RPC-on-TLS Next Steps

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Goals of RPC-on-TLS

- Increase the deployment rate of NFS with encryption
 - Make it significantly simpler for administrators to deploy NFS with privacy and data integrity
 - Reduce the performance cost of using privacy
- Improve security of NFS with AUTH_SYS, which is still widely deployed

Primary Benefits

- In-transit privacy When a server possesses a certificate, clients can authenticate servers, and can enable transport layer encryption
- Machine authentication When each client possesses a certificate, servers can authenticate clients to determine whether:
 - A client may have access to an export, or
 - A client's AUTH_SYS user identities are trustworthy

Secondary Benefits

- Channel security protects the whole data stream rather than a portion of each RPC message
- Hardware offload of encryption is enabled
- User identities can be administered independently of machine identities – combination of GSS, SYS, certs, etc.
- Eventually support transports that have in-built encryption and machine authentication capabilities; *e.g.*, QUIC

Current Prototypes

- DESY prototype of NFSv4 client and server (complete)
- Linux kernel NFS client and server prototype (in progress)

Future Work

- A new document that details of NFSv4 operation on RPCon-TLS
 - Possibly bind the lease management credential with the transport credential
- A new document that specifies an RPC-on-QUIC transport
 - QUIC has TLS built into the transport

Next Steps

- Add a charter milestone including a delivery date target
- Review by other area experts or another SecDir review
- Further detail regarding machine authentication
- More text focusing on weaknesses of AUTH_SYS and how they are to be addressed
- Present a threat model and security analysis