



Wireless ND

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IETF 104

Prague

Wireless IPv6 ND: providing for unmet expectations



- Solicited node multicast requires highly scalable L2 multicast
 - IEEE does not provide it => turns everything into broadcast
 - IPv6 ND appears to work with broadcast on 802.1 fabrics up to some scale ~10K nodes
- IPv6 ND requires reliable and cheap broadcast
 - Radios do not provide that => conserving 802.1 properties over wireless is illusory
 - RFC 4862 cannot operate as designed on wireless
 - Address uniqueness is an unguaranteed side effect of entropy
- 802.11 expects proxy operation and broadcast domain separation
 - 802.11 provides a registration and proxy bridging at L2
 - Requires the same at L3, which does (well... did) not exist
 - Implementations provide proprietary techniques based on snooping => widely imperfect

⇒ RFC 6775 solves the problem for DAD in one LL

⇒ RFC 8505 enables establishing proxy services directly (ND for now), over a LLN, across multiple LLNs

6lo standard work



A proactive setting of proxy/routing state to avoid multicast due to reactive Duplicate address detection and lookup in IPv6 ND

- [RFC 8505](#) (Issued 11/2018)
 - The registration mechanism for proxy and routing services
 - Analogous to a Wi-Fi association but at Layer 3
- [draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router](#) (WGLC complete 1/25)
 - Federates 6lo meshes over a high speed backbone
 - ND proxy analogous to Wi-Fi bridging but at Layer 3
- [draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd](#) (WGLC complete 3/26)
 - Protects addresses against theft (Crypto ID in registration)
- [draft-thubert-6lo-unicast-lookup](#) (new draft)
 - Provides a 6LBR on the backbone to speed up DAD and lookup



IPv6 and 802.11

11.24.14 Proxy ARP (including Proxy Neighbor Discovery) service

Implementation of the proxy ARP service is optional for a WNM STA. A STA that implements the proxy ARP service has dot11ProxyARPImplemented equal to true. When dot11ProxyARPImplemented is true, dot11WirelessManagementImplemented shall be true. When dot11ProxyARPActivated is true, the Proxy ARP Service bit in the Extended Capabilities field shall be set to 1 to indicate that the AP supports the proxy .../...

When an IPv6 address is being resolved, the Proxy Neighbor Discovery service shall respond with a Neighbor Advertisement message (Section 4.4, IETF RFC 4861) on behalf of an associated STA to an Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) Neighbor Solicitation message (Section 4.3, IETF RFC 4861). When MAC address mappings change, the AP may send unsolicited Neighbor Advertisement Messages on behalf of a STA.

NOTE—The Neighbor Solicitation message is used for both address discovery and duplicate address detection (IETF RFC 4862).

There is no such thing as ARP in IPv6. The equivalent function to IPv4 ARP Proxy is IPv6 ND Service. This function operates differently from what 11.22.14 describes, as assuming equivalence with IPv4 ARP Proxy is an oversimplification.

Proposed changes to IEEE Std. 802.11

When an IPv6 address is being resolved, the ARP service shall respond with a Neighbor Advertisement message (Section 4.4, IETF RFC 4861) on behalf of an associated STA to an Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) Neighbor Solicitation message (Section 4.3, IETF RFC 4861). When MAC address mappings change, the AP may send unsolicited Neighbor Advertisement Messages on behalf of a STA.

NOTE—The Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message is used for both address discovery and duplicate address detection (IETF RFC 4862 and IETF RFC 6775).


In contrast to IPv4, IPv6 enables a node to form multiple addresses, some of them temporary to elusive, and with a particular attention paid to privacy. Addresses may be formed and deprecated asynchronously to the association. Even if the knowledge of IPv6 addresses used by a STA can be obtained by snooping protocols such as IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) and DHCPv6, or by observing data traffic sourced at the STA, such methods provide only an imperfect knowledge of the state of the STA at the AP. This may result in a loss of connectivity for some IPv6 addresses, in particular for addresses rarely used and in a situation of mobility. This may also result in undesirable state persistence in the AP when a STA ceases to use an IPv6 address. It results that snooping protocols is not a recommended technique and that it should only be used as last resort.


The recommended alternate is to use the IPv6 Registration method specified in [IETF RFC 8505]. By that method, the AP exposes its capability to proxy ND to the STA in Router Advertisement messages. In turn, the STA may request proxy ND services from the AP for one or more IPv6 addresses, using an Address Registration Option. The Registration state has a lifetime that limits unwanted state persistence in the network. The registration is optionally secured using [draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd] to prevent address theft and impersonation. The registration carries a sequence number, which enables a fast mobility without a loss of connectivity.


The proxy ND operation needs to cover Duplicate Address Detection (Section 5.4, IETF RFC 4862), Neighbor Unreachability Detection (Section 7, IETF RFC 4861), Address Resolution (Section 7.2 IETF RFC 4861) and Address Mobility (section 6, IETF 6lo-backbone-router) to transfer a role of ND proxy to the AP where a STA is associated following the mobility of the STA. The proxy ND specification associated to the address registration is [draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router]. With that specification, the AP participates to the protocol as a Backbone Router, typically operating as a bridging proxy though the routing proxy operation is also possible. As a bridging proxy, the proxy replies to NS lookups with the MAC address of the STA, and then bridges packets to the STA normally; as a routing proxy, it replies with its own MAC address and then routes to the STA at the IP layer. The routing proxy reduces the need to expose the MAC address of the STA on the wired side, for a better stability and scalability of the bridged fabric.

RFC 8505

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6LN

6LR

6LBR

Radio 1 Hop

RFC 8505


RFC 8505

EDAC

NA (EARO)

SRC = 6LR_II
DST = LPN_II
TGT = LPN
TLLA = LPN
UID = LPN
TID included

SRC = 6LR
DST = 6LBR
REG = LPN
UID = LPN
TID included



draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd

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
Unmet expectations

- First come first Serve address registration
 - First registration for an address owns that address till it releases it
 - The network prevents hijacking
- Source address validation
 - Address must be topologically correct
 - Source of the packet owns the source address
- First Hop Security only?
 - Proxy ownership and routing advertisements not protected yet

Status

- Draft-11 published with René's latest updates
- WGLC completed March 26th
- 3 crypto types =>

Crypto-Type value	0 (ECDSA256)	1 (Ed25519)	2 (ECDSA25519)
Elliptic curve	NIST P-256 [FIPS186-4]	Curve25519 [RFC7748]	Curve25519 [RFC7748]
Hash function	SHA-256 [RFC6234]	SHA-512 [RFC6234]	SHA-256 [RFC6234]
Signature algorithm	ECDSA [FIPS186-4]	Ed25519 [RFC8032]	ECDSA [FIPS186-4]
Representation conventions	Weierstrass, (un)compressed, MSB/msb first	Edwards, compressed, LSB/lsw first	Weierstrass, (un)compressed, MSB/msb first
Defining specification	RFC THIS	RFC THIS	RFC THIS



* Crypto-ID Parameters Option
** NDP Signature Option


Security properties


- We made the size of the ROVR tunable in RFC 8505 so we can get high security when using it for Crypto-ID.
- New appendix B on Signature Schemes and representations
- Discussion on implementation attacks:


... implementors should be aware of [breaking-ed25519]. Implementors should be particularly aware that a secure implementation of Ed25519 requires a protected implementation of the hash function SHA-512, whereas this is not required with implementations of SHA-256 used with ECDSA.


draft-ietf-6lo-backbone-router


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draft-thubert-6lo-unicast-lookup

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
Unicast Lookup

- Backbone Routers operate as a distributed 6LBR
 - Use RFC4861/4862 on the backbone
 - EARO in NS/NA to differentiate mobility from duplication
- The new draft positions a 6LBR on the backbone
 - Can be used by 6LBRs and any node to register addresses
 - Can reply to a DAD or an Address lookup for a registered address
 - Avoids multicast on the backbone for scalability
 - Saves time (e.g., IEEE Std 802.11ai FILS aka Tokyo Station scenario)

New stuff

- New « Address Mapping » message using same ICMP Type as EDAR
- New Code Prefix to differentiate Address Mapping from EDAR
- New EARO Status «Not Found»: *The address is not present in the Address Registrar*
- Added SLLAO/TLLAO to EDAR/EDAC and Address Mapping msg.
- New capability in 6C10 to advertise 6LBR with Address Mapping

e.g.,
Wi-Fi
FILS
flow



Asks



- Reviews
- Rapid adoption
 - This is a simple draft and a logical complement
 - Need a draft-ietf for a reference in IEEE Std 802.11
 - Saves time (e.g., IEEE Std 802.11ai FILS aka Tokyo Station scenario)

Questions





draft-thubert-roll-unaware-leaves

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
Unmet expectations


- Scale an IOT subnet to the tens of thousands
 - With device mobility (no renumbering)
 - Controlled Latency and higher Reliability using a backbone
- Deterministic Address presence
 - Route towards the latest location of an address
 - Remove stale addresses








Duplicate registration











Mobility

