JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens
draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt-00

Abstract

This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth2 access tokens in JSON web token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to issue and consume access tokens in interoperable manner.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The original OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] specification does not mandate any specific format for access tokens. While that remains perfectly appropriate for many important scenario, in-market use has shown that many commercial OAuth2 implementations elected to issue access tokens using a format that can be parsed and validated by resource servers directly, without further authorization server involvement. The approach is particularly common in topologies where the authorization server and resource server are not co-located, are not ran by the same entity, or are otherwise separated by some boundary. All of the known commercial implementations known at this time leverage the JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519] format.

Most vendor specific JWT access tokens share the same functional layout, including information in forms of claims meant to support the same scenarios: token validation, transporting authorization information in forms of scopes and entitlements, carrying identity information about the subject, and so on. The differences are mostly confined to the claim names and syntax used to represent the same entities, suggesting that interoperability could be easily achieved by standardizing on a common set of claims and validation rules.
The assumption that access tokens are associated to specific information doesn’t appear only in commercial implementations. Various specifications in the OAuth2 family (such as resource indicators [ResourceIndicators], bearer token usage [RFC6750] and others) postulate the presence in access tokens of scoping mechanisms, such as an audience. The family of specifications associated to introspection also indirectly suggest a fundamental set of information access tokens are expected to carry or at least be associated with.

This specification aims to provide a standardized and interoperable profile as an alternative to the proprietary JWT access tokens layouts going forward. Besides defining a common set of mandatory and optional claims, the profile provides clear indications on how authorization requests parameters determine the content of the issued JWT access token, how an authorization server can publish metadata relevant to the JWT access tokens it issues, and how a resource server should validate incoming JWT access tokens.

Finally, this specification provides security and privacy considerations meant to prevent common mistakes and anti patterns that are likely to occur in naive use of the JWT format to represent access tokens.

1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

JWT access token  An OAuth 2.0 access token encoded in JWT format and complying with the requirements described in this specification.

This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token", "authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint", "authorization request", "authorization response", "token endpoint", "grant type", "access token request", "access token response", and "client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749].

2. JWT Access Token Header and Data Structure

JWT access tokens are regular JWT tokens complying with the requirements described in this section.
2.1. Header

Although JWT access tokens can use any signing algorithm, use of asymmetric algorithms is RECOMMENDED as it simplifies the process of acquiring validation information for resource servers (see Section 4).

The typ header parameter for a JWT access token MUST be at+jwt. See the security considerations section for details on the importance of preventing JWT access tokens to be interpreted as id_tokens.

2.2. Data Structure

The following claims are used in the JWT access token data structure.

- iss REQUIRED - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
- exp REQUIRED - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
- aud REQUIRED - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]. See Section 3 for indications on how an authorization server should determine the value of aud depending on the request. [Note: some vendors seem to rely on resource aliases. If we believe this to be a valuable feature, here’s some proposed language: The aud claim MAY include a list of individual resource indicators if they are all aliases referring to the same requested resource known by the authorization server.]
- sub REQUIRED - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]. In case of access tokens obtained through grants where no resource owner is involved, such as the client credentials grant, the value of sub SHOULD correspond to an identifier the authorization server uses to indicate the client application (such as the client_id).
- client_id REQUIRED - as defined in section 4.3 of [TokenExchange].
- iat OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
- auth_time OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]. Important: as this claim represents the time at which the end user authenticated, its value will remain the same for all the JWT access tokens issued within that session. For example: all the JWT access tokens obtained with a given refresh token will all have the same value of auth_time, corresponding to the instant in which the user first authenticated to obtain the refresh token.
- jti OPTIONAL - as defined in section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519].
acr, amr OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]. The same considerations presented for auth_time apply to acr and amr: those values reflect the authentication context and method used when the end user originally authenticated, and will remain unchanged for the JWT access tokens issued within the context of that session.

2.2.1. Identity Claims

Commercial authorization servers will often include resource owner attributes directly in access tokens, so that resource servers can consume them directly for authorization or other purposes without any further roundtrips to introspection ([RFC7662]) or userinfo ([OpenID.Core]) endpoints.

This profile does not introduce any mechanism for a client to directly request the presence of specific claims in JWT access tokens, as the authorization server can determine what additional claims are required by a particular resource server by taking into consideration the client_id of the client, the scope and the resource parameters included in the request.

Any additional attributes whose semantic is well described by the attributes description found in section 5.1 of [OpenID.Core] SHOULD be codified in JWT access tokens via the corresponding claim names in that section of the OpenID Connect specification.

Authorization servers including resource owner attributes in JWT access tokens should exercise care and verify that all privacy requirements are met, as discussed in Section 6.

2.2.2. Authorization Claims

If an authorization request includes a scope parameter, the corresponding issued JWT access token MUST include a scope claim as defined in section 4.2 of [TokenExchange].

All the individual scopes strings in the scope claim MUST have meaning for the resource indicated in the aud claim.

2.2.2.1. Claims for Authorization Outside of Delegation Scenarios

Many authorization servers embed in the access tokens they issue authorization attributes that go beyond the delegated scenarios described by [RFC7519]. Typical examples include resource owner memberships in roles and groups that are relevant to the resource being accessed, entitlements assigned to the resource owner for the
targeted resource that the authorization server knows about, and so on.

An authorization server wanting to include such attributes in a JWT access token SHOULD use as claim types the attributes described by section 4.1.2 of SCIM Core ([RFC7643]) and in particular roles, groups and entitlements. As in their original definition in [RFC7643], this profile does not provide a specific vocabulary for those entities.

[[note 1 some commercial authorization server include claims indicating whether the client authenticated with the authorization server as a confidential client, for the purpose of determining whether the client_id can be used as a reliable indicator of the identity of the caller (and take that into account for authorization decisions). Discussions at OSW2019 on how to achieve this were inconclusive hence this was punted for further discussion]]

[[note 2 some commercial authorization server include claims indicating whether the resource owner authenticated with a federated identity provider rather than directly with the authorization server. During discussions at OSW2019 there were lukewarm reactions. One proposed line of investigation was to examine what https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secevent-token-13#page-10 does with the sub structure and see whether some mechanisms can be applicable here; however for this early draft no further investigation was made and no info is provided beyond this note]]

3. Requesting a JWT Access Token

An authorization server can issue a JWT access token in response to any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and subsequent extensions meant to result in an access token.

Every JWT access token MUST include an aud claim (see Section 2.2).

If the request includes a resource parameter (as defined in [ResourceIndicators]), the resulting JWT access token aud claim MUST have the same value as the resource parameter in the request.

Example request below:
GET /as/authorization.oauth2?response_type=token
   &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=laeb
   &scope=openid%20profile%20reademail
   &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
   &resource=https%3A%2F%2Frs.example.com%2F HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com

Figure 1: Authorization Request with Resource and Scope Parameters

Once redeemed, the code obtained from the request above will result
in a JWT access token in the form shown below:

```
{"typ":"at+JWT","alg":"RS256","kid":"RjEwOwOA"}
{
   "iss": "https://authorization-server.example.com/",
   "sub": "5ba552d67",
   "aud": "https://rs.example.com/",
   "exp": 1544645174,
   "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3_",
   "scope": "openid profile reademail"
}
```

Figure 2: A JWT Access Token

If it receives a request for an access token containing more than one
resource parameter, an authorization server issuing JWT access tokens
MUST reject the request and fail with [[TODO: select appropriate
error code]].  See Section 2.2 and Section 5 for more details on how
this measure ensures there’s no confusion on to what resource the
access token granted scopes apply.

If the request does not include a resource parameter, the
authorization server MUST use in the aud claim a default resource
indicator.  If a scope parameter is present in the request, the
authorization server SHOULD use it to infer the value of the default
resource indicator to be used in the aud claim.  The mechanism
through which scopes are associated to default resource indicator
values is outside the scope of this specification.  If the values in
the scope parameter refer to different default resource indicator
values, the authorization server SHOULD reject the request with
[[TODO: select appropriate error code]].

4. Validating JWT Access Tokens

For the purpose of facilitating validation data retrieval, it is
RECOMMENDED that authorization servers sign JWT access tokens with an
asymmetric algorithm.
Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] to advertise to resource servers its signing keys via jwks_uri and what iss claim value to expect via the issuer metadata value. Alternatively, authorization servers implementing OpenID connect MAY use the Openid connect discovery document for the same purpose. If an authorization server supports both AS metadata and Openid discovery, the values provided MUST be consistent across the two publication methods.

An authorization server MAY elect to use different keys to sign id_tokens and JWT access tokens.

When invoked as described in OAuth2 bearer token usage, resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the following manner.

1. The resource server MUST verify that the typ header value is at+jwt and reject tokens carrying any other value.

2. If the JWT access token is encrypted, decrypt it using the keys and algorithms that the resource server specified during registration. If encryption was negotiated with the authorization server at registration time and the incoming JWT access token is not encrypted, the resource server SHOULD reject it.

3. The Issuer Identifier for the authorization server (which is typically obtained during discovery) MUST exactly match the value of the iss claim.

4. The resource server MUST validate that the aud claim contains the resource indicator value corresponding to the identifier the resource server expects for itself. The aud claim MAY contain an array with more than one element. The JWT access token MUST be rejected if aud does not list the resource indicator of the current resource server as a valid audience, or if it contains additional audiences that are not known aliases of the resource indicator of the current resource server.

5. The resource server MUST validate the signature of all incoming JWT access token according to [RFC7515] using the algorithm specified in the JWT alg Header Parameter. The resource server MUST use the keys provided by the authorization server.

6. The current time MUST be before the time represented by the exp Claim.
7. If the auth_time claim is present, the resource server SHOULD check the auth_time value and request re-authentication if it determines too much time has elapsed since the last resource owner authentication.

[[Note: I would like to express the requirement that the resource server should not ignore authorization information when present in the JWT access token. I don’t know if this belongs here or elsewhere. Here’s some possible language: If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them in combination with any other contextual information available to determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected. Details about how a resource server performs those checks is beyond the scope of this profile specification.]]

5. Security Considerations

The JWT access token data layout described here is very similar to the one of the id_token as defined by [OpenID.Core]. Without the explicit typing required in this profile, in line with the recommendations in [JWT.BestPractices] there would be the risk of attackers using JWT access tokens in lieu of id_tokens.

This profile explicitly forbids the use of multi value aud claim when the individual values refer to different resources, as that would introduce confusion about what scopes apply to which resource—possibly opening up avenues for elevation of delegated privileges attacks. Alternative techniques to prevent scope confusion include "scope stuffing", imposing to every individual scope string to include a reference to the resource they are meant to be applied to, but its application is problematic (scope opacity violations, size inflation, more error conditions become possible when the combination of requested scopes and resource indicators is invalid) and the observed frequency of the scenario doesn’t warrant complicating the more common cases.

[[todo: expand on Audience, issuer and expiration validation checks serve the usual purposes. What else?]]

6. Privacy Considerations

As JWT access tokens carry information by value, it now becomes possible for requestors and receivers to directly peek inside the token claims collection.

In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply access his or her own personal information) or if the token should be encrypted.

In every scenario, the content of the JWT access token will eventually be accessible to the resource server. It’s important to evaluate whether the resource server gained the proper entitlement to have access to any content received in form of claims, for example through user consent in some form, policies and agreements with the organization running the authorization servers, and so on.

7. IANA Considerations

[[TODO: MIME type registration for at+jwt ]]

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]

[JWT.BestPractices]

[OpenID.Core]

[ResourceIndicators]


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The initial set of requirements informing this specification was extracted by numerous examples of access tokens issued in JWT format by production systems. Thanks to Dominick Bauer (IdentityServer), Brian Campbell (PingIdentity), Daniel Dobalian (Microsoft), Karl Bertocci.
Guinness (Okta) for providing sample tokens issued by their products and services. Brian Campbell and Filip Skokan provided early feedback that shaped the direction of the specification. This profile was discussed at length during the OAuth Security Workshop 2019, with several individuals contributing ideas and feedback. The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of:

John Bradley, Brian Campbell Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Torsten Lodderstedt, Nat Sakimura, Hannes Tschofenig and everyone who actively participated in the unconference discussions.

Appendix B. Document History

[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

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- Initial draft to define a JWT profile for OAuth 2.0 access tokens.

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OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-01

Abstract

OAuth 2.0 authorization requests from browser-based apps must be made using the authorization code grant with the PKCE extension, and should not be issued a client secret when registered.

This specification details the security considerations that must be taken into account when developing browser-based applications, as well as best practices for how they can securely implement OAuth 2.0.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This specification describes the current best practices for implementing OAuth 2.0 authorization flows in applications running entirely in a browser.

For native application developers using OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect, an IETF BCP (best current practice) was published that guides integration of these technologies. This document is formally known as [RFC8252] or BCP 212, but nicknamed "AppAuth" after the OpenID Foundation-sponsored set of libraries that assist developers in adopting these practices.

AppAuth steers developers away from performing user authorization via embedding user agents such as browser controls into native apps, instead insisting that an external agent (such as the system browser) be used. The RFC continues on to promote capabilities and supplemental specifications beyond the base OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect specifications to improve baseline security, such as [RFC7636], also known as PKCE.

OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps addresses the similarities between implementing OAuth for native apps as well as browser-based apps, and includes additional considerations when running in a browser. This is primarily focused on OAuth, except where OpenID Connect provides additional considerations.

2. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

In addition to the terms defined in referenced specifications, this document uses the following terms:

"OAuth": In this document, "OAuth" refers to OAuth 2.0, [RFC6749].

"Browser-based application": An application that is dynamically downloaded and executed in a web browser, usually written in JavaScript. Also sometimes referred to as a "single-page application", or "SPA".
4. Overview

For authorizing users within a browser-based application, the best current practice is to

- Use the OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow with the PKCE extension
- Use the OAuth 2.0 state parameter to carry one-time use CSRF tokens
- Recommend exact matching of redirect URIs, and require the hostname of the redirect URI match the hostname of the URL the app was served from
- Do not return access tokens in the front channel

Since the publication of OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749, browsers have broadly adopted the concept of CORS, enabling the ability for JavaScript applications to make cross-domain requests. During the time RFC 6749 was originally being written, browsers did not have wide support, so it was not possible to require browsers to use the authorization code flow, so the implicit flow was developed instead.

There are several drawbacks to the implicit flow, including the fact that access tokens are returned in the front-channel via the fragment part of the redirect URI, and as such are vulnerable to a variety of attacks where the access token can be intercepted or stolen. See Section 9.8 for a deeper analysis of these attacks and the drawbacks of using the implicit flow in browsers, many of which are described by [oauth-security-topics].

Now, thanks to the wide adoption of CORS, browser-based apps can perform the OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow and make a POST request to the token endpoint to exchange an authorization code for an access token, just like other OAuth clients. This ensures that access tokens are not sent via the less secure front-channel, and are only returned over an HTTPS connection initiated from the application. Combined with PKCE, this enables the authorization server to ensure that authorization codes are useless even if intercepted in transport.

Historically, the Implicit flow provided an advantage to single-page apps since JavaScript could always arbitrarily read and manipulate the fragment portion of the URL without triggering a page reload. Now with the Session History API (described in "Session history and navigation" of [HTML]), browsers have a mechanism to modify the path component of the URL without triggering a page reload, so this overloaded use of the fragment portion is no longer needed.
5. First-Party Applications

While OAuth and OpenID Connect were initially created to allow third-party applications to access an API on behalf of a user, they have both proven to be useful in a first-party scenario as well. First-party apps are applications where the same organization that provides the API being accessed by the application.

For example, a web email client provided by the operator of the email account, or a mobile banking application created by bank itself. (Note that there is no requirement that the application actually be developed by the same company; a mobile banking application developed by a contractor that is branded as the bank’s application is still considered a first-party application.) The first-party app consideration is about the user’s relationship to the application and the service.

To conform to this best practice, first-party applications using OAuth or OpenID Connect MUST use an OAuth Authorization Code flow as described later in this document or use the OAuth Password grant.

It is strongly RECOMMENDED that applications use the Authorization Code flow over the Password grant for several reasons. By redirecting to the authorization server, this provides the authorization server the opportunity to prompt the user for multi-factor authentication options, take advantage of single-sign-on sessions, or use third-party identity providers. In contrast, the Password grant does not provide any built-in mechanism for these, and must be extended with custom code.

6. Architectural Considerations

In some cases, it may make sense to avoid the use of a strictly browser-based OAuth application entirely, and instead use an architecture that keeps OAuth access tokens out of the browser.

6.1. Apps Served from a Common Domain as the API

For simple system architectures, such as when the JavaScript application is served from a domain that can share cookies with the API’s (resource server’s) domain, it is likely a better decision to avoid using OAuth entirely, and just use session authentication to communicate with the API.

OAuth and OpenID Connect provide very little benefit in this deployment scenario, so it is recommended to reconsider whether you need OAuth or OpenID Connect at all in this case. Session authentication has the benefit of having fewer moving parts and fewer
attack vectors. OAuth and OpenID Connect were created primarily for third-party or federated access to APIs, so may not be the best solution in a same-domain scenario.

6.2. Browser-Based App with a Backend Component

To avoid the risks inherent in handling OAuth access tokens from a purely browser-based application, implementations may wish to move the authorization code exchange and handling of access and refresh tokens into a backend component.

Security of the connection between code running in the browser and this backend component is assumed to utilize browser-level protection mechanisms. Details are out of scope of this document, but many recommendations can be found at the OWASP Foundation (https://www.owasp.org/).

In this scenario, the backend component may be a confidential client which has the ability to authenticate itself. Despite this, there are still some ways in which this application is effectively a public client, as the end result is the application’s code is still running in the browser and visible to the user. Some authorization servers may have different policies for public and confidential clients, and this type of hybrid approach does not provide all the assurances of confidential clients that an authorization server is expecting. Authorization servers may wish to treat this type of deployment as a public client.


Public browser-based apps needing user authorization create an authorization request URI with the authorization code grant type per Section 4.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], using a redirect URI capable of being received by the app.

7.1. Initiating the Authorization Request from a Browser-Based Application

Public browser-based apps MUST implement the Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE [RFC7636]) extension to OAuth, and authorization servers MUST support PKCE for such clients.

The PKCE extension prevents an attack where the authorization code is intercepted and exchanged for an access token by a malicious client, by providing the authorization server with a way to verify the same client instance that exchanges the authorization code is the same one that initiated the flow.
Browser-based apps MUST use the OAuth 2.0 "state" parameter to protect themselves against Cross-Site Request Forgery and authorization code swap attacks and MUST use a unique value for each authorization request, and MUST verify the returned state in the authorization response matches the original state the app created.

7.2. Handling the Authorization Code Redirect

Authorization servers SHOULD require an exact match of a registered redirect URI.

If an authorization server wishes to provide some flexibility in redirect URI usage to clients, it MAY require that only the hostname component of the redirect URI match the hostname of the URL the application is served from.

Authorization servers MUST support one of the two redirect URI validation mechanisms as described above.

8. Refresh Tokens

Refresh tokens provide a way for applications to obtain a new access token when the initial access token expires. [oauth-security-topics] describes some additional requirements around refresh tokens on top of the recommendations of [RFC6749].

For public clients, the risk of a leaked refresh token is much greater than leaked access tokens, since an attacker can potentially continue using the stoken refresh token to obtain new access without being detectable by the authorization server. Additionally, browser-based applications provide many attack vectors by which a refresh token can be leaked. As such, these applications are considered a higher risk for handling refresh tokens.

Authorization servers SHOULD NOT issue refresh tokens to browser-based applications.

If an authorization server does choose to issue refresh tokens to browser-based applications, then it MUST issue a new refresh token with every access token refresh response. Doing this mitigates the risk of a leaked refresh token, as a leaked refresh token can be detected if both the attacker and the legitimate client attempt to use the same refresh token. Authorization servers MUST follow the additional refresh token replay mitigation techniques described in [oauth-security-topics].
9. Security Considerations

9.1. Registration of Browser-Based Apps

Browser-based applications are considered public clients as defined by section 2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], and MUST be registered with the authorization server as such. Authorization servers MUST record the client type in the client registration details in order to identify and process requests accordingly.

Authorization servers MUST require that browser-based applications register one or more redirect URIs.

9.2. Client Authentication

Since a browser-based application’s source code is delivered to the end-user’s browser, it cannot contain provisioned secrets. As such, a browser-based app with native OAuth support is considered a public client as defined by Section 2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].

Secrets that are statically included as part of an app distributed to multiple users should not be treated as confidential secrets, as one user may inspect their copy and learn the shared secret. For this reason, and those stated in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC6819], it is NOT RECOMMENDED for authorization servers to require client authentication of browser-based applications using a shared secret, as this serves little value beyond client identification which is already provided by the client_id request parameter.

Authorization servers that still require a statically included shared secret for SPA clients MUST treat the client as a public client, and not accept the secret as proof of the client’s identity. Without additional measures, such clients are subject to client impersonation (see Section 9.3 below).

9.3. Client Impersonation

As stated in Section 10.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the authorization server SHOULD NOT process authorization requests automatically without user consent or interaction, except when the identity of the client can be assured. Even when the user has previously approved an authorization request for a given client_id, the request SHOULD be processed as if no previous request had been approved, unless the identity of the client can be proven.

If authorization servers restrict redirect URIs to a fixed set of absolute HTTPS URIs without wildcard domains, paths, or query string components, this exact match of registered absolute HTTPS URIs MAY be
accepted by authorization servers as proof of identity of the client for the purpose of deciding whether to automatically process an authorization request when a previous request for the client_id has already been approved.

9.4. Cross-Site Request Forgery Protections

Section 5.3.5 of [RFC6819] recommends using the "state" parameter to link client requests and responses to prevent CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) attacks. To conform to this best practice, use of the "state" parameter is REQUIRED, as described in Section 7.1.

9.5. Authorization Server Mix-Up Mitigation

The security considerations around the authorization server mix-up that are referenced in Section 8.10 of [RFC8252] also apply to browser-based apps.

Clients MUST use a unique redirect URI for each authorization server used by the application. The client MUST store the redirect URI along with the session data (e.g. along with "state") and MUST verify that the URI on which the authorization response was received exactly matches.

9.6. Cross-Domain Requests

To complete the authorization code flow, the browser-based application will need to exchange the authorization code for an access token at the token endpoint. If the authorization server provides additional endpoints to the application, such as metadata URLs, dynamic client registration, revocation, introspection, discovery or user info endpoints, these endpoints may also be accessed by the browser-based app. Since these requests will be made from a browser, authorization servers MUST support the necessary CORS headers (defined in [Fetch]) to allow the browser to make the request.

This specification does not include guidelines for deciding whether a CORS policy for the token endpoint should be a wildcard origin or more restrictive. Note, however, that the browser will attempt to GET or POST to the API endpoint before knowing any CORS policy; it simply hides the succeeding or failing result from JavaScript if the policy does not allow sharing. If POSTs in particular from unsupported single-page applications are to be rejected as errors per authorization server security policy, such rejection is typically done based on the Origin request header.
9.7. Content-Security Policy

A browser-based application that wishes to use either long-lived refresh tokens or privileged scopes SHOULD restrict its JavaScript execution to a set of statically hosted scripts via a Content Security Policy ([CSP2]) or similar mechanism. A strong Content Security Policy can limit the potential attack vectors for malicious JavaScript to be executed on the page.

9.8. OAuth Implicit Grant Authorization Flow

The OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant authorization flow (defined in Section 4.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]) works by receiving an access token in the HTTP redirect (front-channel) immediately without the code exchange step. In this case, the access token is returned in the fragment part of the redirect URI, providing an attacker with several opportunities to intercept and steal the access token. Several attacks on the implicit flow are described by [RFC6819] and [oauth-security-topics], not all of which have sufficient mitigation strategies.

9.8.1. Threat: Interception of the Redirect URI

If an attacker is able to cause the authorization response to be sent to a URI under his control, he will directly get access to the fragment carrying the access token. A method of performing this attack is described in detail in [oauth-security-topics].

9.8.2. Threat: Access Token Leak in Browser History

An attacker could obtain the access token from the browser’s history. The countermeasures recommended by [RFC6819] are limited to using short expiration times for tokens, and indicating that browsers should not cache the response. Neither of these fully prevent this attack, they only reduce the potential damage.

Additionally, many browsers now also sync browser history to cloud services and to multiple devices, providing an even wider attack surface to extract access tokens out of the URL.

9.8.3. Threat: Manipulation of Scripts

An attacker could modify the page or inject scripts into the browser via various means, including when the browser’s HTTPS connection is being man-in-the-middled by for example a corporate network. While this type of attack is typically out of scope of basic security recommendations to prevent, in the case of browser-based apps it is
much easier to perform this kind of attack, where an injected script can suddenly have access to everything on the page.

The risk of a malicious script running on the page is far greater when the application uses a known standard way of obtaining access tokens, namely that the attacker can always look at the window.location to find an access token. This threat profile is very different compared to an attacker specifically targeting an individual application by knowing where or how an access token obtained via the authorization code flow may end up being stored.

9.8.4. Threat: Access Token Leak to Third Party Scripts

It is relatively common to use third-party scripts in browser-based apps, such as analytics tools, crash reporting, and even things like a Facebook or Twitter "like" button. In these situations, the author of the application may not be able to be fully aware of the entirety of the code running in the application. When an access token is returned in the fragment, it is visible to any third-party scripts on the page.

9.8.5. Countermeasures

In addition to the countermeasures described by [RFC6819] and [oauth-security-topics], using the authorization code with PKCE avoids these attacks.

When PKCE is used, if an authorization code is stolen in transport, the attacker is unable to do anything with the authorization code.

9.8.6. Disadvantages of the Implicit Flow

There are several additional reasons the Implicit flow is disadvantageous compared to using the standard Authorization Code flow.

- OAuth 2.0 provides no mechanism for a client to verify that an access token was issued to it, which could lead to misuse and possible impersonation attacks if a malicious party hands off an access token it retrieved through some other means to the client.

- Returning an access token in the front channel redirect gives the authorization server little assurance that the access token will actually end up at the application, since there are many ways this redirect may fail or be intercepted.

- Supporting the implicit flow requires additional code, more upkeep and understanding of the related security considerations, while
limiting the authorization server to just the authorization code flow reduces the attack surface of the implementation.

- If the JavaScript application gets wrapped into a native app, then [RFC8252] also requires the use of the authorization code flow with PKCE anyway.

In OpenID Connect, the id_token is sent in a known format (as a JWT), and digitally signed. Performing OpenID Connect using the authorization code flow also provides the additional benefit of the client not needing to verify the JWT signature, as the token will have been fetched over an HTTPS connection directly from the authorization server. However, returning an id_token using the Implicit flow requires the client validate the JWT signature, as malicious parties could otherwise craft and supply fraudulent id_tokens.

9.8.7. Historic Note

Historically, the Implicit flow provided an advantage to single-page apps since JavaScript could always arbitrarily read and manipulate the fragment portion of the URL without triggering a page reload. Now with the Session History API (described in "Session history and navigation" of [HTML]), browsers have a mechanism to modify the path component of the URL without triggering a page reload, so this overloaded use of the fragment portion is no longer needed.

9.9. Additional Security Considerations

The OWASP Foundation (https://www.owasp.org/) maintains a set of security recommendations and best practices for web applications, and it is RECOMMENDED to follow these best practices when creating an OAuth 2.0 Browser-Based application.

10. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA actions.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Server Support Checklist

OAuth servers that support browser-based apps MUST:

1. Require "https" scheme redirect URIs.

2. Require exact matching on redirect URIs or matching the hostname the application is served from.

3. Support PKCE [RFC7636]. Required to protect authorization code grants sent to public clients. See Section 7.1

4. Support cross-domain requests at the token endpoint in order to allow browsers to make the authorization code exchange request. See Section 9.6
5. Not assume that browser-based clients can keep a secret, and SHOULD NOT issue secrets to applications of this type.

Appendix B. Document History

[[] To be removed from the final specification ]]

-01

- Incorporated feedback from Torsten Lodderstedt
- Updated abstract
- Clarified the definition of browser-based apps to not exclude applications cached in the browser, e.g. via Service Workers
- Clarified use of the state parameter for CSRF protection
- Added background information about the original reason the implicit flow was created due to lack of CORS support
- Clarified the same-domain use case where the SPA and API share a cookie domain
- Moved historic note about the fragment URL into the Overview

Appendix C. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the work of William Denniss and John Bradley, whose recommendation for native apps informed many of the best practices for browser-based applications. The authors would also like to thank Hannes Tschofenig and Torsten Lodderstedt, the attendees of the Internet Identity Workshop 27 session at which this BCP was originally proposed, and the following individuals who contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that shaped and formed the final specification:


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JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection

draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-03

Abstract

This draft proposes an additional JSON Web Token (JWT) based response for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] specifies a method for a protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to determine the state of an access token and obtain data associated with the access token. This allows deployments to implement identifier-based access tokens in an interoperable way.

The introspection response, as specified in OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662], is a plain JSON object. However, there are use cases where the resource server requires stronger assurance that the authorization server issued the access token, including cases where the authorization server assumes liability for the token’s content. An example is a resource server using verified person data to create certificates, which in turn are used to create qualified electronic signatures.

In such use cases it may be useful or even required to return a signed JWT as the introspection response. This specification extends the token introspection endpoint with the capability to return responses as JWTs.
2. Requesting a JWT Response

A resource server requests to receive a JWT introspection response by including an Accept header with content type "application/jwt" in the introspection request.

The following is a non-normative example request:

POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Accept: application/jwt
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

   token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA

3. JWT Response

The introspection endpoint responds with a JWT, setting the Content-Type header to "application/jwt".

This JWT MUST contain the claims "iss" and "aud" in order to prevent misuse of the JWT as ID or access token (see Section 6.1).

This JWT MAY furthermore contain all other claims described in Section 2.2. of [RFC7662] and beyond (e.g. as defined in [OpenID.Core]).

The following is a non-normative example response (with line breaks for display purposes only):

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/jwt

eyJraWQiOiIxIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJzdWIiOiJaNU8zdXBQQzg4UXJBa
ngwMGXrGycySmIFZCI6ImU0dHBzOiwiXc9wcm92ZXJvdW5kJW02ZXRcL
3Jic291cmNlIiwiXz0wXzozODQxZmU5JiIiXjoiY2xiY2xibWkiXjoiY2xiY2xibWki
Guo1jyZWFkIiIiXjoiY2xiY2xibWkiXjoiY2xiY2xibWki

The example response contains the following JSON document:
Depending on the specific resource server policy the JWT is either signed, or signed and encrypted. If the JWT is signed and encrypted it MUST be a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519].

Note: If the resource server policy requires a signed and encrypted response and the authorization server receives an unauthenticated request containing an Accept header with content type other than "application/jwt", it MUST refuse to serve the request and return an HTTP status code 400. This is done to prevent downgrading attacks to obtain token data intended for release to legitimate recipients only (see Section 6.2).

4. Client Metadata

The authorization server determines what algorithm to employ to secure the JWT for a particular introspection response. This decision can be based on registered metadata parameters for the resource server, supplied via dynamic client registration with the resource server posing as the client, as defined by this draft.

The parameter names follow the pattern established by OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration [OpenID.Registration] for configuring signing and encryption algorithms for JWT responses at the UserInfo endpoint.

The following client metadata parameters are introduced by this specification:

introspection_signed_response_alg  JWS [RFC7515] "alg" algorithm JWA
[ RFC7518] REQUIRED for signing introspection responses. If this is specified, the response will be signed using JWS and the configured algorithm. The default, if omitted, is "RS256".
introspection_encrypted_response_alg  JWE [RFC7516] "alg" algorithm
JWA [RFC7518] REQUIRED for encrypting introspection
responses. If both signing and encryption are requested, the
response will be signed then encrypted, with the result being
a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519]. The default, if
omitted, is that no encryption is performed.

introspection_encrypted_response_enc  JWE [RFC7516] "enc" algorithm
JWA [RFC7518] REQUIRED for encrypting introspection
responses. If "introspection_encrypted_response_alg" is
specified, the default for this value is A128CBC-HS256. When
"introspection_encrypted_response_enc" is included,
"introspection_encrypted_response_alg" MUST also be provided.

Resource servers may register their public encryption keys using the
"jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters.

5. Authorization Server Metadata

Authorization servers SHOULD publish the supported algorithms for
signing and encrypting the JWT of an introspection response by
utilizing OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414]
parameters.

The following parameters are introduced by this specification:

introspection_signing_alg_values_supported  OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWS [RFC7515] signing algorithms
("alg" values) JWA [RFC7518] supported by the introspection
endpoint to sign the response.

introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported  OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms
("alg" values) JWA [RFC7518] supported by the introspection
endpoint to encrypt the response.

introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported  OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms
("enc" values) JWA [RFC7518] supported by the introspection
endpoint to encrypt the response.

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Cross-JWT Confusion

JWT introspection responses and OpenID Connect ID Tokens are
syntactically similar. An attacker could therefore attempt to
impersonate an end-user at an OpenID Connect relying party by passing the JWT as an ID token.

Such an attack can be prevented like any other token substitution attack. The authorization server MUST include the claims "iss" and "aud" in each JWT introspection response, with the "iss" value set to the authorization server’s issuer URL and the "aud" value set to the resource server’s identifier. This allows a correctly implemented OpenID Connect relying party to detect substitution by checking the "iss" and "aud" claims as described in Section 3.1.3.7. of [OpenID.Core]. Relying parties SHOULD also use and check the "nonce" parameter and claim to prevent token and code replay.

Resource servers utilizing JWTs to represent structured access tokens could be susceptible to replay attacks. Resource servers should therefore apply proper counter measures against replay as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], section 2.2.

JWT Confusion and other attacks involving JWTs are discussed in [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp].

6.2. Token Data Leakage

If the authorization server supports unauthenticated requests an attacker could potentially retrieve token data which must be kept confidential. This attack can be prevented by either authenticating any request to the token introspection endpoint or by setting up the respective recipient for encrypted responses.

In the latter case, confidentiality is ensured by the fact that only the legitimate recipient is able to decrypt the response. An attacker could try to circumvent this measure by requesting a plain JSON response, using an Accept header with the content type set to, for example, "application/json" instead of "application/jwt". To prevent this attack the authorization server MUST NOT serve requests with content type other than "application/jwt" if the resource server is set up to receive encrypted responses (see also Section 3).

7. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Petteri Stenius, Neil Madden, Filip Skokan, and Tony Nadalin for their valuable feedback.

8. IANA Considerations
8.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration

This specification requests registration of the following client metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]:

8.1.1. Registry Contents

- Client Metadata Name: "introspection_signed_response_alg"
  - Client Metadata Description: String value indicating the client’s desired introspection response signing algorithm.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]]

- Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_alg"
  - Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired introspection response encryption algorithm (alg value).
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]]

- Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_enc"
  - Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired introspection response encryption algorithm (enc value).
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]]

8.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

This specification requests registration of the following values in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].

8.2.1. Registry Contents

- Metadata Name: "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported"
  - Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms supported by the authorization server for introspection response signing.

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8.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response

This specification requests registration of the following claim values as defined in [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1, in the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry. [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].

8.3.1. Registry Contents

- Name: "name"
  - Description: End-User’s full name in displayable form including all name parts, possibly including titles and suffixes, ordered according to the End-User’s locale and preferences.

- Name: "given_name"
  - Description: Given name(s) or first name(s) of the End-User. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple given names; all
can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.

- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
- **Name:** "family_name"
- **Description:** Surname(s) or last name(s) of the End-User. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple family names or no family name; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.

- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
- **Name:** "middle_name"
- **Description:** Middle name(s) of the End-User. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple middle names; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters. Also note that in some cultures, middle names are not used.

- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
- **Name:** "nickname"
- **Description:** Casual name of the End-User that may or may not be the same as the given_name. For instance, a nickname value of Mike might be returned alongside a given_name value of Michael.

- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
- **Name:** "preferred_username"
- **Description:** Shorthand name by which the End-User wishes to be referred to at the RP, such as janedoe or j.doe. This value MAY be any valid JSON string including special characters such as @, /, or whitespace.

- **Change Controller:** IESG
o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "profile"

o Description: URL of the End-User’s profile page. The contents of this Web page SHOULD be about the End-User.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "picture"

o Description: URL of the End-User’s profile picture. This URL MUST refer to an image file (for example, a PNG, JPEG, or GIF image file), rather than to a Web page containing an image. Note that this URL SHOULD specifically reference a profile photo of the End-User suitable for displaying when describing the End-User, rather than an arbitrary photo taken by the End-User.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "website"

o Description: URL of the End-User’s Web page or blog. This Web page SHOULD contain information published by the End-User or an organization that the End-User is affiliated with.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "email"

o Description: End-User’s preferred e-mail address. Its value MUST conform to the RFC 5322 [RFC5322] addr-spec syntax.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "email_verified"

o Description: True if the End-User’s e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false. When this Claim Value is true, this means that the OP took affirmative steps to ensure that this
e-mail address was controlled by the End-User at the time the verification was performed. The means by which an e-mail address is verified is context-specific, and dependent upon the trust framework or contractual agreements within which the parties are operating.

- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

- Name: "gender"
  - Description: End-User’s gender. Values defined by this specification are female and male. Other values MAY be used when neither of the defined values are applicable.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

- Name: "birthdate"
  - Description: Time the End-User’s information was last updated. Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

- Name: "zoneinfo"
  - Description: String from zoneinfo [zoneinfo] time zone database representing the End-User’s time zone. For example, Europe/Paris or America/Los_Angeles.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

- Name: "locale"
  - Description: Time the End-User’s information was last updated. Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
  - Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "phone_number"

o Description: End-User’s preferred telephone number. E.164 [E.164] is RECOMMENDED as the format of this Claim, for example, +1 (425) 555-1212 or +56 (2) 687 2400. If the phone number contains an extension, it is RECOMMENDED that the extension be represented using the RFC 3966 [RFC3966] extension syntax, for example, +1 (604) 555-1234;ext=5678.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "phone_number_verified"

o Description: True if the End-User’s phone number has been verified; otherwise false. When this Claim Value is true, this means that the OP took affirmative steps to ensure that this phone number was controlled by the End-User at the time the verification was performed. The means by which a phone number is verified is context-specific, and dependent upon the trust framework or contractual agreements within which the parties are operating. When true, the phone_number Claim MUST be in E.164 format and any extensions MUST be represented in RFC 3966 format.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "address"

o Description: End-User’s preferred postal address. The value of the address member is a JSON [RFC4627] structure containing some or all of the members defined in [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1.1.

o Change Controller: IESG

o Specification Document(s): [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1

o Name: "updated_at"

o Description: Time the End-User’s information was last updated. Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:00Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.

o Change Controller: IESG
9. References

9.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]

[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]

[OpenID.Core]

[OpenID.Registration]


9.2. Informative References

[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

-03

o added registration for OpenID Connect Standard Claims to OAuth Token Introspection Response registry

-02

o updated references

-01

o adapted wording to preclude any accept header except "application/jwt" if encrypted responses are required

o use registered alg value RS256 for default signing algorithm
o added text on claims in the token introspection response
-00

o initial version of the WG draft

o defined default signing algorithm

o changed behavior in case resource server is set up for encryption

o Added text on token data leakage prevention to the security considerations

o moved Security Considerations section forward

WG draft
-01

o fixed typos in client meta data field names

o added OAuth Server Metadata parameters to publish algorithms supported for signing and encrypting the introspection response

o added registration of new parameters for OAuth Server Metadata and Client Registration

o added explicit request for JWT introspection response

o made iss and aud claims mandatory in introspection response

o Stylistic and clarifying edits, updates references

-00

o initial version

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OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-14

Abstract

This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client’s mutual TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] enables third-party client applications to obtain delegated access to protected resources. In the prototypical abstract OAuth flow, illustrated in Figure 1, the client obtains an access token from an entity known as an authorization server and then uses that token when accessing protected resources, such as HTTPS APIs.

+--------+                                 +---------------+
|        |                                 |               |
|        |<--(A)-- Get an access token --->| Authorization |
|        |                                 |     Server    |
|        |                                 |               |
|        |                                 +---------------+
|        |                                         ^
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         v
|        |<--(B)-- Use the access token -->|   Protected   |
|        |                                 |    Resource   |
|        |                                 |               |
|        |                                 +---------------+
|        |                                 |      (C)      |
|        |                                 |               |
|        |<--(C)-- Validate the access token ---+|               |
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         |
|        |                                         |

Figure 1: Abstract OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow
The flow illustrated in Figure 1 includes the following steps:

(A) The client makes an HTTPS "POST" request to the authorization server and presents a credential representing the authorization grant. For certain types of clients (those that have been issued or otherwise established a set of client credentials) the request must be authenticated. In the response, the authorization server issues an access token to the client.

(B) The client includes the access token when making a request to access a protected resource.

(C) The protected resource validates the access token in order to authorize the request. In some cases, such as when the token is self-contained and cryptographically secured, the validation can be done locally by the protected resource. While other cases require that the protected resource call out to the authorization server to determine the state of the token and obtain meta-information about it.

Layering on the abstract flow above, this document standardizes enhanced security options for OAuth 2.0 utilizing client certificate based mutual TLS. Section 2 provides options for authenticating the request in step (A). While step (C) is supported with semantics to express the binding of the token to the client certificate for both local and remote processing in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 respectively. This ensures that, as described in Section 3, protected resource access in step (B) is only possible by the legitimate client bearing the access token and holding the private key corresponding to the certificate.

OAuth 2.0 defines a shared secret method of client authentication but also allows for definition and use of additional client authentication mechanisms when interacting directly with the authorization server. This document describes an additional mechanism of client authentication utilizing mutual TLS certificate-based authentication, which provides better security characteristics than shared secrets. While [RFC6749] documents client authentication for requests to the token endpoint, extensions to OAuth 2.0 (such as Introspection [RFC7662], Revocation [RFC7009], and the Backchannel Authentication Endpoint in [OpenID.CIBA]) define endpoints that also utilize client authentication and the mutual TLS methods defined herein are applicable to those endpoints as well.

Mutual TLS certificate-bound access tokens ensure that only the party in possession of the private key corresponding to the certificate can utilize the token to access the associated resources. Such a constraint is sometimes referred to as key confirmation, proof-of-
possess, or holder-of-key and is unlike the case of the bearer
token described in [RFC6750], where any party in possession of the
access token can use it to access the associated resources. Binding
an access token to the client’s certificate prevents the use of
stolen access tokens or replay of access tokens by unauthorized
parties.

Mutual TLS certificate-bound access tokens and mutual TLS client
authentication are distinct mechanisms, which are complementary but
don’t necessarily need to be deployed or used together.

1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

Throughout this document the term "mutual TLS" refers to the process
whereby a client presents its X.509 certificate and proves possession
of the corresponding private key to a server when negotiating a TLS
session. In contemporary versions of TLS [RFC8446] [RFC5246] this
requires that the client send the Certificate and CertificateVerify
messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the
CertificateVerify and Finished messages.

2. Mutual TLS for OAuth Client Authentication

This section defines, as an extension of OAuth 2.0, Section 2.3
[RFC6749], two distinct methods of using mutual TLS X.509 client
certificates as client credentials. The requirement of mutual TLS
for client authentication is determined by the authorization server
based on policy or configuration for the given client (regardless of
whether the client was dynamically registered, statically configured,
or otherwise established).

In order to utilize TLS for OAuth client authentication, the TLS
connection between the client and the authorization server MUST have
been established or reestablished with mutual TLS X.509 certificate
authentication (i.e. the Client Certificate and Certificate Verify
messages are sent during the TLS Handshake).

For all requests to the authorization server utilizing mutual TLS
client authentication, the client MUST include the "client_id"
parameter, described in OAuth 2.0, Section 2.2 [RFC6749]. The
presence of the "client_id" parameter enables the authorization server to easily identify the client independently from the content of the certificate. The authorization server can locate the client configuration using the client identifier and check the certificate presented in the TLS Handshake against the expected credentials for that client. The authorization server MUST enforce the binding between client and certificate as described in either Section 2.1 or Section 2.2 below.

2.1. PKI Mutual TLS Method

The PKI (public key infrastructure) method of mutual TLS OAuth client authentication adheres to the way in which X.509 certificates are traditionally used for authentication. It relies on a validated certificate chain [RFC5280] and a single subject distinguished name (DN) or a single subject alternative name (SAN) to authenticate the client. Only one subject name value of any type is used for each client. The TLS handshake is utilized to validate the client's possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate and to validate the corresponding certificate chain. The client is successfully authenticated if the subject information in the certificate matches the single expected subject configured or registered for that particular client (note that a predictable treatment of DN values, such as the distinguishedNameMatch rule from [RFC4517], is needed in comparing the certificate’s subject DN to the client's registered DN). Revocation checking is possible with the PKI method but if and how to check a certificate’s revocation status is a deployment decision at the discretion of the authorization server. Clients can rotate their X.509 certificates without the need to modify the respective authentication data at the authorization server by obtaining a new certificate with the same subject from a trusted certificate authority (CA).

2.1.1. PKI Method Metadata Value

For the PKI method of mutual TLS client authentication, this specification defines and registers the following authentication method metadata value into the "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters].

\texttt{tls\_client\_auth}

Indicates that client authentication to the authorization server will occur with mutual TLS utilizing the PKI method of associating a certificate to a client.
2.1.2. Client Registration Metadata

In order to convey the expected subject of the certificate, the following metadata parameters are introduced for the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [RFC7591] in support of the PKI method of mutual TLS client authentication. A client using the "tls_client_auth" authentication method MUST use exactly one of the below metadata parameters to indicate the certificate subject value that the authorization server is to expect when authenticating the respective client.

**tls_client_auth_subject_dn**
An [RFC4514] string representation of the expected subject distinguished name of the certificate, which the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication.

**tls_client_auth_san_dns**
A string containing the value of an expected dNSName SAN entry in the certificate, which the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication.

**tls_client_auth_san_uri**
A string containing the value of an expected uniformResourceIdentifier SAN entry in the certificate, which the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication.

**tls_client_auth_san_ip**
A string representation of an IP address in either dotted decimal notation (for IPv4) or colon-delimited hexadecimal (for IPv6, as defined in [RFC4291] section 2.2) that is expected to be present as an iPAddress SAN entry in the certificate, which the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication.

**tls_client_auth_san_email**
A string containing the value of an expected rfc822Name SAN entry in the certificate, which the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication.

2.2. Self-Signed Certificate Mutual TLS Method

This method of mutual TLS OAuth client authentication is intended to support client authentication using self-signed certificates. As pre-requisite, the client registers its X.509 certificates (using "jwks" defined in [RFC7591]) or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates (using "jwks_uri" from [RFC7591]) with the authorization server. During authentication, TLS is utilized to validate the client’s possession of the private key corresponding to the public key presented within the certificate in the respective TLS handshake.
In contrast to the PKI method, the client’s certificate chain is not validated by the server in this case. The client is successfully authenticated if the certificate that it presented during the handshake matches one of the certificates configured or registered for that particular client. The Self-Signed Certificate method allows the use of mutual TLS to authenticate clients without the need to maintain a PKI. When used in conjunction with a "jwks_uri" for the client, it also allows the client to rotate its X.509 certificates without the need to change its respective authentication data directly with the authorization server.

2.2.1. Self-Signed Method Metadata Value

For the Self-Signed Certificate method of mutual TLS client authentication, this specification defines and registers the following authentication method metadata value into the "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters].

`self_signed_tls_client_auth`

Indicates that client authentication to the authorization server will occur using mutual TLS with the client utilizing a self-signed certificate.

2.2.2. Client Registration Metadata

For the Self-Signed Certificate method of binding a certificate with a client using mutual TLS client authentication, the existing "jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters from [RFC7591] are used to convey the client’s certificates via JSON Web Key (JWK) in a JWK Set (JWKS) [RFC7517]. The "jwks" metadata parameter is a JWK Set containing the client’s public keys as an array of JWKs while the "jwks_uri" parameter is a URL that references a client’s JWKS. A certificate is represented with the "x5c" parameter of an individual JWK within the set. Note that the members of the JWK representing the public key (e.g. "n" and "e" for RSA, "x" and "y" for EC) are required parameters per [RFC7518] so will be present even though they are not utilized in this context. Also note that the sec 4.7 of [RFC7517] requires that the key in the first certificate of the "x5c" parameter match the public key represented by those other members of the JWKS.


When mutual TLS is used by the client on the connection to the token endpoint, the authorization server is able to bind the issued access token to the client certificate. Such a binding is accomplished by associating the certificate with the token in a way that can be accessed by the protected resource, such as embedding the certificate
hash in the issued access token directly, using the syntax described in Section 3.1, or through token introspection as described in Section 3.2. Binding the access token to the client certificate in that fashion has the benefit of decoupling that binding from the client’s authentication with the authorization server, which enables mutual TLS during protected resource access to serve purely as a proof-of-possession mechanism. Other methods of associating a certificate with an access token are possible, per agreement by the authorization server and the protected resource, but are beyond the scope of this specification.

The client makes protected resource requests as described in [RFC6750], however, those requests MUST be made over a mutually authenticated TLS connection using the same certificate that was used for mutual TLS at the token endpoint.

The protected resource MUST obtain, from its TLS implementation layer, the client certificate used for mutual TLS and MUST verify that the certificate matches the certificate associated with the access token. If they do not match, the resource access attempt MUST be rejected with an error per [RFC6750] using an HTTP 401 status code and the "invalid_token" error code.

Metadata to convey server and client capabilities for mutual TLS client certificate-bound access tokens is defined in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 respectively.

3.1. JWT Certificate Thumbprint Confirmation Method

When access tokens are represented as JSON Web Tokens (JWT)[RFC7519], the certificate hash information SHOULD be represented using the "x5t#S256" confirmation method member defined herein.

To represent the hash of a certificate in a JWT, this specification defines the new JWT Confirmation Method [RFC7800] member "x5t#S256" for the X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint. The value of the "x5t#S256" member is a base64url-encoded [RFC4648] SHA-256 [SHS] hash (a.k.a. thumbprint, fingerprint or digest) of the DER encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280]. The base64url-encoded value MUST omit all trailing pad '=' characters and MUST NOT include any line breaks, whitespace, or other additional characters.

The following is an example of a JWT payload containing an "x5t#S256" certificate thumbprint confirmation method.
3.2.  Confirmation Method for Token Introspection

OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] defines a method for a protected resource to query an authorization server about the active state of an access token as well as to determine meta-information about the token.

For a mutual TLS client certificate-bound access token, the hash of the certificate to which the token is bound is conveyed to the protected resource as meta-information in a token introspection response. The hash is conveyed using the same "cnf" with "x5t#S256" member structure as the certificate SHA-256 thumbprint confirmation method, described in Section 3.1, as a top-level member of the introspection response JSON. The protected resource compares that certificate hash to a hash of the client certificate used for mutual TLS authentication and rejects the request, if they do not match.

The following is an example of an introspection response for an active token with an "x5t#S256" certificate thumbprint confirmation method.

```json
{
   "iss": "https://server.example.com",
   "sub": "ty.webb@example.com",
   "exp": 1493726400,
   "nbf": 1493722800,
   "cnf": {
      "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o91tc05O89jdN-dg2"
   }
}
```

Figure 2: Example JWT Claims Set with an X.509 Certificate Thumbprint Confirmation Method
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "active": true,
    "iss": "https://server.example.com",
    "sub": "ty.webb@example.com",
    "exp": 1493726400,
    "nbf": 1493722800,
    "cnf": {
        "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2"
    }
}

Figure 3: Example Introspection Response for a Certificate-Bound Access Token

3.3. Authorization Server Metadata

This document introduces the following new authorization server metadata parameter to signal the server’s capability to issue certificate bound access tokens:

tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens

OPTIONAL. Boolean value indicating server support for mutual TLS client certificate-bound access tokens. If omitted, the default value is "false".

3.4. Client Registration Metadata

The following new client metadata parameter is introduced to convey the client’s intention to use certificate bound access tokens:

tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens

OPTIONAL. Boolean value used to indicate the client’s intention to use mutual TLS client certificate-bound access tokens. If omitted, the default value is "false".

4. Public Clients and Certificate-Bound Tokens

Mutual TLS OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access tokens can be used independently of each other. Use of certificate-bound access tokens without mutual TLS OAuth client authentication, for example, is possible in support of binding access tokens to a TLS client certificate for public clients (those without authentication credentials associated with the "client_id"). The authorization server would configure the TLS stack in the same manner as for the Self-Signed Certificate method such that it does not verify that the
certificate presented by the client during the handshake is signed by a trusted CA. Individual instances of a client would create a self-signed certificate for mutual TLS with both the authorization server and resource server. The authorization server would not use the mutual TLS certificate to authenticate the client at the OAuth layer but would bind the issued access token to that certificate, for which the client has proven possession of the corresponding private key. The access token is then bound to the certificate and can only be used by the client possessing the certificate and corresponding private key and utilizing them to negotiate mutual TLS on connections to the resource server. When the authorization server issues a refresh token to such a client, it SHOULD also bind the refresh token to the respective certificate. And check the binding when the refresh token is presented to get new access tokens. The implementation details of the binding the refresh token are at the discretion of the authorization server.

5. Metadata for Mutual TLS Endpoint Aliases

The process of negotiating client certificate-based mutual TLS involves a TLS server requesting a certificate from the TLS client (the client does not provide one unsolicited). Although a server can be configured such that client certificates are optional, meaning that the connection is allowed to continue when the client does not provide a certificate, the act of a server requesting a certificate can result in undesirable behavior from some clients. This is particularly true of web browsers as TLS clients, which will typically present the end-user with an intrusive certificate selection interface when the server requests a certificate.

Authorization servers supporting both clients using mutual TLS and conventional clients MAY chose to isolate the server side mutual TLS behaviour to only clients intending to do mutual TLS, thus avoiding any undesirable effects it might have on conventional clients. The following authorization server metadata parameter is introduced to facilitate such separation:

mtls_endpoint_aliases
OPTIONAL. A JSON object containing alternative authorization server endpoints that, when present, an OAuth client intending to do mutual TLS uses in preference to the conventional endpoints. The parameter value itself consists of one or more endpoint parameters, such as "token_endpoint", "revocation_endpoint", "introspection_endpoint", etc., conventionally defined for the top-level of authorization server metadata. An OAuth client intending to do mutual TLS (for OAuth client authentication and/or to acquire or use certificate-bound tokens) when making a request directly to the authorization server MUST use the alias URL of the
endpoint within the "mtls_endpoint_aliases", when present, in preference to the endpoint URL of the same name at top-level of metadata. When an endpoint is not present in "mtls_endpoint_aliases", then the client uses the conventional endpoint URL defined at the top-level of the authorization server metadata. Metadata parameters within "mtls_endpoint_aliases" that do not define endpoints to which an OAuth client makes a direct request have no meaning and SHOULD be ignored.

Below is an example of an authorization server metadata document with the "mtls_endpoint_aliases" parameter, which indicates aliases for the token, revocation, and introspection endpoints that an OAuth client intending to do mutual TLS would in preference to the conventional token, revocation, and introspection endpoints. Note that the endpoints in "mtls_endpoint_aliases" use a different host than their conventional counterparts, which allows the authorization server (via SNI or actual distinct hosts) to differentiate its TLS behavior as appropriate.

```json
{
  "issuer": "https://server.example.com",
  "authorization_endpoint": "https://server.example.com/authz",
  "token_endpoint": "https://server.example.com/token",
  "introspection_endpoint": "https://server.example.com/introspect",
  "revocation_endpoint": "https://server.example.com/revo",
  "jwks_uri": "https://server.example.com/jwks",
  "response_types_supported": ["code"],
  "response_modes_supported": ["fragment","query","form_post"],
  "grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
  "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
    ["tls_client_auth","client_secret_basic","none"],
  "mtls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens": true
  "mtls_endpoint_aliases": {
    "token_endpoint": "https://mtls.example.com/token",
    "revocation_endpoint": "https://mtls.example.com/revo",
    "introspection_endpoint": "https://mtls.example.com/introspect"
  }
}
```

Figure 4: Example Authorization Server Metadata with Mutual TLS Endpoint Aliases

6. Implementation Considerations
6.1. Authorization Server

The authorization server needs to set up its TLS configuration appropriately for the OAuth client authentication methods it supports.

An authorization server that supports mutual TLS client authentication and other client authentication methods or public clients in parallel would make mutual TLS optional (i.e. allowing a handshake to continue after the server requests a client certificate but the client does not send one).

In order to support the Self-Signed Certificate method, the authorization server would configure the TLS stack in such a way that it does not verify whether the certificate presented by the client during the handshake is signed by a trusted CA certificate.

As described in Section 3, the authorization server binds the issued access token to the TLS client certificate, which means that it will only issue certificate-bound tokens for a certificate which the client has proven possession of the corresponding private key.

The authorization server may also consider hosting the token endpoint, and other endpoints requiring client authentication, on a separate host name or port in order to prevent unintended impact on the TLS behavior of its other endpoints, e.g. the authorization endpoint. As described in Section 5, it may further isolate any potential impact of the server requesting client certificates by offering a distinct set of endpoints on a separate host or port, which are aliases for the originals that a client intending to do mutual TLS will use in preference to the conventional endpoints.

6.2. Resource Server

OAuth divides the roles and responsibilities such that the resource server relies on the authorization server to perform client authentication and obtain resource owner (end-user) authorization. The resource server makes authorization decisions based on the access token presented by the client but does not directly authenticate the client per se. The manner in which an access token is bound to the client certificate decouples it from the specific method that the client used to authenticate with the authorization server. Mutual TLS during protected resource access can therefore serve purely as a proof-of-possession mechanism. As such, it is not necessary for the resource server to validate the trust chain of the client’s certificate in any of the methods defined in this document. The resource server would therefore configure the TLS stack in a way that
it does not verify whether the certificate presented by the client
during the handshake is signed by a trusted CA certificate.

6.3. Certificate Expiration and Bound Access Tokens

As described in Section 3, an access token is bound to a specific
client certificate, which means that the same certificate must be
used for mutual TLS on protected resource access. It also implies
that access tokens are invalidated when a client updates the
certificate, which can be handled similar to expired access tokens
where the client requests a new access token (typically with a
refresh token) and retries the protected resource request.

6.4. Implicit Grant Unsupported

This document describes binding an access token to the client
certificate presented on the TLS connection from the client to the
authorization server’s token endpoint, however, such binding of
access tokens issued directly from the authorization endpoint via the
implicit grant flow is explicitly out of scope. End users interact
directly with the authorization endpoint using a web browser and the
use of client certificates in user’s browsers bring operational and
usability issues, which make it undesirable to support certificate-
bound access tokens issued in the implicit grant flow.
Implementations wanting to employ certificate-bound access tokens
should utilize grant types that involve the client making an access
token request directly to the token endpoint (e.g. the authorization
code and refresh token grant types).

6.5. TLS Termination

An authorization server or resource server MAY choose to terminate
TLS connections at a load balancer, reverse proxy, or other network
intermediary. How the client certificate metadata is securely
communicated between the intermediary and the application server in
this case is out of scope of this specification.

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Certificate-Bound Refresh Tokens

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] requires that an
authorization server bind refresh tokens to the client to which they
where issued and that confidential clients (those having established
authentication credentials with the authorization server)
authenticate to the AS when presenting a refresh token. As a result,
refresh tokens are indirectly certificate-bound when issued to
clients utilizing the "tls_client_auth" or
"self_signed_tls_client_auth" methods of client authentication. Section 4 describes certificate-bound refresh tokens issued to public clients (those without authentication credentials associated with the "client_id").

7.2. Certificate Thumbprint Binding

The binding between the certificate and access token specified in Section 3.1 uses a cryptographic hash of the certificate. It relies on the hash function having sufficient preimage and second-preimage resistance so as to make it computationally infeasible to find or create another certificate that produces to the same hash output value. The SHA-256 hash function was used because it meets the aforementioned requirement while being widely available. If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using hash function(s) other than SHA-256, it is suggested that additional related JWT confirmation methods members be defined for that purpose and registered in the the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] for JWT "cnf" member values.

7.3. TLS Versions and Best Practices

In the abstract this document is applicable with any TLS version supporting certificate-based client authentication. Both TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] are cited herein because, at the time of writing, 1.3 is the newest version while 1.2 is the most widely deployed. General implementation and security considerations for TLS, including version recommendations, can be found in [BCP195].

7.4. X.509 Certificate Spoofing

If the PKI method of client authentication is used, an attacker could try to impersonate a client using a certificate with the same subject (DN or SAN) but issued by a different CA, which the authorization server trusts. To cope with that threat, the authorization server SHOULD only accept as trust anchors a limited number of CAs whose certificate issuance policy meets its security requirements. There is an assumption then that the client and server agree on the set of trust anchors that the server uses to create and validate the certificate chain. Without this assumption the use of a subject to identify the client certificate would open the server up to certificate spoofing attacks.

7.5. X.509 Certificate Parsing and Validation Complexity

Parsing and validation of X.509 certificates and certificate chains is complex and implementation mistakes have previously exposed
security vulnerabilities. Complexities of validation include (but are not limited to) [CX5P] [DCW] [RFC5280]:

- checking of Basic Constraints, basic and extended Key Usage constraints, validity periods, and critical extensions;
- handling of null-terminator bytes and non-canonical string representations in subject names;
- handling of wildcard patterns in subject names;
- recursive verification of certificate chains and checking certificate revocation.

For these reasons, implementors SHOULD use an established and well-tested X.509 library (such as one used by an established TLS library) for validation of X.509 certificate chains and SHOULD NOT attempt to write their own X.509 certificate validation procedures.

8. Privacy Considerations

In TLS versions prior to 1.3, the client’s certificate is sent unencrypted in the initial handshake and can potentially be used by third parties to monitor, track, and correlate client activity. This is likely of little concern for clients that act on behalf of a significant number of end-users because individual user activity will not be discernible amidst the client activity as a whole. However, clients that act on behalf of a single end-user, such as a native application on a mobile device, should use TLS version 1.3 whenever possible or consider the potential privacy implications of using mutual TLS on earlier versions.

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] for JWT "cnf" member values established by [RFC7800].

- Confirmation Method Value: "x5t#S256"
- Confirmation Method Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[this specification]]
9.2. Authorization Server Metadata Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].

- Metadata Name: "tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens"
- Metadata Description: Indicates authorization server support for mutual TLS client certificate-bound access tokens.
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this specification ]]

- Metadata Name: "mtls_endpoint_aliases"
- Metadata Description: JSON object containing alternative authorization server endpoints, which a client intending to do mutual TLS will use in preference to the conventional endpoints.
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this specification ]]

9.3. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].

- Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_auth"
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): Section 2.1.1 of [[ this specification ]]

- Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "self_signed_tls_client_auth"
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): Section 2.2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

9.4. Token Introspection Response Registration

Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens [RFC7800] defined the "cnf" (confirmation) claim, which enables confirmation key information to be carried in a JWT. However, the same proof-of-possession semantics are also useful for introspected access tokens whereby the protected resource obtains the confirmation key data as meta-information of a token introspection response and uses that information in verifying proof-of-possession. Therefore this specification defines and registers proof-of-possession semantics for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] using the "cnf" structure. When included as a top-level member of an OAuth token introspection response...
response, "cnf" has the same semantics and format as the claim of the same name defined in [RFC7800]. While this specification only explicitly uses the "x5t#S256" confirmation method member (see Section 3.2), it needs to define and register the higher level "cnf" structure as an introspection response member in order to define and use the more specific certificate thumbprint confirmation method.

As such, this specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7662].

- **Claim Name:** "cnf"
- **Claim Description:** Confirmation
- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** [RFC7800] and [[ this specification ]]

### 9.5. Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration

This specification requests registration of the following client metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]:

- **Client Metadata Name:** "tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens"
- **Client Metadata Description:** Indicates the client’s intention to use mutual TLS client certificate-bound access tokens.
- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** Section 3.4 of [[ this specification ]]

- **Client Metadata Name:** "tls_client_auth_subject_dn"
- **Client Metadata Description:** String value specifying the expected subject DN of the client certificate.
- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** Section 2.1.2 of [[ this specification ]]

- **Client Metadata Name:** "tls_client_auth_san_dns"
- **Client Metadata Description:** String value specifying the expected dNSName SAN entry in the client certificate.
- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** Section 2.1.2 of [[ this specification ]]

- **Client Metadata Name:** "tls_client_auth_san_uri"
- **Client Metadata Description:** String value specifying the expected uniformResourceIdentifier SAN entry in the client certificate.
- **Change Controller:** IESG
- **Specification Document(s):** Section 2.1.2 of [[ this specification ]]

o  Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_san_ip"
  o  Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected
     IPAddress SAN entry in the client certificate.
  o  Change Controller: IESG
  o  Specification Document(s): Section 2.1.2 of [[ this specification ]]

o  Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_san_email"
  o  Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected
     rfc822Name SAN entry in the client certificate.
  o  Change Controller: IESG
  o  Specification Document(s): Section 2.1.2 of [[ this specification ]]

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,

[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,

(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List


10.2. Informative References


[OpenID.CIBA]


Appendix A. Example "cnf" Claim, Certificate and JWK

For reference, an "x5t#S256" value and the X.509 Certificate from which it was calculated are provided in the following example figures. A JWK representation of the certificate’s public key along with the "x5c" member is also provided.

"cnf": 
{
"x5t#S256": "A4DtL2JmUMhAsvJj5tKyn64GzmuXbMrJa0n761y5v0"
}

Figure 5: x5t#S256 Confirmation Claim

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBBjCBrAIBAjAKBggqhkjOCPQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDBAA6tGzMB4XDTE4MTAx
ODYmZzcmOWt0DITiYMDuMjEyMzcwOVo7dZENMAsgA1UEAwEBRzscZBM8MBtByqG
SM49agEGCCqGSM49AEE8IAABHcyxgwV6hY8QnhxxzFQ03C7HK9Woy11MbnQQzjj
/Ju08/coZzwS7Lfa4vOLS9WuieIXhbgGWvsDsb0tE6IxmLmsGgYIKoZIzj0EawID
SQawRgJhAP0RC1E+vwJD/D1AIGHzuri+hIV/PpQEKTWUVeORWz83AIEA5x2eXZO
bU1JSGogjw55uAaKLR5Q2DmFfQj1L+SY=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

Figure 6: PEM Encoded Self-Signed Certificate

{
"kty":"EC",
"x":"1yfLHCpXqFjxCeHHHMVDTcLscpb07KuxudBmOMn8C7Q",
"y":"8_coZzwS7Lfa4vOLS9WuieIXhbgGWvsDsb0tE6IxmLmsGgYIKoZIzj0EawID
SQawRgJhAP0RC1E+vwJD/D1AIGHzuri+hIV/PpQEKTWUVeORWz83AIEA5x2eXZO
bU1JSGogjw55uAaKLR5Q2DmFfQj1L+SY=
}

Figure 7: JSON Web Key
Appendix B. Relationship to Token Binding

OAuth 2.0 Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] enables the application of Token Binding to the various artifacts and tokens employed throughout OAuth. That includes binding of an access token to a Token Binding key, which bears some similarities in motivation and design to the mutual TLS client certificate-bound access tokens defined in this document. Both documents define what is often called a proof-of-possession security mechanism for access tokens, whereby a client must demonstrate possession of cryptographic keying material when accessing a protected resource. The details differ somewhat between the two documents but both have the authorization server bind the access token that it issues to an asymmetric key pair held by the client. The client then proves possession of the private key from that pair with respect to the TLS connection over which the protected resource is accessed.

Token Binding uses bare keys that are generated on the client, which avoids many of the difficulties of creating, distributing, and managing certificates used in this specification. However, at the time of writing, Token Binding is fairly new and there is relatively little support for it in available application development platforms and tooling. Until better support for the underlying core Token Binding specifications exists, practical implementations of OAuth 2.0 Token Binding are infeasible. Mutual TLS, on the other hand, has been around for some time and enjoys widespread support in web servers and development platforms. As a consequence, OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens can be built and deployed now using existing platforms and tools. In the future, the two specifications are likely to be deployed in parallel for solving similar problems in different environments. Authorization servers may even support both specifications simultaneously using different proof-of-possession mechanisms for tokens issued to different clients.

Appendix C. Acknowledgements

Scott "not Tomlinson" Tomilson and Matt Peterson were involved in design and development work on a mutual TLS OAuth client authentication implementation, which predates this document. Experience and learning from that work informed some of the content of this document.

This specification was developed within the OAuth Working Group under the chairmanship of Hannes Tschofenig and Rifaat Shekh-Yusef with Eric Rescorla and Benjamin Kaduk serving as Security Area Directors. Additionally, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that helped shape this specification: Vittorio Bertocci,
Appendix D. Document(s) History

[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-14

- Editorial clarifications around there being only a single subject registered/configured per client for the tls_client_auth method.
- Add a brief explanation about how, with tls_client_auth and self_signed_tls_client_auth, refresh tokens are certificate-bound indirectly via the client authentication.
- Add mention of refresh tokens in the abstract.

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-13

- Add an abstract protocol flow and diagram to serve as an overview of OAuth in general and baseline to describe the various ways in which the mechanisms defined herein are intended to be used.
- A little bit less of that German influence.
- Rework the TLS references a bit and, in the Terminology section, clean up the description of what messages are sent and verified in the handshake to do ‘mutual TLS’.
- Move the explanation about "cnf" introspection registration into the IANA Considerations.
- Add CIBA as an informational reference and additional example of an OAuth extension that defines an endpoint that utilizes client authentication.
- Shorten a few of the section titles.
- Add new client metadata values to allow for the use of a SAN in the PKI MTLS client authentication method.
- Add privacy considerations attempting to discuss the implications of the client cert being sent in the clear in TLS 1.2.
- Changed the ‘Certificate Bound Access Tokens Without Client Authentication’ section to ‘Public Clients and Certificate-Bound Tokens’ and moved it up to be a top level section while adding discussion of binding refresh tokens for public clients.
- Reword/restructure the main PKI method section somewhat to (hopefully) improve readability.
- Reword/restructure the Self-Signed method section a bit to (hopefully) make it more comprehensible.
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- Reword the AS and RS Implementation Considerations somewhat to
  (hopefully) improve readability.
- Clarify that the protected resource obtains the client certificate
  used for mutual TLS from its TLS implementation layer.
- Add Security Considerations section about the certificate
  thumbprint binding that includes the hash algorithm agility
  recommendation.
- Add an "mtls_endpoint_aliases" AS metadata parameter that is a
  JSON object containing alternative authorization server endpoints,
  which a client intending to do mutual TLS will use in preference
  to the conventional endpoints.
- Minor editorial updates.

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-12

- Add an example certificate, JWK, and confirmation method claim.
- Minor editorial updates based on implementer feedback.
- Additional Acknowledgements.

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-11

- Editorial updates.
- Mention/reference TLS 1.3 RFC8446 in the TLS Versions and Best
  Practices section.

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-10

- Update draft-ietf-oauth-discovery reference to RFC8414

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-09

- Change "single certificates" to "self-signed certificates" in the
  Abstract

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-08

- Incorporate clarifications and editorial improvements from Justin
  Richer’s WGLC review
- Drop the use of the "sender constrained" terminology per WGLC
  feedback from Neil Madden (including changing the metadata
  parameters from mutual_tls_sender_constrained_access_tokens to
  tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens)
- Add a new security considerations section on X.509 parsing and
  validation per WGLC feedback from Neil Madden and Benjamin Kaduk
- Note that a server can terminate TLS at a load balancer, reverse
  proxy, etc. but how the client certificate metadata is securely
  communicated to the backend is out of scope per WGLC feedback
- Note that revocation checking is at the discretion of the AS per WGLC feedback
- Editorial updates and clarifications
- Update draft-ietf-oauth-discovery reference to -10 and draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding to -06
- Add folks involved in WGLC feedback to the acknowledgements list
- draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-07
- Update to use the boilerplate from RFC 8174
- draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-06
- Add an appendix section describing the relationship of this document to OAuth Token Binding as requested during the the Singapore meeting https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-100-oauth/
- Add an explicit note that the implicit flow is not supported for obtaining certificate bound access tokens as discussed at the Singapore meeting https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-100-oauth/
- Add/incorporate text to the Security Considerations on Certificate Spoofing as suggested https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/V26070X-60tbVSeUz_7W2k94vCo
- Changed the title to be more descriptive
- Move the Security Considerations section to before the IANA Considerations
- Elaborated on certificate-bound access tokens a bit more in the Abstract
- Update draft-ietf-oauth-discovery reference to -08
- draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-05
- Editorial fixes
- draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-04
- Change the name of the 'Public Key method' to the more accurate 'Self-Signed Certificate method' and also change the associated authentication method metadata value to "self_signed_tls_client_auth".
- Removed the "tls_client_auth_root_dn" client metadata field as discussed in https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/swDV2y0be6o8czGKQqi1eJV-g8qc
- Update draft-ietf-oauth-discovery reference to -07
- Clarify that MTLS client authentication isn’t exclusive to the token endpoint and can be used with other endpoints, e.g. RFC 7009 revocation and 7662 introspection, that utilize client
authentication as discussed in
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/
b26mft0G7D3ceebh0xnEYUv4puI
- Reorganize the document somewhat in an attempt to more clearly
  make a distinction between mTLS client authentication and
certificate-bound access tokens as well as a more clear
delineation between the two (PKI/Public key) methods for client
authentication
- Editorial fixes and clarifications

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03
- Introduced metadata and client registration parameter to publish
  and request support for mutual TLS sender constrained access
tokens
- Added description of two methods of binding the cert and client,
  PKI and Public Key.
- Indicated that the "tls_client_auth" authentication method is for
  the PKI method and introduced "pub_key_tls_client_auth" for the
  Public Key method
- Added implementation considerations, mainly regarding TLS stack
  configuration and trust chain validation, as well as how to do
  binding of access tokens to a TLS client certificate for public
  clients, and considerations around certificate-bound access tokens
- Added new section to security considerations on cert spoofing
- Add text suggesting that a new cnf member be defined in the
  future, if hash function(s) other than SHA-256 need to be used for
  certificate thumbprints

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-02
- Fixed editorial issue https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/
  U46UMEh8XIOQnvXY9pHFq1MKPns
- Changed the title (hopefully "Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0" is
  better than "Mutual TLS Profiles for OAuth Clients").

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-01
- Added more explicit details of using RFC 7662 token introspection
  with mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens.
- Added an IANA OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration
  request for "cnf".
- Specify that tls_client_auth_subject_dn and
  tls_client_auth_root_dn are RFC 4514 String Representation of
  Distinguished Names.
- Changed tls_client_auth_issuer_dn to tls_client_auth_root_dn.
- Changed the text in the Section 3 to not be specific about using a
  hash of the cert.
Changed the abbreviated title to 'OAuth Mutual TLS' (previously was the acronym MTLSPOC).

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00

Created the initial working group version from draft-campbell-oauth-mtls

draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-01

Fix some typos.
Add to the acknowledgements list.

draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-00

Add a Mutual TLS sender constrained protected resource access method and a x5t#S256 cnf method for JWT access tokens (concepts taken in part from draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04).
Fixed "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" to "token_endpoint_auth_method" for client metadata.
Add "tls_client_auth_subject_dn" and "tls_client_auth_issuer_dn" client metadata parameters and mention using "jwks_uri" or "jwks".
Say that the authentication method is determined by client policy regardless of whether the client was dynamically registered or statically configured.
Expand acknowledgements to those that participated in discussions around draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00
Add Nat Sakimura and Torsten Lodderstedt to the author list.

draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00

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Abstract

RFC 6750 specified the bearer token concept for securing access to protected resources. Bearer tokens need to be protected in transit as well as at rest. When a client requests access to a protected resource it hands-over the bearer token to the resource server.

The OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession security concept extends bearer token security and requires the client to demonstrate possession of a key when accessing a protected resource.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2019.
1. Introduction

The work on proof-of-possession tokens, an extended token security mechanisms for OAuth 2.0, is motivated in [22]. This document defines the ability for the client request and to obtain PoP tokens from the authorization server. After successfully completing the exchange the client is in possession of a PoP token and the keying material bound to it. Clients that access protected resources then need to demonstrate knowledge of the secret key that is bound to the PoP token.
To best describe the scope of this specification, the OAuth 2.0 protocol exchange sequence is shown in Figure 1. The extension defined in this document piggybacks on the message exchange marked with (C) and (D). To demonstrate possession of the private/secret key to the resource server protocol mechanisms outside the scope of this document are used.

In OAuth 2.0 [2] access tokens can be obtained via authorization grants and using refresh tokens. The core OAuth specification defines four authorization grants, see Section 1.3 of [2], and [19] adds an assertion-based authorization grant to that list. The token endpoint, which is described in Section 3.2 of [2], is used with every authorization grant except for the implicit grant type. In the implicit grant type the access token is issued directly.

This specification extends the functionality of the token endpoint, i.e., the protocol exchange between the client and the authorization server, to allow keying material to be bound to an access token. Two types of keying material can be bound to an access token, namely symmetric keys and asymmetric keys. Conveying symmetric keys from the authorization server to the client is described in Section 4.1 and the procedure for dealing with asymmetric keys is described in Section 4.2.

This document describes how the client requests and obtains a PoP access token from the authorization server for use with HTTPS-based...
2. Terminology

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this specification are to be interpreted as described in [1].

Session Key:

In the context of this specification 'session key' refers to fresh and unique keying material established between the client and the resource server. This session key has a lifetime that corresponds to the lifetime of the access token, is generated by the authorization server and bound to the access token.

This document uses the following abbreviations:

- JWT: JSON Web Token[9]
- JWS: JSON Web Signature[6]
- JWK: JSON Web Key[5]
- JWE: JSON Web Encryption[8]
- CWT: CBOR Web Token[13]
- COSE: CBOR Object Signing and Encryption[14]

3. Processing Instructions

Step (0): As an initial step the client typically determines the resource server it wants to interact with. This may, for example, happen as part of a discovery procedure or via manual configuration.

Step (1): The client starts the OAuth 2.0 protocol interaction based on the selected grant type.

Step (2): When the client interacts with the token endpoint to obtain an access token it MUST use the resource identicator parameter, defined in [16], or the audience parameter, defined in [15], when symmetric PoP tokens are used. For asymmetric PoP tokens the use of resource indicators and audience is optional but
The parameters ‘audience’ and ‘resource’ both allow the client to express the location of the target service and the difference between the two is described in [15]. As a summary, ‘audience’ allows expressing a logical name while ‘resource’ contains an absolute URI. More details about the ‘resource’ parameter can be found in [16].

Step (3): The authorization server parses the request from the server and determines the suitable response based on OAuth 2.0 and the PoP token credential procedures.

Note that PoP access tokens may be encoded in a variety of ways:

JWT The access token may be encoded using the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [9]. The proof-of-possession token functionality is described in [10]. A JWT encoded PoP token MUST be protected against modification by either using a digital signature or a keyed message digest, as described in [6]. The JWT may also be encrypted using [8].

CWT [13] defines an alternative token format based on CBOR. The proof-of-possession token functionality is defined in [12]. A CWT encoded PoP token MUST be protected against modification by either using a digital signature or a keyed message digest, as described in [12].

If the access token is only a reference then a look-up by the resource server is needed, as described in the token introspection specification [23].

Note that the OAuth 2.0 framework nor this specification does not mandate a specific PoP token format but using a standardized format will improve interoperability and will lead to better code re-use.

Application layer interactions between the client and the resource server are beyond the scope of this document.

4. Examples

This section provides a number of examples.

4.1. Symmetric Key Transport

4.1.1. Client-to-AS Request

The client starts with a request to the authorization server indicating that it is interested to obtain a token for https://resource.example.com
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: authz.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=UTF-8

grant_type=authorization_code
&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&scope=calendar%20contacts
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fresource.example.com

Example Request to the Authorization Server

4.1.2. Client-to-AS Response

If the access token request has been successfully verified by the authorization server and the client is authorized to obtain a PoP token for the indicated resource server, the authorization server issues an access token and optionally a refresh token.

Figure 2 shows a response containing a token and a "cnf" parameter with a symmetric proof-of-possession key both encoded in a JSON-based serialization format. The "cnf" parameter contains the RFC 7517 [5] encoded key element.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
    "access_token": "SlAV32hkKG ...
    (remainder of JWT omitted for brevity; JWT contains JWK in the cnf claim)
    "token_type": "pop",
    "expires_in": 3600,
    "refresh_token": "8xLOxBtZp8",
    "cnf": {
        "keys": [
            {
                "kty": "oct",
                "alg": "A128KW",
                "k": "GawguFyGrWKav7AX4VKUg"
            }
        ]
    }
}

Figure 2: Example: Response from the Authorization Server (Symmetric Variant)

Note that the cnf payload in Figure 2 is not encrypted at the application layer since Transport Layer Security is used between the AS and the client and the content of the cnf payload is consumed by the client itself. Alternatively, a JWE could be used to encrypt the key distribution, as shown in Figure 3.
The content of the 'access_token' in JWT format contains the 'cnf' (confirmation) claim. The confirmation claim is defined in [10]. The digital signature or the keyed message digest offering integrity protection is not shown in this example but has to be present in a real deployment to mitigate a number of security threats.

The JWK in the key element of the response from the authorization server, as shown in Figure 2, contains the same session key as the JWK inside the access token, as shown in Figure 4. It is, in this example, protected by TLS and transmitted from the authorization server to the client (for processing by the client).

Figure 3: Example: Encrypted Symmetric Key

Figure 4: Example: Access Token in JWT Format
Note: When the JWK inside the access token contains a symmetric key it must be confidentiality protected using a JWE to maintain the security goals of the PoP architecture since content is meant for consumption by the selected resource server only. The details are described in [22].

4.2. Asymmetric Key Transport

4.2.1. Client-to-AS Request

This example illustrates the case where an asymmetric key shall be bound to an access token. The client makes the following HTTPS request shown in Figure 5. Extra line breaks are for display purposes only.

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=UTF-8

grant_type=authorization_code
&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&token_type=pop
&req_cnf=eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUi...
(remainder of JWK omitted for brevity)
```

Figure 5: Example Request to the Authorization Server (Asymmetric Key Variant)

As shown in Figure 6 the content of the ‘req_cnf’ parameter contains the ECC public key the client would like to associate with the access token (in JSON format).

```
"jwk":{
  "kty": "EC",
  "use": "sig",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "18wHLe1gW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAlbvM",
  "y": "-V4dS4uALmgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TX1PdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
}
```

Figure 6: Client Providing Public Key to Authorization Server
4.2.2. Client-to-AS Response

If the access token request is valid and authorized, the authorization server issues an access token and optionally a refresh token. The authorization server also places information about the public key used by the client into the access token to create the binding between the two. The new token type "pop" is placed into the 'token_type' parameter.

An example of a successful response is shown in Figure 7.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
  "access_token": "2YotnFZFE....jr1zCsicMWpAA",
  "token_type": "pop",
  "expires_in": 3600,
  "refresh_token": "tGzv3J0kF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA"
}

Figure 7: Example: Response from the Authorization Server (Asymmetric Variant)

The content of the 'access_token' field contains an encoded JWT, as shown in Figure 8. The digital signature covering the access token offering authenticity and integrity protection is not shown below (but must be present).
Figure 8: Example: Access Token Structure (Asymmetric Variant)

Note: In this example there is no need for the authorization server to convey further keying material to the client since the client is already in possession of the private key (as well as the public key).

5. Security Considerations

[22] describes the architecture for the OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession security architecture, including use cases, threats, and requirements. This requirements describes one solution component of that architecture, namely the mechanism for the client to interact with the authorization server to either obtain a symmetric key from the authorization server, to obtain an asymmetric key pair, or to offer a public key to the authorization. In any case, these keys are then bound to the access token by the authorization server.

To summarize the main security recommendations: A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents of the access token by using a digital signature or a keyed message digest. Consequently, the token integrity protection MUST be applied to prevent the token from being modified, particularly since it contains a reference to the symmetric key or the asymmetric key. If the access token contains the symmetric key (see Section 2.2 of [10] for a description about how symmetric keys can be securely conveyed within the access token) this symmetric key MUST be encrypted by the authorization server with a long-term key shared with the resource server.

To deal with token redirect, it is important for the authorization server to include the identity of the intended recipient (the audience), typically a single resource server (or a list of resource servers), in the token. Using a single shared secret with multiple
authorization server to simplify key management is NOT RECOMMENDED since the benefit from using the proof-of-possession concept is significantly reduced.

Token replay is also not possible since an eavesdropper will also have to obtain the corresponding private key or shared secret that is bound to the access token. Nevertheless, it is good practice to limit the lifetime of the access token and therefore the lifetime of associated key.

The authorization server MUST offer confidentiality protection for any interactions with the client. This step is extremely important since the client will obtain the session key from the authorization server for use with a specific access token. Not using confidentiality protection exposes this secret (and the access token) to an eavesdropper thereby making the OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession security model completely insecure. OAuth 2.0 [2] relies on TLS to offer confidentiality protection and additional protection can be applied using the JWK [5] offered security mechanism, which would add an additional layer of protection on top of TLS for cases where the keying material is conveyed, for example, to a hardware security module. Which version(s) of TLS ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation. At the time of this writing, TLS version 1.2 [4] is the most recent version. The client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making requests to protected resources, including checking the validity of the certificate.

Similarly to the security recommendations for the bearer token specification [17] developers MUST ensure that the ephemeral credentials (i.e., the private key or the session key) is not leaked to third parties. An adversary in possession of the ephemeral credentials bound to the access token will be able to impersonate the client. Be aware that this is a real risk with many smart phone app and Web development environments.

Clients can at any time request a new proof-of-possession capable access token. Using a refresh token to regularly request new access tokens that are bound to fresh and unique keys is important. Keeping the lifetime of the access token short allows the authorization server to use shorter key sizes, which translate to a performance benefit for the client and for the resource server. Shorter keys also lead to shorter messages (particularly with asymmetric keying material).

When authorization servers bind symmetric keys to access tokens then they SHOULD scope these access tokens to a specific permissions.
6. IANA Considerations

6.1. OAuth Access Token Types

This specification registers the following error in the IANA "OAuth Access Token Types" [25] established by [17].

- Name: pop
- Change controller: IESG
- Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

6.2. OAuth Parameters Registration

This specification registers the following value in the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry [25] established by [2].

- Parameter name: cnf_req
  - Parameter usage location: authorization request, token request
  - Change controller: IESG
  - Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

- Parameter name: cnf
  - Parameter usage location: authorization response, token response
  - Change controller: IESG
  - Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

- Parameter name: rs_cnf
  - Parameter usage location: token response
  - Change controller: IESG
  - Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

6.3. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

This specification registers the following error in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" [25] established by [2].

- Error name: invalid_token_type
  - Error usage location: implicit grant error response, token error response
  - Related protocol extension: token_type parameter
  - Change controller: IESG
  - Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

7. Acknowledgements

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8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-12

Abstract

This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0. It updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader application of OAuth 2.0.

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1. Introduction

Since its publication in [RFC6749] and [RFC6750], OAuth 2.0 has gotten massive traction in the market and became the standard for API protection and, as foundation of OpenID Connect [OpenID], identity providing. While OAuth was used in a variety of scenarios and different kinds of deployments, the following challenges could be observed:

- OAuth implementations are being attacked through known implementation weaknesses and anti-patterns (CSRF, referrer header). Although most of these threats are discussed in the OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations [RFC6819], continued exploitation demonstrates there may be a need for more specific recommendations or that the existing mitigations are too difficult to deploy.

- Technology has changed, e.g., the way browsers treat fragments in some situations, which may change the implicit grant’s underlying security model.

- OAuth is used in much more dynamic setups than originally anticipated, creating new challenges with respect to security. Those challenges go beyond the original scope of [RFC6749], [RFC6749], and [RFC6819].

Moreover, OAuth is being adopted in use cases with higher security requirements than considered initially, such as Open Banking, eHealth, eGovernment, and Electronic Signatures. Those use cases call for stricter guidelines and additional protection.

OAuth initially assumed a static relationship between client, authorization server and resource servers. The URLs of AS and RS were known to the client at deployment time and built an anchor for the trust relationship among those parties. The validation whether
the client talks to a legitimate server was based on TLS server authentication (see [RFC6819], Section 4.5.4). With the increasing adoption of OAuth, this simple model dissolved and, in several scenarios, was replaced by a dynamic establishment of the relationship between clients on one side and the authorization and resource servers of a particular deployment on the other side. This way the same client could be used to access services of different providers (in case of standard APIs, such as e-Mail or OpenID Connect) or serves as a frontend to a particular tenant in a multi-tenancy. Extensions of OAuth, such as [RFC7591] and [RFC8414] were developed in order to support the usage of OAuth in dynamic scenarios. As a challenge to the community, such usage scenarios open up new attack angles, which are discussed in this document.

1.1. Structure

The remainder of the document is organized as follows: The next section updates the OAuth attacker model. Afterwards, the most important recommendations of the OAuth working group for every OAuth implementor are summarized. Subsequently, a detailed analysis of the threats and implementation issues which can be found in the wild today is given along with a discussion of potential countermeasures.

1.2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. The Updated OAuth 2.0 Attacker Model

In [RFC6819], an attacker model was laid out that described the capabilities of attackers against which OAuth deployments must defend. In the following, this attacker model is updated to account for the potentially dynamic relationships involving multiple parties (as described above), to include new types of attackers, and to make it more clearly defined.

OAuth 2.0 aims to ensure that the authorization of the resource owner (RO) (with a user agent) at an authorization server (AS) and the subsequent usage of the access token at the resource server (RS) is protected at least against the following attackers:

- (A1) Web Attackers that control an arbitrary number of network endpoints (except for RO, AS, and RS). Web attackers may set up web sites that are visited by the RO, operate their own user
agents, participate in the protocol using their own user credentials, etc.

Web attackers may, in particular, operate OAuth clients that are registered at AS, and operate their own authorization and resource servers that can be used (in parallel) by ROs. It must also be assumed that web attackers can lure the user to open arbitrary attacker-chosen URIs at any time. This can be achieved through many ways, for example, by injecting malicious advertisements into advertisement networks, or by sending legiti-

These attackers conform to the attacker model that was used in formal analysis efforts for OAuth [arXiv.1601.01229]. Previous attacks on OAuth have shown that OAuth deployments should protect against an even strong attacker model that is described as follows:

- **(A2) Network Attackers** that additionally have full control over the network over which protocol participants communicate. They can eavesdrop on, manipulate, and spoof messages, except when these are properly protected by cryptographic methods (e.g., TLS). Network attacker can also block specific messages.

- **(A3) Attackers** that can read, but not modify, the contents of the authorization response (i.e., the authorization response can leak to an attacker). Examples for such attacks include open redirector attacks, problems existing on mobile operating systems (where different apps can register themselves on the same URI), so-called mix-up attacks, where the client is tricked into sending credentials to an attacker-controlled AS, and the fact that URLs are often stored/logged by browsers (history), proxy servers, and operating systems.

- **(A4) Attackers** that can read, but not modify, the contents of the authorization request (i.e., the authorization request can leak, in the same manner as above, to an attacker).

- **(A5) Attackers** that control a resource server used by RO with an access token issued by AS. For example, a resource server can be compromised by an attacker, an access token may be sent to an attacker-controlled resource server due to a misconfiguration, or an RO is social-engineered into using a attacker-controlled RS.

Note that in this attacker model, an attacker can be a RO or act as one (see A1). For example, an attacker can use his own browser to replay tokens or authorization codes obtained by any of the attacks described above at the client or RS.
This document discusses the additional threats resulting from these
attackers in detail and recommends suitable mitigations.

This is a minimal attacker model. Implementers MUST take into
account all possible attackers in the environment in which their
OAuth implementations are expected to run.

3. Recommendations

This section describes the set of security mechanisms the OAuth
working group recommends to OAuth implementers.

3.1. Protecting Redirect-Based Flows

Authorization servers MUST utilize exact matching of client redirect
URIs against pre-registered URIs. This measure contributes to the
prevention of leakage of authorization codes and access tokens
(depending on the grant type). It also helps to detect mix-up
attacks.

Clients SHOULD avoid forwarding the user’s browser to a URI obtained
from a query parameter since such a function could be utilized to
exfiltrate authorization codes and access tokens. If there is a
strong need for this kind of redirects, clients are advised to
implement appropriate countermeasures against open redirection, e.g.,
as described by the OWASP [owasp].

Clients MUST prevent CSRF and ensure that each authorization response
is only accepted once. One-time use CSRF tokens carried in the
"state" parameter, which are securely bound to the user agent, SHOULD
be used for that purpose.

In order to prevent mix-up attacks, clients MUST only process
redirect responses of the OAuth authorization server they sent the
respective request to and from the same user agent this authorization
request was initiated with. Clients MUST memorize which
authorization server they sent an authorization request to and bind
this information to the user agent and ensure any sub-sequent
messages are sent to the same authorization server. Clients SHOULD
use AS-specific redirect URIs as a means to identify the AS a
particular response came from.

Note: [I-D.bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state] gives advice on how to
implement CSRF prevention and AS matching using signed JWTs in the
"state" parameter.
AS which redirect a request that potentially contains user credentials MUST avoid forwarding these user credentials accidentally (see Section 4.10).

3.1.1. Authorization Code Grant

Clients utilizing the authorization grant type MUST use PKCE [RFC7636] in order to (with the help of the authorization server) detect and prevent attempts to inject (replay) authorization codes into the authorization response. The PKCE challenges must be transaction-specific and securely bound to the user agent in which the transaction was started and the respective client. OpenID Connect clients MAY use the "nonce" parameter of the OpenID Connect authentication request as specified in [OpenID] in conjunction with the corresponding ID Token claim for the same purpose.

Note: although PKCE so far was recommended as a mechanism to protect native apps, this advice applies to all kinds of OAuth clients, including web applications.

Authorization servers SHOULD use client authentication if possible.

Authorization servers SHOULD furthermore consider the recommendations given in [RFC6819], Section 4.4.1.1, on authorization code replay prevention.

3.1.2. Implicit Grant

The implicit grant (response type "token") and other response types causing the authorization server to issue access tokens in the authorization response are vulnerable to access token leakage and access token replay as described in Section 4.1, Section 4.2, Section 4.3, and Section 4.6.

Moreover, no viable mechanism exists to cryptographically bind access tokens issued in the authorization response to a certain client as it is recommended in Section 3.2. This makes replay detection for such access tokens at resource servers impossible.

In order to avoid these issues, clients SHOULD NOT use the implicit grant (response type "token") or any other response type issuing access tokens in the authorization response, such as "token id_token" and "code token id_token", unless the issued access tokens are sender-constrained and access token injection in the authorization response is prevented.

A sender constrained access token scopes the applicability of an access token to a certain sender. This sender is obliged to
demonstrate knowledge of a certain secret as prerequisite for the acceptance of that token at the recipient (e.g., a resource server).

Clients SHOULD instead use the response type "code" (aka authorization code grant type) as specified in Section 3.1.1 or any other response type that causes the authorization server to issue access tokens in the token response. This allows the authorization server to detect replay attempts and generally reduces the attack surface since access tokens are not exposed in URLs. It also allows the authorization server to sender-constrain the issued tokens.

3.2. Token Replay Prevention

Authorization servers SHOULD use TLS-based methods for sender-constrained access tokens as described in Section 4.8.1.2, such as token binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] or Mutual TLS for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] in order to prevent token replay. Refresh tokens MUST be sender-constrained or use refresh token rotation as described in Section 4.12. It is also recommended to use end-to-end TLS whenever possible.

3.3. Access Token Privilege Restriction

The privileges associated with an access token SHOULD be restricted to the minimum required for the particular application or use case. This prevents clients from exceeding the privileges authorized by the resource owner. It also prevents users from exceeding their privileges authorized by the respective security policy. Privilege restrictions also limit the impact of token leakage although more effective counter-measures are described in Section 3.2.

In particular, access tokens SHOULD be restricted to certain resource servers, preferably to a single resource server. To put this into effect, the authorization server associates the access token with certain resource servers and every resource server is obliged to verify for every request, whether the access token sent with that request was meant to be used for that particular resource server. If not, the resource server MUST refuse to serve the respective request. Clients and authorization servers MAY utilize the parameters "scope" or "resource" as specified in [RFC6749] and [I-D.ietf-oauth-resource-indicators], respectively, to determine the resource server they want to access.

Additionally, access tokens SHOULD be restricted to certain resources and actions on resource servers or resources. To put this into effect, the authorization server associates the access token with the respective resource and actions and every resource server is obliged to verify for every request, whether the access token sent with that
request was meant to be used for that particular action on the particular resource. If not, the resource server must refuse to serve the respective request. Clients and authorization servers MAY utilize the parameter "scope" as specified in [RFC6749] to determine those resources and/or actions.

4. Attacks and Mitigations

This section gives a detailed description of attacks on OAuth implementations, along with potential countermeasures. This section complements and enhances the description given in [RFC6819].

4.1. Insufficient Redirect URI Validation

Some authorization servers allow clients to register redirect URI patterns instead of complete redirect URIs. In those cases, the authorization server, at runtime, matches the actual redirect URI parameter value at the authorization endpoint against this pattern. This approach allows clients to encode transaction state into additional redirect URI parameters or to register just a single pattern for multiple redirect URIs. As a downside, it turned out to be more complex to implement and error prone to manage than exact redirect URI matching. Several successful attacks, utilizing flaws in the pattern matching implementation or concrete configurations, have been observed in the wild. Insufficient validation of the redirect URI effectively breaks client identification or authentication (depending on grant and client type) and allows the attacker to obtain an authorization code or access token, either

- by directly sending the user agent to a URI under the attackers control, or
- by exposing the OAuth credentials to an attacker by utilizing an open redirector at the client in conjunction with the way user agents handle URL fragments.

4.1.1. Redirect URI Validation Attacks on Authorization Code Grant

For a public client using the grant type code, an attack would look as follows:

Let’s assume the redirect URL pattern "https://*.somesite.example/*" had been registered for the client "s6BhdRkqt3". This pattern allows redirect URIs pointing to any host residing in the domain somesite.example. So if an attacker manages to establish a host or subdomain in somesite.example he can impersonate the legitimate client. Assume the attacker sets up the host "evil.somesite.example".

The attack can then be conducted as follows:

First, the attacker needs to trick the user into opening a tampered URL in his browser, which launches a page under the attacker’s control, say "https://www.evil.example". (See Attacker A1.)

This URL initiates an authorization request with the client id of a legitimate client to the authorization endpoint. This is the example authorization request (line breaks are for display purposes only):

```
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=9ad67f13
   &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.somesite.example%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.somesite.example
```

Afterwards, the authorization server validates the redirect URI in order to identify the client. Since the pattern allows arbitrary domains host names in "somesite.example", the authorization request is processed under the legitimate client’s identity. This includes the way the request for user consent is presented to the user. If auto-approval is allowed (which is not recommended for public clients according to [RFC6749]), the attack can be performed even easier.

If the user does not recognize the attack, the code is issued and immediately sent to the attacker’s client.

Since the attacker impersonated a public client, it can exchange the code for tokens at the respective token endpoint.

Note: This attack will not work as easily for confidential clients, since the code exchange requires authentication with the legitimate client’s secret. The attacker will need to impersonate or utilize the legitimate client to redeem the code (e.g., by performing a code injection attack). This kind of injections is covered in Section 4.5.

4.1.2. Redirect URI Validation Attacks on Implicit Grant

The attack described above works for the implicit grant as well. If the attacker is able to send the authorization response to a URI under his control, he will directly get access to the fragment carrying the access token.

Additionally, implicit clients can be subject to a further kind of attack. It utilizes the fact that user agents re-attach fragments to the destination URL of a redirect if the location header does not contain a fragment (see [RFC7231], Section 9.5). The attack described here combines this behavior with the client as an open redirector in order to get access to access tokens. This allows
circumvention even of very narrow redirect URI patterns (but not strict URL matching!).

Assume the pattern for client "s6BhdRkqt3" is "https://client.somesite.example/cb?*", i.e., any parameter is allowed for redirects to "https://client.somesite.example/cb". Unfortunately, the client exposes an open redirector. This endpoint supports a parameter "redirect_to" which takes a target URL and will send the browser to this URL using an HTTP Location header redirect 303.

The attack can now be conducted as follows:

First, and as above, the attacker needs to trick the user into opening a tampered URL in his browser, which launches a page under the attacker's control, say "https://www.evil.example".

Afterwards, the website initiates an authorization request, which is very similar to the one in the attack on the code flow. Different to above, it utilizes the open redirector by encoding "redirect_to=https://client.evil.example" into the redirect URI and it uses the response type "token" (line breaks are for display purposes only):

GET /authorize?response_type=token&state=9ad67f13 &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.somesite.example %2Fcb%26redirect_to%253Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fclient.evil.example%252Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.somesite.example

Now, since the redirect URI matches the registered pattern, the authorization server allows the request and sends the resulting access token with a 303 redirect (some response parameters are omitted for better readability)

HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
Location: https://client.somesite.example/cb?
  redirect_to=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fclient.evil.example%2Fcb
  #access_token=2YotnFZFEjrlzCsicMWpAA&...

At example.com, the request arrives at the open redirector. It will read the redirect parameter and will issue an HTTP 303 Location header redirect to the URL "https://client.evil.example/cb".

HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
Location: https://client.evil.example/cb
Since the redirector at client.somesite.example does not include a fragment in the Location header, the user agent will re-attach the original fragment "#access_token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsiC9w8pAA&..." to the URL and will navigate to the following URL:

https://client.evil.example/cb#access_token=2YotnFZFEjr1z...

The attacker’s page at "client.evil.example" can now access the fragment and obtain the access token.

4.1.3. Proposed Countermeasures

The complexity of implementing and managing pattern matching correctly obviously causes security issues. This document therefore proposes to simplify the required logic and configuration by using exact redirect URI matching only. This means the authorization server must compare the two URIs using simple string comparison as defined in [RFC3986], Section 6.2.1.

Additional recommendations:

- Servers on which callbacks are hosted must not expose open redirectors (see Section 4.9).
- Clients MAY drop fragments via intermediary URLs with "fix fragments" (see [fb.fragments]) to prevent the user agent from appending any unintended fragments.
- Clients SHOULD use the authorization code response type instead of response types causing access token issuance at the authorization endpoint. This offers countermeasures against reuse of leaked credentials through the exchange process with the authorization server and token replay through certificate binding of the access tokens.

As an alternative to exact redirect URI matching, the AS could also authenticate clients, e.g., using [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq].

4.2. Credential Leakage via Referrer Headers

Authorization codes or values of "state" can unintentionally be disclosed to attackers through the referrer header, by leaking either from a client’s web site or from an AS’s web site. Note: even if specified otherwise in [RFC7231], Section 5.5.2, the same may happen to access tokens conveyed in URI fragments due to browser implementation issues as illustrated by Chromium Issue 168213 [bug.chromium].
4.2.1. Leakage from the OAuth Client

Leakage from the OAuth client requires that the client, as a result of a successful authorization request, renders a page that

- contains links to other pages under the attacker’s control (ads, faq, ...) and a user clicks on such a link, or
- includes third-party content (iframes, images, etc.), for example if the page contains user-generated content (blog).

As soon as the browser navigates to the attacker’s page or loads the third-party content, the attacker receives the authorization response URL and can extract "code", "access token", or "state".

4.2.2. Leakage from the Authorization Server

In a similar way, an attacker can learn "state" if the authorization endpoint at the authorization server contains links or third-party content as above.

4.2.3. Consequences

An attacker that learns a valid code or access token through a referrer header can perform the attacks as described in Section 4.1.1, Section 4.5, and Section 4.6. If the attacker learns "state", the CSRF protection achieved by using "state" is lost, resulting in CSRF attacks as described in [RFC6819], Section 4.4.1.8.

4.2.4. Proposed Countermeasures

The page rendered as a result of the OAuth authorization response and the authorization endpoint SHOULD NOT include third-party resources or links to external sites.

The following measures further reduce the chances of a successful attack:

- Bind authorization code to a confidential client or PKCE challenge. In this case, the attacker lacks the secret to request the code exchange.

- As described in [RFC6749], Section 4.1.2, authorization codes MUST be invalidated by the AS after their first use at the token endpoint. For example, if an AS invalidated the code after the legitimate client redeemed it, the attacker would fail exchanging this code later.
This does not mitigate the attack if the attacker manages to exchange the code for a token before the legitimate client does so. Therefore, [RFC6749] further recommends that, when an attempt is made to redeem a code twice, the AS SHOULD revoke all tokens issued previously based on that code.

- The "state" value SHOULD be invalidated by the client after its first use at the redirection endpoint. If this is implemented, and an attacker receives a token through the referrer header from the client’s web site, the "state" was already used, invalidated by the client and cannot be used again by the attacker. (This does not help if the "state" leaks from the AS’s web site, since then the "state" has not been used at the redirection endpoint at the client yet.)

- Suppress the referrer header by adding the attribute "rel="noreferrer" to HTML links or by applying an appropriate Referrer Policy [webappsec-referrer-policy] to the document (either as part of the "referrer" meta attribute or by setting a Referrer-Policy header).

- Use authorization code instead of response types causing access token issuance from the authorization endpoint. This provides countermeasures against leakage on the OAuth protocol level through the code exchange process with the authorization server.

- Additionally, one might use the form post response mode instead of redirect for authorization response (see [oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode]).

4.3. Attacks through the Browser History

Authorization codes and access tokens can end up in the browser’s history of visited URLs, enabling the attacks described in the following.

4.3.1. Code in Browser History

When a browser navigates to "client.example/redirection_endpoint?code=abcd" as a result of a redirect from a provider’s authorization endpoint, the URL including the authorization code may end up in the browser’s history. An attacker with access to the device could obtain the code and try to replay it.

Proposed countermeasures:

- Authorization code replay prevention as described in [RFC6819], Section 4.4.1.1, and Section 4.5
Use form post response mode instead of redirect for authorization response (see [oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode])

4.3.2. Access Token in Browser History

An access token may end up in the browser history if a client or just a web site, which already has a token, deliberately navigates to a page like "provider.com/get_user_profile?access_token=abcdef.". Actually [RFC6750] discourages this practice and asks to transfer tokens via a header, but in practice web sites often just pass access tokens in query parameters.

In case of implicit grant, a URL like "client.example/redirection_endpoint#access_token=abcdef" may also end up in the browser history as a result of a redirect from a provider’s authorization endpoint.

Proposed countermeasures:

- Replace implicit flow with postmessage communication or the authorization code grant
- Never pass access tokens in URL query parameters

4.4. Mix-Up

Mix-up is an attack on scenarios where an OAuth client interacts with multiple authorization servers, as is usually the case when dynamic registration is used. The goal of the attack is to obtain an authorization code or an access token by tricking the client into sending those credentials to the attacker instead of using them at the respective endpoint at the authorization/resource server.

4.4.1. Attack Description

For a detailed attack description, refer to [arXiv.1601.01229] and [I-D.ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation]. The description here closely follows [arXiv.1601.01229], with variants of the attack outlined below.

Preconditions: For the attack to work, we assume that

- the implicit or authorization code grant are used with multiple AS of which one is considered "honest" (H-AS) and one is operated by the attacker (A-AS),
the client stores the AS chosen by the user in a session bound to the user’s browser and uses the same redirection endpoint URI for each AS, and

the attacker can manipulate the first request/response pair from a user’s browser to the client (in which the user selects a certain AS and is then redirected by the client to that AS), as in Attacker A2.

Some of the attack variants described below require different preconditions.

In the following, we assume that the client is registered with H-AS (URI: "https://honest.as.example", client id: "7ZGZldHQ") and with A-AS (URI: "https://attacker.example", client id: "666RVZJTA").

Attack on the authorization code grant:

1. The user selects to start the grant using H-AS (e.g., by clicking on a button at the client’s website).

2. The attacker intercepts this request and changes the user’s selection to "A-AS".

3. The client stores in the user’s session that the user selected "A-AS" and redirects the user to A-AS’s authorization endpoint by sending the response code "303 See Other" with a Location header containing the URL "https://attacker.example/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=666RVZJTA".

4. Now the attacker intercepts this response and changes the redirection such that the user is being redirected to H-AS. The attacker also replaces the client id of the client at A-AS with the client’s id at H-AS. Therefore, the browser receives a redirection ("303 See Other") with a Location header pointing to "https://honest.as.example/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=7ZGZldHQ"

5. Now, the user authorizes the client to access her resources at H-AS. H-AS issues a code and sends it (via the browser) back to the client.

6. Since the client still assumes that the code was issued by A-AS, it will try to redeem the code at A-AS’s token endpoint.

7. The attacker therefore obtains code and can either exchange the code for an access token (for public clients) or perform a code injection attack as described in Section 4.5.
Variants:

- **Implicit Grant**: In the implicit grant, the attacker receives an access token instead of the code; the rest of the attack works as above.

- **Mix-Up Without Interception**: A variant of the above attack works even if the first request/response pair cannot be intercepted (for example, because TLS is used to protect these messages): Here, we assume that the user wants to start the grant using A-AS (and not H-AS, see Attacker A1). After the client redirected the user to the authorization endpoint at A-AS, the attacker immediately redirects the user to H-AS (changing the client id to "7ZG2ldHQ"). (A vigilant user might at this point detect that she intended to use A-AS instead of H-AS.) The attack now proceeds exactly as in Steps 3ff. of the attack description above.

- **Per-AS Redirect URIs**: If clients use different redirect URIs for different ASs, do not store the selected AS in the user’s session, and ASs do not check the redirect URIs properly, attackers can mount an attack called "Cross-Social Network Request Forgery". Refer to [oauth_security_jcs_14] for details.

- **OpenID Connect**: There are several variants that can be used to attack OpenID Connect. They are described in detail in [arXiv.1704.08539], Appendix A, and [arXiv.1508.04324v2], Section 6 ("Malicious Endpoints Attacks").

4.4.2. Countermeasures

In scenarios where an OAuth client interacts with multiple authorization servers, clients MUST prevent mix-up attacks.

Potential countermeasures:

- Configure authorization servers to return an AS identifier ("iss") and the "client_id" for which a code or token was issued in the authorization response. This enables clients to compare this data to their own client id and the "iss" identifier of the AS it believed it sent the user agent to. This mitigation is discussed in detail in [I-D.ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation]. In OpenID Connect, if an ID token is returned in the authorization response, it carries client id and issuer. It can be used for this mitigation.

- As it can be seen in the preconditions of the attacks above, clients can prevent mix-up attack by (1) using AS-specific redirect URIs with exact redirect URI matching, (2) storing, for
each authorization request, the intended AS, and (3) comparing the
tended AS with the actual redirect URI where the authorization
response was received.

4.5. Authorization Code Injection

In such an attack, the adversary attempts to inject a stolen
authorization code into a legitimate client on a device under his
control. In the simplest case, the attacker would want to use the
code in his own client. But there are situations where this might
not be possible or intended. Examples are:

- The attacker wants to access certain functions in this particular
  client. As an example, the attacker wants to impersonate his
  victim in a certain app or on a certain web site.

- The code is bound to a particular confidential client and the
  attacker is unable to obtain the required client credentials to
  redeem the code himself.

- The authorization or resource servers are limited to certain
  networks that the attacker is unable to access directly.

4.5.1. Attack Description

The attack works as follows:

1. The attacker obtains an authorization code by performing any of
   the attacks described above.

2. It performs a regular OAuth authorization process with the
   legitimate client on his device.

3. The attacker injects the stolen authorization code in the
   response of the authorization server to the legitimate client.

4. The client sends the code to the authorization server’s token
   endpoint, along with client id, client secret and actual
   "redirect_uri".

5. The authorization server checks the client secret, whether the
   code was issued to the particular client and whether the actual
   redirect URI matches the "redirect_uri" parameter (see
   [RFC6749]).

6. If all checks succeed, the authorization server issues access and
   other tokens to the client, so now the attacker is able to
   impersonate the legitimate user.
4.5.2. Discussion

Obviously, the check in step (5.) will fail if the code was issued to another client id, e.g., a client set up by the attacker. The check will also fail if the authorization code was already redeemed by the legitimate user and was one-time use only.

An attempt to inject a code obtained via a malware pretending to be the legitimate client should also be detected, if the authorization server stored the complete redirect URI used in the authorization request and compares it with the redirect_uri parameter.

[RFC6749], Section 4.1.3, requires the AS to "... ensure that the "redirect_uri" parameter is present if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the initial authorization request as described in Section 4.1.1, and if included ensure that their values are identical.". In the attack scenario described above, the legitimate client would use the correct redirect URI it always uses for authorization requests. But this URI would not match the tampered redirect URI used by the attacker (otherwise, the redirect would not land at the attackers page). So the authorization server would detect the attack and refuse to exchange the code.

Note: this check could also detect attempts to inject a code which had been obtained from another instance of the same client on another device, if certain conditions are fulfilled:

- the redirect URI itself needs to contain a nonce or another kind of one-time use, secret data and
- the client has bound this data to this particular instance.

But this approach conflicts with the idea to enforce exact redirect URI matching at the authorization endpoint. Moreover, it has been observed that providers very often ignore the "redirect_uri" check requirement at this stage, maybe because it doesn’t seem to be security-critical from reading the specification.

Other providers just pattern match the "redirect_uri" parameter against the registered redirect URI pattern. This saves the authorization server from storing the link between the actual redirect URI and the respective authorization code for every transaction. But this kind of check obviously does not fulfill the intent of the spec, since the tampered redirect URI is not considered. So any attempt to inject a code obtained using the "client_id" of a legitimate client or by utilizing the legitimate client on another device won’t be detected in the respective deployments.
It is also assumed that the requirements defined in [RFC6749], Section 4.1.3, increase client implementation complexity as clients need to memorize or re-construct the correct redirect URI for the call to the tokens endpoint.

This document therefore recommends to instead bind every authorization code to a certain client instance on a certain device (or in a certain user agent) in the context of a certain transaction.

4.5.3. Proposed Countermeasures

There are multiple technical solutions to achieve this goal:

- **Nonce**: OpenID Connect’s existing "nonce" parameter can be used for the purpose of detecting authorization code injection attacks. The "nonce" value is one-time use and created by the client. The client is supposed to bind it to the user agent session and sends it with the initial request to the OpenId Provider (OP). The OP binds "nonce" to the authorization code and attests this binding in the ID token, which is issued as part of the code exchange at the token endpoint. If an attacker injected an authorization code in the authorization response, the nonce value in the client session and the nonce value in the ID token will not match and the attack is detected. The assumption is that an attacker cannot get hold of the user agent state on the victim’s device, where he has stolen the respective authorization code. The main advantage of this option is that "nonce" is an existing feature used in the wild. On the other hand, leveraging "nonce" by the broader OAuth community would require AS and clients to adopt ID Tokens.

- **Code-bound State**: The "state" parameter as specified in [RFC6749] could be used similarly to what is described above. This would require to add a further parameter "state" to the code exchange token endpoint request. The authorization server would then compare the "state" value it associated with the code and the "state" value in the parameter. If those values do not match, it is considered an attack and the request fails. The advantage of this approach would be to utilize an existing OAuth parameter. But it would also mean to re-interpret the purpose of "state" and to extend the token endpoint request.

- **PKCE**: The PKCE parameter "code_challenge" along with the corresponding "code_verifier" as specified in [RFC7636] could be used in the same way as "nonce" or "state". In contrast to its original intention, the verifier check would fail although the client uses its correct verifier but the code is associated with a challenge, which does not match. PKCE is a deployed OAuth feature, even though it is used today to secure native apps only.
*Token Binding*: Token binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] could also be used. In this case, the code would need to be bound to two legs, between user agent and AS and the user agent and the client. This requires further data (extension to response) to manifest binding id for particular code. Token binding is promising as a secure and convenient mechanism (due to its browser integration). As a challenge, it requires broad browser support and use with native apps is still under discussion.

*Per-instance client id/secret*: One could use per instance "client_id" and secrets and bind the code to the respective "client_id". Unfortunately, this does not fit into the web application programming model (would need to use per-user client IDs).

PKCE seems to be the most obvious solution for OAuth clients as it available and effectively used today for similar purposes for OAuth native apps whereas "nonce" is appropriate for OpenId Connect clients.

Note on pre-warmed secrets: An attacker can circumvent the countermeasures described above if he is able to create or capture the respective secret or code_challenge on a device under his control, which is then used in the victim’s authorization request.

Exact redirect URI matching of authorization requests can prevent the attacker from using the pre-warmed secret in the faked authorization transaction on the victim’s device.

Unfortunately, it does not work for all kinds of OAuth clients. It is effective for web and JS apps and for native apps with claimed URLs. Attacks on native apps using custom schemes or redirect URIs on localhost cannot be prevented this way, except if the AS enforces one-time use for PKCE verifier or "nonce" values.

4.6. Access Token Injection

In such an attack, the adversary attempts to inject a stolen access token into a legitimate client on a device under his control. This will typically happen if the attacker wants to utilize a leaked access token to impersonate a user in a certain client.

To conduct the attack, the adversary starts an OAuth flow with the client and modifies the authorization response by replacing the access token issued by the authorization server or directly makes up an authorization server response including the leaked access token. Since the response includes the state value generated by the client for this particular transaction, the client does not treat the
response as a CSRF and will use the access token injected by the attacker.

4.6.1. Proposed Countermeasures

There is no way to detect such an injection attack on the OAuth protocol level, since the token is issued without any binding to the transaction or the particular user agent.

The recommendation is therefore to use the authorization code grant type instead of relying on response types issuing access tokens at the authorization endpoint. Code injection can be detected using one of the countermeasures discussed in Section 4.5.

4.7. Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker might attempt to inject a request to the redirect URI of the legitimate client on the victim’s device, e.g., to cause the client to access resources under the attacker’s control.

4.7.1. Proposed Countermeasures

Standard CSRF defenses should be used to protect the redirection endpoint, for example:

- *CSRF Tokens*: Use of CSRF tokens which are bound to the user agent and passed in the "state" parameter to the authorization server.

- *Origin Header*: The Origin header can be used to detect and prevent CSRF attacks. Since this feature, at the time of writing, is not consistently supported by all browsers, CSRF tokens should be used in addition to Origin header checking.

For more details see [owasp_csrf].

4.8. Access Token Leakage at the Resource Server

Access tokens can leak from a resource server under certain circumstances.

4.8.1. Access Token Phishing by Counterfeit Resource Server

An attacker may setup his own resource server and trick a client into sending access tokens to it that are valid for other resource servers (see Attackers A1 and A5). If the client sends a valid access token to this counterfeit resource server, the attacker in turn may use that token to access other services on behalf of the resource owner.
This attack assumes the client is not bound to one specific resource server (and its URL) at development time, but client instances are provided with the resource server URL at runtime. This kind of late binding is typical in situations where the client uses a service implementing a standardized API (e.g., for e-Mail, calendar, health, or banking) and where the client is configured by a user or administrator for a service which this user or company uses.

There are several potential mitigation strategies, which will be discussed in the following sections.

4.8.1.1. Metadata

An authorization server could provide the client with additional information about the location where it is safe to use its access tokens.

In the simplest form, this would require the AS to publish a list of its known resource servers, illustrated in the following example using a metadata parameter "resource_servers":

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

```json
{
    "issuer":"https://server.somesite.example",
    "authorization_endpoint":
        "https://server.somesite.example/authorize",
    "resource_servers": [
        "email.somesite.example",
        "storage.somesite.example",
        "video.somesite.example"
    ]
...
}
```

The AS could also return the URL(s) an access token is good for in the token response, illustrated by the example return parameter "access_token_resource_server":

```json
...
}
```
This mitigation strategy would rely on the client to enforce the security policy and to only send access tokens to legitimate destinations. Results of OAuth related security research (see for example [oauth_security_ubc] and [oauth_security_cmu]) indicate a large portion of client implementations do not or fail to properly implement security controls, like "state" checks. So relying on clients to prevent access token phishing is likely to fail as well. Moreover given the ratio of clients to authorization and resource servers, it is considered the more viable approach to move as much as possible security-related logic to those entities. Clearly, the client has to contribute to the overall security. But there are alternative countermeasures, as described in the next sections, which provide a better balance between the involved parties.

4.8.1.2. Sender-Constrained Access Tokens

As the name suggests, sender-constrained access token scope the applicability of an access token to a certain sender. This sender is obliged to demonstrate knowledge of a certain secret as prerequisite for the acceptance of that token at a resource server.

A typical flow looks like this:

1. The authorization server associates data with the access token which binds this particular token to a certain client. The binding can utilize the client identity, but in most cases the AS utilizes key material (or data derived from the key material) known to the client.

2. This key material must be distributed somehow. Either the key material already exists before the AS creates the binding or the AS creates ephemeral keys. The way pre-existing key material is distributed varies among the different approaches. For example, X.509 Certificates can be used in which case the distribution happens explicitly during the enrollment process. Or the key material is created and distributed at the TLS layer, in which...
case it might automatically happens during the setup of a TLS connection.

3. The RS must implement the actual proof of possession check. This is typically done on the application level, it may utilize capabilities of the transport layer (e.g., TLS). Note: replay prevention is required as well!

There exists several proposals to demonstrate the proof of possession in the scope of the OAuth working group:

- **OAuth Token Binding** ([I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding]): In this approach, an access token is, via the so-called token binding id, bound to key material representing a long term association between a client and a certain TLS host. Negotiation of the key material and proof of possession in the context of a TLS handshake is taken care of by the TLS stack. The client needs to determine the token binding id of the target resource server and pass this data to the access token request. The authorization server then associates the access token with this id. The resource server checks on every invocation that the token binding id of the active TLS connection and the token binding id of associated with the access token match. Since all crypto-related functions are covered by the TLS stack, this approach is very client developer friendly. As a prerequisite, token binding as described in [RFC8473] (including federated token bindings) must be supported on all ends (client, authorization server, resource server).

- **OAuth Mutual TLS** ([I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls]): The approach as specified in this document allows the use of mutual TLS (mTLS) for both client authentication and sender-constrained access tokens. For the purpose of sender-constrained access tokens, the client is identified towards the resource server by the fingerprint of its public key. During processing of an access token request, the authorization server obtains the client’s public key from the TLS stack and associates its fingerprint with the respective access tokens. The resource server in the same way obtains the public key from the TLS stack and compares its fingerprint with the fingerprint associated with the access token.

- **Signed HTTP Requests** ([I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request]): This approach utilizes [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution] and represents the elements of the signature in a JSON object. The signature is built using JWS. The mechanism has built-in support for signing of HTTP method, query parameters and headers. It also incorporates a timestamp as basis for replay prevention.
JWT Pop Tokens ([I-D.sakimura-oauth-jpop]): This draft describes different ways to constrain access token usage, namely TLS or request signing. Note: Since the authors of this draft contributed the TLS-related proposal to [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls], this document only considers the request signing part. For request signing, the draft utilizes [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution] and [RFC7800]. The signature data is represented in a JWT and JWS is used for signing. Replay prevention is provided by building the signature over a server-provided nonce, client-provided nonce and a nonce counter.

Mutual TLS and OAuth Token Binding are built on top of TLS and this way continue the successful OAuth 2.0 philosophy to leverage TLS to secure OAuth wherever possible. Both mechanisms allow prevention of access token leakage in a fairly client developer friendly way.

There are some differences between both approaches: To start with, for OAuth Token Binding, all key material is automatically managed by the TLS stack whereas mTLS requires the developer to create and maintain the key pairs and respective certificates. Use of self-signed certificates, which is supported by the draft, significantly reduces the complexity of this task. Furthermore, OAuth Token Binding allows to use different key pairs for different resource servers, which is a privacy benefit. On the other hand, [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] only requires widely deployed TLS features, which means it might be easier to adopt in the short term.

Application level signing approaches, like [I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request] and [I-D.sakimura-oauth-jpop] have been debated for a long time in the OAuth working group without a clear outcome.

As one advantage, application-level signing allows for end-to-end protection including non-repudiation even if the TLS connection is terminated between client and resource server. But deployment experiences have revealed challenges regarding robustness (e.g., reproduction of the signature base string including correct URL) as well as state management (e.g., replay prevention).

This document therefore recommends implementors to consider one of TLS-based approaches wherever possible.

4.8.1.3. Audience Restricted Access Tokens

An audience restriction essentially restricts the resource server a particular access token can be used at. The authorization server associates the access token with a certain resource server and every
resource server is obliged to verify for every request, whether the access token sent with that request was meant to be used at the particular resource server. If not, the resource server must refuse to serve the respective request. In the general case, audience restrictions limit the impact of a token leakage. In the case of a counterfeit resource server, it may (as described see below) also prevent abuse of the phished access token at the legitimate resource server.

The audience can basically be expressed using logical names or physical addresses (like URLs). In order to prevent phishing, it is necessary to use the actual URL the client will send requests to. In the phishing case, this URL will point to the counterfeit resource server. If the attacker tries to use the access token at the legitimate resource server (which has a different URL), the resource server will detect the mismatch (wrong audience) and refuse to serve the request.

In deployments where the authorization server knows the URLs of all resource servers, the authorization server may just refuse to issue access tokens for unknown resource server URLs.

The client needs to tell the authorization server, at which URL it will use the access token it is requesting. It could use the mechanism proposed [I-D.ietf-oauth-resource-indicators] or encode the information in the scope value.

Instead of the URL, it is also possible to utilize the fingerprint of the resource server’s X.509 certificate as audience value. This variant would also allow to detect an attempt to spoof the legit resource server’s URL by using a valid TLS certificate obtained from a different CA. It might also be considered a privacy benefit to hide the resource server URL from the authorization server.

Audience restriction seems easy to use since it does not require any crypto on the client side. But since every access token is bound to a certain resource server, the client also needs to obtain different RS-specific access tokens, if it wants to access several resource services. [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] has the same property, since different token binding ids must be associated with the access token. [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] on the other hand allows a client to use the access token at multiple resource servers.

It shall be noted that audience restrictions, or generally speaking an indication by the client to the authorization server where it wants to use the access token, has additional benefits beyond the scope of token leakage prevention. It allows the authorization server to create different access token whose format and content is
specifically minted for the respective server. This has huge functional and privacy advantages in deployments using structured access tokens.

4.8.2. Compromised Resource Server

An attacker may compromise a resource server in order to get access to its resources and other resources of the respective deployment. Such a compromise may range from partial access to the system, e.g., its logfiles, to full control of the respective server.

If the attacker was able to take over full control including shell access it will be able to circumvent all controls in place and access resources without access control. It will also get access to access tokens, which are sent to the compromised system and which potentially are valid for access to other resource servers as well. Even if the attacker "only" is able to access logfiles or databases of the server system, it may get access to valid access tokens.

Preventing server breaches by way of hardening and monitoring server systems is considered a standard operational procedure and therefore out of scope of this document. This section will focus on the impact of such breaches on OAuth-related parts of the ecosystem, which is the replay of captured access tokens on the compromised resource server and other resource servers of the respective deployment.

The following measures should be taken into account by implementors in order to cope with access token replay:

- The resource server must treat access tokens like any other credentials. It is considered good practice to not log them and not to store them in plain text.

- Sender-constrained access tokens as described in Section 4.8.1.2 will prevent the attacker from replaying the access tokens on other resource servers. Depending on the severity of the penetration, it will also prevent replay on the compromised system.

- Audience restriction as described in Section 4.8.1.3 may be used to prevent replay of captured access tokens on other resource servers.

4.9. Open Redirection

The following attacks can occur when an AS or client has an open redirector, i.e., a URL which causes an HTTP redirect to an attacker-controlled web site.
4.9.1. Authorization Server as Open Redirector

Attackers could try to utilize a user’s trust in the authorization server (and its URL in particular) for performing phishing attacks. [RFC6749], Section 4.1.2.1, already prevents open redirects by stating the AS MUST NOT automatically redirect the user agent in case of an invalid combination of client_id and redirect_uri.

However, as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-closing-redirectors], an attacker could also utilize a correctly registered redirect URI to perform phishing attacks. It could for example register a client via dynamic client registration [RFC7591] and intentionally send an erroneous authorization request, e.g., by using an invalid scope value, to cause the AS to automatically redirect the user agent to its phishing site.

The AS MUST take precautions to prevent this threat. Based on its risk assessment the AS needs to decide whether it can trust the redirect URI or not and SHOULD only automatically redirect the user agent, if it trusts the redirect URI. If not, it MAY inform the user that it is about to redirect her to the another site and rely on the user to decide or MAY just inform the user about the error.

4.9.2. Clients as Open Redirector

Client MUST NOT expose URLs which could be utilized as open redirector. Attackers may use an open redirector to produce URLs which appear to point to the client, which might trick users to trust the URL and follow it in her browser. Another abuse case is to produce URLs pointing to the client and utilize them to impersonate a client with an authorization server.

In order to prevent open redirection, clients should only expose such a function, if the target URLs are whitelisted or if the origin of a request can be authenticated.

4.10. 307 Redirect

At the authorization endpoint, a typical protocol flow is that the AS prompts the user to enter her credentials in a form that is then submitted (using the HTTP POST method) back to the authorization server. The AS checks the credentials and, if successful, redirects the user agent to the client’s redirection endpoint.

In [RFC6749], the HTTP status code 302 is used for this purpose, but "any other method available via the user-agent to accomplish this redirection is allowed". However, when the status code 307 is used
for redirection, the user agent will send the form data (user credentials) via HTTP POST to the client since this status code does not require the user agent to rewrite the POST request to a GET request (and thereby dropping the form data in the POST request body). If the relying party is malicious, it can use the credentials to impersonate the user at the AS.

In the HTTP standard [RFC6749], only the status code 303 unambiguously enforces rewriting the HTTP POST request to an HTTP GET request. For all other status codes, including the popular 302, user agents can opt not to rewrite POST to GET requests and therefore to reveal the user credentials to the client. (In practice, however, most user agents will only show this behaviour for 307 redirects.)

AS which redirect a request that potentially contains user credentials therefore MUST NOT use the HTTP 307 status code for redirection. If an HTTP redirection (and not, for example, JavaScript) is used for such a request, AS SHOULD use HTTP status code 303 "See Other".

4.11. TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies

A common deployment architecture for HTTP applications is to have the application server sitting behind a reverse proxy, which terminates the TLS connection and dispatches the incoming requests to the respective application server nodes.

This section highlights some attack angles of this deployment architecture, which are relevant to OAuth, and give recommendations for security controls.

In some situations, the reverse proxy needs to pass security-related data to the upstream application servers for further processing. Examples include the IP address of the request originator, token binding ids and authenticated TLS client certificates.

If the reverse proxy would pass through any header sent from the outside, an attacker could try to directly send the faked header values through the proxy to the application server in order to circumvent security controls that way. For example, it is standard practice of reverse proxies to accept "forwarded_for" headers and just add the origin of the inbound request (making it a list). Depending on the logic performed in the application server, the attacker could simply add a whitelisted IP address to the header and render a IP whitelist useless. A reverse proxy must therefore sanitize any inbound requests to ensure the authenticity and integrity of all header values relevant for the security of the application servers.
If an attacker would be able to get access to the internal network between proxy and application server, it could also try to circumvent security controls in place. It is therefore important to ensure the authenticity of the communicating entities. Furthermore, the communication link between reverse proxy and application server must therefore be protected against tapping and injection (including replay prevention).

4.12. Refresh Token Protection

Refresh tokens are a convenient and UX-friendly way to obtain new access tokens after the expiration of older access tokens. Refresh tokens also add to the security of OAuth since they allow the authorization server to issue access tokens with a short lifetime and reduced scope thus reducing the potential impact of access token leakage.

Refresh tokens are an attractive target for attackers since they represent the overall grant a resource owner delegated to a certain client. If an attacker is able to exfiltrate and successfully replay a refresh token, the attacker will be able to mint access tokens and use them to access resource servers on behalf of the resource owner.

[RFC6749] already provides a robust baseline protection by requiring

- confidentiality of the refresh tokens in transit and storage,
- the transmission of refresh tokens over TLS-protected connections between authorization server and client,
- the authorization server to maintain and check the binding of a refresh token to a certain client (i.e., "client_id"),
- authentication of this client during token refresh, if possible, and
- that refresh tokens cannot be generated, modified, or guessed.

[RFC6749] also lays the foundation for further (implementation specific) security measures, such as refresh token expiration and revocation as well as refresh token rotation by defining respective error codes and response behavior.

This draft gives recommendations beyond the scope of [RFC6749] and clarifications.

Authorization servers MUST determine based on their risk assessment whether to issue refresh tokens to a certain client. If the
authorization server decides not to issue refresh tokens, the client may refresh access tokens by utilizing other grant types, such as the authorization code grant type. In such a case, the authorization server may utilize cookies and persistent grants to optimize the user experience.

If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens MUST be bound to the scope and resource servers as consented by the resource owner. This is to prevent privilege escalation by the legit client and reduce the impact of refresh token leakage.

Authorization server MUST utilize one of these methods to detect refresh token replay for public clients:

- **Sender-constrained refresh tokens:** the authorization server cryptographically binds the refresh token to a certain client instance by utilizing [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] or [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls].

- **Refresh token rotation:** the authorization server issues a new refresh token with every access token refresh response. The previous refresh token is invalidated but information about the relationship is retained by the authorization server. If a refresh token is compromised and subsequently used by both the attacker and the legitimate client, one of them will present an invalidated refresh token, which will inform the authorization server of the breach. The authorization server cannot determine which party submitted the invalid refresh token, but it can revoke the active refresh token. This stops the attack at the cost of forcing the legit client to obtain a fresh authorization grant. Implementation note: refresh tokens belonging to the same grant may share a common id. If any of those refresh tokens is used at the authorization server, the authorization server uses this common id to look up the currently active refresh token and can revoke it.

Authorization servers may revoke refresh tokens automatically in case of a security event, such as:

- password change

- logout at the authorization server

Refresh tokens SHOULD expire if the client has been inactive for some time, i.e., the refresh token has not been used to obtain fresh access tokens for some time. The expiration time is at the discretion of the authorization server. It might be a global value
or determined based on the client policy or the grant associated with
the refresh token (and its sensitivity).

5. Acknowledgements

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Campbell for their valuable feedback.

6. IANA Considerations

This draft includes no request to IANA.

7. Security Considerations

All relevant security considerations have been given in the
functional specification.

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[I-D.sakimura-oauth-jpop]  


Appendix A.  Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

-12
  o Added updated attacker model

-11
  o Adapted section 2.1.2 to outcome of consensus call

  o more text on refresh token inactivity and implementation note on refresh token replay detection via refresh token rotation

-10
  o incorporated feedback by Joseph Heenan

  o changed occurrences of SHALL to MUST

  o added text on lack of token/cert binding support tokens issued in the authorization response as justification to not recommend issuing tokens there at all

  o added requirement to authenticate clients during code exchange (PKCE or client credential) to 2.1.1.

  o added section on refresh tokens

  o editorial enhancements to 2.1.2 based on feedback

-09
- changed text to recommend not to use implicit but code
- added section on access token injection
- reworked sections 3.1 through 3.3 to be more specific on implicit grant issues
- added recommendations re implicit and token injection
- uppercased key words in Section 2 according to RFC 2119
- incorporated findings of Doug McDorman
- added section on HTTP status codes for redirects
- added new section on access token privilege restriction based on comments from Johan Peeters
- reworked section 3.8.1
- incorporated Phil Hunt’s feedback
- reworked section on mix-up
- extended section on code leakage via referrer header to also cover state leakage
- added Daniel Fett as author
- replaced text intended to inform WG discussion by recommendations to implementors
- modified example URLs to conform to RFC 2606
- Completed sections on code leakage via referrer header, attacks in browser, mix-up, and CSRF
- Reworked Code Injection Section
- Added reference to OpenID Connect spec
removed refresh token leakage as respective considerations have been given in section 10.4 of RFC 6749

first version on open redirection

 incorporated Christian Mainka’s review feedback

 Restructured document for better readability

 Added best practices on Token Leakage prevention

 Added section on Access Token Leakage at Resource Server

 incorporated Brian Campbell’s findings

 Folded Mix up and Access Token leakage through a bad AS into new section for dynamic OAuth threats

 reworked dynamic OAuth section

 Added references to mitigation methods for token leakage

 Added reference to Token Binding for Authorization Code

 incorporated feedback of Phil Hunt

 fixed numbering issue in attack descriptions in section 2

 (WG document)

 turned the ID into a WG document and a BCP

 Added federated app login as topic in Other Topics

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Abstract

This specification defines a means for an UMA-enabled authorization server and resource server to be loosely coupled, or federated, in a secure and authorized resource owner context.

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1. Introduction

This specification extends and complements [UMAGrant] to loosely couple, or federate, its authorization process. This enables multiple resource servers operating in different domains to communicate with a single authorization server operating in yet another domain that acts on behalf of a resource owner. A service ecosystem can thus automate resource protection, and the resource owner can monitor and control authorization grant rules through the authorization server over time. Further, authorization grants can increase and decrease at the level of individual resources and scopes.

Building on the example provided in the introduction in [UMAGrant], bank customer (resource owner) Alice has a bank account service (resource server), a cloud file system (different resource server hosted elsewhere), and a dedicated sharing management service (authorization server) hosted by the bank. She can manage access to her various protected resources by spouse Bob, accounting professional Charline, financial information aggregation company DecideAccount, and neighbor Erik (requesting parties), all using different client applications. Her bank accounts and her various files and folders are protected resources, and she can use the same sharing management service to monitor and control different scopes of access to them by these different parties, such as viewing, editing, or printing files and viewing account data or accessing payment functions.

This specification, together with [UMAGrant], constitutes UMA 2.0. This specification is OPTIONAL to use with the UMA grant.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Unless otherwise noted, all parameter names and values are case sensitive. JSON [RFC7159] data structures defined in this specification MAY contain extension parameters that are not defined in this specification. Any entity receiving or retrieving a JSON data structure SHOULD ignore extension parameters it is unable to understand. Extension names that are unprotected from collisions are outside the scope of this specification.
1.2. Abstract Flow

The UMA grant defined in [UMAGrant] enhances the abstract protocol flow of OAuth. This specification enhances the UMA grant by defining formal communications between the UMA-enabled authorization server and resource server as they act on behalf of the resource owner, responding to authorization and resource requests, respectively, by a client that is acting on behalf of a requesting party.

A summary of UMA 2.0 communications, combining the UMA grant with federated authorization, is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Federated Authorization Enhancements to UMA Grant Flow
This specification uses all of the terms and concepts in [UMAGrant].
This figure introduces the following new concepts:

**protection API**  The API presented by the authorization server to the
resource server, defined in this specification. This API is
OAuth-protected.

**protection API access token (PAT)**  An [RFC6749] access token with the
scope "uma_protection", used by the resource server as a client
of the authorization server’s protection API. The resource
owner involved in the UMA grant is the same entity taking on
the role of the resource owner authorizing issuance of the PAT.

### 1.3. HTTP Usage, API Security, and Identity Context

This specification is designed for use with HTTP [RFC2616], and for
interoperability and security in the context of loosely coupled
services and applications operated by independent parties in
independent domains. The use of UMA over any protocol other than
HTTP is undefined. In such circumstances, it is RECOMMENDED to
define profiles or extensions to achieve interoperability among
independent implementations (see Section 4 of [UMAGrant]).

The authorization server MUST use TLS protection over its protection
API endpoints, as governed by [BCP195], which discusses deployment
and adoption characteristics of different TLS versions.

The authorization server MUST use OAuth and require a valid PAT to
secure its protection API endpoints. The authorization server and
the resource server (as an OAuth client) MUST support bearer usage of
the PAT, as defined in [RFC6750]. All examples in this specification
show the use of bearer-style PATs in this format.

As defined in [UMAGrant], the resource owner -- the entity here
authorizing PAT issuance -- MAY be an end-user (natural person) or a
non-human entity treated as a person for limited legal purposes
(legal person), such as a corporation. A PAT is unique to a resource
owner, resource server used for resource management, and
authorization server used for protection of those resources. The
issuance of the PAT represents the authorization of the resource
owner for the resource server to use the authorization server for
protecting those resources.

Different grant types for PAT issuance might be appropriate for
different types of resource owners; for example, the client
credentials grant is useful in the case of an organization acting as
a resource owner, whereas an interactive grant type is typically more
appropriate for capturing the approval of an end-user resource owner.
Where an identity token is desired in addition to an access token, it is RECOMMENDED to use [OIDCCore] in addition.

1.4. Separation of Responsibility and Authority

Federation of authorization for the UMA grant delivers a conceptual separation of responsibility and authority:

- The resource owner can control access to resources residing at multiple resource servers from a single authorization server, by virtue of authorizing PAT issuance for each resource server. Any one resource server MAY be operated by a party different from the one operating the authorization server.

- The resource server defines the boundaries of resources and the scopes available to each resource, and interprets how clients’ resource requests map to permission requests, by virtue of being the publisher of the API being protected and using the protection API to communicate to the authorization server.

- The resource owner works with the authorization server to configure policy conditions (authorization grant rules), which the authorization server executes in the process of issuing access tokens. The authorization process makes use of claims gathered from the requesting party and client in order to satisfy all operative operative policy conditions.

The separation of authorization decision making and authorization enforcement is similar to the architectural separation often used in enterprises between policy decision points and policy enforcement points. However, the resource server MAY apply additional authorization controls beyond those imposed by the authorization server. For example, even if an RPT provides sufficient permissions for a particular case, the resource server can choose to bar access based on its own criteria.

Practical control of access among loosely coupled parties typically requires more than just messaging protocols. It is outside the scope of this specification to define more than the technical contract between UMA-conforming entities. Laws may govern authorization-granting relationships. It is RECOMMENDED for the resource owner, authorization server, and resource server to establish agreements about which parties are responsible for establishing and maintaining authorization grant rules and other authorization rules on a legal or contractual level, and parties operating entities claiming to be UMA-conforming should provide documentation of rights and obligations between and among them. See Section 4 of [UMAGrant] for more information.
Except for PAT issuance, the resource owner-resource server and resource owner-authorization server interfaces -- including the setting of policy conditions -- are outside the scope of this specification (see Section 8 and Section 6.1 of [UMAGrant] for privacy considerations). Some elements of the protection API enable the building of user interfaces for policy condition setting (for example, see Section 3.2, which can be used in concert with user interaction for resource protection and sharing and offers an end-user redirection mechanism for policy interactions).

Note: The resource server typically requires access to at least the permission and token introspection endpoints when an end-user resource owner is not available ("offline" access). Thus, the authorization server needs to manage the PAT in a way that ensures this outcome. [UMA-Impl] discusses ways the resource server can enhance its error handling when the PAT is invalid.

1.5. Protection API Summary

The protection API defines the following endpoints:

- Resource registration endpoint as defined in Section 3. The API available at this endpoint provides a means for the resource server to put resources under the protection of an authorization server on behalf of the resource owner and manage them over time.

- Permission endpoint as defined in Section 4. This endpoint provides a means for the resource server to request a set of one or more permissions on behalf of the client based on the client’s resource request when that request is unaccompanied by an access token or is accompanied by an RPT that is insufficient for access to that resource.

- OPTIONAL token introspection endpoint as defined in [RFC7662] and as extended in Section 5. This endpoint provides a means for the resource server to introspect the RPT.

Use of these endpoints assumes that the resource server has acquired OAuth client credentials from the authorization server by static or dynamic means, and has a valid PAT. Note: Although the resource identifiers that appear in permission and token introspection request messages could sufficiently identify the resource owner, the PAT is still required because it represents the resource owner’s authorization to use the protection API, as noted in Section 1.3.

The authorization server MUST declare its protection API endpoints in the discovery document (see Section 2).
1.5.1. Permissions

A permission is (requested or granted) authorized access to a particular resource with some number of scopes bound to that resource. The concept of permissions is used in authorization assessment, results calculation, and RPT issuance in [UMAGrant]. This concept takes on greater significance in relation to the protection API.

The resource server’s resource registration operations at the authorization server result in a set of resource owner-specific resource identifiers. When the client makes a resource request that is unaccompanied by an access token or its resource request fails, the resource server is responsible for interpreting that request and mapping it to a choice of authorization server, resource owner, resource identifier(s), and set of scopes for each identifier, in order to request one or more permissions -- resource identifiers and a set of scopes -- and obtain a permission ticket on the client’s behalf. Finally, when the client has made a resource request accompanied by an RPT and token introspection is in use, the returned token introspection object reveals the structure of permissions, potentially including expiration of individual permissions.

2. Authorization Server Metadata

This specification makes use of the authorization server discovery document structure and endpoint defined in [UMAGrant]. The resource server uses this discovery document to discover the endpoints it needs.

In addition to the metadata defined in that specification and [OAuthMeta], this specification defines the following metadata for inclusion in the discovery document:

permission_endpoint
REQUIRED. The endpoint URI at which the resource server requests permissions on the client’s behalf.

resource_registration_endpoint
REQUIRED. The endpoint URI at which the resource server registers resources to put them under authorization manager protection.

Following are additional requirements related to metadata:

introspection_endpoint
If the authorization server supports token introspection as defined in this specification, it MUST supply this metadata value (defined in [OAuthMeta]).
The authorization server SHOULD document any profiled or extended features it supports explicitly, ideally by supplying the URI identifying each UMA profile and extension as an "uma_profiles_supported" metadata array value (defined in [UMAGrant]), and by using extension metadata to indicate specific usage details as necessary.

3. Resource Registration Endpoint

The API available at the resource registration endpoint enables the resource server to put resources under the protection of an authorization server on behalf of the resource owner and manage them over time. Protection of a resource at the authorization server begins on successful registration and ends on successful deregistration.

The resource server uses a RESTful API at the authorization server’s resource registration endpoint to create, read, update, and delete resource descriptions, along with retrieving lists of such descriptions. The descriptions consist of JSON documents that are maintained as web resources at the authorization server. (Note carefully the similar but distinct senses in which the word "resource" is used in this section.)

Figure 2 illustrates the resource registration API operations, with requests and success responses shown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>authorization server</th>
<th>resource server</th>
<th>resource owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*PROTECTION API:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Resource registration endpoint/API</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Create resource (POST)</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*201 Created with resource ID</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set policy conditions (anytime before deletion/deregistration)</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Read (GET) with resource ID</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*200 OK with resource representation</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Update (PUT) with resource ID</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*200 OK with resource ID</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*List (GET)</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*200 OK with list of resource IDs</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Delete (DELETE) with resource ID</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*200 OK or 204 No Content</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Resource Registration Endpoint and API: Requests and Success Responses

The resource server MAY protect any subset of the resource owner’s resources using different authorization servers or other means entirely, or to protect some resources and not others. Additionally, the choice of protection regimes MAY be made explicitly by the

resource owner or implicitly by the resource server. Any such partitioning by the resource server or owner is outside the scope of this specification.

The resource server MAY register a single resource for protection that, from its perspective, has multiple parts, or has dynamic elements such as the capacity for querying or filtering, or otherwise has internal complexity. The resource server alone is responsible for maintaining any required mappings between internal representations and the resource identifiers and scopes known to the authorization server.

Note: The resource server is responsible for managing the process and timing of registering resources, maintaining the registration of resources, and deregistering resources at the authorization server. Motivations for updating a resource might include, for example, new scopes added to a new API version or resource owner actions at a resource server that result in new resource description text. See [UMA-Impl] for a discussion of initial resource registration timing options.

3.1. Resource Description

A resource description is a JSON document that describes the characteristics of a resource sufficiently for an authorization server to protect it. A resource description has the following parameters:

resource_scopes  REQUIRED. An array of strings, serving as scope identifiers, indicating the available scopes for this resource. Any of the strings MAY be either a plain string or a URI.

description  OPTIONAL. A human-readable string describing the resource at length. The authorization server MAY use this description in any user interface it presents to a resource owner, for example, for resource protection monitoring or policy setting. The value of this parameter MAY be internationalized, as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC7591].

icon_uri  OPTIONAL. A URI for a graphic icon representing the resource. The authorization server MAY use the referenced icon in any user interface it presents to a resource owner, for example, for resource protection monitoring or policy setting.

name  OPTIONAL. A human-readable string naming the resource. The authorization server MAY use this name in any user interface it presents to a resource owner, for example, for resource protection monitoring or policy setting.
monitoring or policy setting. The value of this parameter MAY be internationalized, as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC7591].

type  OPTIONAL. A string identifying the semantics of the resource. For example, if the resource is an identity claim that leverages standardized claim semantics for "verified email address", the value of this parameter could be an identifying URI for this claim. The authorization server MAY use this information in processing information about the resource or displaying information about it in any user interface it presents to a resource owner.

For example, this description characterizes a resource (a photo album) that can potentially be viewed or printed; the scope URI points to a scope description as defined in Section 3.1.1:

```json
{
  "resource_scopes": [
    "view",
    "http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/print"
  ],
  "description": "Collection of digital photographs",
  "icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
  "name": "Photo Album",
  "type": "http://www.example.com/rsrscs/photoalbum"
}
```

3.1.1. Scope Description

A scope description is a JSON document that describes the characteristics of a scope sufficiently for an authorization server to protect the resource with this available scope.

While a scope URI appearing in a resource description (see Section 3.1) MAY resolve to a scope description document, and thus scope description documents are possible to standardize and reference publicly, the authorization server is not expected to resolve scope description details at resource registration time or at any other run-time requirement. The resource server and authorization server are presumed to have negotiated any required interpretation of scope handling out of band.

A scope description has the following parameters:

description  OPTIONAL. A human-readable string describing the resource at length. The authorization server MAY use this description in any user interface it presents to a resource owner, for example, for resource protection monitoring or policy setting.
The value of this parameter MAY be internationalized, as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC7591].

icon_uri  OPTIONAL.  A URI for a graphic icon representing the scope.  The authorization server MAY use the referenced icon in any user interface it presents to a resource owner, for example, for resource protection monitoring or policy setting.

name  OPTIONAL.  A human-readable string naming the scope.  The authorization server MAY use this name in any user interface it presents to a resource owner, for example, for resource protection monitoring or policy setting.  The value of this parameter MAY be internationalized, as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC7591].

For example, this scope description characterizes a scope that involves printing (as opposed to, say, creating or editing in some fashion):

```json
{
  "description":"Print out and produce PDF files of photos",
  "icon_uri":"http://www.example.com/icons/printer",
  "name":"Print"
}
```

3.2.  Resource Registration API

The authorization server MUST support the following five registration options and MUST require a valid PAT for access to them; any other operations are undefined by this specification.  Here, _rreguri_ stands for the resource registration endpoint and __id_ stands for the authorization server-assigned identifier for the web resource corresponding to the resource at the time it was created, included within the URL returned in the Location header.  Each operation is defined in its own section below.

- Create resource description: POST _rreguri/_
- Read resource description: GET _rreguri_/__id_
- Update resource description: PUT _rreguri_/__id_
- Delete resource description: DELETE _rreguri_/__id_
- List resource descriptions: GET _rreguri/_

Within the JSON body of a successful response, the authorization server includes common parameters, possibly in addition to method-specific parameters, as follows:
_id REQUIRED (except for the Delete and List methods). A string value repeating the authorization server-defined identifier for the web resource corresponding to the resource. Its appearance in the body makes it readily available as an identifier for various protected resource management tasks.

user_access_policy_uri OPTIONAL. A URI that allows the resource server to redirect an end-user resource owner to a specific user interface within the authorization server where the resource owner can immediately set or modify access policies subsequent to the resource registration action just completed. The authorization server is free to choose the targeted user interface, for example, in the case of a deletion action, enabling the resource server to direct the end-user to a policy-setting interface for an overall "folder" resource formerly "containing" the deleted resource (a relationship the authorization server is not aware of), to enable adjustment of related policies.

If the request to the resource registration endpoint is incorrect, then the authorization server instead responds as follows (see Section 6 for information about error messages):

- If the referenced resource cannot be found, the authorization server MUST respond with an HTTP 404 (Not Found) status code and MAY respond with a "not_found" error code.

- If the resource server request used an unsupported HTTP method, the authorization server MUST respond with the HTTP 405 (Method Not Allowed) status code and MAY respond with an "unsupported_method_type" error code.

- If the request is missing a required parameter, includes an invalid parameter value, includes a parameter more than once, or is otherwise malformed, the authorization server MUST respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code and MAY respond with an "invalid_request" error code.

3.2.1. Create Resource Description

Adds a new resource description to the authorization server using the POST method. If the request is successful, the resource is thereby registered and the authorization server MUST respond with an HTTP 201 status message that includes a "Location" header and an "_id" parameter.
Form of a create request, with a PAT in the header:

```
POST /rreg/ HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer MHg3OUZEQkZBMjcx
...
{
  "resource_scopes": ["read-public", "post-updates", "read-private", "http://www.example.com/scopes/all"],
  "icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/sharesocial.png",
  "name": "Tweedl Social Service",
  "type": "http://www.example.com/rsrscs/socialstream/140-compatible"
}
```

Form of a successful response, also containing an optional "user_access_policy_uri" parameter:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Location: /rreg/KX3A-39WE
...
{
  "_id": "KX3A-39WE",
  "user_access_policy_uri": "http://as.example.com/rs/222/resource/KX3A-39WE/policy"
}
```

3.2.2. Read Resource Description

Reads a previously registered resource description using the GET method. If the request is successful, the authorization server MUST respond with an HTTP 200 status message that includes a body containing the referenced resource description, along with an "_id" parameter.

Form of a read request, with a PAT in the header:

```
GET /rreg/KX3A-39WE HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer MHg3OUZEQkZBMjcx
...
```
Form of a successful response, containing all the parameters that were registered as part of the description:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
   "_id":"KX3A-39WE",
   "resource_scopes":[
      "read-public",
      "post-updates",
      "read-private",
      "http://www.example.com/scopes/all"
   ],
   "icon_uri":"http://www.example.com/icons/sharesocial.png",
   "name":"Tweedl Social Service",
   "type":"http://www.example.com/rsrcs/socialstream/140-compatible"
}

3.2.3. Update Resource Description

Updates a previously registered resource description, by means of a complete replacement of the previous resource description, using the PUT method. If the request is successful, the authorization server MUST respond with an HTTP 200 status message that includes an "_id" parameter.

Form of an update request adding a "description" parameter to a resource description that previously had none, with a PAT in the header:

PUT /rreg/9UQU-DUWW HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...
{
   "resource_scopes":[
      "http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
      "public-read"
   ],
   "description":"Collection of digital photographs",
   "icon_uri":"http://www.example.com/icons/sky.png",
   "name":"Photo Album",
   "type":"http://www.example.com/rsrsc/photoalbum"
}
3.2.4. Delete Resource Description

Deletes a previously registered resource description using the DELETE method. If the request is successful, the resource is thereby deregistered and the authorization server MUST respond with an HTTP 200 or 204 status message.

Form of a delete request, with a PAT in the header:

DELETE /rreg/9UQU-DUWW
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...

Form of a successful response:

HTTP/1.1 204 No content
...

3.2.5. List Resource Descriptions

Lists all previously registered resource identifiers for this resource owner using the GET method. The authorization server MUST return the list in the form of a JSON array of "_id" string values.

The resource server can use this method as a first step in checking whether its understanding of protected resources is in full synchronization with the authorization server’s understanding.

Form of a list request, with a PAT in the header:

GET /rreg/ HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...

Form of a successful response, not containing the optional "user_access_policy_uri" parameter:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
{
  "_id":"9UQU-DUWW"
}
Form of a successful response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
[
    "KX3A-39WE",
    "9UQU-DUWW"
]

4. Permission Endpoint

The permission endpoint defines a means for the resource server to request one or more permissions (resource identifiers and corresponding scopes) with the authorization server on the client’s behalf, and to receive a permission ticket in return, in order to respond as indicated in Section 3.2 of [UMAGrant]. The resource server uses this endpoint on the following occasions:

- After the client’s initial resource request without an access token
- After the client’s resource request that was accompanied by an invalid RPT or a valid RPT that had insufficient permissions associated with it

The use of the permission endpoint is illustrated in Figure 3, with a request and a success response shown.
The PAT provided in the API request enables the authorization server to map the resource server’s request to the appropriate resource owner. It is only possible to request permissions for access to the resources of a single resource owner, protected by a single authorization server, at a time.

In its response, the authorization server returns a permission ticket for the resource server to give to the client that represents the same permissions that the resource server requested.

The process of choosing what permissions to request from the authorization server may require interpretation and mapping of the client’s resource request. The resource server SHOULD request a set of permissions with scopes that is reasonable for the client’s resource request. The resource server MAY request multiple permissions, and any permission MAY have zero scopes associated with it. Requesting multiple permissions might be appropriate, for example, in cases where the resource server expects the requesting party to need access to several related resources if they need access to any one of the resources (see Section 3.3.4 of [UMAGrant] for an example). Requesting a permission with no scopes might be appropriate, for example, in cases where an access attempt involves an API call that is ambiguous without further context (role-based scopes such as "user" and "admin" could have this ambiguous quality, and an explicit client request for a particular scope at the token

Figure 3: Permission Endpoint: Request and Success Response
endpoint later can clarify the desired access). The resource server SHOULD document its intended pattern of permission requests in order to assist the client in pre-registering for and requesting appropriate scopes at the authorization server. See [UMA-Impl] for a discussion of permission request patterns.

Note: In order for the resource server to know which authorization server to approach for the permission ticket and on which resource owner’s behalf (enabling a choice of permission endpoint and PAT), it needs to derive the necessary information using cues provided by the structure of the API where the resource request was made, rather than by an access token. Commonly, this information can be passed through the URI, headers, or body of the client’s request. Alternatively, the entire interface could be dedicated to the use of a single resource owner and protected by a single authorization server.

4.1. Resource Server Request to Permission Endpoint

The resource server uses the POST method at the permission endpoint. The body of the HTTP request message contains a JSON object for requesting a permission for single resource identifier, or an array of one or more objects for requesting permissions for a corresponding number of resource identifiers. The object format in both cases is derived from the resource description format specified in Section 3.1; it has the following parameters:

resource_id  REQUIRED. The identifier for a resource to which the resource server is requesting a permission on behalf of the client. The identifier MUST correspond to a resource that was previously registered.

resource_scopes  REQUIRED. An array referencing zero or more identifiers of scopes to which the resource server is requesting access for this resource on behalf of the client. Each scope identifier MUST correspond to a scope that was previously registered by this resource server for the referenced resource.
Example of an HTTP request for a single permission at the authorization server’s permission endpoint, with a PAT in the header:

POST /perm HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Host: as.example.com
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69

...

{
  "resource_id":"112210f47de98100",
  "resource_scopes": [ 
    "view",
    "http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/print"
  ]
}


Example of an HTTP request for multiple permissions at the authorization server’s permission endpoint, with a PAT in the header:

POST /perm HTTP/1.1  
Content-Type: application/json  
Host: as.example.com  
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69  
...

[
  {
    "resource_id":"7b727369647d",
    "resource_scopes":[
      "view",
      "crop",
      "lightbox"
    ]
  },
  {
    "resource_id":"7b72736964327d",
    "resource_scopes":[
      "view",
      "layout",
      "print"
    ]
  },
  {
    "resource_id":"7b72736964337d",
    "resource_scopes":[
      "http://www.example.com/scopes/all"
    ]
  }
]


If the authorization server is successful in creating a permission ticket in response to the resource server’s request, it responds with an HTTP 201 (Created) status code and includes the "ticket" parameter in the JSON-formatted body. Regardless of whether the request contained one or multiple permissions, only a single permission ticket is returned.
For example:

HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
  "ticket":"016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de"
}

4.3. Authorization Server Response to Resource Server on Permission Request Failure

If the resource server’s permission registration request is authenticated properly but fails due to other reasons, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code and includes one of the following error codes (see Section 6 for more information about error codes and responses):

invalid_resource_id At least one of the provided resource identifiers was not found at the authorization server.

invalid_scope At least one of the scopes included in the request was not registered previously by this resource server for the referenced resource.

5. Token Introspection Endpoint

When the client makes a resource request accompanied by an RPT, the resource server needs to determine whether the RPT is active and, if so, its associated permissions. Depending on the nature of the RPT and operative caching parameters, the resource server MAY take any of the following actions as appropriate to determine the RPT’s status:

- Introspect the RPT at the authorization server using the OAuth token introspection endpoint (defined in [RFC7662] and this section) that is part of the protection API. The authorization server’s response contains an extended version of the introspection response. If the authorization server supports this specification’s version of the token introspection endpoint, it MUST declare the endpoint in its discovery document (see Section 2) and support this extended version of the response.

- Use a cached copy of the token introspection response if allowed (see Section 4 of [RFC7662]).

- Validate the RPT locally if it is self-contained.
The use of the token introspection endpoint is illustrated in Figure 4, with a request and a success response shown.

![Figure 4: Token Introspection Endpoint: Request and Success Response](image)

The authorization server MAY support both UMA-extended and non-UMA introspection requests and responses.

5.1. Resource Server Request to Token Introspection Endpoint

Note: In order for the resource server to know which authorization server, PAT (representing a resource owner), and endpoint to use in making the token introspection API call, it may need to interpret the client’s resource request.

Example of the resource server’s request to the authorization server for introspection of an RPT, with a PAT in the header:

```
POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
... token=sbjsbhs(/SSJHSUSSJHVhjsgvhgs/hgs)
```

Because an RPT is an access token, if the resource server chooses to supply a token type hint, it would use a "token_type_hint" of "access_token".
The authorization server’s response to the resource server MUST use [RFC7662], responding with a JSON object with the structure dictated by that specification, extended as follows.

If the introspection object’s "active" parameter has a Boolean value of "true", then the object MUST NOT contain a "scope" parameter, and MUST contain an extension parameter named "permissions" that contains an array of objects, each one (representing a single permission) containing these parameters:

resource_id REQUIRED. A string that uniquely identifies the protected resource, access to which has been granted to this client on behalf of this requesting party. The identifier MUST correspond to a resource that was previously registered as protected.

resource_scopes REQUIRED. An array referencing zero or more strings representing scopes to which access was granted for this resource. Each string MUST correspond to a scope that was registered by this resource server for the referenced resource.

exp OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this permission will expire. If the token-level "exp" value pre-dates a permission-level "exp" value, the token-level value takes precedence.

iat OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this permission was originally issued. If the token-level "iat" value post-dates a permission-level "iat" value, the token-level value takes precedence.

nbf OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating the time before which this permission is not valid. If the token-level "nbf" value post-dates a permission-level "nbf" value, the token-level value takes precedence.
Example of a response containing the introspection object with the "permissions" parameter containing a single permission:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...

{
    "active":true,
    "exp":1256953732,
    "iat":1256912345,
    "permissions":[
        {
            "resource_id":"112210f47de98100",
            "resource_scopes": [
                "view",
                "http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/print"
            ],
            "exp":1256953732
        }
    ]
}

6. Error Messages

If a request is successfully authenticated, but is invalid for another reason, the authorization server produces an error response by supplying a JSON-encoded object with the following members in the body of the HTTP response:

error  REQUIRED except as noted. A single error code. Values for this parameter are defined throughout this specification.

error_description  OPTIONAL. Human-readable text providing additional information.

error_uri  OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page with information about the error.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...

{
"error": "invalid_resource_id",
"error_description": "Permission request failed with bad resource ID.",
"error_uri": "https://as.example.com/uma_errors/invalid_resource_id"
}

7. Security Considerations

This specification inherits the security considerations of [UMAGrant] and has the following additional security considerations.

In the context of federated authorization, more parties may be operating and using UMA software entities, and thus may need to establish agreements about the parties’ rights and responsibilities on a legal or contractual level, as discussed in Section 5.8 of [UMAGrant].

The protection API is secured by means of OAuth (through the use of the PAT). Therefore, it is susceptible to OAuth threats.

8. Privacy Considerations

This specification inherits the privacy considerations of [UMAGrant] and has the following additional privacy considerations.

As noted in Section 6.1 of [UMAGrant], the authorization server should apply authorization, security, and time-to-live strategies in a way that favors resource owner needs and action so that removal of authorization grants is achieved in a timely fashion. PATs are another construct to which it can apply these strategies.

In the context of federated authorization, more parties may be operating and using UMA software entities, and thus may need to establish agreements about mutual rights, responsibilities, and common interpretations of UMA constructs for consistent and expected software behavior, as discussed in Section 6.4 of [UMAGrant].

The authorization server comes to be in possession of resource details that may reveal information about the resource owner, which the authorization server’s trust relationship with the resource server is assumed to accommodate. The more information about a resource that is registered, the more risk of privacy compromise there is through a less-trusted authorization server. For example,
if resource owner Alice introduces her electronic health record resource server to an authorization server in the cloud, the authorization server may come to learn a great deal of detail about Alice’s health information just so that she can control access by others to that information.

9. IANA Considerations

This document makes the following requests of IANA.

9.1. OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata Registry

This specification registers OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata defined in Section 2, as required by Section 7.1 of [OAuthMeta].

9.1.1. Registry Contents

- Metadata name: "permission_endpoint"
- Metadata description: endpoint metadata
- Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
- Specification document: Section 2 in this document

- Metadata name: "resource_registration_endpoint"
- Metadata description: endpoint metadata
- Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
- Specification document: Section 2 in this document

9.2. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration

This specification registers the name defined in Section 5.1.1, as required by Section 3.1 of [RFC7662].

9.2.1. Registry Contents

- Name: "permissions"
- Description: array of objects, each describing a scoped, time-limitable permission for a resource
10. Acknowledgments

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- Jacek Szpot, Newcastle University

Additional contributors to this specification include the Kantara UMA Work Group participants, a list of whom can be found at [UMAnitarians].

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User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 Grant for OAuth 2.0 Authorization
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Abstract

This specification defines a means for a client, representing a requesting party, to use a permission ticket to request an OAuth 2.0 access token to gain access to a protected resource asynchronously from the time a resource owner authorizes access.

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1. Introduction

This specification defines an extension OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] grant. The grant enhances OAuth capabilities in the following ways:

- The resource owner authorizes protected resource access to clients used by entities that are in a _requesting party_ role. This enables party-to-party authorization, rather than authorization of application access alone.

- The authorization server and resource server interact with the client and requesting party in a way that is _asynchronous_ with respect to resource owner interactions. This lets a resource owner configure an authorization server with authorization grant rules (policy conditions) at will, rather than authorizing access token issuance synchronously just after authenticating.

For example, bank customer (resource owner) Alice with a bank account service (resource server) can use a sharing management service (authorization server) hosted by the bank to manage access to her various protected resources by spouse Bob, accounting professional Charline, and and financial information aggregation company Decide
Account, all using different client applications. Each of her bank accounts is a protected resource, and two different scopes of access she can control on them are viewing account data and accessing payment functions.

An OPTIONAL second specification, [UMAFedAuthz], defines a means for an UMA-enabled authorization server and resource server to be loosely coupled, or federated, in a resource owner context. This specification, together with [UMAFedAuthz], constitutes UMA 2.0.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Unless otherwise noted, all parameter names and values are case sensitive. JSON [RFC7159] data structures defined in this specification MAY contain extension parameters that are not defined in this specification. Any entity receiving or retrieving a JSON data structure SHOULD ignore extension parameters it is unable to understand. Extension names that are unprotected from collisions are outside the scope of this specification.

1.2. Roles

The UMA grant enhances the OAuth definitions of entities in order to accommodate the requesting party role.

resource owner
An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource, the "user" in User-Managed Access. The resource owner MAY be an end-user (natural person) or MAY be a non-human entity treated as a person for limited legal purposes (legal person), such as a corporation.

requesting party
A natural or legal person that uses a client to seek access to a protected resource. The requesting party may or may not be the same party as the resource owner.

client
An application that is capable of making requests for protected resources with the resource owner’s authorization and on the requesting party’s behalf.

resource server
A server that hosts resources on a resource owner’s behalf and is capable of accepting and responding to requests for protected resources.

authorization server
A server that protects, on a resource owner’s behalf, resources hosted at a resource server.

1.3. Abstract Flow

The UMA grant enhances the abstract protocol flow of OAuth.

Figure 1 shows an example flow illustrating a variety of messaging paths and artifacts. The resource owner entity and its communications with the authorization server are included for completeness, although policy condition setting is outside the scope of this specification and communications among the other four entities are asynchronous with respect to resource owner actions. Further, although both claims pushing and interactive claims gathering are shown, both might not typically be used in one scenario.
Figure 1: Example Flow

Following are key concepts relevant to this specification, as illustrated in the figure:

requesting party token (RPT) An OAuth access token associated with the UMA grant. An RPT is unique to a requesting party, client, authorization server, resource server, and resource owner.

permission Authorized access to a particular resource with some number of scopes bound to that resource. A permission ticket represents some number of requested permissions. An RPT represents some number of granted permissions. Permissions are part of the authorization server’s process and are opaque to the client.

permission ticket A correlation handle representing requested permissions that is created and maintained by the authorization server, initially passed to the client by the resource server, and presented by the client at the token endpoint and during requesting party redirects.
authorization process  The process through which the authorization server determines whether it should issue an RPT to the client on the requesting party’s behalf, based on a variety of inputs. A key component of the process is authorization assessment. (See Section 1.3.1.)

claim  A statement of the value or values of one or more attributes of an entity. The authorization server typically needs to collect and assess one or more claims of the requesting party or client against policy conditions as part of protecting a resource. The two methods available for UMA claims collection are claims pushing and interactive claims gathering. Note: Claims collection might involve authentication for unique user identification, but depending on policy conditions might additionally or instead involve the collection of non-uniquely identifying attributes, authorization for some action (for example, see Section 3.3.3), or other statements of agreement.

claim token  A package of claims provided directly by the client to the authorization server through claims pushing.

persisted claims token (PCT)  A correlation handle issued by an authorization server that represents a set of claims collected during one authorization process, available for a client to use in attempting to optimize a future authorization process.

Note: How the client acquired knowledge of the resource server’s interface and the specific endpoint of the desired protected resource is outside the scope of this specification. For example, the resource server might have a programmatic API or it might serve up simple web pages, and the resource owner might have advertised the endpoint publicly on a blog or other website, listed it in a discovery service, or emailed a link to a particular intended requesting party.

1.3.1. Authorization Process

The authorization process involves the following activities:

- Claims collection. Claims pushing by a client is defined in Section 3.3.1, and interactive claims gathering with an end-user requesting party is defined in Section 3.3.2.

- Authorization assessment (as defined in Section 3.3.4). Authorization assessment involves the authorization server assembling and evaluating policy conditions, scopes, claims, and any other relevant information sourced outside of UMA claims collection flows, in order to mitigate access authorization risk.
o Authorization results determination (as defined in Section 3.3.4). The authorization server either returns a success code (as defined in Section 3.3.5), an RPT, and an optional PCT, or an error code (as defined in Section 3.3.6). If the error code is "need_info" or "request_submitted", the authorization server provides a permission ticket, giving the client an opportunity to continue within the same authorization process (including engaging in further claims collection).

Different choices of claims collection methods, other inputs to authorization assessment, and error codes might be best suited for different deployment ecosystems. For example, where no pre-established relationship is expected between the resource owner’s authorization server and the requesting party, initial requesting party redirection might be a useful pattern, at which point the authorization server might either authenticate the requesting party locally or serve as a relying party for a remote identity provider. Where a common authorization server functions as an identity provider for all resource owners and requesting parties, having the client push claim tokens sourced from that central server itself with a pre-negotiated format and contents might be a useful pattern.

2. Authorization Server Metadata

The authorization server supplies metadata in a discovery document to declare its endpoints. The client uses this discovery document to discover these endpoints for use in the flows defined in Section 3.

The authorization server MUST make a discovery document available. The structure of the discovery document MUST conform to that defined in [OAuthMeta]. The discovery document MUST be available at an endpoint formed by concatenating the string "/.well-known/uma2-configuration" to the "issuer" metadata value defined in [OAuthMeta], using the well-known URI syntax and semantics defined in [RFC5785]. In addition to the metadata defined in [OAuthMeta], this specification defines the following metadata for inclusion in the discovery document:

claims_interaction_endpoint
OPTIONAL. A static endpoint URI at which the authorization server declares that it interacts with end-user requesting parties to gather claims. If the authorization server also provides a claims interaction endpoint URI as part of its "redirect_user" hint in a "need_info" response to a client on authorization failure (see Section 3.3.6), that value overrides this metadata value. Providing the static endpoint URI is useful for enabling interactive claims gathering prior to any
pushed-claims flows taking place, for example, for gathering
authorization for subsequent claim pushing (see Section 3.3.2).

**uma_profiles_supported**

OPTIONAL. UMA profiles and extensions supported by this
authorization server. The value is an array of string values,
where each string value is a URI identifying an UMA profile or
extension. As discussed in Section 4, an authorization server
supporting a profile or extension related to UMA SHOULD supply
the specification’s identifying URI (if any) here.

If the authorization server supports dynamic client registration, it
MUST allow client applications to register "claims_redirect_uri"
metadata, as defined in Section 3.3.2, using the following metadata
field:

**claims_redirect_uris**

OPTIONAL. Array of one or more claims redirection URIs.

3. Flow Details

3.1. Client Requests Resource Without Providing an Access Token

The client requests a protected resource without providing any access
token.

Note: This process does not assume that any relevant policy
conditions have already been defined at the authorization server.

For an example of how the resource server can put resources under the
protection of an authorization server, see [UMAFedAuthz].

Example of a client request at a protected resource without providing
an access token:

```
GET /users/alice/album/photo.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: photoz.example.com ...
```

3.2. Resource Server Responds to Client’s Tokenless Access Attempt

The resource server responds to the client’s tokenless resource
request.

The resource server MUST obtain a permission ticket from the
authorization server to provide in its response, but the means of
doing so is outside the scope of this specification. For an example
of how the resource server can obtain the permission ticket, see
[UMAFedAuthz].
The process of choosing what permissions to request from the authorization server may require interpretation and mapping of the client’s resource request. The resource server SHOULD request a set of permissions with scopes that is reasonable for the client’s resource request.

Note: In order for the resource server to know which authorization server to approach for the permission ticket and on which resource owner’s behalf, it needs to derive the necessary information using cues provided by the structure of the API where the resource request was made, rather than by an access token. Commonly, this information can be passed through the URI, headers, or body of the client’s request. Alternatively, the entire interface could be dedicated to the use of a single resource owner and protected by a single authorization server.

See Section 5.5 for permission ticket security considerations.

3.2.1. Resource Server Response to Client on Permission Request Success

If the resource server is able to provide a permission ticket from the authorization server, it responds to the client by providing a "WWW-Authenticate" header with the authentication scheme "UMA", with the "issuer" URI from the authorization server’s discovery document in an "as_uri" parameter and the permission ticket in a "ticket" parameter.

For example:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: UMA
   realm="example", as_uri="https://as.example.com",
   ticket="016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de" ...

3.2.2. Resource Server Response to Client on Permission Request Failure

If the resource server is unable to provide a permission ticket from the authorization server, then it includes a header of the following form in its response to the client: "Warning: 199 - "UMA Authorization Server Unreachable"".

For example:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Warning: 199 - "UMA Authorization Server Unreachable" ...

Without an authorization server location and permission ticket, the client is unable to continue.
3.3. Client Seeks RPT on Requesting Party’s Behalf

The client seeks issuance of an RPT.

This process assumes that:

- The client has obtained a permission ticket and an authorization server location from the resource server.
- The client has retrieved the authorization server’s discovery document as needed.
- The client has obtained a client identifier or a full set of client credentials as appropriate, either statically or dynamically (for example, through [RFC7591] or [OIDCDynClientReg]). This grant works with clients of both confidential and public types.

Initiation of this process has two options. One option is for the client to request an RPT from the token endpoint immediately, as defined in Section 3.3.1. Claim pushing is available at this endpoint. The other option, if the authorization server’s discovery document statically provided a claims interaction endpoint, is for the client to redirect the requesting party immediately to that endpoint for interactive claims gathering, as defined in Section 3.3.2.

3.3.1. Client Request to Authorization Server for RPT

The client makes a request to the token endpoint by sending the following parameters:

- **grant_type** REQUIRED. MUST be the value "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:uma-ticket".
- **ticket** REQUIRED. The most recent permission ticket received by the client as part of this authorization process.
- **claim_token** OPTIONAL. If this parameter is used, it MUST appear together with the "claim_token_format" parameter. A string containing directly pushed claim information in the indicated format. It MUST be base64url encoded unless specified otherwise by the claim token format. The client MAY provide this information on both first and subsequent requests to this endpoint. The client and authorization server together might need to establish proper audience restrictions for the claim token prior to claims pushing. See Section 5.7 and Section 6.2 for security and privacy considerations regarding pushing of claims.
claim_token_format  OPTIONAL. If this parameter is used, it MUST appear together with the "claim_token" parameter. A string specifying the format of the claim token in which the client is directly pushing claims to the authorization server. The string MAY be a URI. Examples of potential types of claim token formats are [OIDCCore] ID Tokens and SAML assertions.

cpyct  OPTIONAL. If the authorization server previously returned a PCT along with an RPT, the client MAY include the PCT in order to optimize the process of seeking a new RPT. Given that some claims represented by a PCT are likely to contain identity information about a requesting party, a client supplying a PCT in its RPT request MUST make a best effort to ensure that the requesting party using the client now is the same as the requesting party that was associated with the PCT when it was issued. See Section 5.7 and Section 6.2 for additional security and privacy considerations regarding persistence of claims. The client MAY use the PCT for the same requesting party when seeking an RPT for a resource different from the one sought when the PCT was issued, or a protected resource at a different resource server entirely. See Section 5.2 for additional PCT security considerations. See Section 3.3.5 for the form of the authorization server’s response with a PCT.

rpt  OPTIONAL. Supplying an existing RPT (which MAY be expired) gives the authorization server the option of upgrading that RPT instead of issuing a new one (see Section 3.3.5.1 for more about this option).

scope  OPTIONAL. A string of space-separated values representing requested scopes. For the authorization server to consider any requested scope in its assessment, the client MUST have been pre-registered for the same scope with the authorization server. The client should consult the resource server’s API documentation for details about which scopes it can expect the resource server’s initial returned permission ticket to represent as part of the authorization assessment (see Section 3.3.4).

Example of a request message with no optional parameters (line breaks are shown only for display convenience):

POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Authorization: Basic jwfLG53^sad$#f ...
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Auma-ticket &ticket=016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de
Example of a request message that includes an existing RPT for upgrading, a scope being sought that was previously registered with the authorization server, and a PCT and a claim token for consideration in the authorization process:

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Authorization: Basic jwfLG53^sad$f#
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Auma-ticket
&ticket=016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de
&claim_token=eyJ0...
&claim_token_format=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fspecs%2Fopenid-connect-
core-1_0.html%23IDToken
&pct=c2F2ZWRjb25zZW50
&rpt=sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv
&scope=read
```

This specification provides a means to define profiles of claim token formats for use with UMA (see Section 4). The authorization server SHOULD document the profiles it supports in its discovery document.

3.3.2. Client Redirect of Requesting Party to Authorization Server for Interactive Claims-Gathering

The client redirects an end-user requesting party to the authorization server’s claims interaction endpoint for one or more interactive claims-gathering processes as the authorization server requires. These can include direct interactions, such as account registration and authentication local to the authorization server as an identity provider, filling out a questionnaire, or asking the user to authorize subsequent collection of claims by interaction or pushing, and persistent storage of such claims (for example, as associated with a PCT). Interactions could also involve further redirection, for example, for federated (such as social) authentication at a remote identity provider, and other federated claims gathering. See Section 5.7 and Section 6.2 for security and privacy considerations regarding pushing and persistence of claims.

The client might have initiated redirection immediately on receiving an initial permission ticket from the resource server, or, for example, in response to receiving a "redirect_user" hint in a "need_info" error (see Section 3.3.6).

In order for the client to redirect the requesting party immediately on receiving the initial permission ticket from the resource server, this process assumes that the authorization server has statically declared its claims interaction endpoint in its discovery document.
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following parameters to the query component of the claims interaction endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format:

**client_id** REQUIRED. The client’s identifier issued by the authorization server.

**ticket** REQUIRED. The most recent permission ticket received by the client as part of this authorization process.

**claims_redirect_uri** REQUIRED if the client has pre-registered multiple claims redirection URIs or has pre-registered no claims redirection URI; OPTIONAL only if the client has pre-registered a single claims redirection URI. The URI to which the client wishes the authorization server to direct the requesting party’s user agent after completing its interaction. The URI MUST be absolute, MAY contain an "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"-formatted query parameter component that MUST be retained when adding additional parameters, and MUST NOT contain a fragment component. The client SHOULD pre-register its "claims_redirect_uri" with the authorization server, and the authorization server SHOULD require all clients, and MUST require public clients, to pre-register their claims redirection endpoints (see Section 2). Claims redirection URIs are different from the redirection URIs defined in [RFC6749] in that they are intended for the exclusive use of requesting parties and not resource owners. Therefore, authorization servers MUST NOT redirect requesting parties to pre-registered redirection URIs defined in [RFC6749] unless such URIs are also pre-registered specifically as claims redirection URIs. If the URI is pre-registered, this URI MUST exactly match one of the pre-registered claims redirection URIs, with the matching performed as described in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC3986] (Simple String Comparison).

**state** RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain state between the request and callback. The authorization server includes this value when redirecting the user agent back to the client. The use of this parameter is for preventing cross-site request forgery (see Section 5.1 for further security information).

Example of a request issued by a client application (line breaks are shown only for display convenience):

```
GET /rgp_claims?client_id=some_client_id
   &ticket=016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de
   &claims_redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fredirectclaims
   &state=abc HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com
```
3.3.3. Authorization Server Redirect of Requesting Party Back to Client
After Interactive Claims-Gathering

At the conclusion of a successful interaction with the requesting
party, the authorization server returns the requesting party to the
client, adding the following parameters to the query component of the
claims redirection URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format:

- **ticket** REQUIRED. A permission ticket that allows the client to make
  further requests to the authorization server during this
  authorization process. The value MUST NOT be the same as the one
  the client used to make its request.

- **state** OPTIONAL. The same state value that the client provided in
  the request. It MUST be present if and only if the client
  provided it (see Section 5.1 for further security information).

Note: Interactive claims-gathering processes are outside the scope of
this specification. The purpose of the interaction is for the
authorization server to gather information for its own authorization
assessment purposes. This redirection does not involve sending any
of the information back to the client.

The authorization server MAY use interactive claims-gathering to
request authorization from the requesting party for persisting claims
across authorization processes. Such persisted claims will be
represented by a PCT issued to the client in a subsequent step.

The client MUST ignore unrecognized response parameters. If the
request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching claims
redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid,
the authorization server SHOULD inform the requesting party of the
error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user agent to the
invalid redirection URI.

If the request fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid
claims redirection URI, the authorization server informs the client
by adding an "error" parameter to the query component of the claims
redirection URI as defined in Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749].

Example of a response issued by an authorization server (line breaks
are shown only for display convenience):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location:
    https://client.example.com/redirect_claims?
ticket=cHJpdmFjeSBpcyBjb250ZXh0LCBjb250cm9s&state=abc
3.3.4. Authorization Assessment and Results Determination

When the authorization server has received a request for an RPT from a client as defined in Section 3.3.1, it assesses whether the client is authorized to receive the requested RPT and determines the results.

The authorization server MUST apply the following conceptual authorization assessment calculation in determining authorization results. Note: As this calculation is internal to authorization server operations, its particulars are outside the scope of this specification.

1. Assemble a set called _RegisteredScopes_ containing the scopes for which the client is pre-registered (either dynamically or through some static process) at the authorization server. Assemble a set called _RequestedScopes_ containing the scopes the client most recently requested at the token endpoint. The permission ticket that was presented by the client at the token endpoint represents some number of resources, each with some number of scopes; for each of those resources, assemble a set called _TicketScopes(resource)_ containing the scopes associated with that resource.

2. For each resource in the permission ticket, determine a final set of requested scopes as follows:
   
   _RequestedScopes(resource)={TicketScopes(resource) ∪ (RegisteredScopes ∩ RequestedScopes)}_. Treat each scope in _{RegisteredScopes ∩ RequestedScopes}_ as matching any available scope associated with a resource found in the permission ticket.

3. For each _RequestedScopes(resource)_ set, determine all operative policy conditions, and claims and other relevant information serving as input to them, and evaluate its authorization status.

4. For each scope in _RequestedScopes(resource)_ that passes the evaluation, add it to a set called _CandidateGrantedScopes(resource)_.

Note: Claims and other information gathered during one authorization process may become out of date in terms of their relevance for future authorization processes. The authorization server is responsible for managing such relevance wherever information associated with a PCT, or other persistently stored information, is used as input to authorization, including policy conditions themselves.
Note: Since the authorization server’s policy expression and evaluation capabilities are outside the scope of this specification, any one implementation might take a simple or arbitrarily complex form, with varying abilities to combine or perform calculations over claims and their values. For example, logical operations such as accepting "either claim value A or claim value B" as correct are possible to implement.

In the authorization results phase, the authorization server examines each _CandidateGrantedScopes(resource)_ set to determine whether to issue an RPT and what permissions should be associated with it. If all _RequestedScopes(resource)_ sets can be granted, then the authorization server subsequently responds with a success code and issues an RPT containing _CandidateGrantedScopes_ for each resource.

Otherwise, the authorization server subsequently issues either an RPT containing _CandidateGrantedScopes_ for each resource, or one of the error codes, as appropriate. The reason for the two options is that granting only partial scopes might not be useful for the client’s and requesting party’s purposes in seeking authorization for access. The choice of error depends on policy conditions and the authorization server’s implementation choices. The conditions for the "need_info", "request_denied", and "request_submitted" error codes are dependent on authorization assessment and thus these codes might be more likely than the others to be issued subsequent to such a calculation.

The following example illustrates authorization assessment and partial results.

- The resource server has three of the resource owner’s resources of interest to the client and requesting party, "photo1" and "photo2" with scopes "view", "resize", "print", and "download", and "album" with scopes "view", "edit", and "download". It considers "photo1" and "photo2" to be logically "inside" "album".

- Though the exact contents of RPTs, permissions, and permission requests are opaque to the client, the resource server has documented its API, available scopes, and permission requesting practices. For example, if the client requests an album resource, it expects that the resource server will request a permission for the album with a scope that approximates the attempted client operation, but will also request permissions for all the photos "inside" the album, with "view" scope only.

- The client has a pre-registered scope of "download" with the authorization server. This enables the client later to request this scope dynamically on behalf of its requesting party from the
The client requests the album resource in an attempt to edit it, so the resource server obtains a permission ticket with three permissions in it: for "album" with a scope of "edit", and for "photo1" and "photo2", each with a scope of "view". The authorization server assembles the following sets:

- \_TicketScopes\_("album") containing "edit",
- \_TicketScopes\_("photo1") containing "view",
- \_TicketScopes\_("photo2") containing "view".

While asking for an RPT at the token endpoint, the client requests "download" scope on the requesting party's behalf. The authorization server determines the contents of the following sets:

- \_RequestedScopes\_("album") containing "edit" and "download",
- \_RequestedScopes\_("photo1") containing "view" and "download",
- \_RequestedScopes\_("photo2") containing "view" and "download".

The resource owner has set policy conditions that allow access by this particular requesting party only to "photo1" and only for "view" scope.

Based on the authorization server's authorization assessment calculation, it determines the contents of the following sets:

- \_CandidateGrantedScopes\_("album") containing no scopes,
- \_CandidateGrantedScopes\_("photo1") containing "view",
- \_CandidateGrantedScopes\_("photo2") containing no scopes. This adds up to less than in the corresponding \_RequestedScopes\_ sets. The authorization server therefore has a choice whether to issue an RPT (in this case, containing a permission for "photo1" with "view" scope) or an error (say, "request_denied", or "request_submitted" if has a way to notify the resource owner about the album editing resource request and seek an added policy covering it).

See Section 5.6 for a discussion of authorization implementation threats.

### 3.3.5. Authorization Server Response to Client on Authorization Success

If the authorization server's assessment process results in issuance of permissions, it issues the RPT with which it has associated the permissions by using the successful response form defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749].

The authorization server MAY return a refresh token. See Section 3.6 for more information about refreshing an RPT.
The authorization server MAY add the following parameters to its response:

pct  OPTIONAL. A correlation handle representing claims and other information collected during this authorization process, which the client is able to present later in order to optimize future authorization processes on behalf of a requesting party. The PCT MUST be unguessable by an attacker. The PCT MUST NOT disclose claims from the requesting party directly to possessors of the PCT. Instead, such claims SHOULD be associated by reference to the PCT or expressed in an encrypted format that can be decrypted only by the authorization server that issued the PCT. See Section 3.3.2 for more information about the end-user requesting party interaction option. See Section 5.2 for additional PCT security considerations.

upgraded  OPTIONAL. Boolean value. If the client submits an RPT in the request and the authorization server includes the permissions of the RPT from the request as part of the newly issued RPT, then it MUST set this value to "true". If it sets the value to "false" or the value is absent, the client MUST act as if the newly issued RPT does not include the permissions associated with the RPT from the request. (See Section 3.3.5.1.)

The authorization server MAY include any of the parameters defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749] on its response, except that it SHOULD NOT include the "scope" parameter. This is because for an RPT’s permissions, each scope is associated with a specific resource, even though this association is opaque to the client. Note: The outcome of authorization assessment may result in expiration periods for RPTs, permissions, and refresh tokens that can affect the client’s later requests for refreshing the RPT.

Example:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json ... {
  "access_token":sbjsbhs/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsygsvshgsv",
  "token_type":"Bearer"
}

Example with a PCT in the response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json ... {
  "access_token":sbjsbhs/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsygsvshgsv",
  "token_type":"Bearer", "pct":"c2F2ZWRjb25zZW50"
}
3.3.5.1. Authorization Server Upgrades RPT

The authorization server MAY implement RPT upgrading. The authorization server SHOULD document its practices regarding RPT upgrades and to act consistently with respect to RPT upgrades so as to enable clients to manage received RPTs efficiently.

If the authorization server has implemented RPT upgrading, the client has submitted an RPT in its request, and the result is success, the authorization server adds the permissions from the client’s previous RPT to the RPT it is about to issue, setting the value of "upgraded" in its response containing the upgraded RPT to "true".

If the authorization server is upgrading an RPT, and the RPT string is new rather than repeating the RPT provided by the client in the request, then the authorization server SHOULD revoke the existing RPT, if possible, and the client MUST discard its previous RPT. If the authorization server does not upgrade the RPT but issues a new RPT, the client MAY retain the existing RPT.

Example with "upgraded" in the response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json ...
   "access_token": "sbjsbhs/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsyshsv",
   "token_type": "Bearer", "upgraded": true

3.3.6. Authorization Server Response to Client on Authorization Failure

If the client’s request to the token endpoint results in failure, the authorization server responds with an error, as defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] and as follows.

invalid_grant  If the provided permission ticket was not found at the authorization server, or the provided permission ticket has expired, or any other original reasons to use this error code are found as defined in [RFC6749], the authorization server responds with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.

invalid_scope  At least one of the scopes included in the request does not match an available scope for any of the resources associated with requested permissions for the permission ticket provided by the client. The authorization server MAY also return this error when at least one of the scopes included in the request does not match a scope for which the client is pre-registered with the authorization server. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
need_info  The authorization server needs additional information in order for a request to succeed, for example, a provided claim token was invalid or expired, or had an incorrect format, or additional claims are needed to complete the authorization assessment. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code. It MUST include a "ticket" parameter, and it MUST also include either the "required_claims" parameter or the "redirect_user" parameter, or both, as hints about the information it needs.

ticket  REQUIRED. A permission ticket that allows the client to make a further request to the authorization server's token endpoint as part of this same authorization process, potentially immediately. The value MUST NOT be the same as the one the client used to make its request.

required_claims  An array of objects that describe the required claims, with the following subparameters:

claim_token_format  OPTIONAL. An array of strings specifying a set of acceptable formats for a claim token pushed by the client containing this claim, as defined in Section 3.3.1. Any one of the referenced formats would satisfy the authorization server's requirements. Each string MAY be a URI.

claim_type  OPTIONAL. A string, indicating the expected interpretation of the provided claim value. The string MAY be a URI.

friendly_name  OPTIONAL. A string that provides a human-readable form of the claim's name. This can be useful as a "display name" for use in user interfaces in cases where the actual name is complex or opaque, such as an OID or a UUID.

issuer  OPTIONAL. An array of strings specifying a set of acceptable issuing authorities for the claim. Any one of the referenced authorities would satisfy the authorization server's requirements. Each string MAY be a URI.

name  OPTIONAL. A string (which MAY be a URI) representing the name of the claim; the "key" in a key-value pair.

redirect_user  The claims interaction endpoint URI to which to redirect the end-user requesting party at the authorization server to continue the process of interactive claims gathering, as defined in Section 3.3.2. For example, the authorization server could require the requesting party to log in to an
account, or fill out a CAPTCHA to help prove humanness, or perform any number of other interactive tasks. If the requesting party is not an end-user, then no client action is possible on receiving the hint. If a static claims interaction endpoint was also provided in the authorization server’s discovery document, then this value overrides the static value. Providing a value in this response might be appropriate, for example, if the URI needs to be customized per requesting party with a query parameter.

request_denied The client is not authorized to have these permissions. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code.

request_submitted The authorization server requires intervention by the resource owner to determine whether the client is authorized to have these permissions. The authorization server responds with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code. It MUST include a "ticket" parameter and MAY include an "interval" parameter.

ticket REQUIRED. A permission ticket that allows the client to make one or more later polling requests to the token endpoint as part of this same authorization process, when the resource owner might have completed some approval (or denial) action. The value MUST NOT be the same as the one the client used to make its request.

interval OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint. See Section 5.5 for security considerations in scenarios involving polling and consequences for permission ticket lifetimes.

Example when the permission ticket was not found or has expired:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store ...

Example of a "need_info" response with hints about required claims:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store ...

Example of a "need_info" response with a hint to redirect the requesting party to a claims interaction endpoint:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: application/json
    Cache-Control: no-store ... { "error":"need_info",
    "ticket":"ZXJyb3JfZGV0YWlscw==",
    "redirect_user":"https://as.example.com/rqp_claims?id=2346576421" }

Example when the client was not authorized to have the permissions:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: application/json
    Cache-Control: no-store ... { "error":"request_denied" }

Example when the authorization server requires resource owner intervention, including the optional "interval" parameter:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: application/json
    Cache-Control: no-store ... { "error":"request_submitted",
    "ticket":"ZXJyb3JfZGV0YWlscw==", "interval": 5 }

3.4. Client Requests Resource and Provides an RPT

The client requests the resource, now in possession of an RPT. The client uses [RFC6750] for a bearer token, and any other suitable presentation mechanism for an RPT of another access token type.

Example of a client request for the resource carrying an RPT:

GET /users/alice/album/photo.jpg HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv Host: photoz.example.com ...

3.5. Resource Server Responds to Client’s RPT-Accompanied Resource Request

The resource server responds to the client’s RPT-accompanied resource request.

If the resource request fails, the resource server responds as if the request were unaccompanied by an access token, as defined in Section 3.2.

The resource server MUST NOT give access in the case of an invalid RPT or an RPT associated with insufficient authorization.
For an example of how the resource server can introspect the RPT and its permissions at the authorization server prior to responding to the client’s request, see [UMAFedAuthz].

3.6. Authorization Server Refreshes RPT

As noted in Section 3.3.5, when issuing an RPT, the authorization server MAY also issue a refresh token.

Having previously received a refresh token from the authorization server, the client MAY use the refresh token grant as defined in [RFC6749] to attempt to refresh an expired RPT. If the client includes the "scope" parameter in its request, the authorization server MAY limit the scopes in the permissions associated with any resulting refreshed RPT to the scopes requested by the client.

The authorization server MUST NOT perform an authorization assessment calculation on receiving the client’s request to refresh an RPT.

3.7. Client Requests Token Revocation

If the authorization server presents a token revocation endpoint as defined in [RFC7009], the client MAY use the endpoint to request revocation of an RPT (access token), refresh token, or PCT previously issued to it on behalf of a requesting party. This specification defines the following token type hint value:

pct Helps the authorization server optimize lookup of a PCT for revocation.

4. Profiles and Extensions

An UMA profile restricts UMA’s available options. An UMA extension defines how to use UMA’s extensibility points. The two can be combined. Some reasons for creating profiles and extensions include:

- A profile restricting options in order to tighten security
- A profile/extension restricting options and adding messaging parameters for use with a specific industry API
- A profile that documents a specific URI, format, and interpretation for pushed claim tokens (see Section 3.3.1)
- An extension that defines additional metadata for the authorization server discovery document to define machine-readable usage details
The following actions are RECOMMENDED regarding the creation and use of profiles and extensions:

- The creator of a profile or extension related to UMA SHOULD assign it a uniquely identifying URI.

- The authorization server supporting a profile or extension related to UMA with such a URI SHOULD supply the identifying URI in its "uma_profiles_supported" metadata (see Section 2).

5. Security Considerations

This specification relies mainly on OAuth 2.0 security mechanisms as well as transport-level security. Thus, implementers are strongly advised to read [BCP195] and the security considerations in [RFC6749] (Section 10) and [RFC6750] (Section 5) along with the security considerations of any other OAuth token-defining specifications in use, along with the entire [RFC6819] specification, and apply the countermeasures described therein. As well, implementers should take into account the security considerations in all other normatively referenced specifications.

The following sections describe additional security considerations.

5.1. Cross-Site Request Forgery

Redirection used for gathering claims interactively from an end-user requesting party (described in Section 3.3.2) creates the potential for cross-site request forgery (CSRF). This may be the result of an open redirect if the authorization server does not force the client to pre-register its claims redirection endpoint, and server-side artifact tampering if the client does not avail itself of the "state" parameter.

A CSRF attack against the authorization server’s claims interaction endpoint can result in an attacker obtaining authorization for access through a malicious client without involving or alerting the end-user requesting party. The authorization server MUST implement CSRF protection for its claims interaction endpoint and ensure that a malicious client cannot obtain authorization without the awareness and involvement of the requesting party.

If the client uses the interactive claims gathering feature, it MUST implement CSRF protection for its claims redirection URI. It SHOULD use the "state" parameter when redirecting the requesting party to the claims interaction endpoint. The value of the "state" parameter MUST be unguessable by an attacker. Once the authorization server redirects the requesting party back, with the required binding value
contained in the "state" parameter, the client MUST check that the value of the "state" parameter received is equal to the value sent in the initial redirection request. Depending on the type of application, a client has several methods for storing and later verifying the value of the "state" parameter in between the initial redirect and the eventual resulting request to the claims redirection URI, including storage in a server-side session-bound variable, cryptographic derivation from a browser cookie, or secure application-level storage. The client MUST treat requests containing an invalid or unknown "state" parameter value as an error.

The "state" parameter SHOULD NOT include sensitive client or requesting party information in plain text, as it is transmitted through third-party components (the requesting party’s user agent) and could be stored insecurely.

5.2. RPT and PCT Exposure

When a client redirects an end-user requesting party to the claims interaction endpoint, the client provides no a priori context to the authorization server about which user is appearing at the endpoint, other than implicitly through the permission ticket. Thus, a malicious client has the opportunity to switch end-users -- say, enabling malicious end-user Carlos to impersonate legitimate end-user Bob, who might be represented by a PCT already in that client’s possession and might even have authorized the issuance of that PCT -- after the redirect completes and before it returns to the token endpoint to seek permissions.

To mitigate this threat, the authorization server, with the support of the resource owner, should consider the following strategies in combination.

- Require that the requesting party legitimately represent the wielder of the RPT on a legal or contractual level. This solution alone does not reduce the risk from a technical perspective.
- Gather claims interactively from an end-user requesting party that demonstrate that some sufficiently strong level of authentication was performed.
- Require claims to have a high degree of freshness in order for them to satisfy policy conditions.
- Tighten time-to-live strategies around RPTs and their associated permissions (see Section 6.1).
The client MUST only share the RPT (access token) with the resource server and authorization server, as explained in Section 10.3 of [RFC6749], and thus MUST keep it confidential from the requesting party. Because a malicious requesting party (the user of the client in the UMA grant) may have incentives to steal an RPT that the resource owner (the user of the client in other OAuth grants) does not, this security consideration takes on especial importance.

The PCT is similar to a refresh token in that it allows non-interactive issuance of access tokens. The authorization server and client MUST keep the PCT confidential in transit and storage, and MUST NOT share the PCT with any entity other than each other. The authorization server MUST maintain the binding between the PCT and the client to which it was issued.

Given that the PCT represents a set of requesting party claims, a client supplying a PCT in its RPT request MUST make a best effort to ensure that the requesting party using the client now is the same as the requesting party that was associated with the PCT when it was issued. Different clients will have different capabilities in this respect; for example, some applications are single-user and perform no local authentication, associating all PCTs with the "current user", while others might have more sophisticated authentication and user mapping capabilities.

If the authorization server has reason to believe that a PCT is compromised, for example, if the PCT has been supplied by a client that has "impossible geography" parameters, the authorization server should consider not using the claims based on that PCT in its authorization assessment.

5.3. Strengthening RPT Protection Using Proof of Possession

After the client’s resource request with an RPT, assuming the client sent an RPT of the bearer style such as defined in [RFC6750], the resource server will have received from the client the entire secret portion of the token. This specification assumes only bearer-type tokens because they are the only type standardized as of this specification’s publication. However, to strengthen protection for RPTs using a proof-of-possession approach, the resource server could receive an RPT that consists of only a cryptographically signed token identifier, and then to validate the signature, it could, for example, submit the token identifier to the token introspection endpoint to obtain the necessary key information. The details of this usage are outside the scope of this specification.
5.4. Credentials-Guessing

Permission tickets and PCTs are additional credentials that the authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing, as defined in Section 10.10 of [RFC6749].

5.5. Permission Ticket Management

Within the constraints of making permission ticket values unguessable, the authorization server MAY format the permission ticket however it chooses, for example, either as a random string that references data held on the server or by including data within the ticket itself.

Permission tickets MUST be single-use. This prevents susceptibility to a session fixation attack.

The authorization server MUST invalidate a permission ticket when the client presents the permission ticket to either the token endpoint or the claims interaction endpoint, or when the permission ticket expires, whichever occurs first.

The client SHOULD check that the value of the "ticket" parameter it receives back from the authorization server in each response and each redirect of the requesting party back to it differs from the one it sent to the server in the initial request or redirect.

If the authorization server has reason to believe that a permission ticket is compromised, for example, because it has seen the permission ticket before and it believes the first appearance was from a legitimate client and the second appearance is from an attacker, it should consider invalidating any access tokens based on this evidence.

Given that scenarios involving the "request_submitted" error code are likely to involve polling intervals, the permission ticket needs to last long enough to give the client a chance to attempt a polling request, which then needs to figure into other permission ticket security considerations.

5.6. Naive Implementations of Default-Deny Authorization

While a reasonable approach for most scenarios is to implement the classic stance of default-deny ("everything that is not expressly allowed is forbidden"), corner cases can inadvertently result in default-permit behavior. For example, it is insufficient to create default "empty" policy conditions stating "no claims are needed", and
then accept an empty set of supplied claims as sufficient for access
during authorization assessment.

5.7. Requirements for Pre-Established Trust Regarding Claim Tokens

When a client makes an RPT request, it has the opportunity to push a
claim token to attempt to satisfy policy conditions (see
Section 3.3.1).

Claim tokens of any format typically contain audience restrictions,
and an authorization server would not typically be in the primary
audience for a claim token held or generated by a client. It is
RECOMMENDED to document how the client, authorization server,
requesting party, and any additional ecosystem entities and parties
will establish a trust relationship and communicate any required
keying material in a claim token profile, as described in Section 4.
Authorization servers are RECOMMENDED not to accept claim tokens
pushed by untrusted clients and not to ignore audience restrictions
found in claim tokens pushed by clients.

A malicious client could push a claim token to the authorization
server (revealing the claims therein; see Section 6.2) to seek
resource access on its own behalf prior to any opportunity for an
end-user requesting party to authorize claims collection. It is
RECOMMENDED either for trust relationships established by the
ecosystem parties to include prior requesting party authorization as
required, or for end-user requesting party authorization to be
gathered interactively prior to claims pushing, as described in
Section 3.3.2.

Some deployments could have exceptional circumstances allowing the
authorization server to validate claim tokens. For example, if the
authorization server itself is also the identity provider for the
requesting party, then it would be able to validate any ID token that
the client pushes as a claim token and also validate the client to
which it was issued.

5.8. Profiles and Trust Establishment

Parties that are operating and using UMA software entities may need
to establish agreements about the parties’ rights and
responsibilities on a legal or contractual level, along with common
interpretations of UMA constructs for consistent and expected
software behavior. These agreements can be used to improve the
parties’ respective security postures. Written profiles are a key
mechanism for conveying and enforcing these agreements. Section 4
discusses profiling. See [UMA-legal] to learn about frameworks and
tools to assist in the legal and contractual elements of deploying UMA-enabled services.

6. Privacy Considerations

UMA has the following privacy considerations.


The setting of policy conditions, the resource owner-authorization server interface, and the resource owner-resource server interface are outside the scope of this specification. (For an example of how a secure and authorized resource owner context can be established between the resource server and authorization server, see [UMAFedAuthz].)

A variety of flows and user interfaces for policy condition setting involving user agents for both of these servers are possible, each with different privacy consequences for end-user resource owners. As well, various authorization, security, and time-to-live strategies could be applied on a per-resource owner basis or a per-authorization server basis, as the entities see fit. Validity periods of RPTs, refresh tokens, permissions, caching periods for responses, and even OAuth client credentials are all subject to management. Different time-to-live strategies might be suitable for different resources and scopes.

In order to account for modifications of policy conditions that result in the withdrawal of authorization grants (for example, fewer scopes, fewer resources, or resources available for a shorter time) in as timely a fashion as possible, the authorization server should align its strategies for management of these factors with resource owner needs and actions rather than those of clients and requesting parties. For example, the authorization server may want to invalidate a client’s RPT and refresh token as soon as a resource owner changes policy conditions in such a way as to deny the client and its requesting party future access to a full set of previously held permissions.

6.2. Requesting Party Information at the Authorization Server

Claims are likely to contain personal, personally identifiable, and sensitive information, particularly in the case of requesting parties who are end-users.

If the authorization server supports persisting claims for any length of time (for example, to support issuance of PCTs), then it SHOULD
provide a secure and privacy-protected means of storing claim data. It is also RECOMMENDED for the authorization server to use an interactive claims-gathering flow to ask an end-user requesting party for authorization to collect any claims subsequently and to persist their claims (for example, before issuing a PCT), if no prior requesting party authorization has been established among the ecosystem parties (see Section 5.7).

6.3. Resource Owner Information at the Resource Server

Since the client’s initial request for a protected resource is made in an unauthorized and unauthenticated context, such requests are by definition open to all users. The response to that request includes the authorization server’s location to enable the client to request an access token and present claims. If it is known out of band that authorization server is owned and controlled by a single user, or visiting the authorization server contains other identifying information, then an unauthenticated and unauthorized client would be able to tell which resource owner is associated with a given resource. Other information about the resource owner, such as organizational affiliation or group membership, may be gained from this transaction as well.

6.4. Profiles and Trust Establishment

Parties that are operating and using UMA software entities may need to establish agreements about mutual rights, responsibilities, and common interpretations of UMA constructs for consistent and expected software behavior. These agreements can be used to improve the parties’ respective privacy postures. See Section 5.8 for more information. Additional considerations related to Privacy by Design concepts are discussed in [UMA-PbD].

7. IANA Considerations

This document makes the following requests of IANA.

7.1. Well-Known URI Registration

This specification registers the well-known URI defined in Section 2, as required by Section 5.1 of [RFC5785].

7.1.1. Registry Contents

- URI suffix: "uma2-configuration"

- Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
7.2. OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata Registry

This specification registers OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata defined in Section 2, as required by Section 7.1 of [OAuthMeta].

7.2.1. Registry Contents

- Metadata name: "claims_interaction_endpoint"
  - Metadata description: endpoint metadata
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 2 in this document

- Metadata name: "uma_profiles_supported"
  - Metadata description: profile/extension feature metadata
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 2 in this document

7.3. OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry

This specification registers OAuth 2.0 dynamic client registration metadata defined in Section 2, as required by Section 4.1 of [RFC7591].

7.3.1. Registry Contents

- Metadata name: "claims_redirect_uris"
  - Metadata description: claims redirection endpoints
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 2 in this document
7.4. OAuth 2.0 Extension Grant Parameters Registration

This specification registers the parameters defined in Section 3.3.1, as required by Section 11.2 of [RFC6749].

7.4.1. Registry Contents

- Parameter name: "claim_token"
  - Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document

- Parameter name: "pct"
  - Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document

- Parameter name: "pct"
  - Parameter usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.5 in this document

- Parameter name: "rpt"
  - Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.1 in this document

- Parameter name: "ticket"
  - Parameter usage location: client request, token endpoint
7.5. OAuth 2.0 Extensions Error Registration

This specification registers the errors defined in Section 3.3.6, as required by Section 11.4 of [RFC6749].

7.5.1. Registry Contents

- Error name: "need_info" (and its subsidiary parameters)
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.6 in this document
  - Error usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint

- Error name: "request_denied"
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.6 in this document
  - Error usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint

- Error name: "request_submitted" (and its subsidiary parameters)
  - Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
  - Specification document: Section 3.3.6 in this document
Error usage location: authorization server response, token endpoint

7.6. OAuth Token Type Hints Registration

This specification registers the errors defined in Section 3.7, as required by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7009].

7.6.1. Registry Contents

- Hint value: "pct"
- Change controller: Kantara Initiative User-Managed Access Work Group - staff@kantarainitiative.org
- Specification document: Section 3.7 in this document

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9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References

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Abstract

This specification extends the scope of the Nested JSON Web Token (JWT) to allow the enclosing JWT to contain its own Claims Set in addition to the enclosed JWT.

Status of This Memo

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1.  Introduction

JSON Web Token (JWT) is a mechanism that is used to transfer claims between two parties across security domains. Nested JWT is a JWT in which the payload is another JWT. The current specification does not define a means by which the enclosing JWT could have its own Claims Set, only the enclosed JWT would have claims.

This specification extends the scope of the Nested JWT to allow the enclosing JWT to contain its own Claims Set in addition to the enclosed JWT.

1.1.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Overview

RFC7519 defines Nested JWT as a JWT in which nested signing and/or encryption are employed. In Nested JWSs or JWEs, a JWT is used as the payload or plaintext value of an enclosing JWS or JWE structure, respectively.

To indicate that the payload of an enclosing JWT is yet another JWT, the value of the Content Type Parameter of the JOSE header, i.e. "cty", must be set to "JWT", which means that the enclosing JWT cannot have its own claims.

This document updates the enclosing JWT content to allow it to represent a Claims Set and an enclosed JWT, using JSON data structures, and updates the Content Type to indicate this new nested content.

3. JWT Content Type Header Parameter

The JOSE Header contains an optional parameter that could be used to indicate the type of the payload of a JWT. With a typical Nested JWT, the value of the "cty" header must be "JWT". To indicate that the payload contains a Claims Set in addition to the JWT, the value of the "cty" header must be "NJWT".

4. JWT Content

The payload of the enclosing JWT is JSON object that contains the Claims Set, and one new claim that is used to hold the enclosed JWT.

This document defines a new claim, "njwt", that is used to contain the enclosed JWT.
5. Example

    {
        "alg": "HS256",
        "typ": "JWT",
        "cty": "NJWT"
    }

    {
        "sub": "1234567890",
        "name": "John Doe",
        "iat": 1516239022,
        "njwt": "<njwt>"
    }

6. Security Considerations

    TODO

7. IANA Considerations

    TODO

8. Acknowledgments

    TODO

9. Normative References


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