Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-03

Abstract

An entity (a relying party) requires a source of truth and evidence about a remote peer to assess the peer’s trustworthiness. The evidence is typically a believable set of claims about its host, software or hardware platform. This document describes an architecture for such remote attestation procedures (RATS).

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1. Introduction

Remote Attestation provides a way for an entity (the Relying Party) to determine the health and provenance of an endpoint/host (the Attester). Knowledge of the health of the endpoint allows for a determination of trustworthiness of the endpoint.

1.1. Motivation

The IETF has long spent its time focusing on threats to the communication channel (see [RFC3552] and [DOLEV-YAO]), assuming that endpoints could be trusted and were under the observation of trusted, well-trained professionals. This assumption has not been true since the days of the campus mini-computer. For some time after the desktop PC became ubiquitous, the threat to the endpoints has been dealt with as an internal matter, with generally poor results. Enterprises have done some deployment of Network Endpoint Assessment ([RFC5209]) to assess the security posture about an endpoint, but it has not been ubiquitous.

The movement towards personal mobile devices ("smartphones") and the continuing threat from unmanaged residential desktops has resulted in a renewed interest in standardizing internet-scale endpoint remote attestation. Additionally, the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) has made this issue even more critical: some skeptics have even renamed it to the Internet of Threats [iothreats] :-) IoT devices have poor or non-existent user interfaces, as such as there are not even good ways to assess the health of the devices manually: a need to determine the health via remote attestation is now critical.

In addition to the health of the device, knowledge of its provenance helps to determine the level of trust, and prevents attacks to the supply chain.

1.2. Opportunities

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is now a commonly available peripheral on many commodity compute platforms, both servers and desktops. Smartphones commonly have either an actual TPM, or have the ability to emulate one in software running in a Trusted Execution Environment [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]. There are now few barriers to creating a standards-based system for remote attestation procedures.

A number of niche solutions have emerged that provide for use-case specific remote attestation, but none have the generality needed to be used across the Internet.
1.3. Overview of Document

The architecture described in this document (along with the accompanying solution and reference documents) enables the use of common formats for communicating Claims about an Attester to a Relying Party. [FIXME Attester? Flows? To what end?]

Existing transports were not designed to carry attestation Claims. It is therefore necessary to design serializations of Claims that fit into a variety of transports, for instance: X.509 certificates, TLS negotiations, YANG modules or EtherNet/IP. There are also new, greenfield uses for remote attestation. Transport and serialization of these can be done without retrofitting. This is (will be) described in [INSERT reference to adopted document on transport].

While it is not anticipated that the existing niche solutions described in the use cases section Section 3 will exchange claims directly, the use of a common format enables common code. As some of the code needs to be in intentionally hard to modify trusted modules, the use of a common formats and transfer protocols significantly reduces the cost of adoption to all parties. This commonality also significantly reduces the incidence of critical bugs.

In some environments the collection of Evidence by the Attester to be provided to the Verifier is part of an existing protocol: this document does not change that, rather embraces those legacy mechanisms as part of the specification. This is an evolutionary path forward, not revolutionary. Yet in other greenfield environments, there is a desire to have a standard for Evidence as well as for Attestation Results, and this architecture outlines how that is done.

This introduction gives an overview of the message flows and roles involved. Following this, is a terminology section that is referenced normatively by other documents and is a key part of this document. There is then a section on use cases and how they leverage the roles and workflows described.

In this document, terms defined within this document are consistently Capitalized [work in progress. Please raise issues, if there are Blatant inconsistencies].

Current verticals that use remote attestation include:

- The Trusted Computing Group "Network Device Attestation Workflow" [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]
- Android Keystore [keystore]
1.4. RATS in a Nutshell

1. Remote Attestation message flows typically convey Claims that contain the trustworthiness properties associated with an Attested Environment (Evidence).

2. A corresponding provisioning message flows conveys Reference trustworthiness claims that can be compared with attestation Evidence. Reference Values typically consist of firmware or software digests and details about what makes the attesting module a trusted source of Evidence.

3. Relying Parties are performing tasks such as managing a resource, controlling access, and/or managing risk. Attestation Results helps Relying Parties determine levels of trust.

1.5. Remote Attestation Workflow

The logical information flow is from Attester to Verifier to Relying Party. There are variations presented below on how this integrates into actual protocols.
Figure 1: RATS Workflow

In the architecture shown above, specific content items (payload conveyed in message flows) are identified:

- Evidence is as set of believable Claims about distinguishable Environments made by an Attester.
- Known-Good-Values are reference Claims used to appraise Evidence by an Verifier.
- Endorsements are reference Claims about the type of protection that enables an Attester to create believable Evidence. Endorsements enable trust relationships towards system components or environments Evidence cannot be created for by an Attester.
- Attestation Results are the output from the appraisal of Evidence, Known-Good-Values and Endorsements and are consumed by Relying Parties.

Attestation Results are the output of RATS.
Assessment of Attestation Results is be multi-faceted and out-of-scope for the architecture.

If appropriate Endorsements about the Attester are available, Known-Good-Values about the Attester are available, and if the Attester is capable of creating believable Evidence - then the Verifier is able to create Attestation Results that enable Relying Parties to establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness of the Attester.

The Asserter role and the format for Known-Good-Values and Endorsements are not subject to standardization at this time. The current verticals already include provisions for encoding and/or distributing these objects.

1.6. Message Flows

Two distinct flows have been identified for passage of Evidence and production of Attestation Results. It is possible that there are additional situations which are not captured by these two flows.

1.6.1. Passport Model

In the Passport Model message flow the Attester provides it’s Evidence directly to the Verifier. The Verifier will evaluate the Evidence and then sign an Attestation Result. This Attestation Result is returned to the Attester, and it is up to the Attester to communicate the Attestation Result (potentially including the Evidence, if disclosable) to the Relying Party.
This flow is named in this way because of the resemblance of how Nations issue Passports to their citizens. The nature of the Evidence that an individual needs to provide to it’s local authority is specific to the country involved. The citizen retains control of the resulting document and presents it to other entities when it needs to assert a citizenship or identity claim.

1.6.2. Background Check

In the Background-Check message flow the Attester provides it’s Evidence to the Relying Party. The Relying Party sends this evidence to a Verifier of its choice. The Verifier will evaluate the Evidence and then sign an Attestation Result. This Attestation Result is returned to the Relying Party, which processes it directly.
This flow is named in this way because of the resemblance of how employers and volunteer organizations perform background checks. When a prospective employee provides claims about education or previous experience, the employer will contact the respective institutions or former employers to validate the claim. Volunteer organizations often perform police background checks on volunteers in order to determine the volunteer's trustworthiness.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Appraisal: A Verifier process that compares Evidence to Reference values while taking into account Endorsements and produces Attestation Results.

Asserter: See Section 5.3.1.2.

Attester: See Section 5.3.1.1.
Attested Environment: A target environment that is observed or controlled by an Attesting Environment.

Attesting Environment: An environment capable of making trustworthiness Claims about an Attested Environment.

Background-Check Message Flow: An attestation workflow where the Attester provides Evidence to a Relying Party, who consults one or more Verifiers who supply Attestation Results to the Relying Party. See Section 1.6.2.

Claim: A statement about the construction, composition, validation or behavior of an Entity that affects trustworthiness. Evidence, Reference Values and Attestation Results are expressions that consists of one or more Claims.

Conveyance: The process of transferring Evidence, Reference Values and Attestation Results between Entities participating in attestation workflow.

Entity: A device, component (see System Component [RFC4949]), or environment that implements one or more Roles.

Evidence: See Section 5.3.2.1.

Passport Message Flow: An attestation workflow where the Attester provides Evidence to a Verifier who returns Attestation Results that are then forwarded to one or more Relying Parties. See Section 1.6.1.

Reference Values: See Section 5.3.2.2. Also referred to as Known-Good-Values.

Relying Party: See Section 5.3.1.4.

Attestation Results: See Section 5.3.2.3.

Role: A function or process in an attestation workflow, typically described by: Attester, Verifier, Relying Party and Asserter.

Verifier: See Section 5.3.1.3.

3. Reference use cases

This section provides an overview of a number of distinct use cases that benefit from a standardized claim format. In addition to outlining the user, the specific message flow is identified from among the flows detailed in Section 1.6.
3.1. Device Capabilities/Firmware Attestation

This is a large category of claims that includes a number of subcategories, not detailed here.

Use case name: Device Identity

Who will use it: Network Operators, larger enterprises

Attester: varies

Message Flow: sometimes passport and sometimes background check

Relying Party: varies

Description: Network operators want a trustworthy report of identity and version of information of the hardware and software on the machines attached to their network. The process starts with some kind of Root of Trust that provides device identity and protected storage for measurements. The mechanism performs a series of measurements, and expresses this with an attestation as to the hardware and firmware/software which is running.

This is a general description for which there are many specific use cases, including [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation] section 1.2, "Software Inventory"

3.2. IETF TEEP WG Use-Case

Use case name: TAM validation

Who will use it: The TAM server

Message Flow: background check

Attester: Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

Relying Party: end-application

Description: The "Trusted Application Manager (TAM)" server wants to verify the state of a TEE, or applications in the TEE, of a device. The TEE attests to the TAM, which can then decide whether to install sensitive data in the TEE, or whether the TEE is out of compliance and the TAM needs to install updated code in the TEE to bring it back into compliance with the TAM’s policy.
3.3. Safety Critical Systems

Use case name: Safety Critical Systems

Who will use it: Power plants and other systems that need to assert their current state, but which can not accept any inputs from the outside. The corollary system is a black-box (such as in an aircraft), which needs to log the state of a system, but which can never initiate a handshake.

Message Flow: background check

Attester: web services and other sources of status/sensor information

Relying Party: open

Claims used as Evidence: the beginning and ending time as endorsed by a Time Stamp Authority, represented by a time stamp token. The real time clock of the system itself. A Root of Trust for time; the TPM has a relative time from startup.

Description: These requirements motivate the creation of the Time-Base Unidirectional Attestation (TUDA) [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda], the output of TUDA is typically a secure audit log, where freshness is determined by synchronization to a trusted source of external time.

The freshness is preserved in the Evidence by the use of a Time Stamp Authority (TSA) which provides Time Stamp Tokens (TST).

3.4. Virtualized Multi-Tenant Hosts

Use case name: Multi-Tenant Hosts

Who will use it: Virtual machine systems

Message Flow: passport

Attester: virtual machine hypervisor

Relying Party: network operators

Description: The host system will do verification as per Section 3.1

The tenant virtual machines will do verification as per Section 3.1.
The network operator wants to know if the system _as a whole_ is free of malware, but the network operator is not allowed to know who the tenants are.

This is contrasted to the Chassis + Line Cards case (To Be Defined: TBD).

Multiple Line Cards, but a small attestation system on the main card can combine things together. This is a kind of proxy.

3.5. Cryptographic Key Attestation

Cryptographic Attestion includes subcategories such as Device Type Attestation (the FIDO use case), and Key storage Attestation (the Android Keystore use case), and End-User Authorization.

Use case name: Key Attestation

Who will use it: network authentication systems

Message Flow: passport

Attester: device platform

Relying Party: internet peers

Description: The relying party wants to know how secure a private key that identifies an entity is. Unlike the network attestation, the relying party is not part of the network infrastructure, nor do they necessarily have a business relationship (such as ownership) over the end device.

The Device Type Attestation is provided by a Firmware TPM performing the Verifier function, creating Attestation Results that indicate a particular model/type of device. In TCG terms, this is called Implicit Attestation, in this case the Attested Environment is the (smartphone) Rich Execution Environment (REE) ([I-D.ietf-tee-p-architecture] section 2), and the Attesting Environment is within the TEE.

3.6. Geographic Evidence

Use case name: Location Evidence

Who will use it: geo-fenced systems

Message Flow: passport (probably)
Attester: secure GPS system(s)

Relying Party: internet peers

Description: The relying party wants to know the physical location (on the planet earth, using a geodetic system) of the device. This may be provided directly by a GPS/GLONASS/BeiDou/Galileo module that is incorporated into a TPM. This may also be provided by collecting other proximity messages from other device that the relying party can form a trust relationship with.

3.7. Device Provenance Attestation

Use case name: RIV - Device Provenance

Who will use it: Industrial IoT devices

Message Flow: passport

Attester: network management station

Relying Party: a network entity

Description: A newly manufactured device needs to be onboarded into a network where many if not all device management duties are performed by the network owner. The device owner wants to verify the device originated from a legitimate vendor. A cryptographic device identity such as an IEEE802.1AR is embedded during manufacturing and a certificate identifying the device is delivered to the owner onboarding agent. The device authenticates using its 802.1AR IDevID to prove it originated from the expected vendor.

The device chain of custody from the original device manufacturer to the new owner may also be verified as part of device provenance attestation. The chain of custody history may be collected by a cloud service or similar capability that the supply chain and owner agree to use.

[I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation] section 1.2 refers to this as "Provable Device Identity", and section 2.3 details the parties.

4. Conceptual Overview

In network protocol exchanges, it is often the case that one entity (a Relying Party) requires an assessment of the trustworthiness of a remote entity (an Attester or specific system components [RFC4949]

thereof). Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) enable Relying Parties to establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness of Attesters through the

- Creation,
- Conveyance, and
- Appraisal

of attestation Evidence.

Qualities of Evidence: Evidence is composed of Claims about trustworthiness (the set of Claims is unbounded). The system characteristics of Attesters - the Environments they are composed of, and their continuous development - have an impact on the veracity of trustworthiness Claims included in valid Evidence.

Valid Evidence about the intactness of an Attester must be impossible to create by an untrustworthy or compromised Environment of an Attester.

Qualities of Environments: The resilience of Environments that are part of an Attester can vary widely - ranging from those highly resistant to attacks to those having little or no resistance to attacks. Configuration options, if set poorly, can result in a highly resistant environment being operationally less resistant. When a trustworthy Environment changes, it is possible that it transitions from being trustworthy to being untrustworthy.

An untrustworthy or compromised Environment must never be able to create valid Evidence expressing the intactness of an Attester.

The architecture provides a framework for anticipating when a relevant change with respect to a trustworthiness attribute occurs, what exactly changed and how relevant it is. The architecture also creates a context for enabling an appropriate response by applications, system software and protocol endpoints when changes to trustworthiness attributes do occur.

Detailed protocol specifications for message flows are defined in separate documents.

4.1. Two Types of Environments

An Attester produces Evidence about its own integrity, which means "it measures itself". To disambiguate this recursive or circular
looking relationships, two types of Environments inside an Attester are distinguished:

The attest-ED Environments and the attest-ING Environments.

Attested Environments are measured. They provide the raw values and the information to be represented in Claims and ultimately expressed as Evidence.

Attesting Environments conduct the measuring. They collect the Claims, format them appropriately, and typically use key material and cryptographic functions, such as signing or cipher algorithms, to create Evidence.

Attesting Environments use system components that have to be trusted. As a result, Evidence includes Claims about the Attested and the Attesting Environments. Claims about the Attested Environments are appraised using Reference Values and Claims about the Attesting Environments are appraised using Endorsements. It is not mandated that both Environments have to be separate, but it is highly encouraged. Examples of separated Environments that can be used as Attesting Environments include: Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), embedded Secure Elements (eSE), or Hardware Security Modules (HSM).

In summary, the majority of the creation of evidence can take place in an Attested Environments. Exemplary duties include the collection and formatting of Claim values, or the trigger for creating Evidence. A trusted sub-set of the creation of evidence can take place in an Attesting Environment, that provide special protection with respect to key material, identity documents, or primitive functions to create the Evidence itself.

4.2. Evidence Creation Prerequisites

One or more Environments that are part of an Attester must be able to conduct the following duties in order to create Evidence:

- monitoring trustworthiness attributes of other Environments,
- collecting trustworthiness attributes and create Claims about them,
- serialize Claims using interoperable representations,
- provide integrity protection for the sets of Claims, and
- add appropriate attestation provenance attributes about the sets of Claims.
4.3. Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of an Attester and therefore the believability of the Evidence it creates relies on the protection methods in place to shield and restrict the use of key material and the duties conducted by the Attesting Environment. In order to assess trustworthiness effectively, it is mandatory to understand the trustworthiness properties of the environments of an Attester. The corresponding appraisal of Evidence that leads to such an assessment of trustworthiness is the duty of a Verifier.

Trusting the assessment of a Verifier might come from trusting the Verifier’s key material (direct trust), or trusting an Entity that the Verifier is associated with via a certification path (indirect trust).

The trustworthiness of corresponding Attestation Results also relies on trust towards manufacturers and those manufacturer’s hardware in order to assess the integrity and resilience of that manufacturer’s devices.

A stronger level of security comes when information can be vouched for by hardware or by (unchangeable) firmware, especially if such hardware is physically resistant to hardware tampering. The component that is implicitly trusted is often referred to as a Root of Trust.

4.4. Workflow

The basic function of RATS is creation, conveyance and appraisal of attestation Evidence. An Attester creates attestation Evidence that are conveyed to a Verifier for appraisal. The appraisals compare Evidence with expected Known-Good-Values obtained from Asserters (e.g. Principals that are Supply Chain Entities). There can be multiple forms of appraisal (e.g., software integrity verification, device composition and configuration verification, device identity and provenance verification). Attestation Results are the output of appraisals. Attestation Results are signed and conveyed to Relying Parties. Attestation Results provide the basis by which the Relying Party may determine a level of confidence to place in the application data or operations that follow.

The architecture defines attestation Roles: Attester, Verifier, Asserter and Relying Party. Roles exchange messages, but their structure is not defined in this document. The detailed definition of the messages is in an appropriate document, such as [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] or other protocols to be defined. Roles can be combined in various ways into Principals, depending upon the needs of...
the use case. Information Model representations are realized as data structure and conveyance protocol specifications.

4.5. Interoperability between RATS

The RATS architecture anticipates use of information modeling techniques that describe computing structures - their components/computational elements and corresponding capabilities - so that verification operations may rely on the information model as an interoperable way to navigate the structural complexity.

5. RATS Architecture

5.1. Goals

RATS architecture has the following goals:

- Enable semantic interoperability of attestation semantics through information models about computing environments and trustworthiness.

- Enable data structure interoperability related to claims, endpoint composition/structure, and end-to-end integrity and confidentiality protection mechanisms.

- Enable programmatic assessment of trustworthiness. (Note: Mechanisms that manage risk, justify a level of confidence, or determine a consequence of an attestation result are out of scope).

- Provide the building blocks, including Roles and Principals that enable the composition of service-chains/hierarchies and workflows that can create and appraise evidence about the trustworthiness of devices and services.

- Use-case driven architecture and design (see [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases] and Section 3)

- Terminology conventions that are consistently applied across RATS specifications.

- Reinforce trusted computing principles that include attestation.

5.2. Attestation Principles

Specifications developed by the RATS working group apply the following principles:
5.3. Attestation Workflow

Attestation workflow helps a Relying Party make better decisions by providing insight about the trustworthiness of endpoints participating in a distributed system. The workflow consists primarily of four roles; Relying Party, Verifier, Attester and Asserter. Attestation messages contain information useful for appraising the trustworthiness of an Attester endpoint and informing the Relying Party of the appraisal result.

This section details the primary roles of an attestation workflow and the messages they exchange.

5.3.1. Roles

An endpoint system (a.k.a., Entity) may implement one or more attestation Roles to accommodate a variety of possible message flows. Exemplary message flows are described in Section 1.6.1 and Section 1.6.2. Role messages are secured by the Entity that generated it. Entities possess credentials (e.g., cryptographic keys) that authenticate, integrity protect and optionally confidentiality protect attestation messages.

5.3.1.1. Attester

The Attester consists of both an Attesting Environment and an Attested Environment. In some implementations these environments may be combined. Other implementations may have multiples of Attesting and Attested environments. Although endpoint environments can be complex, and that complexity is security relevant, the basic function
of an Attester is to create Evidence that captures operational conditions affecting trustworthiness.

5.3.1.2. Asserter

The Asserter role is out of scope. The mechanism by which an Asserter communicates Known-Good-Values to a Verifier is also not subject to standardization. Users of the RATS architecture are assumed to have pre-existing mechanisms.

5.3.1.3. Verifier

The Verifier workflow function accepts Evidence from an Attester and accepts Reference Values from one or more Asserters. Reference values may be supplied a priori, cached or used to created policies. The Verifier performs an appraisal by matching Claims found in Evidence with Claims found in Reference Values and policies. If an attested Claim value differs from an expected Claim value, the Verifier flags this as a change possibly impacting trust level.

Endorsements may not have corresponding Claims in Evidence (because of their intrinsic nature). Consequently, the Verifier need only authenticate the endpoint and verify the Endorsements match the endpoint identity.

The result of appraisals and Endorsements, informed by owner policies, produces a new set of Claims that a Relying Party is suited to consume.

5.3.1.4. Relying Party

A Role in an attestation workflow that accepts Attestation Results from a Verifier that may be used by the Relying Party to inform application specific decision making. How Attestation Results are used to inform decision making is out-of-scope for this architecture.

5.3.2. Role Messages

5.3.2.1. Evidence

Claims that are formatted and protected by an Attester.

Evidence SHOULD satisfy Verifier expectations for freshness, identity, context, provenance, validity, and veracity.
5.3.2.2. Reference Values

Reference-values are Claims that a manufacturer, vendor or other supply chain entity makes that affects the trustworthiness of an Attester endpoint.

Claims may be persistent properties of the endpoint due to the physical nature of how it was manufactured or may reflect the processes that were followed as part of moving the endpoint through a supply-chain; e.g., validation or compliance testing. This class of Reference-values is known as Endorsements.

Another class of Reference-values identifies the firmware and software that could be installed in the endpoint after its manufacture. A digest of the the firmware or software can be an effective identifier for keeping track of the images produced by vendors and installed on an endpoint. This class of Reference-value is referred to as Known-Good-Value (KGV).

Known-Good-Values: Claims about the Attested Environment.
Typically, Known-Good-Value (KGV) Claims are message digests of firmware, software or configuration data supplied by various vendors. If an Attesting Environment implements cryptography, they include Claims about key material.

Like Claims, Known-Good-Values SHOULD satisfy a Verifier’s expectations for freshness, identity, context, provenance, validity, relevance and veracity. Known-Good-Values are reference Claims that are - like Evidence - well formatted and protected (e.g. signed).

Endorsements: Claims about immutable and implicit characteristics of the Attesting Environment. Typically, endorsement Claims are created by manufacturing or supply chain entities.

Endorsements are intended to increase the level of confidence with respect to Evidence created by an Attester.

5.3.2.3. Attestation Results

Statements about the output of an appraisal of Evidence that are created, formatted and protected by a Verifier.

Attestation Results provide the basis for a Relying Party to establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness of an Attester. Attestation Results SHOULD satisfy Relying Party expectations for freshness, identity, context, provenance, validity, relevance and veracity.
5.4. Principals (Entities?) - Containers for the Roles

[The authors are unhappy with the term Principal, and have been looking for something else. JOSE/JWT uses the term Principal]

Principals are Containers for the Roles.

Principals are users, organizations, devices and computing environments (e.g., devices, platforms, services, peripherals).

Principals may implement one or more Roles. Message flows occurring within the same Principal are out-of-scope.

The methods whereby Principals may be identified, discovered, authenticated, connected and trusted, though important, are out-of-scope.

Principal operations that apply resiliency, scaling, load balancing or replication are generally believed to be out-of-scope.

![Figure 4: Principals-Role Composition](image)

Principals have the following properties:

- Multiplicity - Multiple instances of Principals that possess the same Roles can exist.

- Composition - Principals possessing different Roles can be combined into a singleton Principal possessing the union of Roles. Message flows between combined Principals is uninteresting.
6. Privacy Considerations

The conveyance of Evidence and the resulting Attestation Results reveal a great deal of information about the internal state of a device. In many cases the whole point of the Attestation process is to provide reliable evidence about the type of the device and the firmware that the device is running. This information is particularly interesting to many attackers: knowing that a device is running a weak version of a firmware provides a way to aim attacks better.

Just knowing the existence of a device is itself a disclosure.

Conveyance protocols must detail what kinds of information is disclosed, and to whom it is exposed.

7. Security Considerations

Evidence, Verifiable Assertions and Attestation Results SHOULD use formats that support end-to-end integrity protection and MAY support end-to-end confidentiality protection.

Replay attacks are a concern that protocol implementations MUST deal with. This is typically done via a Nonce Claim, but the details belong to the protocol.

All other attacks involving RATS structures are not explicitly addressed by the architecture.

Additional security protections MAY be required of conveyance mechanisms. For example, additional means of authentication, confidentiality, integrity, replay, denial of service and privacy protection of RATS payloads and Principals may be needed.

8. Acknowledgements

Dave Thaler created the concepts of "Passaport" and "Background Check".

9. References
9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


Authors' Addresses

Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
Darmstadt  64295
Germany

Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Monty Wiseman
GE Global Research
USA
Email: monty.wiseman@ge.com

Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge CB1 9NJ
UK
Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net

Ned Smith
Intel Corporation
USA
Email: ned.smith@intel.com

Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Canada
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
YANG Module for Basic Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation Procedures
draft-birkholz-rats-basic-yang-module-01

Abstract

This document defines a YANG RPC and a minimal datastore tree required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity measurements from a composite device with one or more roots of trust for reporting. Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPC originating from one or more roots of trust of measurement. The module defined requires a TPM 2.0 and corresponding Trusted Software Stack included in the device components of the composite device the YANG server is running on.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.
1. Introduction

This document is based on the terminology defined in the [I-D.birkholz-attestation-terminology] and uses the interaction model and information elements defined in the [I-D.birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-model] document. The currently supported hardware security module (HWM) - sometimes also referred to as an embedded secure element (eSE) - is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). One or more TPM 2.0 embedded in the components of a composite device - sometimes also referred to as an aggregate device - are required in order to use the YANG module defined in this document. A TPM 2.0 is used as a root of trust for reporting (RTR) in order to retrieve attestation evidence from a composite device. Additionally, it is used as a root of trust for measurement (RTM) in order to provide event logs - sometimes also referred to as measurement logs.
1.1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119, BCP 14 [RFC2119].

2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures

One or more TPM 2.0 MUST be embedded in the composite device that is providing attestation evidence via the YANG module defined in this document. The ietf-basic-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite device to take on the role of Claimant and Attester in accordance with the Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture [I-D.birkholz-attestation-terminology] and the corresponding challenge-response interaction model defined in the [I-D.birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-model] document. A fresh nonce with an appropriate amount of entropy MUST be supplied by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with respect to the attestation evidence provided by the attester running the YANG datastore. The functions of this YANG module are restricted to 0-1 TPM 2.0 per hardware component.

2.1. Tree format

<CODE BEGINS>
module: ietf-basic-remote-attestation
  +--ro rats-support-structures
  |  +--ro supported-algos* uint16
  |  +--ro tpms* [tpm_name]
  |     |  +--ro tpm_name string
  |     |  +--ro tpm-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?
  |     |  +--ro certificates* []
  |     |     |  +--ro certificate
  |     |     |     |  +--ro certificate-name? string
  |     |     |     |  +--ro certificate-type? enumeration
  |     |     |  +--ro certificate-value? ietfct:end-entity-cert-cms
  +--ro compute-nodes* [node-name]
  |  +--ro node-name string
  |  +--ro node-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?

rpcs:
  +---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation
  |  +---w input
  |     |  +---w tpm1-attestation-challenge
  |     |     |  +---w pcr-indices* uint8
  |     |     |  +---w nonce-value binary
  |     |     |  +---w TPM_SIG_SCHEME-value uint8
</CODE BEGINS>
+++ w (algo-registry-type)
  ++-:(tcg)
   |   +++- w tcg-hash-algo-id? uint16
   ++-:(ietf)
    |   +++- w ietf-ni-hash-algo-id? uint8
   +++- w nonce-value binary
+++ w (signature-identifier-type)
  ++-:(TPM_ALG_ID)
   |   +++- w TPM_ALG_ID-value? uint16
   ++-:(COSE_Algorithm)
    |   +++- w COSE_Algorithm-value? int32
+++ w (key-identifier)?
  ++-:(public-key)
   |   +++- w pub-key-id? binary
    ++-:(uuid)
     |   +++- w uuid-value? binary
+++ w tpms* [tpm_name]
  +++- w tpm_name string
  +++- w tpm-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?
--- ro output
  ---+ ro tpm20-attestation-response* [tpm_name]
   |   ---+ ro tpm_name string
   |   ++++ ro tpm-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?
   |   ++- ro up-time? uint32
   |   ++- ro node-name? string
   |   ++++ ro node-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?
   |   +++ ro tpms-attest
    |   |   ++- ro pcrdigest? binary
    |   |   ++- ro tpms-attest-result? binary
    |   |   +++- ro tpms-attest-result-length? uint32
    |   |   ++- ro tpmt-signature? binary
+++ x basic-trust-establishment
---+ w input
  +++- w nonce-value binary
  +++- w (signature-identifier-type)
   |   ++-:(TPM_ALG_ID)
    |   |   +++- w TPM_ALG_ID-value? uint16
    |   ++-:(COSE_Algorithm)
     |   |   +++- w COSE_Algorithm-value? int32
    |   +++ w tpm_name string
    |   +++- w tpm-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?
    |   ++- ro certificate-name? string
  ---+ ro output
   |   ---+ ro attestation-certificates* [tpm_name]
    |   |   ro tpm_name string
    |   |   ++++ ro tpm-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?
    |   |   ++- ro up-time? uint32
    |   |   ++- ro node-name? string
++-ro node-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?  
+-ro certificate-name? string  
+-ro attestation-certificate? ietfct:end-entity-cert-cms  
+-ro (key-identifier)?  
  | ++-:(public-key)  
  |   | +++-ro pub-key-id? binary  
  |   | ++-:(uuid)  
  |   | +++-ro uuid-value? binary  
+-x log-retrieval  
  | +++-w input  
  |   | +++-w log-selector* [node-name]  
  |   |     | +++-w node-name string  
  |   |     | +++-w node-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?  
  |   |     | +---:(index-type)?  
  |   |     | | +---:(last-entry)  
  |   |     | | | +++-w last-entry-value? binary  
  |   |     | | +---:(index)  
  |   |     | | | +++-w index-number? uint64  
  |   |     | | +---:(timestamp)  
  |   |     | | | +++-w timestamp? yang:date-and-time  
  |   | +++-w log-type identityref  
  |   | +++-w pcr-list* []  
  |     | +++-w pcr  
  |     | | +++-w pcr-indices* uint8  
  |     | | +---:(algo-registry-type)  
  |     | | | +---: (tcg)  
  |     | | | | +++-w tcg-hash-algo-id? uint16  
  |     | | | +---:(ietf)  
  |     | | | | +++-w ietf-ni-hash-algo-id? uint8  
  |     | | +++-w log-entry-quantity? uint16  
  | ro output  
  | +++-ro system-event-logs  
  | | +++-ro node-data* [node-name tpm_name]  
  | | | +++-ro node-name string  
  | | | +++-ro node-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?  
  | | | +++-ro up-time? uint32  
  | | | +++-ro tpm_name string  
  | | | +++-ro tpm-physical-index? int32 {ietfhw:entity-mib}?  
  | | | +++-ro log-result  
  | | | | +++-ro (log-type)  
  | | | | | +---:(bios)  
  | | | | | | +++-ro bios-event-logs  
  | | | | | | | +++-ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]  
  | | | | | | | | +++-ro event-number uint32  
  | | | | | | | | +++-ro event-type? uint32  
  | | | | | | | | +++-ro pcr-index? uint16  
  | | | | | | | | +++-ro digest-list* []  
  | | | | | | | | | +++-ro (algo-registry-type)
2.2. Raw Format

<CODE BEGINS>
module ietf-basic-remote-attestation {
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-basic-remote-attestation";
  prefix "yang-brat";

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
  }
  import ietf-hardware {
    prefix ietfhw;
  }
  import ietf-crypto-types {
    prefix ietfct;
  }

  organization "Fraunhofer SIT";
  contact "Henk Birkholz Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
  Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de";
  description "A YANG module to enable TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 based remote attestation procedures.
  Copyright (C) Fraunhofer SIT (2019).";
  revision "2019-07-08" {

<CODE ENDS>
grouping hash-algo {
  description
  "A selector for the hashing algorithm";
  choice algo-registry-type {
    mandatory true;
    description
    "Unfortunately, both IETF and TCG have registries here. Choose your weapon wisely.";
    case tcg {
      description
      "you chose the east door, the tcg space opens up to you.";
      leaf tcg-hash-algo-id {
        type uint16;
        description
        "This is an index referencing the TCG Algorithm Registry based on TPM_ALG_ID.";
      }
    }
    case ietf {
      description
      "you chose the west door, the ietf space opens up to you.";
      leaf ietf-ni-hash-algo-id {
        type uint8;
        description
        "This is an index referencing the Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry.";
      }
    }
  }
}

grouping hash {
  description
  "The hash value including hash-algo identifier";
  list hash-digests {
    description
    "The list of hashes.";
    container hash-digest {
      description
      "A hash value based on a hash algorithm registered by an
uses hash-algo;
leaf hash-value {
  type binary;
  description
    "The binary representation of the hash value.";
}
}


grouping nonce {
  description
    "A nonce to show freshness and counter replays.";
leaf nonce-value {
  type binary;
  mandatory true;
  description
    "This nonce SHOULD be generated via a registered
    cryptographic-strength algorithm. In consequence, the length
    of the nonce depends on the hash algorithm used. The algorithm
    used in this case is independent from the hash algorithm used to
    create the hash-value in the response of the attestor.";
}
}


grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {
  description
    "A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its
    individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).
    The corresponding selection filter is represented in this grouping.
    Requesting a PCR value that is not in scope of the AC used, detailed
    exposure via error msg should be avoided.";
leaf-list pcr-indices {
  type uint8;
  description
    "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. At the moment this is limited
    to 32."
}
}


grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {
  description
    "A Verifier can request one or more PCR values uses its
    individually created AC. The corresponding selection filter is
    represented in this grouping. Requesting a PCR value that is not
    in scope of the AC used, detailed exposure via error msg should
    be avoided.";

list pcr-list {
  description
  "For each PCR in this list an individual list of banks
  (hash-algo) can be requested. It depends on the datastore, if
  every bank in this grouping is included per PCR (crude), or if
  each requested bank set is returned for each PCR individually
  (elegant).";
  container pcr {
    description
    "The composite of a PCR number and corresponding bank
    numbers.";
    leaf-list pcr-indices {
      type uint8;
      description
      "The number of the PCR. At the moment this is limited
      32";
    }
    uses hash-algo;
  }
}

grouping pcr-selector {
  description
  "A Verifier can request the generation of an attestation
  certificate (a signed public attestation key
  (non-migratable, tpm-resident) wrt one or more PCR values.
  The corresponding creation input is represented in this grouping.
  Requesting a PCR value that is not supported results in an error,
  detailed exposure via error msg should be avoided.";
  list pcr-list {
    description
    "For each PCR in this list an individual hash-algo can be
    requested.";
    container pcr {
      description
      "The composite of a PCR number and corresponding bank
      numbers.";
      leaf-list pcr-index {
        type uint8;
        description
        "The numbers of the PCRs that are associated with
        the created key. At the moment the highest number is 32";
      }
      uses hash-algo;
    }
  }
}
grouping tpm12-signature-scheme {
    description "The signature scheme used to sign the evidence via a TPM 1.2.";
    leaf TPM_SIG_SCHEME-value {
        type uint8;
        mandatory true;
        description "Selects the signature scheme that is used to sign the TPM quote
        information response. Allowed values can be found in the table at
        the bottom of page 32 in the TPM 1.2 Structures specification
        (Level 2 Revision 116, 1 March 2011).";
    }
}

grouping tpm20-signature-scheme {
    description "The signature scheme used to sign the evidence.";
    choice signature-identifier-type {
        mandatory true;
        description "There are multiple ways to reference a signature type.
        This used to select the signature algo to sign the quote
        information response.";
        case TPM_ALG_ID {
            description "This references the indices of table 9 in the TPM 2.0
            structure specification.";
            leaf TPM_ALG_ID-value {
                type uint16;
                description "The TPM Algo ID.";
            }
        }
        case COSE_Algorithm {
            description "This references the IANA COSE Algorithms Registry indices.
            Every index of this registry to be used must be mapable to a
            TPM_ALG_ID value.";
            leaf COSE_Algorithm-value {
                type int32;
                description "The TPM Algo ID.";
            }
        }
    }
}

grouping tpm12-attestation-key-identifier { }
description
"A selector for a suitable key identifier for a TPM 1.2.";
choice key-identifier {
  description
  "Identifier for the attestation key to use for signing
  attestation evidence.";
  case public-key {
    leaf pub-key-id {
      type binary;
      description
      "The value of the identifier for the public key.";
    }
  }
  case TSS_UUID {
    description
    "Use a YANG agent generated (and maintained) attestation
    key UUID that complies with the TSS_UUID datatype of the TCG
    Software Stack (TSS) Specification, Version 1.10 Golden,
    August 20, 2003.";
    container TSS_UUID-value {
      description
      "A detailed structure that is used to create the
      TPM 1.2 native TSS_UUID as defined in the TCG Software
      Stack (TSS) Specification, Version 1.10 Golden,
      August 20, 2003.";
      leaf ulTimeLow {
        type uint32;
        description
        "The low field of the timestamp.";
      }
      leaf usTimeMid {
        type uint16;
        description
        "The middle field of the timestamp.";
      }
      leaf usTimeHigh {
        type uint16;
        description
        "The high field of the timestamp multiplexed with the
        version number.";
      }
      leaf bClockSeqHigh {
        type uint8;
        description
        "The high field of the clock sequence multiplexed with
        the variant.";
      }
      leaf bClockSeqLow {
      }
    }
  }
}
type uint8;
description
   "The low field of the clock sequence.";
}
leaf-list rgbNode {
    type uint8;
    description
       "The spatially unique node identifier.";
}
}
}

grouping tpm20-attestation-key-identifier {
    description
       "A selector for a suitable key identifier.";
    choice key-identifier {
        description
           "Identifier for the attestation key to use for signing
            attestation evidence.";
        case public-key {
            leaf pub-key-id {
                type binary;
                description
                   "The value of the identifier for the public key.";
            }
        }
        case uuid {
            description
               "Use a YANG agent generated (and maintained) attestation
                key UUID.";
            leaf uuid-value {
                type binary;
                description
                   "The UUID identifying the corresponding public key.";
            }
        }
    }
}

grouping tpm-name {
    description
       "In a system with multiple-TPMs get the data from a specific TPM
        identified by the name and physical-index.";
    leaf tpm_name {
        type string;
        description

"Name of the TPM or All";
}
leaf tpm-physical-index {
  if-feature ietfhw:entity-mib;
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
  description
    "The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
  reference
    "RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
}
}

grouping compute-node {
  description
    "In a distributed system with multiple compute nodes
    this is the node identified by name and physical-index.";
leaf node-name {
  type string;
  description
    "Name of the compute node or All";
}
leaf node-physical-index {
  if-feature ietfhw:entity-mib;
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
  description
    "The entPhysicalIndex for the compute node.";
  reference
    "RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
}
}

grouping tpm12-pcr-info-short {
  description
    "This structure is for defining a digest at release when the only
    information that is necessary is the release configuration.";
  uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
leaf locality-at-release {
  type uint8;
  description
    ".This SHALL be the locality modifier required to release the
    information (TPM 1.2 type TPM_LOCALITY_SELECTION)";
}
leaf digest-at-release {
type binary;
  description
    "This SHALL be the digest of the PCR indices and PCR values
to verify when revealing auth data (TPM 1.2 type
TPM_COMPOSITE_HASH).";
}
}

grouping tpm12-version {
  description
    "This structure provides information relative the version of
the TPM."
  list version {
    description
        "This indicates the version of the structure
(TPM 1.2 type TPM_STRUCT_VER). This MUST be 1.1.0.0.";
    leaf major {
      type uint8;
      description
        "Indicates the major version of the structure.
MUST be 0x01.";
    }
    leaf minor {
      type uint8;
      description
        "Indicates the minor version of the structure.
MUST be 0x01.";
    }
    leaf revMajor {
      type uint8;
      description
        "Indicates the rev major version of the structure.
MUST be 0x00.";
    }
    leaf revMinor {
      type uint8;
      description
        "Indicates the rev minor version of the structure.
MUST be 0x00.";
    }
  }
}

grouping tpm12-quote-info-common {
  description
    "These statements are used in bot quote variants of the TPM 1.2";
  leaf fixed {
    type binary;
description
  "This SHALL always be the string 'QUOT' or 'QUO2'
  (length is 4 bytes).";
}
leaf external-data {
  type binary;
  description
  "160 bits of externally supplied data, typically a nonce.";
}
leaf signature-size {
  type uint32;
  description
  "The size of TPM 1.2 'signature' value.";
}
leaf signature {
  type binary;
  description
  "Signature over SHA-1 hash of tpm12-quote-info2";
}
}

grouping tpm12-quote-info {
  description
  "This structure provides the mechanism for the TPM to quote the
  current values of a list of PCRs (as used by the TPM_Quote2
  command).";
  uses tpm12-version;
  leaf digest-value {
    type binary;
    description
    "This SHALL be the result of the composite hash algorithm using
    the current values of the requested PCR indices
    (TPM 1.2 type TPM_COMPOSITE_HASH).";
  }
}

grouping tpm12-quote-info2 {
  description
  "This structure provides the mechanism for the TPM to quote the
  current values of a list of PCRs
  (as used by the TPM_Quote2 command).";
  leaf tag {
    type uint8;
    description
    "This SHALL be TPM_TAG_QUOTE_INFO2.";
  }
  uses tpm12-pcr-info-short;
}
grouping tpm12-cap-version-info {
  description
  "TPM returns the current version and revision of the TPM 1.2.";
list TPM_PCR_COMPOSITE {
  description
  "The TPM 1.2 TPM_PCRVALUEs for the pcr-indices.";
  uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
  leaf value-size {
    type uint32;
    description
    "This SHALL be the size of the 'tpm12-pcr-value' field
    (not the number of PCRs).";
  }
  leaf-list tpm12-pcr-value {
    type binary;
    description
    "The list of TPM_PCRVALUEs from each PCR selected in sequence
    of tpm12-pcr-selection.";
  }
list version-info {
  description
  "An optional output parameter from a TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote2.";
  leaf tag {
    type uint16;
    description
    "The TPM 1.2 version and revision
    (TPM 1.2 type TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG).
    This MUST be TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO (0x0030)";
  }
  uses tpm12-version;
  leaf spec-level {
    type uint16;
    description
    "A number indicating the level of ordinals supported.";
  }
  leaf errata-rev {
    type uint8;
    description
    "A number indicating the errata version of the
    specification.";
  }
  leaf tpm-vendor-id {
    type binary;
    description
    "The vendor ID unique to each TPM manufacturer.";
  }
  leaf vendor-specific-size {
    type uint16;
  }
}
description
  "The size of the vendor-specific area."
}
leaf vendor-specific {
  type binary;
  description
  "Vendor specific information."
}

grouping tpm12-pcr-composite {
  description
  "The actual values of the selected PCRs (a list of TPM_PCRVALUES (binary) and associated metadata for TPM 1.2)."
  list TPM_PCR_COMPOSITE {
    description
    "The TPM 1.2 TPM_PCRVALUES for the pcr-indices."
    uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
    leaf value-size {
      type uint32;
      description
      "This SHALL be the size of the 'tpm12-pcr-value' field (not the number of PCRs)."
    }
    leaf-list tpm12-pcr-value {
      type binary;
      description
      "The list of TPM_PCRVALUES from each PCR selected in sequence of tpm12-pcr-selection."
    }
  }
}

grouping node-uptime {
  description
  "Uptime in seconds of the node."
  leaf up-time {
    type uint32;
    description
    "Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data"
  }
}

identity log-type {
  description
  "The type of logs available."
}
identity bios {
  base log-type;
  description
    "Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI."
}

identity ima {
  base log-type;
  description
    "Measurement log created by IMA."
}

grouping log-identifier {
  description
    "Identifier for type of log to be retrieved."
  leaf log-type {
    type identityref {
      base log-type;
    } mandatory true;
    description
      "The corresponding measurement log type identity."
  }
}

grouping boot-event-log {
  description
    "Defines an event log corresponding to the event that extended the PCR";
  leaf event-number {
    type uint32;
    description
      "Unique event number of this event"
  } leaf event-type {
    type uint32;
    description
      "log event type"
  } leaf pcr-index {
    type uint16;
    description
      "Defines the PCR index that this event extended"
  } list digest-list {
    description "Hash of event data";
}
uses hash-algo;
leaf-list digest {
  type binary;
  description "The hash of the event data";
}
leaf event-size {
  type uint32;
  description "Size of the event data";
}
leaf-list event-data {
  type uint8;
  description "the event data size determined by event-size";
}
}
grouping ima-event {
  description "Defines an hash log extend event for IMA measurements";
leaf event-number {
  type uint64;
  description "Unique number for this event for sequencing";
}
leaf ima-template {
  type string;
  description "Name of the template used for event logs for e.g. ima, ima-ng";
}
leaf filename-hint {
  type string;
  description "File that was measured";
}
leaf filedata-hash {
  type binary;
  description "Hash of filedata";
}
leaf template-hash-algorithm {
  type string;
  description "Algorithm used for template-hash";
}
leaf template-hash {
  type binary;
  description
    "hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";
}
leaf pcr-index {
  type uint16;
  description
    "Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
}
leaf signature {
  type binary;
  description
    "The file signature";
}

grouping bios-event-log {
  description
    "Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";
  list bios-event-entry {
    key event-number;
    description
      "Ordered list of TCG described event log
       that extended the PCRs in the order they
       were logged";
      uses boot-event-log;
  }
}

grouping ima-event-log {
  list ima-event-entry {
    key event-number;
    description
      "Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number";
      uses ima-event;
  }
  description
    "Measurement log created by IMA.";
}

grouping event-logs {
  description
    "A selector for the log and its type.";
  choice log-type {
    mandatory true;
    description
      "Event log type determines the event logs content.";
  }
}
case bios {
    description
    "BIOS/UEFI event logs";
    container bios-event-logs {
        description
        "This is an index referencing the TCG Algorithm Registry based on TPM_ALG_ID.";
        uses bios-event-log;
    }
}

case ima {
    description
    "IMA event logs";
    container ima-event-logs {
        description
        "This is an index referencing the TCG Algorithm Registry based on TPM_ALG_ID.";
        uses ima-event-log;
    }
}
}

rpc tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {
    description
    "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 1.2 commands of the managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG module to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices, e.g. smart NICs, is still a TODO.";
    input {
        container tpm1-attestation-challenge {
            description
            "This container includes every information element defined in the reference challenge-response interaction model for remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on TPM 1.2 structure definitions";
            uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
            uses nonce;
            uses tpm12-signature-scheme;
            uses tpm12-attestation-key-identifier;
            leaf add-version {
                type boolean;
                description
                "Whether or not to include TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO; if true, then TPM_Quote2 must be used to create the response.";
            }
            uses tpm-name;
        }
    }
}
output {
  list tpm12-attestation-response {
    key tpm_name;
    description
      "The binary output of TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote/TPM_Quote2, including
      the PCR selection and other associated attestation evidence
      metadata";
    uses tpm-name;
    uses node-uptime;
    uses compute-node;
    uses tpm12-quote-info-common;
    choice tpm12-quote {
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Either a tpm12-quote-info or tpm12-quote-info2, depending
        on whether TPM_Quote or TPM_Quote2 was used
        (cf. input field add-version)."
      case tpm12-quote1 {
        description
          "BIOS/UEFI event logs";
        uses tpm12-quote-info;
        uses tpm12-pcr-composite;
      }
      case tpm12-quote2 {
        description
          "BIOS/UEFI event logs";
        uses tpm12-quote-info2;
      }
    }
  }
}

rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
  description
    "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
    managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG
    module to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,
    e.g. smart NICs, is still a TODO.";
  input {
    container tpm20-attestation-challenge {
      description
        "This container includes every information element defined
        in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
        remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
        TPM 2.0 structure definitions";
      uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
    }
  }
}
uses nonce;
uses tpm20-signature-scheme;
uses tpm20-attestation-key-identifier;
}
list tpms {
key tpm_name;
description "TPMs to fetch the attestation information."
uses tpm-name;
}
output {
list tpm20-attestation-response {
key tpm_name;
description "The binary output of TPM2b_Quote. An TPMS_ATTEST structure including a length, encapsulated in a signature";
uses tpm-name;
uses node-uptime;
uses compute-node;
container tpms-attest {
leaf pcrdigest {
type binary; 
description "split out value of TPMS_QUOTE_INFO for convenience";
}
leaf tpms-attest-result {
type binary; 
description "The complete TPM generate structure including signature.";
}
leaf tpms-attest-result-length {
type uint32; 
description "Length of attest result provided by the TPM structure.";
}
description "A composite of value and length and list of selected pcrs (original name: [type]attested)";
}
leaf tpmt-signature {
type binary; 
description "Split out value of the signature for convenience. TODO: check for length values that complemt binary value data node leafs.";
}
rpc basic-trust-establishment {
  description
  "This RPC creates a tpm-resident, non-migratable key to be used
  in TPM_Quote commands, an attestation certificate.";
  input {
    uses nonce;
    uses tpm20-signature-scheme;
    uses tpm-name;
    leaf certificate-name {
      type string;
      description
      "An arbitrary name for the identity certificate chain
      requested.";
    }
  }
  output {
    list attestation-certificates {
      key tpm_name;
      description
      "Attestation Certificate data from a TPM identified by the TPM
      name";
      uses tpm-name;
      uses node-uptime;
      uses compute-node;
      leaf certificate-name {
        type string;
        description
        "An arbitrary name for this identity certificate or
        certificate chain.";
      }
      leaf attestation-certificate {
        type ietfct:end-entity-cert-cms;
        description
        "The binary signed certificate chain data for this identity
        certificate.";
      }
      uses tpm20-attestation-key-identifier;
    }
  }
}

crpc log-retrieval {
  description
  "Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing
the last line received. The number of lines returned can be limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.

```yang
input {
  list log-selector {
    key node-name;
    description
    "Selection of log entries to be reported."
    uses compute-node;
    choice index-type {
      description
      "Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp."
      case last-entry {
        description
        "The last entry of the log already retrieved."
        leaf last-entry-value {
          type binary;
          description
          "Content of an log event which matches 1:1 with a unique event record contained within the log. Log entries subsequent to this will be passed to the requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique, this MUST return an error."
        }
      }
      case index {
        description
        "Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or zero."
        leaf index-number {
          type uint64;
          description
          "The numeric index number of a log entry. Zero means to start at the beginning of the log. Entries subsequent to this will be passed to the requester."
        }
      }
      case timestamp {
        leaf timestamp {
          type yang:date-and-time;
          description
          "Timestamp from which to start the extraction. The next log entry subsequent to this timestamp is to be sent."
        }
        description
        "Timestamp from which to start the extraction."
      }
    }
  }
}
```
uses log-identifier;
uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
leaf log-entry-quantity {
  type uint16;
  description
  "The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it
  means all of them.";
}
}
output {
container system-event-logs {
  description
  "The requested data of the measurement event logs";
  list node-data {
    key "node-name tpm_name";
    description
    "Event logs of a node in a distributed system
    identified by the node name";
    uses compute-node;
    uses node-uptime;
    uses tpm-name;
    container log-result {
      description
      "The requested entries of the corresponding log.";
      uses event-logs;
    }
  }
}
}
}
container rats-support-structures {
  config false;
  description
  "The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying
  parties to discover the information necessary to use the
  remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";
  leaf-list supported-algos {
    type uint16;
    description
    "Supported TPM_ALG_ID values for the TPM in question.
    Will include ComponentIndex soon.";
  }
  list tpms {
    key tpm_name;
    uses tpm-name;
    description
    "A list of TPMs in this composite
list certificates {
  description "The TPM’s endorsement-certificate.";
  container certificate {
    leaf certificate-name {
      type string;
      description "An arbitrary name for this identity certificate or certificate chain.";
    }
    leaf certificate-type {
      type enumeration {
        enum endorsement-cert {
          value 0;
          description "EK Cert type.";
        }
        enum attestation-cert {
          value 1;
          description "AK Cert type.";
        }
      }
    }
    leaf certificate-value {
      type ietfct:end-entity-cert-cms;
      description "The binary signed public endorsement key (EK), attestation key(AK) and corresponding assertions (EK,AK Certificate). In a TPM 2.0 the EK,AK Certificate resides in a well-defined NVRAM location by the TPM vendor.";
    }
  }
}

list compute-nodes {
  key node-name;
  uses compute-node;
  description "A list names of hardware components in this composite device that rats can be conducted with.";
}
3. IANA considerations

This document will include requests to IANA:

To be defined yet.

4. Security Considerations

There are always some.

5. Acknowledgements

Not yet.

6. Change Log

Changes from version 00 to version 01:

- Addressed author’s comments
- Extended complementary details about attestation-certificates
- Relabeled chunk-size to log-entry-quantity
- Relabeled location with compute-node or tpm-name where appropriate
- Added a valid entity-mib physical-index to compute-node and tpm-name to map it back to hardware inventory
- Relabeled name to tpm_name
- Removed event-string in last-entry

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-model]
7.2. Informative References

[I-D.birkholz-attestation-terminology]

Authors’ Addresses

Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
Darmstadt 64295
Germany

Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de

Michael Eckel
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
Darmstadt 64295
Germany

Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de

Shwetha Bhandari
Cisco Systems

Email: shwethab@cisco.com

Bill Sulzen
Cisco Systems

Email: bsulzen@cisco.com
Eric Voit
Cisco Systems
Email: evoit@cisco.com

Liang Xia (Frank)
Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing, Jiangsu  210012
China
Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com

Tom Laffey
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com

Guy C. Fedorkow
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive
Westford, Massachusetts  01886
Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures
draft-birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-model-03

Abstract

This document describes interaction models for remote attestation procedures (RATS). Three conveying mechanisms - Challenge/Response, Uni-Directional, and Streaming Remote Attestation - are illustrated and defined. Analogously, a general overview about the information elements typically used by corresponding conveyance protocols are highlighted. Privacy preserving conveyance of Evidence via Direct Anonymous Attestation is elaborated on for each interaction model, individually.

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1. Introduction

Remote ATtestation procedures (RATS, [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]) are workflows composed of roles and interactions, in which Verifiers create Attestation Results about the trustworthiness of an Attester’s system component characteristics. The Verifier’s assessment in the form of Attestation Results is created based on Attestation Policies and Evidence — trustable and tamper-evident Claims Sets about an Attester’s system component characteristics — created by an Attester. The roles _Attester_ and _Verifier_, as well as the Conceptual Messages _Evidence_ and _Attestation Results_ are terms defined by the RATS Architecture [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. This document captures interaction models that can be used in specific RATS-related solution documents. The primary focus of this document is the conveyance of attestation Evidence. Specific goals of this document are to:

- o prevent inconsistencies in descriptions of these interaction models in other documents (due to text cloning over time),

- o enable to highlight an exact delta/divergence between the core set of characteristics captured here in this document and variants of these interaction models used in other specifications or solutions, and to

- o illustrate the application of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) for each of the interaction models described.

In summary, this document enables the specification and design of trustworthy and privacy preserving conveyance methods for attestation Evidence from an Attester to a Verifier. While the conveyance of other Conceptual Messages is out-of-scope the methods described can also be applied to the conveyance of Endorsements or Attestation Results.

2. Terminology

This document uses the terms, roles, and concepts defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]:

Attester, Verifier, Relying Party, Conceptual Message, Evidence, Endorsement, Attestation Result, Appraisal Policy, Attesting Environment, Target Environment

A PKIX Certificate is an X.509v3 format certificate as specified by [RFC5280].
3. Disambiguation

The term "Remote Attestation" is a common expression and often associated or connoted with certain properties. The term "Remote" in this context does not necessarily refer to a remote entity in the scope of network topologies or the Internet. It rather refers to a decoupled system or entities that exchange the payload of the Conceptual Message type called Evidence [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. This conveyance can also be "local", if the Verifier is part of the same entity as the Attester, e.g., separate system components of a Composite Device (a single RATS Entity). Examples of these types of co-located environments include: a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs), as well as other physical or logical protected/isolated/shielded Computing Environments (e.g. embedded Secure Elements (eSE) or Trusted Platform Modules ( TPM)).

4. Scope and Intent

This document focuses on generic interaction models between Attesters and Verifiers in order to convey Evidence. Complementary procedures, functions, or services that are required for a complete semantic binding of the concepts defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] are out-of-scope of this document. Examples include: identity establishment, key distribution and enrollment, time synchronization, as well as certificate revocation.

Furthermore, any processes and duties that go beyond carrying out remote attestation procedures are out-of-scope. For instance, using the results of a remote attestation that are created by the Verifier, e.g., how to triggering remediation actions or recovery processes, as well as such remediation actions and recovery processes themselves, are also out-of-scope.

The interaction models illustrated in this document are intended to provide a stable basis and reference for other solutions documents inside or outside the IETF. Solution documents of any kind can reference the interaction models in order to avoid text clones and to avoid the danger of subtle discrepancies. Analogously, deviations from the generic model descriptions in this document can be illustrated in solutions documents to highlight distinct contributions.
5. Direct Anonymous Attestation

DAA [DAA] is a signature scheme used in RATS that allows preservation of the privacy of users that are associated with an Attester (e.g. its owner). Essentially, DAA can be seen as a group signature scheme with the feature that given a DAA signature no-one can find out who the signer is, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. To be able to sign anonymously an Attester has to obtain a credential from a DAA Issuer. The DAA Issuer uses a private/public key pair to generate a credential for an Attester and makes the public key (in the form of a public key certificate) available to the verifier to enable them to validate the DAA signature obtained as part of the Evidence.

In order to support these DAA signatures, the DAA Issuer MUST associate a single key pair with each group of Attesters and use the same key pair when creating the credentials for all of the Attesters in this group. The DAA Issuer’s public key certificate for the group replaces the Attester Identity documents in the verification of the Evidence (instead of unique Attester Identity documents). This is in contrast to intuition that there has to be a unique Attester Identity per device.

This document extends the duties of the Endorser role as defined by the RATS architecture with respect to the provision of these Attester Identity documents to Attesters. The existing duties of the Endorser role and the duties of a DAA Issuer are quite similar as illustrated in the following subsections.

5.1. Endorsers

Via its Attesting Environments, an Attester can only create Evidence about its Target Environments. After being appraised to be trustworthy, a Target Environment may become a new Attesting Environment in charge of creating Evidence for further Target Environments. [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] explains this as Layered Attestation. Layered Attestation has to start with an initial Attesting Environment (i.e., there cannot be turtles all the way down [turtles]). At this rock bottom of Layered Attestation, the Attesting Environments are called Roots of Trust (RoT). An Attester cannot create Evidence about its own RoTs by design. As a consequence, a Verifier requires trustable statements about this subset of Attesting Environments from a different source than the Attester itself. The corresponding trustable statements are called Endorsements and originate from external, trustable entities that take on the role of an Endorser (e.g., supply chain entities).
5.2. Endorsers for Direct Anonymous Attestation

In order to enable DAA to be used, an Endorser role takes on the duties of a DAA Issuer in addition to its already defined duties. DAA Issuers offer zero-knowledge proofs based on public key certificates used for a group of Attesters [DAA]. Effectively, these certificates share the semantics of Endorsements. The differences are:

- The associated private keys are used by the DAA Issuer to provide an Attester with a credential that it can use to convince the Verifier that its Evidence is valid. To keep their anonymity the Attester randomises this credential each time that it is used.

- The Verifier can use the DAA Issuer’s public key certificate, together with the randomised credential from the Attester, to confirm that the Evidence comes from a valid Attester.

- A credential is conveyed from an Endorser to an Attester together with the transfer of the public key certificates from Endorser to Verifier.

The zero-knowledge proofs required cannot be created by an Attester alone - like the Endorsements of RoTs - and have to be created by a trustable third entity - like an Endorser. Due to that vast semantic overlap (XXX-mcr:explain), an Endorser in this document can convey trustable third party statements both to a Verifier and an Attester.

6. Normative Prerequisites

In order to ensure an appropriate conveyance of Evidence, the following set of prerequisites MUST be in place to support the implementation of interaction models:

Attester Identity: The provenance of Evidence with respect to a distinguishable Attesting Environment MUST be correct and unambiguous.

An Attester Identity MAY be a unique identity, it MAY be included in a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), or it MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomised DAA credential.

Attestation Evidence Authenticity: Attestation Evidence MUST be correct and authentic.

In order to provide proofs of authenticity, Attestation Evidence SHOULD be cryptographically associated with an identity document (e.g. an PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomised
DAA credential), or SHOULD include a correct and unambiguous and
stable reference to an accessible identity document.

Authentication Secret: An Authentication Secret MUST be available
exclusively to an Attester’s Attesting Environment.

The Attester MUST protect Claims with that Authentication Secret,
thereby proving the authenticity of the Claims included in
Evidence. The Authentication Secret MUST be established before
RATS can take place.

Evidence Freshness: Evidence MUST include an indicator about its
Freshness that can be understood by a Verifier. Analogously,
interaction models MUST support the conveyance of proofs of
freshness in a way that is useful to Verifiers and their appraisal
procedures.

Evidence Protection: Evidence MUST be a set of well-formatted and
well-protected Claims that an Attester can create and convey to a
Verifier in a tamper-evident manner.

7. Generic Information Elements

This section defines the information elements that are vital to all
kinds interaction models. Varying from solution to solution, generic
information elements can be either included in the scope of protocol
messages or can be included in their payload. Ultimately, the
following information elements are required by any kind of scalable
remote attestation procedure using one or more of the interaction
models provided.

Attester Identity (‘attesterIdentity’): _mandatory_

A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser
without accompanying evidence about its validity – used as proof
of identity.

In DAA the Attester’s identity is not revealed to the verifier.
The Attester is issued with a credential by the Endorser that is
randomised and then used to anonymously confirm the validity of
their evidence. The evidence is verified using the Endorser’s
public key.

Authentication Secret IDs (‘authSecID’): _mandatory_

A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be
associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to
protect Evidence. In DAA, Authentication Secret IDs are
represented by the Endorser (DAA issuer)’s public key that MUST be used to create DAA credentials for the corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Evidence.

Each Authentication Secret is uniquely associated with a distinguishable Attesting Environment. Consequently, an Authentication Secret ID also identifies an Attesting Environment. In DAA an Authentication Secret ID does not identify a unique Attesting Environment but associated with a group of Attesting Environments. This is because an Attesting Environment should not be distinguishable and the DAA credential which represents the Attesting Environment is randomised each time it used.

Handle (‘handle’): _mandatory_

A statement that is intended to uniquely distinguish received Evidence and/or determine the Freshness of Evidence.

A Verifier can also use a Handle as an indicator for authenticity or attestation provenance, as only Attesters and Verifiers that are intended to exchange Evidence should have knowledge of the corresponding Handles. Examples include Nonces or signed timestamps.

Claims (‘claims’): _mandatory_

Claims are assertions that represent characteristics of an Attester’s Target Environment.

Claims are part Conceptual Message and are, for example, used to appraise the integrity of Attesters via a Verifiers. The other information elements in this section can be expressed as Claims in any type of Conceptional Messages.

Reference Claims (‘refClaims’) _mandatory_

Reference Claims are a specific subset of Appraisal Policies as defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].

Reference Claims are used to appraise the Claims received from an Attester via appraisal by direct comparison. For example, Reference Claims MAY be Reference Integrity Measurements (RIM) or assertions that are implicitly trusted because they are signed by a trusted authority (see Endorsements in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]). Reference Claims typically represent (trusted) Claim sets about an Attester’s intended platform operational state.
Claim Selection ('claimSelection'): _optional_

A statement that represents a (sub-)set of Claims that can be created by an Attester.

Claim Selections can act as filters that can specify the exact set of Claims to be included in Evidence. An Attester MAY decide whether or not to provide all Claims as requested via a Claim Selection.

Evidence ('signedAttestationEvidence'): _mandatory_

A set of Claims that consists of a list of Authentication Secret IDs that each identifies an Authentication Secret in a single Attesting Environment, the Attester Identity, Claims, and a Handle. Attestation Evidence MUST cryptographically bind all of these information elements. The Evidence MUST be protected via the Authentication Secret. The Authentication Secret MUST be trusted by the Verifier as authoritative.

Attestation Result ('attestationResult'): _mandatory_

An Attestation Result is produced by the Verifier as the output of the appraisal of Evidence. Attestation Results include condensed assertions about integrity or other characteristics of the corresponding Attester.

8. Interaction Models

The following subsections introduce and illustrate the interaction models:

1. Challenge/Response Remote Attestation

2. Uni-Directional Remote Attestation

3. Streaming Remote Attestation

Each section starts with a sequence diagram illustrating the interactions between Attester and Verifier. The other roles RATS roles - mainly Relying Parties and Endorsers - are not relevant for this interaction model. While the interaction models presented focus on the conveyance of Evidence, future work could apply this to the conveyance of other Conceptual Messages, namely Attestation Results, Endorsements, or Appraisal Policies.

All interaction model have a strong focus on the use of a handle to incorporate a proof of freshness. The ways these handles are
processed is the most prominent difference between the three interaction models.

8.1. Challenge/Response Remote Attestation

This Challenge/Response Remote Attestation procedure is initiated by the Verifier, by sending a remote attestation request to the Attester. A request includes a Handle, a list of Authentication Secret IDs, and a Claim Selection.

In the Challenge/Response model, the handle is composed of qualifying data in the form of a cryptographically strongly randomly generated, and therefore unpredictable, nonce. The Verifier-generated nonce is intended to guarantee Evidence freshness.

The list of Authentication Secret IDs selects the attestation keys with which the Attester is requested to sign the Attestation Evidence. Each selected key is uniquely associated with an Attesting Environment of the Attester. As a result, a single Authentication Secret ID identifies a single Attesting Environment.

Analogously, a particular set of Evidence originating from a particular Attesting Environments in a composite device can be requested via multiple Authentication Secret IDs. Methods to acquire
Authentication Secret IDs or mappings between Attesting Environments to Authentication Secret IDs are out-of-scope of this document.

The Claim Selection narrows down the set of Claims collected and used to create Evidence to those that the Verifier requires. If the Claim Selection is omitted, then by default all Claims that are known and available on the Attester MUST be used to create corresponding Evidence. For example when performing a boot integrity evaluation, a Verifier may only be requesting a particular subset of claims about the Attester, such as Evidence about BIOS and firmware the Attester booted up, and not include information about all currently running software.

While it is crucial that Claims, the Handle, as well as the Attester Identity information MUST be cryptographically bound to the signature of Evidence, they may be presented in an encrypted form.

Cryptographic blinding MAY be used at this point. For further reference see section Section 11.

As soon as the Verifier receives signed Evidence, it validates the signature, the Attester Identity, as well as the Nonce, and appraises the Claims. Appraisal procedures are application-specific and can be conducted via comparison of the Claims with corresponding Reference Claims, such as Reference Integrity Measurements. The final output of the Verifier are Attestation Results. Attestation Results constitute new Claims Sets about an Attester’s properties and characteristics that enables Relying Parties, for example, to assess an Attester’s trustworthiness.

8.2. Uni-Directional Remote Attestation
Uni-Directional Remote Attestation procedures can be initiated both by the Attester and by the Verifier. Initiation by the Attester can result in unsolicited pushes of Evidence to the Verifier. Initiation by the Verifier always results in solicited pushes to the Verifier. The Uni-Directional model uses the same information elements as the Challenge/Response model. In the sequence diagram above, the Attester initiates the conveyance of Evidence (comparable with a RESTful POST operation or the emission of a beacon). While a request of evidence from the Verifier would result in a sequence diagram more similar to the Challenge/Response model (comparable with a RESTful
GET operation), the specific manner how handles are created and used always remains as the distinguishing quality of this model. In the Uni-Directional model, handles are composed of trustable signed timestamps as shown in [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda], potentially including other qualifying data. The handles are created by an external 3rd entity - the Handle Distributor - that includes a trustworthy source of time and takes on the role of a Time Stamping Authority (TSA, as initially defined in [RFC3161]). Timstamps created from local clocks (absolute clocks using a global timescale, as well as relative clocks, such as tick-counters) of Attesters and Verifiers MUST be cryptographically bound to fresh Handles received from the Handle Distributor. This binding provides a proof of synchronization that MUST be included in every evidence created. Correspondingly, evidence created for conveyance via this model provides a proof that it was fresh at a certain point in time. Effectively, this allows for series of evidence to be pushed to multiple Verifiers, simultaneously. Methods to detect excessive time drift that would mandate a fresh Handle to be received by the Handle Distributor, as well as timing of handle distribution are out-of-scope of this document.

8.3. Streaming Remote Attestation
Streaming Remote Attestation procedures require the setup of subscription state. Setting up subscription state between a Verifier and an Attester is conducted via a subscribe operation. This subscribe operation is used to convey the handles required for Evidence generation. Effectively, this allows for series of evidence to be pushed to a Verifier similar to the Uni-Directional model. While a Handle Distributor is not required in this model, it is also limited to bi-lateral subscription relationships, in which each Verifier has to create and provide its individual handle. Handles provided by a specific subscribing Verifier MUST be used in Evidence generation for that specific Verifier. The Streaming model uses the same information elements as the Challenge/Response and the Uni-Directional model. Methods to detect excessive time drift that would mandate a refreshed Handle to be conveyed via another subscribe operation are out-of-scope of this document.
9. Additional Application-Specific Requirements

Depending on the use cases covered, there can be additional requirements. An exemplary subset is illustrated in this section.

9.1. Confidentiality

Confidentiality of exchanged attestation information may be desirable. This requirement usually is present when communication takes place over insecure channels, such as the public Internet. In such cases, TLS may be used as a suitable communication protocol that preserves confidentiality. In private networks, such as carrier management networks, it must be evaluated whether or not the transport medium is considered confidential.

9.2. Mutual Authentication

In particular use cases mutual authentication may be desirable in such a way that a Verifier also needs to prove its identity to the Attester, instead of only the Attester proving its identity to the Verifier.

9.3. Hardware-Enforcement/Support

Depending on given usage scenarios, hardware support for secure storage of cryptographic keys, crypto accelerators, as well as protected or isolated execution environments can be mandatory requirements. Well-known technologies in support of these requirements are roots of trusts, such as Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), Shielded Secrets, or Trusted Executions Environments (TEEs).

10. Implementation Status

Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section as well as references to [BCP205] before AUTH48.

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [BCP205]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [BCP205], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

10.1. Implementer

The open-source implementation was initiated and is maintained by the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology - SIT.

10.2. Implementation Name

The open-source implementation is named "CHAllenge-Response based Remote Attestation" or in short: CHARRA.

10.3. Implementation URL

The open-source implementation project resource can be located via: https://github.com/Fraunhofer-SIT/charra

10.4. Maturity

The code's level of maturity is considered to be "prototype".

10.5. Coverage and Version Compatibility

The current version (commit '847bcde') is aligned with the exemplary specification of the CoAP FETCH bodies defined in section Appendix A of this document.

10.6. License

The CHARRA project and all corresponding code and data maintained on github are provided under the BSD 3-Clause "New" or "Revised" license.

10.7. Implementation Dependencies

The implementation requires the use of the official Trusted Computing Group (TCG) open-source Trusted Software Stack (TSS) for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0. The corresponding code and data is also maintained on github and the project resources can be located via: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/

10.8. Contact

Michael Eckel (michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de)

11. Security and Privacy Considerations

In a remote attestation procedure the Verifier or the Attester MAY want to cryptographically blind several attributes. For instance, information can be part of the signature after applying a one-way function (e. g. a hash function).

There is also a possibility to scramble the Nonce or Attester Identity with other information that is known to both the Verifier and Attester. A prominent example is the IP address of the Attester that usually is known by the Attester itself as well as the Verifier. This extra information can be used to scramble the Nonce in order to counter certain types of relay attacks.

12. Acknowledgments

Olaf Bergmann, Michael Richardson, and Ned Smith

13. Change Log

- Initial draft -00
- Changes from version 00 to version 01:
  * Added details to the flow diagram
  * Integrated comments from Ned Smith (Intel)
  * Reorganized sections and
  * Updated interaction model
  * Replaced "claims" with "assertions"
  * Added proof-of-concept CDDL for CBOR via CoAP based on a TPM 2.0 quote operation
- Changes from version 01 to version 02:
* Revised the relabeling of "claims" with "assertion" in alignment with the RATS Architecture I-D.

* Added Implementation Status section

* Updated interaction model

* Text revisions based on changes in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and comments provided on rats@ietf.org.

  o Changes from version 02 to version 00 RATS related document
    * update of the challenge/response diagram
    * minor rephrasing of Prerequisites section
    * rephrasing to information elements and interaction model section

  o Changes from version 00 to version 01
    * added Attestation Authenticity, updated Identity and Secret
    * relabeled Secret ID to Authentication Secret ID + rephrasing
    * relabeled Claim Selection to Assertion Selection + rephrasing
    * relabeled Evidence to (Signed) Attestation Evidence
    * Added Attestation Result and Reference Assertions
    * update of the challenge/response diagram and expositional text
    * added CDDL spec for CoAP FETCH operation proof-of-concept

  o Changes from version 01 to version 02
    * prepared the inclusion of additional reference models
    * update to Introduction and Scope section
    * major update to (Normative) Prerequisites
    * relabeled Attestation Authenticity to Att. Evidence Authenticity
    * relabeled Assertion term back to Claim terms
* added BCP205 Implementation Status section related to Appendix CDDL

o Changes from version 02 to version 03
  * major refactoring to now accommodate three interaction models
  * updated existing and added two new diagrams for models
  * major refactoring of existing and adding of new diagram description
  * incorporated content about Direct Anonymous Attestation
  * integrated comments from Michael Richardson
  * updated roster

14. References

14.1. Normative References


Appendix A. CDDL Specification for a simple CoAP Challenge/Response Interaction

The following CDDL specification is an exemplary proof-of-concept to illustrate a potential implementation of the Challenge/Response Interaction Model. The transfer protocol used is CoAP using the FETCH operation. The actual resource operated on can be empty. Both the Challenge Message and the Response Message are exchanged via the FETCH operation and corresponding FETCH Request and FETCH Response body.
In this example, evidence is created via the root-of-trust for reporting primitive operation "quote" that is provided by a TPM 2.0.

RAIM-Bodies = CoAP-FETCH-Body / CoAP-FETCH-Response-Body

CoAP-FETCH-Body = [ hello: bool, ; if true, the AK-Cert is conveyed
   nonce: bytes,
   pcr-selection: [ + [ tcg-hash-alg-id: uint .size 2, ; TPM2_AL
     G_ID
       [ + pcr: uint .size 1 ],
     ]
   ],
]

CoAP-FETCH-Response-Body = [ attestation-evidence: TPMS_ATTEST-quote,
   tpm-native-signature: bytes,
   ? ak-cert: bytes, ; attestation key certificate
 ]

TPMS_ATTEST-quote = [ qualifiediSigner: uint .size 2, ;TPM2B_NAME
  TPMS_CLOCK_INFO,
  firmwareVersion: uint .size 8
  quote-responses: [ * [ pcr: uint .size 1,
    + [ pcr-value: bytes,
      ? hash-alg-id: uint .size 2,
    ],
  ],
  ],
  ? pcr-digest: bytes,
 ]

TPMS_CLOCK_INFO = [ clock: uint .size 8,
  resetCounter: uint .size 4,
  restartCounter: uint .size 4,
  save: bool,
 ]

Authors’ Addresses

Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
Darmstadt 64295
Germany

Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Michael Eckel  
Fraunhofer SIT  
Rheinstrasse 75  
Darmstadt  64295  
Germany  
Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de

Christopher Newton  
University of Surrey  
Email: cn0016@surrey.ac.uk

Liqun Chen  
University of Surrey  
Email: liqun.chen@surrey.ac.uk
Abstract

This document defines the method and bindings used to convey Evidence via Time-based Uni-Directional Attestation (TUDA) in Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS). TUDA does not require a challenge-response handshake and thereby does not rely on the conveyance of a nonce to prove freshness of remote attestation Evidence. TUDA enables the creation of Secure Audit Logs that can constitute believable Evidence about both current and past operational states of an Attester. In TUDA, RATS entities require access to a Handle Distributor to which a trustable and synchronized time-source is available. The Handle Distributor takes on the role of a Time Stamp Authority (TSA) to distribute Handles incorporating Time Stamp Tokens (TST) to the RATS entities. RATS require an Attesting Environment that generates believable Evidence. While a TPM is used as the corresponding root of trust in this specification, any other type of root of trust can be used with TUDA.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-birkholz-rats-tuda/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (rats) Working Group mailing list (mailto:rats@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ietf-rats/draft-birkholz-rats-tuda.
Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) describe the attempt to determine and appraise system properties, such as integrity and trustworthiness, of a remote peer -- the Attester -- by the use of a Verifier in support of Relying Parties that intend to interact with the Attester. The Verifier carries the burden of appraisal of detailed Evidence about an Attester’s trustworthiness. Evidence is generated by the Attester and consumed by the Verifier. To support security decisions, the Verifier generates digestable Attestation Results that can be easily consumed by Relying Parties. The RATS architecture specifies the corresponding concepts and terms [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].

TUDA uses the architectural constituents of the RATS Architecture, such as the roles Attester and Verifier, and defines a method to convey Conceptual Messages between them. TUDA uses the Uni-Directional Remote Attestation interaction model described in [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. While the Conceptual Message focused on in this document is RATS Evidence, any type of Conceptual Message content that requires a believable indication about the message’s content freshness can be conveyed with TUDA (e.g. Attestation Results).

The conveyance of Evidence in RATS must ensure that Evidence always remains integrity protected, tamper-evident, originates from a trustable entity (or group of entities), and is accompanied by a proof of its freshness.

In contrast to bi-directional interactions as described by Challenge/Response Remote Attestation in [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models], TUDA enables uni-directional conveyance in the interactions between Attester and Verifier. TUDA allows a Verifier to receive Evidence from an Attester without solicitation. Conversely, it allows a Verifier to retrieve Evidence from an Attester without it being generated ad-hoc. Exemplary applications of TUDA are the creation of beacons in vehicular environments [IEEE1609] or authentication mechanisms based on EAP [RFC5247].

The generation of Evidence in RATS requires an Attesting Environment. In this specification, the root of trust acting as an Attesting Environment is a Trusted Platform Module (TPM, see [TPM12] and [TPM2]). The Protected Capabilities [TCGGLOSS] provided by a TPM support various activities in RATS, e.g., Claims collection and Evidence generation.
A trusted coupling of Evidence generation with a global timescale is enabled via a Handle Distributor. Handles generated by a Handle Distributor can include nonces, signed timestamps, or other structured or opaque content used as qualifying data in Evidence generation. In TUDA, all RATS entities, such as the entities taking on the roles of Attester and Verifier, can receive signed timestamps from the Handle Distributor. These trusted timestamps replace nonces in Evidence generation and Evidence appraisal ([I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]).

1.1. Forward Authenticity

Nonces enable an implicit time-keeping in which the freshness of Evidence is inferred by recentness. Recentness is estimated via the time interval between sending a nonce as part of a challenge for Evidence and the reception of Evidence based on that nonce (as outlined in the interaction model depicted in section 8.1 in [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]). Conversely, the omission of nonces in TUDA allows for explicit time-keeping where freshness is not inferred from recentness. Instead, a cryptographic binding of a trusted synchronization to a global timescale in the Evidence itself allows for Evidence that can prove past operational states of an Attester. To capture and support this concept, this document introduces the term Forward Authenticity.

Forward Authenticity: A property of secure communication protocols, in which later compromise of the long-term keys of a data origin does not compromise past authentication of data from that origin. Forward Authenticity is achieved by timely recording of authenticity Claims from Target Environments (via "audit logs" during "audit sessions") that are authorized for this purpose and trustworthy (via endorsed roots of trusts, for example), in a time-frame much shorter than that expected for the compromise of the long-term keys.

Forward Authenticity enables new levels of assurance and can be included in basically every protocol, such as ssh, YANG Push, router advertisements, link layer neighbor discovery, or even ICMP echo requests.

1.2. TUDA Objectives

Time-Based Uni-directional Attestation is designed to:

* increase the confidence in authentication and authorization procedures,
* address the requirements of constrained-node networks,
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* support interaction models that do not maintain connection-state over time, such as REST architectures [REST],

* be able to leverage existing management interfaces, such as SNMP (RFC 3411, [STD62]), RESTCONF [RFC8040] or CoMI [I-D.ietf-core-comi] --- and corresponding bindings,

* support broadcast and multicast schemes (e.g. [IEEE1609]),

* be able to cope with temporary loss of connectivity, and to

* provide trustworthy audit logs of past endpoint states.

1.3. Terminology

This document uses the terms defined in the RATS Architecture [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and by the RATS Reference Interaction Models [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Remote Attestation Principles

Based on the RATS Architecture, the processing of TPM generated Evidence can be separated in three activities.

Evidence Generation: The retrieval of signed digests from an RTR based on a sequence of collected Claims about software component integrity (measurements).

Evidence Conveyance: The transfer of Evidence from the Attester to the Verifier via the Internet.

Evidence Appraisal: The validation of Evidence signatures as well as the assessment of Claim values in Evidence by comparing them with Reference Values.

TUDA is specified in support of these RATS activities that align with the definitions presented in [PRIRA] and [TCGGLOSS].
2.1. Authenticity of Evidence

Remote attestation Evidence is composed of a set of Claims (assertions about the trustworthiness of an Attester’s Target Environments) that is accompanied by a proof of its veracity -- typically a signature based on shielded, private, and potentially use-restricted key material used as an Authentication Secret as specified in section 6 of [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] (or a secure channel as illustrated in [I-D.birkholz-rats-uccs]). As key material alone is typically not self-descriptive with respect to its intended use (its semantics), the Evidence created via TUDA MUST be accompanied by two kinds of certificates that are cryptographically associated with a trust anchor (TA) [RFC4949] via certification paths:

* an Attestation Key (AK) Certificate (AK-Cert) that represents the attestation provenance of the Attesting Environment (see section 4.2. in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]) that generates Evidence, and

* an Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate (EK-Cert) that represents the Protection Capabilities of an Attesting Environment the AK is stored in.

If a Verifier decides to trust the TA of both an AK-Cert and an EK-Cert presented by an Attester -- and thereby the included Claims about the trustworthiness of an Attester’s Target Environments -- the Evidence generated by the Attester can be considered trustable and believable. Ultimately, all trustable and believable Evidence MUST be appraised by a Verifier in order to assess the trustworthiness of the corresponding Attester. Assertions represented via Claims MUST NOT be considered believable by themselves.

In this document, Evidence is generated via TPMs that come with an AK-Cert and a EK-Cert as a basis for believable Evidence generation.

2.2. Generating Evidence about Software Component Integrity

Evidence generated by a TPM for TUDA is based on measured hash values of all software components deployed in Target Environments (see section 4.2. in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]) before they are executed ("measure then execute"). The underlying concept of "Attestation Logs" is elaborated on in Section 2.4.2. of [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]. This concept is implemented, for example, in the Linux kernel where it is called the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [Safford] and used to generates such a sequence of hash values. A representation for conveyance of corresponding event logs is described in the Canonical Event Log [CEL] specification. Open source solutions, for example,
based on [RFC5209] use an IMA log to enable remote attestation [Steffens].

An Attester MUST generate such an event/measurement log.

2.3. Measurements and Digests Generated by an Attester

A hash value of a software component is created before it is executed by Attesters. These hash values are typically represented as event log entries referred to as measurements, which often occur in large quantities. Capabilities such as Linux IMA can be used to generate these measurements on an Attester. Measurements are chained by Attesters using a rolling hash function. A TPM acts as a root of trust for storage (RTS) by providing an Extend ([TPM12], [TPM2]) operation to feed hash values in a rolling hash function. Each measurement added to the sequence of all measurements results in a new current digest hash value. A TPM acts as a root of trust for reporting (RTR) by providing Quote ([TPM12], [TPM2]) operations to generate a digest of all currently extended hash values as Evidence.

TUDA requirements on TPM primitive operations and the information elements processed by them are illustrated using pseudocode in Appendix C and D.

2.4. Attesting Environments and Roots of Trust

The primitive operations used to generate an initial set of measurements at the beginning of an Attester’s boot sequence MUST be provided by a Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) that is a system component of the Attester. An RTM MUST be trusted via trust-relationships to TAs enabled by appropriate Endorsements (e.g., EK-Certs). If a Verifier cannot trust an RTM, measurements based on values generated by the RTM MUST be considered invalid. At least one RTM MUST be accessible to the first Attesting Environment in Attester conducting Layered Attestation (see section 4.3. in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]). An RTM MAY aggregate and retain measurements until the first RTS becomes available in a Layered Attestation procedure -- instead of feeding measurements into an RTS, instantly. The Protection Capabilities of an RTM to also act as a temporary RTS MUST be trusted via trust-relationships to TAs enabled by appropriate Endorsements. System components supporting the use of a TPM typically include such an appropriate RTM. In general, feeding measurements from an initial RTM into a TPM is automated and separated from Protected Capabilities that provide Claims collection from Target Environments that are regular execution environments. A TPM providing the Protection Capabilities for an isolated and shielded location to feed measurements into (integrity and confidentiality) is an appropriate RTS for TUDA.
The primitive operations used to store and chain measurements via a rolling hash function MUST be provided by an appropriate root of trust for storage (RTS) that is a system component of the Attester. An RTS MUST be trusted via trust-relationships to TAs enabled by appropriate Endorsements (e.g., EK-Certs). If a Verifier cannot trust an RTS, Evidence generated based on digest values acquired from the RTS MUST be considered invalid. An RTS MUST be accessible to all Attesting Environments that are chained in a Layered Attestation procedure. A TPM providing the primitive operation for Extend is an appropriate RTM for TUDA.

The primitive operations used to generate Evidence based on digests MUST be provided by roots of trust for reporting (RTR) that are system components of the Attester. An RTR MUST be be trusted via trust-relationships to TAs enabled by appropriate Endorsements (e.g., EK-Certs). If a Verifier cannot trust an RTR, Evidence generated by the RTR MUST be considered invalid. A TPM providing the primitive operations for Quote is an appropriate RTR for TUDA. In a Composite Device (see Section 3.5. in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]) conducting a Layered Attestation procedure, Attesting Environments MAY not be TPMs. At least one Attesting Environment MUST be a TPM. At least one TPM MUST act as an RTR. Attesting Environments that are not TPMs MUST NOT act as an RTR.

A concise definition of the terms RTM, RTS, and RTR can be found in the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Glossary [TCGGLOSS]. An RTS and an RTR are often tightly coupled. In TUDA, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM, see [TPM12] and [TPM2]) takes on the roles of an RTS and an RTR. The specification in this document requires the use of a TPM as a component of the Attester. The protocol part of this specification can also be used with other RTS and RTR as long as essential functional requirements are satisfied (e.g., a trusted relative source of time, such as a tick-counter). A sequence of Layered Attestation using at least an RTM, RTS, and RTR enables an authenticated boot sequence typically referred to as Secure Boot.

2.5. Indeterministic Measurements

The sequence of measurements that is extended into the RTS provided by a TPM may not be deterministic due to race conditions that are side-effects of parallelization. Parallelization occurs, for example, between different isolated execution environments or separate software components started in a execution environment. In order to enable the appraisal of Evidence in cases where sequence of measurement varies, a corresponding event log that records all measurements in sequence, such as the IMA log, has to be conveyed next to the Evidence as depicted in section 8.2. in [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models].
In contrast to Evidence, event logs do not necessarily have to be integrity protected or tamper-evident. Event logs are conveyed to a Verifier in order to compute the reference values required for comparison with digest values (output of TPM Quote operations). While digest values MUST constitute Evidence, measurements in event logs MAY be part of Evidence, but do not have to be. If the values in event logs or their sequence are tampered with before or during conveyance from an Attester to a Verifier, the corresponding Evidence Appraisal fails. While this dependency reflects the intended behavior of RATS, integrity protected or tamper-evident can be beneficial or convenient in some usage scenarios. Additionally, event logs may allow insights into the composition of an Attester and typically come with confidentiality requirements.

In order to compute reference values to compare digest Claims in Evidence with, a Verifier MUST be able to replay the rolling hash function of the Extend operation provided by a TPM (see Section 2.4.2. in [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]).

A Verifier has to replay the event log using its own extend operation with an identical rolling hash function in order to generate reference values as outlined in section 2.4.1. of [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]. During reply, the validity of each event log record MUST be appraised individually by the Verifier in order to infer if each started software component satisfies integrity requirements. These appraisal procedures require Reference Integrity Measurements/Manifests (RIM) as are provided via [I-D.birkholz-rats-coswid-rim] or [TCGRIM]. Each RIM includes Reference Values that are nominal reference hash values for sets of software components. The Reference Values can be compared with hash values about executed software components included in an event log. A Verifier requires an appropriate set of RIMs to compare every record in an event log successfully. RIMs or other sets of Reference Values are supplied by Reference Value Providers as defined in the RATS Architecture [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. Corresponding procedures that enable a Verifier to acquire Reference Values are out-of-scope of this document.

3. TUDA Principles and Requirements

Traditional remote attestation protocols typically use bi-directional challenge/response interaction models. Examples include the Platform Trust Service protocol [PTS] or CAVES [PRIRA], where one entity sends a challenge that is included inside the response to prove the freshness of Evidence via recentness. The corresponding interaction model depicted in Section 8.1. of [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] tightly couples the
three RATS activities of generating, conveying and appraising Evidence.

Time-Based Uni-directional Attestation can decouple these three activities. As a result, TUDA provides additional capabilities, such as:

* remote attestation for Attesters that might not always be able to reach the Internet by enabling the appraisal of past states,

* secure audit logs by combining the Evidence generated with integrity measurement logs (e.g. IMA logs) that represent a detailed record of corresponding past states,

* the use of the uni-directional interaction model [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] that can traverse "diode-like" network security functions (NSF) or can be leveraged RESTful telemetry as enabled by the CoAP Observe option [RFC7252]).

3.1. Attesting Environment Requirements

An Attesting Environment that generates Evidence in TUDA MUST support three specific Protected Capabilities:

* Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) that can extend measurements consecutively and represent the sequence of measurements as a single digest,

* Restricted Signing Keys (RSK) that can only be accessed, if a specific signature about a set of measurements can be provided as authentication, and

* a dedicated source of (relative) time, e.g. a tick counter (a tick being a specific time interval, for example 10 ms).

A TPM is capable of providing these Protected Capabilities for TUDA.

3.2. Handle Distributor Requirements: Time Stamp Authority

Both Evidence generation and Evidence appraisal require a Handle Distributor that can take on the role of a trusted Time Stamp Authority (TSA) as an additional third party. Time Stamp Tokens (TST) included in Handles MUST be generated by Time Stamp Authority based on [RFC3161] that acts as the Handle Distributor. The combination of a local source of time provided by a TPM (on the Attester) and the TST provided by the Handle Distributor (to both the Attester and the Verifier) enable an appropriate proof of freshness.
4. Information Elements and Conveyance

TUDA defines a set of information elements (IE) that represent a set of Claims, are generated and stored on the Attester, and are intended to be transferred to the Verifier in order to enable the appraisal of Evidence. Each TUDA IE:

* MUST be encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR [RFC8949]) to minimize the volume of data in motion. In this document, the composition of the CBOR data items that represent IE is described using the Concise Data Definition Language, CDDL [RFC8610].

* that requires a certain freshness SHOULD only be re-generated when out-dated (not fresh, but stale), which reduces the overall resources required from the Attester, including the usage of a TPM’s resources (re-generation of IE is determined by their age or by specific state changes on the Attester, e.g., due to a reboot-cycle).

* SHOULD only be transferred when required, which reduces the amount of data in motion necessary to conduct remote attestation significantly (only IE that have changed since their last conveyance have to be transferred).

* that requires a certain freshness SHOULD be reused for multiple remote attestation procedures in the limits of its corresponding freshness-window, further reducing the load imposed on the Attester and corresponding TPMs.

5. TUDA Core Concept

Traditional Challenge/Response Remote Attestation [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] includes sending a nonce in the challenge to be used in ad-hoc Evidence generation. Using the TPM 1.2 as an example, a corresponding nonce-challenge would be included within the signature created by the TPM_Quote command in order to prove the freshness of a response containing evidence, see e.g. [PTS].

In contrast, the TUDA protocol uses the combined output of TPM_CertifyInfo and TPM_TickStampBlob. The former provides a proof about the Attester’s state by creating Evidence that a certain key is bound to that state. The latter provides proof that the Attester was in the specified state by using the bound key in a time operation. This combination enables a time-based attestation scheme. The approach is based on the concepts introduced in [SCALE] and [SPKE2008].
Each TUDA IE has an individual time-frame, in which it is considered to be fresh (and therefore valid and trustworthy). In consequence, each TUDA IE that composes data in motion is based on different methods of creation.

As highlighted above, the freshness properties of a challenge-response based protocol enable implicit time-keeping via a time window between:

* the time of transmission of the nonce, and
* the reception of the corresponding response.

Given the time-based attestation scheme, the freshness property of TUDA is equivalent to that of bi-directional challenge response attestation, if the point-in-time of attestation lies between:

* the transmission of a TUDA time-synchronization token, and
* the typical round-trip time between the Verifier and the Attester.

The accuracy of this time-frame is defined by two factors:

* the time-synchronization between the Attester and the Handle Distributor. The time between the two tickstamps acquired via the RoT define the scope of the maximum drift (time "left" and time "right" in respect to the timeline) to the handle including the signed timestamp, and
* the drift of clocks included in the RoT.

Since the conveyance of TUDA Evidence does not rely upon a Verifier provided value (i.e. the nonce), the security guarantees of the protocol only incorporate the Handle Distributor and the RoT used. In consequence, TUDA Evidence can even serve as proof of integrity in audit logs with precise point-in-time guarantees.

Appendix A contains guidance on how to utilize a REST architecture.

Appendix B contains guidance on how to create an SNMP binding and a corresponding TUDA-MIB.

Appendix C contains a corresponding YANG module that supports both RESTCONF and CoREDONF.

Appendix D.2 contains a realization of TUDA using TPM 1.2 primitives.

Appendix D.3 contains a realization of TUDA using TPM 2.0 primitives.
5.1. TPM Specific Terms

PCR: A Platform Configuration Register that is part of the TPM and is used to securely store and report measurements about security posture.

PCR-Hash: A hash value of the security posture measurements stored in a TPM PCR (e.g. regarding running software instances) represented as a byte-string.

5.2. Certificates

HD-CA: The Certificate Authority that provides the certificate for the TSA role of a Handle Distributor (HD).

AIK-CA: The Certificate Authority that provides the certificate for the AK of the TPM. This is the client platform credential for this protocol. It is a placeholder for a specific CA and AIK-Cert is a placeholder for the corresponding certificate, depending on what protocol was used. The specific protocols are out of scope for this document, see also [AIK-Enrollment] and [IEEE802.1AR].

6. The TUDA Protocol Family

Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation consists of the following seven information elements:

Handle Distributor Certificate: The certificate of the Handle Distributor that takes on the role of TSA. The Handle Distributor certificate is used in a subsequent synchronization protocol tokens. This certificate is signed by the HD-CA.

AK Certificate: A certificate about the Attestation Key (AIK) used. An AK-Cert may be an [IEEE802.1AR] IDevID or LDevID, depending on their setting of the corresponding identity property ([AIK-Credential], [AIK-Enrollment]; see Appendix D.2.1).

Synchronization Token: The reference frame for Evidence is provided by the relative timestamps generated by the TPM. In order to put Evidence into relation with a Real Time Clock (RTC), it is necessary to provide a cryptographic synchronization between these trusted relative timestamps and the regular RTC that is a hardware component of the Attester. To do so, trustable timestamps are acquired from a Handle Distributor.

Restriction Info: Evidence Generation relies on the capability of
the RoT to operate on restricted keys. Whenever the PCR values of an Attesting Environment change, a new restricted key is created that can only be operated as long as the PCRs remain in their current state.

In order to prove to the Verifier that this restricted temporary key actually has these properties and also to provide the PCR value that it is restricted, the corresponding signing capabilities of the RoT are used. The TPM creates a signed certificate using the AK about the newly created restricted key.

Measurement Log: A Verifier requires the means to derive the PCRs’ values in order to appraise the trustworthiness of an Attester. As such, a list of those elements that were extended into the PCRs is reported. For certain environments, this step may be optional if a list of valid PCR configurations (in the form of RIM available to the Verifier) exists and no measurement log is required.

Implicit Evidence: The actual Evidence is then based on a signed timestamp provided by the RoT using the restricted temporary key that was certified in the steps above. The signed timestamp generated provides the trustable assertion that at this point in time (with respect to the relative time of the TPM’s tick counter) a certain configuration existed (namely the PCR values associated with the restricted key). In combination with the synchronization token this timestamp represented in relative time can then be related to the real-time clock.

Concise SWID tags: As an option to better assess the trustworthiness of an Attester, a Verifier can request the reference hashes (RIM, sometimes called golden measurements, known-good-values, or nominal values) of all started software components to compare them with the entries in a measurement log. References hashes regarding installed (and therefore running) software can be provided by the manufacturer via SWID tags. SWID tags are provided by the Attester using the Concise SWID representation [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid] and bundled into a collection (a RIM Manifest [I-D.birkholz-rats-coswid-rim]).

These information elements can be sent en bloc, but it is recommended to retrieve them separately to save bandwidth, since these elements have different update cycles. In most cases, retransmitting all seven information elements would result in unnecessary redundancy.

Furthermore, in some scenarios it might be feasible not to store all elements on the Attester, but instead they could be retrieved from another location or be pre-deployed to the Verifier. It is also
feasible to only store public keys on the Verifier and skip certificate provisioning completely in order to save bandwidth and computation time for certificate verification.

6.1. TUDA Information Elements Update Cycles

An Attester can be in various states during its uptime cycles. For TUDA, a subset of these states (which imply associated information) are important to the Evidence Generation. The specific states defined are:

* persistent, even after a hard reboot: includes certificates that are associated with the endpoint itself or with services it relies on.

* volatile to a degree: may change at the beginning of each boot cycle. This includes the capability of a TPM to provide relative time which provides the basis for the synchronization token and implicit attestation -- and which can reset after an Attester is powered off.

* very volatile: can change during any time of an uptime cycle (periods of time an Attester is powered on, starting with its boot sequence). This includes the content of PCRs of a hardware RoT and thereby also the PCR-restricted signing keys used for attestation.

Depending on this "lifetime of state", data has to be transported over the wire, or not. E.g. information that does not change due to a reboot typically has to be transported only once between the Attester and the Verifier.

There are three kinds of events that require fresh Evidence to be generated:

* The Attester completes a boot-cycle

* A relevant PCR changes

* Too much time has passed since the Evidence Generation

The third event listed above is variable per application use case and also depends on the precision of the clock included in the RoT. For usage scenarios, in which the Attester would periodically push information to be used in an audit-log, a time-frame of approximately one update per minute should be sufficient. For those usage scenarios, where Verifiers request (pull) fresh Evidence, an implementation could potentially use a TPM continuously to always
present the most freshly created Evidence. This kind of utilization
can result in a bottle-neck with respect to other purposes: if
unavoidable, a periodic interval of once per ten seconds is
recommended, which typically leaves about 80% of available TPM
resource for other applications.

The following diagram is based on the reference interaction model
found in section 8.1. of [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]
and is enriched with the IE update cycles defined in this section.
Figure 1: Example sequence of events
7. Sync Base Protocol

The uni-directional approach of TUDA requires evidence on how the TPM time represented in ticks (relative time since boot of the TPM) relates to the standard time provided by the TSA. The Sync Base Protocol (SBP) creates evidence that binds the TPM tick time to the TSA timestamp. The binding information is used by and conveyed via the Sync Token (TUDA IE). There are three actions required to create the content of a Sync Token:

* At a given point in time (called "left"), a signed tickstamp counter value is acquired from the hardware RoT. The hash of counter and signature is used as a nonce in the request directed at the TSA.

* The corresponding response includes a data-structure incorporating the trusted timestamp token and its signature created by the TSA.

* At the point-in-time the response arrives (called "right"), a signed tickstamp counter value is acquired from the hardware RoT again, using a hash of the signed TSA timestamp as a nonce.

The three time-related values --- the relative timestamps provided by the hardware RoT ("left" and "right") and the TSA timestamp --- and their corresponding signatures are aggregated in order to create a corresponding Sync Token to be used as a TUDA Information Element that can be conveyed as evidence to a Verifier.

The drift of a clock incorporated in the hardware RoT that drives the increments of the tick counter constitutes one of the triggers that can initiate a TUDA Information Element Update Cycle in respect to the freshness of the available Sync Token.

8. IANA Considerations

This memo includes requests to IANA, including registrations for media type definitions.

TBD

9. Security Considerations

There are Security Considerations. TBD

10. Contributors

TBD
11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References

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[AIK-Enrollment]

[CEL]

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Appendix A.  REST Realization

Each of the seven data items is defined as a media type (Section 8). Representations of resources for each of these media types can be retrieved from URIs that are defined by the respective servers [RFC8820]. As can be derived from the URI, the actual retrieval is via one of the HTTPs ([RFC9112], [RFC9113]) or CoAP [RFC7252]. How a client obtains these URIs is dependent on the application; e.g., CoRE Web links [RFC6690] can be used to obtain the relevant URIs from the self-description of a server, or they could be prescribed by a RESTCONF data model [RFC8040].

Appendix B.  SNMP Realization

SNMPv3 (RFC 3411, [STD62]) is widely available on computers and also constrained devices. To transport the TUDA information elements, an SNMP MIB is defined below which encodes each of the seven TUDA information elements into a table. Each row in a table contains a single read-only columnar SNMP object of datatype OCTET-STRING. The values of a set of rows in each table can be concatenated to reconstitute a CBOR-encoded TUDA information element. The Verifier can retrieve the values for each CBOR fragment by using SNMP GetNext requests to "walk" each table and can decode each of the CBOR-encoded data items based on the corresponding CDDL [RFC8610] definition.

Design Principles:

1. Over time, TUDA attestation values age and should no longer be used. Every table in the TUDA MIB has a primary index with the value of a separate scalar cycle counter object that disambiguates the transition from one attestation cycle to the next.

2. Over time, the measurement log information (for example) may grow large. Therefore, read-only cycle counter scalar objects in all TUDA MIB object groups facilitate more efficient access with SNMP GetNext requests.
3. Notifications are supported by an SNMP trap definition with all of the cycle counters as bindings, to alert a Verifier that a new attestation cycle has occurred (e.g., synchronization data, measurement log, etc. have been updated by adding new rows and possibly deleting old rows).

B.1. Structure of TUDA MIB

The following table summarizes the object groups, tables and their indexes, and conformance requirements for the TUDA MIB:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group/Table</th>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Instance</th>
<th>Fragment</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIKCert</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSACert</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SyncToken</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VerifyToken</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWIDTag</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

B.1.1. Cycle Index

A tudaV1<Group>CycleIndex is the:

1. first index of a row (element instance or element fragment) in the tudaV1<Group>Table;

2. identifier of an update cycle on the table, when rows were added and/or deleted from the table (bounded by tudaV1<Group>Cycles); and

3. binding in the tudaV1TrapV2Cycles notification for directed polling.
B.1.2. Instance Index

A tudaV1<Group>InstanceIndex is the:

1. second index of a row (element instance or element fragment) in
   the tudaV1<Group>Table; except for
2. a row in the tudaV1SyncTokenTable (that has only one instance per
   cycle).

B.1.3. Fragment Index

A tudaV1<Group>FragmentIndex is the:

1. last index of a row (always an element fragment) in the
   tudaV1<Group>Table; and
2. accommodation for SNMP transport mapping restrictions for large
   string elements that require fragmentation.

B.2. Relationship to Host Resources MIB

The General group in the TUDA MIB is analogous to the System group in
the Host Resources MIB [RFC2790] and provides context information for
the TUDA attestation process.

The Verify Token group in the TUDA MIB is analogous to the Device
group in the Host MIB and represents the verifiable state of a TPM
device and its associated system.

The SWID Tag group (containing a Concise SWID reference hash profile
[I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]) in the TUDA MIB is analogous to the Software
Installed and Software Running groups in the Host Resources MIB
[RFC2790].

B.3. Relationship to Entity MIB

The General group in the TUDA MIB is analogous to the Entity General
group in the Entity MIB v4 [RFC6933] and provides context information
for the TUDA attestation process.

The SWID Tag group in the TUDA MIB is analogous to the Entity Logical
group in the Entity MIB v4 [RFC6933].
B.4. Relationship to Other MIBs

The General group in the TUDA MIB is analogous to the System group in MIB-II [RFC1213] and the System group in the SNMPv2 MIB (RFC 3418, [STD62]) and provides context information for the TUDA attestation process.

B.5. Definition of TUDA MIB

<CODE BEGINS>
TUDA-V1-ATTESTATION-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
    MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, Integer32, Counter32,
    enterprises, NOTIFICATION-TYPE
    FROM SNMPv2-SMI                 -- RFC 2578
    MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
    FROM SNMPv2-CONF                -- RFC 2580
    SnmpAdminString
    FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB;        -- RFC 3411

tudaV1MIB MODULE-IDENTITY
    LAST-UPDATED    "202101130000Z" -- 13 January 2021
    ORGANIZATION    "Fraunhofer SIT"
    CONTACT-INFO
        "Andreas Fuchs
        Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
        Email: andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de
        Henk Birkholz
        Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
        Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
        Ira E McDonald
        High North Inc
        Email: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
        Carsten Bormann
        Universitaet Bremen TZI
        Email: cabo@tzi.org"

    DESCRIPTION
        "The MIB module for monitoring of time-based unidirectional
        attestation information from a network endpoint system,
        based on the Trusted Computing Group TPM 1.2 definition.

        Copyright (C) High North Inc (2021)."

REVISION "2021011300000Z" -- 13 January 2021
DESCRIPTION
"Twelfth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-04."

REVISION "2020071300000Z" -- 13 July 2020
DESCRIPTION
"Eleventh version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-03."

REVISION "2020030900000Z" -- 09 March 2020
DESCRIPTION
"Tenth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-02."

REVISION "2019091100000Z" -- 11 September 2019
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"Ninth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-01."

REVISION "2019031200000Z" -- 12 March 2019
DESCRIPTION
"Eighth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-00."

REVISION "2018050300000Z" -- 03 May 2018
DESCRIPTION
"Seventh version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-03."

REVISION "2018050200000Z" -- 02 May 2018
DESCRIPTION
"Sixth version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-02."

REVISION "2017103000000Z" -- 30 October 2017
DESCRIPTION
"Fifth version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-01."

REVISION "2017010900000Z" -- 09 January 2017
DESCRIPTION
"Fourth version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-00."

REVISION "2016070800000Z" -- 08 July 2016
DESCRIPTION
"Third version, published as draft-birkholz-tuda-02."

REVISION "2016032100000Z" -- 21 March 2016
DESCRIPTION
"Second version, published as draft-birkholz-tuda-01."

REVISION "2015101800000Z" -- 18 October 2015
DESCRIPTION
"Initial version, published as draft-birkholz-tuda-00."
::= { enterprises fraunhofersit(21616) mibs(1) tudaV1MIB(1) }

```
tudaV1MIBNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIB 0 }
tudaV1MIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIB 1 }
tudaV1MIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIB 2 }
```

```
tudaV1General OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 1 }
tudaV1GeneralCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Count of TUDA update cycles that have occurred, i.e., sum of all the individual group cycle counters."
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object.
::= { tudaV1General 1 }
```

```
tudaV1GeneralVersionInfo OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(0..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Version information for TUDA MIB, e.g., specific release version of TPM 1.2 base specification and release version of TPM 1.2 errata specification and manufacturer and model TPM module itself."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { tudaV1General 2 }
```

```
tudaV1AIKCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 2 }
tudaV1AIKCertCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Count of AIK Certificate chain update cycles that have occurred."
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
```
::= { tudaV1AIKCert 1 }

tudaV1AIKCertTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF TudaV1AIKCertEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A table of fragments of AIK Certificate data."
::= { tudaV1AIKCert 2 }

tudaV1AIKCertEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TudaV1AIKCertEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry for one fragment of AIK Certificate data."
INDEX { tudaV1AIKCertCycleIndex,
     tudaV1AIKCertInstanceIndex,
     tudaV1AIKCertFragmentIndex }
::= { tudaV1AIKCertTable 1 }

TudaV1AIKCertEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
  tudaV1AIKCertCycleIndex         Integer32,
  tudaV1AIKCertInstanceIndex      Integer32,
  tudaV1AIKCertFragmentIndex      Integer32,
  tudaV1AIKCertData               OCTET STRING
}

tudaV1AIKCertCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "High-order index of this AIK Certificate fragment.
Index of an AIK Certificate chain update cycle that has
occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1AIKCertCycles).
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1AIKCertEntry 1 }

tudaV1AIKCertInstanceIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Middle index of this AIK Certificate fragment.
Ordinal of this AIK Certificate in this chain, where the AIK
Certificate itself has an ordinal of '1' and higher ordinals
go *up* the certificate chain to the Root CA.

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1AIKCertEntry 2 }

tudaV1AIKCertFragmentIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX     Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS     current
DESCRIPTION
"Low-order index of this AIK Certificate fragment.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1AIKCertEntry 3 }

tudaV1AIKCertData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX     OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS     current
DESCRIPTION
"A fragment of CBOR encoded AIK Certificate data." DEFVAL { "" }
::= { tudaV1AIKCertEntry 4 }

--
-- TSA Cert
--
tudaV1TSACert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 3 }

tudaV1TSACertCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX     Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS     current
DESCRIPTION
"Count of TSA Certificate chain update cycles that have occurred.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1TSACert 1 }

tudaV1TSACertTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX     SEQUENCE OF TudaV1TSACertEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS     current
DESCRIPTION
"A table of fragments of TSA Certificate data." ::= { tudaV1TSACert 2 }
tudaV1TSACertEntry OBJECT-TYPE  
SYNTAX TudaV1TSACertEntry  
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible  
STATUS current  
DESCRIPTION  
"An entry for one fragment of TSA Certificate data."  
INDEX { tudaV1TSACertCycleIndex, 
         tudaV1TSACertInstanceIndex, 
         tudaV1TSACertFragmentIndex }  
::= { tudaV1TSACertTable 1 }  

TudaV1TSACertEntry ::=  
SEQUENCE {  
  tudaV1TSACertCycleIndex Integer32,  
  tudaV1TSACertInstanceIndex Integer32,  
  tudaV1TSACertFragmentIndex Integer32,  
  tudaV1TSACertData OCTET STRING  
}  

TudaV1TSACertCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE  
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)  
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible  
STATUS current  
DESCRIPTION  
"High-order index of this TSA Certificate fragment.  
Index of a TSA Certificate chain update cycle that has  
occcurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1TSACertCycles).  

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."  
::= { tudaV1TSACertEntry 1 }  

TudaV1TSACertInstanceIndex OBJECT-TYPE  
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)  
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible  
STATUS current  
DESCRIPTION  
"Middle index of this TSA Certificate fragment.  
Ordinal of this TSA Certificate in this chain, where the TSA  
Certificate itself has an ordinal of '1' and higher ordinals  
go "up" the certificate chain to the Root CA.  

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."  
::= { tudaV1TSACertEntry 2 }  

TudaV1TSACertFragmentIndex OBJECT-TYPE  
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)  
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible  
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Low-order index of this TSA Certificate fragment.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1TSACertEntry 3 }

tudaV1TSACertData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A fragment of CBOR encoded TSA Certificate data."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { tudaV1TSACertEntry 4 }

--
Sync Token
--
tudaV1SyncToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 4 }
tudaV1SyncTokenCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Count of Sync Token update cycles that have occurred.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1SyncToken 1 }
tudaV1SyncTokenInstances OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Count of Sync Token instance entries that have been recorded (some entries MAY have been pruned).
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1SyncToken 2 }
tudaV1SyncTokenTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF TudaV1SyncTokenEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A table of fragments of Sync Token data."

::= { tudaV1SyncToken 3 }

tudaV1SyncTokenEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   TudaV1SyncTokenEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS   current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry for one fragment of Sync Token data."
INDEX    { tudaV1SyncTokenCycleIndex,
       tudaV1SyncTokenInstanceIndex,
       tudaV1SyncTokenFragmentIndex }
::= { tudaV1SyncTokenTable 1 }

TudaV1SyncTokenEntry ::= 
  SEQUENCE {
    tudaV1SyncTokenCycleIndex       Integer32,
    tudaV1SyncTokenInstanceIndex    Integer32,
    tudaV1SyncTokenFragmentIndex    Integer32,
    tudaV1SyncTokenData             OCTET STRING
  }

tudaV1SyncTokenCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS   current
DESCRIPTION
"High-order index of this Sync Token fragment.
  Index of a Sync Token update cycle that has
  occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1SyncTokenCycles).

  DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1SyncTokenEntry 1 }

tudaV1SyncTokenInstanceIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS   current
DESCRIPTION
"Middle index of this Sync Token fragment.
  Ordinal of this instance of Sync Token data
  (NOT bounded by the value of tudaV1SyncTokenInstances).

  DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1SyncTokenEntry 2 }

tudaV1SyncTokenFragmentIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
tudaV1SyncTokenData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A fragment of CBOR encoded Sync Token data."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { tudaV1SyncTokenEntry 4 }

-- -- Restriction Info
--
tudaV1Restrict OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 5 }

tudaV1RestrictCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Count of Restriction Info update cycles that have occurred."
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1Restrict 1 }

tudaV1RestrictTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF TudaV1RestrictEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A table of instances of Restriction Info data."
::= { tudaV1Restrict 2 }

tudaV1RestrictEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TudaV1RestrictEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry for one instance of Restriction Info data."
INDEX { tudaV1RestrictCycleIndex }
::= { tudaV1RestrictTable 1 }
TudaV1RestrictEntry ::= 
SEQUENCE {
    tudaV1RestrictCycleIndex        Integer32,
    tudaV1RestrictData              OCTET STRING
}

TudaV1RestrictCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX      Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
STATUS      current
DESCRIPTION
    "Index of this Restriction Info entry.
    Index of a Restriction Info update cycle that has
    occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1RestrictCycles).
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1RestrictEntry 1 }

TudaV1RestrictData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX      OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS  read-only
STATUS      current
DESCRIPTION
    "An instance of CBOR encoded Restriction Info data."
DEFVAL      { "" }
::= { tudaV1RestrictEntry 2 }

--  Measurement Log  --

TudaV1Measure OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 6 }

TudaV1MeasureCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX      Counter32
MAX-ACCESS  read-only
STATUS      current
DESCRIPTION
    "Count of Measurement Log update cycles that have
    occurred.
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1Measure 1 }

TudaV1MeasureInstances OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX      Counter32
MAX-ACCESS  read-only
STATUS      current
DESCRIPTION
"Count of Measurement Log instance entries that have
been recorded (some entries MAY have been pruned).
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1Measure 2 }

tudaV1MeasureTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF TudaV1MeasureEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A table of instances of Measurement Log data."
::= { tudaV1Measure 3 }

tudaV1MeasureEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TudaV1MeasureEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry for one instance of Measurement Log data."
INDEX { tudaV1MeasureCycleIndex,
tudaV1MeasureInstanceIndex }
::= { tudaV1MeasureTable 1 }

TudaV1MeasureEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
tudaV1MeasureCycleIndex Integer32,
tudaV1MeasureInstanceIndex Integer32,
tudaV1MeasureData OCTET STRING
}

tudaV1MeasureCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"High-order index of this Measurement Log entry.
Index of a Measurement Log update cycle that has
occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1MeasureCycles).
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1MeasureEntry 1 }

tudaV1MeasureInstanceIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Low-order index of this Measurement Log entry. Ordinal of this instance of Measurement Log data (NOT bounded by the value of tudaV1MeasureInstances)."

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object.
::= { tudaV1MeasureEntry 2 }

tudaV1MeasureData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A instance of CBOR encoded Measurement Log data."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { tudaV1MeasureEntry 3 }

--
-- Verify Token
--
tudaV1VerifyToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 7 }

tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Count of Verify Token update cycles that have occurred."

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object.
::= { tudaV1VerifyToken 1 }

tudaV1VerifyTokenTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF TudaV1VerifyTokenEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A table of instances of Verify Token data."
::= { tudaV1VerifyToken 2 }

tudaV1VerifyTokenEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TudaV1VerifyTokenEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry for one instance of Verify Token data."
INDEX { tudaV1VerifyTokenCycleIndex }
::= { tudaV1VerifyTokenTable 1 }

TudaV1VerifyTokenEntry ::= 
  SEQUENCE {
    tudaV1VerifyTokenCycleIndex       Integer32,
    tudaV1VerifyTokenData           OCTET STRING
  }

TudaV1VerifyTokenCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE
  SYNTAX        Integer32 (1..2147483647)
  MAX-ACCESS    not-accessible
  STATUS        current
  DESCRIPTION  
    "Index of this instance of Verify Token data. 
    Index of a Verify Token update cycle that has occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles)."
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1VerifyTokenEntry 1 }

TudaV1VerifyTokenData OBJECT-TYPE
  SYNTAX        OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
  MAX-ACCESS    read-only
  STATUS        current
  DESCRIPTION  
    "A instance of CBOR encoded Verify Token data."
    DEFVAL      { "" }
::= { tudaV1VerifyTokenEntry 2 }

--
--  SWID Tag
--
tudaV1SWIDTag OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBObjects 8 }

tudaV1SWIDTagCycles OBJECT-TYPE
  SYNTAX        Counter32
  MAX-ACCESS    read-only
  STATUS        current
  DESCRIPTION  
    "Count of SWID Tag update cycles that have occurred."
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
::= { tudaV1SWIDTag 1 }

tudaV1SWIDTagTable OBJECT-TYPE
  SYNTAX        SEQUENCE OF TudaV1SWIDTagEntry
  MAX-ACCESS    not-accessible
  STATUS        current
DESCRIPTION
"A table of fragments of SWID Tag data."
::= { tudaV1SWIDTag 2 }

tudaV1SWIDTagEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TudaV1SWIDTagEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry for one fragment of SWID Tag data."
INDEX { tudaV1SWIDTagCycleIndex,
tudaV1SWIDTagInstanceIndex,
tudaV1SWIDTagFragmentIndex }
::= { tudaV1SWIDTagTable 1 }

TudaV1SWIDTagEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
  tudaV1SWIDTagCycleIndex         Integer32,
  tudaV1SWIDTagInstanceIndex      Integer32,
  tudaV1SWIDTagFragmentIndex      Integer32,
  tudaV1SWIDTagData               OCTET STRING
}

tudaV1SWIDTagCycleIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS   current
DESCRIPTION
"High-order index of this SWID Tag fragment.
Index of an SWID Tag update cycle that has
occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1SWIDTagCycles).

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1SWIDTagEntry 1 }

tudaV1SWIDTagInstanceIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS   current
DESCRIPTION
"Middle index of this SWID Tag fragment.
Ordinal of this SWID Tag instance in this update cycle.

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
::= { tudaV1SWIDTagEntry 2 }

tudaV1SWIDTagFragmentIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX   Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Low-order index of this SWID Tag fragment."

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object.
 ::= { tudaV1SWIDTagEntry 3 }

tudaV1SWIDTagData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A fragment of CBOR encoded SWID Tag data."

DEFVAL { "" }
 ::= { tudaV1SWIDTagEntry 4 }

--
-- Trap Cycles
--
tudaV1TrapV2Cycles NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS {
  tudaV1GeneralCycles,
  tudaV1AIKCertCycles,
  tudaV1TSACertCycles,
  tudaV1SyncTokenCycles,
  tudaV1SyncTokenInstances,
  tudaV1RestrictCycles,
  tudaV1MeasureCycles,
  tudaV1MeasureInstances,
  tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles,
  tudaV1SWIDTagCycles
}

STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This trap is sent when the value of any cycle or instance
counter changes (i.e., one or more tables are updated).

Note: The value of sysUpTime in IETF MIB-II (RFC 1213) is
always included in SNMPv2 traps, per RFC 3416."
 ::= { tudaV1MIBNotifications 1 }

--
-- Conformance Information
--
tudaV1Compliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER
 ::= { tudaV1MIBConformance 1 }
tudaV1ObjectGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBConformance 2 }

tudaV1NotificationGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { tudaV1MIBConformance 3 }

--
-- Compliance Statements
--
tudaV1BasicCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
  STATUS current
  DESCRIPTION "An implementation that complies with this module MUST implement all of the objects defined in the mandatory group tudaV1BasicGroup."
  MODULE -- this module
  MANDATORY-GROUPS { tudaV1BasicGroup }

  GROUP tudaV1OptionalGroup
  DESCRIPTION "The optional TUDA MIB objects. An implementation MAY implement this group."

  GROUP tudaV1TrapGroup
  DESCRIPTION "The TUDA MIB traps. An implementation SHOULD implement this group."
 ::= { tudaV1Compliances 1 }

--
-- Compliance Groups
--
tudaV1BasicGroup OBJECT-GROUP
  OBJECTS {
    tudaV1GeneralCycles,
    tudaV1GeneralVersionInfo,
    tudaV1SyncTokenCycles,
    tudaV1SyncTokenInstances,
    tudaV1SyncTokenData,
    tudaV1RestrictCycles,
    tudaV1RestrictData,
    tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles,
    tudaV1VerifyTokenData
  }
  STATUS current
  DESCRIPTION "The basic mandatory TUDA MIB objects."
 ::= { tudaV1ObjectGroups 1 }
Appendix C.  YANG Realization

<CODE BEGINS>
=============== NOTE: '\ line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

module TUDA-V1-ATTESTATION-MIB {
  prefix "tuda-v1";

  import SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB { prefix "snmp-framework"; }
  import yang-types { prefix "yang"; }

  organization "Fraunhofer SIT";
  contact "Andreas Fuchs
          Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
          Email: andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de

description
"The MIB module for monitoring of time-based unidirectional
attestation information from a network endpoint system,
based on the Trusted Computing Group TPM 1.2 definition.

Copyright (C) High North Inc (2021).";

revision "2021-01-13" {
    description
    "Twelfth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-04.";
    reference
    "draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-04";
}
revision "2020-07-13" {
    description
    "Eleventh version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-03.";
    reference
    "draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-03";
}
revision "2020-03-09" {
    description
    "Tenth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-02.";
    reference
    "draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-02";
}
revision "2019-09-11" {
    description
    "Ninth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-01.";
    reference
    "draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-01";
}
revision "2019-03-12" {
    description
    "Eighth version, published as draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-00.";
    reference
    "draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-00";
revision "2018-05-03" {
  description
  "Seventh version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-03.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-03";
}
revision "2018-05-02" {
  description
  "Sixth version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-02.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-02";
}
revision "2017-10-30" {
  description
  "Fifth version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-01.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-01";
}
revision "2017-01-09" {
  description
  "Fourth version, published as draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-00.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-i2nsf-tuda-00";
}
revision "2016-07-08" {
  description
  "Third version, published as draft-birkholz-tuda-02.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-tuda-02";
}
revision "2016-03-21" {
  description
  "Second version, published as draft-birkholz-tuda-01.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-tuda-01";
}
revision "2015-10-18" {
  description
  "Initial version, published as draft-birkholz-tuda-00.";
  reference
  "draft-birkholz-tuda-00";
}
container tudaV1General {
  description
  "TBD";
}
leaf tudaV1GeneralCycles {
  type yang:counter32;
  config false;
  description
  "Count of TUDA update cycles that have occurred, i.e.,
  sum of all the individual group cycle counters.
  DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
}

leaf tudaV1GeneralVersionInfo {
  type snmp-framework:SnmpAdminString {
    length "0..255";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "Version information for TUDA MIB, e.g., specific release
  version of TPM 1.2 base specification and release version
  of TPM 1.2 errata specification and manufacturer and model
  TPM module itself."
}
}

container tudaV1AIKCert {
  description
  "TBD"

  leaf tudaV1AIKCertCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    config false;
    description
    "Count of AIK Certificate chain update cycles that have
    occurred.
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }

  /* XXX table comments here XXX */

  list tudaV1AIKCertEntry {
    key "tudaV1AIKCertCycleIndex tudaV1AIKCertInstanceIndex
    tudaV1AIKCertFragmentIndex";
    config false;
    description
    "An entry for one fragment of AIK Certificate data.";
  }
leaf tudaV1AIKCertCycleIndex {
    type int32 {
        range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description
        "High-order index of this AIK Certificate fragment.
        Index of an AIK Certificate chain update cycle that has
        occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1AIKCertCycles).
        DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1AIKCertInstanceIndex {
    type int32 {
        range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description
        "Middle index of this AIK Certificate fragment.
        Ordinal of this AIK Certificate in this chain, where the AIK
        Certificate itself has an ordinal of '1' and higher ordinals
        go *up* the certificate chain to the Root CA.
        DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1AIKCertFragmentIndex {
    type int32 {
        range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description
        "Low-order index of this AIK Certificate fragment.
        DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1AIKCertData {
    type binary {
        length "0..1024";
    }
    config false;
    description
        "A fragment of CBOR encoded AIK Certificate data."
}
container tudaV1TSACert {
  description "TBD";

  leaf tudaV1TSACertCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    config false;
    description "Count of TSA Certificate chain update cycles that have occurred.

    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }
}

list tudaV1TSACertEntry {
  key "tudaV1TSACertCycleIndex tudaV1TSACertInstanceIndex
dudaV1TSACertFragmentIndex";
  config false;
  description "An entry for one fragment of TSA Certificate data."

  leaf tudaV1TSACertCycleIndex {
    type int32 {
      range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description "High-order index of this TSA Certificate fragment.
    Index of a TSA Certificate chain update cycle that has occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1TSACertCycles).

    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
  }

  leaf tudaV1TSACertInstanceIndex {
    type int32 {
      range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description
"Middle index of this TSA Certificate fragment. Ordinal of this TSA Certificate in this chain, where the TSA Certificate itself has an ordinal of '1' and higher ordinals go *up* the certificate chain to the Root CA.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."

leaf tudaV1TSACertFragmentIndex {
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "Low-order index of this TSA Certificate fragment. DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object.";
}

leaf tudaV1TSACertData {
  type binary {
    length "0..1024";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "A fragment of CBOR encoded TSA Certificate data.";
}
}
}

container tudaV1SyncToken {
  description
  "TBD"

  leaf tudaV1SyncTokenCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    config false;
    description
    "Count of Sync Token update cycles that have occurred. DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object.";
  }

  leaf tudaV1SyncTokenInstances {
    type yang:counter32;
  }
}
config false;
description
"Count of Sync Token instance entries that have
been recorded (some entries MAY have been pruned).

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
}

list tudaV1SyncTokenEntry {

key "tudaV1SyncTokenCycleIndex
tudaV1SyncTokenInstanceIndex
tudaV1SyncTokenFragmentIndex";
config false;
description
"An entry for one fragment of Sync Token data."

leaf tudaV1SyncTokenCycleIndex {
type int32 {
  range "1..2147483647";
}
config false;
description
"High-order index of this Sync Token fragment.
Index of a Sync Token update cycle that has
occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1SyncTokenCycles).

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1SyncTokenInstanceIndex {
type int32 {
  range "1..2147483647";
}
config false;
description
"Middle index of this Sync Token fragment.
Ordinal of this instance of Sync Token data
(Not bounded by the value of tudaV1SyncTokenInstances).

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1SyncTokenFragmentIndex {
type int32 {
  range "1..2147483647";
}
}
config false;
description
"Low-order index of this Sync Token fragment.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
};

leaf tudaV1SyncTokenData {
  type binary {
    length "0..1024";
  }
  config false;
description
"A fragment of CBOR encoded Sync Token data."
};

container tudaV1Restrict {
  description
"TBD";

leaf tudaV1RestrictCycles {
  type yang:counter32;
  config false;
description
"Count of Restriction Info update cycles that have
occurred.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
}

/* XXX table comments here XXX */

list tudaV1RestrictEntry {
  key "tudaV1RestrictCycleIndex";
  config false;
description
"An entry for one instance of Restriction Info data."

leaf tudaV1RestrictCycleIndex {
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
description
"Index of this Restriction Info entry.
Index of a Restriction Info update cycle that has
occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1RestrictCycles).

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object.");
}
leaf tudaV1RestrictData {
type binary {
  length "0..1024";
}
config false;
description
"An instance of CBOR encoded Restriction Info data.
";
}
}
}
container tudaV1Measure {
description
"TBD";

leaf tudaV1MeasureCycles {
type yang:counter32;
config false;
description
"Count of Measurement Log update cycles that have
occurred.

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object.
";
}
leaf tudaV1MeasureInstances {
type yang:counter32;
config false;
description
"Count of Measurement Log instance entries that have
been recorded (some entries MAY have been pruned).

DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object.
";
}
list tudaV1MeasureEntry {
  key "tudaV1MeasureCycleIndex tudaV1MeasureInstanceIndex";
  config false;
description

"An entry for one instance of Measurement Log data."

leaf tudaV1MeasureCycleIndex {
    type int32 {
        range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description
    "High-order index of this Measurement Log entry. 
    Index of a Measurement Log update cycle that has
    occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1MeasureCycles).
    
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1MeasureInstanceIndex {
    type int32 {
        range "1..2147483647";
    }
    config false;
    description
    "Low-order index of this Measurement Log entry. 
    Ordinal of this instance of Measurement Log data 
    (NOT bounded by the value of tudaV1MeasureInstances).
    
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1MeasureData {
    type binary {
        length "0..1024";
    }
    config false;
    description
    "A instance of CBOR encoded Measurement Log data."
}

container tudaV1VerifyToken {
    description
    "TBD"

    leaf tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles {
        type yang:counter32;
        config false;
        description
        "
    }
}
"Count of Verify Token update cycles that have occurred.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."

list tudaV1VerifyTokenEntry {
  key "tudaV1VerifyTokenCycleIndex";
  config false;
  description
  "An entry for one instance of Verify Token data.";

  leaf tudaV1VerifyTokenCycleIndex {
    type int32 {
      range "1..2147483647";
    } config false;
    description
    "Index of this instance of Verify Token data. 
    Index of a Verify Token update cycle that has occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles).
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
  } config false;
  description
  "A instanc-V1-ATTESTATION-MIB.yang"
}

container tudaV1SWIDTag {
  description
  "see CoSWID and YANG SIWD module for now"

  leaf tudaV1SWIDTagCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    config false;
    description
    "A instanc-V1-ATTESTATION-MIB.yang"
  }
}
description
"Count of SWID Tag update cycles that have occurred.
DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
}

list tudaV1SWIDTagEntry {
  key "tudaV1SWIDTagCycleIndex tudaV1SWIDTagInstanceIndex
tudaV1SWIDTagFragmentIndex";
  config false;
  description
  "An entry for one fragment of SWID Tag data."
}

leaf tudaV1SWIDTagCycleIndex {
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "High-order index of this SWID Tag fragment.
  Index of an SWID Tag update cycle that has
  occurred (bounded by the value of tudaV1SWIDTagCycles).
  DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1SWIDTagInstanceIndex {
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "Middle index of this SWID Tag fragment.
  Ordinal of this SWID Tag instance in this update cycle.
  DEFVAL intentionally omitted - index object."
}

leaf tudaV1SWIDTagFragmentIndex {
  type int32 {
    range "1..2147483647";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "Low-order index of this SWID Tag fragment."
leaf tudaV1SWIDTagData {
  type binary {
    length "0..1024";
  }
  config false;
  description
  "A fragment of CBOR encoded SWID Tag data."
}
}

notification tudaV1TrapV2Cycles {
  description
  "This trap is sent when the value of any cycle or instance
  counter changes (i.e., one or more tables are updated).

  Note: The value of sysUpTime in IETF MIB-II (RFC 1213) is
  always included in SNMPv2 traps, per RFC 3416."
}

container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1GeneralCycles {
  description
  "TPD"
  leaf tudaV1GeneralCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    description
    "Count of TUDA update cycles that have occurred, i.e.,
    sum of all the individual group cycle counters.

    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }
}

container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1AIKCertCycles {
  description
  "TPD"
  leaf tudaV1AIKCertCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    description
    "Count of AIK Certificate chain update cycles that have
    occurred.

    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }
}
container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1TSACertCycles {
  description
  "TPD"
  leaf tudaV1TSACertCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    description
    "Count of TSA Certificate chain update cycles that have occurred.
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }
}

container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1SyncTokenCycles {
  description
  "TPD"
  leaf tudaV1SyncTokenCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    description
    "Count of Sync Token update cycles that have occurred.
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }
}

container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1SyncTokenInstances {
  description
  "TPD"
  leaf tudaV1SyncTokenInstances {
    type yang:counter32;
    description
    "Count of Sync Token instance entries that have been recorded (some entries MAY have been pruned).
    DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
  }
}

container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1RestrictCycles {
  description
  "TPD"
  leaf tudaV1RestrictCycles {
    type yang:counter32;
    description
    "Count of Restriction Info update cycles that have occurred."
container tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1MeasureCycles {
    description "TPD"
    leaf tudaV1MeasureCycles {
        type yang:counter32;
        description "Count of Measurement Log update cycles that have occurred.
        DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
    }
}

countainer tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1MeasureInstances {
    description "TPD"
    leaf tudaV1MeasureInstances {
        type yang:counter32;
        description "Count of Measurement Log instance entries that have been recorded (some entries MAY have been pruned).
        DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
    }
}

countainer tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles {
    description "TPD"
    leaf tudaV1VerifyTokenCycles {
        type yang:counter32;
        description "Count of Verify Token update cycles that have occurred.
        DEFVAL intentionally omitted - counter object."
    }
}

countainer tudaV1TrapV2Cycles-tudaV1SWIDTagCycles {
    description "TPD"
    leaf tudaV1SWIDTagCycles {
        type yang:counter32;
Appendix D. Realization with TPM functions

D.1. TPM Functions

The following TPM structures, resources and functions are used within this approach. They are based upon the TPM specifications [TPM12] and [TPM2].

D.1.1. Tick-Session and Tick-Stamp

On every boot, the TPM initializes a new Tick-Session. Such a tick-session consists of a nonce that is randomly created upon each boot to identify the current boot-cycle -- the phase between boot-time of the device and shutdown or power-off -- and prevent replaying of old tick-session values. The TPM uses its internal entropy source that guarantees virtually no collisions of the nonce values between two of such boot cycles.

It further includes an internal timer that is being initialize to Zero on each reboot. From this point on, the TPM increments this timer continuously based upon its internal secure clocking information until the device is powered down or set to sleep. By its hardware design, the TPM will detect attacks on any of those properties.

The TPM offers the function TPM_TickStampBlob, which allows the TPM to create a signature over the current tick-session and two externally provided input values. These input values are designed to serve as a nonce and as payload data to be included in a TickStampBlob: TickstampBlob := sig(TPM-key, currentTicks || nonce || externalData).

As a result, one is able to proof that at a certain point in time (relative to the tick-session) after the provisioning of a certain nonce, some certain externalData was known and provided to the TPM. If an approach however requires no input values or only one input value (such as the use in this document) the input values can be set
to well-known value. The convention used within TCG specifications and within this document is to use twenty bytes of zero h’0000000000000000000000000000000000000000’ as well-known value.

D.1.2. Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)

The TPM is a secure cryptoprocessor that provides the ability to store measurements and metrics about an endpoint’s configuration and state in a secure, tamper-proof environment. Each of these security relevant metrics can be stored in a volatile Platform Configuration Register (PCR) inside the TPM. These measurements can be conducted at any point in time, ranging from an initial BIOS boot-up sequence to measurements taken after hundreds of hours of uptime.

The initial measurement is triggered by the Platforms so-called pre-BIOS or ROM-code. It will conduct a measurement of the first loadable pieces of code; i.e. the BIOS. The BIOS will in turn measure its Option ROMs and the BootLoader, which measures the OS-Kernel, which in turn measures its applications. This describes a so-called measurement chain. This typically gets recorded in a so-called measurement log, such that the values of the PCRs can be reconstructed from the individual measurements for validation.

Via its PCRs, a TPM provides a Root of Trust that can, for example, support secure boot or remote attestation. The attestation of an endpoint’s identity or security posture is based on the content of an TPM’s PCRs (platform integrity measurements).

D.1.3. PCR restricted Keys

Every key inside the TPM can be restricted in such a way that it can only be used if a certain set of PCRs are in a predetermined state. For key creation the desired state for PCRs are defined via the PCRInfo field inside the keyInfo parameter. Whenever an operation using this key is performed, the TPM first checks whether the PCRs are in the correct state. Otherwise the operation is denied by the TPM.

D.1.4. CertifyInfo

The TPM offers a command to certify the properties of a key by means of a signature using another key. This includes especially the keyInfo which in turn includes the PCRInfo information used during key creation. This way, a third party can be assured about the fact that a key is only usable if the PCRs are in a certain state.

D.2. IE Generation Procedures for TPM 1.2
D.2.1.  AIK and AIK Certificate

Attestations are based upon a cryptographic signature performed by the TPM using a so-called Attestation Identity Key (AIK). An AIK has the properties that it cannot be exported from a TPM and is used for attestations. Trust in the AIK is established by an X.509 Certificate emitted by a Certificate Authority. The AIK certificate is either provided directly or via a so-called PrivacyCA [AIK-Enrollment].

This element consists of the AIK certificate that includes the AIK’s public key used during verification as well as the certificate chain up to the Root CA for validation of the AIK certificate itself.

TUDA-Cert = [AIK-Cert, TSA-Cert]; maybe split into two for SNMP
AIK-Cert = Cert
TSA-Cert = Cert

Figure 2: TUDA-Cert element in CDDL

The TSA-Cert is a standard certificate of the TSA.

The AIK-Cert may be provisioned in a secure environment using standard means or it may follow the PrivacyCA protocols. Figure 3 gives a rough sketch of this protocol. See [AIK-Enrollment] for more information.

The X.509 Certificate is built from the AIK public key and the corresponding PKCS #7 certificate chain, as shown in Figure 3.

Required TPM functions:

```c
| create_AIK_Cert(...) = ( |
|   AIK = TPM_MakeIdentity() |
|   IdReq = CollateIdentityRequest(AIK,EK) |
|   IdRes = Call(AIK-CA, IdReq) |
|   AIK-Cert = TPM_ActivateIdentity(AIK, IdRes) |
| ) |

/* Alternative */

| create_AIK_Cert(...) = ( |
|   AIK = TPM_CreateWrapKey(Identity) |
|   AIK-Cert = Call(AIK-CA, AIK.pubkey) |
| ) |
```

Figure 3: Creating the TUDA-Cert element
D.2.2. Synchronization Token

The reference for Attestations are the Tick-Sessions of the TPM. In order to put Attestations into relation with a Real Time Clock (RTC), it is necessary to provide a cryptographic synchronization between the tick session and the RTC. To do so, a synchronization protocol is run with a Time Stamp Authority (TSA) that consists of three steps:

* The TPM creates a TickStampBlob using the AIK
* This TickStampBlob is used as nonce to the Timestamp of the TSA
* Another TickStampBlob with the AIK is created using the TSA’s Timestamp a nonce

The first TickStampBlob is called "left" and the second "right" in a reference to their position on a time-axis.

These three elements, with the TSA’s certificate factored out, form the synchronization token

TUDA-Syntoken = [ 
    left: TickStampBlob-Output, 
    timestamp: TimeStampToken, 
    right: TickStampBlob-Output, 
]

TimeStampToken = bytes ; RFC 3161

TickStampBlob-Output = [ 
    currentTicks: TPM-CURRENT-TICKS, 
    sig: bytes, 
]

TPM-CURRENT-TICKS = [ 
    currentTicks: uint ? ( 
        tickRate: uint 
        tickNonce: TPM-NONCE 
    ) 
] ; Note that TickStampBlob-Output "right" can omit the values for ; tickRate and tickNonce since they are the same as in "left"

TPM-NONCE = bytes .size 20

Figure 4: TUDA-Sync element in CDDL
Required TPM functions:

\[
dummyDigest = \text{h}'0000000000000000000000000000000000000000' \\
dummyNonce = dummyDigest
\]

create_sync_token(AIKHandle, TSA) = { 
  ts_left = TPM_TickStampBlob(
    keyHandle = AIK_Handle,      /*TPM_KEY_HANDLE*/
    antiReplay = dummyNonce,     /*TPM_NONCE*/
    digestToStamp = dummyDigest  /*TPM_DIGEST*/)
  ts = TSA_Timestamp(TSA, nonce = hash(ts_left))

  ts_right = TPM_TickStampBlob(
    keyHandle = AIK_Handle,      /*TPM_KEY_HANDLE*/
    antiReplay = dummyNonce,     /*TPM_NONCE*/
    digestToStamp = hash(ts))    /*TPM_DIGEST*/

  TUDA-SyncToken = 
  
  Figure 5: Creating the Sync-Token element

D.2.3. RestrictionInfo

The attestation relies on the capability of the TPM to operate on restricted keys. Whenever the PCR values for the machine to be attested change, a new restricted key is created that can only be operated as long as the PCRs remain in their current state.

In order to prove to the Verifier that this restricted temporary key actually has these properties and also to provide the PCR value that it is restricted, the TPM command TPM_CertifyInfo is used. It creates a signed certificate using the AIK about the newly created restricted key.

This token is formed from the list of:

* PCR list,
* the newly created restricted public key, and
* the certificate.
TUDA-RestrictionInfo = [Composite,
    restrictedKey_Pub: Pubkey,
    CertifyInfo]

PCRSelection = bytes .size (2..4) ; used as bit string

Composite = [
    bitmask: PCRSelection,
    values: [*PCR-Hash],
]

Pubkey = bytes ; may be extended to COSE pubkeys

CertifyInfo = [
    TPM-CERTIFY-INFO,
    sig: bytes,
]

TPM-CERTIFY-INFO = [
    ; we don’t encode TPM-STRUCT-VER:
    ; these are 4 bytes always equal to h’01010000’
    keyUsage: uint, ; 4byte? 2byte?
    keyFlags: bytes .size 4, ; 4byte
    authDataUsage: uint, ; 1byte (enum)
    algorithmParms: TPM-KEY-PARMS,
    pubkeyDigest: Hash,
    ; we don’t encode TPM-NONCE data, which is 20 bytes, all zero
    parentPCRStatus: bool,
    ; no need to encode pcrinfosizeof
    pcrinfo: TPM-PCR-INFO, ; we have exactly one
]

TPM-PCR-INFO = [
    pcrSelection: PCRSelection; /* TPM_PCR_SELECTION */
    digestAtRelease: PCR-Hash; /* TPM_COMPOSITE_HASH */
    digestAtCreation: PCR-Hash; /* TPM_COMPOSITE_HASH */
]

TPM-KEY-PARMS = [
    ; algorithmID: uint, ; <= 4 bytes, not encoded, constant for TPM1.2
    encScheme: uint, ; <= 2 bytes
    sigScheme: uint, ; <= 2 bytes
    parms: TPM-RSA-KEY-PARMS,
]

TPM-RSA-KEY-PARMS = [
    ; "size of the RSA key in bits":
    keyLength: uint
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; "number of prime factors used by this RSA key":
numPrimes: uint
; "This SHALL be the size of the exponent":
exponentSize: null / uint / biguint
; "If the key is using the default exponent then the exponentSize
; MUST be 0" -> we represent this case as null

Figure 6: TUDA-Key element in CDDL

Required TPM functions:

dummyDigest = h’0000000000000000000000000000000000000000’
dummyNonce = dummyDigest

create_Composite

create_restrictedKey_Pub(pcrsel) = {
   PCRInfo = {pcrSelection = pcrsel,
              digestAtRelease = hash(currentValues(pcrSelection))
              digestAtCreation = dummyDigest}
   / * PCRInfo is a TPM_PCR_INFO and thus also a TPM_KEY */

   wk = TPM_CreateWrapKey(keyInfo = PCRInfo)
   wk.keyInfo.pubKey
}

create_TPM-Certify-Info = {
   CertifyInfo = TPM_CertifyKey(
      certHandle = AIK,       /* TPM_KEY_HANDLE */
      keyHandle = wk,         /* TPM_KEY_HANDLE */
      antiReply = dummyNonce) /* TPM_NONCE */

   CertifyInfo.strip()/* Remove those values that are not needed */
}

Figure 7: Creating the pubkey

D.2.4. Measurement Log

Similarly to regular attestations, the Verifier needs a way to
reconstruct the PCRs’ values in order to estimate the trustworthiness
of the device. As such, a list of those elements that were extended
into the PCRs is reported. Note though that for certain
environments, this step may be optional if a list of valid PCR
configurations exists and no measurement log is required.

TUDA-Measurement-Log = [&PCR-Event]
PCR-Event = [
    type: PCR-Event-Type,
    pcr: uint,
    template-hash: PCR-Hash,
    filedata-hash: tagged-hash,
    pathname: text; called filename-hint in ima (non-ng)
]

PCR-Event-Type = &(
    bios: 0
    ima: 1
    ima-ng: 2
)

; might want to make use of COSE registry here
; however, that might never define a value for sha1
tagged-hash /= [sha1: 0, bytes .size 20]
tagged-hash /= [sha256: 1, bytes .size 32]

D.2.5. Implicit Attestation

The actual attestation is then based upon a TickStampBlob using the
restricted temporary key that was certified in the steps above. The
TPM-TickStamp is executed and thereby provides evidence that at this
point in time (with respect to the TPM internal tick-session) a
certain configuration existed (namely the PCR values associated with
the restricted key). Together with the synchronization token this
tick-related timing can then be related to the real-time clock.

This element consists only of the TPM_TickStampBlock with no nonce.

TUDA-VerifyToken = TickStampBlob-Output

Figure 8: TUDA-Verify element in CDDL

Required TPM functions:

| imp_att = TPM_TickStampBlob(
|     keyHandle = restrictedKey_Handle, /*TPM_KEY_HANDLE*/
|     antiReplay = dummyNonce, /*TPM_NONCE*/
|     digestToStamp = dummyDigest) /*TPM_DIGEST*/
| VerifyToken = imp_att

Figure 9: Creating the Verify Token
D.2.6. Attestation Verification Approach

The seven TUDA information elements transport the essential content that is required to enable verification of the attestation statement at the Verifier. The following listings illustrate the verification algorithm to be used at the Verifier in pseudocode. The pseudocode provided covers the entire verification task. If only a subset of TUDA elements changed (see Section 6.1), only the corresponding code listings need to be re-executed.

```plaintext
TSA_pub = verifyCert(TSA-CA, Cert.TSA-Cert)
AIK_pub = verifyCert(AIK-CA, Cert.AIK-Cert)
```

Figure 10: Verification of Certificates

```plaintext
ts_left = Synctoken.left
ts_right = Synctoken.right

/* Reconstruct ts_right’s omitted values;
   Alternatively assert == */
ts_right.currentTicks.tickRate = ts_left.currentTicks.tickRate
ts_right.currentTicks.tickNonce = ts_left.currentTicks.tickNonce
ticks_left = ts_left.currentTicks
ticks_right = ts_right.currentTicks

/* Verify Signatures */
verifySig(AIK_pub, dummyNonce || dummyDigest || ticks_left)
verifySig(TSA_pub, hash(ts_left) || timestamp.time)
verifySig(AIK_pub, dummyNonce || hash(timestamp) || ticks_right)

delta_left = timestamp.time -
ticks_left.currentTicks * ticks_left.tickRate / 1000
delta_right = timestamp.time -
ticks_right.currentTicks * ticks_right.tickRate / 1000
```

Figure 11: Verification of Synchronization Token
compositeHash = hash_init()
for value in Composite.values:
    hash_update(compositeHash, value)
compositeHash = hash_finish(compositeHash)
certInfo = reconstruct_static(TPM-CERTIFY-INFO)
assert(Composite.bitmask == ExpectedPCRBitmask)
assert(certInfo.pcrinfo.PCRSelection == Composite.bitmask)
assert(certInfo.pcrinfo.digestAtRelease == compositeHash)
assert(certInfo.pubkeyDigest == hash(restrictedKey_Pub))
verifySig(AIK_pub, dummyNonce || certInfo)

Figure 12: Verification of Restriction Info

for event in Measurement-Log:
    if event.pcr not in ExpectedPCRBitmask:
        continue
    if event.type == BIOS:
        assert_whitelist-bios(event.pcr, event.template-hash)
    if event.type == ima:
        assert(event.pcr == 10)
        assert(event.template-hash ==
               hash(event.pathname || event.filedata-hash))
    if event.type == ima-ng:
        assert(event.pcr == 10)
        assert_whitelist-ng(event.pathname, event.filedata-hash)
        assert(event.template-hash ==
               hash(event.pathname || event.filedata-hash))
    virtPCR[event.pcr] = hash_extend(virtPCR[event.pcr],
                                      event.template-hash)
for pcr in ExpectedPCRBitmask:
    assert(virtPCR[pcr] == Composite.values[i++])

Figure 13: Verification of Measurement Log
ts = Verifytoken

/* Reconstruct ts’s omitted values; Alternatively assert == */
    ts.currentTicks.tickRate = ts_left.currentTicks.tickRate
    ts.currentTicks.tickNonce = ts_left.currentTicks.tickNonce

verifySig(restrictedKey_pub, dummyNonce || dummyDigest || ts)

ticks = ts.currentTicks

time_left = delta_right + ticks.currentTicks * ticks.tickRate/1000
    time_right = delta_left + ticks.currentTicks * ticks.tickRate/1000

    [time_left, time_right]

Figure 14: Verification of Attestation Token

D.3. IE Generation Procedures for TPM 2.0

The pseudocode below includes general operations that are conducted as specific TPM commands:

* hash() : description TBD
* sig() : description TBD
* X.509-Certificate() : description TBD

These represent the output structure of that command in the form of a byte string value.

D.3.1. AIK and AIK Certificate

Attestations are based upon a cryptographic signature performed by the TPM using a so-called Attestation Identity Key (AIK). An AIK has the properties that it cannot be exported from a TPM and is used for attestations. Trust in the AIK is established by an X.509 Certificate emitted by a Certificate Authority. The AIK certificate is either provided directly or via a so-called PrivacyCA [AIK-Enrollment].

This element consists of the AIK certificate that includes the AIK’s public key used during verification as well as the certificate chain up to the Root CA for validation of the AIK certificate itself.

TUDA-Cert = [AIK-Cert, TSA-Cert]; maybe split into two for SNMP
AIK-Certificate = X.509-Certificate(AIK-Key,Restricted-Flag)
TSA-Certificate = X.509-Certificate(TSA-Key, TSA-Flag)
D.3.2. Synchronization Token

The synchronization token uses a different TPM command, TPM2 GetTime() instead of TPM TickStampBlob(). The TPM2 GetTime() command contains the clock and time information of the TPM. The clock information is the equivalent of TUDA v1’s tickSession information.

\[
\text{TUDA-SyncToken} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{left\_GetTime} = \text{sig(AIK-Key, TimeInfo = [time, resetCount, restartCount])} \\
\text{middle\_TimeStamp} = \text{sig(TSA-Key, hash(left\_TickStampBlob), UTC-localtime)} \\
\text{right\_TickStampBlob} = \text{sig(AIK-Key, hash(middle\_TimeStamp), TimeInfo = [time, resetCount, restartCount])}
\end{array} \right.
\]

Figure 16: TUDA-Sync element for TPM 2.0

D.3.3. Measurement Log

The creation procedure is identical to Appendix D.2.4.

\[
\text{Measurement-Log} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\* \text{[ EventName, PCR-Num, Event-Hash ]}
\end{array} \right.
\]

Figure 17: TUDA-Log element for TPM 2.0
D.3.4. Explicit time-based Attestation

The TUDA attestation token consists of the result of TPM2_Quote() or a set of TPM2_PCR_READ followed by a TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest. It proves that --- at a certain point-in-time with respect to the TPM’s internal clock --- a certain configuration of PCRs was present, as denoted in the keys restriction information.

TUDA-AttestationToken = TUDA-AttestationToken_quote / TUDA-AttestationToken_audit

TUDA-AttestationToken_quote = sig(AIK-Key,
  TimeInfo = [
    time,
    resetCount,
    restartCount
  ],
  PCR-Selection = [ * PCR],
  PCR-Digest := PCRDigest
)

TUDA-AttestationToken_audit = sig(AIK-key,
  TimeInfo = [
    time,
    resetCount,
    restartCount
  ],
  Session-Digest := PCRDigest
)

Figure 18: TUDA-Attest element for TPM 2.0

D.3.5. Sync Proof

In order to proof to the Verifier that the TPM’s clock was not ‘fast-forwarded’ the result of a TPM2_GetTime() is sent after the TUDA-AttestationToken.

TUDA-SyncProof = sig(AIK-Key,
  TimeInfo = [
    time,
    resetCount,
    restartCount
  ],
)

Figure 19: TUDA-Proof element for TPM 2.0
Acknowledgements

Authors’ Addresses

Andreas Fuchs
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de

Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de

Ira E McDonald
High North Inc
PO Box 221
Grand Marais, 49839
United States of America
Email: blueroofmusic@gmail.com

Carsten Bormann
Universität Bremen TZI
Bibliothekstr. 1
D-28359 Bremen
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63921
Email: cabo@tzi.org
The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00

Abstract

An attestation format based on concise binary object representation (CBOR) is proposed that is suitable for inclusion in a CBOR Web Token (CWT), know as the Entity Attestation Token (EAT). The associated data can be used by a relying party to assess the security state of a remote device or module.

Contributing

TBD

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the device.

Remote attestation is a fundamental service that can underlie other protocols and services that need to know about the trustworthiness of the device before proceeding. One good example is biometric authentication where the biometric matching is done on the device. The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content protection where the relying party wants to know the device will protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing corporate data to be accessed by it.

The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not limited to the following:

- Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)
0  Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly for security oriented chips
0  Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device
0  Configuration and state of the device
0  Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS location

The required data format should be general purpose and extensible so that it can work across many use cases. This is why CBOR (see [RFC7049]) was chosen as the format -- it already supports a rich set of data types, and is both expressive and extensible. It translates well to JSON for good interoperation with web technology. It is compact and can work on very small IoT device. The format proposed here is small enough that a limited version can be implemented in pure hardware gates with no software at all. Moreover, the attestation data is defined in the form of claims that is the same as CBOR Web Token (CWT, see [RFC8392]). This is the motivation for defining the Entity Attestation Token, i.e. EAT.

1.1. Entity Overview

An "entity" can be any device or device subassembly ("submodule") that can generate its own attestation in the form of an EAT. The attestation should be cryptographically verifiable by the EAT consumer. An EAT at the device-level can be composed of several submodule EAT’s. It is assumed that any entity that can create an EAT does so by means of a dedicated root-of-trust (RoT).

Modern devices such as a mobile phone have many different execution environments operating with different security levels. For example it is common for a mobile phone to have an "apps" environment that runs an operating system (OS) that hosts a plethora of downloadable apps. It may also have a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that is distinct, isolated, and hosts security-oriented functionality like biometric authentication. Additionally it may have an eSE (embedded Secure Element) - a high security chip with defenses against HW attacks that can serve as a RoT. This device attestation format allows the attested data to be tagged at a security level from which it originates. In general, any discrete execution environment that has an identifiable security level can be considered an entity.
1.2. Use of CBOR and COSE

Fundamentally this attestation format is a verifiable data format. It is a collection of data items that can be signed by an attestation key, hashed, and/or encrypted. As per Section 7 of [RFC8392], the verification method is in the CWT using the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) methodology (see [RFC8152]).

In addition, the reported attestation data could be determined within the secure operating environment or written to it from an external and presumably less trusted entity on the device. In either case, the source of the reported data must be identifiable by the relying party.

This attestation format is a single relatively simple signed message. It is designed to be incorporated into many other protocols and many other transports. It is also designed such that other SW and apps can add their own data to the message such that it is also attested.

1.3. EAT Operating Models

At least the following three participants exist in all EAT operating models. Some operating models have additional participants.

The Entity. This is the phone, the IoT device, the sensor, the sub-assembly or such that the attestation provides information about.

The Manufacturer. The company that made the entity. This may be a chip vendor, a circuit board module vendor or a vendor of finished consumer products.

The Relying Party. The server, service or company that makes use of the information in the EAT about the entity.

In all operating models, the manufacturer provisions some secret attestation key material (AKM) into the entity during manufacturing. This might be during the manufacturer of a chip at a fabrication facility (fab) or during final assembly of a consumer product or any time in between. This attestation key material is used for signing EATs.

In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity create an EAT of the format described in this document. The EAT is always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the manufacturer.

In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing that the signature on the EAT is valid and consistent with data from
claims in the EAT. This can happen in many different ways. Here are some examples.

- The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party gets corresponding key material (e.g. a root certificate) from the manufacturer. The relying party performs the verification.

- The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims.

- The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-sign the EAT (with a different signing key).

This standard supports all these operating models and does not prefer one over the other. It is important to support this variety of operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In another, a privacy proxy service processes the EAT before it is transmitted to the relying party. In yet another, symmetric key material is used for signing. In this case the manufacturer should perform the verification, because any release of the key material would enable a participant other than the entity to create valid signed EATs.

1.4. What is Not Standardized

1.4.1. Transmission Protocol

EATs may be transmitted by any protocol. For example, they might be added in extension fields of other protocols, bundled into an HTTP header, or just transmitted as files. This flexibility is intentional to allow broader adoption. This flexibility is possible because EAT’s are self-secured with signing (and possibly additionally with encryption and anti-replay). The transmission protocol is not required to fulfill any additional security requirements.

For certain devices, a direct connection may not exist between the EAT-producing device and the Relying Party. In such cases, the EAT should be protected against malicious access. The use of COSE allows for signing and encryption of the EAT. Therefore even if the EAT is conveyed through intermediaries between the device and Relying Party,
such intermediaries cannot easily modify the EAT payload or alter the signature.

1.4.2. Signing Scheme

The term "signing scheme" is used to refer to the system that includes end-end process of establishing signing attestation key material in the entity, signing the EAT, and verifying it. This might involve key IDs and X.509 certificate chains or something similar but different. The term "signing algorithm" refers just to the algorithm ID in the COSE signing structure. No particular signing algorithm or signing scheme is required by this standard.

There are three main implementation issues driving this. First, secure non-volatile storage space in the entity for the attestation key material may be highly limited, perhaps to only a few hundred bits, on some small IoT chips. Second, the factory cost of provisioning key material in each chip or device may be high, with even millisecond delays adding to the cost of a chip. Third, privacy-preserving signing schemes like ECDAA (Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation) are complex and not suitable for all use cases.

Eventually some form of standardization of the signing scheme may be required. This might come in the form of another standard that adds to this document, or when there is clear convergence on a small number of signing schemes this standard can be updated.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519], COSE [RFC8152], and CWT [RFC8392].

StringOrURI. The "StringOrURI" term in this specification has the same meaning and processing rules as the JWT "StringOrURI" term defined in Section 2 of [RFC7519], except that it is represented as a CBOR text string instead of a JSON text string.

NumericDate. The "NumericDate" term in this specification has the same meaning and processing rules as the JWT "NumericDate" term defined in Section 2 of [RFC7519], except that it is represented as a CBOR numeric date (from Section 2.4.1 of [RFC7049]) instead
of a JSON number. The encoding is modified so that the leading
tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

Claim Name. The human-readable name used to identify a claim.

Claim Key. The CBOR map key used to identify a claim.

Claim Value. The CBOR map value representing the value of the claim.

CWT Claims Set. The CBOR map that contains the claims conveyed by the CWT.

FloatOrNumber. The "FloatOrNumber" term in this specification is the type of a claim that is either a CBOR positive integer, negative integer or floating point number.

Attestation Key Material (AKM). The key material used to sign the EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE DevID [IDevID], then this is the private part of the EC key pair. If ECDA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e. EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDA.

3. The Claims

3.1. Universal Entity ID (UEID) Claim

UEID’s identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices. It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be sequential.

It is identified by Claim Key X (X is TBD).

UEID’s must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different protocols and systems. No two products anywhere, even in completely different industries made by two different manufacturers in two different countries. should have the same UEID (if they are not global and universal in this way then relying parties receiving them will have to track other characteristics of the device to keep devices distinct between manufacturers).

The UEID should be permanent. It should never change for a given device / entity. In addition, it should not be reprogrammable.
UEID’s are binary byte-strings (resulting in a smaller size than text strings). When handled in text-based protocols, they should be base-64 encoded.

UEID’s are variable length with a maximum size of 33 bytes (1 type byte and 256 bits). A receivers of a token with UEIDs may reject the token if a UEID is larger than 33 bytes.

UEID’s are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.

A UEID is a byte string. From the consumer’s view (the rely party) it is opaque with no bytes having any special meaning.

When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to accommodate different industries and different manufacturing processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types of manufacturer registrations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>GUID</td>
<td>This is a 128 to 256 bit random number generated once and stored in the device. The GUID may be constructed from various identifiers on the device using a hash function or it may be just the raw random number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>IEEE EUI</td>
<td>This makes use of the IEEE company identification registry. An EUI is made up of an OUI and OUI-36 or a CID, different registered company identifiers, and some unique per-device identifier. EUIs are often the same as or similar to MAC addresses. (Note that while devices with multiple network interfaces may have multiple MAC addresses, there is only one UEID for a device)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x03</td>
<td>IMEI</td>
<td>This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an 8 digit Type Allocation Code and a six digit serial number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL be encoded as a binary integer over 48 bits. The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include Luhn checksum or SVN information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>EUI-48</td>
<td>This is a 48-bit identifier formed by concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 24-bit identifier assigned by the organisation that purchased the OUI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x05</td>
<td>EUI-60</td>
<td>This is a 60-bit identifier formed by concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 36-bit identifier assigned by the organisation that purchased the OUI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x06</td>
<td>EUI-64</td>
<td>This is a 64-bit identifier formed by concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 40-bit identifier assigned by the organisation that purchased the OUI.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: UEID Composition Types

The consumer (the Relying Party) of a UEID should treat a UEID as a completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its internal structure. For example they should not use the OUI part of a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead they should use the OUI claim that is defined elsewhere. The reasons for this are:

- UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.
New types of UEIDs may be created. For example a type 0x04 UEID may be created based on some other manufacturer registration scheme.

Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID to another anytime they want. For example they may find they can optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type 0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is that UEIDs be universally unique.

3.2. Origination (origination) Claims

This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acme-TEE</td>
<td>The EATs are generated in the TEE authored and configured by &quot;Acme&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acme-TPM</td>
<td>The EATs are generated in a TPM manufactured by &quot;Acme&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acme-Linux-Kernel</td>
<td>The EATs are generated in a Linux kernel configured and shipped by &quot;Acme&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acme-TA</td>
<td>The EATs are generated in a Trusted Application (TA) authored by &quot;Acme&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The claim is represented by Claim Key X+1. It is type StringOrURI.

TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI and other are in separate fields.

TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.

3.3. OEM identification by IEEE OUI

This claim identifies a device OEM by the IEEE OUI. Reference TBD. It is a byte string representing the OUI in binary form in network byte order (TODO: confirm details).

Companies that have more than one IEEE OUI registered with IEEE should pick one and prefer that for all their devices.

Note that the OUI is in common use as a part of MAC Address. This claim is only the first bits of the MAC address that identify the
3.4. Security Level (seclevel) Claim

EATs have a claim that roughly characterizes the device / entities ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by roughly defining four security levels as described below. This is similar to the security levels defined in the Metadata Service defined by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance (TODO: reference).

These claims describe security environment and countermeasures available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key reside and the claims originate.

This claim is identified by Claim Key X+2. The value is an integer between 1 and 4 as defined below.

1 - Unrestricted  There is some expectation that implementor will protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.

2 - Restricted  Entities at this level should not be general-purpose operating environments that host features such as app download systems, web browsers and complex productivity applications. It is akin to the Secure Restricted level (see below) without the security orientation. Examples include a WiFi subsystem, an IoT camera, or sensor device.

3 - Secure Restricted  Entities at this level must meet the criteria defined by FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating Environments (TODO: reference). Examples include TEE’s and schemes using virtualization-based security. Like the FIDO security goal, security at this level is aimed at defending well against large-scale network / remote attacks against the device.

4 - Hardware  Entities at this level must include substantial defense against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself. It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements.

This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS (TODO: reference) or those based on Common Criteria (TODO: reference). The claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.
3.5. Nonce (nonce) Claim

The "nonce" (Nonce) claim represents a random value that can be used to avoid replay attacks. This would be ideally generated by the CWT consumer. This value is intended to be a CWT companion claim to the existing JWT claim **_IANAJWT_** (TODO: fix this reference). The nonce claim is identified by Claim Key X+3.

3.6. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims

3.6.1. Secure Boot Enabled (secbootenabled) Claim

The "secbootenabled" (Secure Boot Enabled) claim represents a boolean value that indicates whether secure boot is enabled either for an entire device or an individual submodule. If it appears at the device level, then this means that secure boot is enabled for all submodules. Secure boot enablement allows a secure boot loader to authenticate software running either in a device or a submodule prior allowing execution. This claim is identified by Claim Key X+4.

3.6.2. Debug Disabled (debugdisabled) Claim

The "debugdisabled" (Debug Disabled) claim represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities are disabled for an entity (i.e. value of 'true'). Debug disablement is considered a prerequisite before an entity is considered operational. This claim is identified by Claim Key X+5.

3.6.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot (debugdisabledsinceboot) Claim

The "debugdisabledsinceboot" (Debug Disabled Since Boot) claim represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity were not disabled in any way since boot (i.e. value of 'true'). This claim is identified by Claim Key X+6.

3.6.4. Debug Permanent Disable (debugpermanentdisable) Claim

The "debugpermanentdisable" (Debug Permanent Disable) claim represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can be set to 'true' also if only the manufacturer is allowed to enable debug, but the end user is not. This claim is identified by Claim Key X+7.
3.6.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable (debugfullpermanentdisable) Claim

The "debugfullpermanentdisable" (Debug Full Permanent Disable) claim represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can only be set to 'true' if no party can enable debug capabilities for the entity. Often this is implemented by blowing a fuse on a chip as fuses cannot be restored once blown. This claim is identified by Claim Key X+8.

3.7. Location (loc) Claim

The "loc" (location) claim is a CBOR-formatted object that describes the location of the device entity from which the attestation originates. It is identified by Claim Key X+10. It is comprised of an array of additional subclaims that represent the actual location coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude). The location coordinate claims are consistent with the WGS84 coordinate system [WGS84]. In addition, a subclaim providing the estimated accuracy of the location measurement is defined.

3.7.1. lat (latitude) claim

The "lat" (latitude) claim contains the value of the device location corresponding to its latitude coordinate. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+11.

3.7.2. long (longitude) claim

The "long" (longitude) claim contains the value of the device location corresponding to its longitude coordinate. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+12.

3.7.3. alt (altitude) claim

The "alt" (altitude) claim contains the value of the device location corresponding to its altitude coordinate (if available). It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+13.

3.7.4. acc (accuracy) claim

The "acc" (accuracy) claim contains a value that describes the location accuracy. It is non-negative and expressed in meters. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+14.
3.7.5. altacc (altitude accuracy) claim

The "altacc" (altitude accuracy) claim contains a value that describes the altitude accuracy. It is non-negative and expressed in meters. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+15.

3.7.6. heading claim

The "heading" claim contains a value that describes direction of motion for the entity. Its value is specified in degrees, between 0 and 360. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+16.

3.7.7. speed claim

The "speed" claim contains a value that describes the velocity of the entity in the horizontal direction. Its value is specified in meters/second and must be non-negative. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+17.

3.8. ts (timestamp) claim

The "ts" (timestamp) claim contains a timestamp derived using the same time reference as is used to generate an "iat" claim (see Section 3.1.6 of [RFC8392]). It is of the same type as "iat" (integer or floating-point), and is identified by Claim Key X+18. It is meant to designate the time at which a measurement was taken, when a location was obtained, or when a token was actually transmitted. The timestamp would be included as a subclaim under the "submod" or "loc" claims (in addition to the existing respective subclaims), or at the device level.

3.9. age claim

The "age" claim contains a value that represents the number of seconds that have elapsed since the token was created, measurement was made, or location was obtained. Typical attestable values are sent as soon as they are obtained. However in the case that such a value is buffered and sent at a later time and a sufficiently accurate time reference is unavailable for creation of a timestamp, then the age claim is provided. It is identified by Claim Key X+19.

3.10. uptime claim

The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted. It is identified by Claim Key X+20.
3.11. The submods Claim

Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity submodules for communications (e.g., WiFi and cellular). It may have sub systems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure Element.

The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.

Specifically, the "submods" claim is an array. Each item in the array is a CBOR map containing all the claims for a particular submodule. It is identified by Claim Key X+22.

The security level of the submodule is assumed to be at the same level as the main entity unless there is a security level claim in that submodule indicating otherwise. The security level of a submodule can never be higher (more secure) than the security level of the EAT it is a part of.

3.11.1. The submod_name Claim

Each submodule should have a submod_name claim that is descriptive name. This name should be the CBOR txt type.

3.11.2. Nested EATs, the eat Claim

It is allowed for one EAT to be embedded in another. This is for complex devices that have more than one subsystem capable of generating an EAT. Typically one will be the device-wide EAT that is low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or similar that is high security.

The contents of the "eat" claim must be a fully signed, optionally encrypted, EAT token. It is identified by Claim Key X+23.

4. CBOR Interoperability

EAT is a one-way protocol. It only defines a single message that goes from the entity to the server. The entity implementation will often be in a contained environment with little RAM and the server will usually not be. The following requirements for interoperability take that into account. The entity can generally use whatever encoding it wants. The server is required to support just about every encoding.

Canonical CBOR encoding is explicitly NOT required as it would place an unnecessary burden on the entity implementation.
4.1. Integer Encoding (major type 0 and 1)

The entity may use any integer encoding allowed by CBOR. The server MUST accept all integer encodings allowed by CBOR.

4.2. String Encoding (major type 2 and 3)

The entity can use any string encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite lengths. It may also encode the lengths of strings in any way allowed by CBOR. The server must accept all string encodings.

Major type 2, bstr, SHOULD be have tag 21, 22 or 23 to indicate conversion to base64 or such when converting to JSON.

4.3. Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5)

The entity can use any array or map encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite lengths. Sorting of map keys is not required. Duplicate map keys are not allowed. The server must accept all array and map encodings. The server may reject maps with duplicate map keys.

4.4. Date and Time

The entity should send dates as tag 1 encoded as 64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may not send floating point dates. The server must support tag 1 epoch based dates encoded as 64-bit or 32-bit integers.

The entity may send tag 0 dates, however tag 1 is preferred. The server must support tag 0 UTC dates.

4.5. URIs

URIs should be encoded as text strings and marked with tag 32.

4.6. Floating Point

Encoding data in floating point is to be used only if necessary. Location coordinates are always in floating point. The server must support decoding of all types of floating point.

4.7. Other types

Use of Other types like bignums, regular expressions and so SHOULD NOT be used. The server MAY support them, but is not required to. Use of these tags is
5. IANA Considerations

5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry

Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT Claims Registry is reused. New new IANA registry is created. All EAT claims should be registered in the CWT Claims Registry.

5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document

- Claim Name: UEID
- Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID
- JWT Claim Name: N/A
- Claim Key: X
- Claim Value Type(s): byte string
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): *this document*

TODO: add the rest of the claims in here

5.2. EAT CBOR Tag Registration

How an EAT consumer determines whether received CBOR-formatted data actually represents a valid EAT is application-dependent, much like a CWT. For instance, a specific MIME type associated with the EAT such as "application/eat" could be sufficient for identification of the EAT. Note however that EAT’s can include other EAT’s (e.g. a device EAT comprised of several submodule EAT’s). In this case, a CBOR tag dedicated to the EAT will be required at least for the submodule EAT’s and the tag must be a valid CBOR tag. In other words - the EAT CBOR tag can optionally prefix a device-level EAT, but a EAT CBOR tag must always prefix a submodule EAT. The proposed EAT CBOR tag is 71.

5.2.1. Tag Registered by This Document

- CBOR Tag: 71
- Data Item: Entity Attestation Token (EAT)

- Semantics: Entity Attestation Token (CWT), as defined in *this_doc*
6. Privacy Considerations

Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and therefore implementations should consider providing privacy-preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT. Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT’s provided to unauthenticated consumers.

6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations

A UEID is usually not privacy preserving. Any set of relying parties that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to track the device. Thus, in many usage situations UEID violates governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not have a UEID for these reasons.

There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put UEID’s in tokens:

- The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a UEID.

- The UEID is used only in a particular context or particular use case. It is used only by one relying party.

- The device authenticates the relying party and generates a derived UEID just for that particular relying party. For example, the relying party could prove their identity cryptographically to the device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying party by hashing a proofed relying party ID with the main device UEID.

Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in multiple UEIDs per device. Each UEID is used in a different context, use case or system on the device. However, from the view of the relying party, there is just one UEID and it is still globally universal across manufacturers.
7. Security Considerations

TODO: Perhaps this can be the same as CWT / COSE, but not sure yet because it involves so much entity / device security that those do not.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Very Simple EAT

This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by COSE is shown.

```json
{
/ nonce / 11:h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ UEID / 8:h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2f',
/ secbootenabled / 13:true,
/ debugpermanentdisable / 15:true,
/ ts / 21:1526542894,
}
```

A.2.  Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels

```json
{
/ nonce / 11:h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ UEID / 8:h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2f',
/ secbootenabled / 13:true,
/ debugpermanentdisable / 15:true,
/ ts / 21:1526542894,
/ seclevel / 10:3, / secure restricted OS /

/ submods / 30:
[  
/ 1st submod, an Android Application / {
/ submod_name / 30:'Android App "Foo"',
/ secelvel / 10:1, / unrestricted /
/ app data / -70000:'text string'
},
/ 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element / {
/ submod_name / 30:'Secure Element EAT',
/ eat /  31:71( 18(  
/ an embedded EAT / [ /...COSE_Sign1 bytes with payload.../ ]
)   
)
}  
/ 3rd submod, information about Linux Android / {
/ submod_name/ 30:'Linux Android',
/ seclevel / 10:1, / unrestricted /
/ custom - release / -80000:'8.0.0',
/ custom - version / -80001:'4.9.51+
}
]
```

Authors’ Addresses

Giridhar Mandyam
Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, California
USA
Phone: +1 858 651 7200
EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com

Laurence Lundblade
Security Theory LLC
EMail: lgl@island-resort.com

Miguel Ballesteros
Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, California
USA
Phone: +1 858 651 4299
EMail: mballest@qti.qualcomm.com

Jeremy O’Donoghue
Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
279 Farnborough Road
Farnborough GU14 7LS
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 1252 363189
EMail: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com
Abstract

Token binding allows HTTP servers to bind bearer tokens to TLS connections. In order to do this, clients or user agents must prove possession of a private key. However, proof-of-possession of a private key becomes truly meaningful to a server when accompanied by an attestation statement. This specification describes extensions to the existing token binding protocol to allow for attestation statements to be sent along with the related token binding messages.

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1. Introduction

[RFC8471] and [RFC8472] describe a framework whereby servers can leverage cryptographically-bound authentication tokens in part to create uniquely-identifiable TLS bindings that can span multiple connections between a client and a server. Once the use of token binding is negotiated as part of the TLS handshake, an application layer message (the Token Binding message) may be sent from the client to the relying party whose primary purpose is to encapsulate a signature over a value associated with the current TLS session. The payload used for the signature is the token binding public key (see [RFC8471]). Use of the token binding public key allows for generation of the attestation signature once over the lifetime of the public key.

Proof-of-possession of a private key is useful to a relying party, but the associated signature in the Token Binding message does not provide an indication as to how the private key is stored and in what kind of environment the associated cryptographic operation takes place. This information may be required by a relying party in order
to satisfy requirements regarding client platform integrity. Therefore, attestations are sometimes required by relying parties in order for them to accept signatures from clients. As per the definition in [I-D.birkholz-tuda], "remote attestation describes the attempt to determine the integrity and trustworthiness of an endpoint -- the attesee -- over a network to another endpoint -- the verifier -- without direct access." Attestation statements are therefore widely used in any server verification operation that leverages client cryptography.

TLS token binding can therefore be enhanced with remote attestation statements. The attestation statement can be used to augment Token Binding message. This could be used by a relying party for several different purpose, including (1) to determine whether to accept token binding messages from the associated client, or (2) require an additional mechanism for binding the TLS connection to an authentication operation by the client.

2. Attestation Enhancement to TLS Token Binding Message

The attestation statement can be processed ‘in-band’ as part of the Token Binding Message itself. This document leverages the TokenBinding.extensions field of the Token Binding Message as described in Section 3.4 of [RFC8471], where the extension data conforms to the guidelines of Section 6.3 of the same document. The value of the extension, as required by this same section, is assigned per attestation type. The extension data takes the form of a CBOR (compact binary object representation) Data Definition Language construct, i.e. CDDL.

```cddl
extension_data = {attestation}
attestation = {
    attestation_type:  tstr,
    attestation_data:  bstr,
}
```

The attestation data is determined according to the attestation type. In this document, the following types are defined: "KeyStore" (where the corresponding attestation data defined in [Keystore]) and "TPMv2" (where the corresponding attestation data defined in [TPMv2]). Additional attestation types may be accepted by the token binding implementation (for instance, see Section 8 of [webauthn]).

The attestation data will likely include a signature over a challenge (depending on the attestation type). The challenge can be used to prevent replay of the attestation. However since the attestation is
itself part of the token binding message (which has its own anti-
replay protection mechanism), the attestation signature need only be
generated over a known payload associated with the TLS token binding
session - the token binding public key. As a result, the token
binding client only needs to send the attestation once during the
lifetime of the token binding public key. In other words, if an
attestation is included in the token binding message, it should only
be sent in the initial token binding message following the creation
of the token binding key pair.

2.1. KeyStore Attestation

KeyStore attestation is relevant to the Android operating system.
The Android Keystore mechanism allows for an application (such as a
browser implementing the Token Binding stack) to create a key pair,
export the public key, and protect the private key in a hardware-
backed keystore. The Android Keystore can then be used to verify a
keypair using the Keystore Attestation mechanism, which involves
signing a payload according to a public key that chains to a root
certificate signed by an attestation root key that is specific to the
device manufacturer.

The octet value of the token binding extension that serves as
identification for the Keystore attestation type is requested to be
0.

KeyStore attestation provides a signature over a payload generated by
the application. The payload is a SHA-256 hash of the token binding
public key corresponding to the current TLS connection (see
Section 3.3 of [RFC8471]). Then the attestation takes the form of a
signature, a signature-generation algorithmic identifier
corresponding to the COSE algorithm registry ([cose_iana]), and a
chain of DER-encoded x.509 certificates:

\[
\text{attestation_data} = \{
\text{alg}: \text{int},
\text{sig}: \text{bytes},
\text{x5c}: \text{[credCert}: \text{bytes}, *\text{(caCert}: \text{bytes})]
\}
\]

2.1.1. Verification Procedures

The steps at the server for verifying a Token Binding KeyStore
Attestation are:
o Retrieve token binding public key for the current TLS connection, and compute its SHA-256 hash.

o Verify that attestation_data is in the expected CBOR format.

o Parse the first certificate listed in x5c and extract the public key and challenge. If the challenge does not match the SHA-256 hash of the token binding public key then the attestation is invalid.

o If the challenge matches the expected hash of the token binding public key, verify the sig with respect to the extracted public key and algorithm from the previous step.

o Verify the rest of the certificate chain up to the root. The root certificate must match the expected root for the device.

2.2. TPMv2 Attestation

Version 2 of the Trusted Computing Group’s Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification provides for an attestation generated within the context of a TPM. The attestation then is defined as

\[
\text{attestation_data} = (\text{alg: int, } \text{tpmt_sig: bytes, } \text{tpms_attest: bytes, } \text{x5c: [credCert: bytes, *(caCert: bytes)]})
\]

The \text{tpmt_sig} is generated over a \text{tpms_attest} structure signed with respect to the certificate chain provided in the x5c array, and the algorithmic identifier corresponding to the COSE algorithm registry ([cose_iana]). It is derived from the TPMT_SIGNATURE data structure defined in Section 11.3.4 of [TPMv2]. \text{tpms_attest} is derived from the TPMS_ATTEST data structure in Section 10.2.8 of [TPMv2], specifically with the extraData field being set to a SHA-256 hash of the token binding public key.

The octet value of the token binding extension that serves as identification for the TPMv2 attestation type is requested to be 1.
2.2.1. Verification Procedures

The steps for verifying a Token Binding TPMv2 Attestation are:

- Extract the token binding public key for the current TLS connection.
- Verify that attestation_data is in the expected CBOR format.
- Parse the first certificate listed in x5c and extract the public key.
- Verify the tpms_attest structure, which includes
  - Verify that the type field is set to TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY.
  - Verify that extraData is equivalent to the SHA-256 hash of the token binding public key for the current TLS connection.
  - Verify that magic is set to the expected TPM_GENERATED_VALUE for the expected command sequence used to generate the attestation.
  - Verification of additional TPMS_ATTEST data fields is optional.
- Verify tpmt_sig with respect to the public key provided in the first certificate in x5c, using the algorithm as specified in the sigAlg field (see Sections 11.3.4, 11.2.1.5 and 9.29 of [TPMv2]).

3. Extension Support Negotiation

Even if the client supports a Token Binding extension, it may not be desirable to send the extension if the server does not support it. The benefits of client-suppression of an extension could include saving of bits "over the wire" or simplified processing of the Token Binding message at the server. Currently, extension support is not communicated as part of the Token Binding extensions to TLS (see [RFC8472]).

It is proposed that the Client and Server Hello extensions defined in Sections 3 and 4 of [RFC8472] be extended so that endpoints can communicate their support for specific TokenBinding.extensions. With reference to Section 3, it is recommended that the "token_binding" TLS extension be augmented by the client to include supported TokenBinding.extensions as follows:
The "supported_extensions_list" contains the list of identifiers of all token binding message extensions supported by the client. A server supporting token binding extensions will respond in the server hello with an appropriate "token_binding" extension that includes a "supported_extensions_list". This list must be a subset of the extensions provided in the client hello.

Since a TLS extension cannot itself be extended, the "token_binding" TLS extension cannot be reused. Therefore it is proposed that a new TLS extension be defined - "token_binding_with_extensions". This TLS extension codepoint is identical to the existing "token_binding" extension except for the additional data structures defined above.

3.1. Negotiating Token Binding Protocol Extensions

The negotiation described in Section 4 of [RFC8472] still applies, except now the "token_binding_with_extensions" codepoint would be used if the client supports any token binding extension. In addition, a client can receive a "supported_extensions_list" from the server as part of the server hello. The client must terminate the handshake if the "supported_extensions_list" received from the server is not a subset of the "supported_extensions_list" sent by the client in the client hello. If the server hello list of supported extensions is a subset of the client supported extensions, then the client must only send those extensions specified in the server hello in the Token Binding protocol. If the server hello does not include a "supported_extensions_list", then the client must not send any extensions along with the Token Binding Message.

4. Example - Platform Attestation for Anomaly Detection

An example of where a platform-based attestation is useful can be for remote attestation based on client traffic anomaly detection. Many network infrastructure deployments employ network traffic monitors for anomalous pattern detection. Examples of anomalous patterns detectable in the TLS handshake could be unexpected cipher suite negotiation for a given source/destination pairing. In this case, it
may be desirable for a client-enhanced attestation reflecting for instance that an expected offered cipher suite in the client hello message is present or the originating browser integrity is intact (e.g. through a hash over the browser application package). If the network traffic monitor can interpret the attestation included in the token binding message, then it can verify the attestation and potentially emit alerts based on an unexpected attestation.

5. IANA Considerations

This memo includes the following requests to IANA.

5.1. TLS Extensions Registry

This document proposes an update of the TLS "ExtensionType Values" registry. The following addition to the registry is requested:

Value: TBD

Extension name: token_binding_with_extensions

Reference: this document

Recommended: Yes

5.2. Token Binding Extensions for Attestation

This document proposes two extensions conformant with Section 6.3 of [RFC8471], with the following specifics:

Android Keystore Attestation:
  o Value: 0
  o Description: Android Keystore Attestation
  o Specification: This document

TPM v2 Attestation:
  o Value: 1
  o Description: TPMv2 Attestation
  o Specification: This document
6. Security and Privacy Considerations

The security and privacy considerations provided in Section 7 of [RFC8471] are applicable to the attestation extensions proposed in this document. Additional considerations are provided in this section.

6.1. Attestation Privacy Considerations

The root signing key for the certificate chain used in verifying an attestation can be unique to the device. As a result, this can be used to track a device and/or end user. This potential privacy issue can be mitigated by the use of batch keys as an alternative to unique keys, or by generation of origin-specific attestation keys.

The attestation data may also contain device-specific identifiers, or information that can be used to fingerprint a device. Sensitive information can be excluded from the attestation data when this is a concern.

7. Acknowledgments

Thanks to Andrei Popov for his detailed review and recommendations.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[cose_iana]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "COSE Algorithms", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#algorithms>.

[I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl]

[Keystore]


8.2. Informative References


Authors' Addresses

Giridhar Mandyam
Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, California  92121
USA

Phone: +1 858 651 7200
Email: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com

Laurence Lundblade
Security Theory LLC

Email: lgl@island-resort.com

Abstract

This document details mechanisms created for performing Remote Attestation that have been used in a number of industries. The document initially focuses on existing industry verticals, mapping terminology used in those specifications to the more abstract terminology used by the IETF RATS Working Group.

The document aspires to describe possible future use cases that would be enabled by common formats.

Status of This Memo

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   6.1. Trusted Computing Group Remove Integrity Verification
1. Introduction

The recently chartered IETF RATS WG intends to create a system of attestations that can be shared across a multitude of different users.

This document exists as place to collect use cases for the common RATS technologies in support of the IETF RATS charter point 1. This document is not expected to be published as an RFC, but remain open as a working document. It could become an appendix to provide motivation for a protocol standards document.

End-user use cases that would either directly leverage RATS technology, or would serve to inform technology choices are welcome, however.

2. Terminology

Critical to dealing with and contrasting different technologies is to collect terms which are compatible, to distinguish those terms which are similar but used in different ways.

This section will grow to include forward and external references to terms which have been seen. When terms need to be disambiguated they will be prefixed with their source, such as "TCG(claim)" or "FIDO(relying party)"
Platform attestations generally come in two categories. This document will attempt to indicate for a particular attestation technology falls into this.

2.1. Static attestations

A static attestation says something about the platform on which the code is running.

2.2. Session attestations

A session attestation says something about how a session key used in a connection such as TLS connection was created. It is usually the result of evaluating attestations that are attached to the certificates used to create such a session.

2.3. Statements

The term "statement" is used as the generic term for the semantic content which is being attested to.

2.4. Hardware Root Of Trust

[SP800-155] offers the following definition for root of trust.

"Roots of Trust are components (software, hardware, or hybrid) and computing engines that constitute a set of unconditionally trusted functions. Reliable and trustworthy BIOS integrity measurement and reporting depend upon software agents; each software agent relies upon Roots of Trust, and the level of trustworthiness in each agent depends on its Roots of Trust. BIOS integrity measurement requires the coordination of a Measurement Agent to harvest measurements, a Storage Agent to protect the measurements from modification until they can be reported, and a Reporting Agent to reliably report the measurements. Each of these agents has a corresponding Root of Trust (Root of Trust for Measurement, etc.) These Roots of Trust must act in concert and build on each other to enable reliable and trustworthy measurement, reporting, and verification of BIOS integrity measurements."

SP800-155 uses the terms RoT for Reporting, Storage and Measurement, but not RoT for Verification - it uses "Verification Agent". Though it is assumed the verifier is trustworthy.

However, [tcgglossary] (page 9) includes a RoT for Verification (RTV) as well.

The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust "A component that performs one or more security-specific functions, such as measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update.
It is trusted always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior cannot be detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. "

[SP800-147B] defines RoT for Update (RoTU) and RoTU verification (RoTU-v).

The TCG definition seems more concise than the NIST, but gets to the same point.

For the purpose of this document, a hardware root of trust refers to security functionality that is trusted to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior cannot be detected under normal operation and resists soft exploits by encapsulating the functionality in hardware.

2.5. Template for Use cases

Each use case will consist of a table with a number of constant fields, as illustrated below. The claim names will be loosely synchronized with the EAT draft. The role workflow (formerly "attestation type") will be described in the architecture draft. It will describe two classes of workflow: the passport type (Attestee sends evidence to Attester, receives signed statement, which is sent to relying party), or the background check type (Attestee sends measurements to Relying party, Relying Party checks with Attester).

Use case name: Twelve Monkeys

Who will use it: Army of the Twelve Monkeys SDO

Attester: James Cole

Relying Party: Dr. Kathryn Reilly

Message Flow: Passport

Claims used as evidence: OEM Identity, Age Claim, Location Claim, ptime Claim

Description: James Cole must convince Dr. Reilly he is from the future, and not insane.

3. Requirements Language

This document is not a standards track document and does not make any normative protocol requirements using terminology described in [RFC2119].
4. Overview of Sources of Use Cases

The following specifications have been covered in this document:

- The Trusted Computing Group "Network Device Attestation Workflow"
  [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]

- Android Keystore

- Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance attestation,

This document will be expanded to include summaries from:

- Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM)/Trusted Software Stack (TSS)

- ARM "Platform Security Architecture"
  [I-D.tschofenig-rats-psi-token]

- Intel SGX attestation [intelsgx]

- Windows Defender System Guard attestation [windowsdefender]

- Windows Device Health Attestation [windowshealth]

- Azure Sphere Attestation [azureattestation]:

- IETF NEA WG [RFC5209]

Additional sources are welcome and requested.

5. Use case summaries

This section lists a series of cases where an attestation is done.

5.1. Device Capabilities/Firmware Attestation

This is a category of claims

Use case name: Device Identity

Who will use it: Network Operators

Attester: varies

Message Flow: varies
Relying Party: varies

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: Network operators want a trustworth report of identity and version of information of the hardware and software on the machines attached to their network. The process starts with some kind of Root of Trust that provides device identity and protected storage for measurements. The mechanism performs a series of measurements, and expresses this with an attestation as to the hardware and firmware/software which is running.

This is a general description for which there are many specific use cases, including [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation] section 1.2, "Software Inventory"

5.1.1. Relying on an (third-party) Attestation Server

Use case name: Third Party Attestation Server
Who will use it: Network Operators
Message Flow: background check
Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system
Relying Party: network access control systems
Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: The measurements from a heterogenous network of devices are provided to device-specific attestation servers. The attestation servers know what the "golden" measurements are, and perform the appropriate evaluations, resulting in attestations that the relying parties can depend upon.

5.1.2. Autonomous Relying Party

Use case name: Autonomous
Who will use it: network operators
Message Flow: passport
Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system
Relying Party: peer systems
Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: The signed measurements are sent to a relying party which must validate them directly. They are not sent to a third party. (It may do so with the help of a signed list of golden values, or some other process). The relying party needs to validate the signed statements directly.

This may occur because the network is not connected, or even because it cannot be connected until the equipment is validated.

5.1.3. Proxy Root of Trust

Use case name: Proxy Root of Trust

Who will use it: network operators

Message Flow: passport

Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system

Relying Party: peer systems

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: A variety of devices provide measurements via their Root of Trust. A proxy server collects these measurements, and (having applied a local policy) then creates a device agnostic attestation. The relying party can validate the claims in a standard format.

5.1.4. network scaling - small

Use case name: Network scaled - small

Who will use it: enterprises

Message Flow: background check

Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system

Relying Party: network equipment

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: An entire network of systems needs to be validated (such as all the desktops in an enterprise’s building). The infrastructure is in the control of a single operator and is
already trusted. The network can be partitioned so that machines that do not pass attestation can be quarantined. A 1:1 relationship between the device and the relying party can be used to maintain freshness of the attestation.

5.1.5. network scaling - medium

Use case name: Network scaled - medium

Who will use it: larger enterprises, including network operators

Message Flow: passport

Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system

Relying Party: network equipment

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: An entire network of systems needs to be validated: such as all the desktops in an enterprise’s building, or all the routers at an ISP. The infrastructure is not necessarily trusted: it could be subverted, and it must also attest. The devices may be under a variety of operators, and may be mutually suspicious: each device may therefore need to process attestations from every other device. An NxM mesh of attestations may be untenable, but a system of N:1:M relationships can be setup via proxy attestations.

5.1.6. network scaling - large

Use case name: Network scaled - large

Who will use it: telco/LTE operators

Message Flow: passport

Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system

Relying Party: malware auditing systems

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: An entire network of systems need to be continuously attested. This could be all of the smartphones on an LTE network, or every desktop system in a worldwide enterprise. The network operator wishes to do this in order to maintain identities of connected devices more than to validate correct firmware, but both situations are reasonable.
5.2. Hardware resiliency / watchdogs

Use case name: Hardware watchdog

Who will use it: individual system designers

Message Flow: passport

Attester: manufacturer of OS or hardware system

Relying Party: bootloader or service processor

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: One significant problem is malware that holds a device hostage and does not allow it to reboot to prevent updates to be applied. This is a significant problem, because it allows a fleet of devices to be held hostage for ransom. Within CyRes the TCG is defining hardware Attention Triggers that force a periodical reboot in hardware.

This can be implemented by forcing a reboot unless attestation to an Attestation Server succeeds within the period interval, and having a reboot do remediation by bringing a device into compliance, including installation of patches as needed.

This is unlike the previous section on Device Attestation in that the attestation comes from a network operator, as to the device’s need to continue operating, and is evaluated by trusted firmware (the relying party), which resets a watchdog timer.

5.3. IETF TEEP WG use case

Use case name: TAM validation

Who will use it: The TAM server

Message Flow: background check

Attester: Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

Relying Party: end-application

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: The "Trusted Application Manager (TAM)" server wants to verify the state of a TEE, or applications in the TEE, of a device. The TEE attests to the TAM, which can then decide whether
to install sensitive data in the TEE, or whether the TEE is out of compliance and the TAM needs to install updated code in the TEE to bring it back into compliance with the TAM’s policy.

5.4. Confidential Machine Learning (ML) model

Use case name: Machine Learning protection

Who will use it: Machine Learning systems

Message Flow: TBD

Attester: hardware TEE

Relying Party: machine learning model owner

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: An example use case is where a device manufacturer wants to protect its intellectual property in terms of the ML model it developed and that runs in the devices that its customers purchased, and it wants to prevent attackers, potentially including the customer themselves, from seeing the details of the model. This works by having some protected environment (e.g., a hardware TEE) in the device attest to some manufacturer’s service, which if attestation succeeds, then the manufacturer service releases the model, or a key to decrypt the model, to the requester. If a hardware TEE is involved, then this use case overlaps with the TEEP use case.

5.5. Critical infrastructure

Use case name: Critical Infrastructure

Who will use it: devices

Message Flow: TBD

Attester: plant controller

Relying Party: actuator

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: When a protocol operation can affect some critical system, the device attached to the critical equipment wants some assurance that the requester has not been compromised. As such, attestation can be used to only accept commands from requesters
that are within policy. Hardware attestation in particular, especially in conjunction with a TEE on the requester side, can provide protection against many types of malware.

5.5.1. Computation characteristics

Use case name: Shared Block Chain Computational claims

Who will use it: Consortia of Computation systems

Message Flow: TBD

Attester: computer system (physical or virtual)

Relying Party: other computer systems

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: A group of enterprises organized as a consortium seeks to deploy computing nodes as the basis of their shared blockchain system. Each member of the consortium must forward an equal number of computing nodes to participate in the P2P network of nodes that form the basis of the blockchain system. In order to prevent the various issues (e.g. concentration of hash power, anonymous mining nodes) found in other blockchain systems, each computing node must comply to a predefined allowable manifest of system hardware, software and firmware, as agreed to by the membership of the consortium. Thus, a given computing node must be able to report the (pre-boot) configuration of its system and be able to report at any time the operational status of the various components that make-up its system.

The consortium seeks to have the following things attested: system configuration, group membership, and virtualization status.

This is a peer-to-peer protocol so each device in the consortium is a relying party. The attestation may be requested online by another entity within the consortium, but not by other parties. The attestation needs to be compact and interoperable and may be included in the blockchain itself at the completion of the consensus algorithm.

The attestation will need to start in a hardware RoT in order to validate if the system is running real hardware rather than running a virtual machine.
5.6. Virtualized multi-tenant hosts

Use case name: Multi-tenant hosts
Who will use it: Virtual machine systems
Message Flow: TBD
Attester: virtual machine hypervisor
Relying Party: network operators
Claims used as evidence: TBD
Description: The host system will do verification as per 5.1. The tenant virtual machines will do verification as per 5.1.
The network operator wants to know if the system as a whole is free of malware, but the network operator is not allowed to know who the tenants are.

This is contrasted to the Chassis + Line Cards case (To Be Defined: TBD).

Multiple Line Cards, but a small attestation system on the main card can combine things together. This is a kind of proxy.

5.7. Cryptographic Key Attestation

Use case name: Key Attestation
Who will use it: network authentication systems
Message Flow: TBD
Attester: device platform
Relying Party: internet peers
Claims used as evidence: TBD
Description: The relying party wants to know how secure a private key that identifies an entity is. Unlike the network attestation, the relying party is not part of the network infrastructure, nor do they necessarily have a business relationship (such as ownership) over the end device.
5.7.1. Device Type Attestation

Use case name: Device Type Attestation

Who will use it: mobile platforms

Message Flow: TBD

Attester: device platform

Relying Party: internet peers

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: This use case convinces the relying party of the characteristics of a device. For privacy reasons, it might not identify the actual device itself, but rather the class of device. The relying party can understand from either in-band (claims) or out-of-band (model numbers, which may be expressed as a claim) whether the device has trustworthy features such as a hardware TPM, software TPM via TEE, or software TPM without TEE. Other details such as the availability of finger-print readers or HDMI outputs may also be inferred.

5.7.2. Key storage attestation

Use case name: Key storage Attestation

Who will use it: secure key storage subsystems

Message Flow: TBD

Attester: device platform

Relying Party: internet peers

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: This use case convinces the relying party only about the provenance of a private key by providing claims of the storage security of the private key. This can be conceived as a subset of the previous case, but may be apply very specifically to just a keystore. Additional details associated with the private key may be provided as well, including limitations on usage of the key.

Key storage attestations may be consumed by systems provisioning public key certificates for devices or human users. In these cases, attestations may be incorporated into certificate request protocols.
(e.g., EST {rfc7030}, CMP {rfc4210}, ACME {rfc8555}, SCEP [I-D.gutmann-scep], etc.) and processed by registration authorities or certification authorities prior to determining contents for any issued certificate.

5.7.3. End user authorization

Use case name: End User authorization

Who will use it: authorization systems

Message Flow: TBD

Attester: device platform

Relying Party: internet peers

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: This use case convinces the relying party that the digital signatures made by the indicated key pair were done with the approval of the end-user/device-operator. This may also be considered possible subset of the device attestation above, but the attestation may be on a case-by-case basis. The nature of the approval by the end-user would be indicated. Examples include: the user unlocked the device, the user viewed some message and acknowledge it inside an app, the message was displayed to the user via out-of-app control mechanism. The acknowledgements could include selecting options on the screen, pushing physical buttons, scanning fingerprints, proximity to other devices (via bluetooth beacons, chargers, etc)

5.8. Geographic attestation

Use case name: Location attestation

Who will use it: geo-fenced systems

Message Flow: passport (probably)

Attester: secure GPS system(s)

Relying Party: internet peers

Claims used as evidence: TBD

Description: The relying party wants to know the physical location (on the planet earth) of the device. This may be provided
directly by a GPS/GLONASS/Galileo module that is incorporated into a TPM. This may also be provided by collecting other proximity messages from other devices that the relying party can form a trust relationship with.

5.8.1. I am here

The simplest use case is the claim of some specific coordinates.

5.8.2. I am near

The second use case is the claim that some other devices are nearby. This may be absolute ("I am near device X, which claims to be at location A"), or just relative, ("I am near device X"). This use could use "I am here" or "I am near" claims from a 1:1 basis with device X, or use some other protocol. The nature of how the proximity was established would be part of this claim. In order to defeat a variety of mechanisms that might attempt to proxy ("wormhole") radio communications, highly precise clocks may be required, and there may also have to be attestations as to the precision of those clocks.

An additional example of being near would be for the case where two smartphones can establish that they are together by recording a common random movement, such as both devices being shaken together. Each device may validate the claim from the other (in a disconnected fashion), or a third party may validate the claim as the relying party.

This could be used to establish that a medical professional was in proximity of a patient with implanted devices who needs help.

5.8.3. You are here

A third way to establish location is for a third party to communicate directly with the relying party. The nature of how this trust is established (and whether it is done recursively) is outside of the scope here. What is critical is that the identity of "You" can be communicated through the third party in a way that the relying party can use, but other intermediaries can not view.

5.9. Connectivity attestation

Use case name: Connectivity attestation

Who will use it: entertainment systems

Message Flow: TBD
Attester:  hardware-manufacturer/TEE
Relying Party:  connected peer
Claims used as evidence:  TBD

Description:  The relying party wants to know what devices are connected. A typical situation would be a media owner needing to know what TV device is connected via HDMI and if High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) is intact.

5.10.  Component connectivity attestation

Use case name:  Component connectivity
Who will use it:  chassis systems with pluggable components
Message Flow:  background check
Attester:  line card
Relying Party:  management/control plane software
Claims used as evidence:  TBD

Description:  A management controller or similar hardware component wants to know what peripherals, rack scale device or other dynamically configurable components are currently attached to the platform that is under management controller control. The management controller may serve as attestation verifier over a local bus or backplane but may also aggregate local attestation results and act as a platform attester to a remote verifier.

5.11.  Device provenance attestation

Use case name:  RIV - Device Provenance
Who will use it:  Industrial IoT devices
Message Flow:  passport
Attester:  network management station
Relying Party:  a network entity
Claims used as evidence:  TBD
Description: A newly manufactured device needs to be onboarded into a network where many if not all device management duties are performed by the network owner. The device owner wants to verify the device originated from a legitimate vendor. A cryptographic device identity such as an IEEE802.1AR is embedded during manufacturing and a certificate identifying the device is delivered to the owner onboarding agent. The device authenticates using its 802.1AR IDevID to prove it originated from the expected vendor.

The device chain of custody from the original device manufacturer to the new owner may also be verified as part of device provenance attestation. The chain of custody history may be collected by a cloud service or similar capability that the supply chain and owner agree to use.

[I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation] section 1.2 refers to this as "Provable Device Identity", and section 2.3 details the parties.

5.12. DNS privacy policy

Use case name: DNS-over-TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS server privacy policy

Who will use it: enterprises and browsers and BYOD operating systems

Message Flow: passport

Attester: review agency

Relying Party: browsers and operating systems

Claims used as evidence: DNS server identity, privinfo (see draft-reddy-dprive-dprive-privacy-policy)

Description: Users want to control how their DNS queries are handled by DNS servers so they can configure their system to use DNS servers that comply with their privacy expectations.

This use case communicates an attestation from a DoH server to a web browser or equivalent in a desktop or mobile operating system. The attester is a third party which has performed some kind of review of the DNS server. This may include significant levels of Device Capability attestation as to what is running and how it is configured (see Section 5.1), in which case this is a form of Proxy Root of Trust (Section 5.1.3).
5.13. Safety Critical Systems

Use case name: Safety Critical Systems

Who will use it: Power plants and other systems that need to assert their current state, but which can not accept any inputs from the outside. The corollary system is a black-box (such as in an aircraft), which needs to log the state of a system, but which can never initiate a handshake.

Message Flow: background check

Attester: web services and other sources of status/sensor information

Relying Party: open

Claims used as evidence: the beginning and ending time as endorsed by a Time Stamp Authority, represented by a time stamp token. The real time clock of the system itself. A Root of Trust for time; the TPM has a relative time from startup.

Description: These requirements motivate the creation of the Time Base Unidirectional Attestation (TUDA) [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda], the output of TUDA are typically a secure audit log, where freshness is determined by synchronization to an source of external time.

The freshness is preserved in the evidence by the use of a Time Stamp Authority (TSA) which provides Time Stamp Tokens (TST).

5.14. Trusted Path Routing

Use case name: Trusted Path Routing

Who will use it: Service Providers want to offer a trustworthy transport service to Government, Military, Financial, and Medical end-users.

Message Flow: background check model for a centralized controller based alternative, and passport model for a router/switch distributed alternative.

Attester: Routers/switches

Relying Party: Network Controllers and Peer Routers/Switches
Claims used as evidence: TPM Quotes, log entries passed into TPM PCRs, trustworthiness levels appraised by Verifiers, and included in passports.

Description: There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPsec alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly sensitive traffic flows. These end-users want their sensitive flows to be forwarded across just those network devices currently appraised as trustworthy by the TCG-RIV use case.

[I-D.voit-rats-trusted-path-routing] discusses two alternatives for exchanging traffic with end-user customer identified "sensitive subnets". Traffic going to and from these subnets will transit a path where the IP layer and above are only interpretable by those network devices recently evaluated as trustworthy.

These two alternatives are:

Centralized Trusted Path Routing: For sensitive subnets, trusted end-to-end paths are pre-assigned through a network provider domain. Along these paths, attestation evidence of potentially transited components has been assessed. Each path is guaranteed to only include devices meeting the needs of a formally defined trustworthiness level.

Distributed Trusted Path Routing: Through the exchange of attestation evidence between peering network devices, a trusted topology is established and maintained. Only devices meeting the needs of a formally defined trustworthiness level are included as members of this topology. Traffic exchanged with sensitive subnets is forwarded into this topology.

6. Technology users for RATS.

6.1. Trusted Computing Group Remove Integrity Verification (TCG-RIV)

The TCG RIV Reference Document addresses the problem of knowing if a networking device should be part of a network, if it belongs to the operator, and if it is running appropriate software. The work covers most of the use cases in Section 5.1.

This proposal is available as [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]. The goal is to be multi-vendor, scalable and extensible. The proposal intentionally limits itself to:
Service providers and enterprises deploy hundreds of routers, many of them in remote locations where they’re difficult to access or secure. The point of remote attestation is to:

- identify a remote box in a way that’s hard to spoof
- report the inventory of software was launched on the box in a way that cannot be spoofed, that is undetectably altered by a "Lying Endpoint"

The use case described is to be able to monitor the authenticity of software versions and configurations running on each device. This allows owners and auditors to detect deviation from approved software and firmware versions and configurations, potentially identifying infected devices. [RFC5209]

Attestation may be performed by network management systems. Networking Equipment is often highly interconnected, so it’s also possible that attestation could be performed by neighboring devices.

Specifically listed to be out of scope for the first generation includes: Linux processes, composite assemblies of hardware/software created by end-customers, and equipment that uses Sleep or Hibernate modes. There is an intention to cover some of these are topics in future versions of the documents.

The TCG-RIV Attestation leverages the TPM to make a series of measurements during the boot process, and to have the TPM sign those measurements. The resulting "PCR" hashes are then available to an external verifier.

A critical component of the RIV is compatibility with existing TPM practice for attestation procedures, as spelled out in the TCG TAP Informational Model [tapinfomodel] and TPM architecture specifications [tpmarchspec].

The TCG uses the following terminology:

- Device Manufacturer
o Attester ("device under attestation")
o Verifier (Network Management Station)
o "Explicit Attestation" is the TCG term for a static (platform) attestation
o "Implicit Attestation" is the TCG term for a session attestation
o Reference Integrity Measurements (RIM), which are signed by device manufacturer and integrated into firmware.
o Quotes: measured values (having been signed), and RIMs
o Reference Integrity Values (RIV)
o devices have a Initial Attestation Key (IAK), which is provisioned at the same time as the IDevID [ieee802-1AR]
o PCR - Platform Configuration Registry (deals with hash chains)

The TCG document builds upon a number of IETF technologies: SNMP (Attestation MIB), YANG, XML, JSON, CBOR, NETCONF, RESTCONF, CoAP, TLS and SSH. The TCG document leverages the 802.1AR IDevID and LDevID processes.

6.2. Android Keystore system

[keystore] describes a system used in smart phones that run the Android operation system. The system is primarily a software container to contain and control access to cryptographic keys, and therefore provides many of the same functions that a hardware Trusted Platform Module might provide.

The uses described in section Section 5.7 are the primary focus.

On hardware which is supported, the Android Keystore will make use of whatever trusted hardware is available, including use of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or Secure Element (SE). The Keystore therefore abstracts the hardware, and guarantees to applications that the same APIs can be used on both more and less capable devices.

A great deal of focus from the Android Keystore seems to be on providing fine-grained authorization of what keys can be used by which applications.

XXX - clearly there must be additional (intended?) use cases that provide some kind of attestation.
Android 9 on Pixel 2 and 3 can provide protected confirmation messages. This uses hardware access from the TPM/TEE to display a message directly to the user, and receives confirmation directly from the user. A hash of the contents of the message can be provided in an attestation that the device provides.

In addition, the Android Keystore provides attestation information about itself for use by FIDO.

QUOTE: Finally, the Verified Boot state is included in key attestation certificates (provided by Keymaster/Strongbox) in the deviceLocked and verifiedBootState fields, which can be verified by apps as well as passed onto backend services to remotely verify boot integrity.

6.3. Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) Alliance

The FIDO Alliance [fido] has a number of specifications aimed primarily at eliminating the need for passwords for authentication to online services. The goal is to leverage asymmetric cryptographic operations in common browser and smart-phone platforms so that users can easily authenticate.

The use cases of Section 5.7 are primary.

FIDO specifications extend to various hardware second factor authentication devices.

Terminology includes:

- "relying party" validates a claim
- "relying party application" makes FIDO Authn calls
- "browser" provides the Web Authentication JS API
- "platform" is the base system
- "internal authenticator" is some credential built-in to the device
- "external authenticator" may be connected by USB, bluetooth, wifi, and may be an stand-alone device, USB connected key, phone or watch.

FIDO2 had a Key Attestation Format [fidoattestation], and a Signature Format [fidosignature], but these have been combined into the W3C document [fido_w3c] specification.
A FIDO use case involves the relying party receiving a device attestation about the biometric system that performs the identification of the human. It is the state of the biometric system that is being attested to, not the identity of the human!

FIDO does provide a transport in the form of the WebAuthn and FIDO CTAP protocols.

According to [fidotechnote] FIDO uses attestation to make claims about the kind of device which is to be used to enroll. Keypairs are generated on a per-device _model_ basis, with a certificate having a trust chain that leads back to a well-known root certificate. It is expected that as many as 100,000 devices in a production run would have the same public and private key pair. One assumes that this is stored in a tamper-proof TPM so it is relatively difficult to get this key out. The use of this key attests to the device type, and the kind of protections for keys that the relying party may assume, not to the identity of the end user.

7. Examples of Existing Attestation Formats.

This section provides examples of some existing attestation formats.

7.1. Android Keystore

Android Keystore attestations take the form of X.509 certificates. The examples below package the attestation certificate along with intermediate CA certificates required to validate the attestation as a certificates-only SignedData message [RFC5652]. The trust anchor is available here: [keystore_attestation].

The attestations below were generated using the generateKeyPair method from the DevicePolicyManager class using code similar to the following.
KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder builder = null;
if(hasStrongBox) {
    builder = new KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(
            m_alias,
            KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_VERIFY
            | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT)
            .setKeySize(2048)
            .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_NONE, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
            .setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CBC, KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_GCM)
            .setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1,
            KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_OAEP)
            .setSignaturePaddings(KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PSS,
            KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1)
            .setUserAuthenticationRequired(false)
            .setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)
            .setUnlockedDeviceRequired(true);
} else {
    builder = new KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(
            m_alias,
            KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_VERIFY
            | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT)
            .setKeySize(2048)
            .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_NONE, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256,
            KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA384, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA512)
            .setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CBC,
            KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CTR,
            KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_GCM)
            .setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1,
            KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_OAEP)
            .setSignaturePaddings(KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PSS,
            KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1)
            .setUserAuthenticationRequired(false)
            .setIsStrongBoxBacked(false)
            .setUnlockedDeviceRequired(true);
}
builder.setAttestationChallenge(challenge_bytes);
KeyGenParameterSpec keySpec = builder.build();
AttestedKeyPair akp = dpm.generateKeyPair(componentName, algorithm, keySpec, idAttestationFlags);

7.1.1.  TEE

Annotations included below are delimited by ASN.1 comments, i.e., -. Annotations should be consistent with structures described here: [keystore_attestation].

0 1172: SEQUENCE {
4  764:   SEQUENCE {
8    3:    [0] {
10    1:     INTEGER 2
13    1:     INTEGER 1
16   13:     SEQUENCE {
18    9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)

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[Page 25]
29  0:          NULL
  :          }
31  27:        SEQUENCE {
33  25:          SET {
35  23:            SEQUENCE {
37   3:              OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
42  16:              PrintableString 'c6047571d8f0d17c'
35   3:              SEQUENCE {
42  16:              NULL
35   3:              }
33  25:            }
31  27:        }
60  32:        SEQUENCE {
62  13:          UTCTime 01/01/1970 00:00:00 GMT
77  15:          GeneralizedTime 07/02/2106 06:28:15 GMT
  :          }
94  31:        SEQUENCE {
96  29:          SET {
98  27:            SEQUENCE {
100   3:              OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
105  20:              UTF8String 'Android Keystore Key'
  :              }
  :            }
  :        }
127  290:      SEQUENCE {
131  13:        SEQUENCE {
133   9:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
144  0:          NULL
  :        }
146  271:      BIT STRING, encapsulates {
151  266:        SEQUENCE {
155  257:          INTEGER
158  257:            00 B5 3A 83 61 A2 85 CC D2 D6 25 7F 07 0B B4 A0
160  257:            F6 FE 05 01 C9 55 CB 0D 1B D2 CB 79 BA 2D 12 67
162  257:            75 8D 5B F3 24 D3 F8 EA 99 82 7D 1F 5E CD 77 D6
164  257:            99 11 13 FF 18 C9 3D 4D 01 C5 8E E9 04 E7 17 E2
166  257:            88 12 2B 19 A1 77 2F C2 4F 57 78 98 4E E3 DE 7A
168  257:            1B 18 BE D3 ED C9 59 A0 24 50 E1 FA AC 81 B6 DA
170  257:            80 B0 BD 48 AD 26 9C 4A 4E CE 54 17 58 C1 F4 F8
172  257:            7F 3C 5D 8F C8 2C 2A 7B 18 95 B3 D4 E0 3A C8 9D
174  257:            [ Another 129 bytes skipped ]
416   3:          INTEGER 65537
  :          }
31  27:        }
425  343:      SEQUENCE {
429  14:        SEQUENCE {
431   3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
436   1:          BOOLEAN TRUE

439  4:          OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
441  2:            BIT STRING 4 unused bits
 :    ‘1100’B
 :          }
 :        }
445  323:      SEQUENCE {
449  10:        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ‘1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 1 17’
461  307:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates { -- Attestation Extension
465  303:        SEQUENCE {
469   1:          INTEGER 2 -- attestationVersion (KM3)
472   1:          ENUMERATED 1 -- attestationSecurityLevel (TrustedEnv.)
475   1:          INTEGER 3 -- keymasterVersion
478   1:          ENUMERATED 1 -- keymasterSecurityLevel (TrustedEnv.)
}
481   9:      OCTET STRING ‘challenge’ -- attestationChallenge
492   0:      OCTET STRING -- reserved
 :        Error: Object has zero length.
494   44:      SEQUENCE { -- softwareEnforced
496    8:        [701] {
500    6:          INTEGER 01 64 47 2A 4B 64
504    0:          SET {} -- signature_digests
508    28:        [709] {
512    26:          OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
514    24:            SEQUENCE { -- AttestationApplicationId
516    20:              SET {} -- package_infos
518    18:            SEQUENCE { -- AttestationPackageInfo
520    13:              OCTET STRING ‘AndroidSystem’ -- package_name
535   1:                INTEGER 1 -- version
538   0:                SET {} -- signature_digests
540   229:            SEQUENCE { -- hardwareEnforced
543   14:              [1] {
545   12:                SET {
547   1:                  INTEGER 0 -- KeyPurpose.ENCRIPT
550   1:                  INTEGER 1 -- KeyPurpose.DECRYPT
553   1:                  INTEGER 2 -- KeyPurpose.SIGN
556   1:                  INTEGER 3 -- KeyPurposeVERIFY
559   3:                  [2] {
561   1:                    INTEGER 1 -- Algorithm.RSA
564   4:                  [3] {
566   2:                    INTEGER 2048
[5] { -- digest
    INTEGER 4    -- Digest.SHA256
    INTEGER 5    -- Digest.SHA384
    INTEGER 6    -- Digest.SHA512
    
    [6] { -- padding
      INTEGER 4    -- PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT
      INTEGER 2    -- PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP
      INTEGER 3    -- PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN
      INTEGER 5    -- PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
      
      [200] { -- rsaPublicExponent
        INTEGER 65537
      }
      
      [503] { -- noAuthRequired
        NULL           -- documentation indicates this is a Boolean
      }
      
      [702] { -- origin
        INTEGER 0      -- KeyOrigin.GENERATED
      }
      
      [703] { -- rollbackResistant
        NULL           -- documentation indicates this is a Boolean
      }
      
      [704] { -- rootOfTrust
        OCTET STRING 'google'
        BOOLEAN TRUE   -- deviceLocked
        ENUMERATED 0   -- verifiedBootState (verified)
      }
      
      [705] { -- osVersion
        INTEGER 90000  -- Android P
      }
      
      [706] { -- osPatchLevel
        INTEGER 201806 -- June 2018
      }
      
      [710] { -- attestationIdBrand
        OCTET STRING 'google'
      }
      
      [711] { -- attestationIdDevice
        OCTET STRING 'walleye'
      }
    }
  }

716 9:    [712] { -- attestationIdProduct
720 7:       OCTET STRING 'walleye'
729 14:    [713] { -- attestationIdSerial
733 12:       OCTET STRING 'HT83K1A03849'
747 8:    [716] { -- attestationIdManufacturer
751 6:       OCTET STRING 'Google'
759 9:    [717] { -- attestationIdModel
763 7:       OCTET STRING 'Pixel 2'
772 13:   SEQUENCE {
774 9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
785 0:     NULL
787 385:   BIT STRING
    05 41 B9 13 11 53 93 A2 02 62 1F 15 35 8E D9 7C
    A1 D5 2E ED 13 AC 24 26 B2 A1 2F EE B4 0C 4D 71
    DC 9F 55 EC A1 F6 64 62 F2 73 A8 7E FC 48 63 29
    1E F5 0D 48 F3 73 43 0C 00 E0 D4 07 86 A6 A4 38
    0E A8 47 0F 27 01 01 31 52 F6 62 8A 4B 80 BE 72
    FB 02 E7 56 84 CA CA 4D C3 6C 7C B2 BA C7 D7 9B
    C5 9D 90 65 4E F5 54 8F 25 CC 11 7F 8E 77 10 6A
    6E 9F 80 89 48 8B 1D 51 AA 3B B7 C5 24 3C 28 B1
    [ Another 256 bytes skipped ]
7 0 1304: SEQUENCE {
4 768:   SEQUENCE {
8 3:    [0] {
10 1:      INTEGER 2
13 10:     INTEGER 10 34 53 32 94 08 68 79 38 72
25 13:   SEQUENCE {
27 9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
29:       sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
38 0:     NULL
3 0: }
40 27:   SEQUENCE {
42 25:   SET {
44 23: SEQUENCE {
46 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
51 16: PrintableString '87f4514475ba0a2b'
}
69 30: SEQUENCE {
71 13: UTCTime 26/05/2016 17:14:51 GMT
86 13: UTCTime 24/05/2026 17:14:51 GMT
}
101 27: SEQUENCE {
103 25: SET {
105 23: SEQUENCE {
107 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
112 16: PrintableString 'c6047571d8f0d17c'
}
130 418: SEQUENCE {
134 13: SEQUENCE {
136 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
147 0: NULL
}
149 399: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
154 394: SEQUENCE {
158 385: INTEGER 
161 2: 00 B3 01 0D 78 BC 06 33 25 CA D6 A7 2C EF 49 05
170 9: 4C C1 77 36 F2 E5 7B E8 4C 0A 87 8F 77 6A 09 45
179 9B AC E8 72 DA E2 0E 20 3D 68 30 A5 86 26 14 77
188 AD 7E 93 F5 1D 38 A9 DB 5B FE B2 B8 1A 7B CD 22
197 3B 17 98 FC 1F 4F 77 2D 92 E9 DE 5F 6B 02 09 4E
206 99 86 53 98 1C 5E 23 B6 A4 61 53 A5 FB D1 37 09
215 DB C0 0A 40 E9 28 E6 BE E2 8E 57 94 A9 F2 13 3A
224 11 40 D2 34 99 A6 B4 F3 99 F2 5D 4A 5D 6A 6C 4B
233 [ Another 257 bytes skipped ]
547 3: INTEGER 65537
}
552 221: [3] {
555 218: SEQUENCE {
558 29: SEQUENCE {
560 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
565 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
567 20: OCTET STRING 
570 7B 7B F8 43 CA 1F 0F 96 27 0F 10 6F 7D 0C 23 14
579 72 8F 1D 80
}

: }
589 31:   SEQUENCE {
591 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
596 24:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
598 22:       SEQUENCE {
600 20:         [0]
602 0:           0E 55 6F 46 F5 3B 77 67 E1 B9 73 DC 55 E6 AE EA
604 2:             B4 FD 27 DD
606 0:           }
608 0:         } }
622 12:   SEQUENCE {
624 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
629 1:     BOOLEAN TRUE
632 2:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
634 0:       SEQUENCE ()
636 0:     }
638 14:   SEQUENCE {
640 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
643 1:     BOOLEAN TRUE
646 4:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
648 2:       BIT STRING 7 unused bits
650 0:         '1'B (bit 0)
652 0:       }
654 36:   SEQUENCE {
657 29:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
660 27:       SEQUENCE {
662 25:         [0] {
664 23:           SEQUENCE {
666 21:             [2] 'invalid;email:invalid'
668 0:               }
670 0:             }
672 0:           }
674 0:         } }
686 84:   SEQUENCE {
690 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
694 77:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
698 75:       SEQUENCE {
702 73:         SEQUENCE {
705 71:           [0] {
708 69:             [0] {
711 67:               [6]
714 0:                 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/1'
716 0:                 '0345332940868793872'

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776 13: SEQUENCE {
778 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
779 0:  NULL
800 : }
801 513: BIT STRING
802 :  69 13 A7 56 B3 9F E1 2B CE A2 09 89 E5 DC 03 B4
803 :  B6 FF F6 1E 96 C7 62 C2 31 D1 B3 D6 1A 9E 36 CF
804 :  C2 FC 0E 06 FA 0E CF B5 2D F8 19 D6 13 96 0B 56
805 :  B0 EE 86 3B B1 B8 38 70 4E 57 EB D9 60 DC 58 74
806 :  FE C8 EB A5 78 9F B7 19 5C F0 80 CF 29 16 6B 04
807 :  3A 5D 7C 2E 5F 11 12 36 BE 46 29 45 04 41 8F B5
808 :  AB C6 31 5F 23 28 0C F2 7C 48 4A F6 43 AA 50 D0
809 :  53 96 1E AD 7C A3 89 96 BB 8B BF 2D 9A 0C 16 35
810 :             [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
811 : }
812 0 1393: SEQUENCE {
813 4 857:  SEQUENCE {
814 8 3:   [0] {
815 10 1:    INTEGER 2
816 :   }
817 13 10:  INTEGER 03 88 26 67 60 65 89 96 85 74
818 25 13:  SEQUENCE {
819 27 9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
820 :     sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
821 38 0:   NULL
822 : }
823 40 27:  SEQUENCE {
824 42 25:   SET {
825 44 23:    SEQUENCE {
826 46 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
827 51 16:     PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
828 :   }
829 : }
830 69 30:  SEQUENCE {
831 71 13:   UTCTime 26/05/2016 17:01:32 GMT
832 86 13:   UTCTime 24/05/2026 17:01:32 GMT
833 : }
834 101 27: SEQUENCE {

103 25: SET {
105 23:   SEQUENCE {
107 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
112 16:       PrintableString '87f4514475ba0a2b'
130 546:   SEQUENCE {
134 13:     SEQUENCE {
136 9:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
147 0:         NULL
149 527:       BIT STRING, encapsulates {
154 522:         SEQUENCE {
158 513:           INTEGER : 00 D2 60 D6 45 85 E3 E2 23 79 5A DA 45 57 A7 D8
160 512:             5B AF BD 9A 37 CB FA 97 C0 65 44 9D 3A C6 47 F6
162 512:             0D 0B A2 74 12 CA F7 4B B9 5F FB B4 EC 5A 2B D0
164 512:             16 01 DE BE E2 FE D2 76 0D 75 C4 B1 6A CB 3A 67
166 512:             07 21 E0 D5 19 68 C8 1B 01 A2 24 02 FE AD 40 D6
168 511:             A7 98 16 0F A2 98 2E A7 AD 75 34 84 6F F8 CF 8A
169 511:             A1 0E 90 33 40 9E D0 86 26 57 71 CE FF CF 52 E1
171 511:             F0 F9 2B 7E 68 62 03 D8 FD FD 02 53 03 19 AC 28
173 511:             [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
175 3:           INTEGER 65537
180 182:     } [3] {
183 179:     SEQUENCE {
186 29:     SEQUENCE {
188 3:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
193 22:       OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
195 20:         OCTET STRING :
197 19:           0E 55 6F 46 F5 3B 77 67 E1 B9 73 DC 55 E6 AE EA
199 18:             B4 FD 27 DD
201 17:         }
203 16:     } [0]
206 31:     SEQUENCE {
209 3:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
214 24:       OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
216 22:       SEQUENCE {
219 20:         [0]
222 19:           36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
224 18:             C9 EA 4F 12
226 17:         }
228 16:       } [0]

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
  BOOLEAN TRUE
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
  SEQUENCE {
    BOOLEAN TRUE
  }
  }
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
  BOOLEAN TRUE
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    BIT STRING 1 unused bit
    '1100001'B
  }
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    SEQUENCE {
      SEQUENCE {
        [0] {
          [0] {
            [6] :
              'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/E'
              '8FA196314D2FA18'
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
  NULL
}

BIT STRING
  0E 0D 71 4A 88 0A 58 53 B6 31 14 7D DA 22 31 C6
  06 D6 EF 3B 22 4D D7 A5 C0 3F BF C6 B4 64 A3 FB
  92 C2 CC 67 F4 6C 24 25 49 6E F6 CB 08 D6 A8 0D
  94 06 7F 8C 8C 3C B1 77 CD C2 3F C7 5E A3 85 6D
  F7 A5 94 13 CD 5A 5C F3 9B 0A 0D E1 82 42 F4 C9
  3F AD FC FB 7C AA 27 04 CC 1C 12 45 15 EB E6 70
  A0 6C DE 77 77 54 9B 1F 02 05 76 03 A4 FC 6C 07
F4 CB BB 59 F5 CB ED 58 D8 30 9B 6E 3C F7 76 C1
[ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
0 1376: SEQUENCE {
4 840:  SEQUENCE {
8  3:  [0] {
10  1:  INTEGER 2
  
13  9:  INTEGER 00 E8 FA 19 63 14 D2 FA 18
24 13:  SEQUENCE {
26  9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
  sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
37  0:  NULL
  
39 27:  SEQUENCE {
41 25:  SET {
43 23:  SEQUENCE {
45  3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
50 16:  PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
 
59 27:  UTCTime 26/05/2016 16:28:52 GMT
72 13:  UTCTime 24/05/2026 16:28:52 GMT
}  
100 27:  SEQUENCE {
102 25:  SET {
104 23:  SEQUENCE {
106  3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
111 16:  PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
 
133 13:  SEQUENCE {
135  9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
146  0:  NULL
  
148 527:  BIT STRING, encapsulates {
153 522:  SEQUENCE {
157 513:  INTEGER
  00 AF B6 C7 82 2B B1 A7 01 EC 2B B4 2E 8B CC 54
  16 63 AB EF 98 2F 32 C7 7F 75 31 03 0C 97 52 4B
  1B 5F E8 09 FB C7 2A A9 45 1F 74 3C BD 9A 6F 13
  35 74 4A A5 5E 77 F6 B6 AC 35 35 EE 17 C2 5E 63
  95 17 DD 9C 92 E6 37 4A 53 CB FE 25 8F 8F FB B6
  FD 12 93 78 A2 2A 4C A9 9C 45 2D 47 A5 9F 32 01

674 3:   INTEGER 65537
    
679 166: [3] {
682 163:   SEQUENCE {
685 29:     SEQUENCE {
687 3:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
692 22:       OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
694 20:         OCTET STRING
696 20:           36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
702 20:           C9 EA 4F 12
708 15:       } }
716 31:   SEQUENCE {
718 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
723 24:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
725 22:     SEQUENCE {
727 20:       [0]
733 20:         36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
739 20:         C9 EA 4F 12
745 15:     } }
749 15:   SEQUENCE {
751 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
756 1:     BOOLEAN TRUE
759 5:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
761 3:     SEQUENCE {
763 1:       BOOLEAN TRUE
766 14:   SEQUENCE {
768 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
773 1:     BOOLEAN TRUE
776 4:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
778 2:     BIT STRING 1 unused bit
784 2:       '1100001'B
790 15:   } }
794 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
799 57:   OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
804 55:   SEQUENCE {
7.1.2. Secure Element

The structures below are not annotated except where the difference is specific to the difference between the TEE structure shown above and artifacts emitted by StrongBox.

0 5143: SEQUENCE {
  4 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 5128:  [0] {
19 5124:    SEQUENCE {
23  1:      INTEGER 1
26  0:      SET {}}
28 11:    SEQUENCE {
30  9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
:  }
41 5100:  [0] {
45 1114:    SEQUENCE {
49  834:      SEQUENCE {

53  3:       [0] {
55  1:           INTEGER 2
     :       }
58  1:       INTEGER 1
61 13:       SEQUENCE {
63  9:           OBJECT IDENTIFIER
     :           sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
74  0:           NULL
     :       }
76 47:       SEQUENCE {
78 25:       SET {
80 23:           SEQUENCE {
82  3:               OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
87 16:               PrintableString '90e8da3cadfc7820'
     :       }
     :       }
105 18:       SET {
107 16:           SEQUENCE {
109  3:               OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
114  9:               UTF8String 'StrongBox'
     :       }
     :       }
125 30:       SEQUENCE {
127 13:           UTCTime 01/01/1970 00:00:00 GMT
142 13:           UTCTime 23/05/2028 23:59:59 GMT
     :       }
157 31:       SEQUENCE {
159 29:       SET {
161 27:           SEQUENCE {
163  3:               OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
168 20:               UTF8String 'Android Keystore Key'
     :       }
     :       }
190 290:      SEQUENCE {
194 13:      SEQUENCE {
196  9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
     :           rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
207  0:      NULL
     :       }
209 271:      BIT STRING, encapsulates {
214 266:      SEQUENCE {
218 257:      INTEGER
     :           00 DE 98 94 D5 E5 05 98 E8 FC 73 4D 26 FB 48 6A
     :           CA 06 A0 24 FA 05 D1 D2 32 10 46 F8 5D DD 3E 0D
     :           DF 4F 95 53 D2 CB 10 1F 00 B2 62 15 1E 21 7E 05
     :           C6 10 AC EE 7A D8 69 F1 1F 32 C3 17 CA D7 07 BE

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479  3:          INTEGER 65537
    :          }
    :          }
484  399:          [3] {
488  395:          SEQUENCE {
492   14:            SEQUENCE {
494   3:              OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
499   1:              BOOLEAN TRUE
502   4:              OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
504   2:                BIT STRING 7 unused bits
506   4:                '1'\B (bit 0)
508   375:            SEQUENCE {
512   10:              OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
516   359:                INTEGER 3
520   1:                ENUMERATED 2   -- attestationSecurityLevel (Stro
524   355:                INTEGER 4
528   1:                ENUMERATED 2   -- attestationSecurityLevel (Stro
532   1:                INTEGER 3
536   1:                ENUMERATED 2   -- attestationSecurityLevel (Stro
540   1:                INTEGER 4
544   9:                OCTET STRING 'challenge'
548   0:                OCTET STRING
                   Error: Object has zero length.
552   53:            SEQUENCE {
556   2:              [509] {
560   0:                NULL
564   11:              [701] {
568   9:                INTEGER 00 FF FF FF FF FF E5 99 78
572   28:              [709] {
576   26:                OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
580   24:                SEQUENCE {
584   20:                SET {
588   18:                SEQUENCE {
592   13:                OCTET STRING 'AndroidSystem'
596   1:                INTEGER 1
600   0:                SET ()
604   0:                SET ()
SEQUENCE {
  [1] {
    SET {
      INTEGER 0
      INTEGER 1
      INTEGER 2
      INTEGER 3
    }
  }
  [2] {
    INTEGER 1
  }
  [3] {
    INTEGER 2048
  }
  [4] {
    SET {
      INTEGER 2
      INTEGER 32
    }
  }
  [5] {
    SET {
      INTEGER 0
      INTEGER 4
    }
  }
  [6] {
    SET {
      INTEGER 2
      INTEGER 3
      INTEGER 4
      INTEGER 5
    }
  }
  [503] {
    NULL
  }
  [702] {
    INTEGER 0
  }
  [704] {
    OCTET STRING
      61 FD A1 2B 32 ED 84 21 4A 9C F1 3D 1A FF B7 AA
  }
80 BD 8A 26 8A 86 1E D4 BB 7A 15 17 0F 1A B0 0C

732  1:        BOOLEAN TRUE
735  1:        ENUMERATED 0
738  32:       OCTET STRING

:: 77 96 C5 3D 0E 09 46 2B BA BB FB 7B 8A 65 F6 8D
:: EF 5C 46 88 BF 99 C4 1E 88 42 01 4D 1F 01 2D C5
:: }

772  3:
776  1:
779  5:
783  3:
788  8:
792  6:
800  10:
804  8:
814  10:
818  8:
828  11:
832  9:
843  8:
847  6:
855  9:
859  7:
868  6:
872  4:
878  5:
882  3:
887  13:
889  9:

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null

BIT STRING

A5 C2 3B 0C C0 04 1B C0 5A 18 A5 DF D4 67 1D B9

08 42 4B E2 2C AC 07 0F D8 0E 24 97 56 9E 14 F2

D0 AC DD 1E FC DD 68 20 11 DF 88 B8 B6 22 AD 2B

DB 9C 2E 5C 3F AF 0B 8F 02 68 AA 34 4B 5E C8 75

B1 1A 09 D2 19 41 24 61 65 97 2C 0D A4 78 43 A7

9A 27 B2 4E 24 11 4F FF E2 D8 04 56 39 75 B2 34

D8 18 C7 25 F3 3F C0 6A 37 AB 49 B6 96 51 61 72

[ Another 128 bytes skipped ]

null

SEQUENCE {

INTEGER 2

INTEGER 17 10 24 68 40 71 02 97 78 50

OBJECT IDENTIFIER

sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)

null

SEQUENCE {

SET {

SEQUENCE {

OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)

PrintableString 'ccd18b9b608d658e'

}

}

SET {

SEQUENCE {

OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)

UTF8String 'StrongBox'

}

}

}

}

SEQUENCE {

UTCTime 25/05/2018 23:28:47 GMT

UTCTime 22/05/2028 23:28:47 GMT

}

}

}

SEQUENCE {

SET {

SEQUENCE {

OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)

PrintableString '90e8da3cadfc7820'

}
SET {
    OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
    UTF8String 'StrongBox'

    SEQUENCE {
    ...}

    SEQUENCE {
    ...}

    RSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
    NULL

    BIT STRING, encapsulates {
    ...[Another 129 bytes skipped]...}

    INTEGER 65537
    ...}

    SEQUENCE {
    ...[3]...}

    SEQUENCE {
    ...}

    SEQUENCE {
    ...}

    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...}

    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...]

    OCTET STRING
    ...}

    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...}

    OCTET STRING
    ...]
1697 15:  SEQUENCE {
1699  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
1701  1:    BOOLEAN TRUE
1703  5:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1705  3:      SEQUENCE {
1707  1:        BOOLEAN TRUE
1709  3:      }
1711  1:    }
1713  14:  }
}

1714 14:  SEQUENCE {
1716  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
1718  1:    BOOLEAN TRUE
1720  4:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1722  2:      BIT STRING 2 unused bits
1724  4:        '100000'B (bit 5)
1726  2:      }
1728  84:  }
}

1730 84:  SEQUENCE {
1732  3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
1734  77:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1736  75:      SEQUENCE {
1738  73:        SEQUENCE {
1740  71:          [0] {
1742  69:            [0] {
1744  67:              [6]
1746  65:                'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/1'
1748  63:                '7102468407102977850'
1750  61:              }
1752  69:            }
1754  71:          }
1756  73:        }
1758  75:      }
1760  84:    }
}

1816 13:  SEQUENCE {
1818  9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1820  1:    NULL
1822  0:  }
1824  513:  BIT STRING
1826  511:    13 22 DA F2 92 93 CE C0 9F 70 40 C9 DA 85 6B 61
1828  511:    6F 8F BE E0 A4 04 55 C1 63 84 61 37 F5 4B 71 6D
1830  511:    62 AA 6F BF 6C E8 48 03 AD 28 85 21 9E 3C 1C 91
2348 1376:  SEQUENCE {
2352  840:      SEQUENCE {
2356   3:        [0] {
2358   1:          INTEGER 2
2361   9:          INTEGER 00 E8 FA 19 63 14 D2 FA 18
2372  13:          SEQUENCE {
2374   9:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
2382   0:              sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
2385   0:              NULL
2387  27:          SEQUENCE {
2392  25:            SET {
2396  23:              SEQUENCE {
2400   3:                OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
2404  16:                PrintableString ’f92009e853b6b045’
2418  13:                UTCTime 26/05/2016 16:28:52 GMT
2433  13:                UTCTime 24/05/2026 16:28:52 GMT
2448  27:          SEQUENCE {
2452  25:            SET {
2456  23:              SEQUENCE {
2464  3:                OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
2468  16:                PrintableString ’f92009e853b6b045’
2481  13:              SEQUENCE {
2485   9:                OBJECT IDENTIFIER
2493   0:                  rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
2496  527:            BIT STRING, encapsulates {
2504  513:              INTEGER
2512   :                00 AF B6 C7 82 2B B1 A7 01 EC 2B B4 2E 8B CC 54

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:     16 63 AB EF 98 2F 32 C7 7F 75 31 03 0C 97 52 4B
:     1B 5F E8 09 FB C7 2A A9 45 1F 74 3C BD 9A 6F 13
:     35 74 4A 5E 77 F6 B6 AC 35 35 EE 17 C2 5E 63
:     95 17 DD 9C 92 E6 37 4A 53 CB FE 25 8F 8F FB B6
:     FD 12 93 78 A2 2A 4C A9 9C 4E 25 8F 8F FB B6
:     F4 4A AE 97 CA 1C CD 7E 76 2F B2 F5 31 51 B6 FE B2
:     FF FD 2B 6F E4 FE 5B C6 BD 9E C3 4B FE 08 23 9D
:     [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]

3022 3:     INTEGER 65537
         }
         }
         }

3027 166:

3030 163:     [3] { 3033 29:
            SEQUENCE {
            3035 3:
            OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
            3042 20:
            OCTET STRING
            :     36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
            :     C9 EA 4F 12
            :     }
            :     }
            :     }

3064 31:

3066 3:
            OCTET STRING
            :     36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
            :     C9 EA 4F 12
            :     }
            :     }

3097 15:

3099 3:
            OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
            3107 5:
            SEQUENCE {
            3114 14: 3116 3:
            OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
            3124 4:
            BIT STRING 1 unused bit
            : '1100001' B
3130  64:  
3132  3:  
3137  57:  
3139  55:  
3141  53:  
3143  51:  
3145  49:  
3147  47:  
3196  13:  
3198  9:  
3209  0:  
3211  513:  
3728 1413:  
3732 877:  
3736 3:  
3741 10:  
3753 13:  
3755 9:  
3766 0:  
3768 27:
SET {
  SEQUENCE {
    OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
    PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
  }
  SEQUENCE {
    UTCTime 20/06/2018 22:47:35 GMT
    UTCTime 17/06/2028 22:47:35 GMT
  }
  SEQUENCE {
    SET {
      SEQUENCE {
        OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
        PrintableString 'ccd18b9b608d658e'
      }
    }
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
      UTF8String 'StrongBox'
    }
  }
  SEQUENCE {
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
      NULL
    }
  }
  BIT STRING, encapsulates {
    SEQUENCE {
      INTEGER 65537
    }
    [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
  }
  [3]
SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    1B 17 70 C6 97 DC 84 54 75 7C 3C 98 5C E6 1D 1D
    08 59 5D 53
    }
    }

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    SEQUENCE {
      [0]
      36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
      C9 EA 4F 12
      }
      }
      }

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
  BOOLEAN TRUE
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    SEQUENCE {
      BOOLEAN TRUE
      }
      }
      }

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
  BOOLEAN TRUE
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    BIT STRING 2 unused bits
    '100000'B (bit 5)
    }
    }

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    SEQUENCE {
      [0] {
      [0] {
      [6] :
        'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/8'
        'F6734C9FA504789'
        }
        }
        }
    }
    }

7.2. Windows 10 TPM

The next two sections provide two views of a CSR generated via invocation of the Certificate Enrollment Manager API similar to the below:
CertificateRequestProperties request = new CertificateRequestProperties();
request.FriendlyName = "Self-Signed Device Certificate";
request.KeyAlgorithmName = KeyAlgorithmNames.Rsa;
request.KeyStorageProviderName = "Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider";
request.UseExistingKey = true;
request.Exportable = ExportOption.NotExportable;
request.ContainerName = prj.GetContainerName();
request.Subject = subject_name;
request.KeyUsages = keyUsages;
request.SmartcardReaderName = smartCardReaderName;

string privacyCa =
"MIIDezCCAmGwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBUMQswCQYDVQQGEwJUYzEY" +
"MBYGAIUEChMPVSSTLiBHb321cm5tZW50MQowCwVDQQLwRESVBNMRRwGgYDVQQD" +
"ExNQdXJ1YnJlZC8cm12YN5IENMB4XDT4MDQwMzE0NTQwMFoXDTI4MDQwMzE0" +
"NTQwMFOwVDElMAgKAUEHbMCMV5hGDAWgNVBAoTD1UuY4gR292ZXJubWVudDENO" +
"MAsgAIUEcXwERIEITQTeQBoGA1UEAxMTUHyvZWJyZWQgUHJpdmFJeSBDTCCASIIw" +
"DQYJbKoZIhvcNAQEEBBADgqEPADCCAQocGBEAMROVo8sQ707OsijRxoX5d6MaB0r4" +
"r5TnM97cx0rjSVPu3o/GW9kRQdJtG9gARKKixqKOPJTkFIlxUvVwWkKrtL9jYs" +
"IC2V/otsx3JkqPepud2CTIy3iAU7UD0/0MGgALBn+grDqTAZOSi5p6caA0eo/fOX" +
"O7UNh5z2yW0YAHzdH1y5F9BIOZENr7pRvKziupf30VTQaAmjMWoiDrCQC+D0ya4" +
"8qXU/VPY4c9Bm1g7nUzkHDgdago0lGaj5t2y01W371bR1O6HrZ5D118laIXs7n9k" +
"MpR7GBk4rg/1/FtMV15BpBn/Pp4syi3f+yOQbSz+FPQwfibWGLuKUzPycDvEcAwEA" +
"AamNYMFyWQyDuR00BBYFyF9pRSM65GYc0EVDpu91W0BMAsGA1udwQaEIC" +
"pDAObNVHSEITaFbqgrQbQEpQcDAgYIKnYBBQUHAgECGCSqGAQQBgcVJDAYN6bkgq" +
"hkimG9w0BQsFADA0CQEQAG777Bu5EXmWniVcTIA0n5584Z6N91jWv9lG3IqyGM" +
"2oxDSKPr36c7R27fMqAgc0mN99N7w9x4FvbbkYHgZWPspvRFy79veE+wMCw+zOB88" +
"ri4a2z/cTDMW9uf3r+Ba3jRkgVoaYV9eZtmz6DA3wvEdvUEZN4gLR5yXIdSU" +
"pdVd4eyEFVn8y0p9R2DBB9v5x7Y6OrZQoaDcrweRsXJ9/WLDZj6A6dZsyHM" +
"74CRuXYGhpBB77LYjihgV16Rb4db3dgDIkmTqueEknu73odd pHqgMRvWUB" +
"1XzHnBzPuuCnvPBshJ0vPRW13z3d8qetzS8XECA==";
byte[] privacyCaBytes = Convert.FromBase64String(privacyCa);
IBuffer buffer = privacyCaBytes.AsBuffer();
request.AttestationCredentialCertificate = new Certificate(buffer);;

csrToDiscard = await CertificateEnrollmentManager.UserCertificateEnrollmentManager."
CreateRequestAsync(request);


The structure is essentially a Full PKI Request as described in RFC 5272.

7.2.1. Attestation statement

This section provides an annotation attestation statement as extracted from an encrypted attestation extension. The structure of the attestation statement is defined here:

```
600 1256:                     SEQUENCE {
604   9:                           OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 311 21 24'
615 1241:                           SET {
619 1237:                             OCTET STRING
                4B 41 53 54 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00
                00 00 00 00 B9 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 4B 41 44 53
                02 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00
                00 03 00 00 FF 54 43 47 80 17 00 22 00 0B 9A FD
                AB 8A 0B E9 0B BB 3F 7E 6E B6 77 91 EF A9 15 8A
                03 B2 2B 8C BE 3F EC 56 B6 30 BF 82 73 9C 00 14
                13 6E 2F 14 DD AF 30 72 A6 E3 89 4D BF 7A 54 26
                36 2F 10 D6 00 00 00 00 00 51 4F CB E5 AD 8C 60
                E6 C2 70 80 00 D4 2C 65 4C 6B 95 ED 95 00 22 00
                0B 2B E6 2C AD 8D E9 9A 85 04 D7 F3 7B B7 4C F8
                32 CD B4 F1 80 CA A6 35 B9 2C 39 87 B7 96 03 C3
                A3 00 22 00 0B 6C 88 60 B2 80 E3 BE 7D 34 F2 85
                DC 26 9D 1B 72 A8 0A 17 CF 31 08 F1 55 F2 9B 4E
                82 C8 5B 49 7B 1A F1 4B 12 A1 C5 D1 A4 C5 A4 59
                C4 0A 97 E0 88 ED 1C D3 B6 38 4A 5D 6C 27 F5 69
                7D 17 AD F6 C0 03 27 09 5D 93 B5 13 EA 50 B5 05
                27 7B A0 51 4D 1B 17 52 87 7D B8 A6 05 4A 4F 39
                CA 36 5C A1 19 19 0B 73 B4 0E 7F D3 91 DA 91 EE
                37 C6 CE 78 AF 15 21 5D EB 5E 5F 23 A7 08 E9 85
                D4 6B A0 95 6D D7 E0 3A D1 92 72 B7 D4 E5 35 6A
                01 B0 7D 35 D0 99 BA A1 77 35 76 75 E3 90 A8 6B
                86 27 B8 3D 47 75 2D 98 D0 23 4E 09 D8 26 6B 32
                3C A3 50 A2 E8 FF 70 21 85 C5 5E B1 F5 9C B9
                6E 21 27 C7 2A CD 84 61 02 47 6A A0 E1 9A 9F AF
                02 43 08 D8 BF 9F 69 14 C4 8C 80 32 2D 5C A3 60
                48 F5 5E 8E 65 6B 5E B5 0E A4 ED B9 8B F9 C3 D9
```
The format is structured as follows:

typedef struct {
    UINT32 Magic;
    UINT32 Version;
    UINT32 Platform;
    UINT32 HeaderSize;
    UINT32 cbIdBinding;
    UINT32 cbKeyAttestation;
    UINT32 cbAIKOpaque;
    BYTE idBinding[cbIdBinding];
    BYTE keyAttestation[cbKeyAttestation];
    BYTE aikOpaque[cbAIKOpaque];
} KeyAttestationStatement;

The remainder is the keyAttestation, which is structured as follows:
typedef struct {
    UINT32 Magic;
    UINT32 Platform;
    UINT32 HeaderSize;
    UINT32 cbKeyAttest;
    UINT32 cbSignature;
    UINT32 cbKeyBlob;
    BYTE keyAttest[cbKeyAttest];
    BYTE signature[cbSignature];
    BYTE keyBlob[cbKeyBlob];
} keyAttestation;

4B 41 44 53 - Magic
02 00 00 00 - Platform
18 00 00 00 - HeaderSize
A1 00 00 00 - cbKeyAttest (161)
00 01 00 00 - cbSignature (256)
00 03 00 00 - cbKeyBlob

The keyAttest field is of type TPMS_ATTEST. The TPMS_ATTEST structure is defined in section 10.11.8 of https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-00.99.pdf. FF 54 43 47 - magic 80 17 - type (TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY) 00 22 - name - TPM2B_NAME.size (34 bytes) 00 0B 9A FD AB 8A 0B E9 0B BB - TPM2B_NAME.name 3F 7F E6 B6 77 91 EF A9 15 8A 03 B2 2B 8C BE 3F EC
56 B6 30 BF 82 73 9C 00 14 13 6E 2F 14 DD AF 30 72 A6 E3 89 4D BF 7A
54 26 36 2F 10 D6 00 00 00 00 51 4F CB E5 AD 8C 8C 60 E6 C2 70 80 00
D4 2C 65 4C 6B 95 ED 95 00 22 00 0B 2B E6 2C AD 8D E8 9A 85 04 D7 F3
7B B7 4C F8 32 CD B4 F1 80 CA A6 35 B9 2C 39 87 B7 96 03 C3 A3 00 22
00 0B 88 60 B2 80 E3 BE 7D 34 F2 85 DC 26 9D 1B 72 A8 0A 17 CF 31
08 F1 55 F2 9B 4F 82 C6 5B 49 7B

Signature (256 bytes) - generated using the AIK private key

7.3. Yubikey

As with the Android Keystore attestations, Yubikey attestations take the form of an X.509 certificate. As above, the certificate is presented here packaged along with an intermediate CA certificate as a certificates-only SignedData message.

The attestations below were generated using code similar to that found in the yubico-piv-tool (https://github.com/Yubico/yubico-piv-tool). Details regarding attestations are here: https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Introduction/PIV_attestation.html

7.3.1. Yubikey 4

0 1576: SEQUENCE {
  4  9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 1561:  [0] {
19 1557:   SEQUENCE {
23  1:     INTEGER 1
26  0:     SET { }
28  11:   SEQUENCE {
30  9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
      :   }
41 1533:  [0] {
45  742:   SEQUENCE {
[Another 142 bytes skipped]
496 17:          SEQUENCE {
498 10:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
510 3:          OCTET STRING 04 03 03
      :
      :  }
      :
      :  }
515 13:          SEQUENCE {
517 9:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
528 0:          NULL
      :
      :  }
530 257:          BIT STRING
      :  52 80 5A 6D C3 9E DF 47 A8 F1 B2 A5 9C A3 80 81
      :  3B 1D 6A EB 6A 12 62 4B 11 FD 8D 30 F1 7B FC 71
      :  10 C9 B2 08 FC D1 4E 35 7F 45 F2 10 A2 52 B9 D4
      :  B3 02 1A 01 56 07 6B FA 64 A7 08 F0 03 FB 27 A9
      :  60 8D 0D D3 AC 5A 10 CF 20 96 4E 82 BC 9D E3 37
      :  DA C1 4C 50 E1 3D 16 B4 CA F4 1B FF 08 64 C9 74
      :  4F 2A 3A 43 E0 DE 42 79 F2 13 AE 77 A1 E2 AE 6B
      :  DF 72 A5 B6 CE D7 4C 90 13 DF DE DB F2 8B 34 45
      :  [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
791 783:          SEQUENCE {
795 503:          SEQUENCE {
799 3:          [0] {
804 17:          INTEGER
      :  00 FE B9 AF 03 3B 0B A7 79 04 02 F5 67 AE DF 72
      :  ED
823 13:          SEQUENCE {
825 9:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
836 0:          NULL
      :
      :  }
838 33:          SEQUENCE {
840 31:          SET {
842 29:          SEQUENCE {
844 3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
849 22:          UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Attestation'
      :
      :  }
      :
873 32:          SEQUENCE {
875 13:          UTCTime 14/03/2016 00:00:00 GMT
890 15:          GeneralizedTime 17/04/2052 00:00:00 GMT
      :  }
SEQUENCE {
  SET {
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
      UTF8String 'YubiKey PIV Attestation 9e'
    }
    
    
    
  }
  
  
  
  
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
  rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
  NULL
}

BIT STRING

  30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 00 93 C4 C0 35 95 7E 26
  2A 7E A5 D0 29 C4 D7 E9 39 67 22 B1 09 45 46 4D
  DB A4 77 CB 0B A3 F1 D0 69 3C 24 8D A2 72 72 27
  E1 7F DE CB 67 A4 1D D2 E5 43 44 6F 21 39 F8 57
  34 01 0E 7E C3 81 63 63 6A 6D D7 40 20 7B AF 35
  61 9C 8D C1 D1 2B 25 48 EE 52 FC F3 72 6A 74 96
  01 CB 1C 1A B2 AD F9 18 96 EB 59 EF E3 3A CA BC
  AA 9B 42 FE FF 60 6E 28 89 49 0D C1 B1 B0 25 AE
  [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]

[3] {
  SEQUENCE {
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
      OCTET STRING 04 03 03 -- firmware version
    }
    
    
    
    
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 7'
  OCTET STRING 02 03 4F 9B B5 -- serial number
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 8'
  OCTET STRING 01 01 -- PIN and touch policy
}

SEQUENCE {
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
  sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
  NULL
}

BIT STRING
7.3.2. Yubikey 5

0 1613: SEQUENCE {
  4 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 1598:  [0] {
19 1594:    SEQUENCE {
23 1:      INTEGER 1
26 0:      SET {}
28 11:    SEQUENCE {
30 9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
  :    }
41 1570:      [0] {
45 762:        SEQUENCE {
49 482:          SEQUENCE {
53 3:            [0] {
55 1:              INTEGER 2
  :            }
58 9:              INTEGER 00 86 77 17 E0 1D 19 2B 26
69 13:            SEQUENCE {
71 9:              OBJECT IDENTIFIER:
    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
82 0:              NULL
  :            }
84 43:            SEQUENCE {
86 41:              SET {
88 39:                SEQUENCE {
90 3:                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
95 32:                    UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Root CA Serial 263751'
  :                  }
  :                }
  :            }
129 32:          SEQUENCE {

UTCTime 14/03/2016 00:00:00 GMT
GeneralizedTime 17/04/2052 00:00:00 GMT

SEQUENCE {
  SET {
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
      UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Attestation'
    }
  }
}

SEQUENCE {
  SEQUENCE {
    OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
    NULL
  }
  BIT STRING
  30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 C5 5B 8D E9 B9 3C 53
  69 82 88 FE DA 70 FC 5C 88 78 41 25 A2 1D 7B 84
  8E 93 36 AD 67 2B 4C AB 45 BE B2 E0 D5 9C 1B A1
  68 D5 6B F8 63 5C 83 CB 83 38 62 B7 64 AE 83 37
  37 8E C8 60 80 E6 01 F8 75 AA FE 6E A7 D5 76
  C5 C1 25 AD AA 9E 9D DC B5 7E E9 8E 2A B4 3F 99
  0D F7 9F 20 A0 28 A0 9F B3 B1 22 5F AF 38 FB 73
  46 F4 C7 93 30 DD FA D0 86 E0 C9 C6 72 99 AF FB
  [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]
}

[3] {
  SEQUENCE {
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
      OCTET STRING 05 01 02
    }
    SEQUENCE {
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
      BOOLEAN TRUE
      OCTET STRING 30 06 01 01 FF 02 01 00
    }
    OCTET STRING
    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
    NULL
  }
  BIT STRING
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence 1</th>
<th>Sequence 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ Another 128 bytes skipped ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

984 271: BIT STRING
   : 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 A9 02 2D 7A 4C 0B B1
   : 0C 02 F9 E5 9C E5 6F 20 D1 9D F9 CE B3 B3 4D 1B
   : 61 B0 B4 E0 3F 44 19 72 88 8B 8D 9F 86 4A 5E C7
   : 38 F0 AF C9 28 5C D8 A2 80 C9 43 93 2D FA 39 7F
   : E9 39 2D 18 1B A7 A2 76 8F D4 6C D0 75 96 99 0D
   : 06 37 9D 90 D5 71 00 6E FB 82 D1 5B 2A 7C 3B 62
   : 9E AB 15 81 B9 AD 7F 3D 30 1C 2C 4B 9D C4 D5 64
   : 32 9A 54 D6 23 B1 65 92 A3 D7 57 E2 62 10 2B 93
   : [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]

1259 78: [3] {
1261 76:   SEQUENCE {
1263 17:     SEQUENCE {
1265 10:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
1277 3:       OCTET STRING 05 01 02 -- firmware version
   :   }
1282 20:   SEQUENCE {
1284 10:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 7'
1296 6:     OCTET STRING 02 04 00 93 6A A0 -- serial number
   :   }
1304 16:   SEQUENCE {
1306 10:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 8'
1318 2:     OCTET STRING 01 01 -- PIN and touch policy
   :   }
1322 15:   SEQUENCE {
1324 10:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 9'
1336 1:     OCTET STRING 02 -- form factor
   :   }
1339 13:   SEQUENCE {
1341 9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   :     sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1352 0:     NULL
   :   }
1354 257: BIT STRING
   : 9F EB 7A 4C F0 7C 67 11 ED C5 84 07 C8 19 41 B2
   : 71 42 08 2B D6 CD A8 5F DC AE 79 75 6C F1 E5 4D
   : 28 95 89 69 9D C0 2E A7 D4 48 51 B0 75 FF 63 FD
   : B8 79 93 03 EA BB 8A 67 D8 E7 EC C9 1C 8E 3F AF
   : 74 30 D4 7E 74 A4 26 50 9F D4 57 AE 23 C0 8A 63
   : 4E F3 C7 CF 5A AF 91 11 A2 6B 3B 49 24 32 26 88
   : D8 4F 6F BE BC F0 2D A9 A2 88 B4 5F 54 AF 42 72
   : 08 74 64 57 76 5A 02 9A 9D 21 4B FD 7F 44 8F AF
   : [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
   :   }
8. Privacy Considerations.
TBD

9. Security Considerations
TBD.

10. IANA Considerations
TBD.

11. Acknowledgements

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12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


[ieee802-1AR]

[intelsgx]

[keystore]

[keystore_attestation]


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Appendix A. Changes

- created new section for target use cases
- added comments from Guy, Jessica, Henk and Ned on TCG description.
Authors’ Addresses

Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

Carl Wallace
Red Hound Software
Email: carl@redhoundsoftware.com

Wei Pan
Huawei Technologies
Email: william.panwei@huawei.com