

Capabilities and Limitations of Endpoint Security Solutions (CLESS)

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Introduction to CLESS

- Why? A gap in the « codification » of endpoint security?
- Why now? Many « environmental » changes (technical, regulations, etc.)
- What?
 - In the long term, a full review of endpoint security in all its dimensions
 - Currently we started with
 - Endpoint Models
 - Threat Landscape
 - Endpoint security capabilities
 - An ideal endpoint security
 - Defence in depth
 - Endpoint security limitations
 - Example from production data
 - Regulatory aspects
- Status? An early draft on purpose, we seek feedback and future collaboration

Lessons Learnt Already

- Much harder than initially thought
- Couldn't find any satisfying:
 - Threat Landscape methodology for endpoint security
 - Capabilities list and methodology for endpoint security (not just 3rd party)
 - Good potential of work for SMART on both threat landscape and capabilities
- Production data from Managed Security Services
 - Interesting methodology
 - Study on the last 3 months on hundreds of enterprise customers
 - Endpoint only security gives a lot of results
 - Critical events not detected by endpoints

Questions for Future Development

- Endpoint modeling between 'UEs' and 'Hosts'
 - Better uniformity across the document
- Threat Landscape Methodology
 - Align with or fork from MITRE ATT&CK?
 - Should it be done in this I-D?
- Intrinsic Capabilities
 - Need a much deeper inventory
- Other Aspects
 - Should we have an economic section?
 - Regulations and Human Rights sections – need a good neutral balance
 - New Requirements, New Limits, New Constraints
 - Other real production data?

QUESTIONS ?

THANK YOU