

SMART

Stopping Malware and Researching Threats

IETF Note Well

This summary is only meant to point you in the right direction, and doesn't have all the nuances. The IETF's IPR Policy is set forth in BCP 79; please read it carefully.

The brief summary:

- ❖ **By participating with the IETF, you agree to follow IETF processes.**
- ❖ **If you are aware that a contribution of yours (something you write, say, or discuss in any IETF context) is covered by patents or patent applications, you need to disclose that fact.**
- ❖ **You understand that meetings might be recorded, broadcast, and publicly archived.**

For further information, talk to a chair, ask an Area Director, or review the following:

BCP 9 (on the Internet Standards Process)

BCP 25 (on the Working Group processes)

BCP 78 (on the IETF Trust)

BCP 79 (on Intellectual Property Rights in the IETF)

Also see: <http://www.ietf.org/about/note-well.html>:

Agenda

- Chair Time, Charter & Group Setup (Kathleen / Kirsty) - 10 minutes
- Threat Landscape (Arnaud Taddei) - 15 minutes
- Malicious Uses of Evasive Communications and Threats to Privacy (David McGrew) - 15 minutes
- Testing for the good of the internet (Simon Edwards) - 20 minutes
- BGP hijacking (Töma Gavrichenkov) - 20 minutes
- CLESS draft on endpoint security (Arnaud Taddei) - 10 minutes
- One Snake (NCSC Senior Speaker) - 20 minutes
- Chair Wrap-Up & Discussion (Kathleen / Kirsty) - 10 minutes

SMART RG - Headlines

- Advisory research group on attack defence.
- Research methods to efficiently and effectively detect, mitigate, prevent or eliminate threats.
- Guide IETF protocol development.
- Become the authority on attack defence and prevention in the IETF/IRTF.

What research we would like to see

- case studies of previous incidents and attacks: how they were prevented, detected, mitigated
- best practice, e.g. use of DMARC, to prevent phishing
- new methods for prevention, detection and mitigation – including automation
- reports and statistics on the current threat landscape
- how to spot slow and bulk data exfil from a network reliably
- endpoint detection capabilities and limitations
- threat detection on encrypted traffic
- or research we are completely unaware of!

Draft Charter

The Stopping Malware and Researching Threats Research Group (or SMART RG) will research the effects, both positive and negative, of existing, proposed and newly published protocols and Internet standards on attack defence. It will gather evidence from information security practitioners on methods used to defend against attacks and make this available to protocol designers, implementers and users. As a result, designers, implementers and users of new protocols will be better informed about the possible impact on attack prevention and mitigation. The SMART RG aims to guide IETF protocol development and become the hub of expertise on attack defence in the IETF/IRTF.

> <https://github.com/smart-rg/drafts/blob/master/draft-charter.md>

Further links

- Wiki page: <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/irtf/wiki/smart>
- Mailing list: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/smart>
- Datatracker: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/smart/about/>
- Github: <https://github.com/smart-rg>
- CARIS2: <https://www.internet-society.org/events/caris2>

Coordinating Attack Response at Internet Scale (CARIS 2) Workshop


Kathleen Moriarty

ISOC Workshop

ISOC & Dell EMC sponsored

Some presented Research and Development Work

- OpenC2
- NICT - Security Automation and Visualization
- Incident response coordination - various groups presented
- IPv6 aggregation - MAPRG



not to make changes / don't remove

re-use analysis techniques (e.g. need some more) to work on data

Liability

Legal inputs

Engagement from stakeholders

Value & history of assets

Liability

Profit stream

Value & history of assets

Enter Commodities

Time on the market / Revenue - remaining

Minimization

Company interests

Rig claims and arbitrations

Not touched here

Revenue / market / remaining time / cost

Lack of awareness / analysis

Sensitivity of intelligence

TRUST

Driven by different stakeholders

Dynamic threat landscape

Liability

Court mandate / Regulation

Complexity - can info always be shared in public / on mac

Calibration - pros & marketing TOE

Inability to measure flexibility to define targets

Attacker cost advantage

COMMERCIALIZATION

Difurcation of Internet

Pricing threats

Erosion of trust in IR

Supply Ch. Risk - Equival to pre-substituted coming out of Box

election if information is hard to read so many silos

From Speed to MIT

Solutions: too little, too late

Minimization of Time to Perceive Risks

Privacy / Secrecy of information

Right to Repair

Legal advice Infrastructure for legal enablement

General Counsel

Local regulatory / use specific

clarity of interests in active sharing

New regimes

Lack of expertise

Over-concentration of interest (only treated)

New patterns

Incident Response Today

Supporting

- Trust in incident response teams
- Need to protect network as a forcing function
- Current efforts supported by profit
- FEAR - initially a burst of wind, but eventually leads to complacency

Dragging

- Too many standards
- Regional border impact data flows
- Lack of Resources/Participation
- Monoculture

Looming problems ahead

- Dynamic threat landscape
- Liability
- Bifurcation of Internet
- Lack of skilled analysts
- Sensitivity of Intelligence/trust

Breakout Brainstorming, may lead to work for SMART

- Fingerprinting
 - packet comparisons
- SNARC - uses trust indicator to make decisions about good/bad actors
 - builds on zero trust networking
 - research visual aspect and underlying principle
 - similar theme on IP reputation/BGP ranking
- Attack coordination solutions/automated security
- Cryptographic Rendezvous
- L2 discovery