DoH and DoT Server Discovery

& Deployment Considerations for Home and Mobile Networks

draft-btw-add-home

IETF 107 -- March 2020

M. Boucadair (Orange) T. Reddy (McAfee) D. Wing (Citrix) N. Cook (Open-Xchange)

Agenda

- Scope & Objectives
- Target DoT/DoH deployments
- Which discovery information?
- The discovery procedure
- Rogue servers
- DoH-specific: one pending issue
- Next steps

Scope

Excerpt from the ADD WG Charter:

"Define a mechanism that allows clients to discover DNS resolvers that support encryption and that are available to the client either on the public Internet or on private or local networks."

Objectives

- Discuss DoT/DoH deployment considerations for home networks
 - Both Home and Mobile networks
 - ISP, public, and private resolvers
 - Enterprise networks are out of scope
- Specify the required server discovery mechanism(s)
- Sketch the required steps to use DoT/DoH capabilities provided by local networks

Sample Encrypted DNS Deployments: Managed CPEs





DoT/DoH: Means DoT and/or DoH

Sample Encrypted DNS Deployments: Unmanaged CPEs



Necessary Discovery Information



Discovery Channel



Verified Resolver: Detecting Rogue Server (1/2)



draft-btw-add-home

Verified Resolver: Detecting Rogue Server (2/2)

Host notices rogue server address and ADN are not pre-configured as verified resolver. Rogue server will not be used. Ntw# А Α Internet **ISP** CPE DoT Serve DoF **Attack Server** Serve

Verified Resolvers

- Auto-upgrade
 - If the DNS server's IP address discovered using DHCP/RA is preconfigured in the OS or Browser as a verified resolver, the DNS client auto-upgrades to use the pre-configured DoH/DoT server tied to the discovered DNS server IP address
 - If the ADN (RFC8310) conveyed in DHCP/RA is pre-configured in the OS or browser as a verified resolver, the DNS client autoupgrades to establish a DoH/DoT session with the ADN
- Other approaches are discussed in the draft, e.g.,
 - If the discovered DoH/DoT server is not pre-configured in the OS or browser, the client may validate the signatory (e.g., cryptographically attested by the ISP)

ISP DoH Redirect to CPE DoH

- Offload DoH traffic from ISP DoH
- Local DoH = better round-trip time

 HTTP redirect to send host to ISP-managed CPE

ISP DNS Redirect to CPE DNS



DoH Services & URI Templates

- Why?
 - RFC8484 supports URI templates with "dns" as the only variable, but future extensions may allow for queries with other variables
 - DoH resolvers may host many services; each identified by a URI scheme
 - DoH clients have to be instructed about valid URI templates to use
- How?
 - retrieved by querying a discovered DoH resolver
 - enclosed in a dedicated RA/DHCP option
- How the client uses these services is out of scope draft-btw-add-home

URI Templates in RA/DHCP

Trade-offs detailed in document

<u>Issues</u>

- Risk of stale information
- Dependency between DHCP servers (access routers) and DoH resolvers
- Fails if DoH resolver is not managed by the ISP
- Larger RA/DHCP messages

Advantages

- Clients can immediately use the service(s)
- Convenient if very few (stable)
 URIs are in use
- Per-host policy (See next slide)

Need discussion to choose approach

Customized DHCP Configuration: Example filtering child's device



draft-btw-add-home

Implementation

 Ported DNSDist v1.4.0 with DoT/DoH support to OpenWRT-19.07

Extended DNSDist to do DoT/DoH in the upstream (CPE to resolver)

Next Steps draft-btw-add-home

- More feedback URI Templates discovery
- Consider adopting this document as a WG item

• Questions?

Appendix

draft-btw-add-home

Host a Forwarder in a Managed CPE



- Certificates are managed by the **ISP**
- ACME fully automates certificate management (e.g., certificate issuance, expiry etc.) and **no human intervention is required**
- ACME and <u>https://letsencrypt.org/</u> (to generate certificates for millions of home routers) are already in place by some security vendors. No roadblocks is reported so far
 - Certificates are pushed by ISPs to the CPEs

Multi-Interface Devices: Out of Scope



Do53 for Redirect: Not a Threat

