

DRIP Identity Claims

draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00

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
DRIP WG – IETF 107; March 25, 2020

Overview

- Claim vs Certificate
 - Claim was chosen as “certificate” has a pre-establish connotation
 - Legal and technology baggage with the term and want to avoid confusion
 - This decision is in flux and we would like feedback on it!
- Special to the UAS ecosystem for Remote ID
 - Asserts bindings between entities and objects
 - Created during provisioning of UA/Operator/Registry


Form Cxx

- Self-signed unverified claim
- Used to assert binding of HHIT/HI to a given entity (x)
 - Contains: HHIT, HI, Expiration Timestamp, Signature
 - 116 bytes in length
- Three specific claims:
 - Aircraft on Aircraft (Caa)
 - Operator on Operator (Coo)
 - Registry on Registry (Crr)
- Used in other claim forms



Form Cxy

- Asserts binding between two entities (x and y)
 - Generally 'x' is an entity attesting 'y's claim (or adding a relationship)
 - Contains: Cxx, Cyy, Timestamp, Expiration Timestamp, Signature
 - 304/608 bytes in length
- 3 specific claims of this form:
 - Registry on Operator (Cro)
 - Operator on Aircraft (Coa)
 - Registry on Operator on Aircraft (Croa)




Claim: Registry on Aircraft

- Special as it is used in authentication messages of Broadcast RID
 - Contains: HHIT of Registry, Caa, Expiration Timestamp, Signature
 - 200 bytes long
- Asserts the binding between a Registry and Aircraft




Provisioning: Operator

- Keypair generation
- HHIT derived from HI (public half of keypair)
 - Select Registry and use RRA/HDA to format valid HHIT
- Create Coo, send to Registry
- Registry perform verification check and adds HHIT/HI to DNS in the form of HIP RR
 - Verification check MUST include looking for HHIT collisions in current database of Registered HHITs
- Registry if successful, creates Cro and sends it back to Operator
- Registry if failed, sends error back asking to start over



Provisioning: Aircraft

- Keypair generation
- HHIT derived from HI (public half of keypair)
 - Registry selected and RRA/HDA used to format valid HHIT
- Create Caa, create Coa
- Send Caa, Coa to Registry
- Registry perform verification check and adds HHIT/HI to DNS in the form of HIP RR
 - Verification check MUST include looking for HHIT collisions in current database of Registered HHITs
- Registry if successful, creates Croa, Cra and sends them back
- Registry if failed, sends error back asking to start over



Responsible Behavior



Title text: Never bring tequila to a key-signing party.

<https://xkcd.com/364/>

Discussion

Questions, Comments, Concerns?