

## Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment [IMC'17]

Taejoong (tijay) Chung Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, David Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, Christo Wilson




## Domain Name System (DNS)




\*A record: one of the DNS records that contains IP addresses of a domain name


## **DNS** Spoofing




## DNSSEC 101




## DNSSEC 101




## DNSSEC 101: Hierarchy Builds Trust



## DNSSEC 101: Hierarchy Builds Trust



## How to Deploy DNSSEC (Correctly)




## Scanning All Domains


	Daily Scans
TLDs	.com, .org., .net
# of domains	147M domains
Interval	every day
Period	2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31

### **Over 750 billion DNS Records**

## How DNSSEC is deployed\*




## Generating Signatures



\* A Longitudinal, End-to-End View of the DNSSEC Ecosystem [USENIX Security'17]

## Building a Chain of Trust



### Why does DNSSEC deployment remain so small? Why are 30% of domains w/o DS records?

\* A Longitudinal, End-to-End View of the DNSSEC Ecosystem [USENIX Security'17]

## Open Question (main part of this talk)






## Open Question (main part of this talk)







## Deploying a DNSSEC on Your Server




## Third Party DNS Operator



## Third Party DNS Operator



## Reseller




## Open Question (main part of this talk)



Popular registrar with lots of domains

## Checking Registrar's DNSSEC Policy



## Anecdotal Examples

#### Experiment

We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don't upload DS records.

We asked a registrar to upload a DS record by email from the different email address than the one that registered

We asked a registrar to upload a DS record to our domain via web live chat

#### Result

[1] They removed a DNSSEC menu
[2] "Most people do not understand DNS, so imagine the white faces when I mention DNSSEC"

It was installed successfully

It was installed on someone else's domain due to a mistake by the customer service agent

## Details of the Last Example

3:45:32 PM tijay hg-dnssec.com 3600 IN DS 2371 13 2 129f34c04ac58ece5218b9894148304a736a63757f58ff0cddd9b8df4989

3:56:05 PM Jeniffer S Awesome! one moment

3:56:09 PM Jeniffer S I have now save the request information! Manage DNSSEC paananenmusic.com Record added successfully. It can take 4-8 hours for DNS to propagate 3:57:19 PM tijay paananenmusic.com? 3:57:28 PM tijay my domain is hg-dnssec.com?

3:58:41 PM Jeniffer S I apologize, you are right, silly me, one moment

## Popular Registrar's DNSSEC Policy\*



Registrar	Registrar DNS Operator
GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com)	
NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)	
OVH (ovh.net)	
Google (googledomains.com)	
Alibaba (hichina.com)	×
eNom (name-services.com)	×
HostGator (hostgator.com)	×
NameBright (namebrightdns.com)	×
DreamHost (dreamhost.com)	×
Amazon (aws-dns)	×
123-reg (123-reg.co.uk)	×
RightSide** (name.com)	×
Network Solution (worldnic.com)	×
Bluehost (bluehost.com)	X
register.com (register.com)	X
The others (5 registrars)	X

\* The results are as of July 2019


\*\* Rightside was acquired by Donuts Inc, in July 2017

## Popular Registrar's DNSSEC Policy

Registr Suppor DNSSE Registr Suppor DS uplo Registr Validat DS reco

4/20		Owner DN	S Operator
4/20	Registrar	DS U	pload
rar		Web	Email
rts	GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com)		
EC?	NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)		
	OVH (ovh.net)		
15/20	Google (googledomains.com)		
15/20	Alibaba (hichina.com)		
rar	eNom (name-services.com)		
rts	HostGator (hostgator.com)		
bad?	NameBright (namebrightdns.com)		
	DreamHost (dreamhost.com)		
	Amazon (aws-dns)		
	123-reg (123-reg.co.uk)		
rar	RightSide* (name.com)		
tes	Network Solution (worldnic.com)	×	
ord?	Bluehost (bluehost.com)	X	
	register.com (register.com)	×	
	The others (5 registrars)	×	×

## Popular Registrar's DNSSEC Policy



## Summary: Registrar's DNSSEC Support

	DNS Operator	# of Registrar	What this means to you
Support DNSSEC?	Registrar	<mark>4</mark> /20	If you don't want to run your own name server, most of the time, you CAN'T deploy DNSSEC (16/20)
	Owner	<b>I 5/20</b>	If you do want run your own nameserver, still you CAN'T deploy DNSSEC for 5/20
Check DS Validation	Owner	5/15	If you happen to upload an incorrect DS record, your domain will be inaccessible

### Why are DNSSEC support of registrars so rare?


## Cost of Managements

	DNS	DNSSEC
# of Records	DNSSEC introduces much more records (e.g., need signatures for each record)	
Size of Records	Signatures are usually <b>3~6 times larger</b> than non-DNSSEC records*	
Management	-	Strong Key Unique Key Rollover

Operational Cost Operational cost of DNSSEC is higher than that of DNS

\*DNSSEC and Its Potential for DDoS Attacks (IMC'14)

## Case Study: Registrar's Policy



# Comparison 2017 vs. 2019

## March 2017

	DNS Operator	# of Registrar
Support DNSSEC?	Registrar	<mark>4</mark> /20
	Owner	15/20
Check DS Validation	Owner	5/15

# of
Registrar
3/20
/20



DNSSEC Deployment Still a way to go, but it has been improved



## Why is DNSSEC deployment so rare?



We need historical dataset


## Scanning All Domains

	TLD Measurement Period (Daily Scan)	Domains	
		Total	Percent w/ DNSKEY
.com	2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31	118,147,199	0.7%
.net	2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31	13,773,903	1.0%
.org	2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31	9,682,750	1.1%
.nl	2016/02/09 ~ 2016/12/31	5,674,208	51.6%
.se	2016/06/07 ~ 2016/12/31	1,388,372	46.7%

## Scanning All Domains


TLD	Measurement Period (Daily Scan)	Domains	
		Total	Percent w/ DNSKEY
.com	2015/03/01 ~ 2019/06/19	140,438,505	
.net	2015/03/01 ~ 2019/06/19	13,408,301	
.org	2015/03/01 ~ 2019/06/19	10,066,388	
.nl	2016/02/09 ~ 2019/06/19	5,860,418	
.se	2016/06/07 ~ 2019/06/19	1,450,441	

## [1] Registry: Financial Incentive




Financial Incentive Financial gain is a huge incentive for deploying DNSSEC

## [2] Registrar: Free vs. Paid






Free DNSSEC support encourages users to deploy DNSSEC




Registrar vs. Reseller

Complex relationship between reseller and registrar also result in slow deployment of DNSSEC

## [4] Third-Party DNS Operator



## [4] Third-Party DNS Operator <Cloudflare>



Third-party DNS Operator Deploying DNSSEC is even harder for users using third-party DNS Operators

## Conclusion

- Registrars play a critical role in supporting DNSSEC today
  - Only 5 out of 20 registrars support DNSSEC on their authoritative nameservers
  - 15 out of 20 registrars support uploading a custom DS record
  - Comparing to 2017 it has been improved, but it requires more effort
- DNSSEC deployment depends on many policies
  - Registrar: Free
  - **Registry:** Financial incentive
  - Reseller: Beware to choose a partner (i.e., registrar)
  - Third-party: CDS/CDNSKEY