




## Current state

- Web security depends on TLS connections
- Service Workers aim to support transitions from online to offline
  - Lots of push messaging, not as much offline content
- Two main drivers for real offline solutions
  - Lots of people who aren't online much
  - Interest in new content delivery methods



## Basic problem

- User finds USB drive in car park
- User plugs said USB drive into their computer
- Content arrives by something other than TLS
- Content needs to be usable
- User later goes online
- Content needs to be more usable after



# The state problem

- The Web is a communications medium
- So assume that use of the Web offline means someone wants to communicate later
- Typically state about what happened is saved
- When someone goes online,
  that state has to be available for use








# Option 1: Take Web origins offline

- In short, don't sign connections, sign content
- A bundling format is critical
  - o It's largely uncontroversial, even good
  - It's just an XKCD 927 problem
- Just sign the bundle... right?






https://example.com




## Limitations

- It is hard to know what is safe to sign
- Potential weakening of the basis of authority
  - DNS lookups are seen as a weak second factor
- Revocation status cannot be communicated
  - Over-signing, compromise, or certificate mississuance all lead to a need to revoke
  - Bugs are exposed to exploitation by attackers
  - Content has a limited shelf-life to compensate
- A bunch of other minor issues



# Option 2 (Proposal): Give content its own origin


- State for bundled content is saved in a store that is specific to that bundle
  - The identity of that origin can be meaningless
- A bundle can identify a target origin
- The target origin can accept the bundle
  - Content and state is transferred if successful
  - Origin aliases provide additional continuity
- A transfer can be rejected by a site






## Transfer


- The bundle can designate a target URL
- The bundle requests a transfer to that URL
- The browser fetches the URL with a challenge
- olf the site answers the challenge correctly...
  - Navigation to the target URL happens
  - State is transferred to the target origin
  - The content origin is aliased to the target origin
  - Content from the bundle can be used in place of making requests (performance gain)






## Failed Transfer

- A failed transfer keeps the content origin
  - HTTP 503, connection failures, being offline still
- A rejected transfer is when the server fails the challenge sent by the browser
  - Manifests as a navigation to the target URL
  - No continuity
  - Navigation information passing options only: URL and maybe Referer
  - Useful if server believes content is somehow bad



### Limitations

- Content can't be attributed to its target origin
  - Content has a "potential" origin
  - This is really hard to explain
- Transition to online takes 1 round trip
- State transfer is non-trivial
  - One origin could have multiple bundles
  - Even 1:1 transfer is likely technically challenging
- Likely a bunch of minor issues



## AMP usage

- AMP delivers content to an online recipient
  - The recipient is effectively offline by choice
- AMP is an offline case for a very short time
- Transfer happens immediately
  - State is likely zero
  - State is only created in case of a failed transfer
- This case is likely much easier to handle





# Backup: Comparison

### **Signed Exchanges**

- Requires a bundle format that includes signatures
- Decision about continuity made up front
- Limitations on what can be signed
- Time limited usage
- Immediate transition

#### **Content Origin**

- Requires a bundle format
- Decision about continuity made afterwards
  - Potentially tricky transfers
  - And maybe state merges
- Limitations on what can be signed
- No(fewer?) usage limitations
- Transition requires a request
- Possibly strange UX