Discarding Old Keys

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Martin Thomson, David Schinazi, Kazuho Oku,
Marten Seeman, <your name here>

Goals

As discussed in the Tokyo interim:

Discard Initial keys as soon as possible

Discard Handshake keys when appropriate

Signal when a key update can be initiated

Use explicit signals rather than implicit ones, or timers

Basic Idea

Use an explicit signal for all key transitions

Initial -> Handshake

Handshake (+ 0-RTT) -> 1-RTT

1-RTT_n -> 1-RTT_{n+1}

The signal indicates when it is safe to discard old keys

Options

KEYS_READY #2237

RETIRE_KEYS #2492

MAX_KEY_UPDATES #2504

A bit in the first octet (old version of #2237)

KEYS_READY

KEYS_READY is sent ~~when read keys are available~~

... when the peer is expected to use corresponding keys

Implicitly identifies keys

Initiator of a key update has to suppress old frames

When ~~sent and~~ received

older keys can be discarded
and new key updates initiated

KEYS_READY


C
S
CRYPTO
ClientHello
Initial
0-RTT
0-RTT
ACK
Initial
ACK
KEYS_READY
Hands hake
CRYPTO
..., Finished
1-RTT
1-RTT
KEYS_READY
1-RTT
Initial
Hands hake
1-RTT
1-RTT
Hands hake
1-RTT
ACK
CRYPTO
ServerHello
KEYS_READY
CRYPTO
EncryptedExtensions, ..., Finished
ACK
KEYS_READY

KEYS_READY Key Update



RETIRE_KEYS

RETIRE_KEYS send when no more data will be sent

- Initial->Handshake = first packet (special case for server)
- Handshake->1-RTT = after all data is acknowledged
- Key Update = sent when new keys installed

Implicitly identifies keys

- RETIRE_KEYS is retransmitted until acknowledged

When both sent and received, old keys can be discarded

Subsequent key updates can be initiated once received and sent has been acknowledged

RETIRE_KEYS


C
S
CRYPTO
ClientHello
Initial
0-RTT
ACK
0-RTT
ACK
Initial
CRYPTO
..., Finished
Hands hake
RETIRE_KEYS
1-RTT
1-RTT
Hands hake
RETIRE_KEYS
1-RTT
Initial
Hands hake
1-RTT
1-RTT
Hands hake
1-RTT
ACK
CRYPTO
ServerHello
RETIRE_KEYS *
CRYPTO
EncryptedExtensions, ..., Finished
ACK
RETIRE_KEYS

RETIRE_KEYS Key Update



MAX_KEY_UPDATES

Cap key updates rather than control discarding of keys

Explicit counter in frame sets cap on updates

Fixes key update issues, limited fix for handshake:

- No signal for Initial->Handshake transition
- Handshake->1-RTT signaled with MAX_KEY_UPDATES=0
- First frame is sent after all Handshake data ack'd

MAX_KEY_UPDATES



Use a bit instead

Same basic semantics as the frame (ideally KEYS_READY)

Carried in every packet

No special retransmission rules

Common characteristics

Use a frame (explicit signal agreed in Tokyo)

An endpoint can block key updates by not sending the frame

- Both KEYS_READY and MAX_KEY_UPDATES allow a 3PTO delay to cap active read keys at an endpoint to 2
- The time limit is aspirational, as no mechanism exists to force an endpoint to send the proposed frames

Difference: Explicit vs. Ambient Signal

Explicit: counter in frame

Drawbacks: octets, allows for >1 update

Ambient: use the encryption level

Drawbacks: need to suppress any retransmission when initiating a key update

Initial -> Handshake Transition

MAX_KEY_UPDATES says that the implicit signal is OK

The other proposals use an explicit signal

Table. Initial keys are dropped when receiving ...

	Client	Server
KEYS_READY	Handshake(KEYS_READY)	Handshake(KEYS_READY)
RETIRE_KEYS	Handshake(RETIRE_KEYS)	Handshake(RETIRE_KEYS)
MAX_KEY_UPDATES	Initial(ServerHello)	any Handshake packet

Trigger

KEYS_READY - matching read keys available

RETIRE_KEYS

- Handshake: all data from previous epoch acknowledged
  exception for server: immediately
- 1-RTT: when all CRYPTO data is acknowledged
- Update: send immediately, no update until acknowledged

MAX_KEY_UPDATES - trigger isn't important