64? The value of doing is about DDoS mitigation?

Should above mapping be on a per-Pledge basis?

6.4.4. MASA revocation checking of registrar (certificate)

As the Registrar has a Raw Public Key as an identity, there is no meaningful standard revocation checking that can be done. The MASA SHOULD have a blacklist table, and a way to add entries, but this process is out of scope.
6.4.5. MASA verification of pledge prior-signed-voucher-request

The MASA will know whether or not the Pledge is capable of producing a signed voucher-request for inclusion by the Registrar. In the case where the Pledge can sign the voucher-request to the Registrar, then the Registrar will have put it in the ‘prior-signed-voucher-request’. The MASA can verify the signature from the Pledge using the MASA’s copy of the Pledge’s IDevID public key.

In many cases, the Pledge will not be capable of doing signatures in real time, so no ‘prior-signed-voucher-request’ will be present. The MASA will have rely on the audit log as a history function to determine if the Pledge has previously been claimed, and to identify situations where the claim from the Registrar is fraudulent.

6.4.6. MASA pinning of registrar

When the MASA creates a voucher, it puts the Registrar’s Raw Public Key into the ‘pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info’ leaf of the voucher.

The MASA does not include the ‘pinned-domain-cert’ field.

6.4.7. MASA nonce handling

Use of nonces is highly RECOMMENDED, but there are situations where not all components are connected at the same time in which the nonce will not be present.

There are no significant changes from BRSKI.

6.5. MASA Voucher Response

As explained in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] section 6.3.2, when a voucher is returned by the MASA to the JRC, a public key or certificate container that will verify the voucher SHOULD also be returned.

In order to do this, the MASA MAY return a multipart/mixed return, within that body, two items SHOULD be returned:

1. An application/voucher-cose+cbor body.

2. An application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only, or an application/SOMETHING containing a Raw Public Key.
A MASA is not obligated to return the public key, and MAY return only the application/voucher-cose+cbor object. In that case, the JRC will be unable to validate it.

6.5.1. Pledge voucher verification

The Pledge receives the voucher from the Registrar over it’s CoAP connection. It verifies the signature using the MASA anchor built in, as in the BRSKI case.

6.5.2. Pledge authentication of provisional TLS connection

The BRSKI process uses the pinned-domain-cert field of the voucher to validate the registrar’s ServerCertificate. In the ZeroTouch case, the voucher will contain a pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info field containing the raw public key of the certificate. It should match, byte-to-byte with the raw public key ServerCertificate.

6.6. Pledge Voucher Status Telemetry

The voucher status telemetry report is communicated from the pledge to the registrar over CoAP channel. The shortened URL is as described in table QQQ.

6.7. Registrar audit log request

There are no changes to the Registrar audit log request.

6.7.1. MASA audit log response

There are no changes to the MASA audit log response.

6.7.2. Registrar audit log verification

There are no changes to how the Registrar verifies the audit log.

6.8. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping

TBD.

6.8.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates

TBD.
6.8.2. EST CSR Attributes

In 6tisch, no Autonomic Control Plane will be created, so none of the criteria for SubjectAltname found in [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] apply.

The CSR Attributes request SHOULD NOT be performed.

6.8.3. EST Client Certificate Request

6tisch will use a certificate to:

1. to authenticate an 802.15.9 key agreement protocol.
2. to terminate an incoming DTLS or EDHOC key agreement as part of application data protection.

It is recommended that the requested subjectAltName contain only the [RFC4514] hwSerialNum.

6.8.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry

There are no changes to the status telemetry between Registrar and MASA.

6.8.5. Multiple certificates

Multiple certificates are not supported.

6.8.6. EST over CoAP

This document and [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] detail how to run EST over CoAP.

6.9. Use of Secure Transport for Minimal Join

Rather than bootstrap to a public key infrastructure, the secure channel MAY instead be for the minimal security join process described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

The desire to do a minimal-security join process is signaled by the Registrar in it's voucher-request by including a 'join-process' value of 'minimal'. The MASA copies this value into the voucher that is creates, and also logs this to the audit log.

When the secure channel was created with EDHOC, then the keys setup by EDHOC are simply used by OSCORE exactly as if they had been Pre-Shared. The keys derived by EDHOC SHOULD be stored by both Registrar
and Pledge as their long term key should the join process need to be repeated.

7. Reduced security operational modes

This document defines a specific reduced security operational mode, specifically:

1. X
2. Y
3. Z

7.1. Trust Model

TBD

7.2. Pledge security reductions

TBD

7.3. Registrar security reductions

TBD

7.4. MASA security reductions

TBD

8. IANA Considerations

XXX

8.1. Well-known EST registration

XXX

8.2. PKIX Registry

TBD

8.3. Voucher Status Telemetry

TBD
8.4. DNS Service Names

TBD

8.5. MUD File Extension for the MASA server

TBD

9. Privacy Considerations

[I-D.ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations] details a number of privacy considerations important in Resource Constrained nodes. There are two networks and three sets of constrained nodes to consider. They are: 1. the production nodes on the production network. 2. the new pledges, which have yet to enroll, and which are on a join network. 3. the production nodes which are also acting as proxy nodes.

9.1. Privacy Considerations for Production network

The details of this are out of scope for this document.

9.2. Privacy Considerations for New Pledges

New Pledges do not yet receive Router Advertisements with PIO options, and so configure link-local addresses only based upon layer-2 addresses using the normal SLAAC mechanisms described in [RFC4191].

These link-local addresses are visible to any on-link eavesdropper (who is synchronized to the same Join Assistant), so regardless of what is chosen they can be seen. This link-layer traffic is encapsulated by the Join Proxy into IPIP packets and carried to the JRC. The traffic SHOULD never leave the operator’s network, will be kept confidential by the layer-2 keys inside the LLN. As no outside traffic can enter the join network, to do any ICMP scanning as described in [I-D.ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations].

The join process described herein requires that some identifier meaningful to the network operator be communicated to the JRC. The join request with this object occurs within a secured CoAP channel, although the link-local address configured by the pledge will be visible in either the CoAP stateless proxy option (section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]), or in the equivalent DTLS stateless proxy option (reference TBD).

This need not be a manufacturer created EUI-64 as assigned by IEEE; it could be another value with higher entropy and less interesting
For most constrained device, network attachment occurs very infrequently, often only once in their lifetime, so tracking opportunities may be rare. Once connected, the long 8-byte EUI64 layer-2 address is usually replaced with a short JRC assigned 2-byte address.

Additionally, during the enrollment process, a DTLS connection or EDHOC connection will be created. TLS1.3 will keep contents of the certificates transmitted private while TLS 1.2 will not. If the client certificate can be observed, then the device identity will be visible to passive observers in the 802.11AR IDevID certificate that is sent.

Even when TLS 1.3 is used, an active attacker could collect the information by creating a rogue proxy.

The use of a manufacturer assigned EUI64 (whether derived from IEEE assignment or created through another process during manufacturing time) is encouraged.

9.2.1. EUI-64 derived address for join time IID

The IID used in the link-local address used during the join process be a vendor assigned EUI-64. After the join process has concluded, the device SHOULD be assigned a unique randomly generated long address, and a unique short address (not based upon the vendor EUI-64) for use at link-layer address. At that point, all layer-3 content is encrypted by the layer-2 key.

9.3. Privacy Considerations for Join Proxy

TBD.

10. Security Considerations

TBD

10.1. Security of MASA voucher signing key(s)

TBD
11. Acknowledgements

Kristofer Pister helped with many non-IETF references.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[cullenCiscoPhoneDeploy]

[I-D.ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations]

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal]

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology]
Palattella, M., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q. Wang, "Terms Used in IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e", draft-ietf-6tisch-terminology-10 (work in progress), March 2018.

[I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]

[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]


Watsen, K., "YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism", draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-06 (work in progress), September 2018.


Richardson, M., "GRASP discovery of Registrar by Join Assistant", draft-richardson-anima-6join-discovery-00 (work in progress), October 2016.


12.2. Informative References

[duckling]

[I-D.ietf-ace-actors]

[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]

[I-D.ietf-core-sid]

[I-D.ietf-roll-useofrplinfo]

[ISA100]

[PFS]


Appendix A.  Extra text

The following text is from previous versions of this document. The document has been re-organized to match the flow of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].

A.1.  Assumptions

A.1.1.  One-Touch Assumptions

This document interacts with the one-touch solution described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].
A.1.2. Factory provided credentials (if any)

When a manufacturer installed certificate is provided as the IDevID, it SHOULD contain a number of fields. [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] provides a detailed set of requirements.

A manufacturer unique serial number MUST be provided in the serialNumber SubjectAltName extension, and MAY be repeated in the Common Name. There are no sequential or numeric requirements on the serialNumber, it may be any unique value that the manufacturer wants to use. The serialNumber SHOULD be printed on the packaging and/or on the device in a discrete way so that failures can be physically traced to the relevant device.

A.1.3. Credentials to be introduced

The goal of the bootstrap process is to introduce one or more new locally relevant credentials:

1. a certificate signed by a local certificate authority/registrar. This is the LDevID of [ieee802-1AR].
2. alternatively, a network-wide key to be used to secure L2 traffic.
3. alternatively, a network-wide key to be used to authenticate per-peer keying of L2 traffic using a mechanism such as provided by [ieee802159].

A.2. Network Assumptions

This document is about enrollment of constrained devices [RFC7228] to a constrained network. Constrained networks is such as [ieee802154], and in particular the time-slotted, channel hopping (tsch) mode, feature low bandwidths, and limited opportunities to transmit. A key feature of these networks is that receivers are only listening at certain times.

A.2.1. Security above and below IP

802.15.4 networks have three kinds of layer-2 security:

- a network key that is shared with all nodes and is used for unicast and multicast. The key may be used for privacy, and it may be used in some cases for authentication only (in the case of enhanced beacons).
o a series of network keys that are shared (agreed to) between pairs of nodes (the per-peer key)

o a network key that is shared with all nodes (through a group key management system), and is used for multicast traffic only, while a per-pair key is used for unicast traffic

Setting up the credentials to bootstrap one of these kinds of security, (or directly configuring the key itself for the first case) is required. This is the security below the IP layer.

Security is required above the IP layer: there are three aspects which the credentials in the previous section are to be used.

o to provide for secure connection with a Path Computation Element ([RFC4655]), or other LLC (see ([RFC7554]) section 3).

o to initiate a connection between a Resource Server (RS) and an application layer Authorization Server (AS and CAS from [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]).

A.2.1.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy

Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is the property of a protocol such that complete knowledge of the crypto state (for instance, via a memory dump) at time X does not imply that data from a disjoint time Y can also be recovered. ([PFS]).

PFS is important for two reasons: one is that it offers protection against the compromise of a node. It does this by changing the keys in a non-deterministic way. This second property also makes it much easier to remove a node from the network, as any node which has not participated in the key changing process will find itself no longer connected.

A.2.2. Join network assumptions

The network which the new pledge will connect to will have to have the following properties:

o a known PANID. The PANID 0xXXXX where XXXX is the assigned RFC# for this document is suggested.

o a minimal schedule with some Aloha time. This is usually in the same slotframe as the Enhanced Beacon, but a pledge MUST listen for an unencrypted Enhanced Beacon to so that it can synchronize.
A.2.3. Number and cost of round trips

TBD.

A.2.4. Size of packets, number of fragments

TBD

A.3. Target end-state for join process

At the end of the zero-touch join process there will be a symmetric key protected channel between the Join Registrar/Coordinator and the pledge, now known as a Joined Node. This channel may be rekeyed via new exchange of asymmetric exponents (ECDH for instance), authenticated using the domain specific credentials created during the join process.

This channel is in the form of an OSCOAP protected connection with [I-D.ietf-core-comi] encoded objects. This document includes definition of a [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] compatible objects for encoding of the relevant [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] objects.

Appendix B. Join Protocol

The pledge join protocol state machine is described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], in section XYZ. The pledge recognizes that it is in zero-touch configuration by the following situation:

- no PSK has been configured for the network in which it has joined.
- the pledge has no locally defined certificate (no LDevID), only an IDevID.
- the network asserts an identity that the pledge does not recognize.

All of these conditions MUST be true. If any of these are not true, then the pledge has either been connected to the wrong network, or it has already been bootstrapped into a different network, and it should wait until it finds that network.

The zero-touch process consists of three stages:

1. the key agreement process

2. the provisional enrollment process
3. the key distribution process

B.1. Key Agreement process

The key agreement process is identical to [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. The process uses EDHOC with certificates.

The pledge will have to trust the JRC provisionally, as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], section 3.1.2, and in section 4.1.1 of [RFC7030].

The JRC will be able to validate the IDevID of the pledge using the manufacturer’s CA.

The pledge may not know if it is in a zero-touch or one-touch situation: the pledge may be able to verify the JRC based upon trust anchors that were installed at manufacturing time. In that case, the pledge runs the simplified one-touch process.

The pledge signals in the EDHOC message_2 if it has accepted the JRC certificate. The JRC will in general, not trust the pledge with the network keys until it has provided the pledge with a voucher. The pledge will notice the absence of the provisioning keys.

XXX - there could be some disconnect here. May need additional signals here.

B.2. Provisional Enrollment process

When the pledge determines that it can not verify the certificate of the JRC using built-in trust anchors, then it enters a provisional state. In this state, it keeps the channel created by EDHOC open.

A new EDHOC key derivation is done by the JRC and pledge using a new label, "6tisch-provisional".

The pledge runs as a passive CoMI server, leaving the JRC to drive the enrollment process. The JRC can interrogate the pledge in a variety of fashions as shown below: the process terminates when the JRC provides the pledge with an ownership voucher and the pledge leaves the provisional state.

A typical interaction involves the following requests:
Appendix C. IANA Considerations

This document allocates one value from the subregistry "Address Registration Option Status Values": ND_NS_JOIN_DECLINED Join Assistant, JOIN DECLINED (TBD-AA)

Appendix D. Protocol Definition

D.1. Discovery

Only IPv6 operations using Link-Local addresses are supported. Use of a temporary address is NOT encouraged as the critical resource on the Proxy device is the number of Neighbour Cache Entries that can be used for untrusted pledge entries.
D.1.1. Proxy Discovery Protocol Details

The Proxy is discovered using the enhanced beacon defined in [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon].

D.1.2. Registrar Discovery Protocol Details

The Registrar is not discovered by the Proxy. Any device that is expected to be able to operate as a Registrar MAY be told the address of the Registrar when that device joins the network. The address MAY be included in the [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] Join Response. If the address is NOT included, then Proxy may assume that the Registrar can be found at the DODAG root, which is well known in the 6tisch’s use of the RPL protocol.

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Abstract

In TSCH mode of IEEE802.15.4, as described by [RFC8180], opportunities for broadcasts are limited to specific times and specific channels. Nodes in a TSCH network typically frequently send Enhanced Beacon (EB) frames to announce the presence of the network. This document provides a mechanism by which small details critical for new nodes (pledges) and long sleeping nodes may be carried within the Enhanced Beacon.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ..................................................... 2
   1.1. Terminology ............................................. 2
   1.2. Layer-2 Synchronization ................................ 3
   1.3. Layer-3 synchronization IPv6 Router solicitations and advertisements .......................... 3
2. Protocol Definition ............................................. 4
3. Security Considerations ......................................... 5
4. Privacy Considerations .......................................... 6
5. IANA Considerations ............................................. 6
6. Acknowledgements ................................................ 6
7. References ....................................................... 6
   7.1. Normative References ..................................... 6
   7.2. Informative References ................................... 7
Appendix A. Change history ......................................... 8
Authors’ Addresses .................................................. 8

1. Introduction

[RFC7554] describes the use of the time-slotted channel hopping (TSCCH) mode of [ieee802154]. As further details in [RFC8180], an Enhanced Beacon is transmitted during a slot designated a broadcast slot.

EDNOTE: Explain why broadcasts are rare, and why we need them. What the Enhanced Beacon is, and what Information Elements are, and how the IETF has a subtype for that area. Explain what kind of things could be placed in Information Elements, how big they could be, and how they could be compressed.

1.1. Terminology

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD implementations.

Other terminology can be found in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] in section 2.1.
1.2. Layer-2 Synchronization

As explained in section 6 of [RFC8180], the Enhanced Beacon has a number of purposes: synchronization of ASN and Join Metric, timeslot template identifier, the channel hopping sequence identifier, TSCH SlotFrame and Link IE.

The Enhanced Beacon (EB) is used by nodes already part of a TSCH network to announce its existence. Receiving an EB allows a Joining Node (pledge) to learn about the network and synchronize to it. The EB may also be used as a means for a node already part of the network to re-synchronize [RFC7554].

There are a limited number of timeslots designated as a broadcast slot by each router. These slots are rare, and with 10ms slots, with a slot-frame length of 100, there may be only 1 slot/s for the beacon.

1.3. Layer-3 synchronization IPv6 Router solicitations and advertisements

At layer 3, [RFC4861] defines a mechanism by which nodes learn about routers by listening for multicasted Router Advertisements (RA). If no RA is heard within a set time, then a Router Solicitation (RS) may be multicast, to which an RA will be received, usually unicast.

Although [RFC6775] reduces the amount of multicast necessary to do address resolution via Neighbor Solicitation messages, it still requires multicast of either RAs or RS. This is an expensive operation for two reasons: there are few multicast timeslots for unsolicited RAs; if a pledge node does not hear an RA, and decides to send a RS (consuming a broadcast aloha slot with unencrypted traffic), unicast RS may be sent in response.

This is a particularly acute issue for the join process for the following reasons:

1. use of a multicast slot by even a non-malicious unauthenticated node for a Router Solicitation may overwhelm that time slot.

2. it may require many seconds of on-time before a new pledge hears a Router Solicitation that it can use.

3. a new pledge may listen to many Enhanced Beacons before it can pick an appropriate network and/or closest Join Assistant to attach to. If it must listen for a RS as well as find the Enhanced Beacon, then the process may take a very long time.
2. Protocol Definition

[RFC8137] creates a registry for new IETF IE subtypes. This document allocates a new subtype TBD-XXX.

This document documents a new IE subtype structure is as follows. As explained in [RFC8137] the length of the Sub-Type Content can be calculated from the container, so no length information is necessary.

```
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| TBD-XXX | R | P | res | proxy prio | rank priority |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| pan priority |
+-----------------
| Join Proxy lower-64 |
+-----------------
| (present if P=1) |
+-----------------
| network ID |
| variable length, up to 16 bytes |
+-----------------
| proxy priority |
Lower value indicates willing to act as a Join Proxy as described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. Values range 0 (most willing) to 0x7e (least willing). A priority of 0x7f indicates that the announcer should never be considered as a viable enrollment proxy. Only unenrolled pledges look at this value.

pan priority the pan priority is a value set by the DODAG root to indicate the relative priority of this LLN compared to those with different PANIDs. This value may be used as part of the enrollment priority, but typically is used by devices which have already enrolled, and need to determine which PAN to pick. Unenrolled pledges MAY consider this value when selecting a PAN to join. Enrolled devices MAY consider this value when looking for an eligible parent device.
rank priority the rank "priority" is set by the 6LR which sent the beacon and is an indication of how willing this 6LR is to serve as an RPL parent within a particular network ID. This is a local value to be determined in other work. It might be calculated from RPL rank, and it may include some modifications based upon current number of children, or number of neighbor cache entries available. This value MUST be ignored by pledges, it is for enrolled devices only.

R the Router Advertisement R-flag is set if the sending node will act as a Router for host-only nodes that need addressing via unicast Router Solicitation messages.

P if the Proxy Address P-flag is set, then the lower 64-bits of the Join Proxy’s Link Layer address follows the network ID. If the Proxy Address bit is not set, then the Link Layer address of the Join Proxy is identical to the Layer-2 8-byte address used to originate this enhanced beacon. In either case, the layer-2 address of any IPv6 traffic to the originator of this beacon may use the layer-2 address which was used to originate the beacon.

join-proxy lower-64 if the P-flag bit is set, then 64 bits (8 bytes) of address are present. The Link Local address of the Join Proxy is fe80 (as for any Link Local address), and the bits given in this field.

network ID this is an variable length field, up to 16-bytes in size that uniquely identifies this network, potentially among many networks that are operating in the same frequencies in overlapping physical space. The length of this field can be calculated as being whatever is left in the Information Element.

In a 6tisch network, where RPL [RFC6550] is used as the mesh routing protocol, the network ID can be constructed from a SHA256 hash of the prefix (/64) of the network. That is just a suggestion for a default value. In some LLNs where multiple PANIDs may lead to the same management device (the JRC), then a common value that is the same across all PANs MUST be configured.

3. Security Considerations

All of the contents of this Information Element are sent in the clear. The containing Enhanced Beacon is not encrypted.

The Enhanced Beacon is authenticated at the layer-2 level using 802.15.4 mechanisms using the network-wide keying material. Nodes which are enrolled will have the network-wide keying material and can validate the beacon.
Pledges which have not yet enrolled are unable to authenticate the beacons.

4. Privacy Considerations

The use of a network ID may reveal information about the network. The use of a SHA256 hash of the DODAGID, rather than using the DODAGID directly provides some cover the addresses used within the network. The DODAGID is usually the IPv6 address of the root of the RPL mesh.

An interloper with a radio sniffer would be able to use the network ID to map out the extend of the mesh network.

5. IANA Considerations

Allocate a new number TBD-XXX from Registry IETF IE Sub-type ID. This entry should be called 6tisch-Join-Info.

6. Acknowledgements

Thomas Watteyne provided extensive editorial comments on the document.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture]

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]

[ieee802154]


7.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Change history

The rank priority was expanded to 2 bytes.

00: The extension was originally for the use of Pledges only during the enrollment/join process. Additional information was desired for nodes which have already enrolled in order to aid in the joining (selecting of a parent) of an RPL DAG. The term "join" was realized to be ambiguous, meaning different things to different groups, and so the activity where the pledge finds a "Join Proxy" has been named "enrollment"

-1: This is an evolution of an earlier proposal which provided for storing an entire IPv6 Router Advertisement in an Informational Element. It was deemed too general a solution, possibly subject to mis-use. This proposal restricts the use to just the key pieces of information required.

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Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH

draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-10

Abstract

This document describes the minimal framework required for a new device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network. The framework requires that the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central entity), share a symmetric key. How this key is provisioned is out of scope of this document. Through a single CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) request-response exchange secured by OSCORE (Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), the pledge requests admission into the network and the JRC configures it with link-layer keying material and other parameters. The JRC may at any time update the parameters through another request-response exchange secured by OSCORE. This specification defines the Constrained Join Protocol and its CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation) data structures, and configures the rest of the 6TiSCH communication stack for this join process to occur in a secure manner. Additional security mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal framework.

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Table of Contents

1.  Introduction .................................................. 3
2.  Terminology ................................................... 4
3.  Provisioning Phase ............................................ 5
4.  Join Process Overview ......................................... 7
   4.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon ............................... 8
   4.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery ........................... 9
   4.3.  Step 3 - Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) Execution ... 9
   4.4.  The Special Case of the 6LBR Pledge Joining .......... 10
4.  Link-layer Configuration ....................................... 10
5.  Network-layer Configuration ..................................... 11
7.  Application-level Configuration ............................... 13
   7.1.  Statelessness of the JP ............................... 13
   7.2.  Recommended Settings .................................. 14
   7.3.  OSCORE ................................................ 15
8.  Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) ................................ 17
   8.1.  Join Exchange .......................................... 19
   8.2.  Parameter Update Exchange ............................. 20
   8.3.  Error Handling ......................................... 21
   8.4.  CoJP Objects ........................................... 24
   8.5.  Recommended Settings .................................. 36
9.  Security Considerations ........................................ 37
10. Privacy Considerations ......................................... 38
11. IANA Considerations ........................................... 39
   11.1.  CoJP Parameters Registry ............................. 39
   11.2.  CoJP Key Usage Registry ............................... 40
11.3.  CoJP Unsupported Configuration Code Registry .......... 41
12. Acknowledgments ................................................ 41
13. References ..................................................... 41

1. Introduction

This document defines a "secure join" solution for a new device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH network. The term "secure join" refers to network access authentication, authorization and parameter distribution, as defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology]. The Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) defined in this document handles parameter distribution needed for a pledge to become a joined node. Authorization mechanisms are considered out of scope. Mutual authentication during network access is achieved through the use of a secure channel, as configured by this document. This document also specifies a configuration of different layers of the 6TiSCH protocol stack that reduces the Denial of Service (DoS) attack surface during the join process.

This document presumes a 6TiSCH network as described by [RFC7554] and [RFC8180]. By design, nodes in a 6TiSCH network [RFC7554] have their radio turned off most of the time, to conserve energy. As a consequence, the link used by a new device for joining the network has limited bandwidth [RFC8180]. The secure join solution defined in this document therefore keeps the number of over-the-air exchanges to a minimum.

The micro-controllers at the heart of 6TiSCH nodes have a small amount of code memory. It is therefore paramount to reuse existing protocols available as part of the 6TiSCH stack. At the application layer, the 6TiSCH stack already relies on CoAP [RFC7252] for web transfer, and on OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] for its end-to-end security. The secure join solution defined in this document therefore reuses those two protocols as its building blocks.

CoJP is a generic protocol that can be used as-is in all modes of IEEE Std 802.15.4, including the Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode 6TiSCH is based on. CoJP may as well be used in other (low-power) networking technologies where efficiency in terms of communication overhead and code footprint is important. In such a case, it may be necessary to define configuration parameters specific to the technology in question, through companion documents. The overall process described in Section 4 and the configuration of the stack is specific to 6TiSCH.
CoJP assumes the presence of a Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), a central entity. The configuration defined in this document assumes that the pledge and the JRC share a secret cryptographic key, called PSK (pre-shared key). The PSK is used to configure OSCORE to provide a secure channel to CoJP. How the PSK is installed is out of scope of this document: this may happen during the provisioning phase or by a key exchange protocol that may precede the execution of CoJP.

When the pledge seeks admission to a 6TiSCH network, it first synchronizes to it, by initiating the passive scan defined in [IEEE802.15.4]. The pledge then exchanges CoJP messages with the JRC; these messages can be forwarded by nodes already part of the 6TiSCH network, called Join Proxies. The messages exchanged allow the JRC and the pledge to mutually authenticate, based on the properties provided by OSCORE. They also allow the JRC to configure the pledge with link-layer keying material, short identifier and other parameters. After this secure join process successfully completes, the joined node can interact with its neighbors to request additional bandwidth using the 6top Protocol [RFC8480] and start sending application traffic.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The reader is expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology], [RFC7252], [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and [RFC8152].

The specification also includes a set of informative specifications using the Concise data definition language (CDDL) [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl].

The following terms defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology] are used extensively throughout this document:

- pledge
- joined node
- join proxy (JP)
- join registrar/coordinator (JRC)
o enhanced beacon (EB)

o join protocol

o join process

The following terms defined in [RFC6775] are also used throughout this document:

o 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR)

o 6LoWPAN Node (6LN)

The term "6LBR" is used interchangeably with the term "DODAG root" defined in [RFC6550], assuming the two entities are co-located, as recommended by [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture].

The term "pledge", as used throughout the document, explicitly denotes non-6LBR devices attempting to join the network using their IEEE Std 802.15.4 network interface. The device that attempts to join as the 6LBR of the network and does so over another network interface is explicitly denoted as the "6LBR pledge". When the text equally applies to the pledge and the 6LBR pledge, the "(6LBR) pledge" form is used.

In addition, we use generic terms "pledge identifier" and "network identifier". See Section 3.

The terms "secret key" and "symmetric key" are used interchangeably.

3. Provisioning Phase

The (6LBR) pledge is provisioned with certain parameters before attempting to join the network, and the same parameters are provisioned to the JRC. There are many ways by which this provisioning can be done. Physically, the parameters can be written into the (6LBR) pledge using a number of mechanisms, such as a JTAG interface, a serial (craft) console interface, pushing buttons simultaneously on different devices, over-the-air configuration in a Faraday cage, etc. The provisioning can be done by the vendor, the manufacturer, the integrator, etc.

Details of how this provisioning is done is out of scope of this document. What is assumed is that there can be a secure, private conversation between the JRC and the (6LBR) pledge, and that the two devices can exchange the parameters.

Parameters that are provisioned to the (6LBR) pledge include:
pledge identifier. The pledge identifier identifies the (6LBR) pledge. The pledge identifier MUST be unique in the set of all pledge identifiers managed by a JRC. The pledge identifier uniqueness is an important security requirement, as discussed in Section 9. The pledge identifier is typically the globally unique 64-bit Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64) of the IEEE Std 802.15.4 device, in which case it is provisioned by the hardware manufacturer. The pledge identifier is used to generate the IPv6 addresses of the (6LBR) pledge and to identify it during the execution of the join protocol. For privacy reasons (see Section 10), it is possible to use a pledge identifier different from the EUI-64. For example, a pledge identifier may be a random byte string, but care needs to be taken that such a string meets the uniqueness requirement.

Pre-Shared Key (PSK). A secret cryptographic key shared between the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC. The JRC additionally needs to store the pledge identifier bound to the given PSK. Each (6LBR) pledge MUST be provisioned with a unique PSK. The PSK SHOULD be a cryptographically strong key, at least 128 bits in length, indistinguishable by feasible computation from a random uniform string of the same length. How the PSK is generated and/or provisioned is out of scope of this specification. This could be done during a provisioning step or companion documents can specify the use of a key agreement protocol. Common pitfalls when generating PSKs are discussed in Section 9.

Optionally, a network identifier. The network identifier identifies the 6TiSCH network. The network identifier MUST be carried within Enhanced Beacon (EB) frames. Typically, the 16-bit Personal Area Network Identifier (PAN ID) defined in [IEEE802.15.4] is used as the network identifier. However, PAN ID is not considered a stable network identifier as it may change during network lifetime if a collision with another network is detected. Companion documents can specify the use of a different network identifier for join purposes, but this is out of scope of this specification. Provisioning the network identifier is RECOMMENDED. However, due to operational constraints, the network identifier may not be known at the time when the provisioning is done. In case this parameter is not provisioned to the pledge, the pledge attempts to join one advertised network at a time, which significantly prolongs the join process. This parameter MUST be provisioned to the 6LBR pledge.

Optionally, any non-default algorithms. The default algorithms are specified in Section 7.3.3. When algorithm identifiers are not exchanged, the use of these default algorithms is implied.
Additionally, the 6LBR pledge that is not co-located with the JRC needs to be provisioned with:

- Global IPv6 address of the JRC. This address is used by the 6LBR pledge to address the JRC during the join process. The 6LBR pledge may also obtain the IPv6 address of the JRC through other available mechanisms, such as DHCPv6, GRASP, mDNS, the use of which is out of scope of this document. Pledges do not need to be provisioned with this address as they discover it dynamically through CoJP.

4. Join Process Overview

This section describes the steps taken by a pledge in a 6TiSCH network. When a pledge seeks admission to a 6TiSCH network, the following exchange occurs:

1. The pledge listens for an Enhanced Beacon (EB) frame [IEEE802.15.4]. This frame provides network synchronization information, and tells the device when it can send a frame to the node sending the beacons, which acts as a Join Proxy (JP) for the pledge, and when it can expect to receive a frame. The Enhanced Beacon provides the L2 address of the JP and it may also provide its link-local IPv6 address.

2. The pledge configures its link-local IPv6 address and advertises it to the JP using Neighbor Discovery. This step may be omitted if the link-local address has been derived from a known unique interface identifier, such as an EUI-64 address.

3. The pledge sends a Join Request to the JP in order to securely identify itself to the network. The Join Request is forwarded to the JRC.

4. In case of successful processing of the request, the pledge receives a Join Response from the JRC (via the JP). The Join Response contains configuration parameters necessary for the pledge to join the network.

From the pledge’s perspective, joining is a local phenomenon - the pledge only interacts with the JP, and it needs not know how far it is from the 6LBR, or how to route to the JRC. Only after establishing one or more link-layer keys does it need to know about the particulars of a 6TiSCH network.

The join process is shown as a transaction diagram in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Overview of a successful join process.

As other nodes in the network, the 6LBR node may act as the JP. The 6LBR may in addition be co-located with the JRC.

The details of each step are described in the following sections.

4.1. Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon

The pledge synchronizes to the network by listening for, and receiving, an Enhanced Beacon (EB) sent by a node already in the network. This process is entirely defined by [IEEE802.15.4], and described in [RFC7554].

Once the pledge hears an EB, it synchronizes to the joining schedule using the cells contained in the EB. The pledge can hear multiple EBs; the selection of which EB to use is out of the scope for this document, and is discussed in [RFC7554]. Implementers should make use of information such as: what network identifier the EB contains, the value of the Join Metric field within EBs, whether the source link-layer address of the EB has been tried before, what signal strength the different EBs were received at, etc. In addition, the pledge may be pre-configured to search for EBs with a specific network identifier.

If the pledge is not provisioned with the network identifier, it attempts to join one network at a time, as described in Section 8.1.1.

Once the pledge selects the EB, it synchronizes to it and transitions into a low-power mode. It follows the schedule information contained in the EB which indicates the slots that the pledge may use for the join process. During the remainder of the join process, the node that has sent the EB to the pledge acts as the JP.
At this point, the pledge may proceed to step 2, or continue to listen for additional EBs.

4.2. Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery

The pledge forms its link-local IPv6 address based on the interface identifier, as per [RFC4944]. The pledge MAY perform the Neighbor Solicitation / Neighbor Advertisement exchange with the JP, as per Section 5.5.1 of [RFC6775]. The pledge and the JP use their link-local IPv6 addresses for all subsequent communication during the join process.

Note that Neighbor Discovery exchanges at this point are not protected with link-layer security as the pledge is not in possession of the keys. How JP accepts these unprotected frames is discussed in Section 5.

4.3. Step 3 - Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) Execution

The pledge triggers the join exchange of the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP). The join exchange consists of two messages: the Join Request message (Step 3a), and the Join Response message conditioned on the successful security processing of the request (Step 3b).

All CoJP messages are exchanged over a secure end-to-end channel that provides confidentiality, data authenticity and replay protection. Frames carrying CoJP messages are not protected with link-layer security when exchanged between the pledge and the JP as the pledge is not in possession of the link-layer keys in use. How JP and pledge accept these unprotected frames is discussed in Section 5. When frames carrying CoJP messages are exchanged between nodes that have already joined the network, the link-layer security is applied according to the security configuration used in the network.

4.3.1. Step 3a - Join Request

The Join Request is a message sent from the pledge to the JP, and which the JP forwards to the JRC. The pledge indicates in the Join Request the role it requests to play in the network, as well as the identifier of the network it requests to join. The JP forwards the Join Request to the JRC on the existing links. How exactly this happens is out of scope of this document; some networks may wish to dedicate specific link layer resources for this join traffic.
4.3.2. Step 3b - Join Response

The Join Response is sent by the JRC to the pledge, and is forwarded through the JP. The packet containing the Join Response travels from the JRC to the JP using the operating routes in the network. The JP delivers it to the pledge. The JP operates as the application-layer proxy.

The Join Response contains different parameters needed by the pledge to become a fully operational network node. These parameters include the link-layer key(s) currently in use in the network, the short address assigned to the pledge, the IPv6 address of the JRC needed by the pledge to operate as the JP, among others.

4.4. The Special Case of the 6LBR Pledge Joining

The 6LBR pledge performs Section 4.3 of the join process described above, just as any other pledge, albeit over a different network interface. There is no JP intermediating the communication between the 6LBR pledge and the JRC, as described in Section 6. The other steps of the described join process do not apply to the 6LBR pledge. How the 6LBR pledge obtains an IPv6 address and triggers the execution of the CoJP protocol is out of scope of this document.

5. Link-layer Configuration

In an operational 6TiSCH network, all frames MUST use link-layer frame security [RFC8180]. The IEEE Std 802.15.4 security attributes MUST include frame authenticity, and MAY include frame confidentiality (i.e. encryption).

The pledge does not initially do any authenticity check of the EB frames, as it does not possess the link-layer key(s) in use. The pledge is still able to parse the contents of the received EBs and synchronize to the network, as EBs are not encrypted [RFC8180].

When sending frames during the join process, the pledge sends unencrypted and unauthenticated frames. The JP accepts these unsecured frames for the duration of the join process. This behavior may be implemented by setting the "secExempt" attribute in the IEEE Std 802.15.4 security configuration tables. How the JP learns whether the join process is ongoing is out of scope of this specification.

As the EB itself cannot be authenticated by the pledge, an attacker may craft a frame that appears to be a valid EB, since the pledge can neither verify the freshness nor verify the address of the JP. This opens up a DoS vector, as discussed in Section 9.
6. Network-layer Configuration

The pledge and the JP SHOULD keep a separate neighbor cache for untrusted entries and use it to store each other’s information during the join process. Mixing neighbor entries belonging to pledges and nodes that are part of the network opens up the JP to a DoS attack, as the attacker may fill JP’s neighbor table and prevent the discovery of legitimate neighbors.

Once the pledge obtains link-layer keys and becomes a joined node, it is able to securely communicate with its neighbors, obtain the network IPv6 prefix and form its global IPv6 address. The joined node then undergoes an independent process to bootstrap its neighbor cache entries, possibly with a node that formerly acted as a JP, following [RFC6775]. From the point of view of the JP, there is no relationship between the neighbor cache entry belonging to a pledge and the joined node that formerly acted as a pledge.

The pledge does not communicate with the JRC at the network layer. This allows the pledge to join without knowing the IPv6 address of the JRC. Instead, the pledge communicates with the JP at the network layer using link-local addressing, and with the JRC at the application layer, as specified in Section 7.

The JP communicates with the JRC over global IPv6 addresses. The JP discovers the network IPv6 prefix and configures its global IPv6 address upon successful completion of the join process and the obtention of link-layer keys. The pledge learns the IPv6 address of the JRC from the Join Response, as specified in Section 8.1.2; it uses it once joined in order to operate as a JP.

As a special case, the 6LBR pledge is expected to have an additional network interface that it uses in order to obtain the configuration parameters from the JRC and start advertising the 6TiSCH network. This additional interface needs to be configured with a global IPv6 address, by a mechanism that is out of scope of this document. The 6LBR pledge uses this interface to directly communicate with the JRC using global IPv6 addressing.

The JRC can be co-located on the 6LBR. In this special case, the IPv6 address of the JRC can be omitted from the Join Response message for space optimization. The 6LBR then MUST set the DODAGID field in the RPL DIOs [RFC6550] to its IPv6 address. The pledge learns the address of the JRC once joined and upon the reception of the first RPL DIO message, and uses it to operate as a JP.
6.1. Identification of Unauthenticated Traffic

The traffic that is proxied by the Join Proxy (JP) comes from unauthenticated pledges, and there may be an arbitrary amount of it. In particular, an attacker may send fraudulent traffic in an attempt to overwhelm the network.

When operating as part of a [RFC8180] 6TiSCH minimal network using distributed scheduling algorithms, the traffic from unauthenticated pledges may cause intermediate nodes to request additional bandwidth. An attacker could use this property to cause the network to overcommit bandwidth (and energy) to the join process.

The Join Proxy is aware of what traffic originates from unauthenticated pledges, and so can avoid allocating additional bandwidth itself. The Join Proxy implements a data cap on outgoing join traffic through CoAP’s congestion control mechanism. This cap will not protect intermediate nodes as they cannot tell join traffic from regular traffic. Despite the data cap implemented separately on each Join Proxy, the aggregate join traffic from many Join Proxies may cause intermediate nodes to decide to allocate additional cells. It is undesirable to do so in response to the traffic originated at unauthenticated pledges. In order to permit the intermediate nodes to avoid this, the traffic needs to be tagged. [RFC2597] defines a set of per-hop behaviors that may be encoded into the Diffserv Code Points (DSCPs). Based on the DSCP, intermediate nodes can decide whether to act on a given packet.

6.1.1. Traffic from JP to JRC

The Join Proxy SHOULD set the DSCP of packets that it produces as part of the forwarding process to AF43 code point (See Section 6 of [RFC2597]). A Join Proxy that does not set the DSCP on traffic forwarded should set it to zero so that it is compressed out.

A Scheduling Function (SF) running on 6TiSCH nodes SHOULD NOT allocate additional cells as a result of traffic with code point AF43. Companion SF documents SHOULD specify how this recommended behavior is achieved.

6.1.2. Traffic from JRC to JP

The JRC SHOULD set the DSCP of join response packets addressed to the Join Proxy to AF42 code point. AF42 has lower drop probability than AF43, giving this traffic priority in buffers over the traffic going towards the JRC.
Due to the convergecast nature of the DODAG, the 6LBR links are often the most congested, and from that point down there is progressively less (or equal) congestion. If the 6LBR paces itself when sending join response traffic then it ought to never exceed the bandwidth allocated to the best effort traffic cells. If the 6LBR has the capacity (if it is not constrained) then it should provide some buffers in order to satisfy the Assured Forwarding behavior.

Companion SF documents SHOULD specify how traffic with code point AF42 is handled with respect to cell allocation.

7. Application-level Configuration

The CoJP join exchange in Figure 1 is carried over CoAP [RFC7252] and the secure channel provided by OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. The (6LBR) pledge acts as a CoAP client; the JRC acts as a CoAP server. The JP implements CoAP forward proxy functionality [RFC7252]. Because the JP can also be a constrained device, it cannot implement a cache.

The pledge designates a JP as a proxy by including the Proxy-Scheme option in CoAP requests it sends to the JP. The pledge also includes in the requests the Uri-Host option with its value set to the well-known JRC’s alias, as specified in Section 8.1.1.

The JP resolves the alias to the IPv6 address of the JRC that it learned when it acted as a pledge, and joined the network. This allows the JP to reach the JRC at the network layer and forward the requests on behalf of the pledge.

7.1. Statelessness of the JP

The CoAP proxy defined in [RFC7252] keeps per-client state information in order to forward the response towards the originator of the request. This state information includes at least the CoAP token, the IPv6 address of the client, and the UDP source port number. Since the JP can be a constrained device that acts as a CoAP proxy, memory limitations make it prone to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.

This DoS vector on the JP can be mitigated by making the JP act as a stateless CoAP proxy, where "state" encompasses the information related individual pledges. The JP can wrap the state it needs to keep for a given pledge throughout the network stack in a "state object" and include it as a CoAP token in the forwarded request to the JRC. The JP may use the CoAP token as defined in [RFC7252], if the size of the serialized state object permits, or use the extended CoAP token defined in [I-D.ietf-core-stateless], to transport the
state object. Since the CoAP token is echoed back in the response, the JP is able to decode the state object and configure the state needed to forward the response to the pledge. The information that the JP needs to encode in the state object to operate in a fully stateless manner with respect to a given pledge is implementation specific.

It is RECOMMENDED that the JP operates in a stateless manner and signals the per-pledge state within the CoAP token, for every request it forwards into the network on behalf of unauthenticated pledges. When operating in a stateless manner, the security considerations from [I-D.ietf-core-stateless] apply and the type of the CoAP message that the JP forwards on behalf of the pledge MUST be non-confirmable (NON), regardless of the message type received from the pledge. The use of a non-confirmable message by the JP alleviates the JP from keeping CoAP message exchange state. The retransmission burden is then entirely shifted to the pledge. A JP that operates in a stateless manner still needs to keep congestion control state with the JRC, see Section 9. Recommended values of CoAP settings for use during the join process, both by the pledge and the JP, are given in Section 7.2.

Note that in some networking stack implementations, a fully (per-pledge) stateless operation of the JP may be challenging from the implementation’s point of view. In those cases, the JP may operate as a statefull proxy that stores the per-pledge state until the response is received or timed out, but this comes at a price of a DoS vector.

7.2. Recommended Settings

This section gives RECOMMENDED values of CoAP settings during the join process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Default Value: Pledge</th>
<th>Default Value: JP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACK_TIMEOUT</td>
<td>10 seconds</td>
<td>(10 seconds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAX_RETRANSMIT</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommended CoAP settings. Values enclosed in () have no effect when JP operates in a stateless manner.
These values may be configured to values specific to the deployment. The default values have been chosen to accommodate a wide range of deployments, taking into account dense networks.

The PROBING_RATE value at the JP is controlled by the join rate parameter, see Section 8.4.2. Following [RFC7252], the average data rate in sending to the JRC must not exceed PROBING_RATE. For security reasons, the average data rate SHOULD be measured over a rather short window, e.g. ACK_TIMEOUT, see Section 9.

7.3. OSCORE

Before the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC start exchanging CoAP messages protected with OSCORE, they need to derive the OSCORE security context from the provisioned parameters, as discussed in Section 3.

The OSCORE security context MUST be derived as per Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

- the Master Secret MUST be the PSK.
- the Master Salt MUST be the empty byte string.
- the ID Context MUST be set to the pledge identifier.
- the ID of the pledge MUST be set to the empty byte string. This identifier is used as the OSCORE Sender ID of the pledge in the security context derivation, since the pledge initially acts as a CoAP client.
- the ID of the JRC MUST be set to the byte string 0x4a5243 ("JRC" in ASCII). This identifier is used as the OSCORE Recipient ID of the pledge in the security context derivation, as the JRC initially acts as a CoAP server.
- the Algorithm MUST be set to the value from [RFC8152], agreed out-of-band by the same mechanism used to provision the PSK. The default is AES-CCM-16-64-128.
- the Key Derivation Function MUST be agreed out-of-band by the same mechanism used to provision the PSK. Default is HKDF SHA-256 [RFC5869].

Since the pledge’s OSCORE Sender ID is the empty byte string, when constructing the OSCORE option, the pledge sets the k bit in the OSCORE flag byte, but indicates a 0-length kid. The pledge transports its pledge identifier within the kid context field of the OSCORE option. The derivation in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
results in OSCORE keys and a common IV for each side of the conversation. Nonces are constructed by XOR’ing the common IV with the current sequence number. For details on nonce and OSCORE option construction, refer to [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

Implementations MUST ensure that multiple CoAP requests, including to different JRCs, are properly incrementing the sequence numbers, so that the same sequence number is never reused in distinct requests. The pledge typically sends requests to different JRCs if it is not provisioned with the network identifier and attempts to join one network at a time. Failure to comply will break the security guarantees of the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm because of nonce reuse.

This OSCORE security context is used for initial joining of the (6LBR) pledge, where the (6LBR) pledge acts as a CoAP client, as well as for any later parameter updates, where the JRC acts as a CoAP client and the joined node as a CoAP server, as discussed in Section 8.2. Note that when the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC change roles between CoAP client and CoAP server, the same OSCORE security context as initially derived remains in use and the derived parameters are unchanged, for example Sender ID when sending and Recipient ID when receiving (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]). A (6LBR) pledge is expected to have exactly one OSCORE security context with the JRC.

7.3.1. Replay Window and Persistency

Both (6LBR) pledge and the JRC MUST implement a replay protection mechanism. The use of the default OSCORE replay protection mechanism specified in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is RECOMMENDED.

Implementations MUST ensure that mutable OSCORE context parameters (Sender Sequence Number, Replay Window) are stored in persistent memory. A technique that prevents reuse of sequence numbers, detailed in Appendix B.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], MUST be implemented. Each update of the OSCORE Replay Window MUST be written to persistent memory.

This is an important security requirement in order to guarantee nonce uniqueness and resistance to replay attacks across reboots and rejoins. Traffic between the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC is rare, making security outweigh the cost of writing to persistent memory.
7.3.2. OSCORE Error Handling

Errors raised by OSCORE during the join process MUST be silently dropped, with no error response being signaled. The pledge MUST silently discard any response not protected with OSCORE, including error codes.

Such errors may happen for a number of reasons, including failed lookup of an appropriate security context (e.g. the pledge attempting to join a wrong network), failed decryption, positive replay window lookup, formatting errors (possibly due to malicious alterations in transit). Silently dropping OSCORE messages prevents a DoS attack on the pledge where the attacker could send bogus error responses, forcing the pledge to attempt joining one network at a time, until all networks have been tried.

7.3.3. Mandatory to Implement Algorithms

The mandatory to implement AEAD algorithm for use with OSCORE is AES-CCM-16-64-128 from [RFC8152]. This is the algorithm used for securing IEEE Std 802.15.4 frames, and hardware acceleration for it is present in virtually all compliant radio chips. With this choice, CoAP messages are protected with an 8-byte CCM authentication tag, and the algorithm uses 13-byte long nonces.

The mandatory to implement hash algorithm is SHA-256 [RFC4231]. The mandatory to implement key derivation function is HKDF [RFC5869], instantiated with a SHA-256 hash. See Appendix B for implementation guidance when code footprint is important.

8. Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP)

The Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) is a lightweight protocol over CoAP [RFC7252] and a secure channel provided by OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. CoJP allows the (6LBR) pledge to request admission into a network managed by the JRC, and for the JRC to configure the pledge with the parameters necessary for joining the network, or advertising it in the case of 6LBR pledge. The JRC may update the parameters at any time, by reaching out to the joined node that formerly acted as a (6LBR) pledge. For example, network-wide rekeying can be implemented by updating the keying material on each node.

This section specifies how the CoJP messages are mapped to CoAP and OSCORE, CBOR data structures carrying different parameters, transported within CoAP payload, and the parameter semantics and processing rules.
CoJP relies on the security properties provided by OSCORE. This includes end-to-end confidentiality, data authenticiry, replay protection, and a secure binding of responses to requests.

![Layer Diagram](https://example.com/cojp_layer_diagram.png)

Figure 2: Abstract layering of CoJP.

When a (6LBR) pledge requests admission to a given network, it undergoes the CoJP join exchange that consists of:

- the Join Request message, sent by the (6LBR) pledge to the JRC, potentially proxied by the JP. The Join Request message and its mapping to CoAP is specified in Section 8.1.1.

- the Join Response message, sent by the JRC to the (6LBR) pledge, if the JRC successfully processes the Join Request using OSCORE and it determines through a mechanism that is out of scope of this specification that the (6LBR) pledge is authorized to join the network. The Join Response message is potentially proxied by the JP. The Join Response message and its mapping to CoAP is specified in Section 8.1.2.

When the JRC needs to update the parameters of a joined node that formerly acted as a (6LBR) pledge, it executes the CoJP parameter update exchange that consists of:

- the Parameter Update message, sent by the JRC to the joined node that formerly acted as a (6LBR) pledge. The Parameter Update message and its mapping to CoAP is specified in Section 8.2.1.

- the Parameter Update Response message, sent by the joined node to the JRC in response to the Parameter Update message to signal successful reception of the updated parameters. The Parameter Update Response message and its mapping to CoAP is specified in Section 8.2.2.
The payload of CoJP messages is encoded with CBOR [RFC7049]. The CBOR data structures that may appear as the payload of different CoJP messages are specified in Section 8.4.

8.1. Join Exchange

This section specifies the messages exchanged when the (6LBR) pledge requests admission and configuration parameters from the JRC.

8.1.1. Join Request Message

The Join Request message that the (6LBR) pledge sends SHALL be mapped to a CoAP request:

- The request method is POST.
- The type is Confirmable (CON).
- The Proxy-Scheme option is set to "coap".
- The Uri-Host option is set to "6tisch.arpa". This is an anycast type of identifier of the JRC that is resolved to its IPv6 address by the JP or the 6LBR pledge.
- The Uri-Path option is set to "j".
- The OSCORE option SHALL be set according to [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. The OSCORE security context used is the one derived in Section 7.3. The OSCORE kid context allows the JRC to retrieve the security context for a given pledge.
- The payload is a Join_Request CBOR object, as defined in Section 8.4.1.

Since the Join Request is a confirmable message, the transmission at (6LBR) pledge will be controlled by CoAP’s retransmission mechanism. The JP, when operating in a stateless manner, forwards this Join Request as a non-confirmable (NON) CoAP message, as specified in Section 7. If the CoAP at (6LBR) pledge declares the message transmission as failure, the (6LBR) pledge SHOULD attempt to join the next advertised 6TiSCH network. See Section 7.2 for recommended values of CoAP settings to use during the join exchange.

If all join attempts to advertised networks have failed, the (6LBR) pledge SHOULD signal to the user the presence of an error condition, through some out-of-band mechanism.
8.1.2. Join Response Message

The Join Response message that the JRC sends SHALL be mapped to a CoAP response:

- The response Code is 2.04 (Changed).
- The payload is a Configuration CBOR object, as defined in Section 8.4.2.

8.2. Parameter Update Exchange

During the network lifetime, parameters returned as part of the Join Response may need to be updated. One typical example is the update of link-layer keying material for the network, a process known as rekeying. This section specifies a generic mechanism when this parameter update is initiated by the JRC.

At the time of the join, the (6LBR) pledge acts as a CoAP client and requests the network parameters through a representation of the "/j" resource, exposed by the JRC. In order for the update of these parameters to happen, the JRC needs to asynchronously contact the joined node. The use of the CoAP Observe option for this purpose is not feasible due to the change in the IPv6 address when the pledge becomes the joined node and obtains a global address.

Instead, once the (6LBR) pledge receives and successfully validates the Join Response and so becomes a joined node, it becomes a CoAP server. The joined node exposes the "/j" resource that is used by the JRC to update the parameters. Consequently, the JRC operates as a CoAP client when updating the parameters. The request/response exchange between the JRC and the (6LBR) pledge happens over the already-established OSCORE secure channel.

8.2.1. Parameter Update Message

The Parameter Update message that the JRC sends to the joined node SHALL be mapped to a CoAP request:

- The request method is POST.
- The type is Confirmable (CON).
- The Uri-Path option is set to "j".
- The OSCORE option SHALL be set according to [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. The OSCORE security context used is the one derived in Section 7.3. When a joined node receives a
request with the Sender ID set to 0x4a5243 (ID of the JRC), it is able to correctly retrieve the security context with the JRC.

- The payload is a Configuration CBOR object, as defined in Section 8.4.2.

The JRC has implicit knowledge on the global IPv6 address of the joined node, as it knows the pledge identifier that the joined node used when it acted as a pledge, and the IPv6 network prefix. The JRC uses this implicitly derived IPv6 address of the joined node to directly address CoAP messages to it.

In case the JRC does not receive a response to a Parameter Update message, it attempts multiple retransmissions, as configured by the underlying CoAP retransmission mechanism triggered for confirmable messages. Finally, if the CoAP implementation declares the transmission as failure, the JRC may consider this as a hint that the joined node is no longer in the network. How the JRC decides when to stop attempting to contact a previously joined node is out of scope of this specification but security considerations on the reuse of assigned resources apply, as discussed in Section 9.

8.2.2. Parameter Update Response Message

The Parameter Update Response message that the joined node sends to the JRC SHALL be mapped to a CoAP response:

- The response Code is 2.04 (Changed).

- The payload is empty.

8.3. Error Handling

8.3.1. CoJP CBOR Object Processing

CoJP CBOR objects are transported within both CoAP requests and responses. This section describes handling in case certain CoJP CBOR object parameters are not supported by the implementation or their processing fails. See Section 7.3.2 for the handling of errors that may be raised by the underlying OSCORE implementation.

When such a parameter is detected in a CoAP request (Join Request message, Parameter Update message), a Diagnostic Response message MUST be returned. A Diagnostic Response message maps to a CoAP response and is specified in Section 8.3.2.

When a parameter that cannot be acted upon is encountered while processing a CoJP object in a CoAP response (Join Response message),
a (6LBR) pledge SHOULD reattempt to join. In this case, the (6LBR) pledge SHOULD include the Unsupported Configuration CBOR object within the Join Request object in the following Join Request message. The Unsupported Configuration CBOR object is self-contained and enables the (6LBR) pledge to signal any parameters that the implementation of the networking stack may not support. A (6LBR) pledge MUST NOT attempt more than MAX_RETRANSMIT number of attempts to join if the processing of the Join Response message fails each time. If COJP_MAX_JOIN_ATTEMPTS number of attempts is reached without success, the (6LBR) pledge SHOULD signal to the user the presence of an error condition, through some out-of-band mechanism.

8.3.2. Diagnostic Response Message

The Diagnostic Response message is returned for any CoJP request when the processing of the payload failed. The Diagnostic Response message is protected by OSCORE as any other CoJP protocol message.

The Diagnostic Response message SHALL be mapped to a CoAP response:

- The response Code is 4.00 (Bad Request).
- The payload is an Unsupported Configuration CBOR object, as defined in Section 8.4.5, containing more information about the parameter that triggered the sending of this message.

8.3.3. Failure Handling

The Parameter Update exchange may be triggered at any time during the network lifetime, which may span several years. During this period, it may occur that a joined node or the JRC experience unexpected events such as reboots or complete failures.

This document mandates that the mutable parameters in the security context are written to persistent memory (see Section 7.3.1) by both the JRC and pledges (joined nodes). As the joined node (pledge) is typically a constrained device that handles the write operations to persistent memory in a predictable manner, the retrieval of mutable security context parameters is feasible across reboots such that there is no risk of AEAD nonce reuse due to reinitialized Sender Sequence numbers, or of a replay attack due to the reinitialized replay window. JRC may be hosted on a generic machine where the write operation to persistent memory may lead to unpredictable delays due to caching. In case of a reboot event at JRC occurring before the cached data is written to persistent memory, the loss of mutable security context parameters is likely which consequently poses the risk of AEAD nonce reuse.

In the event of a complete device failure, where the mutable security context parameters cannot be retrieved, it is expected that a failed joined node is replaced with a new physical device, using a new pledge identifier and a PSK. When such a failure event occurs at the JRC, it is possible that the static information on provisioned pledges, like PSKs and pledge identifiers, can be retrieved through available backups. However, it is likely that the information about joined nodes, their assigned short identifiers and mutable security context parameters is lost. If this is the case, during the process of JRC reinitialization, the network administrator MUST force through out-of-band means all the networks managed by the failed JRC to rejoin, through e.g. the reinitialization of the 6LBR nodes and freshly generated dynamic cryptographic keys and other parameters that have influence on the security properties of the network.

In order to recover from such a failure event, the reinitialized JRC can trigger the renegotiation of the OSCORE security context through the procedure described in Appendix B.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. Aware of the failure event, the reinitialized JRC responds to the first join request of each pledge it is managing with a 4.01 Unauthorized error and a random nonce. The pledge verifies the error response and then initiates the CoJP join exchange using a new OSCORE security context derived from an ID Context consisting of the concatenation of two nonces, one that it received from the JRC and the other that the pledge generates locally. After verifying the join request with the new ID Context and the derived OSCORE security context, the JRC should consequently take action in mapping the new ID Context with the previously used pledge identifier. How JRC handles this mapping is implementation specific.

The described procedure is specified in Appendix B.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] and is RECOMMENDED in order to handle the failure events or any other event that may lead to the loss of mutable security context parameters. The length of nonces exchanged using this procedure SHOULD be at least 8 bytes.

The procedure does require both the pledge and the JRC to have good sources of randomness. While this is typically not an issue at the JRC side, the constrained device hosting the pledge may pose limitations in this regard. If the procedure outlined in Appendix B.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is not supported by the pledge, the network administrator MUST take action in reprovisioning the concerned devices with freshly generated parameters, through out-of-band means.
8.4. CoJP Objects

This section specifies the structure of CoJP CBOR objects that may be carried as the payload of CoJP messages. Some of these objects may be received both as part of the CoJP join exchange when the device operates as a (CoJP) pledge, or the parameter update exchange, when the device operates as a joined (6LBR) node.

8.4.1. Join Request Object

The Join_Request structure is built on a CBOR map object.

The set of parameters that can appear in a Join_Request object is summarized below. The labels can be found in the "CoJP Parameters" registry Section 11.1.

- **role**: The identifier of the role that the pledge requests to play in the network once it joins, encoded as an unsigned integer. Possible values are specified in Table 1. This parameter MAY be included. In case the parameter is omitted, the default value of 0, i.e. the role "6TiSCH Node", MUST be assumed.

- **network identifier**: The identifier of the network, as discussed in Section 3, encoded as a CBOR byte string. When present in the Join_Request, it hints to the JRC the network that the pledge is requesting to join, enabling the JRC to manage multiple networks. The pledge obtains the value of the network identifier from the received EB frames. This parameter MUST be included in a Join_Request object regardless of the role parameter value.

- **unsupported configuration**: The identifier of the parameters that are not supported by the implementation, encoded as an Unsupported_Configuration object described in Section 8.4.5. This parameter MAY be included. If a (6LBR) pledge previously attempted to join and received a valid Join Response message over OSCORE, but failed to act on its payload (Configuration object), it SHOULD include this parameter to facilitate the recovery and debugging.

The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the Join_Request follows.

```
Join_Request = {
    ? 1 : uint, ; role
    ? 5 : bstr, ; network identifier
    ? 8 : Unsupported_Configuration ; unsupported configuration
}
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH Node</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The pledge requests to play the role of a regular 6TiSCH node, i.e. non-6LBR node.</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6LBR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The pledge requests to play the role of 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR).</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Role values.

### 8.4.2. Configuration Object

The Configuration structure is built on a CBOR map object. The set of parameters that can appear in a Configuration object is summarized below. The labels can be found in "CoJP Parameters" registry Section 11.1.

- **link-layer key set**: An array encompassing a set of cryptographic keys and their identifiers that are currently in use in the network, or that are scheduled to be used in the future. The encoding of individual keys is described in Section 8.4.3. The link-layer key set parameter MAY be included in a Configuration object. When present, the link-layer key set parameter MUST contain at least one key. When a pledge is joining for the first time and receives this parameter, before sending the first outgoing frame secured with a received key, the pledge needs to successfully complete the security processing of an incoming frame. To do so, the pledge can wait to receive a new frame, or it can store an EB frame that it used to find the JP and use it for immediate security processing upon reception of the key set. This parameter is also used to implement rekeying in the network. How the keys are installed and used differs for the 6LBR and other (regular) nodes, and this is explained in Section 8.4.3.1 and Section 8.4.3.2.

- **short identifier**: a compact identifier assigned to the pledge. The short identifier structure is described in Section 8.4.4. The short identifier parameter MAY be included in a Configuration object.

- **JRC address**: the IPv6 address of the JRC, encoded as a byte string, with the length of 16 bytes. If the length of the byte string is different from 16, the parameter MUST be discarded. If the JRC is not co-located with the 6LBR and has a different IPv6
address than the 6LBR, this parameter MUST be included. In the special case where the JRC is co-located with the 6LBR and has the same IPv6 address as the 6LBR, this parameter MAY be included. If the JRC address parameter is not present in the Configuration object, this indicates that the JRC has the same IPv6 address as the 6LBR. The joined node can then discover the IPv6 address of the JRC through network control traffic. See Section 6.

- blacklist: An array encompassing a list of pledge identifiers that are blacklisted by the JRC, with each pledge identifier encoded as a byte string. The blacklist parameter MAY be included in a Configuration object. When present, the array MUST contain zero or more byte strings encoding pledge identifiers. The joined node MUST silently drop any link-layer frames originating from the pledge identifiers enclosed in the blacklist parameter. When this parameter is received, its value MUST overwrite any previously set values. This parameter allows the JRC to configure the node acting as a JP to filter out traffic from misconfigured or malicious pledges before their traffic is forwarded into the network. If the JRC decides to remove a given pledge identifier from a blacklist, it omits the pledge identifier in the blacklist parameter value it sends next.

- join rate: Average data rate of join traffic forwarded into the network that should not be exceeded when a joined node operates as a JP, encoded as an unsigned integer in bytes per second. The join rate parameter MAY be included in a Configuration object. This parameter allows the JRC to configure different nodes in the network to operate as JP, and act in case of an attack by throttling the rate at which JP forwards unauthenticated traffic into the network. When this parameter is present in a Configuration object, the value MUST be used to set the PROBING_RATE of CoAP at the joined node for communication with the JRC. In case this parameter is set to zero, a joined node MUST silently drop any join traffic coming from unauthenticated pledges. In case this parameter is omitted, the value of positive infinity SHOULD be assumed. Node operating as a JP MAY use another mechanism that is out of scope of this specification to configure PROBING_RATE of CoAP in the absence of join rate parameter from the Configuration object.

The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the Configuration follows. Structures Link_Layer_Key and Short_Identifier are specified in Section 8.4.3 and Section 8.4.4.
Configuration = {
    ? 2 : [ +Link_Layer_Key ], ; link-layer key set
    ? 3 : Short_Identifier, ; short identifier
    ? 4 : bstr, ; JRC address
    ? 6 : [ *bstr ], ; blacklist
    ? 7 : uint ; join rate
}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>CBOR type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>role</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>unsigned integer</td>
<td>Identifies the role parameter</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link-layer key set</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>Identifies the array carrying one or more link-level cryptographic keys</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short identifier</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>Identifies the assigned short identifier</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRC address</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>byte string</td>
<td>Identifies the IPv6 address of the JRC</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>network identifier</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>byte string</td>
<td>Identifies the network identifier parameter</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacklist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>Identifies the blacklist parameter</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>join rate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>unsigned integer</td>
<td>Identifier the join rate parameter</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsupported config</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>Identifies the unsupported configuration parameter</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: CoJP parameters map labels.

8.4.3. Link-Layer Key

The Link_Layer_Key structure encompasses the parameters needed to configure the link-layer security module: the key identifier; the value of the cryptographic key; the link-layer algorithm identifier.
and the security level and the frame types that it should be used with, both for outgoing and incoming security operations; and any additional information that may be needed to configure the key.

For encoding compactness, the Link_Layer_Key object is not enclosed in a top-level CBOR object. Rather, it is transported as a sequence of CBOR elements, some being optional.

The set of parameters that can appear in a Link_Layer_Key object is summarized below, in order:

- **key_id**: The identifier of the key, encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer. This parameter MUST be included. If the decoded CBOR unsigned integer value is larger than the maximum link-layer key identifier, the key is considered invalid. In case the key is considered invalid, the key MUST be discarded and the implementation MUST signal the error as specified in Section 8.3.1.

- **key_usage**: The identifier of the link-layer algorithm, security level and link-layer frame types that can be used with the key, encoded as an integer. This parameter MAY be included. Possible values and the corresponding link-layer settings are specified in IANA "CoJP Key Usage" registry (Section 11.2). In case the parameter is omitted, the default value of 0 from Table 3 MUST be assumed.

- **key_value**: The value of the cryptographic key, encoded as a byte string. This parameter MUST be included. If the length of the byte string is different than the corresponding key length for a given algorithm specified by the key_usage parameter, the key MUST be discarded and the implementation MUST signal the error as specified in Section 8.3.1.

- **key_addinfo**: Additional information needed to configure the link-layer key, encoded as a byte string. This parameter MAY be included. The processing of this parameter is dependent on the link-layer technology in use and a particular keying mode.

To be able to decode the keys that are present in the link-layer key set, and to identify individual parameters of a single Link_Layer_Key object, the CBOR decoder needs to differentiate between elements based on the CBOR type. For example, a uint that follows a byte string signals to the decoder that a new Link_Layer_Key object is being processed.

The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the Link_Layer_Key follows.
Link_Layer_Key = (  
    key_id                   : uint,  
? key_usage               : int,  
    key_value                : bstr,  
? key_addinfo             : bstr,  
)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1K2-ENC-MIC32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-32 for EBs, ENC-MIC-32 for DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT.</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1K2-ENC-MIC64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-64 for EBs, ENC-MIC-64 for DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT.</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1K2-ENC-MIC128</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-128 for EBs, ENC-MIC-128 for DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT.</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1K2-MIC32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-32 for EBs, DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT.</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1K2-MIC64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-64 for EBs, DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT.</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1K2-MIC128</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-128 for EBs, DATA and ACKNOWLEDGMENT.</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1-MIC32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-32 for EBs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1-MIC64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-64 for EBs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K1-MIC128</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-128 for EBs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K2-MIC32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-32 for DATA and ACKNOWLEGMENT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K2-MIC64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-64 for DATA and ACKNOWLEGMENT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K2-MIC128</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use MIC-128 for DATA and ACKNOWLEGMENT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K2-ENC-MIC32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use ENC-MIC-32 for DATA and ACKNOWLEGMENT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K2-ENC-MIC64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use ENC-MIC-64 for DATA and ACKNOWLEGMENT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TiSCH-K2-ENC-MIC128</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>IEEE802154-AES-CCM-128</td>
<td>Use ENC-MIC-128 for DATA and ACKNOWLEGMENT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4.3.1. Rekeying of (6LoWPAN) Border Routers (6LBR)

When the 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR) receives the Configuration object containing a link-layer key set, it MUST immediately install and start using the new keys for all outgoing traffic, and remove any old keys it has installed from the previous key set after a delay of COJP_REKEYING_GUARD_TIME has passed. This mechanism is used by the JRC to force the 6LBR to start sending traffic with the new key. The decision is taken by the JRC when it has determined that the new key has been made available to all (or some overwhelming majority) of nodes. Any node that the JRC has not yet reached at that point is either non-functional or in extended sleep such that it will not be reached. To get the key update, such node needs to go through the join process anew.

8.4.3.2. Rekeying of regular (6LoWPAN) Nodes (6LN)

When a regular 6LN node receives the Configuration object with a link-layer key set, it MUST install the new keys. The 6LN will use both the old and the new keys to decrypt and authenticate any incoming traffic that arrives based upon the key identifier in the packet. It MUST continue to use the old keys for all outgoing traffic until it has detected that the network has switched to the new key set.

The detection of network switch is based upon the receipt of traffic secured with the new keys. Upon reception and successful security processing of a link-layer frame secured with a key from the new key set, a 6LN node MUST then switch to sending outgoing traffic using the keys from the new set for all outgoing traffic. The 6LN node MUST remove any old keys it has installed from the previous key set after a delay of COJP_REKEYING_GUARD_TIME has passed after it starts using the new key set.

Sending of traffic with the new keys signals to other downstream nodes to switch to their new key, and the affect is that there is a ripple of key updates in outward concentric circles around each 6LBR.

8.4.3.3. Use in IEEE Std 802.15.4

When Link_Layer_Key is used in the context of [IEEE802.15.4], the following considerations apply.

Signaling of different keying modes of [IEEE802.15.4] is done based on the parameter values present in a Link_Layer_Key object.
o Key ID Mode 0x00 (Implicit, pairwise): key_id parameter MUST be set to 0. key_addinfo parameter MUST be set to the link-layer address(es) of a single peer with whom the key should be used. Depending on the configuration of the network, key_addinfo may carry the peer’s long link-layer address (i.e. pledge identifier), short link-layer address, or their concatenation with the long address being encoded first. Which address is carried is determined from the length of the byte string.

o Key ID Mode 0x01 (Key Index): key_id parameter MUST be set to a value different than 0. key_addinfo parameter MUST NOT be present.

o Key ID Mode 0x02 (4-byte Explicit Key Source): key_id parameter MUST be set to a value different than 0. key_addinfo parameter MUST be present. key_addinfo parameter MUST be set to a byte string, exactly 4 bytes long. key_addinfo parameter carries the Key Source parameter used to configure [IEEE802.15.4].

o Key ID Mode 0x03 (8-byte Explicit Key Source): key_id parameter MUST be set to a value different than 0. key_addinfo parameter MUST be present. key_addinfo parameter MUST be set to a byte string, exactly 8 bytes long. key_addinfo parameter carries the Key Source parameter used to configure [IEEE802.15.4].

In all cases, key_usage parameter determines how a particular key should be used in respect to incoming and outgoing security policies.

For Key ID Modes 0x01 - 0x03, parameter key_id sets the "secKeyIndex" parameter of [IEEE802.15.4] that is signaled in all outgoing frames secured with a given key. The maximum value key_id can have is 254. The value of 255 is reserved in [IEEE802.15.4] and is therefore considered invalid.

Key ID Mode 0x00 (Implicit, pairwise) enables the JRC to act as a trusted third party and assign pairwise keys between nodes in the network. How JRC learns about the network topology is out of scope of this specification, but could be done through 6LBR - JRC signaling for example. Pairwise keys could also be derived through a key agreement protocol executed between the peers directly, where the authentication is based on the symmetric cryptographic material provided to both peers by the JRC. Such a protocol is out of scope of this specification.
8.4.4. Short Identifier

The Short_Identifier object represents an identifier assigned to the pledge. It is encoded as a CBOR array object, containing, in order:

- **identifier**: The short identifier assigned to the pledge, encoded as a byte string. This parameter MUST be included. The identifier MUST be unique in the set of all identifiers assigned in a network that is managed by a JRC. In case the identifier is invalid, the decoder MUST silently ignore the Short_Identifier object.

- **lease_time**: The validity of the identifier in hours after the reception of the CBOR object, encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer. This parameter MAY be included. The node MUST stop using the assigned short identifier after the expiry of the lease_time interval. It is up to the JRC to renew the lease before the expiry of the previous interval. The JRC updates the lease by executing the Parameter Update exchange with the node and including the Short_Identifier in the Configuration object, as described in Section 8.2. In case the lease expires, the node SHOULD initiate a new join exchange, as described in Section 8.1. In case this parameter is omitted, the value of positive infinity MUST be assumed, meaning that the identifier is valid for as long as the node participates in the network.

The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the Short_Identifier follows.

```
Short_Identifier = [ identifier : bstr, ? lease_time : uint ]
```

8.4.4.1. Use in IEEE Std 802.15.4

When Short_Identifier is used in the context of [IEEE802.15.4], the following considerations apply.

The identifier MUST be used to set the short address of IEEE Std 802.15.4 module. When operating in TSCH mode, the identifier MUST be unique in the set of all identifiers assigned in multiple networks that share link-layer key(s). If the length of the byte string corresponding to the identifier parameter is different than 2, the identifier is considered invalid. The values 0xfffe and 0xffff are reserved by [IEEE802.15.4] and their use is considered invalid.
The security properties offered by the [IEEE802.15.4] link-layer in TSCH mode are conditioned on the uniqueness requirement of the short identifier (i.e. short address). The short address is one of the inputs in the construction of the nonce, which is used to protect link-layer frames. If a misconfiguration occurs, and the same short address is assigned twice under the same link-layer key, the loss of security properties is eminent. For this reason, practices where the pledge generates the short identifier locally are not safe and are likely to result in the loss of link-layer security properties.

The JRC MUST ensure that at any given time there are never two same short identifiers being used under the same link-layer key. If the lease_time parameter of a given Short.Identifier object is set to positive infinity, care needs to be taken that the corresponding identifier is not assigned to another node until the JRC is certain that it is no longer in use, potentially through out-of-band signaling. If the lease_time parameter expires for any reason, the JRC should take into consideration potential ongoing transmissions by the joined node, which may be hanging in the queues, before assigning the same identifier to another node.

8.4.5. Unsupported Configuration Object

The Unsupported_Configuration object is encoded as a CBOR array, containing at least one Unsupported_Parameter object. Each Unsupported_Parameter object is a sequence of CBOR elements without an enclosing top-level CBOR object for compactness. The set of parameters that appear in an Unsupported_Parameter object is summarized below, in order:

- **code**: Indicates the capability of acting on the parameter signaled by parameter_label, encoded as an integer. This parameter MUST be included. Possible values of this parameter are specified in the IANA "CoJP Unsupported Configuration Code Registry" (Section 11.3).

- **parameter_label**: Indicates the parameter. This parameter MUST be included. Possible values of this parameter are specified in the label column of the IANA "CoJP Parameters" registry (Section 11.1).

- **parameter_addinfo**: Additional information about the parameter that cannot be acted upon. This parameter MUST be included. In case the code is set to "Unsupported", parameter_addinfo gives additional information to the JRC. If the parameter indicated by parameter_label cannot be acted upon regardless of its value, parameter_addinfo MUST be set to null, signaling to the JRC that it SHOULD NOT attempt to configure the parameter again. If the
pledge can act on the parameter, but cannot configure the setting indicated by the parameter value, the pledge can hint this to the
JRC. In this case, parameter_addinfo MUST be set to the value of
the parameter that cannot be acted upon following the normative
parameter structure specified in this document. For example, it
is possible to include only a subset of the link-layer key set
object, signaling the keys that cannot be acted upon, or the
entire key set that was received. In case the code is set to
"Malformed", parameter_addinfo MUST be set to null, signaling to
the JRC that it SHOULD NOT attempt to configure the parameter
again.

The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for
Unsupported_Configuration and Unsupported_Parameter objects follows.

Unsupported_Configuration = [
  + parameter           : Unsupported_Parameter
]

Unsupported_Parameter = (
  code                : int,
  parameter_label     : int,
  parameter_addinfo   : nil / any

+-------------+-------+--------------------------------+------------+
|        Name | Value |                    Description | Reference  |
|-------------|-------|--------------------------------+------------|
| Unsupported | 0     |   The indicated setting is not | [[this     |
|             |       |    supported by the networking | document]] |
|             |       |          stack implementation. |            |
| Malformed   | 1     |  The indicated parameter value | [[this     |
|             |       |                  is malformed. | document]] |

Table 4: Unsupported Configuration code values.

8.5.  Recommended Settings

This section gives RECOMMENDED values of CoJP settings.
The COJP_MAX_JOIN_ATTEMPTS value SHOULD take into account possible retransmissions at the link layer due to imperfect wireless links.

9. Security Considerations

Since this document uses the pledge identifier to set the ID Context parameter of OSCORE, an important security requirement is that the pledge identifier is unique in the set of all pledge identifiers managed by a JRC. The uniqueness of the pledge identifier ensures unique (key, nonce) pairs for AEAD algorithm used by OSCORE. It also allows the JRC to retrieve the correct security context, upon the reception of a Join Request message. The management of pledge identifiers is simplified if the globally unique EUI-64 is used, but this comes with privacy risks, as discussed in Section 10.

This document further mandates that the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC are provisioned with unique PSKs. The PSK is used to set the OSCORE Master Secret during security context derivation. This derivation process results in OSCORE keys that are important for mutual authentication of the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC. Should an attacker come to know the PSK, then a man-in-the-middle attack is possible.

Many vendors are known to use unsafe practices when generating and provisioning PSKs. The use of a single PSK shared among a group of devices is a common pitfall that results in poor security. In this case, the compromise of a single device is likely to lead to a compromise of the entire batch, with the attacker having the ability to impersonate a legitimate device and join the network, generate bogus data and disturb the network operation. As a reminder, recall the well-known problem with Bluetooth headsets with a "0000" pin. Additionally, some vendors use methods such as scrambling or hashing of device serial numbers or their EUI-64 to generate "unique" PSKs. Without any secret information involved, the effort that the attacker needs to invest into breaking these unsafe derivation methods is quite low, resulting in the possible impersonation of any device from the batch, without even needing to compromise a single device. The use of cryptographically secure random number generators to generate
the PSK is RECOMMENDED, see [NIST800-90A] for different mechanisms using deterministic methods.

The JP forwards the unauthenticated join traffic into the network. A data cap on the JP prevents it from forwarding more traffic than the network can handle. The data cap can be configured by the JRC by including a join rate parameter in the Join Response and it is implemented through the CoAP’s PROBING_RATE setting. The use of a data cap at a JP forces attackers to use more than one JP if they wish to overwhelm the network. Marking the join traffic packets with a non-zero DSCP allows the network to carry the traffic if it has capacity, but encourages the network to drop the extra traffic rather than add bandwidth due to that traffic.

The shared nature of the "minimal" cell used for the join traffic makes the network prone to a DoS attack by congesting the JP with bogus traffic. Such an attacker is limited by its maximum transmit power. The redundancy in the number of deployed JPs alleviates the issue and also gives the pledge a possibility to use the best available link for joining. How a network node decides to become a JP is out of scope of this specification.

At the beginning of the join process, the pledge has no means of verifying the content in the EB, and has to accept it at "face value". In case the pledge tries to join an attacker’s network, the Join Response message will either fail the security check or time out. The pledge may implement a temporary blacklist in order to filter out undesired EBs and try to join using the next seemingly valid EB. This blacklist alleviates the issue, but is effectively limited by the node’s available memory. Note that this temporary blacklist is different from the one communicated as part of the CoJP Configuration object as it helps pledge fight a DoS attack. These bogus beacons prolong the join time of the pledge, and so the time spent in "minimal" [RFC8180] duty cycle mode. The blacklist communicated as part of the CoJP Configuration object helps JP fight a DoS attack by a malicious pledge.

10. Privacy Considerations

The join solution specified in this document relies on the uniqueness of the pledge identifier in the set of all pledge identifiers managed by a JRC. This identifier is transferred in clear as an OSCORE kid context. The use of the globally unique EUI-64 as pledge identifier simplifies the management but comes with certain privacy risks. The implications are thoroughly discussed in [RFC7721] and comprise correlation of activities over time, location tracking, address scanning and device-specific vulnerability exploitation. Since the join process occurs rarely compared to the network lifetime, long-
term threats that arise from using EUI-64 as the pledge identifier are minimal. In addition, the Join Response message contains a short address which is assigned by the JRC to the (6LBR) pledge. The assigned short address SHOULD be uncorrelated with the long-term pledge identifier. The short address is encrypted in the response. Once the join process completes, the new node uses the short addresses for all further layer 2 (and layer-3) operations. This reduces the aforementioned privacy risks as the short layer-2 address (visible even when the network is encrypted) is not traceable between locations and does not disclose the manufacturer, as is the case of EUI-64. However, an eavesdropper with access to the radio medium during the join process may be able to correlate the assigned short address with the extended address based on timing information with a non-negligible probability. This probability decreases with an increasing number of pledges joining concurrently.

11. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[:this document:]]" with the RFC number of this specification.

This document allocates a well-known name under the .arpa name space according to the rules given in [RFC3172]. The name "6tisch.arpa" is requested. No subdomains are expected. No A, AAAA or PTR record is requested.

11.1. CoJP Parameters Registry

This section defines a sub-registries within the "IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry with the name "Constrained Join Protocol Parameters Registry".

The columns of the registry are:

Name: This is a descriptive name that enables an easier reference to the item. It is not used in the encoding.

Label: The value to be used to identify this parameter. The label is an integer.

CBOR type: This field contains the CBOR type for the field.

Description: This field contains a brief description for the field.

Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification for the field, if one exists.

This registry is to be populated with the values in Table 2.
The amending formula for this sub-registry is: Different ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.

11.2. CoJP Key Usage Registry

This section defines a sub-registries within the "IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry with the name "Constrained Join Protocol Key Usage Registry".

The columns of this registry are:

Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

Value: This is the value used to identify the key usage setting. These values MUST be unique. The value is an integer.

Algorithm: This is a descriptive name of the link-layer algorithm in use and uniquely determines the key length. The name is not used in the encoding.

Description: This field contains a description of the key usage setting. The field should describe in enough detail how the key is to be used with different frame types, specific for the link-layer technology in question.

Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the field, if one exists.

This registry is to be populated with the values in Table 3.

The amending formula for this sub-registry is: Different ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.
11.3. CoJP Unsupported Configuration Code Registry

This section defines a sub-registries within the "IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry with the name "Constrained Join Protocol Unsupported Configuration Code Registry".

The columns of this registry are:

Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

Value: This is the value used to identify the diagnostic code. These values MUST be unique. The value is an integer.

Description: This is a descriptive human-readable name. The description MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the field, if one exists.

This registry is to be populated with the values in Table 4.

The amending formula for this sub-registry is: Different ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.

12. Acknowledgments

The work on this document has been partially supported by the European Union’s H2020 Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreements: No 644852, project ARMOUR; No 687884, project F-Interop and open-call project SPOTS; No 732638, project Fed4FIRE+ and open-call project SODA.

The following individuals provided input to this document (in alphabetic order): Christian Amsuss, Tengfei Chang, Klaus Hartke, Tero Kivinen, Jim Schaad, Goeran Selander, Yasuyuki Tanaka, Pascal Thubert, William Vignat, Xavier Vilajosana, Thomas Watteyne.

13. References
13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References

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Appendix A. Example

Figure 3 illustrates a successful join protocol exchange. The pledge instantiates the OSCORE context and derives the OSCORE keys and nonces from the PSK. It uses the instantiated context to protect the Join Request addressed with a Proxy-Scheme option, the well-known host name of the JRC in the Uri-Host option, and its EUI-64 as pledge identifier and OSCORE kid context. Triggered by the presence of a Proxy-Scheme option, the JP forwards the request to the JRC and sets the CoAP token to the internally needed state. The JP has learned the IPv6 address of the JRC when it acted as a pledge and joined the network. Once the JRC receives the request, it looks up the correct context based on the kid context parameter. The OSCORE data authenticity verification ensures that the request has not been
modified in transit. In addition, replay protection is ensured through persistent handling of mutable context parameters.

Once the JP receives the Join Response, it authenticates the state within the CoAP token before deciding where to forward. The JP sets its internal state to that found in the token, and forwards the Join Response to the correct pledge. Note that the JP does not possess the key to decrypt the CBOR object (configuration) present in the payload. The Join Response is matched to the Join Request and verified for replay protection at the pledge using OSCORE processing rules. In this example, the Join Response does not contain the IPv6 address of the JRC, the pledge hence understands the JRC is co-located with the 6LBR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Proxy</th>
<th>Server</th>
<th>OSCORE Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Join Request</td>
<td>Pledge</td>
<td>JP</td>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Code: 0.02 (POST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proxy-Scheme: coap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Host: 6tisch.arpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCORE: kid: -,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>kid_context: EUI-64,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial IV: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: { Code: 0.02 (POST),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: &quot;j&quot;,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>join_request, &lt;Tag&gt; }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Request</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proxy-Scheme: coap</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Host: 6tisch.arpa</td>
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<td>OSCORE: kid: -,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>kid_context: EUI-64,</td>
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<td>Partial IV: 1</td>
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<td>Payload: { Code: 0.02 (POST),</td>
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<td>Uri-Path: &quot;j&quot;,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>join_request, &lt;Tag&gt; }</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Join Response</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proxy-Scheme: coap</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Host: 6tisch.arpa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>OSCORE: -</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: { Code: 2.04 (Changed),</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>configuration, &lt;Tag&gt; }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Response</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proxy-Scheme: coap</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Uri-Host: 6tisch.arpa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>OSCORE: -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: { Code: 2.04 (Changed),</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>configuration, &lt;Tag&gt; }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Example of a successful join protocol exchange. ( ...) denotes authenticated encryption, <Tag> denotes the authentication tag.

Where the join_request object is:
join_request:
{
5 : h’cafe’ / PAN ID of the network pledge is attempting to join /
}

Since the role parameter is not present, the default role of "6TiSCH Node" is implied.

The join_request object encodes to h’a10542cafe’ with a size of 5 bytes.

And the configuration object is:

collection:
{
2 : [ / link-layer key set /
    1, / key_id /
    h’e6bf4287c2d7618d6a9687445ffdf33e6’ / key_value /
   ],
3 : [ / short identifier /
    h’af93’ / assigned short address /
    ]
}

Since the key_usage parameter is not present in the link-layer key set object, the default value of "6TiSCH-K1K2-ENC-MIC32" is implied. Since key_addinfo parameter is not present and key_id is different than 0, Key ID Mode 0x01 (Key Index) is implied. Similarly, since the lease_time parameter is not present in the short identifier object, the default value of positive infinity is implied.

The configuration object encodes to h’a202820150e6bf4287c2d7618d6a9687445ffdf33e6038142af93’ with a size of 26 bytes.

Appendix B. Lightweight Implementation Option

In environments where optimizing the implementation footprint is important, it is possible to implement this specification without having the implementations of HKDF [RFC5869] and SHA [RFC4231] on constrained devices. HKDF and SHA are used during the OSCORE security context derivation phase. This derivation can also be done by the JRC or a provisioning device, on behalf of the (6LBR) pledge during the provisioning phase. In that case, the derived OSCORE security context parameters are written directly into the (6LBR) pledge, without requiring the PSK be provisioned to the (6LBR) pledge.
The use of HKDF to derive OSCORE security context parameters ensures that the resulting OSCORE keys have good security properties, and are unique as long as the input for different pledges varies. This specification ensures the uniqueness by mandating unique pledge identifiers and a unique PSK for each (6LBR) pledge. From the AEAD nonce reuse viewpoint, having a unique pledge identifier is a sufficient condition. However, as discussed in Section 9, the use of a single PSK shared among many devices is a common security pitfall. The compromise of this shared PSK on a single device would lead to the compromise of the entire batch. When using the implementation/deployment scheme outlined above, the PSK does not need to be written to individual pledges. As a consequence, even if a shared PSK is used, the scheme offers the same level of security as in the scenario where each pledge is provisioned with a unique PSK.

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This specification defines the 6TiSCH Minimal Scheduling Function (MSF). This Scheduling Function describes both the behavior of a node when joining the network, and how the communication schedule is managed in a distributed fashion. MSF builds upon the 6TiSCH Operation Sublayer Protocol (6P) and the Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2019.
1. Introduction

The 6TiSCH Minimal Scheduling Function (MSF), defined in this specification, is a 6TiSCH Scheduling Function (SF). The role of an SF is entirely defined in [RFC8480]. This specification complements [RFC8480] by providing the rules of when to add/delete cells in the communication schedule. This specification satisfies all the requirements for an SF listed in Section 4.2 of [RFC8480].

MSF builds on top of the following specifications: the Minimal IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) Configuration [RFC8180], the 6TiSCH Operation Sublayer Protocol (6P) [RFC8480], and the Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

MSF defines both the behavior of a node when joining the network, and how the communication schedule is managed in a distributed fashion. When a node running MSF boots up, it joins the network by following the 7 steps described in Section 4. The end state of the join process is that the node is synchronized to the network, has mutually authenticated to the network, has identified a preferred routing parent, and has scheduled one default managed cell (defined in Section 5.1) to/from its preferred routing parent. After the join process, the node can continuously add/delete/relocate cells, as described in Section 5. It does so for 3 reasons: to match the link-layer resources to the traffic, to handle changing parent, to handle a schedule collision.

MSF is designed to operate in a wide range of application domains. It is optimized for applications with regular upstream traffic (from the nodes to the root).

This specification follows the recommended structure of an SF specification, given in Appendix A of [RFC8480], with the following adaptations:

- We have reordered some sections, in particular to have the section on the node behavior at boot (Section 4) appear early in this specification.
- We added sections on the interface to the minimal 6TiSCH configuration (Section 2), the use of the SIGNAL command (Section 6), the MSF constants (Section 14), the MSF statistics (Section 15).
2. Interface to the Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration

A node implementing MSF SHOULD implement the Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration [RFC8180], which defines the "minimal cell", a single shared cell providing minimal connectivity between the nodes in the network. The MSF implementation provided in this specification is based on the implementation of the Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration. However, an implementor MAY implements MSF without implementing Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration.

MSF uses the minimal cell to exchange the following packets:

1. Enhanced Beacons (EBs), defined by [IEEE802154-2015]. These are broadcast frames.
2. Broadcast DODAG Information Objects (DIOs), defined by [RFC6550]. Unicast DIOs SHOULD NOT be sent on minimal cell.

Because the minimal cell is SHARED, the back-off algorithm defined in [IEEE802154-2015] is used to resolve collisions. To ensure there is enough bandwidth available on the minimal cell, a node implementing MSF SHOULD enforce some rules for limiting the traffic of broadcast frames. For example, a Trickle Timer defined in [RFC6550] MAY be applied on DIOs. However, this behavior is implementation-specific which is out of the scope of MSF.

As detailed in Section 2.2 of [RFC8480], MSF MUST schedule cells from Slotframe 1, while Slotframe 0 is used for traffic defined in the Minimal 6TiSCH Configuration. The length of Slotframe 0 and Slotframe 1 SHOULD be the same value. The default of SLOTFRAME_LENGTH is RECOMMENDED for both Slotframe 0 and Slotframe 1, although any value can be advertised in the EBs.

3. Autonomous Cells

MSF nodes initialize Slotframe 1 with a set of default cells for unicast communication with their neighbors. These cells are called 'autonomous cells', because they are maintained autonomously by each node. Cells scheduled by 6P transaction are called 'managed cells'. How to schedule managed cells is detailed in Section 5. For autonomous cells, each node has:

- Autonomous Downstream Cell (AutoDownCell), one cell at a [slotOffset, channelOffset] computed as a hash of its own EUI64 (detailed next). Its cell options bits are assigned as TX=1, RX=1, SHARED=0.
o Autonomous Upstream Cell (AutoUpCell), one cell at a
    \([\text{slotOffset}, \text{channelOffset}]\) computed as a hash of the EUI64 of the
    Join Proxy or its RPL routing parent (detailed in Section 4.4).
    Its cell options bits are assigned as TX=1, RX=1, SHARED=1.

To compute a \([\text{slotOffset}, \text{channelOffset}]\) from an EUI64 address, nodes
MUST use the hash function SAX [SAX-DASFAA].  The coordinates are
computed to distribute the cells across all channel offsets, and all
but the first time offsets of Slotframe 1.  The first time offset is
skipped to avoid colliding with the minimal cell in Slotframe 0.  The
slot coordinates derived from a given EUI64 address are computed as
follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{slotOffset}(\text{MAC}) &= 1 + \text{hash}(\text{EUI64}, \text{length}(\text{Slotframe}_1) - 1) \\
\text{channelOffset}(\text{MAC}) &= \text{hash}(\text{EUI64}, 16)
\end{align*}
\]

The second input parameter defines the maximum return value of the
hash function.  There are other optional parameters defined in SAX
determines the performance of SAX hash function.  Those parameters
could be broadcasted in EB frame or pre-configured.  For
interoperability purposes, an example how the hash function is
implemented is detailed in Appendix B.

Because of hash collisions, there will be cases when the AutoUpCell
and AutoDownCell are scheduled at the same slot offset and/or channel
offset.  Hash collisions among a set of cells at a given time offset
is resolved at run-time as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{The AutoUpCell with the most packets in the outgoing queue takes}
\text{precedence.} \\
\text{If the AutoUpCell have empty outgoing queues, the AutoDownCell}
\text{takes precedence.}
\end{align*}
\]

In case the autonomous cell to be installed is conflicted with a
managed cell, a 6P RELOCATE command MUST be issued to the responding
neighbor to relocate the conflicting managed cell.

The traffic on the autonomous cells are scheduled as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Join Request packets and 6P ADD/DELETE Request frames to the}
\text{node’s Join Proxy or its RPL routing parent MUST be sent on}
\text{AutoUpCell.} \\
\text{Join Response packets and 6P ADD/DELETE Response frames to the}
\text{pledge or its RPL routing child MUST be sent on AutoDownCell.} \\
\text{6P RELOCATE Request frames to the node’s RPL routing child MUST be}
\text{sent on AutoDownCell.} \\
\text{6P RELOCATE Response frames to its RPL routing parent MUST be sent}
\text{on AutoUpCell.}
\end{align*}
\]
Throughout the network lifetime, nodes MUST maintain the autonomous cells as follows:

- The AutoDownCell MUST always remain scheduled.
- When a new Join Proxy (JP) is selected, add an AutoUpCell to it.
- When the node is secured after joining process, remove the AutoUpCell to the JP.
- When a new RPL routing parent is selected, add an AutoUpCell to it.
- When the routing parent is de-selected, remove the AutoUpCell to it.
- 6P CLEAR MUST NOT erase any autonomous cells.

4. Node Behavior at Boot

This section details the behavior the node SHOULD follow from the moment it is switched on, until it has successfully joined the network. Section 4.1 details the start state; Section 4.8 details the end state. The other sections detail the 6 steps of the joining process. We use the term "pledge" and "joined node", as defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

4.1. Start State

A node implementing MSF MUST implement the Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. As a corollary, this means that a pledge, before being switched on, may be pre-configured with the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) for joining, as well as any other configuration detailed in ([I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]). This is not needed if the node implements a security solution not based on PSKs, such as ([I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join]).

4.2. Step 1 - Choosing Frequency

When switched on, the pledge SHOULD randomly choose a frequency among the available frequencies, and start listening for EBs on that frequency.

4.3. Step 2 - Receiving EBs

Upon receiving the first EB, the pledge SHOULD continue listening for additional EBs to learn:

1. the number of neighbors N in its vicinity
2. which neighbor to choose as a Join Proxy (JP) for the joining process
While the exact behavior is implementation-specific, the RECOMMENDED behavior is to follow [RFC8180], and listen until EBs sent by NUM_NEIGHBOURS_TO_WAIT nodes (defined in [RFC8180]) have been received.

During this step, the pledge MAY synchronize to any EB it receives from the network it wishes to join. How to decide whether an EB originates from a node from the network it wishes to join is implementation-specific, but MAY involve filtering EBs by the PAN ID field it contains, the presence and contents of the IE defined in [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon], or the key used to authenticate it.

The decision of which neighbor to use as a JP is implementation-specific, and discussed in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

4.4. Step 3 - Setting up Autonomous Cells for the Join Process

After selected a JP, a node MUST set up an AutoUpCell to that JP, as described in Section 3. A Join Request is then sent then by the pledge to its JP over the AutoUpCell. The JP forwards the Join Request to the JRC, possibly over multiple hops, over the AutoUpCells as well. Similarly, the JRC sends the Join Response to the JP, possibly over multiple hops, over the AutoDownCells. When JP received the Join Response from the JRC, it sends that Join Response to the pledge over its AutoDownCell. The pledge thereby learns the keying material used in the network, as well as other configurations, and becomes a "joined node". The AutoUpCell to the JP is removed at the same time by the "joined node".

4.5. Step 4 - Acquiring a RPL rank

Per [RFC6550], the joined node receives DIOs, computes its own rank, and selects a preferred parent.

4.6. Step 5 - Setting up Autonomous Cells for 6P

After selected a preferred parent, the joined node MUST set up an AutoUpCell to that parent. Then it MUST issue a 6P ADD command MUST to that parent, with the following fields:

- CellOptions: set to TX=1,RX=0,SHARED=0
- NumCells: set to 1
- CellList: at least 5 cells, chosen according to Section 8

In case the 6P ADD transaction failed, the node MUST issue another 6P ADD command and repeat until the one cell is installed to the parent.
4.7. Step 6 - Send EBs and DIOs

The node SHOULD start sending EBs and DIOs on the minimal cell, while following the transmit rules for broadcast frames from Section 2.

4.8. End State

For a new node, the end state of the joining process is:

- it is synchronized to the network
- it is using the link-layer keying material it learned through the secure joining process
- it has identified its preferred routing parent
- it has one AutoUpCell to its parent and one AutoDownCell
- it has one Managed Tx Cell to its parent
- it starts to send DIOs, potentially serving as a router for other nodes’ traffic
- it starts to send EBs, potentially serving as a JP for new pledge

5. Rules for Adding/Deleting Cells

Once a node has joined the 6TiSCH network, it adds/deletes/relocates cells with its preferred parent for three reasons:

- to match the link-layer resources to the traffic between the node and its preferred parent (Section 5.1)
- to handle switching preferred parent or (Section 5.2)
- to handle a schedule collision (Section 5.3)

5.1. Adapting to Traffic

A node implementing MSF MUST implement the behavior described in this section.

The goal of MSF is to manage the communication schedule in the 6TiSCH schedule in a distributed manner. For a node, this translates into monitoring the current usage of the cells it has to its preferred parent:

- If the node determines that the number of link-layer frames it is attempting to exchange with its preferred parent per unit of time is larger than the capacity offered by the TSCH managed cells it has scheduled with it, the node issues a 6P ADD command to its preferred parent to add one managed Tx cell to the TSCH schedule.
- If the traffic is lower than the capacity, the node issues a 6P DELETE command to its preferred parent to delete one managed cell from the TSCH schedule.
Adding/removing/relocating cells involves exchanging frames that contain 6P commands. All 6P Request frames to its parent MUST be sent on the AutoUpCell. All 6P Response frames to non-parent neighbor MUST be sent on AutoDownCell. In case a managed cell from non-parent is conflicted with AutoUpCell to be installed, a 6P RELOCATE command needs to be issued to the neighbor, as mentioned in Section 3. The 6P RELOCATE Request frame MUST be sent on AutoDownCell and the Response MUST be sent on AutoUpCell.

The node MUST maintain the following counters for its preferred parent:

**NumCellsElapsed**: Counts the number of managed cells that have elapsed since the counter was initialized. This counter is initialized at 0. Each time the TSCH state machine indicates that the current cell is a managed cell to the preferred parent, NumCellsElapsed is incremented by exactly 1, regardless of whether the cell is used to transmit/receive a frame.

**NumCellsUsed**: Counts the number of managed cells that have been used. This counter is initialized at 0. NumCellsUsed is incremented by exactly 1 when, during a managed cell to the preferred parent, either of the following happens:

* The node sends a frame to its preferred parent. The counter increments regardless of whether a link-layer acknowledgment was received or not.
* The node receives a frame from its preferred parent.

Both NumCellsElapsed and NumCellsUsed counters can be used to cell with cell option TX=1 or RX=1. All the frames used for increasing/decreasing the counters MUST be encrypted or decryptable with the key get from joining process.

Implementors MAY choose to create the same counters for each neighbor, and add them as additional statistics in the neighbor table.

The counters are used as follows:

1. Both NumCellsElapsed and NumCellsUsed are initialized to 0 when the node boots.
2. When the value of NumCellsElapsed reaches MAX_NUMCELLS:
   * If NumCellsUsed > LIM_NUMCELLSUSED_HIGH, trigger 6P to add a single cell to the preferred parent
   * If NumCellsUsed < LIM_NUMCELLSUSED_LOW, trigger 6P to remove a single cell to the preferred parent
5.2. Switching Parent

A node implementing MSF SHOULD implement the behavior described in this section.

Part of its normal operation, the RPL routing protocol can have a node switch preferred parent. The procedure for switching from the old preferred parent to the new preferred parent is:

1. if there is managed cell conflicted with the AutoUpCells to be installed, the node MUST issue a 6P RELOCATE command to relocate the conflicted cell
2. if there is no conflicted cell, the node installs the AutoUpCells to its new parent
3. the node counts the number of managed cells it has per slotframe to the old preferred parent
4. the node triggers one or more 6P ADD commands to schedule the same number of managed cells to the new preferred parent
5. when that successfully completes, the node issues a 6P CLEAR command to its old preferred parent

5.3. Handling Schedule Collisions

A node implementing MSF SHOULD implement the behavior described in this section. The "MUST" statements in this section hence only apply if the node implements schedule collision handling.

Since scheduling is entirely distributed, there is a non-zero probability that two pairs of nearby neighbor nodes schedule a managed cell at the same [slotOffset, channelOffset] location in the TSCH schedule. In that case, data exchanged by the two pairs may collide on that cell. We call this case a "schedule collision".

The node MUST maintain the following counters for each managed unicast cell to its preferred parent:

- **NumTx**: Counts the number of transmission attempts on that cell. Each time the node attempts to transmit a frame on that cell, NumTx is incremented by exactly 1.
- **NumTxAck**: Counts the number of successful transmission attempts on that cell. Each time the node receives an acknowledgment for a transmission attempt, NumTxAck is incremented by exactly 1.

Implementors MAY choose to maintain the same counters for each managed cell in the schedule.
Since both NumTx and NumTxAck are initialized to 0, we necessarily have NumTxAck <= NumTx. We call Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) the ratio NumTxAck/NumTx; and represent it as a percentage. A cell with PDR=50% means that half of the frames transmitted are not acknowledged (and need to be retransmitted).

Each time the node switches preferred parent (or during the join process when the node selects a preferred parent for the first time), both NumTx and NumTxAck MUST be reset to 0. They increment over time, as the schedule is executed and the node sends frames to its preferred parent. When NumTx reaches 256, both NumTx and NumTxAck MUST be divided by 2. That is, for example, from NumTx=256 and NumTxAck=128, they become NumTx=128 and NumTxAck=64. This operation does not change the value of the PDR, but allows the counters to keep incrementing.

The key for detecting a schedule collision is that, if a node has several cells to the same preferred parent, all cells should exhibit the same PDR. A cell which exhibits a PDR significantly lower than the others indicates that there are collisions on that cell.

Every HOUSEKEEPINGCOLLISION_PERIOD, the node executes the following steps:

1. It computes, for each managed unicast cell with its preferred parent (not for the autonomous cell), that cell’s PDR.
2. Any cell that hasn’t yet had NumTx divided by 2 since it was last reset is skipped in steps 3 and 4. This avoids triggering cell relocation when the values of NumTx and NumTxAck are not statistically significant yet.
3. It identifies the cell with the highest PDR.
4. For any other cell, it compares its PDR against that of the cell with the highest PDR. If the difference is less than RELOCATE_PDRTHRES, it triggers the relocation of that cell using a 6P RELOCATE command.

6. 6P SIGNAL command
   The 6P SIGNAL command is not used by MSF.

7. Scheduling Function Identifier
   The Scheduling Function Identifier (SFID) of MSF is IANA_6TISCH_SFID_MSF.
8. Rules for CellList

MSF uses 2-step 6P Transactions exclusively. 6P Transactions are only initiated by a node towards it preferred parent. As a result, the cells to put in the CellList of a 6P ADD command, and in the candidate CellList of a RELOCATE command, are chosen by the node initiating the 6P Transaction. In both cases, the same rules apply:

- The CellList SHOULD contain 5 or more cells.
- Each cell in the CellList MUST have a different slotOffset value.
- For each cell in the CellList, the node MUST NOT have any scheduled cell on the same slotOffset.
- The slotOffset value of any cell in the CellList MUST NOT be the same as the slotOffset of the minimal cell (slotOffset=0).
- The slotOffset of a cell in the CellList SHOULD be randomly and uniformly chosen among all the slotOffset values that satisfy the restrictions above.
- The channelOffset of a cell in the CellList SHOULD be randomly and uniformly chosen in [0..numFrequencies], where numFrequencies represents the number of frequencies a node can communicate on.

9. 6P Timeout Value

It is calculated for the worst case that a 6P response is received, which means the 6P response is sent out successfully at the very latest retransmission. And for each retransmission, it backs-off with largest value. Hence the 6P timeout value is calculated as 

\[(2^{MAXBE})-1) \times SLOTFRAME\_LENGTH\]

where:

- MAXBE is the maximum backoff exponent is used
- SLOTFRAME\_LENGTH represents the length of slotframe

10. Rule for Ordering Cells

Cells are ordered slotOffset first, channelOffset second.

The following sequence is correctly ordered (each element represents the [slotOffset,channelOffset] of a cell in the schedule):

\[[1,3],[1,4],[2,0],[5,3],[6,0],[6,3],[7,9]\]

11. Meaning of the Metadata Field

The Metadata field is not used by MSF.
12. 6P Error Handling

Section 6.2.4 of [RFC8480] lists the 6P Return Codes. Figure 1 lists the same error codes, and the behavior a node implementing MSF SHOULD follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC_SUCCESS</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_EOL</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR</td>
<td>quarantine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_RESET</td>
<td>quarantine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR_VERSION</td>
<td>quarantine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR_SFID</td>
<td>quarantine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR_SEQNUM</td>
<td>clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR_CELLLIST</td>
<td>clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR_BUSY</td>
<td>waitretry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC_ERR_LOCKED</td>
<td>waitretry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Recommended behavior for each 6P Error Code.

The meaning of each behavior from Figure 1 is:

nothing: Indicates that this Return Code is not an error. No error handling behavior is triggered.
clear: Abort the 6P Transaction. Issue a 6P CLEAR command to that neighbor (this command may fail at the link layer). Remove all cells scheduled with that neighbor from the local schedule. Keep that node in the neighbor and routing tables.
quarantine: Same behavior as for "clear". In addition, remove the node from the neighbor and routing tables. Place the node’s identifier in a quarantine list for QUARANTINE_DURATION. When in quarantine, drop all frames received from that node.
waitretry: Abort the 6P Transaction. Wait for a duration randomly and uniformly chosen in [WAITDURATION_MIN,WAITDURATION_MAX]. Retry the same transaction.

13. Schedule Inconsistency Handling

The behavior when schedule inconsistency is detected is explained in Figure 1, for 6P Return Code RC_ERR_SEQNUM.
14. MSF Constants

Figure 2 lists MSF Constants and their RECOMMENDED values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KA_PERIOD</td>
<td>10 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIM_NUMCELLSUSED_HIGH</td>
<td>75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIM_NUMCELLSUSED_LOW</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEKEEPINGCOLLISION_PERIOD</td>
<td>1 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELOCATE_PDRTHRES</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOTFRAME_LENGTH</td>
<td>101 slots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUARANTINE_DURATION</td>
<td>5 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAITDURATION_MIN</td>
<td>30 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAITDURATION_MAX</td>
<td>60 s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: MSF Constants and their RECOMMENDED values.

15. MSF Statistics

Figure 3 lists MSF Statistics and their RECOMMENDED width.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED width</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NumCellsElapsed</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NumCellsUsed</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NumTx</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NumTxAck</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: MSF Statistics and their RECOMMENDED width.

16. Security Considerations

MSF defines a series of "rules" for the node to follow. It triggers several actions, that are carried out by the protocols defined in the following specifications: the Minimal IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) Configuration [RFC8180], the 6TiSCH Operation Sublayer Protocol (6P) [RFC8480], and the Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. In particular, MSF does not define a new protocol or packet format.

MSF relies entirely on the security mechanisms defined in the specifications listed above.
17.  IANA Considerations

17.1.  MSF Scheduling Function Identifiers

This document adds the following number to the "6P Scheduling Function Identifiers" sub-registry, part of the "IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry, as defined by [RFC8480]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFID</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IANA_6TISCH_SFID_MSF</td>
<td>Minimal Scheduling Function (MSF)</td>
<td>RFCXXXX (NOTE:this)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: IETF IE Subtype ’6P’.

18.  References

18.1.  Normative References

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join]

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]

[I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon]

[IEEE802154-2015]
IEEE standard for Information Technology, "IEEE Std 802.15.4-2015 Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs)”, December 2015.

18.2. Informative References

[SAX-DASFAA]

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Appendix B. Example of Implementation of SAX hash function

For the consideration of interoperability, this section provides an example of implementation SAX hash function [SAX-DASFAA]. The input parameters of the function are:

- T, which is the hashing table length
- c, which is the characters of string s, to be hashed

In MSF, the T is replaced by the length slotframe 1. String s is replaced by the mote EUI64 address. The characters of the string c0, c1, ..., c7 are the 8 bytes of EUI64 address.

The SAX hash function requires shift operation which is defined as follow:

- L_shift(v,b), which refers to left shift variable v by b bits
- R_shift(v,b), which refers to right shift variable v by b bits
The steps to calculate the hash value of SAX hash function are:

1. initialize variable h to h0 and variable i to 0, where h is the intermediate hash value and i is the index of the bytes of EUI64 address
2. sum the value of L_shift(h, l_bit), R_shift(h, r_bit) and ci
3. calculate the result of exclusive or between the sum value in Step 2 and h
4. modulo the result of Step 3 by T
5. assign the result of Step 4 to h
6. increase i by 1
7. repeat Step 2 to Step 6 until i reaches to 8
8. assign the result of Step 5 to h

The value of variable h the hash value of SAX hash function.

For interoperability purposes, the values of h0, l_bit and r_bit in Step 1 and 2 are configured as:

- h0 = 0
- l_bit = 0
- r_bit = 1

The appropriate values of l_bit and r_bit could vary depending on the set of motes’ EUI64 address. How to find those values is out of the scope of this specification.

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Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-02

Abstract

This document defines a method to generate robust TSCH schedules in a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4-2015) network, so as to protect network nodes against selective jamming attack. Network nodes independently compute the new schedule at each slotframe, by altering the one originally available from 6top or alternative protocols, while preserving a consistent and collision-free communication pattern. This method can be added on top of the minimal security framework for 6TiSCH.

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1. Introduction

Nodes in a 6TiSCH network communicate using the IEEE 802.15.4-2015 standard and its Timeslotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode. Some properties of TSCH make schedule units, i.e. cells, and their usage predictable, even if security services are used at the MAC layer.
This allows an external adversary to easily derive the communication pattern of a victim node. After that, the adversary can perform a selective jamming attack, by covertly, efficiently, and effectively transmitting over the only exact cell(s) in the victim’s schedule. For example, this enables the adversary to jeopardize a competitor’s network, while still permitting their own network to operate correctly.

This document describes a method to counteract such an attack. At each slotframe, every node autonomously computes a TSCH schedule, as a pseudo-random permutation of the one originally available from 6top [RFC8480] or alternative protocols.

The resulting schedule is provided to TSCH and used to communicate during the next slotframe. In particular, the new communication pattern results unpredictable for an external adversary. Besides, since all nodes compute the same pseudo-random permutation, the new communication pattern remains consistent and collision-free.

The proposed solution is intended to operate on slotframes that are used for data transmission by current network nodes, and that are not used to join the network. In fact, since the TSCH schedule is altered at each slotframe, the proposed method cannot be applied to slotframes that include a "minimal cell" [RFC8180] and possible other rendez-vous cells used for joining the 6TiSCH network.

This document specifies also how this method can be added on top of the minimal security framework for 6TiSCH and its Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with terms and concepts defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology] and [RFC8152].

This document refers also to the following terminology.

- Permutation key. A cryptographic key shared by network nodes and used to permute schedules. Different keys are used to permute the utilization pattern of timeslots and of channel offsets.
2. Properties of TSCH that Simplify Selective Jamming

This section highlights a number of properties of the TSCH cell usage that greatly simplify the performance of the selective jamming attack described in Section 3.

Given:

- N_S as the size of slotframes in timeslots;
- N_C as the number of available channelOffsets;
- The channel 'f' to communicate at timeslot 's' with ASN and channelOffset 'chOff' computed as \( f = F[(ASN + chOff) \mod N_C] \);

And assuming for simplicity that:

- N_S and N_C are coprime values;
- The channel hopping sequence is N_C in size and equal to \( \{0, 1, ..., N_C - 1\} \);

Then, the following properties hold:

- Periodicity property. The sequence of channels used for communication by a certain cell repeats with period \( (N_C \times N_S) \) timeslots.
- Usage property. Within a period, every cell uses all the available channels, each of which only once.
- Offset property. All cells follow the same sequence of channels with a certain offset.
- Predictability property. For each cell, the sequence of channels is predictable. That is, by knowing the channel used by a cell in a given timeslot, it is possible to compute the remaining channel hopping sub-sequence.

In fact, given a cell active on channel 'f' and timeslot 's' on slotframe 'T', and since ASN = \( (s + T \times N_S) \), it holds that

\[
f = [(s + T \times N_S + chOff) \mod N_C]\]

(Equation 1)

By solving this equation in 'chOff', one can predict the channels used by the cell in the next slotframes. Note that, in order to do that, one does not need to know the absolute number 'T' of the slotframe (and thus the exact ASN) in which timeslot 's' uses a
certain channel ‘f’. In fact, one can re-number slotframes starting from any arbitrarily assumed "starting-slotframe".

3. Selective Jamming Attack

This section describes how an adversary can exploit the properties listed in Section 2, and determine the full schedule of a victim node, even if security services at the MAC layer are used.

This allows the adversary to selectively jam only the exact cell(s) in the victim’s schedule, while greatly limiting the exposure to detection. At the same time, the attack is highly effective in jeopardizing victim’s communications, and is highly energy-efficient, i.e., can be carried out on battery.

For simplicity, the following description also assumes that a victim node actually transmits/receives during all its allocated cells at each slotframe.

3.1. Adversary Model

This specification addresses an adversary with the following properties.

- The adversary is external, i.e. it does not control any node registered in the 6TiSCH network.
- The adversary wants to target precise network nodes and their traffic. That is, it does not target the 6TiSCH network as a whole, and does not perform a wide-band constant jamming.
- The adversary is able to target multiple victim nodes at the same time. This may require multiple jamming sources and/or multiple antennas per jamming source to carry out the attack.

Furthermore, compared to wide-band constant jamming, the considered selective jamming attack deserves special attention to be addressed, due to the following reasons.

- It is much more energy efficient.
- It minimizes the adversary’s exposure and hence the chances to be detected.
- It has the same effectiveness on the intended victim nodes. That is, it achieves the same goal, while avoiding the unnecessarily exposure and costs of wide-band constant jamming.
It is worth noting that a wide-band constant jamming can achieve the same result more easily, in the extreme cases where the target slotframe is (nearly) fully used by a few nodes only, or the adversary has as many antennas as the number of available channels. However, this would still come at the cost of high exposure and higher energy consumption for the adversary.

3.2. Attack Example

The following example considers Figure 1, where $N_S = 3$, $N_C = 4$, and the channel hopping sequence is $\{0,1,2,3\}$. The shown schedule refers to a network node that uses three cells ‘$L_1’$, ‘$L_2’$ and ‘$L_3’$, with $\{0,3\}$, $\{1,1\}$ and $\{2,0\}$ as pairs (timeslot, channelOffset), respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch</th>
<th>Of</th>
<th>ASN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>f=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>f=2</td>
<td>f=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>f=3</td>
<td>f=2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>s=0</th>
<th>T = 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>s=1</td>
<td>T = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s=2</td>
<td>T = 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s=0</td>
<td>T = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s=1</td>
<td>T = 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s=2</td>
<td>T = 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Attack Example with Slotframe Re-numbering

1. The adversary starts the attack at absolute slotframe $T = 1$, which is assumed as "starting-slotframe" and thus renamed as slotframe $t = 0$. The renaming is possible due to the offset and predictability properties.

2. The adversary picks a channel ‘$f^*$’ at random, and monitors it for $N_C$ consecutive slotframes to determine the timeslots in which the victim node communicates on that channel. Due to the usage property, the number of such timeslots is equal to the number of cells assigned to the victim node.
With reference to Figure 1, if, for example, \( f^* = 1 \), the adversary determines that the victim node uses channel \( f^* \) in timeslots \( s = 1 \) and \( s = 2 \) of slotframe \( t = 0 \) and in timeslot \( s = 0 \) of slotframe \( t = 1 \). The adversary can then deduce that the victim node uses three different cells \( 'L_1' \), \( 'L_2' \) and \( 'L_3' \), in timeslots 0, 1 and 2, respectively.

3. The adversary determines the channels on which the victim node is going to transmit in the next slotframes, by exploiting the predictability property.

That is, by instantiating Equation 1 for cell \( 'L_1' \), timeslot \( s = 0 \) and slotframe \( t = 1 \), one gets \( 1 = (3 + \text{chOff}_1) \mod 4 \), which has solution for \( \text{chOff}_1 = 2 \). Hence, the function to predict the channel \( 'f_1' \) to be used by cell \( 'L_1' \) in a slotframe \( 't' \), \( t \geq 1 \), is \( f_1 = ((2 + 3 \times t) \mod 4) \), which produces the correct periodic sequence of channels \( 1, 0, 3, 2 \). Similarly, one can instantiate Equation 1 for cells \( 'L_2' \) and \( 'L_3' \), so producing the respective periodic sequence of channels \( 1,0,3,2 \) and \( 1,0,3,2 \).

4. The adversary has discovered the full schedule of the victim node and can proceed with the actual selective jamming attack. That is, according to the found schedule, the adversary transmits over the exact cells used by the victim node for transmission/reception, while staying quiet and saving energy otherwise. This results in a highly effective, highly efficient and hard to detect attack against communications of network nodes.

4. Building Robust Schedules

This section defines a method to protect network nodes against the selective jamming attack described in Section 3. The proposed method alters the communication pattern of all network nodes at every slotframe, in a way unpredictable for the adversary.

At each slotframe \( 'T' \), network nodes autonomously compute the communication pattern for the next slotframe \( 'T+1' \) as a pseudo-random permutation of the one originally available. In order to ensure that the new communication pattern remains consistent and collision-free, all nodes compute the same permutation of the original one. In particular, at every slotframe, each node separately and independently permutes its timeslot utilization pattern (optionally) as well as its channelOffset utilization pattern.

To perform the required permutations, all network nodes rely on a same secure pseudo-random number generator (SPRNG) as shown in Figure 2, where \( E(x,y) \) denotes a cipher which encrypts a plaintext.
‘y’ by means of a key ‘x’. Network nodes MUST support the AES-CCM-16-64-128 algorithm.

```c
unsigned random(unsigned K, unsigned z) {
    unsigned val = E(K,z);
    return val;
}
```

Figure 2: Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator

All network nodes share the same following pieces of information.

- $K_s$, a permutation key used to permute the timeslot utilization pattern, and used as input to the random() function in Figure 2. $K_s$ is provided upon joining the network, and MAY be provided as described in Section 5.

- $K_c$, a permutation key used to permute the channelOffset utilization pattern, and used as input to the random() function in Figure 2. $K_c$ is provided upon joining the network, and MAY be provided as described in Section 5.

- $z_s$, a counter used to permute the timeslot utilization pattern, and used as input to the random() function in Figure 2. At the beginning of each slotframe, $z_s$ is equal to $[(N_S - 1) \times \text{floor} (\text{ASN}^*/N_S)]$, where ASN* is the ASN value of the first timeslot of that slotframe. Then, $z_s$ grows by $(N_S - 1)$ from the beginning of a slotframe to the beginning of the next one.

- $z_c$, a counter used to permute the channelOffset utilization pattern, and used as input to the random() function in Figure 2. At the beginning of each slotframe, $z_c$ is equal to $[(N_C - 1) \times \text{floor} (\text{ASN}^*/N_S)]$, where ASN* is the ASN value of the first timeslot of that slotframe. Then, $z_c$ grows by $(N_C - 1)$ from the beginning of a slotframe to the beginning of the next one.

Then, at every slotframe, each network node takes the following steps, and generates its own permuted communication schedule to be used at the following slotframe. The actual permutation of cells relies on the well-known Fisher-Yates algorithm, that requires to generate $(n - 1)$ pseudo-random numbers in order to pseudo-randomly shuffle a vector of $n$ elements.

1. First, a pseudo-random permutation is performed on the timeslot dimension of the slotframe. This requires $(N_S - 1)$ invocations of random$(K,z)$, consistently with the Fisher-Yates algorithm. In particular, $K = K_s$, while $z_s$ is passed as second argument and is incremented by 1 after each invocation. The result of this
step is a permuted timeslot utilization pattern, while the channelOffset utilization pattern is not permuted yet.

2. Second, a pseudo-random permutation is performed on the channelOffset dimension of the slotframe. This requires \((N_C - 1)\) invocations of random\((K, z)\), consistently with the Fisher-Yates algorithm. In particular, \(K = K_c\), while \(z_c\) is passed as second argument and is incremented by 1 after each invocation. The result of this step is a fully shuffled communication pattern.

The resulting schedule is then provided to TSCH and considered for sending/receiving traffic during the next slotframe.

As further discussed in Section 6.3, it is possible to skip step 1 above, and hence permute only the channelOffset utilization pattern, while keeping a static timeslot utilization pattern.

Note for implementation: the process described above can be practically implemented by using two vectors, i.e. one for shuffling the timeslot utilization pattern and one for shuffling the channelOffset utilization pattern.

5. Adaptation to the 6TiSCH Minimal Security Framework

The security mechanism described in this specification can be added on top of the minimal security framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

That is, the two permutation keys \(K_s\) and \(K_c\) can be provided to a pledge when performing the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

To this end, the Configuration CBOR object [RFC7049] used as payload of the Join Response Message and defined in Section 8.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] is extended with two new CoJP parameters defined in this specification, namely ‘permutation key set’ and ‘permutation cipher’. The resulting payload of the Join Response message is as follows.

```plaintext
Configuration = {
    ? 2 : [ +Link_Layer_Key ], ; link-layer key set
    ? 3 : Short_Identifier, ; short identifier
    ? 4 : bstr, ; JRC address
    ? 6 : [ *bstr ], ; blacklist
    ? 7 : uint, ; join rate
    TBD : [ +Permutation_Key ], ; permutation key set
    TBD : Permutation_Cipher ; permutation cipher
}
```
The parameter ‘permutation key set’ is an array encompassing one or two permutation keys encoded as byte strings. That is, the encoding of each individual permutation key is as follows.

```
Permutation_Key = {
    key_value : bstr
}
```

If the 6TiSCH network uses the security mechanism described in this specification, the parameter ‘permutation key set’ MUST be included in the CoJP Join Response message and the pledge MUST interpret it as follows.

- In case only one permutation key is present, it is used as $K_c$ to permute the channelOffset utilization pattern, as per Section 4.
- In case two permutation keys are present, the first one is used as $K_s$ to permute the timeslot utilization pattern, while the second one is used as $K_c$ to permute the channelOffset utilization pattern, as per Section 4. The two keys MUST have the same length.

The parameter ‘permutation cipher’ indicates the encryption algorithm used for the secure pseudo-random number generator as per Figure 2 in Section 4. The value is one of the encryption algorithms defined for COSE [RFC8152], and is taken from Tables 9, 10 and 11 of [RFC8152]. In case the parameter is omitted, the default value of AES-CCM-16-64-128 (COSE algorithm encoding: 10) MUST be assumed.

5.1. Error Handling

In case ‘permutation key set’ includes two permutation keys with different length or more than two permutation keys, the pledge considers ‘permutation key set’ not valid and MUST signal the error as specified in Section 8.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

The pledge MUST validate that keys included in ‘permutation key set’ are appropriate for the encryption algorithm specified in ‘permutation cipher’ or assumed as default. In case of failed validation, the pledge MUST signal the error as specified in Section 8.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

6. Security Considerations

With reference to Section 3.9 of [RFC7554], this specification achieves an additional "Secure Communication" objective, namely it defines a mechanism to build and enforce a TSCH schedule which is
robust against selective jamming attack, while at the same time consistent and collision-free.

Furthermore, the same security considerations from the minimal security framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] hold for this document. The rest of this section discusses a number of additional security considerations.

6.1. Effectiveness of Schedule Shuffling

The countermeasure defined in Section 4 practically makes each node’s schedule look random to an external observer. Hence, it prevents the adversary from performing the attack described in Section 3.

Then, a still available strategy for the adversary is to jam a number of cells selected at random, possibly on a per-slotframe basis. This considerably reduces the attack effectiveness in successfully jeopardizing victims’ communications.

At the same time, nodes using different cells than the intended victims’ would experience an overall slightly higher fraction of corrupted messages. In fact, the communications of such accidental victims might be corrupted by the adversary, when they occur during a jammed timeslot and exactly over the channelOffset chosen at random.

6.2. Renewal of Key Material

It is RECOMMENDED that the two permutation keys K_s and K_c are revoked and renewed every time a node leaves the network. This prevents a leaving node to keep the permutation keys, which may be exploited to selectively jam communications in the network.

This rekeying operation is supposed to be performed anyway upon every change of network membership, in order to preserve backward and forward security. In particular, new IEEE 802.15.4 link-layer keys are expected to be distributed before a new pledge can join the network, or after one or more nodes have left the network.

The specific approach to renew the two permutation keys, possibly together with other security material, is out of the scope of this specification.

6.3. Static Timeslot Allocations

As mentioned in Section 4 and Section 5, it is possible to permute only the channelOffset utilization pattern, while preserving the originally scheduled timeslot utilization pattern. This can be desirable, or even unavoidable in some scenarios, in order to
guarantee end-to-end latencies in multi-hop networks, as per accordingly designed schedules.

However, preserving a static timeslot utilization pattern would considerably increase the attack surface for a random jammer adversary. That is, the adversary would immediately learn the timeslot utilization pattern of a victim node, and would have a chance to successfully jam a victim’s cell equal to (1 / N_C).

6.4. Network Joining Through Rendez-vous Cells

As described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], a pledge joins a 6TiSCH network through a Join Proxy (JP), according to the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) and based on the information conveyed in broadcast Enhanced Beacons (EBs). In particular, the pledge will communicate with the JP over randez-vous cells indicated in the EBs.

In practice, such cells are commonly part of a separate slotframe, which includes one scheduled "minimal cell" [RFC8180], typically used also for broadcasting EBs. Such slotframe, i.e. Slotframe 0, usually differs from the slotframe(s) used for both EBs and data transmission.

In order to keep the join process feasible and deterministic, the solution described in this specification is not applied to Slotframe 0 or any other slotframes that include randez-vous cells for joining. As a consequence, an adversary remains able to selectively jam the "minimal cell" (or any randez-vous cell used for joining), so potentially jeopardizing the CoJP and preventing pledges to join the network altogether.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

7.1. Permutation Key Set

IANA is asked to enter the following value into the "Constrained Join Protocol Parameters Registry" defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] and within the "IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TISCH) parameters" registry.
7.2. Permutation Cipher

IANA is asked to enter the following value into the "Constrained Join Protocol Parameters Registry" defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] and within the "IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TISCH) parameters" registry.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]


Appendix A. Test Vector

This appendix provides a test vector for an example where the method proposed in this document is used to generate robust TSCH schedules.

The example focuses on one network node and considers the schedule in Figure 1 as the original schedule to permute at each slotframe.

The results shown in this example have been produced using the implementation available at [Test-Implementation].
A.1. Detailed Technique

In this example, the permutation of the timeslot utilization pattern and of the channelOffset utilization pattern occurs as follows.

A.1.1. Data Structures and Schedule Encoding

Each network node maintains two vectors $X_s$ and $X_c$, each composed of $N_S$ unsigned integer values. At the beginning of each slotframe, $X_s$ and $X_c$ indicate the node’s original schedule. In particular:

- $X_s$ indicates the usage of timeslots in the slotframe. That is, the element $X_s[i]$ refers to the $i$-th timeslot of the slotframe.
- $X_c$ indicates the usage of channelOffsets at each timeslot in the slotframe. That is, $X_c[i]$ refers to the channelOffset value used in the $i$-th timeslot of the slotframe.

Then, the two vectors encode the schedule information as follows:

- If the $i$-th timeslot is not used, $X_s[i] = 0$ and $X_c[i] = N_C$.
- If the $i$-th timeslot is used to transmit with channelOffset ‘c’, $X_s[i] = 1$ and $X_c[i] = c$.
- If the $i$-th timeslot is used to receive with channelOffset ‘c’, $X_s[i] = 2$ and $X_c[i] = c$.

Note that optimized implementations can achieve the same goal with permutation vectors of smaller size.

A.1.2. Pseudo-Random Number Generation

When invoking $E()$ within the random() function in Figure 2:

- The second parameter has 5 bytes in size like the ASN, and is provided as plaintext to the permutation cipher.
- A copy of the second parameter is left-padded with 8 octects with value 0x00. The result is provided as 13-byte nonce to the permutation cipher, i.e. AES-CCM-16-64-128 in this example.
- No additional authenticated data are provided to the permutation cipher.

The unsigned value returned by $E()$ and random() is the computed ciphertext left-padded with 3 octects with value 0x00. That is, the returned value is 8 bytes in size.
A.1.3. Array Permutation

To produce the required permutations, this example considers the Fisher-Yates modern version in Figure 3, which requires \((n - 1)\) swaps to shuffle an array of \(n\) elements.

```cpp
// Shuffle an array 'a' of 'n' elements (indices 0, ..., n - 1)
for i from (n - 1) down to 1 do {
    j = random integer such that 0 <= j <= i;
    exchange a[j] and a[i];
}
```

Figure 3: Fisher-Yates algorithm

At each step of the loop, \(j\) is computed as \(r \mod (i + 1)\), where \(\mod\) is the modulo operator, and \(r\) is the value returned by the function \(\text{random}(\)\) in Figure 2, as described in Appendix A.1.2.

A.1.4. Schedule Permutation

At each slotframe, the original schedule is considered as starting point to produce the permuted schedule for the following slotframe.

In particular, the permuted schedule for the following slotframe is computed according to the following steps.

1. The same pseudo-random permutation is performed on both vectors \(X_s\) and \(X_c\), by using the Fisher-Yates algorithm in Figure 3. This requires \((N_S - 1)\) invocations of \(\text{random}(K, z)\). In particular, \(K = K_s\), while \(z_s\) is passed as second argument and is incremented by 1 after each invocation. As a result, \(X_s\) specifies the permuted timeslot utilization pattern, whereas \(X_c\) specifies a consistent while temporary channelOffset utilization pattern.

2. A vector \(Y\) of size \(N_C\) is produced, as a permutation of \(\{0, 1, ..., N_C - 1\}\) performed by using the Fisher-Yates algorithm in Figure 3. This requires \((N_C - 1)\) invocations of \(\text{random}(K, z)\). In particular, \(K = K_c\), while \(z_c\) is passed as second argument and is incremented by 1 after each invocation.

3. The vector \(X_c\) is updated as follows. Each element \(X_c[i]\) that refers to a non active timeslot, i.e. \(X_c[i] = N_C\), is left as is. Otherwise, \(X_c[i]\) takes as value \(Y[j]\), where \(j = X_c[i]\).

As a result, the two permuted vectors \(X_s\) and \(X_c\) together provide a full communication pattern to use during the next slotframe.
A.2. Test Configuration

\( N_S = 3 \) // Slotframe size, in timeslots

\( N_C = 4 \) // Available channel offsets

Channel hopping sequence = \( \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \)

\( X_s = \{1, 1, 2\} \) // Original timeslot utilization pattern \( \{Tx, Tx, Rx\} \)

\( X_c = \{3, 1, 0\} \) // Original channelOffset utilization pattern

Starting ASN = 0

Permutation cipher: AES-CCM-16-64-128

\( K_s = \{ 0xce, 0xb0, 0x09, 0xae, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x44, 0x51, 0xfe, 0xad, 0xf0, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x6f, 0x45, 0x55 \} \)

\( K_c = \{ 0xce, 0xb0, 0x09, 0xae, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x44, 0x51, 0xfe, 0xad, 0xf0, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x6f, 0x45, 0x56 \} \)

A.3. Example Output

******************* ******************* *******************
START ROUND 1 of 2
The slotframe starts with: ASN = 0; \( z_s = 0; z_c = 0 \)
******************* ******************* *******************
-- Start shuffling the time offsets --
---------- ---------- ----------
Counter (\( z_s \)): 0
Plaintext: 0x0000000000 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x00000000000000000000000000 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0xbedca72db3 (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x000000bedca72db3 (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 2
Fisher-Yates swap-index \( j \): 0

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Counter } (z_s): 1 \\
\text{Plaintext: } 0x0000000001 \text{ (5 bytes)} \\
\text{Cipher nonce: } 0x000000000000000000000001 \text{ (13 bytes)} \\
\text{Ciphertext: } 0x23d36801f1 \text{ (5 bytes)} \\
\text{Padded ciphertext: } 0x00000023d36801f1 \text{ (8 bytes)} \\
\text{Fisher-Yates swap index } i: 1 \\
\text{Fisher-Yates swap-index } j: 1
\end{array}
\]

-- Intermediate schedule --

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Timeslot utilization pattern } X_s = \{2, 1, 1\} \\
\text{ChannelOffset utilization pattern } X_c = \{0, 1, 3\}
\end{array}
\]

-- Start shuffling the channel offset schedule --

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Counter } (z_c): 0 \\
\text{Plaintext: } 0x0000000000 \text{ (5 bytes)} \\
\text{Cipher nonce: } 0x00000000000000000000000000 \text{ (13 bytes)} \\
\text{Ciphertext: } 0x1e957fe44d \text{ (5 bytes)} \\
\text{Padded ciphertext: } 0x0000001e957fe44d \text{ (8 bytes)} \\
\text{Fisher-Yates swap index } i: 3 \\
\text{Fisher-Yates swap-index } j: 1
\end{array}
\]
Counter (z_c): 1
Plaintext: 0x0000000001 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0x6e2b990263 (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext in bytes: 0x0000006e2b990263 (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 2
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 2
---------- ---------- ----------
Counter (z_c): 2
Plaintext: 0x0000000002 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000002 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0x4fae2cfe22 (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x0000004fae2cfe22 (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 1
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 0
---------- ---------- ----------
Next slotframe starting with ASN = 3 will use:
- Shuffled timeslot schedule {2, 1, 1}, i.e. (Rx, Tx, Tx).
- Shuffled channel offset schedule {3, 0, 1}.
- Shuffled frequencies schedule {2, 0, 2}.

START ROUND 2 OF 2
The slotframe starts with: ASN = 3; z_s = 2; z_c = 3

---------- ---------- ----------
-- Start shuffling the time offsets --

Counter (z_s): 2
Plaintext: 0x0000000002 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x00000000000000000000000002 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0xd9a0c0f8eb (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x000000d9a0c0f8eb (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 2
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 2

Counter (z_s): 3
Plaintext: 0x0000000003 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x00000000000000000000000003 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0x7aabd818ac (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x0000007aabd818ac (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 1
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 0

-- Intermediate schedules --
Timeslot utilization pattern X_s = \{1, 1, 2\}
ChannelOffset utilization pattern X_c = \{1, 3, 0\}

-- Start shuffling the channel offset schedule --
Counter (z_c): 3
Plaintext: 0x0000000003 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x00000000000000000000000003 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0x947cf7c1d4 (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x000000947cf7c1d4 (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 3
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 0
----------------- ----------------

Counter (z_c): 4
Plaintext: 0x0000000004 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x00000000000000000000000004 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0xa9255744e7 (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x000000a9255744e7 (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 2
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 1
----------------- ----------------

Counter (z_c): 5
Plaintext: 0x0000000005 (5 bytes)
Cipher nonce: 0x00000000000000000000000005 (13 bytes)
Ciphertext: 0xa70a456e9e (5 bytes)
Padded ciphertext: 0x000000a70a456e9e (8 bytes)
Fisher-Yates swap index i: 1
Fisher-Yates swap-index j: 0
----------------- ----------------
Next slotframe starting with ASN = 6 will use:

- Shuffled timeslot schedule \( (1, 1, 2) \), i.e. \( \text{Tx, Tx, Rx} \).
- Shuffled channel offset schedule \( (3, 0, 2) \).
- Shuffled frequencies schedule \( (1, 3, 2) \).

Acknowledgments

The authors sincerely thank Tengfei Chang, Michael Richardson, Yasuyuki Tanaka, Pascal Thubert and Malisa Vucinic for their comments and feedback.

The work on this document has been partly supported by the EIT-Digital High Impact Initiative ACTIVE, and by the VINNOVA and Celtic-Next project CRITISEC.

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