

***CTLS***

draft-rescorla-tls-ctls-03

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# WHAT PROBLEMS WE ARE TRYING TO SOLVE?

- Legacy cruft in TLS 1.3 handshake
- Ability to have reduced profiles of TLS
  - Small wire and size for constrained applications
  - “Simple” TLS for applications which don’t need the entire feature set (e.g., 0-RTT)
- Clearer separation between handshake and record layer
  - Allow handshake to be used with other record layers (e.g., QUIC)

Many of these were issues we punted out of 1.3

# MOTIVATING USE CASES

- QUIC
- ATLS
- LAKE
- EAP

## TWO (AND A HALF) TECHNICAL PIECES

- Clean up the handshake messages a bit
- A specialization mechanism for describing subsets of TLS
- More clearly delineate how to plug handshake into new record layers

# CLEAN UP HANDSHAKE MESSAGES


- Replace all integers with varints
- Remove some unnecessary "legacy" fields
  - E.g., `session_id`
- Remove handshake message length from Handshake framing
  - All messages are already self-describing

One difficulty: backward compatibility

# SPECIALIZATION MECHANISM

- TLS is a general protocol
  - But not everyone wants all the flexibility
- *General idea: monomorphize along individual axes (e.g., version)*
  - Nail down the value of that axis
  - Remove on-the-wire representation of the negotiation point for that axis
  - Transcript is *reconstructed* to include what would have been sent
- **Specialization with forward-compatibility**
  - Remove unneeded extensions ... but otherwise allow extensions
  - Compress known certificates ... but also allow unknown certificates

# ONE WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THIS



# JSON SYNTAX

- Specializations are defined in a JSON syntax
- Partly just a formalism
- But also provides a machine readable form so you could automatically monomorphize
- Should we define a canonical wire encoding/defined profiles, etc.?



## EXAMPLE: JSON SYNTAX

```
{  
  "version" : 772,  
  "cipherSuite" : "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"  
}
```

- This means "do only TLS 1.3 with AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256"
- Omit "supported\_versions" and "cipher\_suites" fields on the wire
- Decompressed transcript has single-valued fields

# PREDEFINED EXTENSIONS

- Predefined extensions don't appear on the wire
  - Generally just defined as fixed hex strings
  - But do appear in the transcript
- Otherwise extensions are encoded as usual
- All extensions have to appear in code point order
  - Except for PSK, obviously!
  - This is a change from TLS 1.3
  - ... but it's compatible

# EXTENDED EXAMPLE

```
{
  "version": 772,
  "cipherSuite": "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256",
  "dhGroup": "X25519",
  "signatureAlgorithm": "ECDSA_P256_SHA256",
  "randomSize": 8,
  "finishedSize": 8,
  "clientHelloExtensions": {
    "server_name": "000e00000b6578616d706c652e636f6d",
  },
  "certificateRequestExtensions": {
    "signature_algorithms": "00020403"
  },
}
```

# KNOWN CERTIFICATES

- A map of certificates in hex and a short nickname
- Nickname just gets encoded in the CertificateEntry field
  - This means they need to be distinguishable from certs
  - Make them short, don't start with 0x30, etc.
- Expanded in the transcript like everything else

# INITIAL PERFORMANCE NUMBERS (SHORT FINISHED, RANDOM)

	ECDHE			PSK		
	TLS	CTLS	Overhead	TLS	CTLS	Overhead
ClientHello	132	50	10	147	67	15
ServerHello	90	48	8	56	18	2
ServerFlight	478	104	16	42	12	3
ClientFlight	458	100	11	36	10	1
=====						
Total	1158	302	45	280	107	21

# HANDSHAKE/RECORD LAYER SEPARATION

- These are nominally separate but actually tied together
- QUIC separates them
  - TLS 1.3 handshake
  - Its own record layer
- Plan: firm up the interface and requirements on the "record layer"
  - Really retconning what happened in QUIC

**ADOPT AS WG DRAFT?**