




Security Considerations for Deterministic Networking

Draft Update IETF 106 Singapore 2019

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
DetNet Security Considerations

Scope



- Draft: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-detnet-security/>
- Scope
 - A reference/toolkit for those who have not built time-sensitive networks before
 - Exclusively addresses time-related threats
 - Other DetNet drafts address draft-topic-specific considerations then refer here (as informational)


DetNet Security Considerations Status



- Status
 - Data plane technology-independent sections
 - Mature, but still some editing and a few small sections to fill in
 - IP- and MPLS-specific sections
 - No unique threats identified – discussion on this later
 - TSN-specific section
 - Not started
 - Security-related statements from Use Cases
 - Update? Delete?


DetNet Security Considerations

Discussion and Next Steps



- Discussion
 - Data plane technology-specific threats - are we missing something?
 - There will be more data planes – so maybe that info should not be in here?
 - Security-related statements from Use Cases – Update? Delete?
 - SecDir review – before or after WG LC?
- Next Steps
 - Finish edits, add any new material
 - Working Group Last Call

DetNet Security Considerations





- The End
- Remaining slides are optional, a brief overview of the draft

DetNet Security Considerations

- Security Considerations draft as "toolkit"
 - Attackers
 - Attacks
 - Impacts
 - Mitigations
 - Table of attacks to impacts and mitigation
 - Table of use cases to relevant attacks

Attacker Types

[Based on RFC 7384]



Attacks

Attack	Attacker Type			
	Internal MITM	External Inj.	Internal MITM	External Inj.
Delay attack	+		+	
Replication: Increased Attack Surface	+	+	+	+
Path Manipulation	+	+		
Packet Modification / Injection	+	+		
Reconnaissance	+		+	
Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms	+	+	+	+

(and others)

Impact of Recon and Delay Attacks

Control Plane

- Reconnaissance
- Monitor changes in the network
 - Monitor flows and their IDs
 - Identify controllers

- Delay attacks
- Resource exhaustion (removing old links delayed)
 - Reduces QoS (creating new links delayed)
 - Denial of Service (due to exhaustion, not enough to form new link)
 - Loss of privacy (data sent to old target)

Data Plane

- Identify active targets
 - Determine type of targets based on observed stream parameters.
 - Find opportune moment to conduct final attack
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- Increased buffering in bridges
 - Elimination nodes consume more resources
 - Skew path metrics
 - Outage (single path)

Mitigations

Mitigation Method

- Path redundancy
- Integrity protection
- DetNet node authentication
- Encryption
- Control message protection
- Performance analytics

Relevant Attack(s)

- Man-in-the-middle attacks
- Modification/tampering
- Spoofing
- Recon
- Control plane attacks
- Resource exhaustion attacks

Mapping Attacks to Impacts / Mitigations

Attack	Impact	Mitigations
Delay Attack	-Non-deterministic delay -Data disruption -Increased resource consumption	-Path redundancy -Performance analytics
DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing	-Increased resource consumption -Data disruption	-Path redundancy -Integrity protection -DetNet Node authentication

(etc)

Mapping Attacks to Use Case Themes

Theme	Attack										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Network Layer - AVB/TSN Eth.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Central Administration							+	+	+	+	+
Hot Swap			+	+							+
Data Flow Information Models											
L2 and L3 Integration						+	+				