# Routing in Fat Trees (RIFT) Update draft-rift-rift-04

IETF 104, 3/19, Prague

The RIFT Authors

#### Update from -03

- Last version presented in Montreal -03
- We went to -04 since then
- Specification Holes pretty much all closed now
- Lost of Open Source Code written and interop'ed
- Once or twice weekly online meetings has been held by the 'core crew' on ongoing basis
  - Most meetings recorded and posted to mailing list

#### Update -03/-04, Green is Done



#### Rough Statistics


- Emails on "core contributor" email threads since last IETF: hundreds
- Commits on Open Source version since last IETF without branch merges: 380 (last time was 205)
- Lines on Open Source version patch since last IETF: 24'622 (last time was 15'897)
- Diff Size Between -03 and -04 specification: 5'683 lines of text (last time was 6'574) Objects on encoding model changed 3 (last time was 7)
- Ideas Discussed and Scrapped: Dozens and dozens ;-)

#### What Changed?

- Security Envelope and Security Model
- Packet Numbering (Debugging and Loss Detection)
- Sequence Number Arithmetic
- Link Capabilities
- More Tightening of Flooding Rules
- Clarifications on Flood Reduction Based on Open Source Implementation
  - Flooding In-Cast Reduction Explanation

### Security Model

- Port-Association Model
- Node-Association Model
- Fabric-Association Model
- Can prevent all known attacks
   tegrity
  - Lifetime protected
  - Nonce exchange prevents replay Provisioning
  - Origin integrity
- Does NOT
  - Provide confidentiality
  - Provide a chain-of-trust



#### Security Envelope

- RIFT Magic
- Outer Key Envelope
  - Generated link by link
  - Protected by Nonces, encapsulates TIE Lifetime
- Inner Key Envelope (only on TIEs)
  - Protects TIE
  - TIE can be passed through opaquely withoutrigin Security Envelope Header deserialization
  - Allows to extend the model with optional without breaking backwards compatibility

UDP Header:	
	RIFT destination port
+-	•
UDP Length	UDP Checksum
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	Packet Number
Outer Security Envelope Header:	
	Outer Key ID   Fingerprint     Length
Security Fingerprint covers all following content ~	
Nonce Local	Nonce Remote
+	
ប្សាប់ rigin Security Envelope Header:	
Inner Key ID   elements	Fingerprint     Length
y	

Serialized RIFT Model Object

Serialized RIFT Model Object

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
### New Link Capabilites

- Link
  - BFD available or not

## Final Cases and Tightening of Flooding Rules

- Open Source Implementors ask lots of questions ;-)
- Lifetime difference where lifetimes equal specified (60 secs)
- Last case of flooding inconsistency
  - Only occurs if 3 levels reboot in a specific sequence and the bottom generates a lower number on its N-TIE that the biggest held and middle cannot get
- Cosmetic change that asks a node to flush all other TIEs than its own on level change
  - Was leading to harmless but also useless TIEs hanging in a node until expiry

## Flooding Incast Solved and Explained



#### Smaller Stuff

- Packet numbering on each packet type
  - Optionally increasing on each sent packet
    - Allows detection of losses on remote side and throttling
- Sequence Number Arithmetic
  - On TIE Types
  - Sequence Numbers
- Type Tightening
  - Types got smaller to save space (we don't be too concerned about it but wasting if we can be more frugal is not wise)
    - Seq#
    - Packet Numbers
    - Level Type
    - Version Types
- Unsolicited, optional downstream label

#### THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION