

# Trials and tribulations of migrating to IETF QUIC

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# Where is Google/Chrome now?

gQUIC v46 is default enabled, v39 and v43 are still supported on the server

Invariants-3 compatible with transport-19 packet types

Future version will be invariants-4 compatible

V46 only supports 8 byte CIDs client -> server and 0 byte server -> client

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This talk is about v43 -> v46 (invariants-03)

Public Reset ->  
Connection Close + Stateless Reset

# Why is changing public reset hard?

**Issue:** LOTS of spots sent a public reset, each one had to be fixed

**Why does it matter?:** Handshake timeouts and idle timeouts are MUCH longer than sending a close/reset, so connections were stuck until they timed out if no packet or the wrong packet was sent.

# When to send what?

gQUIC:

If no state, always send a “public reset”

IETF QUIC:

If short header and no state, send a Stateless Reset

If long header and no state and it's Initial, try to create a connection

If long header and no state and it's Handshake, send an Initial close

If the version is not supported, send VN

QUIC identification


# v46: Large increase in post-handshake blackholing

v46 blackholing  
almost 2x of v43



# v46: Large increase in post-handshake blackholing

Suddenly improved  
April ~13th!  
Not server  
Not Chrome  
?



# What is TOO\_MANY\_RTOs?

On the 5th RTO, close the connection

Enabled by default on Chrome Desktop

Definitely a heuristic, but it's better than nothing

A great proxy for sudden blackholing

But when were the connections being blackholed?


Note: gQUIC 5 RTOs  $\approx$  7 PTOs because our 5 RTOs are after 2 TLPs are sent

# When in a connection?

HUGE spike of TOO\_MANY\_RTOS at 2, 3 and 4 packets

Almost identical from 7 packets

# of packets received before TOO\_MANY\_RTOS



# Turned out to be middlebox QUIC identification

Suddenly improved when a vendor updated their QUIC identification

Most users updated weekly, but some updated less frequently (ie: quarterly)

This caused a multi-week issue which was eventually diagnosed

## How to block QUIC\*

If QUIC is going to be blocked, ensure all packets in at least one direction are completely blocked.

Anything else is likely **very** user visible

\*Or likely any other connection based transport

# Antivirus QUIC blocking

Suddenly, QUIC usage among Windows users dropped measurably!

Eventually traced it to a single AV company

At the time, v46 was not blocked

v46 was default enabled, and then v46 was blocked :(

# Slight change in SNI location

People have started inspecting gQUIC SNI in some locations

Most haven't told us, so breakage is a real risk as gQUIC -> IETF QUIC

Realistically, there are 2+ more versions before final IETF QUIC

# What's Next?

CRYPTO frames, Invariants-5, TLS 1.3, header protection, etc

gQUIC is now closer to IETF QUIC, with many changes to go

Some are visible to passive observers, so something will break...