Goals

● Solve a number of active problems holistically

● Convey through DNS info needed to make connections to HTTPS URIs:
  ○ Encrypted SNI keys
  ○ Transport protocol (HTTP/3, HTTP/2, etc) and associated parameters
  ○ Indicate origin defaults to HTTPS
  ○ Service name (similar to SRV) — covers most “ANAME” use-cases
  ○ … extensible to future use-cases
Goals, cont...

- Single new record for clients to resolve in-parallel with AAAA/A
- Design for usability, extensibility, and to enable performance optimizations
- Compelling enough to convince clients (eg, browsers) to implement
- Opportunity to improve secure defaults
Clients may end up on one or more service endpoints (i.e. sets of servers) which may have different capabilities and keys, such as on different CDNs. HTTPSSVC provides a way to tie these together.
Alias form  
(SvcRecordType=0)

- Covers many “SRV” and “ANAME” use-cases

For default https:// and http:// (ports 80 & 443)  
SvcRecordType=0 means “Alias form”

example.com.  7200 IN HTTPSSVC 0 0 svc.example.net.

_for alternate ports & schemes_

_8443._https.example.com.  7200 IN HTTPSSVC 0 0 svc.example.net.
Alternative services form  \( (SvcRecordType=1) \)

- Covers ESNI use case and other protocol improvements

```
svc.example.net. 7200 IN HTTPSSVC 1 2 svc3.example.net. "h3="\:8003"; \ 
esnikeys="..."
```

```
svc.example.net. 7200 IN HTTPSSVC 1 3 svc2.example.net. "h2="\:8002"; \ 
esnikeys="..."
```

“Please use QUIC to UDP svc3.example.net:8003 with these ESNI keys, or use HTTP/2 to TCP svc2.example.net:8002 with these other ESNI keys.”
Major feedback and design questions so far

- How much to generalize (eg, into ???) but while still covering HTTPS well?
- Whether to allow inlining of address records?
- Whether to allow external references to named keys?
- Impact on client complexity, especially for non-browser clients
- Whether clients implementations will require DoH and/or DNSSEC
- ...

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- Impact on client complexity, especially for non-browser clients
- Whether clients implementations will require DoH and/or DNSSEC
- What to name the RRTYPE
- ...
Next steps...

Forums:

- dnsop : on Tuesday  (feedback on DNS RR & coverage of ANAME use-case)
- tls : on Thursday  (alternative to ESNI RR for HTTPS use-case)
- httpbis : on Thursday  (feedback on interaction with Alt-Svc and HTTP(S))

Current workspace prior to adoption:

https://github.com/MikeBishop/dns-alt-svc

BIND9 private type implementation already available!  (Thanks Mark Andrews!)

Feedback on mailing list(s) and to authors most welcome!
FAQs

● Why HTTP(S)-specific?
  ○ Different protocols have different bootstrap requirements
  ○ Builds on Alt-Svc which is a capability already in HTTP
  ○ HTTP(S) is most common reason given for needing ANAME
  ○ This proposal is not “browser” specific and should be able to work with API & mobile clients

● Why include ESNI?
  ○ Specific use-case TLS WG is looking to solve
  ○ Better for HTTPS use-case than an “ESNI” specific record
  ○ Easy to split esnikeys="..." alt-svc parameter to its own draft

● Why address HSTS case?
  ○ Unique opportunity to improve secure defaults, especially for “bare names”
Proposed approach for ESNI keys in the DNS

- Separate ESNI key format from DNS distribution
  - Per-application-protocol binding
- HTTPSSVC for ESNI keys for HTTPS
  - Alt-Svc esnikeys="..." parameter could also be used for Alt-Svc received via HTTPS
  - HTTPSSVC solves many of the ESNI keys corner cases (multi-CDN, proxies, etc)
- Generic (and simpler?) ESNI record format could exist for other protocols

- Alternative: make HTTPSSVC more generic
Comparison between HTTPSSVC & ANAME
(for the “zone apex CNAME” issue)

HTTPSSVC

Pros:
- Doesn’t require any changes to DNS servers

Cons:
- Only respected by compliant clients
- HTTPS-specific

ANAME

Pros:
- Doesn’t require any changes to clients

Cons:
- Requires complex changes to participating authoritative servers, especially when DNSSEC or ECS is also in use

Neither may fully replace the need or use-cases for the other.