

# ***DNS in Applications***

*One Application's Perspective*

*Why*

# *Mission Statement*


Individuals' security and privacy on the internet are fundamental and must not be treated as optional.

-- Mozilla Manifesto

# *HTTPS*

Securing HTTP has been a huge challenge

# *Mission Accomplished (Mostly)*



# *Attention moves to new problems*

Bad site behaviour (tracking, breaches, etc...)

Hardening (SPECTRE and friends, ...)

Gaps in encryption (traffic analysis, unencrypted content, ...)

# *ESNI and Encrypted DNS*

Encrypting DNS is good

But we also care about who gets the information

# *Trusted Recursive Resolver Principle*

Individual control, with strong privacy properties for defaults

***Why not***

# ***DNS is not a single coherent namespace***

An important value of a single communications network resides within the concept of a single referential framework, where my reference to some network resource can be passed to you and still refer to the same resource.

-- Geoff Huston

# *Lots of reasons for applications not to do DNS*

Content filtering

Malware detection and blocking

Captive portals

Enterprise service access

Network specific service access

Routing policies

Regulatory mandates

Applications will screw it up

DoH providers will screw it up

It's a race to the bottom

# *One main reason*

DNS is an effective control point

*Not a good reason*

DNS ~~is~~ was an effective control point

# *Alternative name resolution happens*

Application-layer resolution happens; e.g., RFC 7838

Effective control requires covering these also

No effective control without engaging with endpoints

# *DNS for captive portals*

IETF capport working group formed for the same problem:

People started encrypting web traffic,

... and it became harder to intercept and redirect to a portal

Using DNS here is worse than using cleartext HTTP

# *Content filtering by DNS name*

Works only in the broadest sense

Using DNS results in under- or over-blocking

e.g., blocking all of a host that has one censored page

Endpoint cooperation is necessary to be fully effective

***DNS is NOT an effective  
control surface***

# ***DNS is plumbing***

This is not a problem you can fix with UX

Most people don't care about plumbing until it stops working

They should not need to care

***Where from here***

# *In the long term*

Applications will encrypt what they can

Applications will choose who they trust with data

Entities looking to exert control will have to engage with owners of endsystems

## *In the short term*

People still rely (heavily) on DNS for many of these use cases

Disable application DNS where controls are in place

... use an unauthenticated signal for this

Agree that this is a stop-gap