

# Group OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments Framework

draft-tiloca-ace-group-oscore-profile-01

**Marco Tiloca**, RISE  
Rikard Höglund, RISE  
Ludwig Seitz, RISE  
Francesca Palombini, Ericsson

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# Motivation (1/3)

- › Application scenarios with group communication
  - Group OSCORE provides security also over multicast
  - What about access control for resources at group members ?
- › For very simple use cases
  - Straightforward and plain access control may be just fine
  - Joining the security group is enough to access resources
  - Any group member can do anything at any other group members' resource
- › For more complicated use cases
  - Different clients should have different access rights
  - Creating (many) more groups poorly scales and is hard to manage

# Motivation (2/3)

- › Simple groups of smart locks
  - Some clients should only check the lock status
  - Some clients can both check and change the lock status
  - The smart locks should be servers only, i.e. cannot lock/unlock each other
- › Building automation (BACnet, thanks Dave!)
  - Light switch (Class C1): issue only low-priority commands
  - Fire panel (Class C2): issue all commands, set/unset high-priority level
  - C1 cannot override C2 commands, until C2 relinquishes high-priority control
  - Goal 1: limit execution of high-priority commands to C2 clients only
  - Goal 2: prevent a compromised C1 client to lock-out normal control
- › Use ACE to enforce fine-grained access control. However ...

# Motivation (3/3)

- › Every current profile of ACE
  - Does not cover secure group communication between C and RSs
  - Relies on a single security protocol between C and RS
  
- › OSCORE profile
  - C and RS must use OSCORE
  - The Token is bound to the OSCORE Security Context
  - Group OSCORE is simply not admitted
  
- › We cannot use Group OSCORE and ACE-based access control of resources

# Contribution

- › New Group OSCORE profile of ACE
  - Builds on the OSCORE profile v -08
  - Admits two security protocols: OSCORE and Group OSCORE
  - Assumes that C and RS have already joined a same OSCORE group
- › Outcomes
  - Pairwise OSCORE Security Context **ctx**
  - Token bound to both **ctx** and the Group OSCORE Security Context **g\_ctx**
  - **ctx** is bound to **g\_ctx** , i.e. **ctx** derivation relies also on **g\_ctx** parameters
- › Properties
  - Proof-of-Possession of the OSCORE Master Secret in the Token
  - Server Authentication (through OSCORE or Group OSCORE)
  - Proof-of-Group-Membership for that exact Client (Token bound also to **g\_ctx**)

# Overview – Δs from OSCORE profile

- › The C-to-AS Access Token Request includes also:
  - ‘salt’: **Sender ID** (‘kid’) of the Client in the OSCORE group
  - ‘context\_id’: **Group ID** (‘kid\_context’) of the OSCORE group
  - ‘client\_cred’: Client’s **public key** in the OSCORE group
  - ‘client\_cred\_verify’: Client’s **signature**

- › Signature in ‘client\_cred\_verify’
  - Computed with the signing key in the OSCORE group

- › What does the Client sign?
  - If **(D)TLS** is used between C and AS, sign an exporter value (Section 7.5 of RFC 8446)
  - If **OSCORE** is used between C and AS, sign PRK = HMAC-Hash(x1 | x2, IKM)
    - › x1 = Context ID of the C-AS context ; x2 = Sender ID of C in the C-AS context
    - › IKM = OSCORE Master Secret of the C-AS context

```
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "audience" : "tempSensor4711",
  "scope" : "read",
  "salt" : h'00',
  "context_id" : h'abcd0000',
  "client_cred" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : EC2,
      "crv" : P-256,
      "x" : h'd7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eccd890c7fa
          27c9e354089bbe13',
      "y" : h'f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22afb725d535e515d020
          731e79a3b4e47120'
    }
  },
  "client_cred_verify" : h'...'
}
```

Access Token Request

# Overview – Δs from OSCORE profile

- › The AS-to-C Access Token Response includes also:
  - Namesake parameters of the OSCORE Sec Ctx Object
  - Same OSCORE Sec Ctx Object in the Access Token
- › The Access Token includes also:
  - ‘client\_cred’: Client’s public key in the OSCORE Group
- › Token POST and response
  - Exchange of nonces N1 and N2 as in the OSCORE profile
  - RS can check the public key of C with the Group Manager
  - RS stores {Access Token; Sender ID; Group ID; C Public Key}
  - Another group member cannot impersonate C (thanks, Jim!)

```
Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "access_token" : h'a5037674656d7053656e73 ...'
  (remainder of access token omitted for brevity),
  "profile" : "coap_group_oscore",
  "expires_in" : 3600,
  "cnf" : {
    "OSCORE_Security_Context" : {
      "alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128",
      "clientId" : b64'qA',
      "serverId" : b64'Qg',
      "ms" : h'f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f',
      "salt" : h'00',
      "context_id" : h'abcd0000'
    }
  }
}
```

**Access Token Response**

```
{
  "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "iat" : "1360189224",
  "exp" : "1360289224",
  "scope" : "temperature_g firmware_p",
  "cnf" : {
    "OSCORE_Security_Context" : {
      "alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128",
      "clientId" : 'client',
      "serverId" : 'server',
      "ms" : h'f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f',
      "salt" : h'00',
      "context_id" : h'abcd0000'
    }
  },
  "client_cred" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : EC2,
      "crv" : P-256,
      "x" : h'd7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eccd890c7fa
        27c9e354089bbe13',
      "y" : h'f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22afb725d535e515d020
        731e79a3b4e47120'
    }
  }
}
```

**Access Token**


# Overview – $\Delta$ s from OSCORE profile

- › Derivation of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context **ctx**
  - Extended parameters, through more concatenations
  - Use also information related to the OSCORE Group
- › **Context ID** =  $\langle \text{Group ID of the OSCORE group} \rangle | N1 | N2$ 
  - The **Group ID of the OSCORE group** is also in the Access Token, as 'context\_id'
- › **Salt** =  $\langle \text{Sender ID of C in the OSCORE group} \rangle | N1 | N2 | \langle \text{Master Salt in the OSCORE group} \rangle$ 
  - The **Sender ID of C in the OSCORE group** is also in the Access Token, as 'salt'
  - The **Master Salt in the OSCORE group** is known to C and RS as group members
- › **Master Secret** =  $\langle \text{OSCORE Master Secret} \rangle | \langle \text{Master Secret of the OSCORE group} \rangle$ 
  - The OSCORE Master Secret is in the Access Token, as 'ms' like in the OSCORE profile
  - The **Master Secret of the OSCORE group** is known to C and RS as group members




# C – RS1 pairing

**0**: Sender ID ('kid') of C in the OSCORE group  
**abcd0000**: Group ID ('kid\_context') of the OSCORE group




# C – RS2 pairing

0: Sender ID ('kid') of C in the OSCORE group  
abcd0000: Group ID ('kid\_context') of the OSCORE group



# C – {RS1,RS2}

**0**: Sender ID ('kid') of C in the OSCORE group  
**abcd0000**: Group ID ('kid\_context') of the OSCORE group



**C can access RS1 and RS2 resources, as per the posted Access Token, using OSCORE or Group OSCORE**

# Summary

- › New ACE profile for secure group communication
  - Two security protocols: OSCORE and Group OSCORE
  - The pairwise context and group context are bound to each other
  - The Access Token is bound also to the group context
  
- › Benefits
  - Enables Group OSCORE together with ACE-based access control
  - Builds on the OSCORE profile and its context derivation
  
- › Need for document reviews

Thank you!

Comments/questions?

<https://gitlab.com/crimson84/draft-tiloca-ace-group-oscore-profile>