Abstract

Constrained Devices as they are used in the "Internet of Things" need security. One important element of this security is that devices in the Internet of Things need to be able to decide which operations requested of them should be considered authorized, need to ascertain that the authorization to request the operation does apply to the actual requester, and need to ascertain that other devices they place requests on are the ones they intended.

To transfer detailed authorization information from an authorization manager (such as an ACE-OAuth Authorization Server) to a device, a representation format is needed. This document provides a suggestion for such a format, the Authorization Information Format (AIF). AIF is defined both as a general structure that can be used for many different applications and as a specific refinement that describes REST resources and the permissions on them.

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1. Introduction

(See Abstract.)

1.1. Terminology

This memo uses terms from [RFC7252] and [RFC4949].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. These words may also appear in this document in lower case as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.
(Note that this document is itself informational, but it is discussing normative statements that MUST be put into concrete terms in each specification that makes use of this document.)

The term "byte", abbreviated by "B", is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

2. Information Model

Authorizations are generally expressed through some data structures that are cryptographically secured (or transmitted in a secure way). This section discusses the information model underlying the payload of that data (as opposed to the cryptographic armor around it).

For the purposes of this strawman, the underlying access control model will be that of an access matrix, which gives a set of permissions for each possible combination of a subject and an object. We do not concern the AIF format with the subject for which the AIF object is issued, focusing the AIF object on a single row in the access matrix (such a row traditionally is also called a capability list). As a consequence, AIF MUST be used in a way that the subject of the authorizations is unambiguously identified (e.g., as part of the armor around it).

The generic model of a such a capability list is a list of pairs of object identifiers and the permissions the subject has on the object(s) identified.

\[
\text{AIF-Generic}\langle \text{Toid}, \text{Tperm}\rangle = [* \left[ \text{Toid}, \text{Tperm}\right]]
\]

Figure 1: Definition of Generic AIF

In a specific data model, the object identifier ("Toid") will often be a text string, and the set of permissions ("Tperm") will be represented by a bitset in turn represented as a number (see Section 3).

\[
\text{AIF-Specific} = \text{AIF-Generic}\langle \text{tstr}, \text{uint}\rangle
\]

Figure 2: Likely shape of a specific AIF
2.1. REST-specific model

In the specific instantiation of the REST resources and the permissions on them, for the object identifiers ("Toid"), we simply use the URI of a resource on a CoAP server. More specifically, the parts of the URI that identify the server ("authority" in [RFC3986]) are considered the realm of the authentication mechanism (which are handled in the cryptographic armor); we therefore focus on the "path-absolute" and "query" parts of the URI (URI "local-part" in this specification, as expressed by the Uri-Path and Uri-Query options in CoAP). As a consequence, AIF MUST be used in a way that it is unambiguous who is the target (enforcement point) of these authorizations.

For the permissions ("Tperm"), we simplify the model permissions to giving the subset of the CoAP methods permitted. This model is summarized in Table 1.

```
+============+================+
| local-part | Permission Set |
+============+================+
| /s/light   | GET            |
+------------+----------------+
| /a/led     | PUT, GET       |
+------------+----------------+
| /dtls      | POST           |
+------------+----------------+
```

Table 1: An authorization instance in the AIF Information Model

2.2. Limitations

This simple information model only allows granting permissions for statically identifiable objects, e.g. URIs for the REST-specific instantiation. One might be tempted to extend the model towards URI templates [RFC6570], however, that requires some considerations of the ease and unambiguity of matching a given URI against a set of templates in an AIF object.

This simple information model also doesn’t allow further conditionalizing access based on state outside the identification of objects (e.g., "opening a door is allowed if that isn’t locked").
Finally, the model does not provide any special access for a set of resources that are specific to a subject, e.g. that the subject created itself by previous operations (PUT, POST) or that were specifically created for the subject by others.

2.3. Extended REST-specific model

The extended REST-specific model addresses the need to provide defined access to dynamic resources that were created by the subject itself, specifically, a resource that is made known to the subject by providing Location-* options in a CoAP result or using the Location header field in HTTP [RFC7231] (the Location-indicating mechanisms). (The concept is somewhat comparable to "ACL inheritance" in NFSv4 [rfc5661], except that it does not use a containment relationship but the fact that the dynamic resource was created from a resource to which the subject had access.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>local-part</th>
<th>Permission Set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/a/make-coffee</td>
<td>POST, Dynamic-GET, Dynamic-DELETE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: An authorization instance in the AIF Information Model

For a method X, the presence of a Dynamic-X permission means that the subject holds permission to exercise the method X on resources that have been returned by a Location-indicating mechanism to a request that the subject made to the resource listed ("/a/make-coffee" in the example, which might return the location of a resource that allows GET to find out about the status and DELETE to cancel the coffee-making operation).

Since the use of the extension defined in this section can be detected by the mentioning of the Dynamic-X permissions, there is no need for another explicit switch between the basic and the extended model; the extended model is always presumed once a Dynamic-X permission is present.

3. Data Model

Different data model specializations can be defined for the generic information model given above.
In this section, we will give the data model for basic REST authorization. As discussed, the object identifier is specialized as a text string giving a relative URI (local-part as absolute path on the server serving as enforcement point). The permission set is specialized to a single number by the following steps:

* The entries in the table that specify the same local-part are merged into a single entry that specifies the union of the permission sets.

* The (non-dynamic) methods in the permission sets are converted into their CoAP method numbers, minus 1.

* Dynamic-X permissions are converted into what the number would have been for X, plus a Dynamic-Offset chosen as 32 (e.g., 35 for Dynamic-DELETE).

* The set of numbers is converted into a single number by taking each number to the power of two and computing the inclusive OR of the binary representations of all the power values.

This data model could be interchanged in the JSON [RFC8259] representation given in Figure 3.

```
["/s/light", 1], ["/a/led", 5], ["/dtls", 2]
```

Figure 3: An authorization instance encoded in JSON (46 bytes)

In CDDL [RFC8610], a straightforward specification of the data model (including both the methods from [RFC7252] and the new ones from [RFC8132], identified by the method code minus 1) is:
AIF-REST = AIF-Generic<path, permissions>
path = tstr   ; URI relative to enforcement point
permissions = uint .bits methods
methods = &(
   GET: 0
   POST: 1
   PUT: 2
   DELETE: 3
   FETCH: 4
   PATCH: 5
   iPATCH: 6
   Dynamic-GET: 32; 0 .plus Dynamic-Offset
   Dynamic-POST: 33; 1 .plus Dynamic-Offset
   Dynamic-PUT: 34; 2 .plus Dynamic-Offset
   Dynamic-DELETE: 35; 3 .plus Dynamic-Offset
   Dynamic-FETCH: 36; 4 .plus Dynamic-Offset
   Dynamic-PATCH: 37; 5 .plus Dynamic-Offset
   Dynamic-iPATCH: 38; 6 .plus Dynamic-Offset
)

Figure 4: AIF in CDDL

A representation of this information in CBOR [RFC7049] is given in Figure 5; again, several optimizations/improvements are possible.

```
83                        # array(3)
82                     # array(2)
68                  # text(8)
2f732f6c69676874     # "/s/light"
01                  # unsigned(1)
82                     # array(2)
66                  # text(6)
2f612f6c6564       # "/a/led"
05                  # unsigned(5)
82                     # array(2)
65                  # text(5)
2f647466c73       # "/dtls"
02                  # unsigned(2)
```

Figure 5: An authorization instance encoded in CBOR (29 bytes)

Note that choosing 32 as Dynamic-Offset means that all future CoAP methods that can be registered can be represented both as themselves and in the Dynamic-X variant, but only the dynamic forms of methods 1 to 21 are typically usable in a JSON form [RFC7493].
4. Media Types

This specification defines media types for the generic information model, expressed in JSON ("application/aif+json") or in CBOR ("application/aif+cbor"). These media types have parameters for specifying "Toid" and "Tperm"; default values are the values "local-uri" for "Toid" and "REST-method-set" for "Tperm".

[A insert lots of boilerplate here]

A specification that wants to use Generic AIF with different "Toid" and/or "Tperm" is expected to request these as media type parameters (Section 5.2) and register a corresponding Content-Format (Section 5.3).

5. IANA Considerations

5.1. Media Types

See Section 4.

5.2. Registries

IANA is requested to create a registry for AIF with two sub-registries for "Toid" and "Tperm", populated with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregistry</th>
<th>name</th>
<th>Description/Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toid</td>
<td>local-part</td>
<td>local-part of URI as specified in [RFCthis]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tperm</td>
<td>REST-method-set</td>
<td>set of REST methods represented as specified in [RFCthis]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

The registration policy is Specification required [RFC8126]. The designated expert will engage with the submitter to ascertain the requirements of this document are addressed.

5.3. Content-Format

IANA is requested to register Content-Format numbers in the CoRE Parameters Registry [IANA.core-parameters], as follows:
6. Security Considerations

(TBD. Some issues are already discussed in the security considerations of [RFC7252] and in [RFC8576].)

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References

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Abstract

This document defines how to use the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework to distribute keying material and configuration parameters for secure group communication. Candidate group members acting as Clients and authorized to join a group can do so by interacting with a Key Distribution Center (KDC) acting as Resource Server, from which they obtain the keying material to communicate with other group members. While defining general message formats as well as the interface and operations available at the KDC, this document supports different approaches and protocols for secure group communication. Therefore, details are delegated to separate application profiles of this document, as specialized instances that target a particular group communication approach and define how communications in the group are protected. Compliance requirements for such application profiles are also specified.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-key-groupcomm.

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1. Introduction

This document builds on the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework and defines how to request, distribute and renew keying material and configuration parameters to protect message exchanges in a group communication environment.

Candidate group members acting as Clients and authorized to join a group can interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) acting as Resource Server and responsible for that group, in order to obtain the necessary keying material and parameters to communicate with other group members.

In particular, this document defines the operations and interface available at the KDC, as well as general message formats for the interactions between Clients and KDC. At the same time, communications in the group can rely on different approaches, e.g., based on multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] or on publish-subscribe messaging [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub], and can be protected in different ways.

Therefore, this document delegates details on the communication and security approaches used in a group to separate application profiles. These are specialized instances of this document, targeting a particular group communication approach and defining how communications in the group are protected, as well as the specific keying material and configuration parameters provided to group members. In order to ensure consistency and aid the development of such application profiles, this document defines a number of related compliance requirements (see Appendix A).
If the application requires backward and forward security, new keying material is generated and distributed to the group upon membership changes (rekeying). A group rekeying scheme performs the actual distribution of the new keying material, by rekeying the current group members when a new Client joins the group, and the remaining group members when a Client leaves the group. This can rely on different approaches, including efficient group rekeying schemes such as [RFC2093], [RFC2094] and [RFC2627].

Consistently with what is recommended in the ACE framework, this document uses CBOR [RFC8949] for data encoding. However, using JSON [RFC8259] instead of CBOR is possible, by relying on the conversion method specified in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of [RFC8949].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with:

* The terms and concepts described in the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and in the Authorization Information Format (AIF) [I-D.ietf-ace-aif] to express authorization information. The terminology for entities in the considered architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. In particular, this includes Client (C), Resource Server (RS), and Authorization Server (AS).

* The terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252]. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition, aimed at denoting resources such as /token and /introspect at the AS, and /authz-info at the RS. This document does not use the CoAP definition of "endpoint", which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol".

* The terms and concepts described in CBOR [RFC8949] and COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign].

A principal interested to participate in group communication as well as already participating as a group member is interchangeably denoted as "Client" or "node".
Furthermore, this document uses "names" or "identifiers" for groups and nodes. Their different meanings are summarized below.

* **Group**: a set of nodes that share common keying material and security parameters used to protect their communications with one another. That is, the term refers to a "security group".

This is not to be confused with an "application group", which has relevance at the application level and whose members share a common pool of resources or content. Examples of application groups are the set of all nodes deployed in a same physical room, or the set of nodes registered to a pub-sub topic.

The same security group might be associated to multiple application groups. Also, the same application group can be associated to multiple security groups. Further details and considerations on the mapping between the two types of group are out of the scope of this document.

* **Key Distribution Center (KDC)**: the entity responsible for managing one or multiple groups, with particular reference to the group membership and the keying material to use for protecting group communications.

* **Group name**: the invariant once established identifier of a group. It is used in the interactions between Client, AS and RS to identify a group. A group name is always unique among the group names of the existing groups under the same KDC.

* **GROUPNAME**: the invariant once established text string used in URIs. GROUPNAME uniquely maps to the group name of a group, although they do not necessarily coincide.

* **Group identifier**: the identifier of the group keying material used in a group. Unlike group name and GROUPNAME, this identifier changes over time, when the group keying material is updated.

* **Node name**: the invariant once established identifier of a node. It is used in the interactions between Client and RS and to identify a member of a group. Within the same group, a node name is always unique among the node names of all the current members of that group.

* **NODENAME**: the invariant once established text string used in URIs to identify a member a group. Its value coincides with the node name of the associated group member.

This document additionally uses the following terminology:
* Transport profile, to indicate a profile of ACE as per Section 5.8.4.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. A transport profile specifies the communication protocol and communication security protocol between an ACE Client and Resource Server, as well as proof-of-possession methods, if it supports proof-of-possession access tokens, etc. Transport profiles of ACE include, for instance, [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and [I-D.ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile].

* Application profile, that defines how applications enforce and use supporting security services they require. These services may include, for instance, provisioning, revocation and distribution of keying material. An application profile may define specific procedures and message formats.

2. Overview

The full procedure can be separated in two phases: the first one follows the ACE Framework, between Client, AS and KDC; the second one is the key distribution between Client and KDC. After the two phases are completed, the Client is able to participate in the group communication, via a Dispatcher entity.

```
+------------+               +-----------+
|     AS     |               |    KDC    |
+------------+       .-----+-----------+
                  /       +-----------+
                 ^       /           +-----------+
                /   /           /           +-----------+
               / v           /           /           +-----------+
              +------------+   /           +------------+         ||+-----------+
            ^             /           ^             /         |||   Group   |
            |             /           |             /         |||  members  |
            +---------------+       +---------------+         ||+++-----------+
```

Figure 1: Key Distribution Participants

The following participants (see Figure 1) take part in the authorization and key distribution.

* Client (C): node that wants to join a group and take part in group communication with other group members. Within the group, the Client can have different roles.

* Authorization Server (AS): as per the AS defined in the ACE Framework, it enforces access policies, and knows if a node is allowed to join a given group with write and/or read rights.
* Key Distribution Center (KDC): maintains the keying material to protect group communications, and provides it to Clients authorized to join a given group. During the first part of the exchange (Section 3), it takes the role of the RS in the ACE Framework. During the second part (Section 4), which is not based on the ACE Framework, it distributes the keying material. In addition, it provides the latest keying material to group members when requested or, if required by the application, when membership changes.

* Dispatcher: entity through which the Clients communicate with the group, when sending a message intended to multiple group members. That is, the Dispatcher distributes such a one-to-many message to the group members as intended recipients. A single-recipient message intended to only one group member may be delivered by alternative means, with no assistance from the Dispatcher.

Examples of a Dispatcher are: the Broker in a pub-sub setting; a relayer for group communication that delivers group messages as multiple unicast messages to all group members; an implicit entity as in a multicast communication setting, where messages are transmitted to a multicast IP address and delivered on the transport channel.

This document specifies a mechanism for:

* Authorizing a Client to join the group (Section 3), and providing it with the group keying material to communicate with the other group members (Section 4).

* Allowing a group member to retrieve group keying material (Section 4.8.1.1 and Section 4.8.2.1).

* Allowing a group member to retrieve public keys of other group members (Section 4.4.1.1) and to provide an updated public key (Section 4.9.1.1).

* Allowing a group member to leave the group (Section 5).

* Evicting a group member from the group (Section 5).

* Renewing and re-distributing the group keying material (rekeying) upon a membership change in the group (Section 4.8.3.1 and Section 5).

Figure 2 provides a high level overview of the message flow for a node joining a group. The message flow can be expanded as follows.
1. The joining node requests an access token from the AS, in order to access one or more group-membership resources at the KDC and hence join the associated groups.

   This exchange between Client and AS MUST be secured, as specified by the transport profile of ACE used between Client and KDC. Based on the response from the AS, the joining node will establish or continue using a secure communication association with the KDC.

2. The joining node transfers authentication and authorization information to the KDC, by transferring the obtained access token. This is typically achieved by including the access token in a request sent to the /authz-info endpoint at the KDC.

   Once this exchange is completed, the joining node MUST have a secure communication association established with the KDC, before joining a group under that KDC.

   This exchange and the following secure communications between the Client and the KDC MUST occur in accordance with the transport profile of ACE used between Client and KDC, such as the DTLS transport profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and OSCORE transport profile [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] of ACE.

3. The joining node starts the joining process to become a member of the group, by sending a request to the related group-membership resource at the KDC. Based on the application requirements and policies, the KDC may perform a group rekeying, by generating new group keying material and distributing it to the current group members through the rekeying scheme used in the group.

   At the end of the joining process, the joining node has received from the KDC the parameters and group keying material to securely communicate with the other group members. Also, the KDC has stored the association between the authorization information from the access token and the secure session with the joining node.

4. The joining node and the KDC maintain the secure association, to support possible future communications. These especially include key management operations, such as retrieval of updated keying material or participation to a group rekeying process.

5. The joining node can communicate securely with the other group members, using the keying material provided in step 3.
3. Authorization to Join a Group

This section describes in detail the format of messages exchanged by the participants when a node requests access to a given group. This exchange is based on ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

As defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the Client requests the AS for the authorization to join the group through the KDC (see Section 3.1). If the request is approved and authorization is granted, the AS provides the Client with a proof-of-possession access token and parameters to securely communicate with the KDC (see Section 3.2).

Communications between the Client and the AS MUST be secured, according to what is defined by the used transport profile of ACE. The Content-Format used in the message also depends on the used transport profile of ACE. For example, it can be application/ace+cbor for the first two messages and application/cwt for the third message, which are defined in the ACE framework.
The transport profile of ACE also defines a number of details such as the communication and security protocols used with the KDC (see Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

Figure 3 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
+----------------+  +----------------+  +----------------+
|                | AS |                | KDC |
| ---- Authorization Request: POST /token -------> |     |     |
|        |     |     |     |     |
| <--- Authorization Response: 2.01 (Created) ----|     |     |
|        |     |     |     |     |
| ---- Token Transfer Request: POST /authz-info -------> |     |     |
|        |     |     |     |     |
| <--- Token Transfer Response: 2.01 (Created) --------> |     |     |
```

Figure 3: Message Flow of Join Authorization

3.1. Authorization Request

The Authorization Request sent from the Client to the AS is defined in Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and MAY contain the following parameters, which, if included, MUST have format and value as specified below.

* 'scope', specifying the name of the groups that the Client requests to access, and optionally the roles that the Client requests to have in those groups.

This parameter is encoded as a CBOR byte string, which wraps a CBOR array of one or more scope entries. All the scope entries are specified according to a same format, i.e. either the AIF format or the textual format defined below.

- If the AIF format is used, each scope entry is encoded as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-aif]. The object identifier "Toid" corresponds to the group name and MUST be encoded as a CBOR text string. The permission set "Tperm" indicates the roles that the Client wishes to take in the group.

The AIF format is the default format for application profiles of this specification, and is preferable for those that aim to a compact encoding of scope. This is desirable especially for application profiles defining several roles, with the Client possibly requesting for multiple roles combined.
Figure 4 shows an example in CDDL notation [RFC8610] where scope uses the AIF format.

- If the textual format is used, each scope entry is a CBOR array formatted as follows.
  
  o As first element, the group name, encoded as a CBOR text string.
  
  o Optionally, as second element, the role or CBOR array of roles that the Client wishes to take in the group. This element is optional since roles may have been pre-assigned to the Client, as associated to its verifiable identity credentials. Alternatively, the application may have defined a single, well-known role for the target resource(s) and audience(s).

Figure 5 shows an example in CDDL notation where scope uses the textual format, with group name and role identifiers encoded as CBOR text strings.

It is REQUIRED of application profiles of this specificaton to specify the exact format and encoding of scope (REQ1). This includes defining the set of possible roles and their identifiers, as well as the corresponding encoding to use in the scope entries according to the used scope format.

If the application profile uses the AIF format, it is also REQUIRED to register its specific instance of "Toid" and "Tperm", as well as the corresponding Media Type and Content-Format, as per the guidelines in [I-D.ietf-ace-aif] (REQ2).

If the application profile uses the textual format, it MAY additionally specify CBOR values to use for abbreviating the role identifiers (OPT1).

* 'audience', with an identifier of the KDC.

As defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], other additional parameters can be included if necessary.
gname = tstr
permissions = uint . bits roles
roles = &(
    Requester: 1,
    Responder: 2,
    Monitor: 3,
    Verifier: 4
)
scope_entry = AIF_Generic<gname, permissions>
scope = << [ + scope_entry ] >>

Figure 4: Example of scope using the AIF format

gname = tstr
role = tstr
scope_entry = [ gname , ? ( role / [ 2*role ] ) ]
scope = << [ + scope_entry ] >>

Figure 5: Example of scope using the textual format, with the
group name and role identifiers encoded as text strings

3.2. Authorization Response

The AS processes the Authorization Request as defined in
Section 5.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], especially verifying
that the Client is authorized to access the specified groups with the
requested roles, or possibly a subset of those.

In case of successful verification, the Authorization Response sent
from the AS to the Client is also defined in Section 5.8.2 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Note that the parameter ‘expires_in’ MAY
be omitted if the application defines how the expiration time is
communicated to the Client via other means, or if it establishes a
default value.

Additionally, when included, the following parameter MUST have the
corresponding values:
* ‘scope’ has the same format and encoding of ‘scope’ in the Authorization Request, defined in Section 3.1. If this parameter is not present, the granted scope is equal to the one requested in Section 3.1.

The proof-of-possession access token (in ‘access_token’ above) MUST contain the following parameters:

* a confirmation claim (see for example ‘cnf’ defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] for CWT);

* an expiration time claim (see for example ‘exp’ defined in Section 3.1.4 of [RFC8392] for CWT);

* a scope claim (see for example ‘scope’ registered in Section 8.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] for CWT).

This claim specifies the same access control information as in the ‘scope’ parameter of the Authorization Response, if the parameter is present in the message, or as in the ‘scope’ parameter of the Authorization Request otherwise.

By default, this claim has the same encoding as the ‘scope’ parameter in the Authorization Request, defined in Section 3.1.

Optionally, an alternative extended format of scope defined in Section 7 can be used. This format explicitly signals the semantics used to express the actual access control information, and according to which this has to be parsed. This enables a Resource Server to correctly process a received access token, also in case:

- The Resource Server implements a KDC that supports multiple application profiles of this specification, using different scope semantics; and/or

- The Resource Server implements further services beyond a KDC for group communication, using different scope semantics.

If the Authorization Server is aware that this applies to the Resource Server for which the access token is issued, the Authorization Server SHOULD use the extended format of scope defined in Section 7.

The access token MAY additionally contain other claims that the transport profile of ACE requires, or other optional parameters.
When receiving an Authorization Request from a Client that was previously authorized, and for which the AS still owns a valid non-expired access token, the AS MAY reply with that token. Note that it is up to application profiles of ACE to make sure that re-posting the same token does not cause re-use of keying material between nodes (for example, that is done with the use of random nonces in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]).

3.3. Token Transferring

The Client sends a Token Transfer Request to the KDC, i.e., a CoAP POST request including the access token and targeting the authz-info endpoint (see Section 5.10.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

Note that this request deviates from the one defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], since it allows to ask the KDC for additional information concerning the public keys used in the group to ensure source authentication, as well as for possible additional group parameters.

The joining node MAY ask for this information from the KDC through the same Token Transfer Request. In this case, the message MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace+cbor defined in Section 8.16 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], and the message payload MUST be formatted as a CBOR map, which MUST include the access token. The CBOR map MAY additionally include the following parameter, which, if included, MUST have format and value as specified below.

* `sign_info` defined in Section 3.3.1, specifying the CBOR simple value `null` (0xf6) to request information about the signature algorithm, signature algorithm parameters, signature key parameters and about the exact encoding of public keys used in the groups that the Client has been authorized to join.

Alternatively, such information may be pre-configured on the joining node, or may be retrieved by alternative means. For example, the joining node may have performed an early group discovery process and obtained the link to the associated group-membership resource at the KDC, together with attributes descriptive of the group configuration (see, e.g., [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery]).

After successful verification, the Client is authorized to receive the group keying material from the KDC and join the group. Hence, the KDC replies to the Client with a Token Transfer Response, i.e., a CoAP 2.01 (Created) response.
The Token Transfer Response MUST have Content-Format "application/ace+cbor", and its payload is a CBOR map. Note that this deviates from what is defined in the ACE framework, where the response from the authz-info endpoint is defined as conveying no payload (see Section 5.10.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

If the access token contains a role that requires the Client to send its own public key to the KDC when joining the group, the CBOR map MUST include the parameter 'kdcchallenge' defined in Section 3.3.2, specifying a dedicated challenge N_S generated by the KDC.

Later, when joining the group (see Section 4.3.1.1), the Client uses the 'kdcchallenge' value and additional information to build a proof-of-possession (PoP) input. This is in turn used to compute a PoP evidence, which the Client also provides to the Group Manager in order to prove possession of its own private key (see the 'client_cred_verify' parameter in Section 4.3.1).

The KDC MUST store the 'kdcchallenge' value associated to the Client at least until it receives a Joining Request from it (see Section 4.3.1.1), to be able to verify the PoP evidence provided during the join process, and thus that the Client possesses its own private key.

The same 'kdcchallenge' value MAY be reused several times by the Client, to generate a new PoP evidence, e.g., in case the Client provides the Group Manager with a new public key while being a group member (see Section 4.9.1.1), or joins a different group where it intends to use a different public key. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the KDC keeps storing the 'kdcchallenge' value after the first join is processed as well. If the KDC has already discarded the 'kdcchallenge' value, that will trigger an error response with a newly generated 'kdcchallenge' value that the Client can use to restart the join process, as specified in Section 4.3.1.1.

If 'sign_info' is included in the Token Transfer Request, the KDC SHOULD include the 'sign_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response, as per the format defined in Section 3.3.1. Note that the field 'id' of each 'sign_info_entry' specifies the name, or array of group names, for which that 'sign_info_entry' applies to. As an exception, the KDC MAY omit the 'sign_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response even if 'sign_info' is included in the Token Transfer Request, in case none of the groups that the Client is authorized to join uses signatures to achieve source authentication.
Note that the CBOR map specified as payload of the 2.01 (Created) response may include further parameters, e.g., according to the used transport profile of ACE. Application profiles of this specification MAY define additional parameters to use within this exchange (OPT2).

Application profiles of this specification MAY define alternative specific negotiations of parameter values for the signature algorithm and signature keys, if ‘sign_info’ is not used (OPT3).

If allowed by the used transport profile of ACE, the Client may provide the Access Token to the KDC by other means than the Token Transfer Request. An example is the DTLS transport profile of ACE, where the Client can provide the access token to the KDC during the secure session establishment (see Section 3.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]).

3.3.1. ‘sign_info’ Parameter

The ‘sign_info’ parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the request and response messages exchanged between the Client and the authz-info endpoint at the RS (see Section 5.10.1. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

This parameter allows the Client and the RS to exchange information about a signature algorithm and about public keys to accordingly use for signature verification. Its exact semantics and content are application specific.

In this specification and in application profiles building on it, this parameter is used to exchange information about the signature algorithm and about public keys to be used with it, in the groups indicated by the transferred access token as per its ‘scope’ claim (see Section 3.2).

When used in the Token Transfer Request sent to the KDC (see Section 3.3), the ‘sign_info’ parameter specifies the CBOR simple value ‘null’ (0xf6). This is done to ask for information about the signature algorithm and about the public keys used in the groups that the Client has been authorized to join – or to have a more restricted interaction as per its granted roles (e.g., the Client is an external signature verifier).
When used in the following Token Transfer Response from the KDC (see Section 3.3), the 'sign_info' parameter is a CBOR array of one or more elements. The number of elements is at most the number of groups that the Client has been authorized to join - or to have a more restricted interaction (see above). Each element contains information about signing parameters and about public keys for one or more groups, and is formatted as follows.

* The first element 'id' is a group name or an array of group names, associated to groups for which the next four elements apply. In the following, each specified group name is referred to as 'gname'.

* The second element 'sign_alg' is an integer or a text string if the POST request included the 'sign_info' parameter with value the CBOR simple value 'null' (0xf6), and indicates the signature algorithm used in the groups identified by the 'gname' values. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define specific values that this parameter can take (REQ3), selected from the set of signing algorithms of the COSE Algorithms registry [COSE.Algorithms].

* The third element 'sign_parameters' is a CBOR array indicating the parameters of the signature algorithm used in the groups identified by the 'gname' values. Its content depends on the value of 'sign_alg'. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the possible values and structure for the elements of this parameter (REQ4).

* The fourth element 'sign_key_parameters' is a CBOR array indicating the parameters of the key used with the signature algorithm, in the groups identified by the 'gname' values. Its content depends on the value of 'sign_alg'. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the possible values and structure for the elements of this parameter (REQ5).

* The fifth element 'pub_key_enc' parameter is either a CBOR integer indicating the encoding of public keys used in the groups identified by the 'gname' values, or has value the CBOR simple value 'null' (0xf6) indicating that the KDC does not act as repository of public keys for group members. Its acceptable integer values are taken from the 'Label' column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry [COSE.Header.Parameters]. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define specific values to use for this parameter, consistently with the acceptable formats of public keys (REQ6).
The CDDL notation [RFC8610] of the 'sign_info' parameter is given below.

\[
\begin{align*}
sign_info & = \text{sign_info}_\text{req} / \text{sign_info}_\text{resp} \\
\text{sign_info}_\text{req} & = \text{nil} \quad ; \text{in the Token Transfer} \\
& \quad ; \text{Request to the KDC} \\
\text{sign_info}_\text{resp} & = [ + \text{sign_info}_\text{entry}] \quad ; \text{in the Token Transfer} \\
& \quad ; \text{Response from the KDC} \\
\text{sign_info}_\text{entry} & = \\
& [ \\
& \quad \text{id} : \text{gname} / [ + \text{gname}], \\
& \quad \text{sign_alg} : \text{int} / \text{tstr}, \\
& \quad \text{sign_parameters} : [ \text{any}], \\
& \quad \text{sign_key_parameters} : [ \text{any}], \\
& \quad \text{pub_key_enc} = \text{int} / \text{nil} \\
& ] \\
\text{gname} & = \text{tstr}
\end{align*}
\]

This format is consistent with every signature algorithm currently defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], i.e., with algorithms that have only the COSE key type as their COSE capability. Appendix B describes how the format of each ‘sign_info_entry’ can be generalized for possible future registered algorithms having a different set of COSE capabilities.

3.3.2. ‘kdcchallenge’ Parameter

The ‘kdcchallenge’ parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of response message returned from the authz-info endpoint at the RS, as defined in Section 5.10.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter contains a challenge generated by the RS and provided to the Client.

In this specification and in application profiles building on it, the Client may use this challenge to prove possession of its own private key in the Joining Request (see the ‘client_cred_verify’ parameter in Section 4.3.1).

4. KDC Functionalities

This section describes the functionalities provided by the KDC, as related to the provisioning of the keying material as well as to the group membership management.
In particular, this section defines the interface available at the KDC; specifies the handlers of each resource provided by the KDC interface; and describes how Clients interact with those resources to join a group and to perform additional operations as group members.

As most important operation after transferring the access token to the KDC, the Client can perform a "Joining" exchange with the KDC, by specifying the group it requests to join (see Section 4.3.1.1). Then, the KDC verifies the access token and that the Client is authorized to join the specified group. If so, the KDC provides the Client with the keying material to securely communicate with the other members of the group.

Later on as a group member, the Client can also rely on the interface at the KDC to perform additional operations, consistently with the roles it has in the group.

4.1. Interface at the KDC

The KDC provides its interface by hosting the following resources. Note that the root url-path "ace-group" used hereafter is a default name; implementations are not required to use this name, and can define their own instead. The Interface Description (if=) \Link Target \Attribute value "ace.group" is registered in Section 11.5 and can be used to describe this interface.

If request messages sent to the KDC as well as success response messages from the KDC include a payload and specify a Content-Format, those messages MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor, defined in Section 11.2. CBOR labels for the message parameters are defined in Section 8.

* /ace-group : this resource is invariant once established, and indicates that this specification is used. If other applications run on a KDC implementing this specification and use this same resource, those applications will collide, and a mechanism will be needed to differentiate the endpoints.

A Client can access this resource in order to retrieve a set of group names, each corresponding to one of the specified group identifiers. This operation is described in Section 4.2.1.1.

* /ace-group/GROUPNAME : one such sub-resource to /ace-group is hosted for each group with name GROUPNAME that the KDC manages, and contains the symmetric group keying material for that group.
A Client can access this resource in order to join the group with name GROUPNAME, or later as a group member to retrieve the current group keying material. These operations are described in Section 4.3.1.1 and Section 4.3.2.1, respectively.

If the value of the GROUPNAME URI path and the group name in the access token scope ('gname' in Section 3.2) are not required to coincide, the KDC MUST implement a mechanism to map the GROUPNAME value in the URI to the group name, in order to refer to the correct group (REQ7).

* /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key : this resource is invariant once established, and contains the public keys of all the members of the group with name GROUPNAME.

This resource is created only in case the KDC acts as repository of public keys for group members.

A Client can access this resource in order to retrieve the public keys of other group members, in addition to when joining the group. That is, the Client can retrieve the public keys of all the current group members, or a subset of them by specifying filter criteria. These operations are described in Section 4.4.2.1 and Section 4.4.1.1, respectively.

Clients may be authorized to access this resource even without being group members, e.g., if authorized to be external signature verifiers for the group.

* ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key : this resource is invariant once established, and contains the public key of the KDC for the group with name GROUPNAME.

This resource is created only in case the KDC has an associated public key and this is required for the correct group operation. It is REQUIRED of application profiles to define whether the KDC has such an associated public key (REQ8).

A Client can interact with this resource in order to retrieve the current public key of the KDC, in addition to when joining the group.

Clients may be authorized to access this resource even without being group members, e.g., if authorized to be external signature verifiers for the group.
* /ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies : this resource is invariant once established, and contains the group policies of the group with name GROUPNAME.

A Client can access this resource as a group member in order to retrieve the group policies. This operation is described in Section 4.6.1.1.

* /ace-group/GROUPNAME/num : this resource is invariant once established, and contains the current version number for the symmetric group keying material of the group with name GROUPNAME.

A Client can access this resource as a group member in order to retrieve the version number of the keying material currently used in the group. This operation is described in Section 4.7.1.1.

* /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME : one such sub-resource of /ace-group/GROUPNAME is hosted for each group member of the group with name GROUPNAME. Each of such resources is identified by the node name NODENAME of the associated group member, and contains the group keying material and the individual keying material for that group member.

A Client as a group member can access this resource in order to retrieve the current group keying material together with its the individual keying material; request new individual keying material to use in the group; and leave the group. These operations are described in Section 4.8.1.1, Section 4.8.2.1, and Section 4.8.3.1, respectively.

* /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key : this resource is invariant once established, and contains the individual public keying material for the node with name NODENAME, as group member of the group with name GROUPNAME.

A Client can access this resource in order to upload at the KDC a new public key to use in the group. This operation is described in Section 4.9.1.1.

This resource is not created if the group member does not have individual public keying material to use in the group, or if the KDC does not store the public keys of group members.
The KDC is expected to fully provide the interface defined above. It is otherwise REQUIRED of the application profiles of this specification to indicate which resources are not hosted, i.e., which parts of the interface defined in this section are not supported by the KDC (REQ9). Application profiles of this specification MAY extend the KDC interface, by defining additional resources and their handlers.

It is REQUIRED of the application profiles of this specification to register a Resource Type for the root url-path (REQ10). This Resource Type can be used to discover the correct url to access at the KDC. This Resource Type can also be used at the GROUPNAME sub-resource, to indicate different application profiles for different groups.

It is REQUIRED of the application profiles of this specification to define what specific actions (e.g., CoAP methods) are allowed on each resource provided by the KDC interface, depending on whether the Client is a current group member; the roles that a Client is authorized to take as per the obtained access token (see Section 3.1); and the roles that the Client has as current group member (REQ11).

4.1.1. Operations Supported by Clients

It is expected that a Client minimally supports the following set of primary operations and corresponding interactions with the KDC.

* FETCH request to ace-group/ , in order to retrieve group names associated to group identifiers.

* POST and GET requests to ace-group/GROUPNAME/ , in order to join a group (POST) and later retrieve the current group key material as a group member (GET).

* GET and FETCH requests to ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key , in order to retrieve the public keys of all the other group members (GET) or only some of them by filtering (FETCH). While retrieving public keys remains possible by using GET requests, retrieval by filtering allows to greatly limit the size of exchanged messages.

* GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/num , in order to retrieve the current version of the group key material as a group member.

* DELETE request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME , in order to leave the group.
In addition, some Clients may rather not support the following set of secondary operations and corresponding interactions with the KDC. This can be specified, for instance, in compliance documents defining minimalistic Clients and their capabilities in specific deployments. In turn, these might also have to consider the used application profile of this specification.

* GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key, in order to retrieve the current public key of the KDC, in addition to when joining the group. This is relevant only if the KDC has an associated public key and this is required for the correct group operation.

* GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies, in order to retrieve the current group policies as a group member, in addition to when joining the group.

* GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME, in order to retrieve the current group keying material and individual keying material. The former can also be retrieved through a GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/ (see above). The latter would not be possible to re-obtain as a group member.

* PUT request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME, in order to ask for new individual keying material. The Client would have to alternatively re-join the group through a POST request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/ (see above). Furthermore, depending on its roles in the group or on the application profile of this specification, the Client might simply not be associated to any individual keying material.

* POST request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key, in order to provide the KDC with a new public key. The Client would have to alternatively re-join the group through a POST request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/ (see above). Furthermore, depending on its roles in the group, the Client might simply not have an associated public key to provide.

It is REQUIRED of application profiles of this specification to categorize possible newly defined operations for Clients into primary operations and secondary operations, and to provide accompanying considerations (REQ12).

4.1.2. Error Handling

Upon receiving a request from a Client, the KDC MUST check that it is storing a valid access token from that Client. If this is not the case, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response.
Unless the request targets the /ace-group resource, the KDC MUST check that it is storing a valid access token from that Client such that:

* The scope specified in the access token includes a scope entry related to the group name GROUPNAME associated to targeted resource; and

* The set of roles specified in that scope entry allows the Client to perform the requested operation on the targeted resource (REQ11).

In case the KDC stores a valid access token but the verifications above fail, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. This response MAY be an AS Request Creation Hints, as defined in Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], in which case the Content-Format MUST be set to application/ace+cbor.

If the request is not formatted correctly (e.g., required fields are not present or are not encoded as expected), the handler MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response.

If the request includes unknown or non-expected fields, the handler MUST silently ignore them and continue processing the request. Application profiles of this specification MAY define optional or mandatory payload formats for specific error cases (OPT4).

Some error responses from the KDC can have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. In such a case, the payload of the response MUST be a CBOR map, which includes the following fields.

* ‘error’, with value a CBOR integer specifying the error occurred at the KDC. The value is taken from the "Value" column of the "ACE Groupcomm Errors" registry defined in Section 11.13 of this specification. This field MUST be present.

* ‘error_description’, with value a CBOR text string specifying a human-readable diagnostic description of the error occurred at the KDC, written in English. The diagnostic text is intended for software engineers as well as for device and network operators, in order to aid debugging and provide context for possible intervention. The diagnostic message SHOULD be logged by the KDC. This field MAY be present, and it is unlikely relevant in an unattended setup where human intervention is not expected.
The 'error' and 'error_description' fields are defined as OPTIONAL to support for Clients (see Section 8). A Client supporting the 'error' parameter and able to understand the specified error may use that information to determine what actions to take next.

Section 9 of this specification defines an initial set of error identifiers, as possible values for the 'error' field. Application profiles of this specification inherit this initial set or error identifiers and MAY define additional value (OPT5).

4.2. /ace-group

This resource implements the FETCH handler.

4.2.1. FETCH Handler

The FETCH handler receives group identifiers and returns the corresponding group names and GROUPNAME URIs.

The handler expects a request with payload formatted as a CBOR map, which MUST contain the following fields:

* 'gid', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing one or more group identifiers. The exact encoding of group identifier MUST be specified by the application profile (REQ13). The Client indicates that it wishes to receive the group names and GROUPNAMEs of all groups having these identifiers.

The handler identifies the groups that are secured by the keying material identified by those group identifiers.

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05 (Content) response, whose payload is formatted as a CBOR map that MUST contain the following fields:

* 'gid', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing zero or more group identifiers. The handler indicates that those are the identifiers it is sending group names and GROUPNAMEs for. This CBOR array is a subset of the 'gid' array in the FETCH request.

* 'gname', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing zero or more group names. The elements of this array are encoded as text strings. Each element of index i of this CBOR array corresponds to the element of group identifier i in the 'gid' array.
* ‘guri’, whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing zero or more URIs, each indicating a GROUPNAME resource. The elements of this array are encoded as text strings. Each element of index i of this CBOR array corresponds to the element of group identifier i in the ‘gid’ array.

If the KDC does not find any group associated to the specified group identifiers, the handler returns a response with payload formatted as a CBOR byte string of zero length.

Note that the KDC only verifies that the node is authorized by the AS to access this resource. Nodes that are not members of the group but are authorized to do signature verification on the group messages may be allowed to access this resource, if the application needs it.

4.2.1.1. Retrieve Group Names

In case the joining node only knows the group identifier of the group it wishes to join or about which it wishes to get update information from the KDC, the node can contact the KDC to request the corresponding group name and joining resource URI. The node can request several group identifiers at once. It does so by sending a CoAP FETCH request to the /ace-group endpoint at the KDC formatted as defined in Section 4.2.1.

Figure 6 gives an overview of the exchanges described above, and Figure 7 shows an example.

![Diagram](image-url)
Request:

Header: FETCH (Code=0.05)
Ur-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):
  { "gid": [01, 02] }

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):
  { "gid": [01, 02], "gname": ["group1", "group2"],
    "guri": ["ace-group/g1", "ace-group/g2"] }

Figure 7: Example of Group Name and URI Retrieval Request-Response

4.3. /ace-group/GROUPNAME

This resource implements the POST and GET and handlers.

4.3.1. POST Handler

The POST handler processes the Joining Request sent by a Client to join a group, and returns a Joining Response as successful result of the joining process (see Section 4.3.1.1). At a high level, the POST handler adds the Client to the list of current group members, adds the public key of the Client to the list of the group members' public keys, and returns the symmetric group keying material for the group identified by GROUPNAME.

The handler expects a request with payload formatted as a CBOR map, which MAY contain the following fields, which, if included, MUST have format and value as specified below.

* 'scope', with value the specific group that the Client is attempting to join, i.e., the group name, and the roles it wishes to have in the group. This value is a CBOR byte string wrapping one scope entry, as defined in Section 3.1.
If the Client wishes to retrieve the public keys of all the current group members, the 'get_pub_keys' parameter MUST encode the CBOR simple value 'null' (0xf6). Otherwise, the 'get_pub_keys' parameter MUST encode a non-empty CBOR array, containing the following three elements formatted as defined below.

- The first element, namely 'inclusion_flag', encodes the CBOR simple value True. That is, the Client indicates that it wishes to receive the public keys of all group members having their node identifier specified in the third element of the 'get_pub_keys' array, namely 'id_filter' (see below).

- The second element, namely 'role_filter', is a non-empty CBOR array. Each element of the array contains one role or a combination of roles for the group identified by GROUPNAME. That is, when the Joining Request includes a non-Null 'get_pub_keys' parameter, the Client filters public keys based on node identifiers.

In particular, the Client indicates that it wishes to retrieve the public keys of all the group members having any of the single roles, or at least all of the roles indicated in any combination of roles. For example, the array ['role1', 'role2+role3'] indicates that the Client wishes to receive the public keys of all group members that have at least 'role1' or at least both 'role2' and 'role3'.

- The third element, namely 'id_filter', is an empty CBOR array. That is, when the Joining Request includes a non-Null 'get_pub_keys' parameter, the Client does not filter public keys based on node identifiers.
In fact, when first joining the group, the Client is not expected or capable to express a filter based on node identifiers of other group members. Instead, when already a group member and sending a Joining Request to re-join, the Client is not expected to include the 'get_pub_keys' parameter in the Joining Request altogether, since it can rather retrieve public keys associated to specific group identifiers as defined in Section 4.4.1.1.

The CDDL definition [RFC8610] of 'get_pub_keys' is given in Figure 8, using as example encoding: node identifier encoded as a CBOR byte string; role identifier encoded as a CBOR text string, and combination of roles encoded as a CBOR array of roles.

Note that, for this handler, 'inclusion_flag' is always set to true, the array of roles 'role_filter' is always non-empty, while the array of node identifiers 'id_filter' is always empty. However, this is not necessarily the case for other handlers using the 'get_pub_keys' parameter.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{inclusion\_flag} & = \text{bool} \\
\text{role} & = \text{tstr} \\
\text{comb\_role} & = [ 2*\text{role} ] \\
\text{role\_filter} & = [ *(\text{role} / \text{comb\_role}) ] \\
\text{id} & = \text{bstr} \\
\text{id\_filter} & = [ *\text{id} ] \\
\text{get\_pub\_keys} & = \text{null} / [ \text{inclusion\_flag}, \text{role\_filter}, \text{id\_filter} ]
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 8: CDDL definition of get_pub_keys, using as example node identifier encoded as bstr and role as tstr

* 'client_cred’, encoded as a CBOR byte string, with value the original binary representation of the Client’s public key. This parameter is used if the KDC is managing (collecting from/distributing to the Client) the public keys of the group members, and if the Client’s role in the group will require for it to send messages to one or more group members. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the specific formats that are acceptable to use for encoding public keys in the group (REQ6).

* 'cnonce’, encoded as a CBOR byte string, and including a dedicated nonce N_C generated by the Client. This parameter MUST be present if the 'client_cred’ parameter is present.
* ’client_cred_verify’, encoded as a CBOR byte string. This parameter MUST be present if the ’client_cred’ parameter is present and no public key associated to the Client’s token can be retrieved for that group.

This parameter contains a proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence computed by the Client over the following PoP input: the scope (encoded as CBOR byte string), concatenated with N_S (encoded as CBOR byte string) concatenated with N_C (encoded as CBOR byte string), where:

- scope is the CBOR byte string either specified in the ’scope’ parameter above, if present, or as a default scope that the handler is expected to understand, if omitted.

- N_S is the challenge received from the KDC in the ’kdcchallenge’ parameter of the 2.01 (Created) response to the Token Transfer Request (see Section 3.3), encoded as a CBOR byte string.

- N_C is the nonce generated by the Client and specified in the ’cnonce’ parameter above, encoded as a CBOR byte string.

An example of PoP input to compute ’client_cred_verify’ using CBOR encoding is given in Figure 9.

A possible type of PoP evidence is a signature, that the Client computes by using its own private key, whose corresponding public key is specified in the ’client_cred’ parameter. Application profiles of this specification MUST specify the exact approaches used to compute the PoP evidence to include in ’client_cred_verify’, and MUST specify which of those approaches is used in which case (REQ14).

If the token was not provided to the KDC through a Token Transfer Request (e.g., it is used directly to validate TLS instead), it is REQUIRED of the specific application profile to define how the challenge N_S is generated (REQ15).

* ’pub_keys_repos’, which can be present if the format of the Client’s public key in the ’client_cred’ parameter is a certificate. In such a case, this parameter has as value the URI of the certificate. This parameter is encoded as a CBOR text string. Alternative specific encodings of this parameter MAY be defined in applications of this specification (OPT6).
* `control_uri`, with value a full URI, encoded as a CBOR text string. A default url-path is `/ace-group/GROUPNAME/node`, although implementations can use different ones instead. The URI MUST NOT have url-path `ace-group/GROUPNAME`.

If `control_uri` is specified in the Joining Request, the Client acts as a CoAP server and hosts a resource at this specific URI. The KDC MAY use this URI to send CoAP requests to the Client (acting as CoAP server in this exchange), for example for one-to-one provisioning of new group keying material when performing a group rekeying (see Section 4.8.1.1), or to inform the Client of its removal from the group Section 5.

In particular, this resource is intended for communications concerning exclusively the group whose group name `GROUPNAME` is specified in the `scope` parameter. If the KDC does not implement mechanisms using this resource for that group, it can ignore this parameter. Other additional functionalities of this resource MAY be defined in application profiles of this specifications (OPT7).

```
scope, N_S, and N_C expressed in CBOR diagnostic notation:
  scope = h'826667726E7570316673656E646572'
  N_S   = h'018a278f7faab55a'
  N_C   = h'25a8991cd700ac01'

scope, N_S, and N_C as CBOR encoded byte strings:
  scope = 0x4f826667726E7570316673656E646572
  N_S   = 0x48018a278f7faab55a
  N_C   = 0x4825a8991cd700ac01

PoP input:
  0x4f 826667726E7570316673656E646572
  48 018a278f7faab55a 48 25a8991cd700ac01

Figure 9: Example of PoP input to compute 'client_cred_verify' using CBOR encoding
```

If the request does not include a `scope` field, the KDC is expected to understand with what roles the Client is requesting to join the group. For example, as per the access token, the Client might have been granted access to the group with only one role. If the KDC cannot determine which exact scope should be considered for the Client, it MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response.

The handler considers the scope specified in the access token associated to the Client, and checks the scope entry related to the group with name `GROUPNAME` associated to the endpoint. In particular,
the handler checks whether the set of roles specified in that scope entry includes all the roles that the Client wishes to have in the group as per the Joining Request. If this is not the case, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response.

If the KDC manages the group members' public keys, the handler checks if one is included in the 'client_cred' field. If so, the KDC retrieves the public key and performs the following actions.

* If the access token was provided through a Token Transfer Request (see Section 3.3) but the KDC cannot retrieve the 'kdcchallenge' associated to this Client (see Section 3.3), the KDC MUST reply with a 4.00 Bad Request error response, which MUST also have Content-Format application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. The payload of the error response is a CBOR map including a newly generated 'kdcchallenge' value. This is specified in the 'kdcchallenge' parameter.

* The KDC checks the public key to be valid for the group identified by GROUPNAME. That is, it checks that the public key is encoded according to the format used in the group, is intended for the public key algorithm used in the group, and is aligned with the possible associated parameters used in the group.

  If this verification fails, the handler MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 2 ("Public key incompatible with the group configuration").

* The KDC verifies the PoP evidence contained in the 'client_cred_verify' field. Application profiles of this specification MUST specify the exact approaches used to verify the PoP evidence, and MUST specify which of those approaches is used in which case (REQ14).

  If the PoP evidence does not pass verification, the handler MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 3 ("Invalid Proof-of-Possession evidence").

If no public key is included in the 'client_cred' field, the handler checks if a public key is already associated to the received access token and to the group identified by GROUPNAME (see also Section 4.3.1.1). Note that the same joining node may use different public keys in different groups, and all those public keys would be associate to the same access token.
If an eligible public key for the Client is neither present in the 'client_cred' field nor retrieved from the stored ones at the KDC, it is RECOMMENDED that the handler stops the processing and replies with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. Applications profiles MAY define alternatives (OPT8).

If, regardless the reason, the KDC replies with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, this response MAY have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and have a CBOR map as payload. For instance, the CBOR map can include a 'sign_info' parameter formatted as 'sign_info_res' defined in Section 3.3.1, with the 'pub_key_enc' element set to the CBOR simple value 'null' (0xf6) if the Client sent its own public key and the KDC is not set to store public keys of the group members.

If all the verifications above succeed, the KDC proceeds as follows.

First, only in case the Client is not already a group member, the handler performs the following actions:

* The handler adds the Client to the list of current members of the group.

* The handler assigns a name NODENAME to the Client, and creates a sub-resource to /ace-group/GROUPNAME at the KDC, i.e., "/ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME".

* The handler associates the node identifier NODENAME to the access token and the secure session for the Client.

Then, the handler performs the following actions.

* If the KDC manages the group members’ public keys:

  - The handler associates the retrieved Client’s public key to the tuple composed of the node name NODENAME, the group name GROUPNAME and the received access token.

  - The handler adds the retrieved Client’s public key to the stored list of public keys stored for the group identified by GROUPNAME. If such list already includes a public key for the Client, but a different public key is specified in the 'client_cred' field, then the handler MUST replace the old public key in the list with the one specified in the 'client_cred' field.
* If the application requires backward security or if the used application profile prescribes so, the KDC MUST generate new group keying material and securely distribute it to the current group members (see Section 6).

* The handler returns a successful Joining Response as defined below, containing the symmetric group keying material; the group policies; and the public keys of the current members of the group, if the KDC manages those and the Client requested them.

The Joining Response MUST have response code 2.01 (Created) if the Client has been added to the list of group members in this joining exchange (see above), or 2.04 (Changed) otherwise, i.e., if the Client is re-joining the group without having left it.

The Joining Response message MUST include the Location-Path CoAP option, specifying the URI path to the sub-resource associated to the Client, i.e. "/ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME".

The Joining Response message MUST have Content-Format application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map, which MUST contain the following fields and values.

* ’gkty’, identifying the key type of the ’key’ parameter. The set of values can be found in the "Key Type" column of the "ACE Groupcomm Key Types" registry. Implementations MUST verify that the key type matches the application profile being used, if present, as registered in the "ACE Groupcomm Key Types" registry.

* ’key’, containing the keying material for the group communication, or information required to derive it.

* ’num’, containing the version number of the keying material for the group communication, formatted as an integer. This is a strictly monotonic increasing field. The application profile MUST define the initial version number (REQ16).

The exact format of the ’key’ value MUST be defined in applications of this specification (REQ17), as well as values of ’gkty’ accepted by the application (REQ18). Additionally, documents specifying the key format MUST register it in the "ACE Groupcomm Key Types" registry defined in Section 11.8, including its name, type and application profile to be used with.
The response SHOULD contain the following parameter:

* `'exp'`, with value the expiration time of the keying material for the group communication, encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer. This field contains a numeric value representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC until the specified UTC date/time, ignoring leap seconds, analogous to what specified for NumericDate in Section 2 of [RFC7519]. Group members MUST stop using the keying material to protect outgoing messages and retrieve new keying material at the time indicated in this field.

Optionally, the response MAY contain the following parameters, which, if included, MUST have format and value as specified below.

* `'ace-groupcomm-profile'`, with value a CBOR integer that MUST be used to uniquely identify the application profile for group communication. Applications of this specification MUST register an application profile identifier and the related value for this parameter in the "ACE Groupcomm Profiles" registry (REQ19).

* `'pub_keys'`, MUST be present if 'get_pub_keys' was present in the request, otherwise it MUST NOT be present. This parameter is a CBOR array specifying the public keys of the group members, i.e., of all of them or of the ones selected according to the 'get_pub_keys' parameter in the request. In particular, each element of the array is a CBOR byte string, with value the original binary representation of a group member's public key. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the specific formats of public keys that are acceptable to use in the group (REQ6).

* `'peer_roles'`, MUST be present if 'pub_keys' is also present, otherwise it MUST NOT be present. This parameter is a CBOR array of n elements, with n the number of public keys included in the 'pub_keys' parameter (at most the number of members in the group). The i-th element of the array specifies the role (or CBOR array of roles) that the group member associated to the i-th public key in 'pub_keys' has in the group. In particular, each array element is encoded as the role element of a scope entry, as defined in Section 3.1.
* 'peer_identifiers', MUST be present if 'pub_keys' is also present, otherwise it MUST NOT be present. This parameter is a CBOR array of n elements, with n the number of public keys included in the 'pub_keys' parameter (at most the number of members in the group). The i-th element of the array specifies the node identifier that the group member associated to the i-th public key in 'pub_keys' has in the group. In particular, the i-th array element is encoded as a CBOR byte string, with value the node identifier of the group member.

* 'group_policies', with value a CBOR map, whose entries specify how the group handles specific management aspects. These include, for instance, approaches to achieve synchronization of sequence numbers among group members. The elements of this field are registered in the "ACE Groupcomm Policies" registry. This specification defines the three elements "Sequence Number Synchronization Methods", "Key Update Check Interval" and "Expiration Delta", which are summarized in Figure 11. Application profiles that build on this document MUST specify the exact content format and default value of included map entries (REQ20).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CBOR label</th>
<th>CBOR type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sequence Number</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>tstr/int</td>
<td>Method for recipient group members to synchronize with sequence numbers of of sender group members. Its value is taken from the 'Value' column of the Sequence Number Synchronization Method registry</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Update Check Interval</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Polling interval in seconds, for group members to check at the KDC if the latest group keying material is the one that they own</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expiration Delta</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>uint</td>
<td>Number of seconds from 'exp' until the specified UTC date/time after which group members MUST stop using the group keying material they own to verify incoming messages</td>
<td>[[[this document]]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: ACE Groupcomm Policies

* 'kdc_cred', encoded as a CBOR byte string, with value the original binary representation of the KDC’s public key. This parameter is used if the KDC has an associated public key and this is required for the correct group operation. It is REQUIRED of application profiles to define whether the KDC has a public key and if this has to be provided through the 'kdc_cred' parameter (REQ8).
In such a case, the KDC’s public key MUST have the same format used for the public keys of the group members. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the specific formats that are acceptable to use for encoding public keys in the group (REQ6).

* ’kdc_nonce’, encoded as a CBOR byte string, and including a dedicated nonce N_KDC generated by the KDC. This parameter MUST be present if the ’kdc_cred’ parameter is present.

* ’kdc_cred_verify’ parameter, encoded as a CBOR byte string. This parameter MUST be present if the ’kdc_cred’ parameter is present.

This parameter contains a proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence computed by the KDC over the nonce N_KDC, which is specified in the ’kdc_nonce’ parameter and taken as PoP input.

A possible type of PoP evidence is a signature, that the KDC computes by using its own private key, whose corresponding public key is specified in the ’kdc_cred’ parameter. Application profiles of this specification MUST specify the exact approaches used by the KDC to compute the PoP evidence to include in ’kdc_cred_verify’, and MUST specify which of those approaches is used in which case (REQ21).

* ’rekeying_scheme’, identifying the rekeying scheme that the KDC uses to provide new group keying material to the group members. This parameter is encoded as a CBOR integer, whose value is taken from the ”Value” column of the "ACE Groupcomm Rekeying Schemes" registry defined in Section 11.14 of this specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Point-to-Point</td>
<td>The KDC individually targets each node to rekey, using the pairwise secure communication association with that node</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12: ACE Groupcomm Rekeying Schemes

Application profiles of this specification MAY define a default group rekeying scheme, to refer to in case the ’rekeying_scheme’ parameter is not included in the Joining Response (OPT9).

* ’mgt_key_material’, encoded as a CBOR byte string and containing the specific administrative keying material that the joining node requires in order to participate in the group rekeying process
performed by the KDC. This parameter MUST NOT be present if the 'rekeying_scheme' parameter is not present and the application profile does not specify a default group rekeying scheme to use in the group. Some simple rekeying scheme may not require specific administrative keying material to be provided, e.g., the basic "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme (see Section 6.1).

In more advanced group rekeying schemes, the administrative keying material can be composed of multiple keys organized, for instance, into a logical tree hierarchy, whose root key is the only administrative key shared by all the group members. In such a case, each group member is exclusively associated to one leaf key in the hierarchy, and owns only the administrative keys from the associated leaf key all the way up along the path to the root key. That is, different group members can be provided with a different subset of the overall administrative keying material.

It is expected from separate documents to define how the advanced group rekeying scheme possibly indicated in the 'rekeying_scheme' parameter is used by an application profile of this specification. This includes defining the format of the administrative keying material to specify in 'mgt_key_material', consistently with the group rekeying scheme and the application profile in question.

* 'control_group_uri', with value a full URI, encoded as a CBOR text string. The URI MUST specify addressing information intended to reach all the members in the group. For example, this can be a multicast IP address, optionally together with a port number (which defaults to 5683 if omitted). The URI MUST include GROUPNAME in the url-path. A default url-path is /ace-group/GROUPNAME, although implementations can use different ones instead. The URI MUST NOT have url-path ace-group/GROUPNAME/node.

If 'control_group_uri' is included in the Joining Response, the Clients supporting this parameter act as CoAP servers, host a resource at this specific URI, and listen to the specified addressing information.

The KDC MAY use this URI to send one-to-many CoAP requests to the Client group members (acting as CoAP servers in this exchange), for example for one-to-many provisioning of new group keying material when performing a group rekeying (see Section 4.8.1.1), or to inform the Clients of their removal from the group Section 5.

In particular, this resource is intended for communications concerning exclusively the group whose group name GROUPNAME is specified in the 'scope' parameter. If the KDC does not implement
mechanisms using this resource for that group, it can ignore this parameter. Other additional functionalities of this resource MAY be defined in application profiles of this specifications (OPT10).

If the Joining Response includes the 'kdc_creds_verify' parameter, the Client verifies the conveyed PoP evidence and considers the group joining unsuccessful in case of failed verification. Application profiles of this specification MUST specify the exact approaches used by the Client to verify the PoP evidence in 'kdc_creds_verify', and MUST specify which of those approaches is used in which case (REQ21).

Specific application profiles that build on this document MUST specify the communication protocol that members of the group use to communicate with each other (REQ22) and how exactly the keying material is used to protect the group communication (REQ23).

4.3.1.1. Join the Group

Figure 13 gives an overview of the Joining exchange between Client and KDC, when the Client first joins a group, while Figure 14 shows an example.

```
Client          KDC

----- Joining Request: POST /ace-group/GROUPNAME ----->
<------------- Joining Response: 2.01 (Created) -----------
Location-Path = "/ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME"
```

Figure 13: Message Flow of the Joining Exchange
Request:

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with PUB_KEY and POP_EVIDENCE being CBOR byte strings):

\{"scope": [["group1", ["sender", "receiver"]]],
  "get_pub_keys": [true, ["sender"], []],
  "client_cred": PUB_KEY,
  "cnonce": h'6df49c495409a9b5', "client_cred_verify": POP_EVIDENCE\}

Response:

Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Location-Path: "kdc.example.com"
Location-Path: "g1"
Location-Path: "nodes"
Location-Path: "c101"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with KEY being a CBOR byte strings):

\{"gkty": 13, "key": KEY, "num": 12, "exp": 1609459200,
  "pub_keys": [PUB_KEY1, PUB_KEY2],
  "peer_roles": ["sender", ["sender", "receiver"]],
  "peer_identifiers": [ID1, ID2]\}

Figure 14: Example of First Exchange for Group Joining

If not previously established, the Client and the KDC MUST first establish a pairwise secure communication channel (REQ24). This can be achieved, for instance, by using a transport profile of ACE. The Joining exchange MUST occur over that secure channel. The Client and the KDC MAY use that same secure channel to protect further pairwise communications that must be secured.

The secure communication protocol is REQUIRED to establish the secure channel between Client and KDC by using the proof-of-possession key bound to the access token. As a result, the proof-of-possession to bind the access token to the Client is performed by using the proof-of-possession key bound to the access token for establishing secure communication between the Client and the KDC.

To join the group, the Client sends a CoAP POST request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name of the group to join, formatted as specified in Section 4.3.1. This group name is the same as in the scope entry corresponding to
that group, specified in the ‘scope’ parameter of the Authorization Request/Response, or it can be retrieved from it. Note that, in case of successful joining, the Client will receive the URI to retrieve individual keying material and to leave the group in the Location-Path option of the response.

If the node is joining a group for the first time, and the KDC maintains the public keys of the group members, the Client is REQUIRED to send its own public key and proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence in the Joining Request (see the ‘client_cred’ and ‘client_cred_verify’ parameters in Section 4.3.1). The request is accepted only if both public key is provided and the PoP evidence is successfully verified.

If a node re-joins a group as authorized by the same access token and using the same public key, it can omit the public key and the PoP evidence, or just the PoP evidence, from the Joining Request. Then, the KDC will be able to retrieve the node’s public key associated to the access token for that group. If the public key has been discarded, the KDC replies with 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, as specified in Section 4.3.1. If a node re-joins a group but wants to update its own public key, it needs to include both its public key and the PoP evidence in the Joining Request like when it joined the group for the first time.

4.3.2. GET Handler

The GET handler returns the symmetric group keying material for the group identified by GROUPNAME.

The handler expects a GET request.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2, the handler verifies that the Client is a current member of the group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 0 ("Operation permitted only to group members").

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05 (Content) response containing the symmetric group keying material. The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map which MUST contain the parameters 'gkty', 'key' and 'num' specified in Section 4.3.1.
Each of the following parameters specified in Section 4.3.1 MUST also be included in the payload of the response, if they are included in the payload of the Joining Responses sent for the group: 'rekeying_scheme', 'mgt_key_material'.

The payload MAY also include the parameters 'ace-groupcomm-profile' and 'exp' parameters specified in Section 4.3.1.

4.3.2.1. Retrieve Group Keying Material

A node in the group can contact the KDC to retrieve the current group keying material, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/ GROUPNAME endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name.

Figure 15 gives an overview of the Joining exchange between Client and KDC, when the Client first joins a group, while Figure 16 shows an example.

Client                                                              KDC

----- Key Distribution Request: POST /ace-group/GROUPNAME ------>

<----------- Key Distribution Response: 2.05 (Content) ---------

Figure 15: Message Flow of Key Distribution Request-Response

Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with KEY being a CBOR byte strings):
{ "gkty": 13, "key": KEY, "num": 12 }

Figure 16: Example of Key Distribution Request-Response
4.4. \texttt{/ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key}

This resource implements the GET and FETCH handlers.

4.4.1. FETCH Handler

The FETCH handler receives identifiers of group members for the group identified by GROUPNAME and returns the public keys of such group members.

The handler expects a request with payload formatted as a CBOR map, that MUST contain the following field.

* \texttt{'get\_pub\_keys'}, whose value is encoded as in Section 4.3.1 with the following modifications.

- The arrays \texttt{'role\_filter'} and \texttt{'id\_filter'} MUST NOT both be empty, i.e., in CBOR diagnostic notation: \texttt{[ bool, [ ], [ ] ]}. If the \texttt{'get\_pub\_keys'} parameter has such a format, the request MUST be considered malformed, and the KDC MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response.

Note that a group member can retrieve the public keys of all the current group members by sending a GET request to the same KDC resource instead (see Section 4.4.2.1).

- The element \texttt{'inclusion\_flag'} encodes the CBOR simple value True if the third element \texttt{'id\_filter'} specifies an empty CBOR array, or if the Client wishes to receive the public keys of the nodes having their node identifier specified in \texttt{'id\_filter'} (i.e., selection by inclusive filtering). Instead, this element encodes the CBOR simple value False if the Client wishes to receive the public keys of the nodes not having the node identifiers specified in the third element \texttt{'id\_filter'} (i.e., selection by exclusive filtering).

- The array \texttt{'role\_filter'} can be empty, if the Client does not wish to filter the requested public keys based on the roles of the group members.

- The array \texttt{'id\_filter'} contains zero or more node identifiers of group members, for the group identified by GROUPNAME. The Client indicates that it wishes to receive the public keys of the nodes having or not having these node identifiers, in case the \texttt{'inclusion\_flag'} element encodes the CBOR simple value True or False, respectively. The array \texttt{'id\_filter'} may be empty, if the Client does not wish to filter the requested public keys based on the node identifiers of the group members.
Note that, in case the 'role_filter' array and the 'id_filter' array are both non-empty:

* If the 'inclusion_flag' encodes the CBOR simple value True, the handler returns the public keys of group members whose roles match with 'role_filter' and/or having their node identifier specified in 'id_filter'.

* If the 'inclusion_flag' encodes the CBOR simple value False, the handler returns the public keys of group members whose roles match with 'role_filter' and, at the same time, not having their node identifier specified in 'id_filter'.

The specific format of public keys as well as identifiers, roles and combination of roles of group members MUST be specified by It is REQUIRED of application profiles of this specification (REQ1, REQ6, REQ25).

The handler identifies the public keys of the current group members for which either:

* the role identifier matches with one of those indicated in the request; note that the request can contain a "combination of roles", where the handler select all group members who have all roles included in the combination.

* the node identifier matches with one of those indicated in the request.

If all verifications succeed, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message response with payload formatted as a CBOR map, containing only the following parameters from Section 4.3.1.

* 'num', which encodes the version number of the current group keying material.

* 'pub_keys', which encodes the list of public keys of the selected group members.

* 'peer_roles', which encodes the role (or CBOR array of roles) that each of the selected group members has in the group.

* 'peer_identifiers', which encodes the node identifier that each of the selected group members has in the group.

The specific format of public keys as well as of node identifiers of group members is specified by the application profile (REQ6, REQ25).
If the KDC does not store any public key associated to the specified node identifiers, the handler returns a response with payload formatted as a CBOR byte string of zero length.

The handler MAY enforce one of the following policies, in order to handle possible node identifiers that are included in the ‘id_filter’ element of the ‘get_pub_keys’ parameter of the request but are not associated to any current group member. Such a policy MUST be specified by the application profile (REQ26).

* The KDC silently ignores those node identifiers.

* The KDC retains public keys of group members for a given amount of time after their leaving, before discarding them. As long as such public keys are retained, the KDC provides them to a requesting Client.

If the KDC adopts this policy, the application profile MUST also specify the amount of time during which the KDC retains the public key of a former group member after its leaving, possibly on a per-member basis.

Note that this resource handler only verifies that the node is authorized by the AS to access this resource. Nodes that are not members of the group but are authorized to do signature verifications on the group messages may be allowed to access this resource, if the application needs it.

4.4.1.1. Retrieve a Subset of Public Keys in the Group

In case the KDC maintains the public keys of group members, a node in the group can contact the KDC to request the public keys, roles and node identifiers of a specified subset of group members, by sending a CoAP FETCH request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name, and formatted as defined in Section 4.4.1.

Figure 17 gives an overview of the exchange mentioned above, while Figure 18 shows an example of such an exchange.

Client

- Public Key Request: FETCH /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key->

KDC

<--------- Public Key Response: 2.05 (Created) ---------
Figure 17: Message Flow of Public Key Exchange to Request the Public Keys of Specific Group Members

Request:

Header: FETCH (Code=0.05)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "pub-key"
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload:
   { "get_pub_keys": [true, [], [ ID3 ]] }

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):
   { "pub_keys": [ PUB_KEY3 ],
      "peer_roles": [ "receiver" ],
      "peer_identifiers": [ ID3 ] }

Figure 18: Example of Public Key Exchange to Request the Public Keys of Specific Group Members

4.4.2. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

If all verifications succeed, the KDC replies with a 2.05 (Content) response as in the FETCH handler in Section 4.4.1, but specifying in the payload the public keys of all the group members, together with their roles and node identifiers.

4.4.2.1. Retrieve All Public Keys in the Group

In case the KDC maintains the public keys of group members, a group or an external signature verifier can contact the KDC to request the public keys, roles and node identifiers of all the current group members, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name.

Figure 19 gives an overview of the message exchange, while Figure 20 shows an example of such an exchange.
Figure 19: Message Flow of Public Key Exchange to Request the Public Keys of all the Group Members

Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "pub-key"
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):

```
{ "num": 5,
  "pub_keys": [ PUB_KEY1, PUB_KEY2, PUB_KEY3 ],
  "peer_roles": ["sender", ["sender", "receiver"], "receiver"],
  "peer_identifiers": [ ID1, ID2, ID3 ] }
```

Figure 20: Example of Public Key Exchange to Request the Public Keys of all the Group Members

4.5. ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key

This resource implements a GET handler.

4.5.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

If all verifications succeed, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing the KDC’s public key together with a proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. The payload of the response is a CBOR map, which includes the following fields.
* The 'kdc_cred' parameter, specifying the KDC’s public key. This parameter is encoded like the 'kdc_cred' parameter in the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1).

* The 'kdc_nonce' parameter, specifying a nonce generated by the KDC. This parameter is encoded like the 'kdc_nonce' parameter in the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1).

* The 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter, specifying a PoP evidence computed by the KDC. This parameter is encoded like the 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter in the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1).

The PoP evidence is computed over the nonce specified in the 'kdc_nonce' parameter and taken as PoP input, by means of the same method used when preparing the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1). Application profiles of this specification MUST specify the exact approaches used by the KDC to compute the PoP evidence to include in 'kdc_cred_verify’, and MUST specify which of those approaches is used in which case (REQ21).

4.5.1.1. Retrieve the KDC’s Public Key

In case the KDC has an associated public key as required for the correct group operation, a group member or an external signature verifier can contact the KDC to request the KDC’s public key, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name.

Upon receiving the 2.05 (Content) response, the Client retrieves the KDC’s public key from the 'kdc_cred' parameter, and MUST verify the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence specified in the 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter. In case of successful verification of the PoP evidence, the Client MUST store the obtained KDC’s public key and replace the currently stored one.

The PoP evidence is verified by means of the same method used when processing the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1). Application profiles of this specification MUST specify the exact approaches used by the Client to verify the PoP evidence in 'kdc_cred_verify’, and MUST specify which of those approaches is used in which case (REQ21).

Figure 21 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 22 shows an example.
Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "kdc-pub-key"
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with PUB_KEY_KDC and POP_EVIDENCE being CBOR byte strings):

```json
{
  "kdc_nonce": h'25a8991cd700ac01',
  "kdc_cred": PUB_KEY_KDC,
  "kdc_cred_verify": POP_EVIDENCE
}
```

Figure 22: Example of KDC Public Key Request-Response

4.6. /ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies

This resource implements the GET handler.

4.6.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.
In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2, the handler verifies that the Client is a current member of the group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 0 ("Operation permitted only to group members").

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05 (Content) response containing the list of policies for the group identified by GROUPNAME. The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map including only the parameter 'group_policies' defined in Section 4.3.1 and specifying the current policies in the group. If the KDC does not store any policy, the payload is formatted as a zero-length CBOR byte string.

The specific format and meaning of group policies MUST be specified in the application profile (REQ20).

4.6.1.1. Retrieve the Group Policies

A node in the group can contact the KDC to retrieve the current group policies, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name, and formatted as defined in Section 4.6.1.

Figure 23 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 24 shows an example.

```
Client                                                   KDC
|                                                      |
|-Policies Request: GET ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies ->|
|                                                      |
|<--------- Policies Response: 2.05 (Content) ---------|

Figure 23: Message Flow of Policies Request-Response
```
Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "policies"
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):
  { "group_policies": {"exp-delta": 120} }

Figure 24: Example of Policies Request-Response

4.7. /ace-group/GROUPNAME/num

This resource implements the GET handler.

4.7.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2, the handler verifies that the Client is a current member of the group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 0 ("Operation permitted only to group members").

If all verifications succeed, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing an integer that represents the version number of the symmetric group keying material. This number is incremented on the KDC every time the KDC updates the symmetric group keying material, before the new keying material is distributed. This number is stored in persistent storage.

The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR integer.
4.7.1.1. Retrieve the Keying Material Version

A node in the group can contact the KDC to request information about the version number of the symmetric group keying material, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/num endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name, formatted as defined in Section 4.7.1. In particular, the version is incremented by the KDC every time the group keying material is renewed, before it’s distributed to the group members.

Figure 25 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 26 shows an example.

Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "num"
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload(in CBOR diagnostic notation):
13

Figure 25: Message Flow of Version Request-Response

4.8. /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME

This resource implements the GET, PUT and DELETE handlers.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2, each of the handlers performs the following two verifications.
* The handler verifies that the Client is a current member of the
group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03
(Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format
set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined
in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 0
("Operation permitted only to group members").

* The handler verifies that the node name of the Client is equal to
NODENAME used in the url-path. If the verification fails, the
handler replies with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response.

4.8.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05
(Content) response containing both the group keying material and the
individual keying material for the Client, or information enabling
the Client to derive it. The payload of the response is formatted as
a CBOR map. The format for the group keying material is the same as
defined in the response of Section 4.3.2. The specific format of
individual keying material for group members, or of the information
to derive it, and corresponding CBOR label, MUST be specified in the
application profile (REQ27) and registered in Section 11.7.

Optionally, the KDC can make the sub-resource at ace-
group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME also Observable [RFC7641] for the
associated node. In case the KDC removes that node from the group
without having been explicitly asked for it, this allows the KDC to
send an unsolicited 4.04 (Not Found) response to the node as a
notification of eviction from the group (see Section 5).

Note that the node could have been observing also the resource at
ace-group/GROUPNAME, in order to be informed of changes in the keying
material. In such a case, this method would result in largely
overlapping notifications received for the resource at ace-group/
GROUPNAME and the sub-resource at ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME.

In order to mitigate this, a node that supports the No-Response
option [RFC7967] can use it when starting the observation of the sub-
resource at ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME. In particular, the
GET observation request can also include the No-Response option, with
value set to 2 (Not interested in 2.xx responses).
4.8.1.1. Retrieve Group and Individual Keying Material

When any of the following happens, a node MUST stop using the owned group keying material to protect outgoing messages, and SHOULD stop using it to decrypt and verify incoming messages.

* Upon expiration of the keying material, according to what indicated by the KDC with the ‘exp’ parameter in a Joining Response, or to a pre-configured value.

* Upon receiving a notification of revoked/renewed keying material from the KDC, possibly as part of an update of the keying material (rekeying) triggered by the KDC.

* Upon receiving messages from other group members without being able to retrieve the keying material to correctly decrypt them. This may be due to rekeying messages previously sent by the KDC, that the Client was not able to receive or decrypt.

In either case, if it wants to continue participating in the group communication, the node has to request the latest keying material from the KDC. To this end, the Client sends a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME endpoint at the KDC, formatted as specified in Section 4.8.1.

Note that policies can be set up, so that the Client sends a Key Re-Distribution request to the KDC only after a given number of received messages could not be decrypted (because of failed decryption processing or inability to retrieve the necessary keying material).

It is application dependent and pertaining to the particular message exchange (e.g., [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]) to set up these policies for instructing Clients to retain incoming messages and for how long (OPT11). This allows Clients to possibly decrypt such messages after getting updated keying material, rather than just consider them non valid messages to discard right away.

The same Key Distribution Request could also be sent by the Client without being triggered by a failed decryption of a message, if the Client wants to be sure that it has the latest group keying material. If that is the case, the Client will receive from the KDC the same group keying material it already has in memory.

Figure 27 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 28 shows an example.
Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "nodes"
Uri-Path: "c101"
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation,
with KEY and IND_KEY being CBOR byte strings,
and "ind-key" the profile-specified label
for individual keying material):
{ "gkty": 13, "key": KEY, "num": 12, "ind-key": IND_KEY }

Figure 28: Example of Key Distribution Request-Response

4.8.2. PUT Handler

The PUT handler processes requests from a Client that asks for new
individual keying material, as required to process messages exchanged
in the group.

The handler expects a PUT request with empty payload.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2 and at the beginning
of Section 4.8, the handler verifies that this operation is
consistent with the set of roles that the Client has in the group
(REQ11). If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.00
(Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format
set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in
Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 1 ("Request
inconsistent with the current roles").
If the KDC is currently not able to serve this request, i.e., to generate new individual keying material for the requesting Client, the KDC MUST reply with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 4 ("No available node identifiers").

If all verifications succeed, the handler reply with a 2.05 (Content) response containing newly generated, individual keying material for the Client. The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map. The specific format of newly-generated individual keying material for group members, or of the information to derive it, and corresponding CBOR label, MUST be specified in the application profile (REQ27) and registered in Section 11.7.

The typical successful outcome consists in replying with newly generated, individual keying material for the Client, as defined above. However, application profiles of this specification MAY also extend this handler in order to achieve different akin outcomes (OPT12), for instance:

* Not providing the Client with newly generated, individual keying material, but rather rekeying the whole group, i.e., providing all the current group members with newly generated group keying material.

* Both providing the Client with newly generated, individual keying material, as well as rekeying the whole group, i.e., providing all the current group members with newly generated group keying material.

In either case, the handler may specify the new group keying material as part of the 2.05 (Content) response.

Note that this handler is not intended to accommodate requests from a group member to trigger a group rekeying, whose scheduling and execution is an exclusive prerogative of the KDC.
4.8.2.1. Request to Change Individual Keying Material

A Client may ask the KDC for new, individual keying material. For instance, this can be due to the expiration of such individual keying material, or to the exhaustion of AEAD nonces, if an AEAD encryption algorithm is used for protecting communications in the group. An example of individual keying material can simply be an individual encryption key associated to the Client. Hence, the Client may ask for a new individual encryption key, or for new input material to derive it.

To this end, the Client performs a Key Renewal Request/Response exchange with the KDC, i.e., it sends a CoAP PUT request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name and NODENAME is its node name, and formatted as defined in Section 4.8.1.

Figure 29 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 30 shows an example.

```
Client                      KDC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Renewal Request:</td>
<td>PUT ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Renewal Response: 2.05 (Content)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 29: Message Flow of Key Renewal Request-Response

Request:

- Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
- Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
- Uri-Path: "ace-group"
- Uri-Path: "g1"
- Uri-Path: "nodes"
- Uri-Path: "c101"
- Payload: -

Response:

- Header: Content (Code=2.05)
- Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
- Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with IND_KEY being a CBOR byte string, and "ind-key" the profile-specified label for individual keying material):
  
  ```
  { "ind-key": IND_KEY }
  ```
Figure 30: Example of Key Renewal Request-Response

Note the difference between the Key Renewal Request in this section and the Key Distribution Request in Section 4.8.1.1. The former asks the KDC for new individual keying material, while the latter asks the KDC for the current group keying material together with the current individual keying material.

As discussed in Section 4.8.2, application profiles of this specification may define alternative outcomes for the Key Renewal Request-Response exchange (OPT12), where the provisioning of new individual keying material is replaced by or combined with the execution of a whole group rekeying.

4.8.3. DELETE Handler

The DELETE handler removes the node identified by NODENAME from the group identified by GROUPNAME.

The handler expects a DELETE request with empty payload.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2, the handler verifies that the Client is a current member of the group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 0 ("Operation permitted only to group members").

If all verification succeeds, the handler performs the actions defined in Section 5 and replies with a 2.02 (Deleted) response with empty payload.

4.8.3.1. Leave the Group

A Client can actively request to leave the group. In this case, the Client sends a CoAP DELETE request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name and NODENAME is its node name, formatted as defined in Section 4.8.3.

Note that, after having left the group, the Client may wish to join it again. Then, as long as the Client is still authorized to join the group, i.e., the associated access token is still valid, the Client can request to re-join the group directly to the KDC (see Section 4.3.1.1), without having to retrieve a new access token from the AS.
4.9. /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key

This resource implements the POST handler.

4.9.1. POST Handler

The POST handler is used to replace the stored public key of this Client (identified by NODENAME) with the one specified in the request at the KDC, for the group identified by GROUPNAME.

The handler expects a POST request with payload as specified in Section 4.3.1, with the difference that it includes only the parameters 'client_cred', 'cnonce' and 'client_cred_verify'. In particular, the PoP evidence included in 'client_cred_verify' is computed in the same way considered in Section 4.3.1 and defined by the specific application profile (REQ14), with a newly generated N_C nonce and the previously received N_S. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the specific formats of public keys that are acceptable to use in the group (REQ6).

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2 and at the beginning of Section 4.8, the handler verifies that this operation is consistent with the set of roles that the node has in the group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 1 ("Request inconsistent with the current roles").

If the KDC cannot retrieve the 'kdcchallenge' associated to this Client (see Section 3.3), the KDC MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, which MUST also have Content-Format application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. The payload of the error response is a CBOR map including a newly generated 'kdcchallenge' value. This is specified in the 'kdcchallenge' parameter. In such a case the KDC MUST store the newly generated value as the 'kdcchallenge' value associated to this Client, possibly replacing the currently stored value.
Otherwise, the handler checks that the public key specified in the 'client_credential' field is valid for the group identified by GROUPNAME. That is, the handler checks that the public key is encoded according to the format used in the group, is intended for the public key algorithm used in the group, and is aligned with the possible associated parameters used in the group. If that cannot be successfully verified, the handler MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 2 ("Public key incompatible with the group configuration").

Otherwise, the handler verifies the PoP evidence contained in the 'client_credential_verify' field of the request, by using the public key specified in the 'client_credential' field, as well as the same way considered in Section 4.3.1 and defined by the specific application profile (REQ14). If the PoP evidence does not pass verification, the handler MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 3 ("Invalid Proof-of-Possession evidence").

If all verifications succeed, the handler performs the following actions.

* The handler associates the public key from the 'client_credential' field of the request to the node identifier NODENAME and to the access token associated to the node identified by NODENAME.

* In the stored list of group members' public keys for the group identified by GROUPNAME, the handler replaces the public key of the node identified by NODENAME with the public key specified in the 'client_credential' field of the request.

Then, the handler replies with a 2.04 (Changed) response, which does not include a payload.

4.9.1.1. Uploading a New Public Key

In case the KDC maintains the public keys of group members, a node in the group can contact the KDC to upload a new public key to use in the group, and replace the currently stored one.

To this end, the Client performs a Public Key Update Request/Response exchange with the KDC, i.e., it sends a CoAP POST request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name and NODENAME is its node name.
The request is formatted as specified in Section 4.9.1.

Figure Figure 31 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 32 shows an example.

```
Client          KDC
--------------- Public Key Update Request: ---------------------->
    POST ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key
<------- Public Key Update Response: 2.04 (Changed) ---------->
```

Figure 31: Message Flow of Public Key Update Request-Response

Request:

- Header: POST (Code=0.02)
- Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
- Uri-Path: "ace-group"
- Uri-Path: "g1"
- Uri-Path: "nodes"
- Uri-Path: "c101"
- Uri-Path: "pub-key"
- Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
- Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with PUB_KEY and POP_EVIDENCE being CBOR byte strings):
  ```
  { "client_cred": PUB_KEY, "cnonce": h'9ff7684414affcc8',
    "client_cred_verify": POP_EVIDENCE }
  ```

Response:

- Header: Changed (Code=2.04)
- Payload: -

Figure 32: Example of Public Key Update Request-Response

Additionally, after updating its own public key, a group member MAY send a number of requests including an identifier of the updated public key, to notify other group members that they have to retrieve it. How this is done depends on the group communication protocol used, and therefore is application profile specific (OPT13).

5. Removal of a Group Member

A Client identified by NODENAME may be removed from a group identified by GROUPNAME where it is a member, due to the following reasons.
1. The Client explicitly asks to leave the group, as defined in Section 4.8.3.1.

2. The node has been found compromised or is suspected so.

3. The Client’s authorization to be a group member with the current roles is not valid anymore, i.e., the access token has expired or has been revoked. If the AS provides token introspection (see Section 5.9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), the KDC can optionally use it and check whether the Client is still authorized.

In either case, the KDC performs the following actions.

* The KDC removes the Client from the list of current members or the group.

* In case of forced eviction, i.e., for cases 2 and 3 above, the KDC deletes the public key of the removed Client, if it acts as repository of public keys for group members.

* If the removed Client is registered as an observer of the group-membership resource at ace-group/GROUPNAME, the KDC removes the Client from the list of observers of that resource.

* If the sub-resource nodes/NODENAME was created for the removed Client, the KDC deletes that sub-resource.

In case of forced eviction, i.e., for cases 2 and 3 above, the KDC MAY explicitly inform the removed Client, by means of the following methods.

- If the evicted Client implements the 'control_uri' resource specified in Section 4.3.1, the KDC sends a DELETE request, targeting the URI specified in the 'control_uri' parameter of the Joining Request (see Section 4.3.1).

- If the evicted Client is observing its associated sub-resource at ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME (see Section 4.8.1), the KDC sends an unsolicited 4.04 (Not Found) error response, which does not include the Observe option and indicates that the observed resource has been deleted (see Section 3.2 of [RFC7641]).

The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 5 ("Group membership terminated").
If the application requires forward security or the used application profile requires so, the KDC MUST generate new group keying material and securely distribute it to all the current group members except the leaving node (see Section 6).

6. Group Rekeying Process

A group rekeying is started and driven by the KDC. The KDC is not intended to accommodate explicit requests from group members to trigger a group rekeying. That is, the scheduling and execution of a group rekeying is an exclusive prerogative of the KDC. Reasons that can trigger a group rekeying are a change in the group membership, the current group keying material approaching its expiration time, or a regularly scheduled update of the group keying material.

The KDC MUST increment the version number NUM of the current keying material, before distributing the newly generated keying material with version number NUM+1 to the group. Once completed the group rekeying, the KDC MUST delete the old keying material and SHOULD store the newly distributed keying material in persistent storage.

Distributing the new group keying material requires the KDC to send multiple rekeying messages to the group members. Depending on the rekeying scheme used in the group and the reason that has triggered the rekeying process, each rekeying message can be intended to one or multiple group members, hereafter referred to as target group members. The KDC MUST support at least the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme in Section 6.1 and MAY support additional ones.

Each rekeying message MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and its payload formatted as a CBOR map, which MUST include at least the information specified in the Key Distribution Response message (see Section 4.3.2), i.e., the parameters 'gkty', 'key' and 'num' defined in Section 4.3.1. The CBOR map MAY include the parameter 'exp', as well as the parameter 'mgt_key_material' specifying new administrative keying material for the target group members, if relevant for the used rekeying scheme.
A rekeying message may include additional information, depending on the rekeying scheme used in the group, the reason that has triggered the rekeying process and the specific target group members. In particular, if the group rekeying is performed due to one or multiple Clients that have joined the group and the KDC acts as repository of public keys of the group members, then a rekeying message MAY also include the public keys that those Clients use in the group, together with the roles and node identifier that the corresponding Client has in the group. It is RECOMMENDED to specify this information by means of the parameters ‘pub_keys’, ‘peer_roles’ and ‘peer_identifiers’, like done in the Joining Response message (see Section 4.3.1).

The complete format of a rekeying message, including the encoding and content of the ‘mgt_key_material’ parameter, has to be defined in separate specifications aimed at profiling the used rekeying scheme in the context of the used application profile of this specification. As a particular case, an application profile of this specification MAY define additional information to include in rekeying messages for the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme in Section 6.1 (OPT14).

Consistently with the used group rekeying scheme, the actual delivery of rekeying messages can occur through different approaches, as discussed in the following.

6.1. Point-to-Point Group Rekeying

This approach consists in the KDC sending one individual rekeying message to each target group member. In particular, the rekeying message is protected by means of the security association between the KDC and the target group member in question, as per the used application profile of this specification and the used transport profile of ACE.

This is the approach taken by the basic "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme, that the KDC can explicitly signal in the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1), through the ‘rekeying_scheme’ parameter specifying the value 0.

When taking this approach in the group identified by GROUPNAME, the KDC can practically deliver the rekeying messages to the target group members in different, co-existing ways.

* The KDC SHOULD make the ace-group/GROUPNAME resource Observable [RFC7641]. Thus, upon performing a group rekeying, the KDC can distribute the new group keying material through individual notification responses sent to the target group members that are also observing that resource.
In case the KDC deletes the group, this also allows the KDC to send an unsolicited 4.04 (Not Found) response to each observer group member, as a notification of group termination. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4. The value of the ‘error’ field MUST be set to 6 ("Group deleted").

* If a target group member specified a URI in the ‘control_uri’ parameter of the Joining Request upon joining the group (see Section 4.3.1), the KDC can provide that group member with the new group keying material by sending a unicast POST request to that URI.

A Client that does not plan to observe the ace-group/GROUPNAME resource at the KDC SHOULD provide a URI in the ‘control_uri’ parameter of the Joining Request upon joining the group.

If the KDC has to send a rekeying message to a target group member, but this did not include the ‘control_uri’ parameter in the Joining Request and is not a registered observer for the ace-group/GROUPNAME resource, then that target group member would not be able to participate to the group rekeying. Later on, after having repeatedly failed to successfully exchange secure messages in the group, that group member can retrieve the current group keying material from the KDC, by sending a GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME or ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME (see Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.8.1, respectively).

6.2. One-to-Many Group Rekeying

This section provides high-level recommendations on how the KDC can rekey a group by means of a more efficient and scalable group rekeying scheme, e.g., [RFC2093][RFC2094][RFC2627]. That is, each rekeying message might be, and likely is, intended to multiple target group members, and thus can be delivered to the whole group, although possible to decrypt only for the actual target group members.

This yields an overall lower number of rekeying messages, thus potentially reducing the overall time required to rekey the group. On the other hand, it requires the KDC to provide and use additional administrative keying material to protect the rekeying messages, and to additionally sign them to ensure source authentication (see Section 6.2.1). Typically, this pays off in large-scale groups, where the introduced performance overhead is less than what experienced by rekeying the group in a point-to-point fashion (see Section 6.1).
The exact set of rekeying messages to send, their content and format, the administrative keying material to use to protect them, as well as the set of target group members depend on the specific group rekeying scheme, and are typically affected by the reason that has triggered the group rekeying. Details about the data content and format of rekeying messages have to be defined by separate documents profiling the use of the group rekeying scheme, in the context of the used application profile of this specification.

When one of these group rekeying schemes is used, the KDC provides a number of related information to a Client joining the group in the Joining Response message (see Section 4.3.1). In particular, 'rekeying_scheme' identifies the rekeying scheme used in the group (if no default can be assumed); 'control_group_uri', if present, specifies a URI with a multicast address where the KDC will send the rekeying messages for that group; 'mgt_key_material' specifies a subset of the administrative keying material intended for that particular joining Client to have, as used to protect the rekeying messages sent to the group when intended also to that joining Client.

Rekeying messages can be protected at the application layer, by using COSE and the administrative keying material as prescribed by the specific group rekeying scheme (see Section 6.2.1). After that, the delivery of protected rekeying messages to the intended target group members can occur in different ways, such as the following ones.

* Over multicast - In this case, the KDC simply sends a rekeying message as a CoAP request addressed to the multicast URI specified in the 'control_group_uri' parameter of the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1).

  If a particular rekeying message is intended to a single target group member, the KDC may alternatively protect the message using the security association with that group member, and deliver the message like when using the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme (see Section 6.1).

* Through a pub-sub communication model - In this case, the KDC acts as publisher and publishes each rekeying message to a specific "rekeying topic", which is associated to the group and is hosted at a broker server. Following their group joining, the group members subscribe to the rekeying topic at the broker, thus receiving the group rekeying messages as they are published by the KDC.

  In order to make such message delivery more efficient, the rekeying topic associated to a group can be further organized into subtopics. For instance, the KDC can use a particular subtopic to
address a particular set of target group members during the rekeying process, as possibly aligned to a similar organization of the administrative keying material (e.g., a key hierarchy).

The setup of rekeying topics at the broker as well as the discovery of the topics at the broker for group members are application specific. A possible way is for the KDC to provide such information in the Joining Response message (see Section 4.3.1), by means of a new parameter analogous to 'control_group_uri' and specifying the URI(s) of the rekeying topic(s) that a group member has to subscribe to at the broker.

Regardless the specifically used delivery method, the group rekeying scheme can perform a possible roll-over of the administrative keying material through the same sent rekeying messages. Actually, such a roll-over occurs every time a group rekeying is performed upon the leaving of group members, which have to be excluded from future communications in the group.

From a high level point of view, each group member owns only a subset of the overall administrative keying material, obtained upon joining the group. Then, when a group rekeying occurs:

* Each rekeying message is protected by using a (most convenient) key from the administrative keying material such that: i) the used key is not owned by any node leaving the group, i.e. the key is safe to use and does not have to be renewed; and ii) the used key is owned by all the target group members, that indeed have to be provided with new group keying material to protect communications in the group.

* Each rekeying message includes not only the new group keying material intended to all the rekeyed group members, but also any new administrative keys that: i) are pertaining to and supposed to be owned by the target group members; and ii) had to be updated since leaving group members own the previous version.

Further details depend on the specific rekeying scheme used in the group.

6.2.1. Protection of Rekeying Messages

When using a group rekeying scheme relying on one-to-many rekeying messages, the actual data content of each rekeying message is prepared according to what the rekeying scheme prescribes.
Then, the KDC can protect the rekeying message as defined below. The used encryption algorithm which SHOULD be the same one used to protect communications in the group. The method defined below assumes that the following holds for the management keying material specified in the 'mgt_key_material' parameter of the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1).

* The included symmetric encryption keys are accompanied by a corresponding and unique key identifier assigned by the KDC.

* A Base IV is also included, with the same size of the AEAD nonce considered by the encryption algorithm to use.

First, the KDC computes a COSE_Encrypt0 object as follows.

* The encryption key to use is selected from the administrative keying material, as defined by the rekeying scheme used in the group.

* The plaintext is the actual data content of the rekeying message.

* The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is empty, unless otherwise specified by separate documents profiling the use of the group rekeying scheme.

* Since the KDC is the only sender of rekeying messages, the AEAD nonce can be computed as follows, where NONCE_SIZE is the size in bytes of the AEAD nonce. Separate documents profiling the use of the group rekeying scheme may define alternative ways to compute the AEAD nonce.

The KDC considers the following values.

- COUNT, as a 1-byte unsigned integer associated to the used encryption key. Its value is set to 0 when starting to perform a new group rekeying instance, and is incremented after each use of the encryption key.

- NEW_NUM, as the version number of the new group keying material to distribute in this rekeying instance, left-padded with zeroes to exactly NONCE_SIZE - 1.

Then, the KDC computes a Partial IV as the byte string concatenation of COUNT and NEW_NUM, in this order. Finally, the AEAD nonce is computed as the XOR between the Base IV and the Partial IV.
* The protected header of the COSE_Encrypt0 object MUST include the following parameters.
  - 'alg', specifying the used encryption algorithm.
  - 'kid', specifying the identifier of the encryption key from the administrative keying material used to protect this rekeying message.

* The unprotected header of the COSE_Encrypt0 object MUST include the 'Partial IV' parameter, with value the Partial IV computed above.

In order to ensure source authentication, each rekeying message protected with the administrative keying material MUST be signed by the KDC. To this end, the KDC computes a countersignature of the COSE_Encrypt0 object, as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]. In particular, the following applies when computing the countersignature.

* The Countersign_structure contains the context text string "CounterSignature0".

* The private key of the KDC is used as signing key.

* The payload is the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object.

* The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is empty, unless otherwise specified by separate documents profiling the use of a group rekeying scheme.

* The protected header of the signing object MUST include the parameter 'alg', specifying the used signature algorithm.

If source authentication of messages exchanged in the group is also ensured by means of signatures, then rekeying messages MUST be signed using the same signature algorithm and related parameters. Also, the KDC’s public key used for signature verification MUST be provided in the Joining Response through the 'kdc_cred' parameter, together with the corresponding proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence in the 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter.

If source authentication of messages exchanged in the group is not ensured by means of signatures, then the KDC MUST provide its public key together with a corresponding PoP evidence as part of the management keying material specified in the 'mgt_key_material' parameter of the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1). It is RECOMMENDED to specify this information by using the same format and
encoding used for the parameters 'kdc_cred', 'kdc_nonce' and 'kdc_cred_verify' in the Joining Response. It is up to separate documents profiling the use of the group rekeying scheme to specify such details.

After that, the KDC specifies the computed countersignature in the 'COSE_Countersignature0' header parameter of the COSE_Encrypt0 object.

Finally, the KDC specifies the COSE_Encrypt0 object as payload of a CoAP request, which is sent to the target group members as per the used message delivery method.

7. Extended Scope Format

This section defines an extended format of binary encoded scope, which additionally specifies the semantics used to express the same access control information from the corresponding original scope.

As also discussed in Section 3.2, this enables a Resource Server to unambiguously process a received access token, also in case the Resource Server runs multiple applications or application profiles that involve different scope semantics.

The extended format is intended only for the 'scope' claim of access tokens, for the cases where the claim takes as value a CBOR byte string. That is, the extended format does not apply to the 'scope' parameter included in ACE messages, i.e., the Authorization Request and Authorization Response exchanged between the Client and the Authorization Server (see Sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), the AS Request Creation Hints message from the Resource Server (see Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), and the Introspection Response from the Authorization Server (see Section 5.9.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

The value of the 'scope' claim following the extended format is composed as follows. Given the original scope using a semantics SEM and encoded as a CBOR byte string, the corresponding extended scope is encoded as a tagged CBOR byte string, wrapping a CBOR sequence [RFC8742] of two elements. In particular:

* The first element of the sequence is a CBOR integer, and identifies the semantics SEM used for this scope. The value of this element has to be taken from the "Value" column of the "ACE Scope Semantics" registry defined in Section 11.12 of this specification.
When defining a new semantics for a binary scope, it is up to the applications and application profiles to define and register the corresponding integer identifier (REQ28).

* The second element of the sequence is the original scope using the semantics SEM, encoded as a CBOR byte string.

Finally, the CBOR byte string wrapping the CBOR sequence is tagged, and identified by the CBOR tag TBD_TAG "ACE Extended Scope Format", defined in Section 11.6 of this specification.

The resulting tagged CBOR byte string is used as value of the ‘scope’ claim of the access token.

The usage of the extended scope format is not limited to application profiles of this specification or to applications based on group communication. Rather, it is generally applicable to any application and application profile where access control information in the access token is expressed as a binary encoded scope.

Figure 33 and Figure 34 build on the examples in Section 3.2, and show the corresponding extended scopes.

gname = tstr
permissions = uint . bits roles
roles = &(
  Requester: 1,
  Responder: 2,
  Monitor: 3,
  Verifier: 4
)

scope_entry = AIF_Generic<gname, permissions>
scope = << [ + scope_entry ] >>
semantics = int

; This defines an array, the elements
; of which are to be used in a CBOR Sequence:
sequence = [semantics, scope]

extended_scope = #6.TBD_TAG(<< sequence >>)

Figure 33: Example CDLL definition of scope, using the default Authorization Information Format
gname = tstr
role = tstr
scope_entry = [ gname , ? ( role / [ 2*role ] ) ]
scope = << [ + scope_entry ] >>
semantics = int

; This defines an array, the elements
; of which are to be used in a CBOR Sequence:
sequence = [semantics, scope]
extended_scope = #6.TBD_TAG(<< sequence >>)

Figure 34: CDLL definition of scope, using as example group name
encoded as tstr and role as tstr

8. ACE Groupcomm Parameters

This specification defines a number of parameters used during the
second part of the message exchange, after the exchange of Token
Transfer Request and Response. The table below summarizes them, and
specifies the CBOR key to use instead of the full descriptive name.

Note that the media type application/ace-groupcomm+cbor MUST be used
when these parameters are transported in the respective message
fields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>CBOR Type</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>error</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>error_description</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gid</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gname</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array of tstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guri</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array of tstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scope</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get_pub_keys</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array / nil</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
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<td>client_cred</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>cnonce</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_cred_verify</td>
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<td>pub_keys_repos</td>
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<td>[this document]</td>
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<td>control_uri</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gkty</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>int / tstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
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<td>key</td>
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<td>int / tstr</td>
<td>See the &quot;ACE Groupcomm Key Types&quot; registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>num</td>
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<td>int</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-groupcomm-profile</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
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<td>TBD</td>
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<td>pub_keys</td>
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<td>peer_roles</td>
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<td>[this document]</td>
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<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group_policies</td>
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<td>map</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
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<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kdc_nonce</td>
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<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>tstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sign_info</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kdcchallenge</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 35: ACE Groupcomm Parameters
The KDC is expected to support and understand all the parameters above. Instead, a Client can support and understand only a subset of such parameters, depending on the roles it expects to take in the joined groups or on other conditions defined in application profiles of this specification.

In the following, the parameters are categorized according to the support expected by Clients. That is, a Client that supports a parameter is able to: i) use and specify it in a request message to the KDC; and ii) understand and process it if specified in a response message from the KDC. It is REQUIRED of application profiles of this specification to sort their newly defined parameters according to the same categorization (REQ29).

Note that the actual use of a parameter and its inclusion in a message depends on the specific exchange, the specific Client and group involved, as well as what is defined in the used application profile of this specification.

A Client MUST support the following parameters.

* 'scope', 'gkty', 'key', 'num', 'exp', 'gid', 'gname', 'guri', 'pub_keys', 'peer_identifiers', 'ace_groupcomm_profile', 'control_uri', 'rekeying_scheme'.

A Client SHOULD support the following parameter.

* 'get_pub_keys'. That is, not supporting this parameter would yield the inconvenient and undesirable behavior where: i) the Client does not ask for the other group members’ public keys upon joining the group (see Section 4.3.1.1); and ii) later on as a group member, the Client only retrieves the public keys of all group members (see Section 4.4.2.1).

A Client MAY support the following optional parameters. Application profiles of this specification MAY define that Clients must or should support these parameters instead (OPT15).

* 'error', 'error_description'.

The following conditional parameters are relevant only if specific conditions hold. It is REQUIRED of application profiles of this specification to define whether Clients must, should or may support these parameters, and under which circumstances (REQ30).

* 'client_cred', 'cnonce', 'client_cred_verify'. These parameters are relevant for a Client that has a public key to use in a joined group.
* 'kdcchallenge'. This parameter is relevant for a Client that has a public key to use in a joined group and that provides the access token to the KDC through a Token Transfer Request (see Section 3.3).

* 'pub_keys_repo'. This parameter is relevant for a Client that has a public key to use in a joined group and that makes it available from a key repository different than the KDC.

* 'group_policies'. This parameter is relevant for a Client that is interested in the specific policies used in a group, but it does not know them or cannot become aware of them before joining that group.

* 'peer_roles'. This parameter is relevant for a Client that has to know about the roles of other group members, especially when retrieving and handling their corresponding public keys.

* 'kdc_nonce', 'kdc_cred', 'kdc_cred_verify'. These parameters are relevant for a Client that joins a group for which, as per the used application profile of this specification, the KDC has an associated public key and this is required for the correct group operation.

* 'mgt_key_material'. This parameter is relevant for a Client that supports an advanced rekeying scheme possibly used in the group, such as based on one-to-many rekeying messages sent over IP multicast.

* 'control_group_uri'. This parameter is relevant for a Client that supports the hosting of local resources each associated to a group (hence acting as CoAP server) and the reception of one-to-many requests sent to those resources by the KDC (e.g., over IP multicast), targeting multiple members of the corresponding group. Examples of related management operations that the KDC can perform by this means are the eviction of group members and the execution of a group rekeying process through an advanced rekeying scheme, such as based on one-to-many rekeying messages.

9. ACE Groupcomm Error Identifiers

This specification defines a number of values that the KDC can include as error identifiers, in the 'error' field of an error response with Content-Format application/ace-groupcomm+cbor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Operation permitted only to group members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Request inconsistent with the current roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Public key incompatible with the group configuration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Invalid proof-of-possession evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No available node identifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Group membership terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Group deleted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 36: ACE Groupcomm Error Identifiers

A Client supporting the 'error' parameter (see Section 4.1.2 and Section 8) and able to understand the specified error may use that information to determine what actions to take next. If it is included in the error response and supported by the Client, the 'error_description' parameter may provide additional context.

In particular, the following guidelines apply, and application profiles of this specification can define more detailed actions for the Client to take when learning that a specific error has occurred.

* In case of error 0, the Client should stop sending the request in question to the KDC. Rather, the Client should first join the targeted group. If it has not happened already, this first requires the Client to obtain an appropriate access token authorizing access to the group and provide it to the KDC.

* In case of error 1, the Client as a group member should re-join the group with all the roles needed to perform the operation in question. This might require the Client to first obtain a new access token and provide it to the KDC, if the current access token does not authorize to take those roles in the group. For operations admitted to a Client which is not a group member (e.g., an external signature verifier), the Client should first obtain a new access token authorizing to also have the missing roles.
* In case of error 2, the Client has to obtain or self-generate a different asymmetric key pair, as aligned to the public key algorithms, parameters and encoding used in the targeted group. After that, the Client should provide its new consistent public key to the KDC.

* In case of error 3, the Client should ensure to be computing its proof-of-possession evidence by correctly using the parameters and procedures defined in the used application profile of this specification. In an unattended setup, it might be not possible for a Client to autonomously diagnose the error and take an effective next action to address it.

* In case of error 4, the Client should wait for a certain (pre-configured) amount of time, before trying re-sending its request to the KDC.

* In case of error 5, the Client may try joining the group again. This might require the Client to first obtain a new access token and provide it to the KDC, e.g., if the current access token has expired.

* In case of error 6, the Client should clean up its state regarding the group, just like if it has left the group with no intention to re-join it.

10. Security Considerations

Security considerations are inherited from the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], and from the specific transport profile of ACE used between the Clients and the KDC, e.g., [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].

Furthermore, the following security considerations apply.

10.1. Secure Communication in the Group

When a group member receives a message from a certain sender for the first time since joining the group, it needs to have a mechanism in place to avoid replayed messages, e.g., Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] or Appendix E of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. Such a mechanism aids the recipient group member also in case it has rebooted and lost the security state used to protect previous group communications with that sender.

By its nature, the KDC is invested with a large amount of trust, since it acts as generator and provider of the symmetric keying material used to protect communications in each of its groups. While
details depend on the specific communication and security protocols used in the group, the KDC is in the position to decrypt messages exchanged in the group as if it was also a group member, as long as those are protected through commonly shared group keying material.

A compromised KDC would thus put the attacker in the same position, which also means that:

* The attacker can generate and control new group keying material, hence possibly rekeying the group and evicting certain group members as part of a broader attack.

* The attacker can actively participate to communications in a group even without been authorized to join it, and can allow further unauthorized entities to do so.

* The attacker can build erroneous associations between node identifiers and group members’ public keys.

On the other hand, as long as the security protocol used in the group ensures source authentication of messages (e.g., by means of signatures), the KDC is not able to impersonate group members since it does now own their private keys.

Further security considerations are specific of the communication and security protocols used in the group, and thus have to be provided by those protocols and complemented by the application profiles of this specification using them.

10.2. Update of Group Keying Material

Due to different reasons, the KDC can generate new group keying material and provide it to the group members (rekeying) through the rekeying scheme used in the group, as discussed in Section 6.

In particular, the KDC must renew the group keying material latest upon its expiration. Before then, the KDC may also renew the group keying material on a regular or periodical fashion.

The KDC should renew the group keying material upon a group membership change. Since the minimum number of group members is one, the KDC should provide also a Client joining an empty group with new keying material never used before in that group. Similarly, the KDC should provide new group keying material also to a Client that remains the only member in the group after the leaving of other group members.
Note that the considerations in Section 10.1 about dealing with replayed messages still hold, even in case the KDC rekeys the group upon every single joining of a new group member. However, if the KDC has renewed the group keying material upon a group member’s joining, and the time interval between the end of the rekeying process and that member’s joining is sufficiently small, then that group member is also on the safe side, since it would not accept replayed messages protected with the old group keying material previous to its joining.

The KDC may enforce a rekeying policy that takes into account the overall time required to rekey the group, as well as the expected rate of changes in the group membership. That is, the KDC may not rekey the group at each and every group membership change, for instance if members’ joining and leaving occur frequently and performing a group rekeying takes too long. Instead, the KDC might rekey the group after a minimum number of group members have joined or left within a given time interval, or after a maximum amount of time since the last group rekeying was completed, or yet during predictable network inactivity periods.

However, this would result in the KDC not constantly preserving backward and forward security in the group. That is:

* Newly joining group members would be able to access the keying material used before their joining, and thus they could access past group communications if they have recorded old exchanged messages. This might still be acceptable for some applications and in situations where the new group members are freshly deployed through strictly controlled procedures.

* The leaving group members would remain able to access upcoming group communications, as protected with the current keying material that has not been updated. This is typically undesirable, especially if the leaving group member is compromised or suspected to be, and it might have an impact or compromise the security properties of the protocols used in the group to protect messages exchanged among the group member.

The KDC should renew the group keying material in case it has rebooted, even in case it stores the whole group keying material in persistent storage. This assumes that the secure associations with the current group members as well as any administrative keying material required to rekey the group are also stored in persistent storage.

However, if the KDC relies on Observe notifications to distribute the new group keying material, the KDC would have lost all the current ongoing Observations with the group members after rebooting, and the
group members would continue using the old group keying material. Therefore, the KDC will rather rely on each group member asking for the new group keying material (see Section 4.3.2.1 and Section 4.8.1.1), or rather perform a group rekeying by actively sending rekeying messages to group members as discussed in Section 6.

The KDC needs to have a mechanism in place to detect DoS attacks from nodes repeatedly performing actions that might trigger a group rekeying. Such actions can include leaving and/or re-joining the group at high rates, or often asking the KDC for new individual keying material. Ultimately, the KDC can resort to removing these nodes from the group and (temporarily) preventing them from joining the group again.

The KDC also needs to have a congestion control mechanism in place, in order to avoid network congestion upon distributing new group keying material. For example, CoAP and Observe give guidance on such mechanisms, see Section 4.7 of [RFC7252] and Section 4.5.1 of [RFC7641].

A node that has left the group should not expect any of its outgoing messages to be successfully processed, if received by other nodes after its leaving, due to a possible group rekeying occurred before the message reception.

10.2.1. Misalignment of Group Keying Material

A group member can receive a message shortly after the group has been rekeyed, and new keying material has been distributed by the KDC (see Section 6). In the following two cases, this may result in misaligned keying material between the group members.

In the first case, the sender protects a message using the old group keying material. However, the recipient receives the message after having received the new group keying material, hence not being able to correctly process it. A possible way to ameliorate this issue is to preserve the old, recent group keying material for a maximum amount of time defined by the application, during which it is used solely for processing incoming messages. By doing so, the recipient can still temporarily process received messages also by using the old, retained group keying material. Note that a former (compromised) group member can take advantage of this by sending messages protected with the old, retained group keying material. Therefore, a conservative application policy should not admit the storage of old group keying material. Eventually, the sender will have obtained the new group keying material too, and can possibly re-send the message protected with such keying material.
In the second case, the sender protects a message using the new group keying material, but the recipient receives that message before having received the new group keying material. Therefore, the recipient would not be able to correctly process the message and hence discards it. If the recipient receives the new group keying material shortly after that and the application at the sender endpoint performs retransmissions, the former will still be able to receive and correctly process the message. In any case, the recipient should actively ask the KDC for the latest group keying material according to an application-defined policy, for instance after a given number of unsuccessfully decrypted incoming messages.

10.3. Block-Wise Considerations

If the Block-Wise CoAP options [RFC7959] are used, and the keying material is updated in the middle of a Block-Wise transfer, the sender of the blocks just changes the group keying material to the updated one and continues the transfer. As long as both sides get the new group keying material, updating group the keying material in the middle of a transfer will not cause any issue. Otherwise, the sender will have to transmit the message again, when receiving an error message from the recipient.

Compared to a scenario where the transfer does not use Block-Wise, depending on how fast the group keying material is changed, the group members might consume a larger amount of the network bandwidth by repeatedly resending the same blocks, which might be problematic.

11. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

11.1. Media Type Registrations

This specification registers the 'application/ace-groupcomm+cbor' media type for messages of the protocols defined in this document following the ACE exchange and carrying parameters encoded in CBOR. This registration follows the procedures specified in [RFC6838].

Type name: application

Subtype name: ace-groupcomm+cbor

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as CBOR map containing the protocol parameters defined in [this document].

Security considerations: See Section 10 of this document.

Interoperability considerations: n/a

Published specification: [this document]

Applications that use this media type: The type is used by Authorization Servers, Clients and Resource Servers that support the ACE groupcomm framework as specified in [this document].

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information: N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org)

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: None

Author: Francesca Palombini francesca.palombini@ericsson.com (mailto:francesca.palombini@ericsson.com)

Change controller: IESG

11.2. CoAP Content-Formats

IANA is asked to register the following entry to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group.

Media Type: application/ace-groupcomm+cbor

Encoding: -

ID: TBD

Reference: [this document]

11.3. OAuth Parameters

IANA is asked to register the following entries in the "OAuth Parameters" registry following the procedure specified in Section 11.2 of [RFC6749].
* Parameter name: sign_info
* Parameter usage location: client-rs request, rs-client response
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[This specification]]

* Parameter name: kdcchallenge
* Parameter usage location: rs-client response
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[This specification]]

11.4. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings

IANA is asked to register the following entries in the "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry following the procedure specified in Section 8.10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* Name: sign_info
* CBOR Key: TBD (range -256 to 255)
* Value Type: Simple value null / array
* Reference: [[This specification]]

* Name: kdcchallenge
* CBOR Key: TBD (range -256 to 255)
* Value Type: Byte string
* Reference: [[This specification]]

11.5. Interface Description (if=) Link Target Attribute Values

IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "Interface Description (if=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group.

* Attribute Value: ace.group
* Description: The 'ace group' interface is used to provision keying material and related information and policies to members of a group using the Ace framework.

* Reference: [This Document]

11.6. CBOR Tags

IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "CBOR Tags" registry.

* Tag : TBD_TAG
* Data Item: byte string
* Semantics: Extended ACE scope format, including the identifier of the used scope semantics.

* Reference: [This Document]

11.7. ACE Groupcomm Parameters

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Parameters" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15.

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

* CBOR Key: This is the value used as CBOR key of the item. These values MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer, a negative integer, or a string.

* CBOR Type: This contains the CBOR type of the item, or a pointer to the registry that defines its type, when that depends on another item.

* Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the item.

This registry has been initially populated by the values in Section 8. The Reference column for all of these entries refers to sections of this document.
11.8. ACE Groupcomm Key Types

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Key Types" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15.

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

* Key Type Value: This is the value used to identify the keying material. These values MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer, a negative integer, or a text string.

* Profile: This field may contain one or more descriptive strings of application profiles to be used with this item. The values should be taken from the Name column of the "ACE Groupcomm Profiles" registry.

* Description: This field contains a brief description of the keying material.

* References: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the format of the keying material, if one exists.

This registry has been initially populated by the values in Figure 10. The specification column for all of these entries will be this document.

11.9. ACE Groupcomm Profiles

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Profiles" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: The name of the application profile, to be used as value of the profile attribute.
11.10. ACE Groupcomm Policies

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Policies" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: The name of the group communication policy.

* CBOR label: The value to be used to identify this group communication policy. Key map labels MUST be unique. The label can be a positive integer, a negative integer or a string. Integer values between 0 and 255 and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length 2 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are designated as expert review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private use.

* CBOR type: the CBOR type used to encode the value of this group communication policy.

* Description: This field contains a brief description for this group communication policy.

* Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification providing the format of the group communication policy, if one exists.
This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 11.

11.11. Sequence Number Synchronization Methods

This specification establishes the "Sequence Number Synchronization Methods" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: The name of the sequence number synchronization method.

* Value: The value to be used to identify this sequence number synchronization method.

* Description: This field contains a brief description for this sequence number synchronization method.

* Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification describing the sequence number synchronization method.

11.12. ACE Scope Semantics

This specification establishes the "ACE Scope Semantics" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Value: The value to be used to identify this scope semantics. The value MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer or a negative integer. Integer values between 0 and 255 are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as expert review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private use.

* Description: This field contains a brief description of the scope semantics.
11.13. ACE Groupcomm Errors

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Errors" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Value: The value to be used to identify the error. The value MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer or a negative integer. Integer values between 0 and 255 are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as expert review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private use.

* Description: This field contains a brief description of the error.

* Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification defining the error, if one exists.

This registry has been initially populated by the values in Section 9. The Reference column for all of these entries refers to this document.

11.14. ACE Groupcomm Rekeying Schemes

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Rekeying Schemes" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 11.15. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Value: The value to be used to identify the group rekeying scheme. The value MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer or a negative integer. Integer values between 0 and 255 are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values...
from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as expert review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private use.

* Name: The name of the group rekeying scheme.

* Description: This field contains a brief description of the group rekeying scheme.

* Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification defining the group rekeying scheme, if one exists.

This registry has been initially populated by the value in Figure 12.

11.15. Expert Review Instructions

The IANA Registries established in this document are defined as expert review. This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.

Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

* Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as private use are intended for testing purposes and closed environments, code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.

* Specifications are required for the standards track range of point assignment. Specifications should exist for specification required ranges, but early assignment before a specification is available is considered to be permissible. Specifications are needed for the first-come, first-serve range if they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an interoperable way. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is being used for.
Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range for standards track documents does not mean that a standards track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range. The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that size.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[COSE.Algorithms]
IANA, "COSE Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#algorithms>.

[COSE.Header.Parameters]
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H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)",
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and J. Park, "Group OSCORE - Secure Group Communication for CoAP",
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[I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]

[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]

[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]


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12.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]

[I-D.ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile]


Appendix A. Requirements on Application Profiles

This section lists the requirements on application profiles of this specification, for the convenience of application profile designers.

A.1. Mandatory-to-Address Requirements

* REQ1: Specify the format and encoding of 'scope'. This includes defining the set of possible roles and their identifiers, as well as the corresponding encoding to use in the scope entries according to the used scope format (see Section 3.1).

* REQ2: If the AIF format of 'scope' is used, register its specific instance of "Toid" and "Tperm", as well as the corresponding Media Type and Content-Format, as per the guidelines in [I-D.ietf-ace-aif].

* REQ3: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_alg' (see Section 3.3).
REQ4: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_parameters' (see Section 3.3).

REQ5: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_key_parameters' (see Section 3.3).

REQ6: Specify the acceptable formats for encoding public keys and, if used, the acceptable values for 'pub_key_enc' (see Section 3.3).

REQ7: If the value of the GROUPNAME URI path and the group name in the access token scope (gname in Section 3.2) are not required to coincide, specify the mechanism to map the GROUPNAME value in the URI to the group name (see Section 4.1).

REQ8: Define whether the KDC has a public key and if this has to be provided through the 'kdc_cred' parameter, see Section 4.3.1.

REQ9: Specify if any part of the KDC interface as defined in this document is not supported by the KDC (see Section 4.1).

REQ10: Register a Resource Type for the root url-path, which is used to discover the correct url to access at the KDC (see Section 4.1).

REQ11: Define what specific actions (e.g., CoAP methods) are allowed on each resource provided by the KDC interface, depending on whether the Client is a current group member; the roles that a Client is authorized to take as per the obtained access token (see Section 3.1); and the roles that the Client has as current group member.

REQ12: Categorize possible newly defined operations for Clients into primary operations expected to be minimally supported and secondary operations, and provide accompanying considerations (see Section 4.1.1).

REQ13: Specify the encoding of group identifier (see Section 4.2.1).

REQ14: Specify the approaches used to compute and verify the PoP evidence to include in 'client_cred_verify', and which of those approaches is used in which case (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ15: Specify how the nonce N_S is generated, if the token is not provided to the KDC through the Token Transfer Request to the authz-info endpoint (e.g., if it is used directly to validate TLS instead).
REQ16: Define the initial value of the 'num' parameter (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ17: Specify the format of the 'key' parameter (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ18: Specify the acceptable values of the 'gkty' parameter (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ19: Specify and register the application profile identifier (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ20: If used, specify the format and content of 'group_policies' and its entries. Specify the policies default values (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ21: Specify the approaches used to compute and verify the PoP evidence to include in 'kdc_cred_verify', and which of those approaches is used in which case (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ22: Specify the communication protocol the members of the group must use (e.g., multicast CoAP).

REQ23: Specify the security protocol the group members must use to protect their communication (e.g., group OSCORE). This must provide encryption, integrity and replay protection.

REQ24: Specify how the communication is secured between Client and KDC. Optionally, specify transport profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] to use between Client and KDC (see Section 4.3.1.1).

REQ25: Specify the format of the identifiers of group members (see Section 4.3.1).

REQ26: Specify policies at the KDC to handle ids that are not included in 'get_pub_keys' (see Section 4.4.1).

REQ27: Specify the format of newly-generated individual keying material for group members, or of the information to derive it, and corresponding CBOR label (see Section 4.8.1).

REQ28: Specify and register the identifier of newly defined semantics for binary scopes (see Section 7).

REQ29: Categorize newly defined parameters according to the same criteria of Section 8.
REQ30: Define whether Clients must, should or may support the conditional parameters defined in Section 8, and under which circumstances.

A.2. Optional-to-Address Requirements

* OPT1: Optionally, if the textual format of 'scope' is used, specify CBOR values to use for abbreviating the role identifiers in the group (see Section 3.1).

* OPT2: Optionally, specify the additional parameters used in the exchange of Token Transfer Request and Response (see Section 3.3).

* OPT3: Optionally, specify the negotiation of parameter values for signature algorithm and signature keys, if 'sign_info' is not used (see Section 3.3).

* OPT4: Optionally, specify possible or required payload formats for specific error cases.

* OPT5: Optionally, specify additional identifiers of error types, as values of the 'error' field in an error response from the KDC.

* OPT6: Optionally, specify the encoding of 'pub_keys_repos' if the default is not used (see Section 4.3.1).

* OPT7: Optionally, specify the functionalities implemented at the 'control_uri' resource hosted at the Client, including message exchange encoding and other details (see Section 4.3.1).

* OPT8: Optionally, specify the behavior of the handler in case of failure to retrieve a public key for the specific node (see Section 4.3.1).

* OPT9: Optionally, define a default group rekeying scheme, to refer to in case the 'rekeying_scheme' parameter is not included in the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1).

* OPT10: Optionally, specify the functionalities implemented at the 'control_group_uri' resource hosted at the Client, including message exchange encoding and other details (see Section 4.3.1).

* OPT11: Optionally, specify policies that instruct Clients to retain messages and for how long, if they are unsuccessfully decrypted (see Section 4.8.1.1). This makes it possible to decrypt such messages after getting updated keying material.
* OPT12: Optionally, specify for the KDC to perform group rekeying (together or instead of renewing individual keying material) when receiving a Key Renewal Request (see Section 4.8.2.1).

* OPT13: Optionally, specify how the identifier of a group member’s public key is included in requests sent to other group members (see Section 4.9.1.1).

* OPT14: Optionally, specify additional information to include in rekeying messages for the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme (see Section 6).

* OPT15: Optionally, specify if Clients must or should support any of the parameters defined as optional in this specification (see Section 8).

Appendix B. Extensibility for Future COSE Algorithms

As defined in Section 8.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], future algorithms can be registered in the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms] as specifying none or multiple COSE capabilities.

To enable the seamless use of such future registered algorithms, this section defines a general, agile format for each 'sign_info_entry' of the 'sign_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response, see Section 3.3.1.

If any of the currently registered COSE algorithms is considered, using this general format yields the same structure of 'sign_info_entry' defined in this document, thus ensuring retro-compatibility.

B.1. Format of 'sign_info_entry'

The format of each 'sign_info_entry' (see Section 3.3.1) is generalized as follows. Given N the number of elements of the 'sign_parameters' array, i.e., the number of COSE capabilities of the signature algorithm, then:

* 'sign_key_parameters' is replaced by N elements 'sign_capab_i', each of which is a CBOR array.

* The i-th array following 'sign_parameters', i.e., 'sign_capab_i' (i = 0, ..., N-1), is the array of COSE capabilities for the algorithm capability specified in 'sign_parameters'[i].
sign_info_entry =
[  id : gname / [ + gname ],
  sign_alg : int / tstr,
  sign_parameters : [ alg_capab_1 : any,
  alg_capab_2 : any,
  ...,
  alg_capab_N : any],
  sign_capab_1 : [ any ],
  sign_capab_2 : [ any ],
  ...
  sign_capab_N : [ any ],
  pub_key_enc = int / nil ]

gname = tstr

Figure 37: 'sign_info_entry' with general format

Appendix C.  Document Updates

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

C.1.  Version -14 to -15
  * Fixed nits.

C.2.  Version -13 to -14
  * Clarified scope and goal of the document in abstract and introduction.
  * Overall clarifications on semantics of operations and parameters.
  * Major restructuring in the presentation of the KDC interface.
  * Revised error handling, also removing redundant text.
  * Imported parameters and KDC resource about the KDC’s public key from draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore.
  * New parameters ‘group_rekeying_scheme’ and ‘control_group_uri’.
  * Provided example of administrative keying material transported in ‘mgt_key_material’.
  * Reasoned categorization of parameters, as expected support by ACE Clients.
* Reasoned categorization of KDC functionalities, as minimally/
  optional to support for ACE Clients.

* Guidelines on enhanced error responses using 'error' and
  'error_description'.

* New section on group rekeying, discussing at a high-level a basic
  one-to-one approach and possible one-to-many approaches.

* Revised and expanded security considerations, also about the KDC.

* Updated list of requirements for application profiles.

* Several further clarifications and editorial improvements.

C.3. Version -05 to -13

* Incremental revision of the KDC interface.

* Removed redundancy in parameters about signature algorithm and
  signature keys.

* Node identifiers always indicated with 'peer_identifiers'.

* Format of public keys changed from raw COSE Keys to be
  certificates, CWTs or CWT Claims Set (CCS). Adapted parameter
  'pub_key_enc'.

* Parameters and functionalities imported from draft-ietf-key-
  groupcomm-oscore where early defined.

* Possible provisioning of the KDC’s Diffie-Hellman public key in
  response to the Token transferring to /authz-info.

* Generalized proof-of-possession evidence, to be not necessarily a
  signature.

* Public keys of group members may be retrieved filtering by role
  and/or node identifier.

* Enhanced error handling with error code and error description.

* Extended "typed" format for the 'scope' claim, optional to use.

* Editorial improvements.

C.4. Version -04 to -05
Updated uppercase/lowercase URI segments for KDC resources.
* Supporting single Access Token for multiple groups/topics.
* Added 'control_uri' parameter in the Joining Request.
* Added 'peer_roles' parameter to support legal requesters/responders.
* Clarification on stopping using owned keying material.
* Clarification on different reasons for processing failures, related policies, and requirement OPT11.
* Added a KDC sub-resource for group members to upload a new public key.
* Possible group rekeying following an individual Key Renewal Request.
* Clarified meaning of requirement REQ3; added requirement OPT12.
* Editorial improvements.

C.5. Version -03 to -04
* Revised RESTful interface, as to methods and parameters.
* Extended processing of joining request, as to check/retrieval of public keys.
* Revised and extended profile requirements.
* Clarified specific usage of parameters related to signature algorithms/keys.
* Included general content previously in draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore
* Registration of media type and content format application/ace-group+cbor
* Editorial improvements.

C.6. Version -02 to -03
* Exchange of information on the signature algorithm and related parameters, during the Token POST (Section 3.3).
* Restructured KDC interface, with new possible operations (Section 4).

* Client PoP signature for the Joining Request upon joining (Section 4.1.2.1).

* Revised text on group member removal (Section 5).

* Added more profile requirements (Appendix A).

C.7. Version -01 to -02

* Editorial fixes.

* Distinction between transport profile and application profile (Section 1.1).

* New parameters 'sign_info' and 'pub_key_enc' to negotiate parameter values for signature algorithm and signature keys (Section 3.3).

* New parameter 'type' to distinguish different Key Distribution Request messages (Section 4.1).

* New parameter 'client_cred_verify' in the Key Distribution Request to convey a Client signature (Section 4.1).

* Encoding of 'pub_keys_repos' (Section 4.1).

* Encoding of 'mgt_key_material' (Section 4.1).

* Improved description on retrieval of new or updated keying material (Section 6).

* Encoding of 'get_pub_keys' in Public Key Request (Section 7.1).

* Extended security considerations (Sections 10.1 and 10.2).

* New "ACE Public Key Encoding" IANA registry (Section 11.2).

* New "ACE Groupcomm Parameters" IANA registry (Section 11.3), populated with the entries in Section 8.

* New "Ace Groupcomm Request Type" IANA registry (Section 11.4), populated with the values in Section 9.
* New "ACE Groupcomm Policy" IANA registry (Section 11.7) populated with two entries "Sequence Number Synchronization Method" and "Key Update Check Interval" (Section 4.2).

* Improved list of requirements for application profiles (Appendix A).

C.8.  Version -00 to -01

* Changed name of 'req_aud' to 'audience' in the Authorization Request (Section 3.1).

* Defined error handling on the KDC (Sections 4.2 and 6.2).

* Updated format of the Key Distribution Response as a whole (Section 4.2).

* Generalized format of 'pub_keys' in the Key Distribution Response (Section 4.2).

* Defined format for the message to request leaving the group (Section 5.2).

* Renewal of individual keying material and methods for group rekeying initiated by the KDC (Section 6).

* CBOR type for node identifiers in 'get_pub_keys' (Section 7.1).

* Added section on parameter identifiers and their CBOR keys (Section 8).

* Added request types for requests to a Join Response (Section 9).

* Extended security considerations (Section 10).

* New IANA registries "ACE Groupcomm Key registry", "ACE Groupcomm Profile registry", "ACE Groupcomm Policy registry" and "Sequence Number Synchronization Method registry" (Section 11).

* Added appendix about requirements for application profiles of ACE on group communication (Appendix A).

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Abstract

This document defines an application profile of the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization, to request and provision keying material in group communication scenarios that are based on CoAP and are secured with Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE). This application profile delegates the authentication and authorization of Clients, that join an OSCORE group through a Resource Server acting as Group Manager for that group. This application profile leverages protocol-specific transport profiles of ACE to achieve communication security, server authentication and proof-of-possession for a key owned by the Client and bound to an OAuth 2.0 Access Token.

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1. Introduction

Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] is a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] and enabling end-to-end security of CoAP payload and options.

As described in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], Group OSCORE is used to protect CoAP group communication [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], which can employ, for example, IP multicast as underlying data transport. This relies on a Group Manager, which is responsible for managing an OSCORE group and enables the group members to exchange CoAP messages secured with Group OSCORE. The Group Manager can be responsible for multiple groups, coordinates the joining process of new group members, and is entrusted with the distribution and renewal of group keying material.

This document is an application profile of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], which itself builds on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Message exchanges among the participants as well as message formats and processing follow what specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] for provisioning and renewing keying material in group communication scenarios, where Group OSCORE is used to protect CoAP group communication.
1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with:

* The terms and concepts described in the ACE framework for authentication and authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and in the Authorization Information Format (AIF) [I-D.ietf-ace-aif] to express authorization information. The terminology for entities in the considered architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. In particular, this includes Client (C), Resource Server (RS), and Authorization Server (AS).

* The terms and concept related to the message formats and processing specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], for provisioning and renewing keying material in group communication scenarios.

* The terms and concepts described in CBOR [RFC8949] and COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs].

* The terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252] and group communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition, aimed at denoting resources such as /token and /introspect at the AS, and /authz-info at the RS. This document does not use the CoAP definition of "endpoint", which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol".

* The terms and concepts for protection and processing of CoAP messages through OSCORE [RFC8613] and through Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] in group communication scenarios. These especially include:

  - Group Manager, as the entity responsible for a set of groups where communications are secured with Group OSCORE. In this document, the Group Manager acts as Resource Server.
Authentication credential, as the set of information associated with an entity, including that entity’s public key and parameters associated with the public key. Examples of authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC7925] and C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert].

Additionally, this document makes use of the following terminology.

* Requester: member of an OSCORE group that sends request messages to other members of the group.

* Responder: member of an OSCORE group that receives request messages from other members of the group. A responder may reply back, by sending a response message to the requester which has sent the request message.

* Monitor: member of an OSCORE group that is configured as responder and never replies back to requesters after receiving request messages. This corresponds to the term "silent server" used in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

* Signature verifier: entity external to the OSCORE group and intended to verify the signature of messages exchanged in the group (see Sections 3.1 and 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). An authorized signature verifier does not join the OSCORE group as an actual member, yet it can retrieve the authentication credentials of the current group members from the Group Manager.

* Signature-only group: an OSCORE group that uses only the group mode (see Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

* Pairwise-only group: an OSCORE group that uses only the pairwise mode (see Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

2. Protocol Overview

Group communication for CoAP has been enabled in [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] and can be secured with Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE) as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. A network node joins an OSCORE group by interacting with the responsible Group Manager. Once registered in the group, the new node can securely exchange messages with other group members.
This document describes how to use [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] and [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] to perform a number of authentication, authorization and key distribution actions as overviewed in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], when the considered group is specifically an OSCORE group.

With reference to [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]:

* The node wishing to join the OSCORE group, i.e., the joining node, is the Client.

* The Group Manager is the Key Distribution Center (KDC), acting as a Resource Server.

* The Authorization Server associated with the Group Manager is the AS.

A node performs the steps described in Sections 3 and 4.3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] in order to obtain an authorization for joining an OSCORE group and then to join that group. The format and processing of messages exchanged during such steps are further specified in Section 5 and Section 6 of this document.

All communications between the involved entities MUST be secured.

In particular, communications between the Client and the Group Manager leverage protocol-specific transport profiles of ACE to achieve communication security, proof-of-possession and server authentication. It is expected that, in the commonly referred base-case of this document, the transport profile to use is pre-configured and well-known to nodes participating in constrained applications.

With respect to what is defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]:

* The interface provided by the Group Manager extends the original interface defined in Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] for the KDC, as specified in Section 8 of this document.

* In addition to those defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], additional parameters are defined in this document and summarized in Section 12.

* In addition to those defined in Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], additional error identifiers are defined in this document and summarized in Section 13.
Finally, Appendix A lists the specifications on this application profile of ACE, based on the requirements defined in Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

3. Format of Scope

Building on Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], this section defines the exact format and encoding of scope used in this profile.

To this end, this profile uses the Authorization Information Format (AIF) [I-D.ietf-ace-aif]. In particular, with reference to the generic AIF model

\[
\text{AIF-Generic} \langle \text{Toid}, \text{Tperm} \rangle = [\ast [\text{Toid}, \text{Tperm}]]
\]

the value of the CBOR byte string used as scope encodes the CBOR array \([\ast [\text{Toid}, \text{Tperm}]]\), where each \([\text{Toid}, \text{Tperm}]\) element corresponds to one scope entry.

Furthermore, this document defines the new AIF specific data model \(\text{AIF-OSCORE-GROUPCOMM}\), that this profile MUST use to format and encode scope entries.

In particular, the following holds for each scope entry.

* The object identifier ("Toid") is specialized as a CBOR item specifying the name of the groups pertaining to the scope entry.

* The permission set ("Tperm") is specialized as a CBOR unsigned integer with value \(R\), specifying the permissions that the Client wishes to have in the groups indicated by "Toid".

More specifically, the following applies when, as defined in this document, a scope entry includes as set of permissions the set of roles to take in an OSCORE group.

* The object identifier ("Toid") is a CBOR text string, specifying the group name for the scope entry.

* The permission set ("Tperm") is a CBOR unsigned integer with value \(R\), specifying the role(s) that the Client wishes to take in the group (REQ1). The value \(R\) is computed as follows.

  - Each role in the permission set is converted into the corresponding numeric identifier \(X\) from the "Value" column of the "Group OSCORE Roles" registry, for which this document defines the entries in Figure 1.
The set of $N$ numbers is converted into the single value $R$, by taking two to the power of each numeric identifier $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_N$, and then computing the inclusive OR of the binary representations of all the power values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>This value is reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requester</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Send requests; receive responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responder</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Send responses; receive requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Receive requests; never send requests/responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verifier</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Verify signature of intercepted messages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Numeric identifier of roles in an OSCORE group

The following CDDL [RFC8610] notation defines a scope entry that uses the AIF-OSCORE-GROUPCOMM data model and expresses a set of Group OSCORE roles from those in Figure 1.

```
AIF-OSCORE-GROUPCOMM = AIF-Generic<oscore-gname, oscore-gperm>

oscore-gname = tstr ; Group name
oscore-gperm = uint . bits group-oscore-roles

group-oscore-roles = &(
    Requester: 1,
    Responder: 2,
    Monitor: 3,
    Verifier: 4
)

scope_entry = [oscore-gname, oscore-gperm]
```

Future specifications that define new Group OSCORE roles MUST register a corresponding numeric identifier in the "Group OSCORE Roles" registry defined in Section 16.10 of this document.

Note that the value 0 is not available to use as numeric identifier to specify a Group OSCORE role. It follows that, when expressing Group OSCORE roles to take in a group as per this document, a scope entry has the least significant bit of "Tperm" always set to 0.
This is an explicit feature of the AIF-OSCORE-GROUPCOMM data model. That is, for each scope entry, the least significant bit of "Tperm" set to 0 explicitly identifies the scope entry as exactly expressing a set of Group OSCORE roles ("Tperm"), pertaining to a single group whose name is specified by the string literal in "Toid".

Instead, by relying on the same AIF-OSCORE-GROUPCOMM data model, [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-gm-admin] defines the format of scope entries for Administrator Clients that wish to access an admin interface at the Group Manager. In such scope entries, the least significant bit of "Tperm" is always set to 1.

4. Authentication Credentials

Source authentication of a message sent within the group and protected with Group OSCORE is ensured by means of a digital signature embedded in the message (in group mode), or by integrity-protecting the message with pairwise keying material derived from the asymmetric keys of sender and recipient (in pairwise mode).

Therefore, group members must be able to retrieve each other’s authentication credential from a trusted repository, in order to verify source authenticity of incoming group messages.

As also discussed in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], the Group Manager acts as trusted repository of the authentication credentials of the group members, and provides those authentication credentials to group members if requested to. Upon joining an OSCORE group, a joining node is thus expected to provide its own authentication credential to the Group Manager.

In particular, one of the following four cases can occur when a new node joins an OSCORE group.

* The joining node is going to join the group exclusively as monitor, i.e., it is not going to send messages to the group. In this case, the joining node is not required to provide its own authentication credential to the Group Manager, which thus does not have to perform any check related to the format of the authentication credential, to a signature or ECDH algorithm, and to possible parameters associated with the algorithm and the public key. In case the joining node still provides an authentication credential in the ‘client_cred’ parameter of the Joining Request (see Section 6.1), the Group Manager silently ignores that parameter, as well as the related parameters ‘cnonce’ and ‘client_cred_verify’.
* The Group Manager already acquired the authentication credential of the joining node during a past joining process. In this case, the joining node MAY choose not to provide again its own authentication credential to the Group Manager, in order to limit the size of the Joining Request. The joining node MUST provide its own authentication credential again if it has provided the Group Manager with multiple authentication credentials during past joining processes, intended for different OSCORE groups. If the joining node provides its own authentication credential, the Group Manager performs consistency checks as per Section 6.2 and, in case of success, considers it as the authentication credential associated with the joining node in the OSCORE group.

* The joining node and the Group Manager use an asymmetric proof-of-possession key to establish a secure communication association. Then, two cases can occur.

1. When establishing the secure communication association, the Group Manager obtained from the joining node the joining node’s authentication credential, in the format used in the OSCORE group and including the asymmetric proof-of-possession key as public key. Also, such authentication credential and the proof-of-possession key are compatible with the signature or ECDH algorithm, and possible associated parameters used in the OSCORE group.

   In this case, the Group Manager considers the authentication credential as the one associated with the joining node in the OSCORE group. If the joining node is aware that the authentication credential and the public key included thereof are also valid for the OSCORE group, then the joining node MAY choose to not provide again its own authentication credential to the Group Manager.

   The joining node MUST provide again its own authentication credential if it has provided the Group Manager with multiple authentication credentials during past joining processes, intended for different OSCORE groups. If the joining node provides its own authentication credential in the ‘client_cred’ parameter of the Joining Request (see Section 6.1), the Group Manager performs consistency checks as per Section 6.2 and, in case of success, considers it as the authentication credential associated with the joining node in the OSCORE group.
2. The authentication credential is not in the format used in the
OSCORE group, or else the authentication credential and the
proof-of-possession key included as public key are not
compatible with the signature or ECDH algorithm, and possible
associated parameters used in the OSCORE group.

In this case, the joining node MUST provide a different
compatible authentication credential and public key included
thereof to the Group Manager in the 'client_cred' parameter of
the Joining Request (see Section 6.1). Then, the Group
Manager performs consistency checks on this latest provided
authentication credential as per Section 6.2 and, in case of
success, considers it as the authentication credential
associated with the joining node in the OSCORE group.

* The joining node and the Group Manager use a symmetric proof-of-
possession key to establish a secure communication association.
In this case, upon performing a joining process with that Group
Manager for the first time, the joining node specifies its own
authentication credential in the ‘client_cred’ parameter of the
Joining Request (see Section 6.1).

5. Authorization to Join a Group

This section builds on Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] and
is organized as follows.

First, Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 describe how the joining node
interacts with the AS, in order to be authorized to join an OSCORE
group under a given Group Manager and to obtain an Access Token.
Then, Section 5.3 describes how the joining node transfers the
obtained Access Token to the Group Manager. The following considers
a joining node that intends to contact the Group Manager for the
first time.

Note that what is defined in Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] applies, and only additions or
modifications to that specification are defined in this document.

5.1. Authorization Request

The Authorization Request message is as defined in Section 3.1 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions.

* If the 'scope' parameter is present:
- The value of the CBOR byte string encodes a CBOR array, whose format MUST follow the data model AIF-OSCORE-GROUPCOMM defined in Section 3. In particular, for each OSCORE group to join:
  o The group name is encoded as a CBOR text string.
  o The set of requested roles is expressed as a single CBOR unsigned integer. This is computed as defined in Section 3, from the numerical abbreviations of each requested role defined in the "Group OSCORE Roles" registry, for which this document defines the entries in Figure 1 (REQ1).

5.2. Authorization Response

The Authorization Response message is as defined in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions:

* The AS MUST include the ‘expires_in’ parameter. Other means for the AS to specify the lifetime of Access Tokens are out of the scope of this document.

* The AS MUST include the ‘scope’ parameter, when the value included in the Access Token differs from the one specified by the joining node in the Authorization Request. In such a case, the second element of each scope entry MUST be present, and specifies the set of roles that the joining node is actually authorized to take in the OSCORE group for that scope entry, encoded as specified in Section 5.1.

Furthermore, if the AS uses the extended format of scope defined in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] for the ‘scope’ claim of the Access Token, the first element of the CBOR sequence [RFC8742] MUST be the CBOR integer with value SEM_ID_TBD, defined in Section 16.12 of this document (REQ28). This indicates that the second element of the CBOR sequence, as conveying the actual access control information, follows the scope semantics defined for this application profile in Section 3 of this document.

5.3. Token Transferring

The exchange of Token Transfer Request and Token Transfer Response is defined in Section 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In addition to that, the following applies:

* The Token Transfer Request MAY additionally contain the following parameters, which, if included, MUST have the corresponding values defined below (OPT2):

- 'ecdh_info' defined in Section 5.3.1 of this document, with value the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) to request information about the ECDH algorithm, the ECDH algorithm parameters, the ECDH key parameters and the exact format of authentication credentials used in the groups that the Client has been authorized to join. This is relevant in case the joining node supports the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

- 'kdc_dh_creds' defined in Section 5.3.2 of this document, with value the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) to request the Diffie-Hellman authentication credentials of the Group Manager for the groups that the Client has been authorized to join. That is, each of such authentication credentials includes a Diffie-Hellman public key of the Group Manager. This is relevant in case the joining node supports the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

Alternatively, the joining node may retrieve this information by other means.

* The 'kdcchallenge' parameter contains a dedicated nonce N_S generated by the Group Manager. For the N_S value, it is RECOMMENDED to use a 8-byte long random nonce. The joining node can use this nonce in order to prove the possession of its own private key, upon joining the group (see Section 6.1).

The 'kdcchallenge' parameter MAY be omitted from the Token Transfer Response, if the 'scope' of the Access Token specifies only the role "monitor" or only the role "verifier" or only the two roles combined, for each and every of the specified groups.

* If the 'sign_info' parameter is present in the response, the following applies for each element 'sign_info_entry'.

  - 'id' MUST NOT refer to OSCORE groups that are pairwise-only groups.
  
  - 'sign_alg' takes value from the "Value" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

  - 'sign_parameters' is a CBOR array. Its format and value are the same of the COSE capabilities array for the algorithm indicated in 'sign_alg', as specified for that algorithm in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms] (REQ4).
- 'sign_key_parameters' is a CBOR array. Its format and value are the same of the COSE capabilities array for the COSE key type of the keys used with the algorithm indicated in 'sign_alg', as specified for that key type in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types] (REQ5).

- 'pub_key_enc' takes value from the "Label" column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry [COSE.Header.Parameters] (REQ6). Consistently with Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], acceptable values denote a format of authentication credential that MUST explicitly provide the public key as well as the comprehensive set of information related to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable).

At the time of writing this specification, acceptable formats of authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC7925] and C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. Further formats may be available in the future, and would be acceptable to use as long as they comply with the criteria defined above.

[ As to CWTs and CCSs, the COSE Header Parameters 'kcwt' and 'kccs' are under pending registration requested by draft-ietf-lake-edhoc. ]

[ As to C509 certificates, the COSE Header Parameters 'c5b' and 'c5c' are under pending registration requested by draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert. ]

This format is consistent with every signature algorithm currently considered in [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], i.e., with algorithms that have only the COSE key type as their COSE capability. Appendix B of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] describes how the format of each 'sign_info_entry' can be generalized for possible future registered algorithms having a different set of COSE capabilities.

* If 'ecdh_info' is included in the Token Transfer Request, the Group Manager SHOULD include the 'ecdh_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response, as per the format defined in Section 5.3.1. Note that the field 'id' of each 'ecdh_info_entry' specifies the name, or array of group names, for which that 'ecdh_info_entry' applies to.
As an exception, the KDC MAY omit the 'ecdh_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response even if 'ecdh_info' is included in the Token Transfer Request, in case all the groups that the Client is authorized to join are signature-only groups.

* If 'kdc_dh_creds' is included in the Token Transfer Request and any of the groups that the Client has been authorized to join is a pairwise-only group, then the Group Manager MUST include the 'kdc_dh_creds' parameter in the Token Transfer Response, as per the format defined in Section 5.3.2. Otherwise, if 'kdc_dh_creds' is included in the Token Transfer Request, the Group Manager MAY include the 'kdc_dh_creds' parameter in the Token Transfer Response. Note that the field 'id' specifies the group name, or array of group names, for which the corresponding 'kdc_dh_creds' applies to.

Note that, other than through the above parameters as defined in Section 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the joining node may have obtained such information by alternative means. For example, information conveyed in the 'sign_info' and 'ecdh_info' parameters may have been pre-configured, or the joining node MAY early retrieve it by using the approach described in [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery], to discover the OSCORE group and the link to the associated group-membership resource at the Group Manager (OPT3).

5.3.1. 'ecdh_info' Parameter

The 'ecdh_info' parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the request and response messages exchanged between the Client and the authz-info endpoint at the RS (see Section 5.10.1. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

This parameter allows the Client and the RS to exchange information about an ECDH algorithm as well as about the authentication credentials and public keys to accordingly use for deriving Diffie-Hellman secrets. Its exact semantics and content are application specific.

In this application profile, this parameter is used to exchange information about the ECDH algorithm as well as about the authentication credentials and public keys to be used with it, in the groups indicated by the transferred Acces Token as per its 'scope' claim (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]).

When used in the Token Transfer Request sent to the Group Manager, the 'ecdh_info' parameter has value the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6). This is done to ask for information about the ECDH algorithm.
as well as about the authentication credentials and public keys to be used to compute static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secrets [NIST-800-56A], in the OSCORE groups that the Client has been authorized to join and that use the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

When used in the following Token Transfer Response from the Group Manager, the 'ecdh_info' parameter is a CBOR array of one or more elements. The number of elements is at most the number of OSCORE groups that the Client has been authorized to join.

Each element contains information about ECDH parameters as well as about authentication credentials and public keys, for one or more OSCORE groups that use the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE and that the Client has been authorized to join. Each element is formatted as follows.

* The first element 'id' is the group name of the OSCORE group or an array of group names for the OSCORE groups for which the specified information applies. In particular 'id' MUST NOT refer to OSCORE groups that are signature-only groups.

* The second element 'ecdh_alg' is a CBOR integer or a CBOR text string indicating the ECDH algorithm used in the OSCORE group identified by 'gname'. Values are taken from the "Value" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

* The third element 'ecdh_parameters' is a CBOR array indicating the parameters of the ECDH algorithm used in the OSCORE group identified by 'gname'. Its format and value are the same of the COSE capabilities array for the algorithm indicated in 'ecdh_alg', as specified for that algorithm in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

* The fourth element 'ecdh_key_parameters' is a CBOR array indicating the parameters of the keys used with the ECDH algorithm in the OSCORE group identified by 'gname'. Its content depends on the value of 'ecdh_alg'. In particular, its format and value are the same of the COSE capabilities array for the COSE key type of the keys used with the algorithm indicated in 'ecdh_alg', as specified for that key type in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types].

* The fifth element 'cred_fmt' is a CBOR integer indicating the format of authentication credentials used in the OSCORE group identified by 'gname'. It takes value from the "Label" column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry [COSE.Header.Parameters] (REQ6). Acceptable values denote a format that MUST provide the
In the Token Transfer Request to the Group Manager.

ecdh_info_res = [ + ecdh_info_entry ] ; in the Token Transfer Response from the Group Manager.

ecdh_info_entry =
[ id : gname / [ + gname ],
  ecdh_alg : int / tstr,
  ecdh_parameters : [ any ],
  ecdh_key_parameters : [ any ],
  cred_fmt = int
]

gname = tstr

This format is consistent with every ECDH algorithm currently defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], i.e., with algorithms that have only the COSE key type as their COSE capability. Appendix B of this document describes how the format of each 'ecdh_info_entry' can be generalized for possible future registered algorithms having a different set of COSE capabilities.

5.3.2. ‘kdc_dh_creds’ Parameter

The 'kdc_dh_creds' parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the request and response messages exchanged between the Client and the authz-info endpoint at the RS (see Section 5.10.1. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

This parameter allows the Client to request and retrieve the Diffie-Hellman authentication credentials of the RS, i.e., authentication credentials including a Diffie-Hellman public key of the RS.
In this application profile, this parameter is used to request and retrieve from the Group Manager its Diffie-Hellman authentication credentials to use, in the OSCORE groups that the Client has been authorized to join. The Group Manager has specifically a Diffie-Hellman authentication credential in an OSCORE group, and thus a Diffie-Hellman public key in that group, if and only if the group is a pairwise-only group. In this case, the early retrieval of the Group Manager’s authentication credential is necessary in order for the joining node to prove the possession of its own private key, upon joining the group (see Section 6.1).

When used in the Token Transfer Request sent to the Group Manager, the ‘kdc_dh_creds’ parameter has value the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6). This is done to ask for the Diffie-Hellman authentication credentials that the Group Manager uses in the OSCORE groups that the Client has been authorized to join.

When used in the following Token Transfer Response from the Group Manager, the ‘kdc_dh_creds’ parameter is a CBOR array of one or more elements. The number of elements is at most the number of OSCORE groups that the Client has been authorized to join.

Each element ‘kdc_dh_creds_entry’ contains information about the Group Manager’s Diffie-Hellman authentication credentials, for one or more OSCORE groups that are pairwise-only groups and that the Client has been authorized to join. Each element is formatted as follows.

* The first element ‘id’ is the group name of the OSCORE group or an array of group names for the OSCORE groups for which the specified information applies. In particular ‘id’ MUST refer exclusively to OSCORE groups that are pairwise-only groups.

* The second element ‘cred_fmt’ is a CBOR integer indicating the format of authentication credentials used in the OSCORE group identified by ‘gname’. It takes value from the "Label" column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry [COSE.Header.Parameters] (REQ6). Acceptable values denote a format that MUST explicitly provide the public key as well as comprehensive set of information related to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable). The same considerations and guidelines for the ‘pub_key_enc’ element of ‘sign_info’ apply (see Section 5.3).

* The third element ‘cred’ is a CBOR byte string, which encodes the Group Manager’s Diffie-Hellman authentication credential in its original binary representation made available to other endpoints in the group. In particular, the original binary representation complies with the format specified by the ‘cred_fmt’ element.
Note that the authentication credential provides the comprehensive set of information related to its public key algorithm, i.e., the ECDH algorithm used in the OSCORE group as pairwise key agreement algorithm.

The CDDL notation [RFC8610] of the 'kdc_dh_creds' parameter is given below.

\[
kdc_dh_creds = kdc_dh_creds_req / kdc_dh_creds_resp
\]

\[
kdc_dh_creds_req = null                     \; in the Token Transfer
                   ; in the Token Transfer
                   ; Request to the
                   ; Group Manager
\]

\[
kdc_dh_creds_res = [ + kdc_dh_creds_entry ] ; in the Token Transfer
                   ; Response from the
                   ; Group Manager
\]

\[
kdc_dh_creds_entry =
[   id : gname / [ + gname ],
    cred_fmt = int,
    cred = bstr
]
\]

6. Group Joining

This section describes the interactions between the joining node and the Group Manager to join an OSCORE group. The message exchange between the joining node and the Group Manager consists of the messages defined in Section 4.3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. Note that what is defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] applies, and only additions or modifications to that specification are defined in this document.

6.1. Send the Joining Request

The joining node requests to join the OSCORE group by sending a Joining Request message to the related group-membership resource at the Group Manager, as per Section 4.3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. Additionally to what is defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the following applies.
* The 'scope' parameter MUST be included. Its value encodes one scope entry with the format defined in Section 3, indicating the group name and the role(s) that the joining node wants to take in the group.

* The 'get_pub_keys' parameter is present only if the joining node wants to retrieve the authentication credentials of the group members from the Group Manager during the joining process (see Section 4). Otherwise, this parameter MUST NOT be present.

If this parameter is present and its value is not the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6), each element of the inner CBOR array 'role_filter' is encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer, with the same value of a permission set ("Tperm") indicating that role or combination of roles in a scope entry, as defined in Section 3.

* 'cnonce' contains a dedicated nonce N_C generated by the joining node. For the N_C value, it is RECOMMENDED to use a 8-byte long random nonce.

* The proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence included in 'client_cred_verify' is computed as defined below (REQ14). In either case, the N_S used to build the PoP input is as defined in Section 6.1.1.

- If the group is not a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence MUST be a signature. The joining node computes the signature by using the same private key and signature algorithm it intends to use for signing messages in the OSCORE group.

- If the group is a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence MUST be a MAC computed as follows, by using the HKDF Algorithm HKDF SHA-256, which consists of composing the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps [RFC5869].

\[ \text{MAC} = \text{HKDF}(\text{salt}, \text{IKM}, \text{info}, L) \]

The input parameters of HKDF are as follows.

- salt takes as value the empty byte string.

- IKM is computed as a cofactor Diffie-Hellman shared secret, see Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A], using the ECDH algorithm used in the OSCORE group. The joining node uses its own Diffie-Hellman private key and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the Group Manager. For X25519 and X448, the procedure is described in Section 5 of [RFC7748].
6.1.1.  Value of the N_S Challenge

The value of the N_S challenge is determined as follows.

1. If the joining node has provided the Access Token to the Group Manager by means of a Token Transfer Request to the /authz-info endpoint as in Section 5.3, then N_S takes the same value of the most recent ‘kdcchallenge’ parameter received by the joining node from the Group Manager. This can be either the one specified in the Token Transfer Response, or the one possibly specified in a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response to a following Joining Request (see Section 6.2).

2. If the provisioning of the Access Token to the Group Manager has relied on the DTLS profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] with the Access Token as content of the "psk_identity" field of the ClientKeyExchange message [RFC6347], then N_S is an exporter value computed as defined in Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]. Specifically, N_S is exported from the DTLS session between the joining node and the Group Manager, using an empty ’context_value’, 32 bytes as ’key_length’, and the exporter label "EXPORTER-ACE-Sign-Challenge-coap-group-oscore-app" defined in Section 16.7 of this document.

It is up to applications to define how N_S is computed in further alternative settings.

Section 15.3 provides security considerations on the reusage of the N_S challenge.

6.2.  Receive the Joining Request

The Group Manager processes the Joining Request as defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions.

The Group Manager verifies the PoP evidence contained in ”client_cred_verify” as follows:
* As PoP input, the Group Manager uses the value of the 'scope' parameter from the Joining Request as a CBOR byte string, concatenated with N_S encoded as a CBOR byte string, concatenated with N_C encoded as a CBOR byte string. In particular, N_S is determined as described in Section 6.1.1, while N_C is the nonce provided in the 'cnonce' parameter of the Joining Request.

* As public key of the joining node, the Group Manager uses either the one included in the authentication credential retrieved from the 'client_cred' parameter of the Joining Request, or the one from the already stored authentication credential as acquired from previous interactions with the joining node (see Section 4).

* If the group is not a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence is a signature. The Group Manager verifies it by using the public key of the joining node, as well as the signature algorithm used in the OSCORE group and possible corresponding parameters.

* If the group is a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence is a MAC. The Group Manager recomputes the MAC through the same process taken by the joining node when preparing the value of the 'client_cred_verify' parameter for the Joining Request (see Section 6.1), with the difference that the Group Manager uses its own Diffie-Hellman private key and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the joining node. The verification succeeds if and only if the recomputed MAC is equal to the MAC conveyed as PoP evidence in the Joining Request.

The Group Manager MUST reply with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) error response in the following cases:

* There are currently no OSCORE Sender IDs available to assign in the OSCORE group and, at the same time, the joining node is not going to join the group exclusively as monitor. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 4 ("No available node identifiers").

* The OSCORE group that the joining node has been trying to join is currently inactive (see Section 8.1). The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 9 ("Group currently not active").

The Group Manager MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response in the following cases:
* The 'client_cred' parameter is present in the Joining Request and its value is not an eligible authentication credential (e.g., it is not of the format accepted in the group).

* The 'client_cred' parameter is not present in the Joining Request while the joining node is not going to join the group exclusively as monitor, and any of the following conditions holds:
  - The Group Manager does not store an eligible authentication credential (e.g., of the format accepted in the group) for the joining node.
  - The Group Manager stores multiple eligible authentication credentials (e.g., of the format accepted in the group) for the joining node.

* The 'scope' parameter is not present in the Joining Request, or it is present and specifies any set of roles not included in the following list: "requester", "responder", "monitor", ("requester", "responder"). Future specifications that define a new role for members of OSCORE groups MUST define possible sets of roles (including the new role and existing roles) that are acceptable to specify in the 'scope' parameter of a Joining Request.

* The Joining Request includes the 'client_cred' parameter but does not include both the 'cnonce' and 'client_cred_verify' parameters.

In order to prevent the acceptance of Ed25519 and Ed448 public keys that cannot be successfully converted to Montgomery coordinates, and thus cannot be used for the derivation of pairwise keys (see Section 2.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), the Group Manager MAY reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response in case all the following conditions hold:

* The OSCORE group uses the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.

* The OSCORE group uses EdDSA public keys [RFC8032].

* The authentication credential of the joining node from the 'client_cred' parameter includes a public key which:
  - Is for the elliptic curve Ed25519 and has its Y coordinate equal to -1 or 1 (mod p), with p = (2^255 - 19), see Section 4.1 of [RFC7748]; or
  - Is for the elliptic curve Ed448 and has its Y coordinate equal to -1 or 1 (mod p), with p = (2^448 - 2^224 - 1), see Section 4.2 of [RFC7748].
A 4.00 (Bad Request) error response from the Group Manager to the joining node MUST have content format application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. The response payload is a CBOR map formatted as follows:

* If the group uses (also) the group mode of Group OSCORE, the CBOR map MUST contain the 'sign_info' parameter, whose CBOR label is defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. This parameter has the same format of 'sign_info_res' defined in Section 3.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, it includes a single element 'sign_info_entry' pertaining to the OSCORE group that the joining node has tried to join with the Joining Request.

* If the group uses (also) the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE, the CBOR map MUST contain the 'ecdh_info' parameter, whose CBOR label is defined in Section 16.3. This parameter has the same format of 'ecdh_info_res' defined in Section 5.3.1. In particular, it includes a single element 'ecdh_info_entry' pertaining to the OSCORE group that the joining node has tried to join with the Joining Request.

* If the group is a pairwise-only group, the CBOR map MUST contain the 'kdc_dh_creds' parameter, whose CBOR label is defined in Section 16.3. This parameter has the same format of 'kdc_dh_creds_res' defined in Section 5.3.2. In particular, it includes a single element 'kdc_dh_creds_entry' pertaining to the OSCORE group that the joining node has tried to join with the Joining Request.

* The CBOR map MAY include the 'kdcchallenge' parameter, whose CBOR label is defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. If present, this parameter is a CBOR byte string, which encodes a newly generated 'kdcchallenge' value that the Client can use when preparing a Joining Request (see Section 6.1). In such a case the Group Manager MUST store the newly generated value as the 'kdcchallenge' value associated with the joining node, possibly replacing the currently stored value.

6.2.1. Follow-up to a 4.00 (Bad Request) Error Response

When receiving a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, the joining node MAY send a new Joining Request to the Group Manager. In such a case:

* The 'cnonce' parameter MUST include a new dedicated nonce N_C generated by the joining node.
* The ‘client_cred’ parameter MUST include an authentication credential in the format indicated by the Group Manager. Also, the authentication credential as well as the included public key MUST be compatible with the signature or ECDH algorithm, and possible associated parameters.

* The ‘client_cred_verify’ parameter MUST include a PoP evidence computed as described in Section 6.1, by using the private key associated with the authentication credential specified in the current ‘client_cred’ parameter, with the signature or ECDH algorithm, and possible associated parameters indicated by the Group Manager. If the error response from the Group Manager includes the ‘kdcchallenge’ parameter, the joining node MUST use its content as new N_S challenge to compute the PoP evidence.

6.3. Send the Joining Response

If the processing of the Joining Request described in Section 6.2 is successful, the Group Manager updates the group membership by registering the joining node NODENAME as a new member of the OSCORE group GROUPNAME, as described in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

If the joining node has not taken exclusively the role of monitor, the Group Manager performs also the following actions.

* The Group Manager selects an available OSCORE Sender ID in the OSCORE group, and exclusively assigns it to the joining node. The Group Manager MUST NOT assign an OSCORE Sender ID to the joining node if this joins the group exclusively with the role of monitor, according to what is specified in the Access Token (see Section 5.2).

Consistently with Section 3.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], the Group Manager MUST assign an OSCORE Sender ID that has not been used in the OSCORE group since the latest time when the current Gid value was assigned to the group.

If the joining node is recognized as a current group member, e.g., through the ongoing secure communication association, the following also applies.

- The Group Manager MUST assign a new OSCORE Sender ID different than the one currently used by the joining node in the OSCORE group.
The Group Manager MUST add the old, relinquished OSCORE Sender ID of the joining node to the most recent set of stale Sender IDs, in the collection associated with the group (see Section 7.1).

The Group Manager stores the association between i) the authentication credential of the joining node; and ii) the Group Identifier (Gid), i.e., the OSCORE ID Context, associated with the OSCORE group together with the OSCORE Sender ID assigned to the joining node in the group. The Group Manager MUST keep this association updated over time.

Then, the Group Manager replies to the joining node, providing the updated security parameters and keying material necessary to participate in the group communication. This success Joining Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions:

* The ‘gkty’ parameter identifies a key of type "Group_OSCORE_Input_Material object", defined in Section 16.4 of this document.

* The ‘key’ parameter includes what the joining node needs in order to set up the Group OSCORE Security Context as per Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

This parameter has as value a Group_OSCORE_Input_Material object, which is defined in this document and extends the OSCORE_Input_Material object encoded in CBOR as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. In particular, it contains the additional parameters ‘group_senderId’, ‘cred_fmt’, ‘sign_enc_alg’, ‘sign_alg’, ‘sign_params’, ‘ecdh_alg’ and ‘ecdh_params’ defined in Section 16.6 of this document.

More specifically, the ‘key’ parameter is composed as follows.

- The ‘hkdf’ parameter, if present, specifies the HKDF Algorithm used in the OSCORE group. The HKDF Algorithm is specified by the HMAC Algorithm value. This parameter MAY be omitted, if the HKDF Algorithm used in the group is HKDF SHA-256. Otherwise, this parameter MUST be present.

- The ‘salt’ parameter, if present, has as value the OSCORE Master Salt used in the OSCORE group. This parameter MAY be omitted, if the Master Salt used in the group is the empty byte string. Otherwise, this parameter MUST be present.
- The 'ms' parameter includes the OSCORE Master Secret value used in the OSCORE group. This parameter MUST be present.

- The 'contextId' parameter has as value the Group Identifier (Gid), i.e., the OSCORE ID Context of the OSCORE group. This parameter MUST be present.

- The 'group_senderId' parameter has as value the OSCORE Sender ID assigned to the joining node by the Group Manager, as described above. This parameter MUST be present if and only if the node does not join the OSCORE group exclusively with the role of monitor, according to what is specified in the Access Token (see Section 5.2).

- The 'cred_fmt' parameter specifies the format of authentication credentials used in the OSCORE group. This parameter MUST be present and it takes value from the "Label" column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry [COSE.Header.Parameters] (REQ6). Consistently with Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], acceptable values denote a format that MUST explicitly provide the public key as well as the comprehensive set of information related to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable).

At the time of writing this specification, acceptable formats of authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC7925] and C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. Further formats may be available in the future, and would be acceptable to use as long as they comply with the criteria defined above.

[ As to CWTs and CCSs, the COSE Header Parameters 'kcwt' and 'kccs' are under pending registration requested by draft-ietf-lake-edhoc. ]

[ As to C509 certificates, the COSE Header Parameters 'c5b' and 'c5c' are under pending registration requested by draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert. ]

The 'key' parameter MUST also include the following parameters, if and only if the OSCORE group is not a pairwise-only group.
- The 'sign_enc_alg' parameter, specifying the Signature Encryption Algorithm used in the OSCORE group to encrypt messages protected with the group mode. This parameter takes values from the "Value" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

- The 'sign_alg' parameter, specifying the Signature Algorithm used to sign messages in the OSCORE group. This parameter takes values from the "Value" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

- The 'sign_params' parameter, specifying the parameters of the Signature Algorithm. This parameter is a CBOR array, which includes the following two elements:
  
  - 'sign_alg_capab': a CBOR array, with the same format and value of the COSE capabilities array for the Signature Algorithm indicated in 'sign_alg', as specified for that algorithm in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

  - 'sign_key_type_capab': a CBOR array, with the same format and value of the COSE capabilities array for the COSE key type of the keys used with the Signature Algorithm indicated in 'sign_alg', as specified for that key type in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types].

The 'key' parameter MUST also include the following parameters, if and only if the OSCORE group is not a signature-only group.

- The 'alg' parameter, specifying the AEAD Algorithm used in the OSCORE group to encrypt messages protected with the pairwise mode.

- The 'ecdh_alg' parameter, specifying the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used in the OSCORE group. This parameter takes values from the "Value" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

- The 'ecdh_params' parameter, specifying the parameters of the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm. This parameter is a CBOR array, which includes the following two elements:
o 'ecdh_alg_capab': a CBOR array, with the same format and
value of the COSE capabilities array for the algorithm
indicated in 'ecdh_alg', as specified for that algorithm in
the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry
[COSE.Algorithms].

o 'ecdh_key_type_capab': a CBOR array, with the same format
and value of the COSE capabilities array for the COSE key
type of the keys used with the algorithm indicated in
'ecdh_alg', as specified for that key type in the
"Capabilities" column of the "COSE Key Types" registry
[COSE.Key.Types].

The format of 'key' defined above is consistent with every
signature algorithm and ECDH algorithm currently considered in
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], i.e., with algorithms that have
only the COSE key type as their COSE capability. Appendix B of
this document describes how the format of the 'key' parameter can
be generalized for possible future registered algorithms having a
different set of COSE capabilities.

Furthermore, the following applies.

* The 'exp' parameter MUST be present.

* The 'ace-groupcomm-profile' parameter MUST be present and has
value coap_group_oscore_app (PROFILE_TBD), which is defined in
Section 16.5 of this document.

* The 'pub_keys' parameter, if present, includes the authentication
credentials requested by the joining node by means of the
'get_pub_keys' parameter in the Joining Request.

If the joining node has asked for the authentication credentials
of all the group members, i.e., 'get_pub_keys' had value the CBOR
simple value "null" (0xf6) in the Joining Request, then the Group
Manager provides only the authentication credentials of the group
members that are relevant to the joining node. That is, in such a
case, 'pub_keys' includes only: i) the authentication credentials
of the responders currently in the OSCORE group, in case the
joining node is configured (also) as requester; and ii) the
authentication credentials of the requesters currently in the
OSCORE group, in case the joining node is configured (also) as
responder or monitor.
* The 'peer_identifiers' parameter includes the OSCORE Sender ID of each group member whose authentication credential is specified in the 'pub_keys' parameter. That is, a group member’s Sender ID is used as identifier for that group member (REQ25).

* The 'group_policies' parameter SHOULD be present, and SHOULD include the following elements:
  - "Key Update Check Interval" defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with default value 3600;
  - "Expiration Delta" defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with default value 0.

* The 'kdc_cred' parameter MUST be present, specifying the Group Manager’s authentication credential in its original binary representation (REQ8). The Group Manager’s authentication credential MUST be in the format used in the OSCORE group. Also, the authentication credential as well as the included public key MUST be compatible with the signature or ECDH algorithm, and possible associated parameters used in the OSCORE group.

* The 'kdc_nonce' parameter MUST be present, specifying the dedicated nonce N_KDC generated by the Group Manager. For N_KDC, it is RECOMMENDED to use a 8-byte long random nonce.

* The 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter MUST be present, specifying the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence computed by the Group Manager. The PoP evidence is computed over the nonce N_KDC, which is specified in the 'kdc_nonce' parameter and taken as PoP input. The PoP evidence is computed as defined below (REQ21).

  - If the group is not a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence MUST be a signature. The Group Manager computes the signature by using the signature algorithm used in the OSCORE group, as well as its own private key associated with the authentication credential specified in the 'kdc_cred' parameter.

  - If the group is a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence MUST be a MAC computed as follows, by using the HKDF Algorithm HKDF-SHA-256, which consists of composing the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps [RFC5869].

    \[ MAC = HKDF(salt, IKM, info, L) \]

    The input parameters of HKDF are as follows.
    - salt takes as value the empty byte string.
IKM is computed as a cofactor Diffie-Hellman shared secret, see Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A], using the ECDH algorithm used in the OSCORE group. The Group Manager uses its own Diffie-Hellman private key and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the joining node. For X25519 and X448, the procedure is described in Section 5 of [RFC7748].

- info takes as value the PoP input.
- L is equal to 8, i.e., the size of the MAC, in bytes.

* The 'group_rekeying' parameter MAY be omitted, if the Group Manager uses the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme registered in Section 11.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] as rekeying scheme in the OSCORE group (OPT9). Its detailed use for this profile is defined in Section 11 of this document. In any other case, the 'group_rekeying' parameter MUST be included.

As a last action, if the Group Manager reassigns Gid values during the group's lifetime (see Section 3.2.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), then the Group Manager MUST store the Gid specified in the 'contextId' parameter of the 'key' parameter, as the Birth Gid of the joining node in the joined group (see Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). This applies also in case the joining node is in fact re-joining the group; in such a case, the newly determined Birth Gid overwrites the one currently stored.

6.4. Receive the Joining Response

Upon receiving the Joining Response, the joining node retrieves the Group Manager’s authentication credential from the 'kdc_cred' parameter. The joining node MUST verify the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence specified in the 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter of the Joining Response as defined below (REQ21).

* If the group is not a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence is a signature. The joining node verifies it by using the public key of the Group Manager from the received authentication credential, as well as the signature algorithm used in the OSCORE group and possible corresponding parameters.

* If the group is a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence is a MAC. The joining node recomputes the MAC through the same process taken by the Group Manager when computing the value of the 'kdc_cred_verify' parameter (see Section 6.3), with the difference that the joining node uses its own Diffie-Hellman private key and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the Group Manager from the
received authentication credential. The verification succeeds if and only if the recomputed MAC is equal to the MAC conveyed as PoP evidence in the Joining Response.

In case of failed verification of the PoP evidence, the joining node MUST stop processing the Joining Response and MAY send a new Joining Request to the Group Manager (see Section 6.1).

In case of successful verification of the PoP evidence, the joining node uses the information received in the Joining Response to set up the Group OSCORE Security Context, as described in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. If the following parameters were not included in the 'key' parameter of the Joining Response, the joining node considers the default values specified below, consistently with Section 3.2 of [RFC8613].

* Absent the 'hkdf' parameter, the joining node considers HKDF SHA-256 as HKDF Algorithm to use in the OSCORE group.
* Absent the 'salt' parameter, the joining node considers the empty byte string as Master Salt to use in the OSCORE group.
* Absent the 'group_rekeying' parameter, the joining node considers the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme registered in Section 11.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] as the rekeying scheme used in the group (OPT9). Its detailed use for this profile is defined in Section 11 of this document.

In addition, the joining node maintains an association between each authentication credential retrieved from the 'pub_keys' parameter and the role(s) that the corresponding group member has in the OSCORE group.

From then on, the joining node can exchange group messages secured with Group OSCORE as described in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. When doing so:

* The joining node MUST NOT process an incoming request message, if protected by a group member whose authentication credential is not associated with the role "Requester".
* The joining node MUST NOT process an incoming response message, if protected by a group member whose authentication credential is not associated with the role "Responder".
* The joining node MUST NOT use the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE to process messages in the group, if the Joining Response did not include the 'ecdh_alg' parameter.
If the application requires backward security, the Group Manager MUST generate updated security parameters and group keying material, and provide it to the current group members, upon the new node’s joining (see Section 11). In such a case, the joining node is not able to access secure communication in the OSCORE group occurred prior its joining.

7. Overview of the Group Rekeying Process

In a number of cases, the Group Manager has to generate new keying material and distribute it to the group (rekeying), as also discussed in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

To this end the Group Manager MUST support the Group Rekeying Process described in Section 11 of this document, as an instance of the "Point-to-Point" rekeying scheme defined in Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] and registered in Section 11.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. Future documents may define the use of alternative group rekeying schemes for this application profile, together with the corresponding rekeying message formats. The resulting group rekeying process MUST comply with the functional steps defined in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

Upon generating the new group keying material and before starting its distribution, the Group Manager MUST increment the version number of the group keying material. When rekeying a group, the Group Manager MUST preserve the current value of the OSCORE Sender ID of each member in that group.

The data distributed to a group through a rekeying MUST include:

* The new version number of the group keying material for the group.

* A new Group Identifier (Gid) for the group as introduced in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], used as ID Context parameter of the Group OSCORE Common Security Context of that group (see Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

Note that the Gid differs from the group name also introduced in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], which is a plain, stable and invariant identifier, with no cryptographic relevance and meaning.

* A new value for the Master Secret parameter of the Group OSCORE Common Security Context of the group (see Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
A set of stale Sender IDs, which allows each rekeyed node to purge authentication credentials and Recipient Contexts used in the group and associated with those Sender IDs. This in turn allows every group member to rely on stored authentication credentials, in order to confidently assert the group membership of other sender nodes, when receiving protected messages in the group (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). More details on the maintenance of stale Sender IDs are provided in Section 7.1.

Also, the data distributed through a group rekeying MAY include a new value for the Master Salt parameter of the Group OSCORE Common Security Context of that group.

The Group Manager MUST rekey the group in the following cases.

* The application requires backward security - In this case, the group is rekeyed when a node joins the group as a new member. Therefore, a joining node cannot access communications in the group prior its joining.

* One or more nodes leave the group - That is, the group is rekeyed when one or more current members spontaneously request to leave the group (see Section 9.11), or when the Group Manager forcibly evicts them from the group, e.g., due to expired or revoked authorization (see Section 10). Therefore, a leaving node cannot access communications in the group after its leaving, thus ensuring forward security in the group.

Due to the set of stale Sender IDs distributed through the rekeying, this ensures that a node owning the latest group keying material does not store the authentication credentials of former group members (see Sections 3.2 and 12.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

* Extension of group lifetime - That is, the group is rekeyed when the expiration time for the group keying material approaches or has passed, if it is appropriate to extend the group operation beyond that.

The Group Manager MAY rekey the group for other reasons, e.g., according to an application-specific rekeying period or scheduling.

7.1. Stale OSCORE Sender IDs

Throughout the lifetime of every group, the Group Manager MUST maintain a collection of stale Sender IDs for that group.
The collection associated with a group MUST include up to \( N > 1 \) ordered sets of stale OSCORE Sender IDs. It is up to the application to specify the value of \( N \), possibly on a per-group basis.

The \( N \)-th set includes the Sender IDs that have become "stale" under the current version \( V \) of the group keying material. The \((N-1)\)-th set refers to the immediately previous version \((V-1)\) of the group keying material, and so on.

In the following cases, the Group Manager MUST add a new element to the most recent set \( X \), i.e., the set associated with the current version \( V \) of the group keying material.

* When a current group member obtains a new Sender ID, its old Sender ID is added to \( X \). This happens when the Group Manager assigns a new Sender ID upon request from the group member (see Section 9.2), or in case the group member re-joins the group (see Section 6.1 and Section 6.3), thus also obtaining a new Sender ID.

* When a current group member leaves the group, its current Sender ID is added to \( X \). This happens when a group member requests to leave the group (see Section 9.11) or is forcibly evicted from the group (see Section 10).

The value of \( N \) can change throughout the lifetime of the group. If the new value \( N' \) is smaller than \( N \), the Group Manager MUST preserve the (up to) \( N' \) most recent sets in the collection and MUST delete any possible older set from the collection.

Finally, the Group Manager MUST perform the following actions, when the group is rekeyed and the group shifts to the next version \( V' = (V + 1) \) of the group keying material.

1. The Group Manager rekeys the group. This includes also distributing the set of stale Sender IDs \( X \) associated with the old group keying material with version \( V \) (see Section 7).

2. After completing the group rekeying, the Group Manager creates a new empty set \( X' \) associated with the new version \( V' \) of the newly established group keying material, i.e., \( V' = (V + 1) \).

3. If the current collection of stale Sender IDs has size \( N \), the Group Manager deletes the oldest set in the collection.

4. The Group Manager adds the new set \( X' \) to the collection of stale Sender IDs, as the most recent set.
8. Interface at the Group Manager

The Group Manager provides the interface defined in Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the additional sub-resources defined from Section 8.1 to Section 8.3 of this document.

Furthermore, Section 8.4 provides a summary of the CoAP methods admitted to access different resources at the Group Manager, for nodes with different roles in the group or as non members (REQ11).

The GROUPNAME segment of the URI path MUST match with the group name specified in the scope entry of the Access Token scope (i.e., 'gname' in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]) (REQ7).

The Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute value "core.osc.gm" is registered in Section 16.11 (REQ10), and can be used to describe group-membership resources and its sub-resources at a Group Manager, e.g., by using a link-format document [RFC6690].

Applications can use this common resource type to discover links to group-membership resources for joining OSCORE groups, e.g., by using the approach described in [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery].

8.1. ace-group/GROUPNAME/active

This resource implements a GET handler.

8.1.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the handler verifies that the requesting Client is a current member of the group. If the verification fails, the KDC MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 0 ("Operation permitted only to group members").

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05 (Content) response, specifying the current status of the group, i.e., active or inactive. The payload of the response is formatted as defined in Section 9.9.

The method to set the current group status is out of the scope of this document, and is defined for the administrator interface of the Group Manager specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-gm-admin].
8.2. ace-group/GROUPNAME/verif-data

This resource implements a GET handler.

8.2.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the Group Manager performs the following checks.

If the requesting Client is a current group member, the Group Manager MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the ‘error’ field MUST be set to 8 (“Operation permitted only to signature verifiers”).

If GROUPNAME denotes a pairwise-only group, the Group Manager MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the ‘error’ field MUST be set to 7 (“Signatures not used in the group”).

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05 (Content) response, specifying data that allow also an external signature verifier to verify signatures of messages protected with the group mode and sent to the group (see Sections 3.1 and 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor. The payload of the response is a CBOR map, which is formatted as defined in Section 9.6.

8.3. ace-group/GROUPNAME/stale-sids

This resource implements a FETCH handler.

8.3.1. FETCH Handler

The handler expects a FETCH request, whose payload specifies a version number of the group keying material, encoded as an unsigned CBOR integer.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the handler verifies that the requesting Client is a current member of the group. If the verification fails, the Group Manager MUST reply with a 4.03
(Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the ‘error’ field MUST be set to 0 ("Operation permitted only to group members").

If all verifications succeed, the handler replies with a 2.05 (Content) response, specifying data that allow the requesting Client to delete the Recipient Contexts and authentication credentials associated with former members of the group (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. The payload of the response is formatted as defined in Section 11.3.1.

8.4. Admitted Methods

The table in Figure 2 summarizes the CoAP methods admitted to access different resources at the Group Manager, for (non-)members of a group with group name GROUPNAME, and considering different roles. The last two rows of the table apply to a node with node name NODENAME.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Type1</th>
<th>Type2</th>
<th>Type3</th>
<th>Type4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/</td>
<td>G Po</td>
<td>G Po</td>
<td>Po *</td>
<td>Po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/active</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/verif-data</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key</td>
<td>G F</td>
<td>G F</td>
<td>G F</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/stale-sids</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/num</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/</td>
<td>G Pu D</td>
<td>G D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NODENAME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/</td>
<td>Po</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NODENAME/pub-key</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CoAP methods: G = GET; F = FETCH; Po = POST; Pu = PUT; D = DELETE

Type1 = Member as Requester and/or Responder
Type2 = Member as Monitor
Type3 = Non-member (authorized to be signature verifier)
(*) = cannot join the group as signature verifier
Type4 = Non-member (not authorized to be signature verifier)

Figure 2: Admitted CoAP Methods on the Group Manager Resources

8.4.1. Signature Verifiers

Just like any candidate group member, a signature verifier provides the Group Manager with an Access Token, as described in Section 5.3. However, unlike candidate group members, it does not join any OSCORE group, i.e., it does not perform the joining process defined in Section 6.
After successfully transferring an Access Token to the Group Manager, a signature verifier is allowed to perform only some operations as non-member of a group, and only for the OSCORE groups specified in the validated Access Token. These are the operations specified in Section 9.3, Section 9.5, Section 9.6 and Section 9.10.

Consistently, in case a node is not a member of the group with group name GROUPNAME and is authorized to be only signature verifier for that group, the Group Manager MUST reply with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response if that node attempts to access any other endpoint than: /ace-group; ace-group/GROUPNAME/verif-data; /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key; and ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key.

8.5. Operations Supported by Clients

Building on what is defined in Section 4.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], and with reference to the resources at the Group Manager newly defined earlier in Section 8 of this document, it is expected that a Client minimally supports also the following set of operations and corresponding interactions with the Group Manager (REQ12).

* GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/active, in order to check the current status of the group.

* GET request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/verif-data, in order for a signature verifier to retrieve data required to verify signatures of messages protected with the group mode of Group OSCORE and sent to a group (see Sections 3.1 and 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). Note that this operation is relevant to support only to signature verifiers.

* FETCH request to ace-group/GROUPNAME/stale-sids, in order to retrieve from the Group Manager the data required to delete some of the stored group members' authentication credentials and associated Recipient Contexts (see Section 8.3.1). These data are provided as an aggregated set of stale Sender IDs, which are used as specified in Section 11.3.

9. Additional Interactions with the Group Manager

This section defines the possible interactions with the Group Manager, in addition to the group joining specified in Section 6.
9.1. Retrieve Updated Keying Material

At some point, a group member considers the Group OSCORE Security Context invalid and to be renewed. This happens, for instance, after a number of unsuccessful security processing of incoming messages from other group members, or when the Security Context expires as specified by the ‘exp’ parameter of the Joining Response.

When this happens, the group member retrieves updated security parameters and group keying material. This can occur in the two different ways described below.

9.1.1. Get Group Keying Material

If the group member wants to retrieve only the latest group keying material, it sends a Key Distribution Request to the Group Manager.

In particular, it sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME at the Group Manager.

The Group Manager processes the Key Distribution Request according to Section 4.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The Key Distribution Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions.

* The ‘key’ parameter is formatted as defined in Section 6.3 of this document, with the difference that it does not include the ‘group_SenderId’ parameter.

* The ‘exp’ parameter MUST be present.

* The ‘ace-groupcomm-profile’ parameter MUST be present and has value coap_group_oscore_app.

Upon receiving the Key Distribution Response, the group member retrieves the updated security parameters and group keying material, and, if they differ from the current ones, uses them to set up the new Group OSCORE Security Context as described in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

9.1.2. Get Group Keying Material and OSCORE Sender ID

If the group member wants to retrieve the latest group keying material as well as the OSCORE Sender ID that it has in the OSCORE group, it sends a Key Distribution Request to the Group Manager.

In particular, it sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME at the Group Manager.
The Group Manager processes the Key Distribution Request according to Section 4.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The Key Distribution Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions.

* The 'key' parameter is formatted as defined in Section 6.3 of this document. In particular, if the requesting group member has exclusively the role of monitor, then the 'key' parameter does not include the 'group_SenderId'.

Note that, in any other case, the current Sender ID of the group member is not specified as a separate parameter, but rather specified by 'group_SenderId' within the 'key' parameter.

* The 'exp' parameter MUST be present.

Upon receiving the Key Distribution Response, the group member retrieves the updated security parameters, group keying material and Sender ID, and, if they differ from the current ones, uses them to set up the new Group OSCORE Security Context as described in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

9.2. Request to Change Individual Keying Material

As discussed in Section 2.5.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], a group member may at some point exhaust its Sender Sequence Numbers in the OSCORE group.

When this happens, the group member MUST send a Key Renewal Request message to the Group Manager, as per Section 4.8.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, it sends a CoAP PUT request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME at the Group Manager.

Upon receiving the Key Renewal Request, the Group Manager processes it as defined in Section 4.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions.

The Group Manager MUST return a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response in case the OSCORE group identified by GROUPNAME is currently inactive (see Section 8.1). The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 9 ("Group currently not active").

Otherwise, the Group Manager performs one of the following actions.
1. If the requesting group member has exclusively the role of monitor, the Group Manager replies with a 4.03 (Forbidden) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 1 ("Request inconsistent with the current roles").

2. Otherwise, the Group Manager takes one of the following actions.

* The Group Manager rekeys the OSCORE group. That is, the Group Manager generates new group keying material for that group (see Section 11), and replies to the group member with a group rekeying message as defined in Section 11, providing the new group keying material. Then, the Group Manager rekeys the rest of the OSCORE group, as discussed in Section 11.

The Group Manager SHOULD perform a group rekeying only if already scheduled to occur shortly, e.g., according to an application-specific rekeying period or scheduling, or as a reaction to a recent change in the group membership. In any other case, the Group Manager SHOULD NOT rekey the OSCORE group when receiving a Key Renewal Request (OPT12).

* The Group Manager determines and assigns a new OSCORE Sender ID for that group member, and replies with a Key Renewal Response formatted as defined in Section 4.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, the CBOR Map in the response payload includes a single parameter 'group_SenderId' defined in Section 16.3 of this document, specifying the new Sender ID of the group member encoded as a CBOR byte string.

Consistently with Section 2.5.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], the Group Manager MUST assign a new Sender ID that has not been used in the OSCORE group since the latest time when the current Gid value was assigned to the group.

Furthermore, the Group Manager MUST add the old, relinquished Sender ID of the group member to the most recent set of stale Sender IDs, in the collection associated with the group (see Section 7.1).

The Group Manager MUST return a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response in case there are currently no Sender IDs available to assign in the OSCORE group. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is
formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 4 ("No available node identifiers").

9.3. Retrieve Authentication Credentials of Group Members

A group member or a signature verifier may need to retrieve the authentication credentials of (other) group members. To this end, the group member or signature verifier sends a Public Key Request message to the Group Manager, as per Sections 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, it sends the request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key at the Group Manager.

If the Public Key Request uses the method FETCH, the Public Key Request is formatted as defined in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular:

* Each element (if any) of the inner CBOR array 'role_filter' is formatted as in the inner CBOR array 'role_filter' of the 'get_pub_keys' parameter of the Joining Request when the parameter value is not the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) (see Section 6.1).

* Each element (if any) of the inner CBOR array 'id_filter' is a CBOR byte string, which encodes the OSCORE Sender ID of the group member for which the associated authentication credential is requested (REQ25).

Upon receiving the Public Key Request, the Group Manager processes it as per Section 4.4.1 or Section 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], depending on the request method being FETCH or GET, respectively. Additionally, if the Public Key Request uses the method FETCH, the Group Manager silently ignores node identifiers included in the 'get_pub_keys' parameter of the request that are not associated with any current group member (REQ26).

The success Public Key Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.4.1 or Section 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], depending on the request method being FETCH or GET, respectively.

9.4. Upload a New Authentication Credential

A group member may need to provide the Group Manager with its new authentication credential to use in the group from then on, hence replacing the current one. This can be the case, for instance, if the signature or ECDH algorithm and possible associated parameters used in the OSCORE group have been changed, and the current authentication credential is not compatible with them.
To this end, the group member sends a Public Key Update Request message to the Group Manager, as per Section 4.9.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following addition.

* The group member computes the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence included in 'client_cred_verify' in the same way taken when preparing a Joining Request for the OSCORE group in question, as defined in Section 6.1 (REQ14).

In particular, the group member sends a CoAP POST request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key at the Group Manager.

Upon receiving the Public Key Update Request, the Group Manager processes it as per Section 4.9.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with the following additions.

* The N_S challenge used to build the proof-of-possession input is computed as defined in Section 6.1.1 (REQ15).

* The Group Manager verifies the PoP challenge included in 'client_cred_verify' in the same way taken when processing a Joining Request for the OSCORE group in question, as defined in Section 6.2 (REQ14).

* The Group Manager MUST return a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response in case the OSCORE group identified by GROUPNAME is currently inactive (see Section 8.1). The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 9 ("Group currently not active").

* If the requesting group member has exclusively the role of monitor, the Group Manager replies with a 4.00 (Bad request) error response. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the 'error' field MUST be set to 1 ("Request inconsistent with the current roles").

* If the request is successfully processed, the Group Manager stores the association between i) the new authentication credential of the group member; and ii) the Group Identifier (Gid), i.e., the OSCORE ID Context, associated with the OSCORE group together with the OSCORE Sender ID assigned to the group member in the group. The Group Manager MUST keep this association updated over time.
9.5. Retrieve the Group Manager’s Authentication Credential

A group member or a signature verifier may need to retrieve the authentication credential of the Group Manager. To this end, the requesting Client sends a KDC Public Key Request message to the Group Manager.

In particular, it sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key at the Group Manager defined in Section 4.5.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], where GROUPNAME is the name of the OSCORE group.

In addition to what is defined in Section 4.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the Group Manager MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, if the requesting Client is not a current group member and GROUPNAME denotes a pairwise-only group. The response MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and is formatted as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The value of the ‘error’ field MUST be set to 7 ("Signatures not used in the group").

The payload of the 2.05 (Content) KDC Public Key Response is a CBOR map, which is formatted as defined in Section 4.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, the Group Manager specifies the parameters ‘kdc_cred’, ‘kdc_nonce’ and ‘kdc_challenge’ as defined for the Joining Response in Section 6.3 of this document. This especially applies to the computing of the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence included in ‘kdc_cred_verify’ (REQ21).

Upon receiving a 2.05 (Content) KDC Public Key Response, the requesting Client retrieves the Group Manager’s authentication credential from the ‘kdc_cred’ parameter, and proceeds as defined in Section 4.5.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, the requesting Client verifies the PoP evidence included in ‘kdc_cred_verify’ by means of the same method used when processing the Joining Response, as defined in Section 6.3 of this document (REQ21).

Note that a signature verifier would not receive a successful response from the Group Manager, in case GROUPNAME denotes a pairwise-only group.
9.6. Retrieve Signature Verification Data

A signature verifier may need to retrieve data required to verify signatures of messages protected with the group mode and sent to a group (see Sections 3.1 and 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). To this end, the signature verifier sends a Signature Verification Data Request message to the Group Manager.

In particular, it sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/verif-data at the Group Manager defined in Section 8.2 of this document, where GROUPNAME is the name of the OSCORE group.

The payload of the 2.05 (Content) Signature Verification Data Response is a CBOR map, which has the format used for the Joining Response message in Section 6.3, with the following differences.

* From the Joining Response message, only the parameters ‘gkty’, ‘key’, ‘num’, ‘exp’ and ‘ace-groupcomm-profile’ are present. In particular, the ‘key’ parameter includes only the following data.
  
  
  - The parameters ‘alg’ and ‘ecdh_alg’. These parameter MUST NOT be present if the group is a signature-only group. Otherwise, they MUST be present.

* The parameter ‘group_enc_key’ is also included, with CBOR label defined in Section 16.3. This parameter specifies the Group Encryption Key of the OSCORE Group, encoded as a CBOR byte string. The Group Manager derives the Group Encryption Key from the group keying material, as per Section 2.1.6 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. This parameter MUST be present.

In order to verify signatures in the group (see Section 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), the signature verifier relies on: the data retrieved from the 2.05 (Content) Signature Verification Data Response; the public keys of the group members signing the messages to verify, retrieved from those members’ authentication credentials that can be obtained as defined in Section 9.3; and the public key of the Group Manager, retrieved from the Group Manager’s authentication credential that can be obtained as defined in Section 9.5.

Figure 3 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 4 shows an example.
Signature Verification Data Request
------------------------------------------|
GET ace-group/GROUPNAME/verif-data

<--- Signature Verification Data Response: 2.05 (Content) --->

Figure 3: Message Flow of Signature Verification Data Request-Response

Request:
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
Uri-Path: "ace-group"
Uri-Path: "g1"
Uri-Path: "verif-data"
Payload: -

Response:
Header: Content (Code=2.05)
Content-Format: "application/ace-groupcomm+cbor"
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation, with GROUPCOMM_KEY_TBD and PROFILE_TBD being CBOR integers, while GROUP_ENC_KEY being a CBOR byte string):

```
{
  "gkty": GROUPCOMM_KEY_TBD,
  "key": {
    "hkdf": 5,                      ; HMAC 256/256
    "contextId": h'37fc',           ; x5chain
    "cred_fmt": 33,                 ; x5chain
    "sign_enc_alg": 10,             ; AES-CCM-16-64-128
    "sign_alg": -8,                 ; EdDSA
    "sign_params": [[1], [1, 6]]   ; [[OKP], [OKP, Ed25519]]
  },
  "num": 12,
  "exp": 1609459200,
  "ace_groupcomm_profile": PROFILE_TBD,
  "group_enc_key": GROUP_ENC_KEY
}
```

Figure 4: Example of Signature Verification Data Request-Response
9.7. Retrieve the Group Policies

A group member may request the current policies used in the OSCORE group. To this end, the group member sends a Policies Request, as per Section 4.6.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, it sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies at the Group Manager, where GROUPNAME is the name of the OSCORE group.

Upon receiving the Policies Request, the Group Manager processes it as per Section 4.6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The success Policies Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

9.8. Retrieve the Keying Material Version

A group member may request the current version of the keying material used in the OSCORE group. To this end, the group member sends a Version Request, as per Section 4.7.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, it sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/num at the Group Manager, where GROUPNAME is the name of the OSCORE group.

Upon receiving the Version Request, the Group Manager processes it as per Section 4.7.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The success Version Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.7.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

9.9. Retrieve the Group Status

A group member may request the current status of the OSCORE group, i.e., active or inactive. To this end, the group member sends a Group Status Request to the Group Manager.

In particular, the group member sends a CoAP GET request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/active at the Group Manager defined in Section 8.1 of this document, where GROUPNAME is the name of the OSCORE group.

The payload of the 2.05 (Content) Group Status Response includes the CBOR simple value "true" (0xf5) if the group is currently active, or the CBOR simple value "false" (0xf4) otherwise. The group is considered active if it is set to allow new members to join, and if communication within the group is fine to happen.

Upon learning from a 2.05 (Content) response that the group is currently inactive, the group member SHOULD stop taking part in communications within the group, until it becomes active again.
Upon learning from a 2.05 (Content) response that the group has become active again, the group member can resume taking part in communications within the group.

Figure 5 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 6 shows an example.

--- Group Status Request: GET ace-group/GROUPNAME/active --->
<---------- Group Status Response: 2.05 (Content) ---------->

Figure 5: Message Flow of Group Status Request-Response

Request:

Header: GET (Code=0.01)  
Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"  
Uri-Path: "ace-group"  
Uri-Path: "g1"  
Uri-Path: "active"  
Payload: -

Response:

Header: Content (Code=2.05)  
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):  
  true

Figure 6: Example of Group Status Request-Response

9.10. Retrieve Group Names

A node may want to retrieve from the Group Manager the group name and the URI of the group-membership resource of a group. This is relevant in the following cases.

* Before joining a group, a joining node may know only the current Group Identifier (Gid) of that group, but not the group name and the URI to the group-membership resource.

* As current group member in several groups, the node has missed a previous group rekeying in one of them (see Section 11). Hence, it retains stale keying material and fails to decrypt received messages exchanged in that group.
Such messages do not provide a direct hint to the correct group name, that the node would need in order to retrieve the latest keying material and authentication credentials from the Group Manager (see Section 9.1.1, Section 9.1.2 and Section 9.3). However, such messages may specify the current Gid of the group, as value of the 'kid_context' field of the OSCORE CoAP option (see Section 6.1 of [RFC8613] and Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

As signature verifier, the node also refers to a group name for retrieving the required authentication credentials from the Group Manager (see Section 9.3). As discussed above, intercepted messages do not provide a direct hint to the correct group name, while they may specify the current Gid of the group, as value of the 'kid_context' field of the OSCORE CoAP option. In such a case, upon intercepting a message in the group, the node requires to correctly map the Gid currently used in the group with the invariant group name.

Furthermore, since it is not a group member, the node does not take part to a possible group rekeying. Thus, following a group rekeying and the consequent change of Gid in a group, the node would retain the old Gid value and cannot correctly associate intercepted messages to the right group, especially if acting as signature verifier in several groups. This in turn prevents the efficient verification of signatures, and especially the retrieval of required, new authentication credentials from the Group Manager.

In either case, the node only knows the current Gid of the group, as learned from received or intercepted messages exchanged in the group. As detailed below, the node can contact the Group Manager, and request the group name and URI to the group-membership resource corresponding to that Gid. Then, it can use that information to either join the group as a candidate group member, get the latest keying material as a current group member, or retrieve authentication credentials used in the group as a signature verifier. To this end, the node sends a Group Name and URI Retrieval Request, as per Section 4.2.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

In particular, the node sends a CoAP FETCH request to the endpoint /ace-group at the Group Manager formatted as defined in Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. Each element of the CBOR array 'gid' is a CBOR byte string (REQ13), which encodes the Gid of the group for which the group name and the URI to the group-membership resource are requested.
Upon receiving the Group Name and URI Retrieval Request, the Group Manager processes it as per Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. The success Group Name and URI Retrieval Response is formatted as defined in Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, each element of the CBOR array 'gid' is a CBOR byte string (REQ13), which encodes the Gid of the group for which the group name and the URI to the group-membership resource are provided.

For each of its groups, the Group Manager maintains an association between the group name and the URI to the group-membership resource on one hand, and only the current Gid for that group on the other hand. That is, the Group Manager does not maintain an association between the former pair and any other Gid for that group than the current, most recent one.

Figure 7 gives an overview of the exchanges described above, while Figure 8 shows an example.

```
Node                      Group Manager
---- Group Name and URI Retrieval Request: FETCH ace-group/ --->
<--- Group Name and URI Retrieval Response: 2.05 (Content) -----

Figure 7: Message Flow of Group Name and URI Retrieval Request-Response
```
9.11. Leave the Group

A group member may request to leave the OSCORE group. To this end, the group member sends a Group Leaving Request, as per Section 4.8.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, it sends a CoAP DELETE request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME at the Group Manager.

Upon receiving the Group Leaving Request, the Group Manager processes it as per Section 4.8.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. Then, the Group Manager performs the follow-up actions defined in Section 10 of this document.

10. Removal of a Group Member

Other than after a spontaneous request to the Group Manager as described in Section 9.11, a node may be forcibly removed from the OSCORE group, e.g., due to expired or revoked authorization.
In either case, if the Group Manager reassigns Gid values during the group's lifetime (see Section 3.2.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), the Group Manager "forgets" the Birth Gid currently associated with the leaving node in the OSCORE group. This was stored following the Joining Response sent to that node, after its latest (re-)joining of the OSCORE group (see Section 6.3).

If any of the two conditions below holds, the Group Manager MUST inform the leaving node of its eviction as follows. If both conditions hold, the Group Manager MUST inform the leaving node by using only the method corresponding to one of either conditions.

* If, upon joining the group (see Section 6.1), the leaving node specified a URI in the 'control_uri' parameter defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the Group Manager sends a DELETE request targeting the URI specified in the 'control_uri' parameter (OPT7).

* If the leaving node has been observing the associated resource at ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME, the Group Manager sends an unsolicited 4.04 (Not Found) error response to the leaving node, as specified in Section 4.3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

Furthermore, the Group Manager might intend to evict all the current group members from the group at once. In such a case, if the Joining Responses sent by the Group Manager to nodes joining the group (see Section 6.3) specify a URI in the 'control_group_uri' parameter defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], then the Group Manager MUST additionally send a DELETE request targeting the URI specified in the 'control_group_uri' parameter (OPT10).

If the leaving node has not exclusively the role of monitor, the Group Manager performs the following actions.

* The Group Manager frees the OSCORE Sender ID value of the leaving node. This value MUST NOT become available for possible upcoming joining nodes in the same group, until the group has been rekeyed and assigned a new Group Identifier (Gid).

* The Group Manager MUST add the relinquished Sender ID of the leaving node to the most recent set of stale Sender IDs, in the collection associated with the group (see Section 7.1).

* The Group Manager cancels the association between, on one hand, the authentication credential of the leaving node and, on the other hand, the Gid associated with the OSCORE group together with the freed Sender ID value. The Group Manager deletes the
authentication credential of the leaving node, if that
authentication credential has no remaining association with any
pair (Gid, Sender ID).

Then, the Group Manager MUST generate updated security parameters and
group keying material, and provide it to the remaining group members
(see Section 11). As a consequence, the leaving node is not able to
acquire the new security parameters and group keying material
distributed after its leaving.

The same considerations from Section 5 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] apply here as well, considering the
Group Manager acting as KDC.

11. Group Rekeying Process

In order to rekey the OSCORE group, the Group Manager distributes a
new Group Identifier (Gid), i.e., a new OSCORE ID Context; a new
OSCORE Master Secret; and, optionally, a new OSCORE Master Salt for
that group. When doing so, the Group Manager MUST increment the
version number of the group keying material, before starting its
distribution.

As per Section 3.2.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], the Group
Manager MAY reassign a Gid to the same group over that group’s
lifetime, e.g., once the whole space of Gid values has been used for
the group in question. If the Group Manager supports reassignment of
Gid values and performs it in a group, then the Group Manager
additionally takes the following actions.

* Before rekeying the group, the Group Manager MUST check if the new
  Gid to be distributed coincides with the Birth Gid of any of the
  current group members (see Section 6.3).

* If any of such "elder members" is found in the group, the Group
  Manager MUST evict them from the group. That is, the Group
  Manager MUST terminate their membership and MUST rekey the group
  in such a way that the new keying material is not provided to
  those evicted elder members. This also includes adding their
  relinquished Sender IDs to the most recent set of stale Sender
  IDs, in the collection associated with the group (see
  Section 7.1), before rekeying the group.
Until a further following group rekeying, the Group Manager MUST store the list of those latest-evicted elder members. If any of those nodes re-joins the group before a further following group rekeying occurs, the Group Manager MUST NOT rekey the group upon their re-joining. When one of those nodes re-joins the group, the Group Manager can rely, e.g., on the ongoing secure communication association to recognize the node as included in the stored list.

Across the rekeying execution, the Group Manager MUST preserve the same unchanged OSCORE Sender IDs for all group members intended to remain in the group. This avoids affecting the retrieval of authentication credentials from the Group Manager and the verification of group messages.

The Group Manager MUST support the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme registered in Section 11.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], as per the detailed use defined in Section 11.1 of this document. Future specifications may define how this application profile can use alternative group rekeying schemes, which MUST comply with the functional steps defined in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. The Group Manager MUST indicate the use of such an alternative group rekeying scheme to joining nodes, by means of the 'group_rekeying' parameter included in Joining Response messages (see Section 6.3).

It is RECOMMENDED that the Group Manager gets confirmation of successful distribution from the group members, and admits a maximum number of individual retransmissions to non-confirming group members. Once completed the group rekeying process, the Group Manager creates a new empty set $X'$ of stale Sender IDs associated with the version of the newly distributed group keying material. Then, the Group Manager MUST add the set $X'$ to the collection of stale Sender IDs associated with the group (see Section 7.1).

In case the rekeying terminates and some group members have not received the new keying material, they will not be able to correctly process following secured messages exchanged in the group. These group members will eventually contact the Group Manager, in order to retrieve the current keying material and its version.

Some of these group members may be in multiple groups, each associated with a different Group Manager. When failing to correctly process messages secured with the new keying material, these group members may not have sufficient information to determine which exact Group Manager they should contact, in order to retrieve the current keying material they are missing.
If the Gid is formatted as described in Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], the Group Prefix can be used as a hint to determine the right Group Manager, as long as no collisions among Group Prefixes are experienced. Otherwise, a group member needs to contact the Group Manager of each group, e.g., by first requesting only the version of the current group keying material (see Section 9.8) and then possibly requesting the current keying material (see Section 9.1.1).

Furthermore, some of these group members can be in multiple groups, all of which associated with the same Group Manager. In this case, these group members may also not have sufficient information to determine which exact group they should refer to, when contacting the right Group Manager. Hence, they need to contact a Group Manager multiple times, i.e., separately for each group they belong to and associated with that Group Manager.

Section 11.2 defines the actions performed by a group member upon receiving the new group keying material. Section 11.3 discusses how a group member can realize that it has missed one or more rekeying instances, and the actions it is accordingly required to take.

11.1. Sending Rekeying Messages

When using the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme, the group rekeying messages MUST have Content-Format set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor and have the same format used for the Joining Response message in Section 6.3, with the following differences. Note that this extends the minimal content of a rekeying message as defined in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] (OPT14).

* From the Joining Response, only the parameters 'gkty', 'key', 'num', 'exp', and 'ace-groupcomm-profile' are present. In particular, the 'key' parameter includes only the following data.
  - The 'ms' parameter, specifying the new OSCORE Master Secret value. This parameter MUST be present.
  - The 'contextId' parameter, specifying the new Gid to use as OSCORE ID Context value. This parameter MUST be present.
  - The 'salt' value, specifying the new OSCORE Master Salt value. This parameter MAY be present.
* The parameter ‘stale_node_ids’ MUST also be included, with CBOR label defined in Section 16.3. This parameter is encoded as a CBOR array, where each element is encoded as a CBOR byte string. The CBOR array has to be intended as a set, i.e., the order of its elements is irrelevant. The parameter is populated as follows.

- The Group Manager creates an empty CBOR array ARRAY.

- The Group Manager considers the collection of stale Sender IDs associated with the group (see Section 7.1), and takes the most recent set X, i.e., the set associated with the current version of the group keying material about to be relinquished.

- For each Sender ID in X, the Group Manager encodes it as a CBOR byte string and adds the result to ARRAY.

- The parameter ‘stale_node_ids’ takes ARRAY as value.

* The parameters ‘pub_keys’, ‘peer_roles’ and ‘peer_identifiers’ SHOULD be present, if the group rekeying is performed due to one or multiple Clients that have requested to join the group. Following the same semantics used in the Joining Response message (see Section 6.3), the three parameters specify the authentication credential, roles in the group and node identifier of each of the Clients that have requested to join the group. The Group Manager MUST NOT include a non-empty subset of these three parameters.

The Group Manager separately sends a group rekeying message formatted as defined above to each group member to be rekeyed.

Each rekeying message MUST be secured with the pairwise secure communication association between the Group Manager and the group member used during the joining process. In particular, each rekeying message can target the ‘control_uri’ URI path defined in Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] (OPT7), if provided by the intended recipient upon joining the group (see Section 6.1).

This distribution approach requires group members to act (also) as servers, in order to correctly handle unsolicited group rekeying messages from the Group Manager. In particular, if a group member and the Group Manager use OSCORE [RFC8613] to secure their pairwise communications, the group member MUST create a Replay Window in its own Recipient Context upon establishing the OSCORE Security Context with the Group Manager, e.g., by means of the OSCORE profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].
Group members and the Group Manager SHOULD additionally support alternative distribution approaches that do not require group members to act (also) as servers. A number of such approaches are defined in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. In particular, a group member may use CoAP Observe [RFC7641] and subscribe for updates to the group-membership resource of the group, at the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/ of the Group Manager (see Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]). Alternatively, a full-fledged Pub-Sub model can be considered [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub], where the Group Manager publishes to a rekeying topic hosted at a Broker, while the group members subscribe to such topic (see Section 6.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]).

11.2. Receiving Rekeying Messages

Once received the new group keying material, a group member proceeds as follows. Unless otherwise specified, the following is independent of the specifically used group rekeying scheme.

The group member considers the stale Sender IDs received from the Group Manager. If the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme as detailed in Section 11.1 is used, the stale Sender IDs are specified by the 'stale_node_ids' parameter.

After that, as per Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], the group member MUST remove every authentication credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.

Then, the following cases can occur, based on the version number V’ of the new group keying material distributed through the rekeying process. If the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme as detailed in Section 11.1 is used, this information is specified by the 'num' parameter.

* The group member has not missed any group rekeying. That is, the old keying material stored by the group member has version number V, while the received new keying material has version number V’ = (V + 1). In such a case, the group member simply installs the new keying material and derives the corresponding new Security Context.
* The group member has missed one or more group rekeying instances. That is, the old keying material stored by the group member has version number \( V \), while the received new keying material has version number \( V' > (V + 1) \). In such a case, the group member MUST proceed as defined in Section 11.3.

* The group member has received keying material not newer than the stored one. That is, the old keying material stored by the group member has version number \( V \), while the received keying material has version number \( V' < (V + 1) \). In such a case, the group member MUST ignore the received rekeying messages and MUST NOT install the received keying material.

### 11.3. Missed Rekeying Instances

A group member can realize to have missed one or more rekeying instances in one of the ways discussed below. In the following, \( V \) denotes the version number of the old keying material stored by the group member, while \( V' \) denotes the version number of the latest, possibly just distributed, keying material.

a. The group member has participated in a rekeying process that has distributed new keying material with version number \( V' > (V + 1) \), as discussed in Section 11.2.

b. The group member has obtained the latest keying material from the Group Manager, as a response to a Key Distribution Request (see Section 9.1.1) or to a Joining Request when re-joining the group (see Section 6.1). In particular, \( V \) is different than \( V' \) specified by the 'num' parameter in the response.

c. The group member has obtained the authentication credentials of other group members, through a Public Key Request-Response exchange with the Group Manager (see Section 9.3). In particular, \( V \) is different than \( V' \) specified by the 'num' parameter in the response.

d. The group member has performed a Version Request-Response exchange with the Group Manager (see Section 9.8). In particular, \( V \) is different than \( V' \) specified by the 'num' parameter in the response.

In either case, the group member MUST delete the stored keying material with version number \( V \).

If case (a) or case (b) applies, the group member MUST perform the following actions.
1. The group member MUST NOT install the latest keying material yet, in case that was already obtained.

2. The group member sends a Stale Sender IDs Request to the Group Manager (see Section 11.3.1), specifying the version number V as payload of the request.

   If the Stale Sender IDs Response from the Group Manager has no payload, the group member MUST remove all the authentication credentials from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete all its Recipient Contexts used in the group.

   Otherwise, the group member considers the stale Sender IDs specified in the Stale Sender IDs Response from the Group Manager. Then, the group member MUST remove every authentication credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.

3. The group member installs the latest keying material with version number V’ and derives the corresponding new Security Context.

   If case (c) or case (d) applies, the group member SHOULD perform the following actions.

   1. The group member sends a Stale Sender IDs Request to the Group Manager (see Section 11.3.1), specifying the version number V as payload of the request.

      If the Stale Sender IDs Response from the Group Manager has no payload, the group member MUST remove all the authentication credentials from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete all its Recipient Contexts used in the group.

      Otherwise, the group member considers the stale Sender IDs specified in the Stale Sender IDs Response from the Group Manager. Then, the group member MUST remove every authentication credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.
2. The group member obtains the latest keying material with version number V' from the Group Manager. This can happen by sending a Key Distribution Request to the Group Manager (see Section 9.1.1) and Section 9.1.2).

3. The group member installs the latest keying material with version number V' and derives the corresponding new Security Context.

If case (c) or case (d) applies, the group member can alternatively perform the following actions.

1. The group member re-joins the group (see Section 6.1). When doing so, the group member MUST re-join with the same roles it currently has in the group, and MUST request the Group Manager for the authentication credentials of all the current group members. That is, the 'get_pub_keys' parameter of the Joining Request MUST be present and MUST be set to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6).

2. When receiving the Joining Response (see Section 6.4 and Section 6.4), the group member retrieves the set Z of authentication credentials specified in the 'pub_keys' parameter.

   Then, the group member MUST remove every authentication credential which is not in Z from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group that does not include any of the authentication credentials in Z.

3. The group member installs the latest keying material with version number V' and derives the corresponding new Security Context.

11.3.1. Retrieve Stale Sender IDs

When realizing to have missed one or more group rekeying instances (see Section 11.3), a node needs to retrieve from the Group Manager the data required to delete some of its stored group members’ authentication credentials and Recipient Contexts (see Section 8.3.1). These data are provided as an aggregated set of stale Sender IDs, which are used as specified in Section 11.3.

In particular, the node sends a CoAP FETCH request to the endpoint /ace-group/GROUPNAME/stale-sids at the Group Manager defined in Section 8.3 of this document, where GROUPNAME is the name of the OSCORE group.
The payload of the Stale Sender IDs Request MUST include a CBOR unsigned integer. This encodes the version number V of the most recent group keying material stored and installed by the requesting Client, which is older than the latest, possibly just distributed, keying material with version number V'.

The handler MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, if the request is not formatted correctly. Also, the handler MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response, if the specified version number V is greater or equal than the version number V' associated with the latest keying material in the group, i.e., in case V >= V'.

Otherwise, the handler responds with a 2.05 (Content) Stale Sender IDs Response. The payload of the response is formatted as defined below, where SKEW = (V' - V + 1).

* The Group Manager considers ITEMS as the current number of sets stored in the collection of stale Sender IDs associated with the group (see Section 7.1).

* If SKEW > ITEMS, the Stale Sender IDs Response MUST NOT have a payload.

* Otherwise, the payload of the Stale Sender IDs Response MUST include a CBOR array, where each element is encoded as a CBOR byte string. The CBOR array has to be intended as a set, i.e., the order of its elements is irrelevant. The Group Manager populates the CBOR array as follows.

  * The Group Manager creates an empty CBOR array ARRAY and an empty set X.

  * The Group Manager considers the SKEW most recent sets stored in the collection of stale Sender IDs associated with the group. Note that the most recent set is the one associate to the latest version of the group keying material.

  * The Group Manager copies all the Sender IDs from the selected sets into X. When doing so, the Group Manager MUST discard duplicates. That is, the same Sender ID MUST NOT be present more than once in the final content of X.

  * For each Sender ID in X, the Group Manager encodes it as a CBOR byte string and adds the result to ARRAY.
Finally, ARRAY is specified as payload of the Stale Sender IDs Response. Note that ARRAY might result in the empty CBOR array.

Figure 9 gives an overview of the exchange described above, while Figure 10 shows an example.

```
Group Manager

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stale Sender IDs Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FETCH ace-group/GROUPNAME/stale-sids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;------- Stale Sender IDs Response: 2.05 (Content) -------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Message Flow of Stale Sender IDs Request-Response
```

Request:

- Header: FETCH (Code=0.05)
- Uri-Host: "kdc.example.com"
- Uri-Path: "ace-group"
- Uri-Path: "g1"
- Uri-Path: "stale-sids"
- Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation): 42

Response:

- Header: Content (Code=2.05)
- Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation):
  - [h'01', h'fc', h'12ab', h'de44', h'ff']

Figure 10: Example of Stale Sender IDs Request-Response

12. ACE Groupcomm Parameters

In addition to those defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], this application profile defines additional parameters used during the second part of the message exchange with the Group Manager, i.e., after the exchange of Token Transfer Request and Response (see Section 5.3). The table below summarizes them and specifies the CBOR key to use instead of the full descriptive name.
Note that the media type application/ace-groupcomm+cbor MUST be used when these parameters are transported in the respective message fields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>CBOR Type</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>group_senderId</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ecdh_info</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kdc_dh_creds</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group_enc_key</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stale_node_ids</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: ACE Groupcomm Parameters

The Group Manager is expected to support and understand all the parameters above. Instead, a Client is required to support the new parameters defined in this application profile as specified below (REQ29).

* 'group_senderId' MUST be supported by a Client that intends to join an OSCORE group with the role of Requester and/or Responder.

* 'ecdh_info' MUST be supported by a Client that intends to join a group which uses the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.

* 'kdc_dh_creds' MUST be supported by a Client that intends to join a group which uses the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE and that does not plan to or cannot rely on an early retrieval of the Group Manager’s Diffie-Hellman authentication credential.

* 'group_enc_key' MUST be supported by a Client that intends to join a group which uses the group mode of Group OSCORE or to be signature verifier for that group.

* 'stale_node_ids' MUST be supported.

When the conditional parameters defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] are used with this application profile, a Client must, should or may support them as specified below (REQ30).
* 'client_cred', 'cnonce', 'client_cred_verify'. A Client that has an own authentication credential to use in a group MUST support these parameters.

* 'kdcchallenge'. A Client that has an own authentication credential to use in a group and that provides the Access Token to the Group Manager through a Token Transfer Request (see Section 5.3) MUST support this parameter.

* 'pub_keys_repo'. This parameter is not relevant for this application profile, since the Group Manager always acts as repository of the group members' authentication credentials.

* 'group_policies'. A Client that is interested in the specific policies used in a group, but that does not know them or cannot become aware of them before joining that group, SHOULD support this parameter.

* 'peer_roles'. A Client MUST support this parameter, since in this application profile it is relevant for Clients to know the roles of the group member associated with each authentication credential.

* 'kdc_nonce', 'kdc_cred' and 'kdc_cred_verify'. A Client MUST support these parameters, since the Group Manager's authentication credential is required to process messages protected with Group OSCORE (see Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

* 'mgt_key_material'. A Client that supports an advanced rekeying scheme possibly used in the group, such as based on one-to-many rekeying messages sent by the Group Manager (e.g., over IP multicast), MUST support this parameter.

* 'control_group_uri'. A Client that supports the hosting of local resources each associated with a group (hence acting as CoAP server) and the reception of one-to-many requests sent to those resources by the Group Manager (e.g., over IP multicast) MUST support this parameter.

13. ACE Groupcomm Error Identifiers

In addition to those defined in Section 9 of [I-D.iets-f-ace-key-groupcomm], this application profile defines new values that the Group Manager can include as error identifiers, in the 'error' field of an error response with Content-Format application/ace-groupcomm+cbor.
A Client supporting the ‘error’ parameter (see Sections 4.1.2 and 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]) and able to understand the specified error may use that information to determine what actions to take next. If it is included in the error response and supported by the Client, the ‘error_description’ parameter may provide additional context. In particular, the following guidelines apply.

* In case of error 7, the Client should stop sending the request in question to the Group Manager. In this application profile, this error is relevant only for a signature verifier, in case it tries to access resources related to a pairwise-only group.

* In case of error 8, the Client should stop sending the request in question to the Group Manager.

* In case of error 9, the Client should wait for a certain (pre-configured) amount of time, before trying re-sending its request to the Group Manager.

14. Default Values for Group Configuration Parameters

This section defines the default values that the Group Manager assumes for the configuration parameters of an OSCORE group, unless differently specified when creating and configuring the group. This can be achieved as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-gm-admin].

14.1. Common

This section always applies, as related to common configuration parameters.

* For the HKDF Algorithm ‘hkdf’, the Group Manager SHOULD use HKDF SHA-256, defined as default in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. In the ‘hkdf’ parameter, this HKDF Algorithm is specified by the HMAC Algorithm HMAC 256/256 (COSE algorithm encoding: 5).
For the format 'cred_fmt' used for the authentication credentials in the group, the Group Manager SHOULD use CBOR Web Token (CWT) or CWT Claims Set (CCS) [RFC8392], i.e., the COSE Header Parameter 'kcwt' and 'kccs', respectively.

[ These COSE Header Parameters are under pending registration requested by draft-ietf-lake-edhoc. ]

* For 'max_stale_sets', the Group Manager SHOULD consider N = 3 as the maximum number of stored sets of stale Sender IDs in the collection associated with the group (see Section 7.1).

### 14.2. Group Mode

This section applies if the group uses (also) the group mode of Group OSCORE.

* For the Signature Encryption Algorithm 'sign_enc_alg' used to encrypt messages protected with the group mode, the Group Manager SHOULD use AES-CCM-16-64-128 (COSE algorithm encoding: 10) as default value.

The Group Manager SHOULD use the following default values for the Signature Algorithm 'sign_alg' and related parameters 'sign_params', consistently with the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms], the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types] and the "COSE Elliptic Curves" registry [COSE.Elliptic.Curves].

* For the Signature Algorithm 'sign_alg' used to sign messages protected with the group mode, the signature algorithm EdDSA [RFC8032].

* For the parameters 'sign_params' of the Signature Algorithm:
  - The array [[OKP], [OKP, Ed25519]], in case EdDSA is assumed or specified for 'sign_alg'. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type OKP and the elliptic curve Ed25519 [RFC8032].
  - The array [[EC2], [EC2, P-256]], in case ES256 [RFC6979] is specified for 'sign_alg'. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type EC2 and the elliptic curve P-256.
  - The array [[EC2], [EC2, P-384]], in case ES384 [RFC6979] is specified for 'sign_alg'. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type EC2 and the elliptic curve P-384.
14.3. Pairwise Mode

This section applies if the group uses (also) the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.

For the AEAD Algorithm ‘alg’ used to encrypt messages protected with the pairwise mode, the Group Manager SHOULD use the same default value defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613], i.e., AES-CCM-16-64-128 (COSE algorithm encoding: 10).

For the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm ‘ecdh_alg’ and related parameters ‘ecdh_params’, the Group Manager SHOULD use the following default values, consistently with the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms], the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types] and the "COSE Elliptic Curves" registry [COSE.Elliptic.Curves].

* For the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm ‘ecdh_alg’ used to compute static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secrets, the ECDH algorithm ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 specified in Section 6.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs].

* For the parameters ‘ecdh_params’ of the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm:
  - The array [[OKP], [OKP, X25519]], in case EdDSA is assumed or specified for ‘sign_alg’, or in case the group is a pairwise-only group. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type OKP and the elliptic curve X25519 [RFC8032].
  - The array [[EC2], [EC2, P-256]], in case ES256 [RFC6979] is specified for ‘sign_alg’. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type EC2 and the elliptic curve P-256.
  - The array [[EC2], [EC2, P-384]], in case ES384 [RFC6979] is specified for ‘sign_alg’. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type EC2 and the elliptic curve P-384.
  - The array [[EC2], [EC2, P-521]], in case ES512 [RFC6979] is specified for ‘sign_alg’. In particular, this indicates to use the COSE key type EC2 and the elliptic curve P-521.
15. Security Considerations

Security considerations for this profile are inherited from [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], and the specific transport profile of ACE signalled by the AS, such as [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. The following security considerations also apply for this profile.

15.1. Management of OSCORE Groups

This profile leverages the following management aspects related to OSCORE groups and discussed in the sections of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] referred below.

* Management of group keying material (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). The Group Manager is responsible for the renewal and re-distribution of the keying material in the groups of its competence (rekeying).

The Group Manager performs a rekeying when one or more members leave the group, thus preserving forward security and ensuring that the security properties of Group OSCORE are fulfilled. According to the specific application requirements, the Group Manager can also rekey the group upon a new node’s joining, in case backward security has also to be preserved.

* Provisioning and retrieval of authentication credentials (see Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). The Group Manager acts as repository of authentication credentials of group members, and provides them upon request.

* Synchronization of sequence numbers (see Section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). This concerns how a responder node that has just joined an OSCORE group can synchronize with the sequence number of requesters in the same group.

Before sending the Joining Response, the Group Manager MUST verify that the joining node actually owns the associated private key. To this end, the Group Manager can rely on the proof-of-possession challenge-response defined in Section 6.

Alternatively, when establishing a secure communication association with the Group Manager, the joining node can provide the Group Manager with its own authentication credential, and use the public key included thereof as asymmetric proof-of-possession key. For example, this is the case when the joining node relies on...
Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and authenticates itself during the DTLS handshake with the Group Manager. However, this requires the authentication credential to be in the format used in the OSCORE group, and that both the authentication credential of the joining node and the included public key are compatible with the signature or ECDH algorithm, and possible associated parameters used in the OSCORE group.

A node may have joined multiple OSCORE groups under different non-synchronized Group Managers. Therefore, it can happen that those OSCORE groups have the same Group Identifier (Gid). It follows that, upon receiving a Group OSCORE message addressed to one of those groups, the node would have multiple Security Contexts matching with the Gid in the incoming message. It is up to the application to decide how to handle such collisions of Group Identifiers, e.g., by trying to process the incoming message using one Security Context at the time until the right one is found.

15.2. Size of Nonces as Proof-of-Possession Challenge

With reference to the Joining Request message in Section 6.1, the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence included in 'client_cred_verify' is computed over an input including also N_C | N_S, where | denotes concatenation.

For the N_C challenge, it is RECOMMENDED to use a 8-byte long random nonce. Furthermore, N_C is always conveyed in the 'cnonce' parameter of the Joining Request, which is always sent over the secure communication association between the joining node and the Group Manager.

As defined in Section 6.1.1, the way the N_S value is computed depends on the particular way the joining node provides the Group Manager with the Access Token, as well as on following interactions between the two.

* If the Access Token has not been provided to the Group Manager by means of a Token Transfer Request to the /authz-info endpoint as in Section 5.3, then N_S is computed as a 32-byte long challenge. For an example, see point (2) of Section 6.1.1.
* If the Access Token has been provided to the Group Manager by means of a Token Transfer Request to the /authz-info endpoint as in Section 5.3, then N_S takes the most recent value provided to the Client by the Group Manager in the 'kdcchallenge' parameter, as specified in point (1) of Section 6.1.1. This value is provided either in the Token Transfer Response (see Section 5.3), or in a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response to a following Joining Request (see Section 6.2). In either case, it is RECOMMENDED to use a 8-byte long random challenge as value for N_S.

If we consider both N_C and N_S to take 8-byte long values, the following considerations hold.

* Let us consider both N_C and N_S as taking random values, and the Group Manager to never change the value of the N_S provided to a Client during the lifetime of an Access Token. Then, as per the birthday paradox, the average collision for N_S will happen after $2^{32}$ new transferred Access Tokens, while the average collision for N_C will happen after $2^{32}$ new Joining Requests. This amounts to considerably more token provisionings than the expected new joinings of OSCORE groups under a same Group Manager, as well as to considerably more requests to join OSCORE groups from a same Client using a same Access Token under a same Group Manager.

* Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] as well Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] recommend the use of 8-byte random values as well. Unlike in those cases, the values of N_C and N_S considered in this document are not used for as sensitive operations as the derivation of a Security Context, and thus do not have possible implications in the security of AEAD ciphers.

15.3. Reusage of Nonces for Proof-of-Possession Input

As long as the Group Manager preserves the same N_S value currently associated with an Access Token, i.e., the latest value provided to a Client in a 'kdcchallenge' parameter, the Client is able to successfully reuse the same proof-of-possession (PoP) input for multiple Joining Requests to that Group Manager.

In particular, the Client can reuse the same N_C value for every Joining Request to the Group Manager, and combine it with the same unchanged N_S value. This results in reusing the same PoP input for producing the PoP evidence to include in the 'client_cred_verify' parameter of the Joining Requests.

Unless the Group Manager maintains a list of N_C values already used by that Client since the latest update to the N_S value associated with the Access Token, the Group Manager can be forced to falsely
believe that the Client possesses its own private key at that point in time, upon verifying the PoP evidence in the 'client_cred_verify' parameter.

16. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[This document]]" with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.

This document has the following actions for IANA.

16.1. OAuth Parameters

IANA is asked to register the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters" registry, as per the procedure specified in Section 11.2 of [RFC6749].

* Parameter name: ecdh_info
  * Parameter usage location: client-rs request, rs-client response
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): [[This document]]

* Parameter name: kdc_dh_creds
  * Parameter usage location: client-rs request, rs-client response
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): [[This document]]

16.2. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings

IANA is asked to register the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry, as per the procedure specified in Section 8.10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* Name: ecdh_info
  * CBOR Key: TBD (range -256 to 255)
  * Value Type: Simple value "null" / Array
  * Reference: [[This document]]
16.3. ACE Groupcomm Parameters

IANA is asked to register the following entry to the "ACE Groupcomm Parameters" registry defined in Section 11.7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

* Name: group_senderId
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Byte string
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 9.2)

* Name: ecdh_info
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Array
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.2)

* Name: kdc_dh_creds
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Array
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.2)

* Name: group_enc_key
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Byte string
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 8.2.1)
16.4. ACE Groupcomm Key Types

IANA is asked to register the following entry to the "ACE Groupcomm Key Types" registry defined in Section 11.8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

* Name: Group_OSCORE_Input_Material object
* Key Type Value: GROUPCOMM_KEY_TBD
* Profile: "coap_group_oscore_app", defined in Section 16.5 of this document.
* Description: A Group_OSCORE_Input_Material object encoded as described in Section 6.3 of this document.
* Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.3)

16.5. ACE Groupcomm Profiles

IANA is asked to register the following entry to the "ACE Groupcomm Profiles" registry defined in Section 11.9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

* Name: coap_group_oscore_app
* Description: Application profile to provision keying material for participating in group communication protected with Group OSCORE as per [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
* CBOR Value: PROFILE_TBD
* Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.3)

16.6. OSCORE Security Context Parameters

IANA is asked to register the following entries in the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry defined in Section 9.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].
* Name: group_SenderId
  * CBOR Label: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Byte string
  * Registry: -
  * Description: OSCORE Sender ID assigned to a member of an OSCORE group
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.3)

* Name: cred_fmt
  * CBOR Label: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Integer
  * Registry: COSE Header Parameters
  * Description: Format of authentication credentials to be used in the OSCORE group
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.3)

* Name: sign_enc_alg
  * CBOR Label: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Text string / Integer
  * Registry: COSE Algorithms
  * Description: OSCORE Signature Encryption Algorithm Value
  * Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.3)

* Name: sign_alg
  * CBOR Label: TBD
  * CBOR Type: Text string / Integer
  * Registry: COSE Algorithms
16.7. TLS Exporter Labels

IANA is asked to register the following entry to the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry defined in Section 6 of [RFC5705] and updated in Section 12 of [RFC8447].
* Value: EXPORTER-ACE-Sign-Challenge-coap-group-oscore-app
* DTLS-OK: Y
* Recommended: N
* Reference: [[This document]] (Section 6.1.1)

16.8. AIF

For the media-types application/aif+cbor and application/aif+json defined in Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-aif], IANA is requested to register the following entries for the two media-type parameters Toid and Tperm, in the respective sub-registry defined in Section 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-aif] within the "MIME Media Type Sub-Parameter" registry group.

* Name: oscore-gname
* Description/Specification: OSCORE group name
* Reference: [[This document]]

* Name: oscore-gperm
* Description/Specification: permissions pertaining OSCORE groups
* Reference: [[This document]]

16.9. CoAP Content-Format

IANA is asked to register the following entries to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group.

* Media Type: application/aif+cbor; Toid="oscore-gname", Tperm="oscore-gperm"
* Encoding: -
* ID: TBD
* Reference: [[This document]]

* Media Type: application/aif+json; Toid="oscore-gname", Tperm="oscore-gperm"
16.10.  Group OSCORE Roles

This document establishes the IANA "Group OSCORE Roles" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 16.14.

This registry includes the possible roles that nodes can take in an OSCORE group, each in combination with a numeric identifier. These numeric identifiers are used to express authorization information about joining OSCORE groups, as specified in Section 3 of [[This document]].

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: A value that can be used in documents for easier comprehension, to identify a possible role that nodes can take in an OSCORE group.

* Value: The numeric identifier for this role. Integer values greater than 65535 are marked as "Private Use", all other values use the registration policy "Expert Review" [RFC8126].

* Description: This field contains a brief description of the role.

* Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the role.

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 1. The Reference column for all of these entries will be [[This document]].

16.11.  CoRE Resource Type

IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry within the "Constrained Restful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group.

* Value: "core.osc.gm"

* Description: Group-membership resource of an OSCORE Group Manager.
Client applications can use this resource type to discover a group membership resource at an OSCORE Group Manager, where to send a request for joining the corresponding OSCORE group.

16.12. ACE Scope Semantics

IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "ACE Scope Semantics" registry defined in Section 11.12 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

- Value: SEM_ID_TBD
- Description: Membership and key management operations at the ACE Group Manager for Group OSCORE.

16.13. ACE Groupcomm Errors

IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "ACE Groupcomm Errors" registry defined in Section 11.13 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

- Value: 7
- Description: Signatures not used in the group.

- Value: 8
- Description: Operation permitted only to signature verifiers.

- Value: 9
- Description: Group currently not active.

The IANA registry established in this document is defined as "Expert Review". This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.

Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

* Clarity and correctness of registrations. Experts are expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested entries. Experts should inspect the entry for the considered role, to verify the correctness of its description against the role as intended in the specification that defined it. Experts should consider requesting an opinion on the correctness of registered parameters from the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Working Group and the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Working Group.

Entries that do not meet these objective of clarity and completeness should not be registered.

* Duplicated registration and point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments.

* Experts should take into account the expected usage of roles when approving point assignment. Given a 'Value' V as code point, the length of the encoding of \((2^{(V+1)} - 1)\) should be weighed against the usage of the entry, considering the resources and capabilities of devices it will be used on. Additionally, given a 'Value' V as code point, the length of the encoding of \((2^{(V+1)} - 1)\) should be weighed against how many code points resulting in that encoding length are left, and the resources and capabilities of devices it will be used on.

* Specifications are recommended. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to verify the points above.

17. References

17.1. Normative References
[COSE.Algorithms]
IANA, "COSE Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#algorithms>.

[COSE.Elliptic.Curves]
IANA, "COSE Elliptic Curves",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#elliptic-curves>.

[COSE.Header.Parameters]
IANA, "COSE Header Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#header-parameters>.

[COSE.Key.Types]
IANA, "COSE Key Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#key-type>.

[I-D.ietf-ace-aif]
Bormann, C., "An Authorization Information Format (AIF) for ACE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-aif-07, 15 March 2022,

[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]
Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-18, 4 June 2021,

[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]
Palombini, F. and M. Tiloca, "Key Provisioning for Group Communication using ACE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-15, 23 December 2021,

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authorz]
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-46, 8 November 2021, 

[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]
Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,  
"OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization 
for Constrained Environments Framework", Work in Progress,  

[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]

[I-D.ietf-cose/rfc8152bis-algs]

[I-D.ietf-cose/rfc8152bis-struct]

[NIST-800-56A]

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 


17.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-gm-admin]

[I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub]

[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]
Appendix A. Profile Requirements

This section lists how this application profile of ACE addresses the requirements defined in Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-group-comm].

A.1. Mandatory-to-Address Requirements

* REQ1 - Specify the format and encoding of 'scope'. This includes defining the set of possible roles and their identifiers, as well as the corresponding encoding to use in the scope entries according to the used scope format: see Section 3 and Section 5.1.

* REQ2 - If the AIF format of 'scope' is used, register its specific instance of "Toid" and "Tperm" as Media Type parameters and a corresponding Content-Format, as per the guidelines in [I-D.ietf-ace-aif]: see Section 16.8 and Section 16.9.

* REQ3 - if used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_alg': values from the "Value" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

* REQ4 - If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_parameters': format and values from the COSE algorithm capabilities as specified in the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms].

* REQ5 - If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_key_parameters': format and values from the COSE key type capabilities as specified in the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types].

* REQ6 - Specify the acceptable formats for authentication credentials and, if used, the acceptable values for 'pub_key_enc': acceptable formats explicitly provide the public key as well as the comprehensive set of information related to the public key algorithm (see Section 5.3 and Section 6.3). Consistent acceptable values for 'pub_key_enc' are taken from the "Label" column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry [COSE.Header.Parameters].

* REQ7 - If the value of the GROUPNAME URI path and the group name in the Access Token scope (gname in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]) are not required to coincide, specify the mechanism to map the GROUPNAME value in the URI to the group name: not applicable, since a perfect matching is required.
* REQ8 - Define whether the KDC has an authentication credential and if this has to be provided through the 'kdc_cred' parameter, see Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]: yes, as required by the Group OSCORE protocol [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], see Section 6.3 of this document.

* REQ9 - Specify if any part of the KDC interface as defined in Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] is not supported by the KDC: not applicable.

* REQ10 - Register a Resource Type for the root url-path, which is used to discover the correct url to access at the KDC (see Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]): the Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute value "core.osc.gm" is registered in Section 16.11.

* REQ11 - Define what specific actions (e.g., CoAP methods) are allowed on each resource provided by the KDC interface, depending on whether the Client is a current group member; the roles that a Client is authorized to take as per the obtained access token; and the roles that the Client has as current group member: see Section 8.4.

* REQ12 - Categorize possible newly defined operations for Clients into primary operations expected to be minimally supported and secondary operations, and provide accompanying considerations: see Section 8.5.

* REQ13 - Specify the encoding of group identifier (see Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]): CBOR byte string (see Section 9.10).

* REQ14 - Specify the approaches used to compute and verify the PoP evidence to include in 'client_cred_verify', and which of those approaches is used in which case: see Section 6.1 and Section 6.2.

* REQ15 - Specify how the nonce N_S is generated, if the token is not provided to the KDC through the Token Transfer Request to the authz-info endpoint (e.g., if it is used directly to validate TLS instead): see Section 6.1.1.

* REQ16 - Define the initial value of the 'num' parameter: the initial value MUST be set to 0 when creating the OSCORE group, e.g., as in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-gm-admin].

* REQ17 - Specify the format of the 'key' parameter: see Section 6.3.
* REQ18 - Specify acceptable values of the ‘gkty’ parameter:
  Group_OSCORE_Input_Material object (see Section 6.3).

* REQ19 - Specify and register the application profile identifier:
  coap_group_oscore_app (see Section 16.5).

* REQ20 - If used, specify the format and content of
  ‘group_policies’ and its entries: see Section 6.3.

* REQ21 - Specify the approaches used to compute and verify the PoP
  evidence to include in ‘kdc_cred_verify’, and which of those
  approaches is used in which case: see Section 6.3, Section 6.4 and
  Section 9.5.

* REQ22 - Specify the communication protocol that the members of the
  group must use: CoAP [RFC7252], also for group communication
  [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis].

* REQ23 - Specify the security protocols that the group members must
  use to protect their communication: Group OSCORE
  [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

* REQ24 - Specify how the communication is secured between the
  Client and KDC: by means of any transport profile of ACE
  [I-D.ietf-ace-ace-oauth-authz] between Client and Group Manager that
  complies with the requirements in Appendix C of
  [I-D.ietf-ace-ace-oauth-authz].

* REQ25 - Specify the format of the identifiers of group members:
  the Sender ID used in the OSCORE group (see Section 6.3 and
  Section 9.3).

* REQ26 - Specify policies at the KDC to handle member ids that are
  not included in ‘get_pub_keys’: see Section 9.3.

* REQ27 - Specify the format of newly-generated individual keying
  material for group members, or of the information to derive it,
  and corresponding CBOR label: see Section 9.2.

* REQ28 - Specify and register the identifier of newly defined
  semantics for binary scopes: see Section 16.12.

* REQ29 - Categorize newly defined parameters according to the same
  criteria of Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]: see
  Section 12.
* REQ30 - Define whether Clients must, should or may support the conditional parameters defined in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], and under which circumstances: see Section 12.

A.2. Optional-to-Address Requirements

* OPT1 (Optional) - If the textual format of 'scope' is used, specify CBOR values to use for abbreviating the role identifiers in the group: not applicable.

* OPT2 (Optional) - Specify additional parameters used in the exchange of Token Transfer Request and Response:

  - 'ecdh_info', to negotiate the ECDH algorithm, ECDH algorithm parameters, ECDH key parameters and exact format of authentication credentials used in the group, in case the joining node supports the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE (see Section 5.3).

  - 'kdc_dh_creds', to ask for and retrieve the Group Manager’s Diffie-Hellman authentication credentials, in case the joining node supports the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE and the Access Token authorizes to join parwise-only groups (see Section 5.3).

* OPT3 (Optional) - Specify the negotiation of parameter values for signature algorithm and signature keys, if 'sign_info' is not used: possible early discovery by using the approach based on the CoRE Resource Directory described in [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery].

* OPT4 (Optional) - Specify possible or required payload formats for specific error cases: send a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response to a Joining Request (see Section 6.2).

* OPT5 (Optional) - Specify additional identifiers of error types, as values of the 'error' field in an error response from the KDC: see Section 16.13.

* OPT6 (Optional) - Specify the encoding of 'pub_keys_repos' if the default is not used: no.

* OPT7 (Optional) - Specify the functionalities implemented at the 'control_uri' resource hosted at the Client, including message exchange encoding and other details (see Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]): see Section 10 for the eviction of a group member; see Section 11 for the group rekeying process.
* OPT8 (Optional) - Specify the behavior of the handler in case of failure to retrieve an authentication credential for the specific node: send a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response to a Joining Request (see Section 6.2).

* OPT9 (Optional) - Define a default group rekeying scheme, to refer to in case the 'rekeying_scheme' parameter is not included in the Joining Response (see Section 4.3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]): the "Point-to-Point" rekeying scheme registered in Section 11.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], whose detailed use for this profile is defined in Section 11 of this document.

* OPT10 (Optional) - Specify the functionalities implemented at the 'control_group_uri' resource hosted at the Client, including message exchange encoding and other details (see Section 4.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]): see Section 10 for the eviction of multiple group members.

* OPT11 (Optional) - Specify policies that instruct Clients to retain unsuccessfully decrypted messages and for how long, so that they can be decrypted after getting updated keying material: no.

* OPT12 (Optional) - Specify for the KDC to perform group rekeying (together or instead of renewing individual keying material) when receiving a Key Renewal Request: the Group Manager SHOULD NOT perform a group rekeying, unless already scheduled to occur shortly (see Section 9.2).

* OPT13 (Optional) - Specify how the identifier of a group members’s authentication credential is included in requests sent to other group members: no.

* OPT14 (Optional) - Specify additional information to include in rekeying messages for the "Point-to-Point" group rekeying scheme (see Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]): see Section 11.1.

* OPT15 (Optional) - Specify if Clients must or should support any of the parameters defined as optional in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]: no.

Appendix B. Extensibility for Future COSE Algorithms

As defined in Section 8.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], future algorithms can be registered in the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms] as specifying none or multiple COSE capabilities.
To enable the seamless use of such future registered algorithms, this section defines a general, agile format for:

* Each 'ecdh_info_entry' of the 'ecdh_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response (see Section 5.3 and Section 5.3.1);

* The 'sign_params' and 'ecdh_params' parameters within the 'key' parameter (see Section 6.3), as part of the response payloads used in Section 6.3, Section 9.1.1, Section 9.1.2 and Section 11.

Appendix B of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] describes the analogous general format for 'sign_info_entry' of the 'sign_info' parameter in the Token Transfer Response (see Section 5.3 of this document).

If any of the currently registered COSE algorithms is considered, using this general format yields the same structure defined in this document for the items above, thus ensuring retro-compatibility.

B.1. Format of 'ecdh_info_entry'

The format of each 'ecdh_info_entry' (see Section 5.3 and Section 5.3.1) is generalized as follows. Given N the number of elements of the 'ecdh_parameters' array, i.e., the number of COSE capabilities of the ECDH algorithm, then:

* 'ecdh_key_parameters' is replaced by N elements 'ecdh_capab_i', each of which is a CBOR array.

* The i-th array following 'ecdh_parameters', i.e., 'ecdh_capab_i' (i = 0, ..., N-1), is the array of COSE capabilities for the algorithm capability specified in 'ecdh_parameters'[i].

ecdh_info_entry =
[ id : gname / [ + gname ],
  ecdh_alg : int / tstr,
  ecdh_parameters : [ alg_capab_1 : any,
    alg_capab_2 : any,
    ...
    alg_capab_N : any],
  ecdh_capab_1 : [ any ],
  ecdh_capab_2 : [ any ],
  ...
  ecdh_capab_N : [ any ],
  cred_fmt = int / null
]

gname = tstr

The format of 'key' (see Section 6.3) is generalized as follows.

* The 'sign_params' array includes N+1 elements, whose exact structure and value depend on the value of the signature algorithm specified in 'sign_alg'.

- The first element, i.e., 'sign_params'[0], is the array of the N COSE capabilities for the signature algorithm, as specified for that algorithm in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms] (see Section 8.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]).

- Each following element 'sign_params'[i], i.e., with index i > 0, is the array of COSE capabilities for the algorithm capability specified in 'sign_params'[0][i-1].

For example, if 'sign_params'[0][0] specifies the key type as capability of the algorithm, then 'sign_params'[1] is the array of COSE capabilities for the COSE key type associated with the signature algorithm, as specified for that key type in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types] (see Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]).

* The 'ecdh_params' array includes M+1 elements, whose exact structure and value depend on the value of the ECDH algorithm specified in 'ecdh_alg'.

- The first element, i.e., 'ecdh_params'[0], is the array of the M COSE capabilities for the ECDH algorithm, as specified for that algorithm in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Algorithms" registry [COSE.Algorithms] (see Section 8.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]).

- Each following element 'ecdh_params'[i], i.e., with index i > 0, is the array of COSE capabilities for the algorithm capability specified in 'ecdh_params'[0][i-1].

For example, if 'ecdh_params'[0][0] specifies the key type as capability of the algorithm, then 'ecdh_params'[1] is the array of COSE capabilities for the COSE key type associated with the ECDH algorithm, as specified for that key type in the "Capabilities" column of the "COSE Key Types" registry [COSE.Key.Types] (see Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]).
Appendix C. Document Updates

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

C.1. Version -13 to -14

* Major reordering of the document sections.
* The HKDF Algorithm is specified by the HMAC Algorithm.
* Group communication does not necessarily use IP multicast.
* Generalized AIF data model, also for draft-ace-oscore-gm-admin.
* Clarifications and editorial improvements.

C.2. Version -12 to -13

* Renamed parameters about authentication credentials.
* It is optional for the Group Manager to reassign Gids by tracking "Birth Gids".
* Distinction between authentication credentials and public keys.
* Updated IANA considerations related to AIF.
* Updated textual description of registered ACE Scope Semantics value.

C.3. Version -11 to -12

* Clarified semantics of 'ecdh_info' and 'kdc_dh_creds'.
* Definition of /ace-group/GROUPNAME/kdc-pub-key moved to draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm.
* ace-group/ accessible also to non-members that are not Verifiers.
* Clarified what resources are accessible to Verifiers.
* Revised error handling for the newly defined resources.
* Revised use of CoAP error codes.
* Use of "Token Tranfer Request" and "Token Transfer Response".
* New parameter 'rekeying_scheme'.

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* Categorization of new parameters and inherited conditional parameters.

* Clarifications on what to do in case of enhanced error responses.

* Changed UCCS to CCS.

* Authentication credentials of just joined Clients can be in rekeying messages.

* Revised names of new IANA registries.

* Clarified meaning of registered CoRE resource type.

* Alignment to new requirements from draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm.

* Fixes and editorial improvements.

C.4. Version -10 to -11

* Removed redundancy of key type capabilities, from ‘sign_info’, ‘ecdh_info’ and ‘key’.

* New resource to retrieve the Group Manager’s authentication credential.

* New resource to retrieve material for Signature Verifiers.

* New parameter ‘sign_enc_alg’ related to the group mode.

* ‘cred_fmt’ takes value from the COSE Header Parameters registry.

* Improved alignment of the Joining Response payload with the Group OSCORE Security Context parameters.

* Recycling Group IDs by tracking "Birth GIDs".

* Error handling in case of non available Sender IDs upon joining.

* Error handling in case EdDSA public keys with invalid Y coordinate when the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE is supported.

* Generalized proof-of-possession (PoP) for the joining node’s private key; defined Diffie-Hellman based PoP for OSCORE groups using only the pairwise mode.

* Proof-of-possessment of the Group Manager’s private key in the Joining Response.
* Always use ‘peer_identifiers’ to convey Sender IDs as node identifiers.
* Stale Sender IDs provided when rekeying the group.
* New resource for late retrieval of stale Sender IDs.
* Added examples of message exchanges.
* Revised default values of group configuration parameters.
* Fixes to IANA registrations.
* General format of parameters related to COSE capabilities, supporting future registered COSE algorithms (new Appendix).

C.5. Version -09 to -10
* Updated non-recycling policy of Sender IDs.
* Removed policies about Sender Sequence Number synchronization.
* ’control_path’ renamed to ’control_uri’.
* Format of ’get_pub_keys’ aligned with draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm.
* Additional way to inform of group eviction.
* Registered semantics identifier for extended scope format.
* Extended error handling, with error type specified in some error responses.
* Renumbered requirements.

C.6. Version -08 to -09
* The url-path “ace-group” is used.
* Added overview of admitted methods on the Group Manager resources.
* Added exchange of parameters relevant for the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.
* The signed value for ’client_cred_verify’ includes also the scope.
* Renamed the key material object as Group_OSCORE_Input_Material object.
* Replaced ‘clientId’ with ‘group_SenderId’.
* Added message exchange for Group Names request–response.
* No reassignment of Sender ID and Gid in the same OSCORE group.
* Updates on group rekeying contextual with request of new Sender ID.
* Signature verifiers can also retrieve Group Names and URIs.
* Removed group policy about supporting Group OSCORE in pairwise mode.
* Registration of the resource type rt="core.osc.gm".
* Update list of requirements.
* Clarifications and editorial revision.

C.7. Version -07 to -08
* AIF specific data model to express scope entries.
  * A set of roles is checked as valid when processing the Joining Request.
  * Updated format of ‘get_pub_keys’ in the Joining Request.
  * Payload format and default values of group policies in the Joining Response.
  * Updated payload format of the FETCH request to retrieve authentication credentials.
  * Default values for group configuration parameters.
  * IANA registrations to support the AIF specific data model.

C.8. Version -06 to -07
* Alignments with draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm.
  * New format of ‘sign_info’, using the COSE capabilities.
* New format of Joining Response parameters, using the COSE capabilities.
* Considerations on group rekeying.
* Editorial revision.

C.9. Version -05 to -06
* Added role of external signature verifier.
* Parameter ‘rsnonce’ renamed to ‘kdcchallenge’.
* Parameter ‘kdcchallenge’ may be omitted in some cases.
* Clarified difference between group name and OSCORE Gid.
* Removed the role combination ["requester", "monitor"].
* Admit implicit scope and audience in the Authorization Request.
* New format for the ‘sign_info’ parameter.
* Scope not mandatory to include in the Joining Request.
* Group policy about supporting Group OSCORE in pairwise mode.
* Possible individual rekeying of a single requesting node combined with a group rekeying.
* Security considerations on reusage of signature challenges.
* Addressing optional requirement OPT12 from draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm
* Editorial improvements.

C.10. Version -04 to -05
* Nonce N_S also in error responses to the Joining Requests.
* Supporting single Access Token for multiple groups/topics.
* Supporting legal requesters/responders using the ‘peer_roles’ parameter.
* Registered and used dedicated label for TLS Exporter.
* Added method for uploading a new authentication credential to the Group Manager.

* Added resource and method for retrieving the current group status.

* Fixed inconsistency in retrieving group keying material only.

* Clarified retrieval of keying material for monitor-only members.

* Clarification on incrementing version number when rekeying the group.

* Clarification on what is re-distributed with the group rekeying.

* Security considerations on the size of the nonces used for the signature challenge.

* Added CBOR values to abbreviate role identifiers in the group.

C.11. Version -03 to -04

* New abstract.

* Moved general content to draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm

* Terminology: node name; node resource.

* Creation and pointing at node resource.

* Updated Group Manager API (REST methods and offered services).

* Size of challenges ‘cnonce’ and ‘rsnonce’.

* Value of ‘rsnonce’ for reused or non-traditionally-posted tokens.

* Removed reference to RFC 7390.

* New requirements from draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm

* Editorial improvements.

C.12. Version -02 to -03

* New sections, aligned with the interface of ace-key-groupcomm.

* Exchange of information on the signature algorithm and related parameters, during the Token POST (Section 4.1).
* Nonce ‘rsnonce’ from the Group Manager to the Client (Section 4.1).

* Client PoP signature in the Key Distribution Request upon joining (Section 4.2).

* Local actions on the Group Manager, upon a new node’s joining (Section 4.2).

* Local actions on the Group Manager, upon a node’s leaving (Section 12).

* IANA registration in ACE Groupcomm Parameters registry.

* More fulfilled profile requirements (Appendix A).

C.13. Version -01 to -02

* Editorial fixes.

* Changed: "listener" to "responder"; "pure listener" to "monitor".

* Changed profile name to "coap_group_oscore_app", to reflect it is an application profile.

* Added the ‘type’ parameter for all requests to a Join Resource.

* Added parameters to indicate the encoding of authentication credentials.

* Challenge-response for proof-of-possession of signature keys (Section 4).

* Renamed ‘key_info’ parameter to ‘sign_info’; updated its format; extended to include also parameters of the signature key (Section 4.1).

* Code 4.00 (Bad request), in responses to joining nodes providing an invalid authentication credential (Section 4.3).

* Clarifications on provisioning and checking of authentication credentials (Sections 4 and 6).

* Extended discussion on group rekeying and possible different approaches (Section 7).

* Extended security considerations: proof-of-possession of signature keys; collision of OSCORE Group Identifiers (Section 8).
* Registered three entries in the IANA registry "Sequence Number Synchronization Method" (Section 9).

* Registered one public key encoding in the "ACE Public Key Encoding" IANA registry (Section 9).

C.14. Version -00 to -01

* Changed name of ‘req_aud’ to ‘audience’ in the Authorization Request (Section 3.1).

* Added negotiation of signature algorithm/parameters between Client and Group Manager (Section 4).

* Updated format of the Key Distribution Response as a whole (Section 4.3).

* Added parameter ‘cs_params’ in the ‘key’ parameter of the Key Distribution Response (Section 4.3).

* New IANA registrations in the "ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints" registry, "ACE Groupcomm Key" registry, "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry and "ACE Groupcomm Profile" registry (Section 9).

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Abstract

This document specifies a profile for the ACE (Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments) framework to enable authorization in a Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)-based publish-subscribe messaging system. Proof-of-possession keys, bound to OAuth2.0 access tokens, are used to authenticate and authorize MQTT Clients. The protocol relies on TLS for confidentiality and MQTT server (Broker) authentication.

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1. Introduction

This document specifies a profile for the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In this profile, Clients and Servers (Brokers) use MQTT to exchange Application Messages. The protocol relies on TLS for communication security between entities. The MQTT protocol interactions are described based on the MQTT v5.0 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5]. Since it is expected that MQTT deployments will continue to support MQTT v3.1.1 Clients, this document also describes a reduced set of protocol interactions for MQTT v3.1.1 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v3.1.1]. However, MQTT v5.0 is the RECOMMENDED version as it works more naturally with ACE-style authentication and authorization.

MQTT is a publish-subscribe protocol, and after connecting to the MQTT Server (Broker), a Client can publish and subscribe to multiple topics. The Broker, which acts as the Resource Server (RS), is responsible for distributing messages published by the publishers to their subscribers. In the rest of the document, the terms "RS", "MQTT Server" and "Broker" are used interchangeably.

Messages are published under a Topic Name, and subscribers subscribe to the Topic Names to receive the corresponding messages. The Broker uses the Topic Name in a published message to determine which subscribers to relay the messages to. In this document, topics, more specifically, Topic Names, are treated as resources. The Clients are assumed to have identified the publish/subscribe topics of interest out-of-band (topic discovery is not a feature of the MQTT protocol). A Resource Owner can pre-configure policies at the Authorization Server (AS) that give Clients publish or subscribe permissions to different topics.

Clients prove their permission to publish and subscribe to topics hosted on an MQTT Broker using an access token, bound to a proof-of-possession (PoP) key. This document describes how to authorize the following exchanges between the Clients and the Broker.

* Connection requests from the Clients to the Broker
* Publish requests from the Clients to the Broker and from the Broker to the Clients
* Subscribe requests from the Clients to the Broker

Clients use the MQTT PUBLISH packet to publish to a topic. The mechanisms specified in this document do not protect the payload of the PUBLISH packet from the Broker. Hence, the payload is not signed or encrypted specifically for the subscribers. This functionality may be implemented using the proposal outlined in the ACE Pub-Sub Profile [I-D.ietf-ace-pubsub-profile].

To provide communication confidentiality and Broker authentication to the MQTT Clients, TLS is used, and TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] is RECOMMENDED. This document makes the same assumptions as Section 4 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] regarding Client and RS registration with the AS and setting up the keying material. While the Client-Broker exchanges are only over MQTT, the required Client-AS and RS-AS interactions are described for HTTPS-based communication [I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics], using "application/ace+json" content type, and unless otherwise specified, using JSON encoding. The token MAY be an opaque reference to authorization information or JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519]. For JWTs, this document follows [RFC7800] for PoP semantics for JWTs, and the mechanisms for providing and verifying PoP are detailed in Section 2.2. The Client-AS and RS-AS exchanges MAY also use protocols other than HTTP, e.g., Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] or MQTT. It is recommended that TLS is used to secure these communication channels between Client-AS and RS-AS. To reduce the protocol memory and bandwidth requirements, implementations MAY also use "application/ace+cbor" content type, and CBOR encoding [RFC8949], and CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] and associated PoP semantics. For more information, see Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) [RFC8747]. A JWT token uses JOSE, while a CWT token uses COSE [RFC9152] for security protection.

1.1. Requirements Language

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. ACE-Related Terminology

Certain security-related terms such as "authentication", "authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message authentication code", and "verify" are taken from [RFC4949].
The terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] such as "Client" (C), "Resource Server" (RS) and "Authorization Server" (AS).

The term "resource" is used to refer to an MQTT Topic Name, which is defined in Section 1.3. Hence, the "Resource Owner" is any entity that can authoritatively speak for the topic. This document also defines a Client Authorization Server for Clients that are not able to support HTTP.

Client Authorization Server (CAS)
An entity that prepares and endorses authentication and authorization data for a Client, and communicates to the AS using HTTPS.

1.3. MQTT-Related Terminology

The document describes message exchanges as MQTT protocol interactions. The Clients are MQTT Clients, which connect to the Broker to publish and subscribe to Application Messages, labelled with their topics. For additional information, please refer to the MQTT v5.0 – the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5] or the MQTT v3.1.1 – the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v3.1.1].

Broker
The Server in MQTT. It acts as an intermediary between the Clients that publish Application Messages and the Clients that made Subscriptions. The Broker acts as the Resource Server for the Clients.

Client
A device or program that uses MQTT.

Network Connection
A construct provided by the underlying transport protocol that is being used by MQTT. It connects the Client to the Server. It provides the means to send an ordered, lossless, stream of bytes in both directions. This document uses TLS as transport protocol.

Session
A stateful interaction between a Client and a Broker. Some Sessions last only as long as the Network Connection; others can span multiple Network Connections.

Application Message
The data carried by the MQTT protocol. The data has an associated Quality-of-Service (QoS) level and Topic Name.
MQTT Control Packet
The MQTT protocol operates by exchanging a series of MQTT Control packets. Each packet is composed of a Fixed Header, a Variable Header (depending on the control packet type), and a Payload.

UTF-8 encoded string
A string prefixed with a two-byte length field that gives the number of bytes in a UTF-8 encoded string itself. Unless stated otherwise, all UTF-8 encoded strings can have any length in the range 0 to 65535 bytes.

Binary Data
Binary Data is represented by a two-byte length field which indicates the number of data bytes, followed by that number of bytes. Thus, the length of Binary Data is limited to the range of 0 to 65535 Bytes.

Variable Byte Integer
Variable Byte Integer is encoded using an encoding scheme that uses a single byte for values up to 127. For larger values, the least significant seven bits of each byte encode the data, and the most significant bit is used to indicate whether there are bytes following in the representation. Thus, each byte encodes 128 values and a "continuation bit". The maximum number of bytes in the Variable Byte Integer field is four.

QoS level
The level of assurance for the delivery of an Application Message. The QoS level can be 0-2, where 0 indicates "At most once delivery", 1 "At least once delivery", and 2 "Exactly once delivery".

Property
The last field of the Variable Header is a set of properties for several MQTT control packets (e.g. CONNECT, CONNACK). A Property consists of an Identifier that defines its usage and data type, followed by a value. The Identifier is encoded as a Variable Byte Integer. For example, the "Authentication Data" property uses the Identifier 22.

Topic Name
The label attached to an Application Message, which is matched to a Subscription.
Subscription
A Subscription comprises a Topic Filter and a maximum QoS. A Subscription is associated with a single session.

Topic Filter
An expression that indicates interest in one or more Topic Names. Topic Filters may include wildcards.

MQTT sends various control packets across a Network Connection. The following is not an exhaustive list, and the control packets that are not relevant for authorization are not explained. These include, for instance, the PUBREL and PUBCOMP packets used in the 4-step handshake required for QoS level 2.

CONNECT
Client request to connect to the Broker. This is the first packet sent by a Client.

CONNACK
The Broker connection acknowledgment. CONNACK packets contain return codes indicating either a success or an error state in response to a Client’s CONNECT packet.

AUTH
Authentication Exchange. An AUTH control packet is sent from the Client to the Broker or from the Broker to the Client as part of an extended authentication exchange. AUTH Properties include Authentication Method and Authentication Data. The Authentication Method is set in the CONNECT packet, and consequent AUTH packets follow the same Authentication Method. The contents of the Authentication Data are defined by the Authentication Method.

PUBLISH
Publish request sent from a publishing Client to the Broker, or from the Broker to a subscribing Client.

PUBACK
Response to a PUBLISH request with QoS level 1. A PUBACK can be sent from the Broker to a Client or from a Client to the Broker.

PUBREC
Response to PUBLISH request with QoS level 2. PUBREC can be sent from the Broker to a Client or from a Client to the Broker.
SUBSCRIBE
Subscribe request sent from a Client.

SUBACK
Subscribe acknowledgment from the Broker to the Client.

PINGREQ
A ping request sent from a Client to the Broker. It signals to the Broker that the Client is alive and is used to confirm that the Broker is also alive. The "Keep Alive" period is set in the CONNECT packet.

PINGRESP
Response sent by the Broker to the Client in response to PINGREQ. It indicates the Broker is alive.

DISCONNECT
The DISCONNECT packet is the final MQTT Control Packet sent from the Client or the Broker. It indicates the reason why the Network Connection is being closed. If the Network Connection is closed without the Client first sending a DISCONNECT packet with Reason Code 0x00 (Normal disconnection) and the Connection has a Will Message, the Will Message is published.

Will
If the Network Connection is not closed normally, the Broker sends a last Will message for the Client if the Client provided one in its CONNECT packet. Situations in which the Will Message is published include, but are not limited to:

* An I/O error or network failure detected by the Broker.

* The Client fails to communicate within the Keep Alive period.

* The Client closes the Network Connection without first sending a DISCONNECT packet with a Reason Code 0x00 (Normal disconnection).

* The Broker closes the Network Connection without first receiving a DISCONNECT packet with a Reason Code 0x00 (Normal disconnection).

If the Will Flag is set in the CONNECT flags, then the payload of the CONNECT packet includes information about the Will. The information consists of the Will Properties, Will Topic, and Will Payload fields.
2. Authorizing Connection Requests

This section specifies how Client connections are authorized by the AS and verified by the MQTT Broker. Figure 1 shows the basic protocol flow during connection setup. The token request and response use the token endpoint at the AS, specified for HTTP-based interactions in Section 5.8 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Steps (D) and (E) are optional and use the introspection endpoint specified in Section 5.9 of the ACE framework. The discussion in this document assumes that the Client and the Broker use HTTPS to communicate with the AS via these endpoints. The Client and the Broker use MQTT to communicate between them. The C-AS and Broker-AS communication MAY be implemented using protocols other than HTTPS, e.g. CoAP or MQTT. Whatever protocol is used for C-AS and Broker-AS communications MUST provide mutual authentication, confidentiality protection, and integrity protection.

If the Client is resource-constrained or does not support HTTPS, a separate Client Authorization Server may carry out the token request on behalf of the Client (Figure 1 (A) and (B)), and later, onboard the Client with the token. The interactions between a Client and its Client Authorization Server for token onboarding and support for MQTT-based token requests at the AS are out of the scope of this document.
2.1. Client Token Request to the Authorization Server (AS)

The first step in the protocol flow (Figure 1 (A)) is the token acquisition by the Client from the AS. The Client and the AS MUST perform mutual authentication. The Client requests an access token from the AS as described in Section 5.8.1 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The document follows the procedures defined in Section 3.2.1 of the DTLS profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] for RPK (Raw Public Keys [RFC7250]), and in Section 3.3.1 of the same document for PSK (Pre-Shared Keys). However, the content type of the request is set to "application/ace+json", and the AS uses JSON in the payload of its responses to the Client and the RS. As explained earlier, implementations MAY also use "application/ace+cbor" content type.
On receipt of the token request, the AS verifies the request. If the AS successfully verifies the access request and authorizes the Client for the indicated audience (i.e., RS) and scopes (i.e., publish/subscribe permissions over topics as described in Section 2.3), the AS issues an access token (Figure 1 (B)).

The response includes the parameters described in Section 5.8.2 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. For RPK, the parameters are as described in Section 3.2.1 of the DTLS profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. For PSK, the document follows Section 3.3.1 of the DTLS profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. In both cases, if the response contains an "ace_profile" parameter, this parameter is set to "mqtt_tls". The returned token is a Proof-of-Possession (PoP) token by default.

This document follows [RFC7800] for PoP semantics for JWTs (CWTs MAY also be used). The AS includes a "cnf" (confirmation) parameter in the PoP token, to declare that the Client possesses a particular key and RS can cryptographically confirm that the Client has possession of that key, as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params].

Note that the contents of the web tokens (including the "cnf" parameter) are to be consumed by the RS and not the Client (the Client obtains the key information in a different manner). The RPK case is handled as described in Section 3.2.1 of the DTLS profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. For the PSK case, the referenced procedures apply, with the following exceptions to accommodate JWT and JOSE use. In this case, the AS adds a "cnf" parameter to the access information carrying a JWK (JSON Web Key) [RFC7517] object that contains either the symmetric key itself or a key identifier that can be used by the RS to determine the secret key it shares with the Client. The JWT is created as explained in Section 7 of [RFC7519], and the JWT MUST include JWE [RFC7516]. If CWT/COSE is used this information MUST be inside the "COSE_Key" object, and MUST be encrypted using a "COSE_Encrypt0" structure.

The AS returns error responses for JSON-based interactions following Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]. When CBOR is used, the interactions MUST implement Section 5.8.3 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

2.2. Client Connection Request to the Broker (C)
2.2.1. Overview of Client-RS Authentication Methods over TLS and MQTT

Unless the Client publishes and subscribes to only public topics, the Client and the Broker MUST perform mutual authentication. The Client MUST authenticate to the Broker either over MQTT or TLS before performing any other action. For MQTT, the options are "None" and "ace". For TLS, the options are "Anon" for an anonymous client, and "Known(RPK/PSK)" for RPK and PSK, respectively. The "None" and "Anon" options do not provide client authentication but can be used either during authentication or in combination with authentication at the other layer. When the Client uses TLS:Anon,MQTT:None, the Client can only publish or subscribe to public topics. Thus, the client authentication procedures involve the following possible combinations:

* TLS:Anon,MQTT:None: This option is used only for the topics that do not require authorization, including the "authz-info" topic. Publishing to the "authz-info" topic is described in Section 2.2.2.

* TLS:Anon,MQTT:ace: The token is transported inside the CONNECT packet and MUST be validated using one of the methods described in Section 2.2.2. This option also supports a tokenless connection request for AS discovery. As per the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], a separate step is needed to determine whether the discovered AS URI is authorized to act as an AS.

* TLS:Known(RPK/PSK),MQTT:none: This specification supports client authentication with TLS with RPK and PSK following the procedures described in DTLS profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. For the RPK, the Client MUST have published the token to the "authz-info" topic. For the PSK, the token MAY be published to the "authz-info" topic, or MAY be, alternatively, provided as a "PSK identity" (e.g. an "identity" in the "identities" field in the Client's "pre_shared_key" extension in TLS 1.3).

* TLS:Known(RPK/PSK),MQTT:ace: This option SHOULD NOT be chosen as the token transported in the CONNECT overwrites any permissions passed during the TLS authentication.

It is RECOMMENDED that the Client implements TLS:Anon,MQTT:ace as the first choice when working with protected topics. However, MQTT v3.1.1 Clients that do not prefer to overload username and password fields for ACE (as described in Section 6) MAY implement TLS:Known(RPK/PSK),MQTT:none, and consequently TLS:Anon,MQTT:None to submit their token to "authz-info".
The Broker MUST support TLS:Anon,MQTT:ace. To support Clients with different capabilities, the Broker MAY provide multiple client authentication options, e.g. support TLS:Known(RPK),MQTT:none and TLS:Anon,MQTT:None, to enable RPK-based client authentication.

The Client MUST authenticate the Broker during the TLS handshake. If the Client authentication uses TLS:Known(RPK/PSK), then the Broker is authenticated using the respective method. Otherwise, to authenticate the Broker, the Client MUST validate a public key from an X.509 certificate or an RPK from the Broker against the "rs_cnf" parameter in the token response, which contains information about the public key used by the RS to authenticate if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]. The AS MAY include the thumbprint of the RS’s X.509 certificate in the "rs_cnf" (thumbprint as defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-x509]). In this case, the Client MUST validate the RS certificate against this thumbprint.

2.2.2. authz-info: The Authorization Information Topic

In the cases when the Client must transport the token to the Broker first, the Client connects to the Broker to publish its token to the "authz-info" topic. The "authz-info" topic MUST be publish-only (i.e., the Clients are not allowed to subscribe to it). "authz-info" is not protected, and hence, the Client uses the TLS:Anon,MQTT:None option over a TLS connection. After publishing the token, the Client disconnects from the Broker and is expected to reconnect using client authentication over TLS (i.e., TLS:Known(RPK/PSK),MQTT:none).

The Broker stores and indexes all tokens received to the "authz-info" topic in its key store (similar to the DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]). This profile follows the recommendation of Section 5.10.1 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and expects that the Broker stores only one token per PoP key, and any other token linked to the same key overwrites an existing token.

The Broker MUST verify the validity of the token (i.e., through local validation or introspection, if the token is a reference) as described in Section 2.2.5. If the token is not valid, the Broker MUST discard the token.
Depending on the QoS level of the PUBLISH packet, the Broker returns the error response as a PUBACK, PUBREC, or DISCONNECT packet. If the QoS level is equal to 0, and the token is not valid, or the claims cannot be obtained in the case of an introspected token, the Broker MUST send a DISCONNECT packet with the reason code 0x87 (Not authorized). If the PUBLISH payload does not parse to a token, the Broker MUST send a DISCONNECT with the reason code 0x99 (Payload format invalid).

If the QoS level of the PUBLISH packet is greater than or equal to 1, and the token is not valid, or the claims cannot be obtained in the case of an introspected token, the Broker MUST send the reason code 0x87 (Not authorized) in the PUBACK or PUBREC. If the PUBLISH payload does not parse to a token, the PUBACK/PUBREC reason code is 0x99 (Payload format invalid).

It must be noted that when the Broker sends the "Not authorized" response, this corresponds to the token being not valid, and not that the actual PUBLISH packet was not authorized. Given that the "authz-info" is a public topic, this response is not expected to cause confusion.

2.2.3. Client Authentication over TLS

This document supports TLS with Raw Public Keys (RPK) [RFC7250] and with Pre-Shared Keys (PSK). The TLS session setup follows the DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize], as the profile applies to TLS equally well [I-D.ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize]. When there are exceptions to the DTLS profile, these are explicitly stated in the document. If TLS 1.2 is used, [RFC7925] describes how TLS can be used for constrained devices, alongside recommended cipher suites. Additionally, TLS 1.2 implementations MUST use the "Extended Main Secret" extension (terminology adopted from [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]) to incorporate the handshake transcript into the main secret [RFC7627]. TLS implementations SHOULD use the SNI (Server Name Indication) [RFC6066] and APLN (Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation) [RFC7301] extensions so the TLS handshake authenticates as much of the protocol context as possible.

2.2.3.1. Raw Public Key Mode

This document follows the procedures defined in Section 3.2.2 of the DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] with the following exceptions. The Client MUST upload the access token to the Broker using the method specified in Section 2.2.2 before initiating the handshake.
2.2.3.2. Pre-Shared Key Mode

This document follows the procedures defined in Section 3.3.2 of DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] with the following exceptions.

To use TLS 1.3 with pre-shared keys, the Client utilizes the PSK key extension specified in [RFC8446] using the key conveyed in the "cnf" parameter of the AS response. The same key is bound to the access token in the "cnf" claim. The Client can upload the token as specified in Section 2.2.2 before initiating the handshake. When using a previously uploaded token, the Client MUST indicate during the handshake which previously uploaded access token it intends to use. To do so, it MUST create a "COSE_Key" or "JWK" structure with the "kid" that was conveyed in the "rs_cnf" claim in the token response from the AS and the key type "symmetric". This structure is then included as the only element in the "cnf" structure and the encoded value of that "cnf" structure used as a PSK identity in TLS. As an alternative to the access token upload, the Client can provide the most recent access token, JWT or CWT, as a PSK identity.

In contrast to DTLS profile for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize], a Client MAY omit support for the cipher suites TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8. For TLS 1.2, however, a client MUST support TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 for PSK ([RFC8442]) and TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 for RPK ([RFC8422]), as recommended in [RFC7525] (and adjusted to be a PSK cipher suite as appropriate).

2.2.4. Client Authentication over MQTT

2.2.4.1. Transporting the Access Token Inside the MQTT CONNECT

This section describes how the Client transports the token to the Broker inside the CONNECT packet. If this method is used, the Client TLS connection is expected to be anonymous, and the Broker is authenticated during the TLS connection setup. The approach described in this section is similar to an earlier proposal by Fremantle, et al. [fremantle14].

After sending the CONNECT, the Client MUST wait to receive the CONNACK from the Broker. The only packets it is allowed to send are DISCONNECT or AUTH that is in response to the Broker AUTH. Similarly, except for a DISCONNECT and AUTH response from the Client, the Broker MUST NOT process any packets before sending a CONNACK.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the MQTT CONNECT packet used in MQTT v5.0. A CONNECT packet is composed of a fixed header, a variable header, and a payload. The fixed header contains the Control Packet Type (CPT), Reserved, and Remaining Length fields. Remaining Length is a Variable Byte Integer that represents the number of bytes remaining within the current Control Packet, including data in the Variable Header and the Payload. The Variable Header contains the Protocol Name, Protocol Level, Connect Flags, Keep Alive, and Properties fields. The Connect Flags in the variable header specify the properties of the MQTT session. It also indicates the presence or absence of some fields in the Payload. The payload contains one or more encoded fields, namely a unique Client Identifier for the Client, a Will Topic, Will Payload, User Name, and Password. All but the Client Identifier can be omitted depending on the flags in the Variable Header. The Client Identifier identifies the Client to the Broker, and therefore, is unique for each Client. It must be noted that the Client Identifier is an unauthenticated identifier used within the MQTT protocol and so is not bound to the access token.
The CONNECT flags are Username, Password, Will retain, Will QoS, Will Flag, Clean Start, and Reserved. Figure 3 shows how the flags MUST be set to use AUTH packets for authentication and authorization, i.e., the username and password flags MUST be set to 0. An MQTT v5.0 Broker MAY also support token transport using Username and Password to provide a security option for MQTT v3.1.1 Clients, as described in Section 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User name Flag</th>
<th>Pass. Flag</th>
<th>Will retain Flag</th>
<th>Will QoS Flag</th>
<th>Will Flag</th>
<th>Clean Start</th>
<th>Rsvd. Flag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: CONNECT Flags for AUTH

The Will Flag indicates that a Will message needs to be sent. The Client MAY set the Will Flag as desired (marked as "X" in Figure 3). If the Will Flag is set to 1, the Broker MUST check that the token allows the publication of the Will message (i.e., the Will Topic filter is in the scope array). The check is performed against the token scope described in Section 2.3. If the Will authorization fails, the connection is refused as described in Section 2.4.1. If the Broker accepts the connection request, the Broker stores the Will message and publishes it when the Network Connection is closed according to Will QoS, and Will retain parameters and MQTT Will management rules. To avoid publishing the Will Messages in the case of temporary network disconnections, the Client specifies a Will Delay Interval in the Will Properties. Section 5 explains how the Broker deals with the retained messages in further detail.

In MQTT v5.0, the Client signals a clean session (i.e., that the session does not continue an existing session) by setting the Clean Start Flag to 1 in the CONNECT packet. In this profile, the Client SHOULD always start with a clean session. The Broker MAY also signal that it does not support session continuation by setting Session Expiry Interval to 0 in the CONNACK. If the Broker starts a clean session, the Broker MUST set the Session Present flag to 0 in the CONNACK packet to signal this to the Client.

The Broker MAY support session continuation, e.g., if the Broker requires it for QoS reasons. In this case, if a CONNECT packet is received with Clean Start set to 0 and there is a Session associated with the Client Identifier, the Broker MUST resume communications.
with the Client based on the state from the existing Session. In its response, the Broker MUST set the Session Present flag to 1 in the CONNACK packet to signal session continuation to the Client. The session state stored by the Client and the Broker is described in Section 5.

When reconnecting to a Broker that supports session continuation, the Client MUST still provide a token, in addition to using the same Client Identifier and setting the Clean Start to 0. The Broker MUST still perform PoP validation on the provided token. If the token matches the stored state, the Broker MAY skip introspecting a token-by-reference and use the stored introspection result. The Broker MUST also verify the Client is authorized to receive or send MQTT packets that are pending transmission. When a Client connects with a long Session Expiry Interval, the Broker may need to maintain the Client’s MQTT session state after it disconnects for an extended period. Brokers SHOULD implement administrative policies to limit misuse.

Note that, according to the MQTT standard, the Broker uses the Client Identifier to identify the session state. In the case of a Client Identifier collision, a Client may take over another Client’s session. Given that the Broker MUST associate the Client with a valid token, a Client will only send or receive messages to its authorized topics. Therefore, while this issue is not expected to affect security, it may affect QoS (i.e., PUBLISH or QoS messages saved for Client A may be delivered to a Client B). In addition, if this Client Identifier represents a Client already connected to the Broker, the Broker sends a DISCONNECT packet to the existing Client with Reason Code of 0x8E (Session taken over) and closes the connection to the Client.

2.2.4.2. Authentication Using AUTH Property

To use AUTH, the Client MUST set the Authentication Method as a property of a CONNECT packet by using the property identifier 21 (0x15). This is followed by a UTF-8 Encoded String containing the name of the Authentication Method, which MUST be set to "ace". If the Broker does not support this profile, it sends a CONNACK with a Reason Code of 0x8C (Bad authentication method).

The Authentication Method is followed by the Authentication Data, which has a property identifier 22 (0x16) and is Binary Data. Based on the Authentication Data, the Broker MUST support both options below:

* Proof-of-Possession using a challenge from the TLS session
* Proof-of-Possession via Broker-generated challenge/response

2.2.4.2.1. Proof-of-Possession Using a Challenge from the TLS session

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authentication</th>
<th>Token Length</th>
<th>Token</th>
<th>MAC or Signature (over TLS exporter content)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 4: Authentication Data for PoP Based on TLS Exporter Content

For this option, the Authentication Data inside the Client’s CONNECT MUST contain the two-byte integer token length, the token, and the keyed message digest (MAC) or the Client signature (as shown in Figure 4). The Proof-of-Possession key in the token is used to calculate the keyed message digest (MAC) or the Client signature based on the content obtained from the TLS exporter ([RFC5705] for TLS 1.2, and Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]) for TLS 1.3. This content is exported from the TLS session using the exporter label "EXPORTER-ACE-MQTT-Sign-Challenge", an empty context, and length of 32 bytes. The token is also validated as described in Section 2.2.5, and the Broker responds with a CONNACK with the appropriate response code. The Client cannot reauthenticate using this method during the same TLS session (see Section 4).

2.2.4.2.2. Proof-of-Possession via Broker-generated Challenge/Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authentication</th>
<th>Token Length</th>
<th>Token</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 5: Authentication Data to Initiate PoP Based on Challenge/Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authentication</th>
<th>RS Nonce</th>
<th>Data Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8 bytes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Authentication Data for Broker Challenge
For this option, the Broker follows a Broker-generated challenge/response protocol. If the Authentication Data inside the Client’s CONNECT contains only the two-byte integer token length and the token (as shown in Figure 5), the Broker MUST respond with an AUTH packet, with the Authenticate Reason Code set to 0x18 (Continue Authentication). The Broker also uses this method if the Authentication Data does not contain a token, but the Broker has a token stored for the connecting Client.

The Broker continues authentication using an AUTH packet that contains the Authentication Method and the Authentication Data. The Authentication Method MUST be set to "ace", and the Authentication Data MUST NOT be empty and MUST contain an 8-byte RS nonce as a challenge for the Client (Figure 6).

+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Authentication | Client Nonce | MAC or Signature |
| Data Length    | (8 bytes)   | (over RS nonce+Client nonce) |
+---------------------------------------------------------+

Figure 7: Authentication Data for Client Challenge Response

The Client responds to this with an AUTH packet with a reason code 0x18 (Continue Authentication). Similarly, the Client packet sets the Authentication Method to "ace". The Authentication Data in the Client’s response is formatted as shown in Figure 7 and includes the 8-byte Client nonce, and the signature or MAC computed over the RS nonce concatenated with the Client nonce using PoP key in the token.

Next, the token is validated as described in Section 2.2.5. The success case is illustrated in Figure 8. The Client MAY also re-authenticate using this challenge-response flow, as described in Section 4.
2.2.5. Broker Token Validation

The Broker MUST verify the validity of the token either locally (e.g., in the case of a self-contained token) or MAY send a request to the introspection endpoint of the AS (as described for HTTP-based interactions in Section 5.9 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]). The Broker MUST verify the claims in the access token according to the rules set in Section 5.10.1.1 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

To authenticate the Client, the Broker validates the signature or the MAC, depending on how the PoP protocol is implemented. For self-contained tokens, the Broker MUST process the security protection of the token first, as specified by the respective token format, i.e. a CWT token uses COSE, while a JWT token uses JOSE. For a token-by-reference, the Broker uses the "cnf" structure returned as a result of token introspection as specified in [RFC7519]. HS256 (HMAC-SHA-256) [RFC6234] and Ed25519 [RFC8032] are mandatory to implement for the Broker. The Client MUST implement at least one of them depending on the choice of symmetric or asymmetric validation. Validation of the signature or MAC MUST fail if the signature algorithm is set to "none", when the key used for the signature algorithm cannot be determined, or the computed and received signature/MAC do not match.
The Broker MUST check if the access token is still valid, if it is the intended destination (i.e., the audience) of the token, and if the token was issued by an authorized authorization server. If the Client is using TLS RPK mode to authenticate to the Broker, the AS constructs the access token so that the Broker can associate the access token with the Client’s public key. The "cnf" claim MUST contain either the Client’s RPK or, if the key is already known by the Broker (e.g., from previous communication), a reference to it.

2.3. Token Scope and Authorization

The scope field contains the publish and subscribe permissions for the Client. Therefore, the token or its introspection result MUST be cached to allow a Client’s future PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE messages. During the CONNECT, if the Will Flag is set to 1, the Broker MUST also authorize the publication of the Will Topic and message using the token’s scope field. The Broker uses the scope to match against the Topic Name in a PUBLISH packet (including Will Topic in the CONNECT) or a Topic Filter in a SUBSCRIBE packet.

The scope in the token is a single value. For a JWT, the single scope is base64url encoded string with any padding characters removed, which has an internal structure of a JSON array. For a CWT, this information is represented in CBOR. The internal structure follows the Authorization Information Format (AIF) for ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-aif]. Using the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610], the specific data model for MQTT is:

```
AIF-MQTT = AIF-Generic<mqtt-topic-filter, mqtt-permissions>
AIF-Generic<Toid, Tperm> = [* [Toid, Tperm]]
mqtt-topic-filter = tstr ; as per Section 4.7 of MQTT v5.0
mqtt-permissions = [+permission]
permission = "pub"/"sub"
```

Figure 9: AIF-MQTT data model

Topic filters are implemented according to Section 4.7 of MQTT v5.0 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5]. By default, Wildcard Subscriptions are supported, and so, the topic filter may include special wildcard characters. The multi-level wildcard, "+", matches any number of levels within a topic, and the single-level wildcard, "+", matches one topic level. The Broker MAY signal in the CONNACK explicitly whether wildcard subscriptions are supported by returning a CONNACK property "Wildcard Subscription Available". A value of 0 means that Wildcard Subscriptions are not supported. A value of 1 means Wildcard Subscriptions are supported.

Following this model, an example scope may contain:
Figure 10: Example scope

This access token gives publish ("pub") and subscribe ("sub") permissions to the "topic1", publish permission to all the subtopics of "topic2", and subscribe permission to all "topic3", skipping one level.

If the scope is empty, the Broker records no permissions for the Client for any topic. In this case, the Client is not able to publish or subscribe to any protected topics. The non-empty scope is used to authorize the Will Topic, if provided, in the CONNECT packet, during connection setup, and if the connection request succeeds, the Topic Names or Topic Filters requested in the future PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE packets. For the authorization to succeed, the Broker MUST verify that the topic name or filter in question is either an exact match to or a subset of at least one "topic_filter" in the scope.

2.4. Broker Response to Client Connection Request

Based on the validation result (obtained either via local inspection or using the introspection interface of the AS), the Broker MUST send a CONNACK packet to the Client.

2.4.1. Unauthorized Request and the Optional Authorization Server Discovery

Authentication can fail for the following reasons:

* If the Client does not provide a valid token,
* the Client omits the Authentication Data field and the Broker has no token stored for the Client,
* the token or Authentication data are malformed, or
* if the Will flag is set, the authorization checks for the Will topic fails.

The Broker responds with the CONNACK reason code 0x87 (Not Authorized) or any other applicable reason code.

The Broker MAY also trigger AS discovery and include a User Property (identified as property type 38 (0x26)) in the CONNACK for the AS Request Creation Hints. The User Property is a UTF-8 string pair, composed of a name and a value. The name of the User Property MUST be set to "ace_as_hint". The value of the user property is a UTF-8
encoded JSON object containing the mandatory "AS" parameter, and the optional parameters "audience", "kid", "cnonce", and "scope" as defined in Section 5.3 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

2.4.2. Authorization Success

On success, the reason code of the CONNACK is 0x00 (Success). If the Broker starts a new session, it MUST also set Session Present to 0 in the CONNACK packet to signal a clean session to the Client. Otherwise, it MUST set Session Present to 1.

Having accepted the connection, the Broker MUST be prepared to store the token during the connection and after disconnection for future use. If the token is not self-contained and the Broker uses token introspection, it MAY cache the validation result to authorize the subsequent PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE packets. PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE packets, which are sent after a connection setup, do not contain access tokens. If the introspection result is not cached, the Broker needs to introspect the saved token for each request. The Broker SHOULD also use a cache timeout to introspect tokens regularly. The timeout value is application-specific and should be chosen to reduce the risk of using stale introspection responses.

3. Authorizing PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE Packets

Using the cached token or its introspection result, the Broker uses the scope field to match against the Topic Name in a PUBLISH packet, or a Topic Filter in a SUBSCRIBE packet.

3.1. PUBLISH Packets from the Publisher Client to the Broker

On receiving the PUBLISH packet, the Broker MUST use the type of packet (i.e., PUBLISH) and the Topic name in the packet header to match against the scope array items in the cached token or its introspection result. Following the example in Section 2.3, the Client sending a PUBLISH for "topic2/a" would be allowed, as the scope array includes the ["topic2/#", ["pub"]).

If the Client is allowed to publish to the topic, the Broker publishes the message to all valid subscribers of the topic. In the case of an authorization failure, the Broker MUST return an error if the Client has set the QoS level of the PUBLISH packet to greater than or equal to 1. Depending on the QoS level, the Broker responds with either a PUBACK or PUBREC packet with reason code 0x87 (Not authorized). On receiving an acknowledgment with 0x87 (Not authorized), the Client MAY reauthenticate by providing a new token as described in Section 4.

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For QoS level 0, the Broker sends a DISCONNECT with reason code 0x87 (Not authorized) and closes the Network Connection. Note that the server-side DISCONNECT is a new feature of MQTT v5.0 (in MQTT v3.1.1, the server needs to drop the connection).

For all QoS levels, the Broker MAY return 0x80 Unspecified error if they do not want to leak the topic names to unauthorized clients.

3.2. PUBLISH Packets from the Broker to the Subscriber Clients

To forward PUBLISH packets to the subscribing Clients, the Broker identifies all the subscribers that have valid matching topic subscriptions to the Topic name of the PUBLISH packet (i.e., the tokens are valid, and token scopes allow a subscription to this particular Topic name). The Broker forwards the PUBLISH packet to all the valid subscribers.

The Broker MUST NOT forward messages to unauthorized subscribers. To avoid silently dropping messages, the Broker MUST close the network connection and SHOULD inform the affected subscribers. The only way to inform a client, in this case, would be sending a DISCONNECT packet. Therefore, the Broker SHOULD send a DISCONNECT packet with the reason code 0x87 (Not authorized) before closing the network connection to these clients.

3.3. Authorizing SUBSCRIBE Packets

In MQTT, a SUBSCRIBE packet is sent from a Client to the Broker to create one or more subscriptions to one or more topics. The SUBSCRIBE packet may contain multiple Topic Filters. The Topic Filters may include wildcard characters.

On receiving the SUBSCRIBE packet, the Broker MUST use the type of packet (i.e., SUBSCRIBE) and the Topic Filter in the packet header to match against the scope field of the stored token or introspection result. The Topic Filters MUST be an exact match to or be a subset of at least one of the "topic_filter" fields in the scope array found in the Client’s token. For example, if the Client sends a subscription request for topic "a/b/*", and has a token that permits "a/*", this is a valid subscription request, as "a/b/*" is a subset of "a/*". (The process is similar to a Broker matching the Topic Name in a PUBLISH packet against the Subscriptions known to the Server.)

As a response to the SUBSCRIBE packet, the Broker issues a SUBACK. For each Topic Filter, the SUBACK packet includes a return code matching the QoS level for the corresponding Topic Filter. In the case of failure, the return code is 0x87, indicating that the Client
is not authorized. The Broker MAY return 0x80 Unspecified error if they do not want to leak the topic names to unauthorized clients. A reason code is returned for each Topic Filter. Therefore, the Client may receive success codes for a subset of its Topic Filters while being unauthorized for the rest.

4. Token Expiration, Update, and Reauthentication

The Broker MUST check for token expiration whenever a CONNECT, PUBLISH, or SUBSCRIBE is received or sent. The Broker SHOULD check for token expiration on receiving a PINGREQUEST. The Broker MAY also check for token expiration periodically, e.g., every hour. This may allow for early detection of a token expiry.

The token expiration is checked by checking the "exp" claim of a JWT or introspection response or via performing an introspection request with the AS as described in Section 5.9 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Token expirations may trigger the Broker to send PUBACK, SUBACK and DISCONNECT packets with return code set to "Not authorized". After sending a DISCONNECT, the Network Connection is closed, and no more messages can be sent.

The Client MAY reauthenticate as a response to the PUBACK and SUBACK that signal loss of authorization. The Clients MAY also proactively update their tokens, i.e., before they receive a packet with a "Not authorized" return code. To start reauthentication, the Client MUST send an AUTH packet with the reason code 0x19 (Re-authentication). The Client MUST set the Authentication Method as "ace" and transport the new token in the Authentication Data. If re-authenticating during the current TLS session, the Client MUST NOT use the method described in Section 2.2.4.2.1, Proof-of-Possession using a challenge from the TLS session, to avoid re-using the same challenge value from the TLS-Exporter. Note that this means that servers will either need to record in the session ticket or database entry whether the TLS-Exporter-derived challenge was used, or always deny use of the TLS-Exporter-derived challenge for resumed sessions. In TLS 1.3, the resumed connection would have a new exporter value, but the requirement is phrased this way for simplicity. For re-authentications in the same TLS-session, the Client MUST use the challenge-response PoP as defined in Section 2.2.4.2.2. The Broker accepts reauthentication requests if the Client has already submitted a token (may be expired), for which it performed proof-of-possession. Otherwise, the Broker MUST deny the request. If the reauthentication fails, the Broker MUST send a DISCONNECT with the reason code 0x87 (Not Authorized).
5. Handling Disconnections and Retained Messages

In the case of a Client DISCONNECT, if the Session Expiry Interval is set to 0, the Broker doesn’t maintain session state but MUST keep the retained messages. If the Broker maintains session state, the state MAY include the token and its introspection result (for reference tokens) in addition to the MQTT session state. The MQTT session state is identified by the Client Identifier and includes the following:

* Client subscription state,

* messages with QoS levels 1 and 2, and which have not been completely acknowledged or are pending transmission to the Client, and

* if the Session is currently not connected, the time at which the Session will end and Session State will be discarded.

The token/introspection state is not part of the MQTT session state, and PoP validation is required for each new connection, regardless of whether MQTT session continuation is used.

The messages to be retained are indicated to the Broker by setting a RETAIN flag in a PUBLISH packet. This way, the publisher signals to the Broker to store the most recent message for the associated topic. Hence, the new subscribers can receive the last sent message from the publisher for that particular topic without waiting for the next PUBLISH packet. The Broker MUST continue publishing the retained messages as long as the associated tokens are valid. In the MQTT standard, if QoS is 0 for the PUBLISH packet, the Broker may discard the retained message any time. For QoS>1, the message expiry interval dictates how long the retained message is kept. However, it is important that the Broker avoids sending messages indefinitely for the Clients that never update their tokens (i.e., the Client connects briefly with a valid token, sends a PUBLISH packet with RETAIN flag set to 1 and QoS>1, disconnects, and never connects again). Therefore, the Broker MUST use the minimum of token expiry and message expiry interval to discard a retained message.

In case of disconnections due to network errors or server disconnection due to a protocol error (which includes authorization errors), the Will message is sent if the Client supplied a Will in the CONNECT packet. The Client’s token scope array MUST include the Will Topic. The Will message MUST be published to the Will Topic regardless of whether the corresponding token has expired (as it has been validated and accepted during CONNECT).
6. Reduced Protocol Interactions for MQTT v3.1.1

This section describes a reduced set of protocol interactions for the MQTT v3.1.1 Clients. An MQTT v5.0 Broker MAY implement these interactions for the MQTT v3.1.1 Clients; The flows described in this section are NOT RECOMMENDED for use by MQTT v5.0 Clients. Brokers that do not support MQTT v3.1.1 Clients return a CONNACK packet with Reason Code 0x84 (Unsupported Protocol Version) in response to the connection requests.

6.1. Token Transport

As in MQTT v5.0, the token MAY either be transported before, by publishing to the "authz-info" topic, or inside the CONNECT packet. If the Client provided the token via the "authz-info" topic and will not update the token in the CONNECT packet, it MUST authenticate over TLS. The Broker SHOULD still be prepared to store the Client access token for future use (regardless of the method of transport).

In MQTT v3.1.1, after the Client has published to the "authz-info" topic, the Broker cannot communicate the result of the token validation because PUBACK reason codes or server-side DISCONNECT packets are not supported. In any case, the subsequent TLS handshake would fail without a valid token, which can prompt the Client to obtain a valid token.

To transport the token to the Broker inside the CONNECT packet, the Client uses the username and password fields. Figure 11 shows the structure of the MQTT CONNECT packet.
Figure 11: MQTT CONNECT Variable Header Using Username and Password for ACE

Figure 12 shows how the MQTT connect flags MUST be set to initiate a connection with the Broker.

```
+-----------------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| User name flag | Pass. flag | Will retain flag | Will QoS flag | Will Flag flag | Clean flag | Rsvd. flag |
+-----------------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| 1                     | 1               | X               | XX              | X               | X               | X               | 0               |
+-----------------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
```

Figure 12: MQTT CONNECT Flags (Rsvd=Reserved)

The Client SHOULD set the Clean flag to 1 to always start a new session. If the Clean flag is set to 0, the Broker MUST resume communications with the Client based on the state from the current Session (as identified by the Client Identifier). If there is no Session associated with the Client Identifier, the Broker MUST create a new session. The Broker MUST set the Session Present flag in the CONNACK packet accordingly, i.e., 0 to indicate a clean session to the Client and 1 to indicate session continuation. The Broker MUST still perform PoP validation on the provided Client token. MQTT v3.1.1 does not use a Session Expiry Interval, and the Client expects that the Broker maintains the session state after it disconnects. However, stored Session state can be discarded as a result of
administrator action or policies (e.g. defining an automated response based on storage capabilities), and Brokers SHOULD implement administrative policies to limit misuse.

The Client MAY set the Will Flag as desired (marked as "X" in Figure 12). Username and Password flags MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the Payload of the CONNECT packet includes both Username and Password fields. The MQTT Username is a UTF-8 encoded string, and the MQTT Password is Binary Data.

The CONNECT in MQTT v3.1.1 does not have a field to indicate the authentication method. To signal that the Username field contains an ACE token, this field MUST be prefixed with "ace" keyword, i.e., the Username field is a concatenation of 'a', 'c', 'e' and the access token represented as:

\[ 'U+0061'||'U+0063'||'U+0065'||\text{UTF-8}(\text{access token}) \]

Figure 13: Username in CONNECT

To this end, the access token MUST be base64url encoded, omitting the '=' padding characters [RFC4648].

The password field MUST be set to the keyed message digest (MAC) or signature associated with the access token for PoP. The Client MUST apply the PoP key on the challenge derived from the TLS session as described in Section 2.2.4.2.1.

6.2. Handling Authorization Errors

Error handling is more primitive in MQTT v3.1.1 due to not having appropriate error fields, error codes, and server-side DISCONNECTs. Therefore, the Broker will disconnect on almost any error and may not keep the session state, necessitating that clients make a greater effort to ensure that tokens remain valid and do not attempt to publish to topics that they do not have permissions for. The following lists how the Broker responds to specific errors.

* CONNECT without a token: The tokenless CONNECT attempt MUST fail. This is because the challenge-response based PoP is not possible for MQTT v3.1.1. It is also not possible to support AS discovery since a CONNACK packet in MQTT v3.1.1 does not include a means to provide additional information to the Client. Therefore, AS discovery needs to take place out-of-band.

* Client-Broker PUBLISH authorization failure: In the case of a failure, it is not possible to return an error in MQTT v3.1.1. Acknowledgment messages only indicate success. In the case of an
authorization error, the Broker MUST ignore the PUBLISH packet and
disconnect the Client. Also, as DISCONNECT packets are only sent
from a Client to the Broker, the server disconnection needs to
take place below the application layer.

* SUBSCRIBE authorization failure: In the SUBACK packet, the return
code is 0x80 indicating failure for the unauthorized topic(s).
Note that, in both MQTT versions, a reason code is returned for
each Topic Filter.

* Broker-Client PUBLISH authorization failure: When the Broker is
forwarding PUBLISH packets to the subscribed Clients, it may
discover that some of the subscribers are no longer authorized due
to expired tokens. These token expirations MUST lead to
disconnecting the Client rather than silently dropping messages.

7. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[this
document]" with the RFC number of this specification and delete this
paragraph.

7.1. TLS Exporter Label Registration

This document registers "EXPORTER-ACE-MQTT-Sign-Challenge"
(introduced in Section 2.2.4.2.1 in this document) in the TLS
Exporter Label Registry [RFC8447].

* Recommended: No
* DTLS-OK: No
* Reference: [This document]

7.2. Media Type Registration

This document registers the "application/ace+json" media type for
messages of the protocols defined in this document carrying
parameters encoded in JSON.

* Type name: application
* Subtype name: ace+json
* Required parameters: N/A
* Optional parameters: N/A
* Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to those specified for the "application/json" media type.

* Security considerations: Section 8 of [this document]

* Interoperability considerations: none

* Published specification: [this document]

* Applications that use this media type: This media type is intended for authorization server-client and authorization server-resource server communication as part of the ACE framework using JSON encoding as specified in [this document].

* Fragment identifier considerations: none

* Additional information:
  - Deprecated alias names for this type: none
  - Magic number(s): none
  - File extension(s): none
  - Macintosh file type code(s): none

* Person & email address to contact for further information: Cigdem Sengul (csengul@acm.org)

* Intended usage: COMMON

* Restrictions on usage: none

* Author: Cigdem Sengul (csengul@acm.org)

* Change controller: IETF

* Provisional registration? (standards tree only): no

7.3. ACE OAuth Profile Registration

The following registrations are done for the ACE OAuth Profile Registry following the procedure specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* Name: mqtt_tls
* Description: Profile for delegating Client authentication and authorization using MQTT for the Client and Broker (RS) interactions, and HTTP for the AS interactions. TLS is used for confidentiality and integrity protection and server authentication. Client authentication can be provided either via TLS or using in-band PoP validation at the MQTT application layer.

* CBOR Value: To be assigned by IANA in the (-256, 255) range

* Reference: [this document]

7.4. AIF

For the media-types application/aif+cbor and application/aif+json defined in Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-aif], IANA is requested to register the following entries for the two media-type parameters Toid and Tperm, in the respective sub-registry defined in Section 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-aif] within the "MIME Media Type Sub-Parameter" registry group.

For Toid:

* Name: mqtt-topic-filter

* Description/Specification: Topic Filter as defined in Section 2.3.

* Reference: [[This document]] (Section 2.3)

For Tperm:

* Name: mqtt-permissions

* Description/Specification: Permissions for MQTT client as defined in Section 2.3. Tperm is an array of one or more text strings that each have a value of either "pub" or "sub".

* Reference: [[This document]] (Section 2.3)

8. Security Considerations

This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Therefore, the security considerations outlined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] apply to this work.

In addition, the security considerations outlined in MQTT v5.0 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5] and MQTT v3.1.1 - the OASIS Standard [MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v3.1.1] apply. Mainly, this document
provides an authorization solution for MQTT, the responsibility of which is left to the specific implementation in the MQTT standards. In the following, we comment on a few relevant issues based on the current MQTT specifications.

After the Broker validates an access token and accepts a connection from a client, it caches the token to authorize a Client’s publish and subscribe requests in an ongoing session. The Broker does not cache any tokens that cannot be validated. If a Client’s permissions get revoked, but the access token has not expired, the Broker may still grant publish/subscribe to revoked topics. If the Broker caches the token introspection responses, then the Broker SHOULD use a reasonable cache timeout to introspect tokens regularly. The timeout value is application-specific and should be chosen to reduce the risk of using stale introspection responses. When permissions change dynamically, it is expected that AS also follows a reasonable expiration strategy for the access tokens.

The Broker may monitor Client behaviour to detect potential security problems, especially those affecting availability. These include repeated token transfer attempts to the public "authz-info" topic, repeated connection attempts, abnormal terminations, and Clients that connect but do not send any data. If the Broker supports the public "authz-info" topic, described in Section 2.2.2, then this may be vulnerable to a DDoS attack, where many Clients use the "authz-info" public topic to transport tokens that are not meant to be used, and which the Broker may need to store until the tokens expire.

For MQTT v5.0, when a Client connects with a long Session Expiry Interval, the Broker may need to maintain the Client’s MQTT session state after it disconnects for an extended period. For MQTT v3.1.1, the session state may need to be stored indefinitely, as it does not have a Session Expiry Interval feature. The Broker SHOULD implement administrative policies to limit misuse of the session continuation by the Client.

9. Privacy Considerations

The privacy considerations outlined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] apply to this work.
In MQTT, the Broker is a central trusted party and may forward potentially sensitive information between Clients. The mechanisms defined in this document do not protect the contents of the PUBLISH packet from the Broker, and hence, the content of the PUBLISH packet is not signed or encrypted separately for the subscribers. This functionality may be implemented using the proposal outlined in the ACE Pub-Sub Profile [I-D.ietf-ace-pubsub-profile]. However, this solution would still not provide privacy for other fields of the packet, such as Topic Name.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-aif]

[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]

[I-D.ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize]

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]

[I-D.ietf-cose-x509]

[I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics]

[MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v3.1.1]

[MQTT-OASIS-Standard-v5]


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Checklist for profile requirements

Based on the requirements on profiles for the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], this document fulfills the following:

* Optional AS discovery: AS discovery is supported with the MQTT v5.0 described in Section 2.2.

* The communication protocol between the Client and Broker (RS): MQTT

* The security protocol between the Client and RS: TLS

* Client and RS mutual authentication: Several options are possible and described in Section 2.2.1.

* Proof-of-possession protocols: Specified in Section 2.2.4.2; both symmetric and asymmetric keys supported.

* Content format: For the HTTPS interactions with AS, "application/ace+json".

* Unique profile identifier: mqtt_tls

* Token introspection: RS uses HTTPS introspect interface of AS.

* Token request: Client or its Client AS uses the HTTPS token endpoint of the AS.

* authz-info endpoint: It MAY be supported using the method described in Section 2.2.2, but is not protected other than by the TLS channel between Client and RS.

* Token transport: Via "authz-info" topic, or TLS with PSK, provided as a PSK identity, or in MQTT CONNECT packet for both versions of MQTT. The AUTH extensions can also be used for authentication and re-authentication for MQTT v5.0, as described in Section 2.2 and Section 4.

Appendix B. Document Updates

Version 15: Addressing GENART review comments.

Version 11 to 15: Addressing AD review comments.

Version 10 to 11: Clarified the TLS use between RS-AS and Client-AS.

Version 09 to 10: Fixed version issues for references.
Version 08 to 09: Fixed spacing issues and references.

Version 07 to 08:

* Fixed several nits, typos based on WG reviews.
* Added missing references.
* Added the definition for Property defined by MQTT, and Client Authorization Server.
* Added artwork to show Authorization Data format for various PoP-related message exchange.
* Removed all MQTT-related must/should/may.
* Made AS discovery optional.
* Clarified what the client and server must implement for client authentication; cleaned up TLS 1.3 related language.

Version 06 to 07:

* Corrected the title.
* In Section 2.2.3, added the constraint on which packets the Client can send, and the server can process after CONNECT before CONNACK.
* In Section 2.2.3, clarified that session state is identified by Client Identifier, and listed its content.
* In Section 2.2.3, clarified the issue of Client Identifier collision, when the Broker supports session continuation.
* Corrected the buggy scope example in Section 3.1.

Version 05 to 06:

* Replace the originally proposed scope format with AIF model. Defined the AIF-MQTT, gave an example with a JSON array. Added a normative reference to the AIF draft.
* Clarified client connection after submitting token via "authz-info" topic as TLS:Known(RPK/PSK),MQTT:none.
* Expanded acronyms on their first use including the ones in the title.
* Added a definition for "Session".
* Corrected "CONNACK" definition, which earlier said it's the first packet sent by the Broker.
* Added a statement that the Broker will disconnect on almost any error and may not keep session state.
* Clarified that the Broker does not cache tokens that cannot be validated.

Version 04 to 05:
* Reorganised Section 2 such that "Unauthorized Request: Authorization Server Discovery" is presented under Section 2.
* Fixed Figure 2 to remove the "empty" word.
* Clarified that MQTT v5.0 Brokers may implement username/password option for transporting the ACE token only for MQTT v.3.1.1 clients. This option is not recommended for MQTT v.5.0 clients.
* Changed Clean Session requirement both for MQTT v.5.0 and v.3.1.1. The Broker SHOULD NOT, instead of MUST NOT, continue sessions. Clarified expected behaviour if session continuation is supported. Added to the Security Considerations the potential misuse of session continuation.
* Fixed the Authentication Data to include token length for the Challenge/Response PoP.
* Added that Authorization Server Discovery is triggered if a token is not valid and not only missing.
* Clarified that the Broker should not accept any other packets from Client after CONNECT and before sending CONNACK.
* Added that client reauthentication is accepted only for the challenge/response PoP.
* Added Ed25519 as mandatory to implement.
* Fixed typos.

Version 03 to 04:
* Linked the terms Broker and MQTT server more at the introduction of the document.
* Clarified support for MQTTv3.1.1 and removed phrases that might be considered as MQTTv5 is backwards compatible with MQTTv3.1.1

* Corrected the Informative and Normative references.

* For AS discovery, clarified the CONNECT message omits the Authentication Data field. Specified the User Property MUST be set to "ace_as_hint" for AS Request Creation Hints.

* Added that MQTT v5 brokers MAY also implement reduced interactions described for MQTTv3.1.1.

* Added to Section 3.1, in case of an authorization failure and QoS level 0, the RS sends a DISCONNECT with reason code 0x87 (Not authorized).

* Added a pointer to section 4.7 of MQTTv5 spec for more information on topic names and filters.

* Added HS256 and RSA256 are mandatory to implement depending on the choice of symmetric or asymmetric validation.

* Added MQTT to the TLS exporter label to make it application specific: 'EXPORTER-ACE-MQTT-Sign-Challenge'.

* Added a format for Authentication Data so that length values prefix the token (or client nonce) when Authentication Data contains more than one piece of information.

* Clarified clients still connect over TLS (server-side) for the authz-info flow.

Version 02 to 03:

* Added the option of Broker certificate thumbprint in the 'rs_cnf' sent to the Client.

* Clarified the use of a random nonce from the TLS Exporter for PoP, added to the IANA requirements that the label should be registered.

* Added a client nonce, when Challenge/Response Authentication is used between Client and Broker.

* Clarified the use of the "authz-info" topic and the error response if token validation fails.
* Added clarification on wildcard use in scopes for publish/subscribe permissions

* Reorganised sections so that token authorization for publish/subscribe messages are better placed.

**Version 01 to 02:**

* Clarified protection of Application Message payload as out of scope, and cited draft-palombini-ace-coap-pubsub-profile for a potential solution

* Expanded Client connection authorization to capture different options for Client and Broker authentication over TLS and MQTT

* Removed Payload (and specifically Client Identifier) from proof-of-possession in favor of using tls-exporter for a TLS-session based challenge.

* Moved token transport via "authz-info" topic from the Appendix to the main text.

* Clarified Will scope.

* Added MQTT AUTH to terminology.

* Typo fixes, and simplification of figures.

**Version 00 to 01:**

* Present the MQTTv5 as the RECOMMENDED version, and MQTT v3.1.1 for backward compatibility.

* Clarified Will message.

* Improved consistency in the use of terminology and upper/lower case.

* Defined Broker and MQTTs.

* Clarified HTTPS use for C-AS and RS-AS communication. Removed reference to actors document, and clarified the use of client authorization server.

* Clarified the Connect message payload and Client Identifier.

* Presented different methods for passing the token and PoP.
* Added new figures to explain AUTH packets exchange, updated CONNECT message figure.

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Abstract

This document specifies the use of Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) as a transport medium for the Certificate Management Protocol Version 2 (CMPv2) and Lightweight CMP Profile [Lightweight-CMP-Profile]. CMPv2 defines the interaction between various PKI entities for the purpose of certificate creation and management. CoAP is an HTTP like client-server protocol used by various constrained devices in IoT space.

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1. Introduction

The CMPv2 is used by PKI entities for the generation and management of the certificates. One of the requirements of CMPv2 [RFC4210] is to be independent of the transport protocol in use. CMP has mechanisms to take care of required transactions, error reporting and encryption of messages. The CoAP defined in [RFC7252], [RFC7959] and [RFC8323] is a client-server protocol, like HTTP, that is designed to be used by constrained devices over constrained networks. The recommended transport for CoAP is UDP, however [RFC8323] specifies the support of CoAP over TCP, TLS and Websockets. This document specifies the use of CoAP as a transport medium for the CMPv2 and Lightweight CMP Profile [Lightweight-CMP-Profile]. This document, in general, follows the HTTP transport specifications for CMPv2 defined in [RFC6712] and specifies the additional requirements for CoAP transport. This document also provides guidance on how to use a "CoAP to HTTP" proxy for a better adaptation of CoAP transport without significant changes to the existing PKI entities. Although CoAP transport can be used for communication between Registration Authority (RA) and Certification Authority (CA) or between CAs, the
The scope of this document is for communication between End Entity (EE) and RA or EE and CA. This document is applicable only when the CoAP transport is being used for the CMPv2 transactions.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. CoAP Transport For CMPv2

CMPv2 transaction consists of passing PKIMessage [RFC4210] between the PKI End Entities (EEs), Registration Authorities (RAs), and Certification Authorities (CAs). If the EEs are constrained devices then they will prefer, as a client, the use of CoAP instead of HTTP as a transport medium, while the RAs and CAs, in general, are not constrained and can support both CoAP and HTTP Client and Server implementation. This section specifies how to use CoAP as transport mechanism for CMPv2 or Lightweight CMP Profile [Lightweight-CMP-Profile].

2.1. Discovery of CMP Entities

The information about the URIs of CA and RA that is required by EEs can be either configured out of band on EEs or the EEs can use the service discovery mechanism described in section 7 of [RFC7252] to find them. The EE, RA SHOULD support service discovery as described in section 7 of [RFC7252]. An EE MUST verify the configured Root CA certificate against the Root CA certificate of the discovered entity to make sure it is talking to correct endpoint.

2.2. CoAP URI Format

2.3. CoAP Request Format

The CMPv2 PKIMessage MUST be DER encoded and sent as the body of the CoAP POST request. If the CoAP request is successful then the server should return a "2.05 Content" response code. If the CoAP request is not successful then an appropriate CoAP Client Error 4.xx or a Server Error 5.xx response code MUST be returned.

2.4. CoAP Content-Format

When transferring CMPv2 PKIMessage over CoAP the media type application/pkixcmp MUST be used.

2.5. Announcement PKIMessage

When using the CoAP protocol, a PKI EE SHOULD poll for the possible changes via PKI Information request using General Message defined in the PKIMessage for various type of changes like CA key update or to get current CRL to check revocation or using Support messages defined in section 5.4 of Lightweight CMP Profile [Lightweight-CMP-Profile]. This will help constrained devices acting as EEs save resources as there is no need to open a listening socket for notifications and it will also make the use of a CoAP to HTTP proxy transparent to the EE.

2.6. CoAP Block Wise Transfer Mode

Since the CMPv2 PKIMessage consists of a header body and optional fields a CMPv2 message can be much larger than the MTU of the outgoing interface of the device. In order to avoid IP fragmentation of messages that are exchanged between EEs and RAs or CAs, the Block Wise transfer [RFC7959] mode MUST be used for the CMPv2 Transactions over CoAP. If a CoAP to HTTP proxy is in the path between EEs and CA or EEs and RA then, it MUST receive the entire body from the client before sending the HTTP request to the server. This will avoid unnecessary errors in case the entire content of the PKIMessage is not received and Proxy opens a connection with the server.

2.7. Multicast CoAP

CMPv2 PKIMessage request messages sent from EEs to RAs or from EEs to CAs over CoAP transport MUST not use a Multicast destination address.

3. Using CoAP over DTLS

Although CMPv2 protocol does not depend upon the underlying transport for the encryption and authentication of the messages but in cases when end to end secrecy is desired for the CoAP transport, CoAP over DTLS [RFC6347] as a transport medium SHOULD be used. Section 9.1 of
[RFC7252] defines how to use DTLS [RFC6347] for securing the CoAP.
For CMPv2 and Lightweight CMP Profile [Lightweight-CMP-Profile] the
clients should follow specifications defined in section 7.1 and
section 7.2 of Lightweight CMP Profile [Lightweight-CMP-Profile] for
setting up DTLS [RFC6347] connection either using certificates or
shared secret. Once a DTLS [RFC6347] connection is established it
SHOULD be used for as long as possible to avoid the frequent overhead
of using DTLS [RFC6347] connection for constrained devices.

4. Proxy support

The use of a CoAP to HTTP proxy is recommended to avoid significant
changes in the implementation of the CAs and RAs. However, if a
proxy is in place then Announcements Messages cannot be passed to EEs
efficiently. In case a CoAP to HTTP proxy is used for CMP
transactions, it SHOULD support service discovery mentioned in
section 2.1

4.1. CoAP to HTTP Proxy

If a CoAP to HTTP proxy is used then it MUST be positioned between
EEs and RAs or between EEs and CAs when RA is not part of CMP
transactions. The use of a CoAP to HTTP proxy between CAs and RAs is
not recommended. The implementation of a CoAP to HTTP proxy is
specified in Section 10 of [RFC7252]. The CoAP to HTTP proxy will
also protect the CAs and RAs from UDP based Denial of Service
attacks.

4.2. CoAPs to HTTPs Proxy

A CoAPs to HTTPS proxy (DTLS [RFC6347] transport to TLS [RFC8446]
transport proxy) can be used instead of the CoAP to HTTP proxy if the
server support HTTPS protocol, however client SHOULD be configured to
trust the CA certificate used by proxy to sign the Man in the Middle
(MITM) certificate for certificate chain validation [RFC5280].

5. Security Considerations

The CMPv2 protocol itself does not require secure transport and
depends upon various mechanisms in the protocol itself to make sure
that the transactions are secure. However, the CoAP protocol which
uses UDP as layer 4 transport is vulnerable to many issues due to the
connectionless characteristics of UDP itself. The Security
considerations for CoAP protocol are mentioned in the [RFC7252].
Using a CoAP to HTTP proxy mitigates some of the risks as the
requests from the EE’s can terminate inside the trusted network and
will not require the server to listen on a UDP port making it safe
from UDP based address spoofing, Denial of Service, and amplification attacks due to the characteristics of UDP.

6. IANA Considerations

This document requires a new entry to the CoAP Content-Formats Registry code for the content-type application/pkixcmp

7. Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Hendrik Brockhaus, David von Oheimb, and Andreas Kretschmer for their guidance in writing the content of this document and providing valuable feedback.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


8.3. URL References


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Abstract

This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. The profile uses Group OSCORE to provide communication security between a Client and a (set of) Resource Server(s) as members of an OSCORE Group. The profile securely binds an OAuth 2.0 Access Token with the public key of the Client associated with the private key used in the OSCORE group. The profile uses Group OSCORE to achieve server authentication, as well as proof-of-possession for the Client’s public key. Also, it provides proof of the Client’s membership to the correct OSCORE group, by binding the Access Token to information from the Group OSCORE Security Context, thus allowing the Resource Server(s) to verify the Client’s membership upon receiving a message protected with Group OSCORE from the Client.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (ace@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://gitlab.com/crimson84/draft-tiloca-ace-group-oscore-profile.

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1. Introduction

A number of applications rely on a group communication model, where a Client can access a resource shared by multiple Resource Servers at once, e.g., over IP multicast. Typical examples are switching of luminaries, actuators control, and distribution of software updates. Secure communication in the group can be achieved by sharing a set of keying material, which is typically provided upon joining the group.

For some of such applications, it may be just fine to enforce access control in a straightforward fashion. That is, any Client authorized to join the group, hence to get the group keying material, can be also implicitly authorized to perform any action at any resource of any Server in the group. An example of application where such implicit authorization might be used is a simple lighting scenario, where the lightbulbs are the Servers, while the user account on an app on the user’s phone is the Client. In this case, it might be fine to not require additional authorization evidence from any user account, if it is acceptable that any current group member is also authorized to switch on and off any light, or to check their status.

However, in different instances of such applications, the approach above is not desirable, as different group members are intended to have different access rights to resources of other group members. That is, access control to the secure group communication channel and access control to the resource space provided by servers in the group should remain logically separated domains. For instance, a more fine-grained approach is required in the two following use cases.

As a first case, an application provides control of smart locks acting as Servers in the group, where: a first type of Client, e.g., a user account of a child, is allowed to only query the status of the smart locks; while a second type of Client, e.g., a user account of a parent, is allowed to both query and change the status of the smart locks. Further similar applications concern the enforcement of different sets of permissions in groups with sensor/actuator devices, e.g., thermostats, acting as Servers. Also, some group members may even be intended as Servers only. Hence, they must be prevented from acting as Clients altogether and from accessing resources at other Servers, especially when attempting to perform non-safe operations.

As a second case, building automation scenarios often rely on Servers that, under different circumstances, enforce different level of priority for processing received commands. For instance, BACnet deployments consider multiple classes of Clients, e.g., a normal light switch (C1) and an emergency fire panel (C2). Then, a C1 Client is not allowed to override a command from a C2 Client, until the latter relinquishes control at its higher priority. That is: i)
only C2 Clients should be able to adjust the minimum required level of priority on the Servers, so rightly locking out C1 Clients if needed; and ii) when a Server is set to accept only high-priority commands, only C2 Clients should be able to perform such commands otherwise allowed also to C1 Clients. Given the different maximum authority of different Clients, fine-grained access control would effectively limit the execution of high- and emergency-priority commands only to devices that are in fact authorized to do so. Besides, it would prevent a misconfigured or compromised device from initiating a high-priority command and lock out normal control.

In the cases above, being a legitimate group member and storing the group keying material is not supposed to imply any particular access rights. Also, introducing a different security group for each different set of access rights would result in additional keying material to distribute and manage. In particular, if the access rights for a single node change, this would require to evict that node from the current group, followed by that node joining a different group aligned with its new access rights. Moreover, the keying material of both groups would have to be renewed for their current members. Overall, this would have a non negligible impact on operations and performance in the system.

A fine-grained access control model can be rather enforced within a same group, by using the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. That is, a Client has to first obtain authorization credentials in the form of an Access Token, and post it to the Resource Server(s) in the group before accessing the intended resources.

The ACE framework delegates to separate profile documents how to secure communications between the Client and the Resource Server. However each of the current profiles of ACE defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] [I-D.ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile] admits a single security protocol that cannot be used to protect group messages sent over IP multicast.

This document specifies the "coap_group_oscore" profile of the ACE framework, where a Client uses CoAP [RFC7252] or CoAP over IP multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] to communicate to one or multiple Resource Servers, which are members of an application group and share a common set of resources. This profile uses Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] as the security protocol to protect messages exchanged between the Client and the Resource Servers. Hence, it requires that both the Client and the Resource Servers have previously joined the same OSCORE group.
That is, this profile describes how access control is enforced for a Client after it has joined an OSCORE group, to access resources at other members in that group. The process for joining the OSCORE group through the respective Group Manager as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] takes place before the process described in this document, and is out of the scope of this profile.

The Client proves its access to be authorized to the Resource Server by using an Access Token, which is bound to a key (the proof-of-possession key). This profile uses Group OSCORE to achieve server authentication, as well as proof-of-possession for the Client’s public key used in the OSCORE group in question. Note that the proof of possession is not done by a dedicated protocol element, but rather occurs after the first Group OSCORE exchange.

Furthermore, this profile provides proof of the Client’s membership to the correct OSCORE group, by binding the Access Token to the Client’s authentication credential used in the group and including the Client’s public public key, as well as to information from the pre-established Group OSCORE Security Context. This allows the Resource Server to verify the Client’s group membership upon reception of a message protected with Group OSCORE from that Client.

OSCORE [RFC8613] specifies how to use COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] to secure CoAP messages. Group OSCORE builds on OSCORE to provide secure group communication, and ensures source authentication: by means of digital signatures embedded in protected messages (in group mode); or by protecting messages with pairwise keying material derived from the asymmetric keys of the two peers exchanging the message (in pairwise mode).

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to CBOR [RFC8949], COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], CoAP [RFC7252], OSCORE [RFC8613] and Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. These especially include:

* Group Manager, as the entity responsible for a set of groups where communications among members are secured with Group OSCORE.

* Authentication credential, as the set of information associated with an entity, including that entity's public key and parameters associated with the public key. Examples of authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC7925] and C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert].

Members of an OSCORE group have an associated authentication credential in the format used in the group. As per Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], an authentication credential provides the public key as well as the comprehensive set of information related to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable).

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in the ACE framework for authentication and authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], as well as in the OSCORE profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. The terminology for entities in the considered architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. In particular, this includes Client (C), Resource Server (RS), and Authorization Server (AS).

Note that, unless otherwise indicated, the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition, aimed at denoting resources such as /token and /introspect at the AS, and /authz-info at the RS. This document does not use the CoAP definition of "endpoint", which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol".

Additionally, this document makes use of the following terminology.

* Equivalent COSE Key: a COSE Key built from an authentication credential used in the OSCORE group. The equivalent COSE Key preserves all the main information elements from the authentication credential, in particular the key coordinates and the comprehensive set of information related to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable).

* Pairwise-only group: an OSCORE group that uses only the pairwise mode (see Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

Examples throughout this document are expressed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without the tag and value abbreviations.
2. Protocol Overview

This section provides an overview of this profile, i.e., on how to use the ACE framework for authentication and authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] to secure communications between a Client and a (set of) Resource Server(s) using Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

Note that this profile of ACE describes how access control can be enforced for a node after it has joined an OSCORE group, to access resources at other members in that group.

In particular, the process for joining the OSCORE group through the respective Group Manager as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] must take place before the process described in this document, and is out of the scope of this profile.

An overview of the protocol flow for this profile is shown in Figure 1. In the figure, it is assumed that both RS1 and RS2 are associated with the same AS. It is also assumed that C, RS1 and RS2 have previously joined an OSCORE group with Group Identifier (gid) "abcd0000", and got assigned Sender ID (sid) "0", "1" and "2" in the group, respectively. The names of messages coincide with those of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] when applicable.

C                           RS1          RS2                         AS
| [--- Resource Request -->] |            |                           |
| [<---- AS Request ------->] |            |                           |
|                     Creation Hints |
| -------- POST /token -----------------------------------------------> |
|           (aud: RS1, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...) |
|<------------------------ Access Token + RS Information -------> |
|                         (aud: RS1, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...) |
| ---- POST /authz-info -----> |
|                  (access_token) |
|<--- 2.01 Created ----------|
|-------- POST /token -----------------------------------------------> |
|           (aud: RS2, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...) |
Figure 1: Protocol Overview.

2.1. Pre-Conditions

Using Group OSCORE and this profile requires both the Client and the Resource Servers to have previously joined the same OSCORE group. This especially includes the derivation of the Group OSCORE Security Context and the assignment of unique Sender IDs to use in the group. Nodes may join the OSCORE group through the respective Group Manager by using the approach defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], which is also based on ACE.
After the Client and Resource Servers have joined the group, this profile provides access control for accessing resources on those Resource Servers, by securely communicating with Group OSCORE.

As a pre-requisite for this profile, the Client has to have successfully joined the OSCORE group where also the Resource Servers (RSs) are members. Depending on the limited information initially available, the Client may have to first discover the exact OSCORE group used by the RSs for the resources of interest, e.g., by using the approach defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery].

2.2. Access Token Retrieval

This profile requires that the Client retrieves an Access Token from the AS for the resource(s) it wants to access on each of the RSs, using the /token endpoint, as specified in Section 5.8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In a general case, it can be assumed that different RSs are associated with different ASs, even if the RSs are members of a same OSCORE group.

In the Access Token request to the AS, the Client MUST include the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group and its own Sender ID in that group. The AS MUST specify these pieces of information in the Access Token, included in the Access Token response to the Client.

Furthermore, in the Access Token request to the AS, the Client MUST also include: its own public key used in the OSCORE group; and a proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence to proof possession of the corresponding private key. The PoP evidence is computed over a PoP input uniquely related to the secure communication association between the Client and the AS. The AS MUST include also the public key indicated by the Client in the Access Token.

The Access Token request and response MUST be confidentiality-protected and ensure authenticity. This profile RECOMMENDS the use of OSCORE between the Client and the AS, to reduce the number of libraries the client has to support. Other protocols fulfilling the security requirements defined in Sections 5 and 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] MAY alternatively be used, such as TLS [RFC8446] or DTLS [RFC6347][I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13].
2.3. Access Token Posting

After having retrieved the Access Token from the AS, the Client posts the Access Token to the RS, using the /authz-info endpoint and mechanisms specified in Section 5.10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], as well as Content-Format = application/ace+cbor. When using this profile, the communication with the /authz-info endpoint is not protected.

If the Access Token is valid, the RS replies to this POST request with a 2.01 (Created) response with Content-Format = application/ace+cbor. Also, the RS associates the received Access Token with the Group OSCORE Security Context identified by the Group Identifier specified in the Access Token, following Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. In practice, the RS maintains a collection of Security Contexts with associated authorization information, for all the clients that it is currently communicating with, and the authorization information is a policy used as input when processing requests from those clients.

Finally, the RS stores the association between i) the authorization information from the Access Token; and ii) the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group together with the Sender ID and the authentication credential of the Client in that group. This binds the Access Token with the Group OSCORE Security Context of the OSCORE group.

Finally, when the Client communicates with the RS using the Group OSCORE Security Context, the RS verifies that the Client is a legitimate member of the OSCORE group and especially the exact group member with the same Sender ID associated with the Access Token. This occurs when verifying a request protected with Group OSCORE, since the request includes the Client’s Sender ID and either it embeds a signature computed also over that Sender ID (if protected with the group mode), or it is protected by means of pairwise symmetric keying material derived from the asymmetric keys of the two peers (if protected with the pairwise mode).

2.4. Secure Communication

The Client can send a request protected with Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] to the RS. This can be a unicast request addressed to the RS, or a multicast request addressed to the OSCORE group where the RS is also a member. To this end, the Client uses the Group OSCORE Security Context already established upon joining the OSCORE group, e.g., by using the approach defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. The RS may send a response back to the Client, protecting it by means of the same Group OSCORE Security Context.
3. Client-AS Communication

This section details the Access Token POST Request that the Client sends to the /token endpoint of the AS, as well as the related Access Token response.

The Access Token MUST be bound to the public key of the client as proof-of-possession key (pop-key), by means of the ‘cnf’ claim.

3.1. C-to-AS: POST to Token Endpoint

The Client-to-AS request is specified in Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The Client MUST send this POST request to the /token endpoint over a secure channel that guarantees authentication, message integrity and confidentiality.

The POST request is formatted as the analogous Client-to-AS request in the OSCORE profile of ACE (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]), with the following additional parameters that MUST be included in the payload.

* ‘context_id’, defined in Section 3.1.1 of this document. This parameter specifies the Group Identifier (GID), i.e., the Id Context of an OSCORE group where the Client and the RS are currently members. In particular, the Client wishes to communicate with the RS using the Group OSCORE Security Context associated with that OSCORE group.

* ‘salt_input’, defined in Section 3.1.2 of this document. This parameter includes the Sender ID that the Client has in the OSCORE group whose GID is specified in the ‘context_id’ parameter above.

* ‘req_cnf’, defined in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]. This parameter follows the syntax from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] when including Value Type "COSE_Key" (1) and specifying an asymmetric key. In particular, the specified public key is the COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group. The specified public key will be used as the pop-key bound to the Access Token.

Alternative Value Types defined in future specifications are fine to consider, if indicating a non-encrypted asymmetric key or full-fledged authentication credential.
In addition, the Client computes its proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence, in order to prove possession of its own private key used in the OSCORE group to the AS. This allows the AS to verify that the Client indeed owns the private key associated with that public key, as its alleged identity credential within the OSCORE group.

To this end, the Client MUST use as PoP input the byte representation of a quantity that uniquely represents the secure communication association between the Client and the AS. It is RECOMMENDED that the Client considers the following as PoP input.

* If the Client and the AS communicate over (D)TLS, the PoP input is an exporter value computed as defined in Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]. In particular, the exporter label MUST be 'EXPORTER-ACE-Sign-Challenge-Client-AS' defined in Section 10.5 of this document, together with an empty 'context_value', and 32 bytes as 'key_length'.

* If the Client and the AS communicate over OSCORE, the PoP input is the output PRK of a HKDF-Extract step [RFC5869], i.e., PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM). In particular, 'salt' takes (x1 | x2), where x1 is the ID Context of the OSCORE Security Context between the Client and the AS, x2 is the Sender ID of the Client in that Security Context, and | denotes byte string concatenation. Also, 'IKM' is the OSCORE Master Secret of the OSCORE Security Context between the Client and the AS.

The HKDF MUST be one of the HMAC-based HKDF [RFC5869] algorithms defined for COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]. The Client and AS may agree on the HKDF algorithm to use during the Client’s registration at the AS. HKDF SHA-256 is mandatory to implement.

Then, the Client computes the PoP evidence as follows.

* If the OSCORE group is not a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence MUST be a signature. The Client computes the signature by using the same private key and signature algorithm it uses for signing messages in the OSCORE group. The private key corresponds to the authentication credential used in the OSCORE group, for which the equivalent COSE Key is specified in the 'req_cnf' parameter above.

* If the OSCORE group is a pairwise-only group, the PoP evidence MUST be a MAC computed as follows, by using the HKDF Algorithm HKDF SHA-256, which consists of composing the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps [RFC5869].

\[
\text{MAC} = \text{HKDF}(\text{salt, IKM, info, L})
\]
The input parameters of HKDF are as follows.

- salt takes as value the empty byte string.

- IKM is computed as a cofactor Diffie-Hellman shared secret, see Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A], using an ECDH algorithm pre-agreed between Client and AS. The Client uses its own Diffie-Hellman private key and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the AS. For X25519 and X448, the procedure is described in Section 5 of [RFC7748].

The Client’s private key corresponds to the Client’s authentication credential used in the OSCORE group, for which the equivalent COSE Key is specified in the ’req_cnf’ parameter above. The Client may obtain the Diffie-Hellman public key of the AS during its registration process at the AS.

The Client and AS may agree on the ECDH algorithm to use during the Client’s registration at the AS. The ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 algorithm specified in Section 6.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement.

- info takes as value the PoP input.

- L is equal to 8, i.e., the size of the MAC, in bytes.

Finally, the Client MUST include one of the two following parameters in the payload of the POST request to the AS.

* ’client_cred_verify’, defined in Section 3.1.3 of this document, specifying the Client’s PoP evidence as a signature, which is computed as defined above. This parameter MUST be included if and only if the OSCORE group is not a pairwise-only group.

* ’client_cred_verify_mac’, defined in Section 3.1.4 of this document, specifying the Client’s PoP evidence as a MAC, which is computed as defined above. This parameter MUST be included if and only if the OSCORE group is a pairwise-only group.

An example of such a request is shown in Figure 2.
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
    "audience" : "tempSensor4711",
    "scope" : "read",
    "context_id" : h’abcd0000’,
    "salt_input" : h’00’,
    "req_cnf" : {
        "COSE_Key" : {
            "kty" : EC2,
            "crv" : P-256,
            "x" : h’d7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eccd890c7fa27c9e354089bbe13’,
            "y" : h’f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22afbf725d35e515d020731e79a3b4e47120’
        }
    },
    "client_cred_verify" : h’...’
    (signature content omitted for brevity)
}

Figure 2: Example C-to-AS POST /token request for an Access Token bound to an asymmetric key.

3.1.1. ‘context_id’ Parameter

The ‘context_id’ parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Access Token request message defined in Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter provides a value that the Client wishes to use with the RS as a hint for a security context. Its exact content is profile specific.

3.1.2. ‘salt_input’ Parameter

The ‘salt_input’ parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Access Token request message defined in Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter provides a value that the Client wishes to use as part of a salt with the RS, for deriving cryptographic keying material. Its exact content is profile specific.
3.1.3. ‘client_cred_verify’ Parameter

The ‘client_cred_verify’ parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Access Token request message defined in Section 5.8.1. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter provides a signature computed by the Client to prove the possession of its own private key.

3.1.4. ‘client_cred_verify_mac’ Parameter

The ‘client_cred_verify_mac’ parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Access Token request message defined in Section 5.8.1. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter provides a Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed by the Client to prove the possession of its own private key.

3.2. AS-to-C: Access Token

After having verified the POST request to the /token endpoint and that the Client is authorized to obtain an Access Token corresponding to its Access Token request, the AS MUST verify the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence. In particular, the AS proceeds as follows.

* As PoP input, the AS uses the same value considered by the Client in Section 3.1.

* As public key of the Client, the AS uses the one specified in the ‘req_cnf’ parameter of the Access Token request.

* If the Access Token request includes the ‘client_cred_verify’ parameter, this specifies the PoP evidence as a signature. Then, the AS verifies the signature by using the public key of the Client.

* If the Access Token request includes the ‘client_cred_verify_mac’ parameter, this specifies the PoP evidence as a Message Authentication Code (MAC).

Then, the AS recomputes the MAC through the same process taken by the Client when preparing the value of the ‘client_cred_verify_mac’ parameter for the Access Token (see Section 3.1), with the difference that the AS uses its own Diffie-Hellman private key and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the Client. The verification succeeds if and only if the recomputed MAC is equal to the MAC conveyed as PoP evidence in the Access Token request.
If both the 'client_cred_verify' and 'client_cred_verify_mac' parameters are present, or if the verification of the PoP evidence fails, the AS considers the Client request invalid.

If the Client request was invalid, or not authorized, the AS returns an error response as described in Section 5.8.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

If all verifications are successful, the AS responds as defined in Section 5.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In particular:

* The AS can signal that the use of Group OSCORE is REQUIRED for a specific Access Token by including the 'ace_profile' parameter with the value "coap_group_oscore" in the Access Token response. The Client MUST use Group OSCORE towards all the Resource Servers for which this Access Token is valid. Usually, it is assumed that constrained devices will be pre-configured with the necessary profile, so that this kind of profile signaling can be omitted.

* The AS MUST NOT include the 'rs_cnf' parameter defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]. In general, the AS may not be aware of the authentication credentials (and public keys included thereof) that the RSs use in the OSCORE group. Also, the Client is able to retrieve the authentication credentials of other group members from the responsible Group Manager, both upon joining the group or later on as a group member, as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

The AS MUST include the following information as metadata of the issued Access Token. The use of CBOR web tokens (CWT) as specified in [RFC8392] is RECOMMENDED.

* The profile "coap_group_oscore". If the Access Token is a CWT, this is placed in the 'ace_profile' claim of the Access Token, as per Section 5.10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* The salt input specified in the 'salt_input' parameter of the Token Request. If the Access Token is a CWT, the content of the 'salt_input' parameter MUST be placed in the 'salt_input' claim of the Access Token, defined in Section 3.2.1 of this document.

* The Context Id input specified in the 'context_id' parameter of the Token Request. If the Access Token is a CWT, the content of the 'context_id' parameter MUST be placed in the 'contextId_input' claim of the Access Token, defined in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
The public key that the client uses in the OSCORE group and specified in the 'req_cnf' parameter of the Token request.

If the Access Token is a CWT, the public key MUST be specified in the 'cnf' claim, which follows the syntax from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] when including Value Type "COSE_Key" (1) and specifying an asymmetric key. In particular, the 'cnf' claim includes the same COSE Key specified in the 'req_cnf' parameter of the Token Request, i.e., the COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group.

Alternative Value Types defined in future specifications are fine to consider, if indicating a non-encrypted asymmetric key or full-fledged authentication credential.

Figure 3 shows an example of such an AS response. The access token has been truncated for readability.

```
Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "access_token" : h'8343a1010aa2044c53 ...'
  (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity),
  "ace_profile" : "coap_group_oscore",
  "expires_in" : 3600
}
```

Figure 3: Example AS-to-C Access Token response with the Group OSCORE profile.

Figure 4 shows an example CWT Claims Set, containing the Client’s public key in the group (as pop-key) in the 'cnf' claim.
{  
  "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "iat" : "1360189224",
  "exp" : "1360289224",
  "scope" : "temperature_g firmware_p",
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : EC2,
      "crv" : P-256,
      "x" : h'd7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eccd890c7fa27c9e354089bbe13',
      "y" : h'f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22af725d535e515d020731e79a3b4e47120'
    },
    "salt_input" : h'00',
    "contextId_input" : h'abcd0000'
  }
}

Figure 4: Example CWT Claims Set with OSCORE parameters.

The same CWT Claims Set as in Figure 4 and encoded in CBOR is shown in Figure 5, using the value abbreviations defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and [RFC8747]. The bytes in hexadecimal are reported in the first column, while their corresponding CBOR meaning is reported after the "#" sign on the second column, for easiness of readability.

NOTE: it should be checked (and in case fixed) that the values used below (which are not yet registered) are the final values registered by IANA.
3.2.1. Salt Input Claim

The 'salt_input' claim provides a value that the Client requesting the Access Token wishes to use as a part of a salt with the RS, e.g., for deriving cryptographic material.

This parameter specifies the value of the salt input, encoded as a CBOR byte string.
3.2.2. Context ID Input Claim

The 'contextId_input' claim provides a value that the Client requesting the Access Token wishes to use with the RS, as a hint for a security context.

This parameter specifies the value of the Context ID input, encoded as a CBOR byte string.

4. Client-RS Communication

This section details the POST request and response to the /authz-info endpoint between the Client and the RS.

The proof-of-possession required to bind the Access Token to the Client is explicitly performed when the RS receives and verifies a request from the Client protected with Group OSCORE, either with the group mode (see Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]) or with the pairwise mode (see Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

In particular, the RS uses the Client’s public key bound to the Access Token, either when verifying the signature of the request (if protected with the group mode), or when verifying the request as integrity-protected with pairwise keying material derived from the two peers’ authentication credentials and asymmetric keys (if protected with the pairwise mode). In either case, the RS also authenticates the Client.

Similarly, when receiving a protected response from the RS, the Client uses the RS’s public key either when verifying the signature of the response (if protected with the group mode), or when verifying the response as integrity-protected with pairwise keying material derived from the two peers’ authentication credentials and asymmetric keys (if protected with the pairwise mode). In either case, the Client also authenticates the RS. Mutual authentication is only achieved after the client has successfully verified the protected response from the RS.

Therefore, an attacker using a stolen Access Token cannot generate a valid Group OSCORE message as protected through the Client’s private key, and thus cannot prove possession of the pop-key bound to the Access Token. Also, if a Client legitimately owns an Access Token but has not joined the OSCORE group, it cannot generate a valid Group OSCORE message, as it does not store the necessary keying material shared among the group members.
Furthermore, a Client C1 is supposed to obtain a valid Access Token from the AS, as including the public key associated with its own private key used in the OSCORE group, together with its own Sender ID in that OSCORE group (see Section 3.1). This allows the RS receiving an Access Token to verify with the Group Manager of that OSCORE group whether such a Client has indeed that Sender ID and an authentication credential including that public key in the OSCORE group.

As a consequence, a different Client C2, also member of the same OSCORE group, is not able to impersonate C1, by: i) getting a valid Access Token, specifying the Sender ID of C1 and a different (made-up) public key; ii) successfully posting the Access Token to RS; and then iii) attempting to communicate using Group OSCORE impersonating C1, while blaming C1 for the consequences.

4.1.  C-to-RS POST to authz-info Endpoint

The Client posts the Access Token to the /authz-info endpoint of the RS, as defined in Section 5.10.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

4.2.  RS-to-C: 2.01 (Created)

The RS MUST verify the validity of the Access Token as defined in Section 5.10.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], with the following additions.

* The RS MUST check that the claims 'salt_input', 'contextId_input' and 'cnf' are included in the Access Token.

* The RS considers: the content of the 'contextId_input' claim as the GID of the OSCORE group; the content of the 'salt_input' claim as the Sender ID that the Client has in the group; and the content of the 'cnf' claim as the COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the group.

The RS MUST check whether it already stores an authentication credential associated with the pair (GID, Sender ID) above, such that the COSE Key specified in the 'cnf' claim is its equivalent COSE Key.

If this is not the case, the RS MUST request the Client’s authentication credential to the Group Manager of the OSCORE group as described in Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], specifying the Client’s Sender ID in the OSCORE group, i.e., the value of the 'salt_input' claim. Then, the RS performs the following actions.
- The RS MUST check whether the Client’s authentication credential retrieved from the Group Manager is such that the COSE Key specified in the ‘cnf’ claim of the Access Token is its equivalent COSE Key.

- The RS MUST check that the Client’s Sender ID provided by the Group Manager together with the Client’s authentication credential matches the one retrieved from the ‘salt_input’ claim of the Access Token.

If any of the checks above fails, the RS MUST consider the Access Token non valid, and MUST respond to the Client with an error response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).

If the Access Token is valid and further checks on its content are successful, the RS associates the authorization information from the Access Token with the Group OSCORE Security Context.

In particular, the RS associates the authorization information from the Access Token with the 3-tuple \((GID, \text{SaltInput}, \text{AuthCred})\), where \(GID\) is the Group Identifier of the OSCORE Group, while \(\text{SaltInput}\) and \(\text{AuthCred}\) are the Sender ID and the authentication credential that the Client uses in that OSCORE group, respectively.

The RS MUST keep this association up-to-date over time, as the 3-tuple \((GID, \text{SaltInput}, \text{AuthCred})\) associated with the Access Token might change. In particular:

* If the OSCORE group is rekeyed (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and Section 20 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]), the Group Identifier also changes in the group, and the new one replaces the current ‘GID’ value in the 3-tuple.

* If the Client requests and obtains a new OSCORE Sender ID from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]), the new Sender ID replaces the current ‘SaltInput’ value in the 3-tuple.

Finally, the RS MUST send a 2.01 (Created) response to the Client, as defined in Section 5.10.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
4.3. Client-RS Secure Communication

When previously joining the OSCORE group, both the Client and RS have already established the related Group OSCORE Security Context to communicate as group members. Therefore, they can simply start to securely communicate using Group OSCORE, without deriving any additional keying material or security association.

4.3.1. Client Side

After having received the 2.01 (Created) response from the RS, following the POST request to the authz-info endpoint, the Client starts the communication with the RS, by sending a request protected with Group OSCORE using the Group OSCORE Security Context [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

When communicating with the RS to access the resources as specified by the authorization information, the Client MUST use the Group OSCORE Security Context of the OSCORE group, whose GID was specified in the ‘context_id’ parameter of the Token request.

4.3.2. Resource Server Side

After successful validation of the Access Token as defined in Section 4.2 and after having sent the 2.01 (Created) response, the RS can start to communicate with the Client using Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

When processing an incoming request protected with Group OSCORE, the RS MUST consider as valid Client’s authentication credential only the one associated to the stored Access Token. As defined in Section 4.5, a possible change of authentication credential requires the Client to upload to the RS a new Access Token bound to the new authentication credential.

Additionally, for every incoming request, if Group OSCORE verification succeeds, the verification of access rights is performed as described in Section 4.4.

After the expiration of the Access Token related to a Group OSCORE Security Context, if the Client uses the Group OSCORE Security Context to send a request for any resource intended for OSCORE group members and that requires an active Access Token, the RS MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message protected with the Group OSCORE Security Context.
4.4. Access Rights Verification

The RS MUST follow the procedures defined in Section 5.10.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If an RS receives a Group OSCORE-protected request from a Client, the RS processes it according to [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

If the Group OSCORE verification succeeds, and the target resource requires authorization, the RS retrieves the authorization information from the Access Token associated with the Group OSCORE Security Context. Then, the RS MUST verify that the action requested on the resource is authorized.

The response code MUST be 4.01 (Unauthorized) if the RS has no valid Access Token for the Client. If the RS has an Access Token for the Client but no actions are authorized on the target resource, the RS MUST reject the request with a 4.03 (Forbidden). If the RS has an Access Token for the Client but the requested action is not authorized, the RS MUST reject the request with a 4.05 (Method Not Allowed).

4.5. Change of Client’s Authentication Credential in the Group

During its membership in the OSCORE group, the client might change the authentication credential it uses in the group. When this happens, the Client uploads the new authentication credential to the Group Manager, as defined in Section 11 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

After that, and in order to continue communicating with the RS, the Client MUST perform the following actions.

1. The Client requests a new Access Token to the AS, as defined in Section 3. In particular, when sending the POST request as defined in Section 3.1, the Client indicates:

   * The current Group Identifier of the OSCORE group, as value of the ‘context_id’ parameter.
   * The current Sender ID it has in the OSCORE group, as value of the ‘salt_input’ parameter.
   * The public key of the new authentication credential it uses in the OSCORE group, as value of the ‘req_cnf’ parameter. In particular, the specified public key is the COSE Key equivalent to the new authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group.
* The proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence corresponding to the public key of the new authentication credential, as value of the 'client_cred_verify' or 'client_cred_verify_mac' parameter.

2. After receiving the response from the AS (see Section 3.2), the Client performs the same exchanges with the RS as defined in Section 4.

When receiving the new Access Token, the RS performs the same steps defined in Section 4.2, with the following addition, in case the new Access Token is successfully verified and stored. The RS also deletes the old Access Token, i.e., the one whose associated 3-tuple has the same GID and SaltInput values as in the 3-tuple including the new authentication credential of the Client and associated with the new Access Token.

5. Secure Communication with the AS

As specified in the ACE framework (see Sections 5.8 and 5.9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), the requesting entity (RS and/or Client) and the AS communicate via the /token or /introspection endpoint. The use of CoAP and OSCORE [RFC8613] for this communication is RECOMMENDED in this profile. Other protocols fulfilling the security requirements defined in Sections 5 and 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] (such as HTTP and DTLS or TLS) MAY be used instead.

If OSCORE [RFC8613] is used, the requesting entity and the AS are expected to have a pre-established Security Context in place. How this Security Context is established is out of the scope of this profile. Furthermore, the requesting entity and the AS communicate using OSCORE through the /introspection endpoint as specified in Section 5.9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], and through the /token endpoint as specified in Section 5.8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

6. Discarding the Security Context

As members of an OSCORE group, the Client and the RS may independently leave the group or be forced to, e.g., if compromised or suspected so. Upon leaving the OSCORE group, the Client or RS also discards the Group OSCORE Security Context, which may anyway be renewed by the Group Manager through a group rekeying process (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
The Client or RS can acquire a new Group OSCORE Security Context, by re-joining the OSCORE group, e.g., by using the approach defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. In such a case, the Client SHOULD request a new Access Token and post it to the RS.

7. CBOR Mappings

The new parameters defined in this document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 6, using the given integer abbreviation for the map key.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Value Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>context_id</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salt_input</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_cred_verify</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_cred_verify_mac</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: CBOR mappings for new parameters.

The new claims defined in this document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 7, using the given integer abbreviation for the map key.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Value Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>salt_input</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contextId_input</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>bstr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: CBOR mappings for new claims.

8. Security Considerations

This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Thus, the general security considerations from the ACE framework also apply to this profile.

The proof-of-possession (PoP) key bound to an Access Token is always an asymmetric key, i.e., the public key that the Client uses in the OSCORE group. This means that there is never a same shared secret used as PoP key with possible multiple RSs. Therefore, it is possible and safe for the AS to issue an Access Token whose audience comprises multiple RSs.
In such a case, as per Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the AS has to ensure the integrity protection of the Access Token by protecting it through an asymmetric signature. In addition, the used audience has to correctly identify all the RSs that are intended recipients of the Access Token. As a particular case, the audience can be the name of the OSCORE group, if the Access Token is intended to all the RSs in that group.

Furthermore, this document inherits the general security considerations about Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], as to the specific use of Group OSCORE according to this profile.

Group OSCORE is designed to secure point-to-point as well as point-to-multipoint communications, providing a secure binding between a single request and multiple corresponding responses. In particular, Group OSCORE fulfills the same security requirements of OSCORE, for group requests and responses.

Group OSCORE ensures source authentication of messages both in group mode (see Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]) and in pairwise mode (see Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

When protecting an outgoing message in group mode, the sender uses its private key to compute a digital signature, which is embedded in the protected message. The group mode can be used to protect messages sent over multicast to multiple recipients, or sent over unicast to one recipient.

When protecting an outgoing message in pairwise mode, the sender uses a pairwise symmetric key, as derived from the asymmetric keys of the two peers exchanging the message. The pairwise mode can be used to protect only messages intended to one recipient.

9. Privacy Considerations

This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Thus the general privacy considerations from the ACE framework also apply to this profile.

As this profile uses Group OSCORE, the privacy considerations from [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] apply to this document as well.
An unprotected response to an unauthorized request may disclose information about the RS and/or its existing relationship with the Client. It is advisable to include as little information as possible in an unencrypted response. However, since both the Client and the RS share a Group OSCORE Security Context, unauthorized, yet protected requests are followed by protected responses, which can thus include more detailed information.

Although it may be encrypted, the Access Token is sent in the clear to the /authz-info endpoint at the RS. Thus, if the Client uses the same single Access Token from multiple locations with multiple Resource Servers, it can risk being tracked through the Access Token's value.

Note that, even though communications are protected with Group OSCORE, some information might still leak, due to the observable size, source address and destination address of exchanged messages.

10. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

10.1. ACE Profile Registry

IANA is asked to add the following entry to the "ACE Profile" registry defined in Section 8.8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* Name: coap_group_oscore

* Description: Profile to secure communications between constrained nodes using the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments framework, by enabling authentication and fine-grained authorization of members of an OSCORE group, that use a pre-established Group OSCORE Security Context to communicate with Group OSCORE. Optionally, the dual mode defined in Appendix A additionally establishes a pairwise OSCORE Security Context, and thus also enables OSCORE communication between two members of the OSCORE group.

* CBOR Value: TBD (value between 1 and 255)

* Reference: [[this document]]

10.2. OAuth Parameters Registry

IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters" registry.
* Name: "context_id"
  * Parameter Usage Location: token request
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.1 of [[this document]]

* Name: "salt_input"
  * Parameter Usage Location: token request
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.2 of [[this document]]

* Name: "client_cred_verify"
  * Parameter Usage Location: token request
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.3 of [[this document]]

* Name: "client_cred_verify_mac"
  * Parameter Usage Location: token request
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4 of [[this document]]

* Name: "client_cred"
  * Parameter Usage Location: token request
  * Change Controller: IESG
  * Specification Document(s): Appendix A.2.1.1 of [[this document]]
10.3. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry

IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry defined in Section 8.10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* Name: "context_id"
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * Value Type: bstr
  * Reference: Section 3.1.1 of [[this document]]

* Name: "salt_input"
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * Value Type: bstr
  * Reference: Section 3.1.2 of [[this document]]

* Name: "client_cred_verify"
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * Value Type: bstr
  * Reference: Section 3.1.3 of [[this document]]

* Name: "client_cred_verify_mac"
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * Value Type: bstr
  * Reference: Section 3.1.4 of [[this document]]

* Name: "client_cred"
  * CBOR Key: TBD
  * Value Type: bstr
IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry.

- **Claim Name**: "salt_input"
- **Claim Description**: Client provided salt input
- **JWT Claim Name**: "N/A"
- **Claim Key**: TBD
- **Claim Value Type(s)**: bstr
- **Change Controller**: IESG
- **Specification Document(s)**: Section 3.2.1 of [[this document]]

- **Claim Name**: "contextId_input"
- **Claim Description**: Client context id input
- **JWT Claim Name**: "N/A"
- **Claim Key**: TBD
- **Claim Value Type(s)**: bstr
- **Change Controller**: IESG
- **Specification Document(s)**: Section 3.2.2 of [[this document]]

- **Claim Name**: "client_cred"
- **Claim Description**: Client Credential
- **JWT Claim Name**: "N/A"
- **Claim Key**: TBD
- **Claim Value Type(s)**: map
- **Change Controller**: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Appendix A.2.2.2 of [[this document]]

10.5. TLS Exporter Label Registry

IANA is asked to add the following entry to the "TLS Exporter Label" registry defined in Section 6 of [RFC5705] and updated in Section 12 of [RFC8447].

* Value: EXPORTER-ACE-Sign-Challenge-Client-AS
* DTLS-OK: Y
* Recommended: N
* Reference: [[this document]] (Section 3.1)

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]
[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]

[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]

[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]

[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]

[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]

[NIST-800-56A]
[RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

[RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, March 2010,

[RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,

DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,

DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,

[RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,

DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January 2016,

[RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,

DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, May 2018,

[RFC8447]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS", RFC 8447,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,

DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
11.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]

[I-D.ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile]

[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]

[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]

[I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery]
Tiloca, M., Amsuess, C., and P. V. D. Stok, "Discovery of OSCORE Groups with the CoRE Resource Directory", Work in
Appendix A. Dual Mode (Group OSCORE & OSCORE)

This appendix defines the dual mode of this profile, which allows using both OSCORE [RFC8613] and Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] as security protocols, by still relying on a single Access Token.

That is, the dual mode of this profile specifies how a Client uses CoAP [RFC7252] to communicate to a single Resource Server, or CoAP over IP multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] to communicate to multiple Resource Servers that are members of a group and share a common set of resources.

In particular, the dual mode of this profile uses two complementary security protocols to provide secure communication between the Client and the Resource Server(s). That is, it defines the use of either OSCORE or Group OSCORE to protect unicast requests addressed to a single Resource Server, as well as possible responses. Additionally, it defines the use of Group OSCORE to protect multicast requests sent to a group of Resource Servers, as well as possible individual responses. Like in the main mode of this profile, the Client and the Resource Servers need to have already joined the same OSCORE group, for instance by using the approach defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], which is also based on ACE.
The Client proves its access to be authorized to the Resource Server by using an Access Token, which is bound to a key (the proof-of-possession key). This profile mode uses OSCORE to achieve proof of possession, and OSCORE or Group OSCORE to achieve server authentication.

Unlike in the main mode of this profile, where a public key is used as pop-key, this dual mode uses OSCORE-related, symmetric keying material as pop-key instead. Furthermore, this dual mode provides proof of Client’s membership to the correct OSCORE group, by securely binding the pre-established Group OSCORE Security Context to the pairwise OSCORE Security Context newly established between the Client and the Resource Server.

In addition to the terminology used for the main mode of this profile, the rest of this appendix refers also to "pairwise OSCORE Security Context" as to an OSCORE Security Context established between only one Client and one Resource Server, and used to communicate with OSCORE [RFC8613].

A.1. Protocol Overview

This section provides an overview on how to use the ACE framework for authentication and authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] to secure communications between a Client and a (set of) Resource Server(s) using OSCORE [RFC8613] and/or Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

Just as for main mode of this profile overviewed in Section 2, the process for joining the OSCORE group through the respective Group Manager as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] must take place before the process described in the rest of this section, and is out of the scope of this profile.

An overview of the protocol flow for the dual mode of this profile is shown in Figure 8. In the figure, it is assumed that both RS1 and RS2 are associated with the same AS. It is also assumed that C, RS1 and RS2 have previously joined an OSCORE group with Group Identifier (gid) "abcd0000", and got assigned Sender ID (sid) "0", "1" and "2" in the group, respectively. The names of messages coincide with those of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] when applicable.
-------- POST /token ----------------------------------------------->
(aud: RS1, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...)

------------------------ Access Token + RS Information -----
(aud: RS1, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...)

---- POST /authz-info ----->
(access_token, N1, ID1)

<-- 2.01 Created (N2, ID2) --

/Pairwise Security Context Derivation/

-------- POST /token ----------------------------------------------->
(aud: RS2, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...)

------------------------ Access Token + RS Information -----
(aud: RS2, sid: 0, gid: abcd0000, ...)

---- POST /authz-info ----->
(access_token, N1’, ID1’)

<-- 2.01 Created (N2’, ID2’) -----

/Pairwise Security Context Derivation/

---------- OSCORE Request ------>
(kid: ID2)

/Proof-of-possession;
Pairwise Security
Context storage/

<---- OSCORE Response ------

/Proof-of-possession;
Pairwise Security
Context storage/

/Mutual authentication
between C and RS1
(as OSCORE peers)/
A.1.1. Pre-Conditions

The same pre-conditions for the main mode of this profile (see Section 2.1) hold for the dual mode described in this appendix.

A.1.2. Access Token Posting

After having retrieved the Access Token from the AS, the Client generates a nonce N1 and an identifier ID1 unique in the sets of its own Recipient IDs from its pairwise OSCORE Security Contexts. The client then posts both the Access Token, N1 and its chosen ID to the RS, using the /authz-info endpoint and mechanisms specified in Section 5.10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and Content-Format = application/ace+cbor.

When using the dual mode of this profile, the communication with the authz-info endpoint is not protected, except for update of access rights. Note that, when using the dual mode, this request can alternatively be protected with Group OSCORE, using the Group OSCORE Security Context paired with the pairwise OSCORE Security Context originally established with the first Access Token posting.
If the Access Token is valid, the RS replies to this POST request with a 2.01 (Created) response with Content-Format = application/ace+cbor, which in a CBOR map contains a nonce N2 and an identifier ID2 unique in the sets of its own Recipient IDs from its pairwise OSCORE Security Contexts.

A.1.3. Setup of the Pairwise OSCORE Security Context

After sending the 2.01 (Created) response, the RS sets the ID Context of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context (see Section 3 of [RFC8613]) to the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group specified in the Access Token, concatenated with N1, concatenated with N2, concatenated with the value in the contextId parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material provided in the 'cnf' claim of the Access Token.

Then, the RS derives the complete pairwise OSCORE Security Context associated with the received Access Token, following Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. In practice, the RS maintains a collection of Security Contexts with associated authorization information, for all the clients that it is currently communicating with, and the authorization information is a policy used as input when processing requests from those clients.

During the derivation process, the RS uses: the ID Context above; the exchanged nonces N1 and N2; the identifier ID1 received from the Client, set as its own OSCORE Sender ID; the identifier ID2 provided to the Client, set as its Recipient ID for the Client; and the parameters in the Access Token. The derivation process uses also the Master Secret of the OSCORE group, that the RS knows as a group member, as well as the Sender ID of the Client in the OSCORE group, which is specified in the Access Token. This ensures that the pairwise OSCORE Security Context is securely bound to the Group OSCORE Security Context of the OSCORE group.

Finally, the RS stores the association between i) the authorization information from the Access Token; and ii) the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group together with the Sender ID and the authentication credential of the Client in that group.

After having received the nonce N2, the Client sets the ID Context in its pairwise OSCORE Security Context (see Section 3 of [RFC8613]) to the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group, concatenated with N1, concatenated with N2, concatenated with the value in the contextId parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material provided in the 'cnf' parameter of the Access Token response from the AS. Then, the Client derives the complete pairwise OSCORE Security Context, following Section 3.2 of [RFC8613].
During the derivation process, the Client uses: the ID Context above, the exchanged nonces N1 and N2; the identifier ID1 provided to the RS, set as its own Recipient ID for the RS; the identifier ID2 received from the RS, set as its own OSCORE Sender ID; and the parameters received from the AS. The derivation process uses also the Master Secret of the OSCORE group, that the Client knows as a group member, as well as its own Sender ID in the OSCORE group.

When the Client communicates with the RS using the pairwise OSCORE Security Context, the RS achieves proof-of-possession of the credentials bound to the Access Token. Also, the RS verifies that the Client is a legitimate member of the OSCORE group.

A.1.4. Secure Communication

Other than starting the communication with the RS using Group OSCORE as described in Section 4.3, the Client can send to the RS a request protected with OSCORE, using the pairwise OSCORE Security Context.

If the request is successfully verified, then the RS stores the pairwise OSCORE Security Context, and uses it to protect the possible response, as well as further communications with the Client, until the Access Token is deleted, due to, for example, expiration. This pairwise OSCORE Security Context is discarded when an Access Token (whether the same or different) is used to successfully derive a new pairwise OSCORE Security Context.

As discussed in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], the use of random nonces N1 and N2 during the exchange between the Client and the RS prevents the reuse of an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) nonce/key pair for two different messages. Reuse might otherwise occur when Client and RS derive a new pairwise OSCORE Security Context from an existing (non-expired) Access Token, e.g., in case of reboot of either the Client or the RS, and might lead to loss of both confidentiality and integrity.

Additionally, just as per the main mode of this profile (see Section 4.3), the Client and RS can also securely communicate by protecting messages with Group OSCORE, using the Group OSCORE Security Context already established upon joining the OSCORE group.

A.2. Client-AS Communication

This section details the Access Token POST Request that the Client sends to the /token endpoint of the AS, as well as the related Access Token response.
Section 3.2 of [RFC8613] defines how to derive a pairwise OSCORE Security Context based on a shared Master Secret and a set of other parameters, established between the OSCORE client and server, which the client receives from the AS in this exchange.

The proof-of-possession key (pop-key) received from the AS in this exchange MUST be used to build the Master Secret in OSCORE (see Appendix A.3.3 and Appendix A.3.4).

A.2.1. C-to-AS: POST to Token Endpoint

The Client-to-AS request is specified in Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The Client MUST send this POST request to the /token endpoint over a secure channel that guarantees authentication, message integrity and confidentiality.

The POST request is formatted as the analogous Client-to-AS request in the main mode of this profile (see Section 3.1), with the following modifications.

* The parameter ‘req_cnf’ MUST NOT be included in the payload.

* The parameter ‘client_cred’, defined in Appendix A.2.1.1 of this document, MUST be included in the payload. This parameter specifies the public key that the Client uses in the OSCORE group, whose identifier is indicated in the ‘context_id’ parameter. In particular, the specified public key is the COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group.

* The proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence included in the ‘client_cred_verify’ or ‘client_cred_verify_mac’ parameter is computed by using the Client’s private key associated with the public key in the ‘client_cred’ parameter above.

An example of such a request is shown in Figure 9.
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
    "audience" : "tempSensor4711",
    "scope" : "read",
    "context_id" : h'abcd0000',
    "salt_input" : h'00',
    "client_cred" : {
        "COSE_Key" : {
            "kty" : EC2,
            "crv" : P-256,
            "x" : h'd7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eecd890c7fa27c9e354089bbe13',
            "y" : h'f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22af725d535e515d020731e79a3b4e47120'
        }
    },
    "client_cred_verify" : h'...
    // (signature content omitted for brevity),
}

Figure 9: Example C-to-AS POST /token request for an Access Token bound to a symmetric key.

Later on, the Client may want to update its current access rights, without changing the existing pairwise OSCORE Security Context with the RS. In this case, the Client MUST include in its POST request to the /token endpoint a 'req_cnf' parameter, defined in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params], which MUST include a 'kid' field, as defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8747]. The 'kid' field has as value a CBOR byte string containing the OSCORE_Input_Material Identifier (assigned as discussed in Appendix A.2.2).

This identifier, together with other information such as audience, can be used by the AS to determine the shared secret bound to the proof-of-possession Access Token and therefore MUST identify a symmetric key that was previously generated by the AS as a shared secret for the communication between the Client and the RS. The AS MUST verify that the received value identifies a proof-of-possession key that has previously been issued to the requesting Client. If that is not the case, the Client-to-AS request MUST be declined with the error code "invalid_request" as defined in Section 5.8.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
This POST request for updating the access rights of an Access Token SHOULD NOT include the parameters 'salt_input', 'context_id', 'client_cred' and 'client_cred_verify'. An exception is the case defined in Appendix A.3.6, where the Client, following a change of authentication credential in the OSCORE group, requests a new Access Token associated with the public key of the new authentication credential, while still without changing the existing pairwise OSCORE Security Context with the RS.

An example of such a request is shown in Figure 10.

```
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "audience" : "tempSensor4711",
  "scope" : "read",
  "req_cnf" : {
    "kid" : h'01'
  }
}
```

Figure 10: Example C-to-AS POST /token request for updating rights to an Access Token bound to a symmetric key.

A.2.1.1. 'client_cred' Parameter

The 'client_cred' parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Access Token request message defined in Section 5.8.1. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter provides an asymmetric key that the Client wishes to use as its own public key, but which is not used as proof-of-possession key.

This parameter follows the syntax of the 'cnf' claim from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] when including Value Type "COSE_Key" (1) and specifying an asymmetric key. Alternative Value Types defined in future specifications are fine to consider if indicating a non-encrypted asymmetric key.

A.2.2. AS-to-C: Access Token

After having verified the POST request to the /token endpoint and that the Client is authorized to obtain an Access Token corresponding to its Access Token request, the AS MUST verify the proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence.
In particular, the AS proceeds as defined in Section 3.2, with the difference that it uses the public key specified in the 'client_cred' parameter as public key of the Client.

If both the 'client_cred_verify' and 'client_cred_verify_mac' parameters are present, or if the verification of the PoP evidence fails, the AS considers the Client request invalid. The AS does not perform this operation when asked to update a previously released Access Token.

If all verifications are successful, the AS responds as defined in Section 5.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the Client request was invalid, or not authorized, the AS returns an error response as described in Section 5.8.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

The AS can signal that the use of OSCORE and Group OSCORE is REQUIRED for a specific Access Token by including the "ace_profile" parameter with the value "coap_group_oscore" in the Access Token response. This means that the Client MUST use OSCORE and/or Group OSCORE towards all the Resource Servers for which this Access Token is valid.

In particular, the Client MUST follow Appendix A.3.3 to derive the pairwise OSCORE Security Context to use for communications with the RS. Instead, the Client has already established the related Group OSCORE Security Context to communicate with members of the OSCORE group, upon previously joining that group.

Usually, it is assumed that constrained devices will be pre-configured with the necessary profile, so that this kind of profile signaling can be omitted.

In contrast with the main mode of this profile, the Access Token response to the Client is analogous to the one in the OSCORE profile of ACE, as described in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. In particular, the AS provides an OSCORE_Input_Material object, which is defined in Section 3.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] and included in the 'cnf' parameter (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]) of the Access Token response.

The AS MUST send different OSCORE_Input_Material (and therefore different Access Tokens) to different authorized clients, in order for the RS to differentiate between clients.

In the issued Access Token, the AS MUST include as metadata the same information as defined in the main mode of this profile (see Section 3.2) with the following modifications.
* The public key that the client uses in the OSCORE group and specified in the 'client_cred' parameter of the Token request (see Appendix A.2.1) MUST also be included in the Access Token.

If the Access Token is a CWT, the AS MUST include it in the 'client_cred' claim of the Access Token, defined in Appendix A.2.2.2 of this document. In particular, the 'client_cred' claim includes the same COSE Key specified in the 'client_cred' parameter of the Token Request, i.e., the COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group.

* The OSCORE_Input_Material specified in the 'cnf' parameter of the Access Token response MUST also be included in the Access Token. If the Access Token is a CWT, the same OSCORE_Input_Material included in the 'cnf' parameter of the Access Token response MUST be included in the 'osc' field of the 'cnf' claim of the Access Token (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]).

Figure 11 shows an example of such an AS response. The access token has been truncated for readability.

```
Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "access_token" : h'8343a1010aa2044c53 ...'
  (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity),
  "ace_profile" : "coap_group_oscore",
  "expires_in" : 3600,
  "cnf" : {
    "osc" : {
      "alg" : AES-CCM-16-64-128,
      "id" : h'01',
      "ms" : h'f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f',
      "salt" : h'1122',
      "contextId" : h'99'
    }
  }
}
```

Figure 11: Example AS-to-C Access Token response with the Group OSCORE profile.

Figure 12 shows an example CWT, containing the necessary OSCORE parameters in the 'cnf' claim.
Figure 12: Example CWT with OSCORE parameters.

The same CWT as in Figure 12 and encoded in CBOR is shown in Figure 13, using the value abbreviations defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and [RFC8747].

NOTE: it should be checked (and in case fixed) that the values used below (which are not yet registered) are the final values registered in IANA.

```bash
A8                                      # map(8)
03                                   # unsigned(3)
76                                   # text(22)
74656D7053656E736F72496E4C6976696E67526F66
06                                   # unsigned(6)
1A 5112D728                         # unsigned(1360189224)
04                                   # unsigned(4)
1A 51145DC8                         # unsigned(1360289224)
09                                   # unsigned(9)
78 18                               # text(24)
74656D70657261747572655F67206669726D776172655F70
```

If the Client has requested an update to its access rights using the same pairwise OSCORE Security Context, which is valid and authorized, the AS MUST omit the 'cnf' parameter in the response to the client.
Instead, the updated Access Token conveyed in the AS-to-C response MUST include a 'cnf' claim specifying a 'kid' field, as defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8747]. The response from the AS MUST carry the OSCORE Input Material identifier in the 'kid' field within the 'cnf' claim of the Access Token. That is, the 'kid' field is a CBOR byte string, with value the same value of the 'kid' field of the 'req_cnf' parameter from the C-to-AS request for updating rights to the Access Token (see Figure 10). This information needs to be included in the Access Token, in order for the RS to identify the previously generated pairwise OSCORE Security Context.

Figure 14 shows an example of such an AS response. The Access Token has been truncated for readability.

```
Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "access_token" : h'8343a1010aa2044c53 ...'
  (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity),
  "profile" : "coap_group_oscore",
  "expires_in" : 3600
}

Figure 14: Example AS-to-C Access Token response with the Group OSCORE profile, for update of access rights.
```

Figure 15 shows an example CWT, containing the necessary OSCORE parameters in the 'cnf' claim for update of access rights.

```
{
  "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "iat" : 1360189224,
  "exp" : 1360289224,
  "scope" : "temperature_h",
  "cnf" : {
    "kid" : h'01'
  }
}

Figure 15: Example CWT with OSCORE parameters for update of access rights.
```
A.2.2.1. Public Key Hash as Client Credential

As a possible optimization to limit the size of the Access Token, the AS may specify as value of the 'client_cred' claim simply the hash of the Client’s public key, i.e., the hash of the COSE Key K equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group.

The specifically used hash-function MUST be collision-resistant on byte-strings, and MUST be selected from the "Named Information Hash Algorithm" Registry defined in Section 9.4 of [RFC6920].

In particular, the AS provides the Client with an Access Token as defined in Appendix A.2.2, with the following differences.

The AS prepares INPUT_HASH as follows, with \( \mid \) denoting byte string concatenation.

* If the equivalent COSE Key K has COSE Key Type OKP, INPUT_HASH = \( i \), where \( i \) is the x-parameter of the COSE_Key specified in the 'client_cred' parameter of the Token request, encoded as a CBOR byte string.

* If the equivalent COSE Key K has COSE Key Type EC2, INPUT_HASH = \( (i_1 \mid i_2) \), where \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) are the x-parameter and y-parameter of the COSE_Key specified in the 'client_cred' parameter of the Token request, respectively, each encoded as a CBOR byte string.

* If the equivalent COSE Key K has COSE Key Type RSA, INPUT_HASH = \( (i_1 \mid i_2) \), where \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) are the n-parameter and e-parameter of the COSE_Key specified in the 'client_cred' parameter of the Token request, respectively, each encoded as a CBOR byte string.

Then, the AS hashes INPUT_HASH according to the procedure described in [RFC6920], with the output OUTPUT_HASH in binary format, as described in Section 6 of [RFC6920].

Finally, the AS includes a single entry within the 'client_cred' claim of the Access Token. This entry has label "kid" (3) defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8747], and value a CBOR byte string wrapping OUTPUT_HASH.

Upon receiving the Access Token, the RS processes it according to Appendix A.3.2, with the following differences.
The RS considers: the content of the 'contextId_input' claim as the GID of the OSCORE group; the content of the 'salt_input' claim as the Sender ID that the Client has in the group; and the content of the 'client_cred' claim as the hash RECEIVEDHASH of a COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the group.

The RS MUST check whether it already stores an authentication credential associated with the pair (GID, Sender ID) above, such that the recomputed hash NEWHASH of its equivalent COSE Key matches with RECEIVEDHASH from the 'client_cred' claim.

If this is not the case, the RS MUST request the Client’s authentication credential to the Group Manager of the OSCORE group as described in Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], specifying the Client’s Sender ID in the OSCORE group, i.e., the value of the ‘salt_input’ claim. Then, the RS performs the following actions.

* The RS MUST check whether RECEIVEDHASH matches with the recomputed hash NEWHASH of a COSE Key equivalent to the Client’s authentication credential retrieved from the Group Manager.

* The RS MUST check that the Client’s Sender ID provided by the Group Manager together with the Client’s authentication credential matches the one retrieved from the ‘salt_input’ claim of the Access Token.

The RS MUST calculate NEWHASH using the same method used by the AS described above, and using the same hash function. The hash function to use can be determined from the information conveyed in the 'client_cred' claim, as the procedure described in [RFC6920] also encodes the used hash function as metadata of the hash value.

### A.2.2.2. Client Credential Claim

The 'client_cred' claim provides an asymmetric key that the Client owning the Access Token wishes to use as its own public key, but which is not used as proof-of-possession key.

This parameter follows the syntax of the 'cnf' claim from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] when including Value Type "COSE_Key" (1) and specifying an asymmetric key. Alternative Value Types defined in future specifications are fine to consider, if indicating a non-encrypted asymmetric key or full-fledged authentication credential.
A.3. Client-RS Communication

This section details the POST request and response to the /authz-info endpoint between the Client and the RS. With respect to the exchanged messages and their content, the Client and the RS perform as defined in the OSCORE profile of ACE (see Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]).

That is, the Client generates a nonce N1 and posts it to the RS, together with: an identifier ID1 unique in the sets of its own Recipient IDs from its pairwise OSCORE Security Contexts; and the Access Token that includes the material provisioned by the AS.

Then, the RS generates a nonce N2, and an identifier ID2 unique in the sets of its own Recipient IDs from its pairwise OSCORE Security Contexts. After that, the RS derives a pairwise OSCORE Security Context as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. In particular, it uses the two exchanged nonces and the two identifiers established with the Client, as well as two shared secrets together with additional pieces of information specified in the Access Token.

Both the client and the RS generate the pairwise OSCORE Security Context using the pop-key as part of the OSCORE Master Secret. In addition, the derivation of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context takes as input also information related to the OSCORE group, i.e., the Master Secret and Group Identifier of the group, as well as the Sender ID of the Client in the group. Hence, the derived pairwise OSCORE Security Context is also securely bound to the Group OSCORE Security Context of the OSCORE Group. Thus, the proof-of-possession required to bind the Access Token to the Client occurs after the first OSCORE message exchange.

Therefore, an attacker using a stolen Access Token cannot generate a valid pairwise OSCORE Security Context and thus cannot prove possession of the pop-key. Also, if a Client legitimately owns an Access Token but has not joined the OSCORE group, that Client cannot generate a valid pairwise OSCORE Security Context either, since it lacks the Master Secret used in the OSCORE group.

Besides, just as in the main mode (see Section 4), the RS is able to verify whether the Client has indeed the claimed Sender ID and authentication credential in the OSCORE group.
A.3.1. C-to-RS POST to authz-info Endpoint

The Client MUST generate a nonce N1, an OSCORE Recipient ID (ID1), and post them to the /authz-info endpoint of the RS together with the Access Token, as defined in the OSCORE profile of ACE (see Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]).

The same recommendations, considerations and behaviors defined in Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] hold.

If the Client has already posted a valid Access Token, has already established a pairwise OSCORE Security Context with the RS, and wants to update its access rights, the Client can do so by posting the new Access Token (retrieved from the AS and specifying the updated set of access rights) to the /authz-info endpoint.

The Client MUST protect the request using either the pairwise OSCORE Security Context established during the first Access Token exchange, or the Group OSCORE Security Context associated with that pairwise OSCORE Security Context.

In either case, the Client MUST only send the Access Token in the payload, i.e., no nonce or identifier are sent. After proper verification (see Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]), the new Access Token will supersede the old one at the RS, by replacing the corresponding authorization information. At the same time, the RS will maintain the same pairwise OSCORE Security Context and Group OSCORE Security Context, as now both associated with the new Access Token.

A.3.2. RS-to-C: 2.01 (Created)

The RS MUST verify the validity of the Access Token as defined in Section 4.2, with the following modifications.

* If the POST request to /authz-info is not protected, the RS checks that the ‘cnf’ claim is included in the Access Token and that it contains an OSCORE_Input_Material object. Also, the RS checks that the ‘salt_input’, ‘client_cred’ and ‘contextId_input’ claims are included in the Access Token.

* If the POST request to /authz-info is protected with the pairwise OSCORE Security Context shared with the Client or with the Group OSCORE Security Context of the OSCORE group, i.e., the Client is requesting an update of access rights, the RS checks that the ‘cnf’ claim is included in the Access Token and that it contains only the ‘kid’ field.
* If the 'salt_input', 'client_cred' and 'contextId_input' claims are included in the Access Token, the RS extracts the content of 'client_cred'. Then, the RS considers that content as the COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential that the Client uses in the group, whose GID is specified in the 'contextId_input' claim. The RS can compare this public key with the actual COSE Key equivalent to the authentication credential of the claimed Client, retrieved from its local storage or from the Group Manager (see Section 4.2).

If any of the checks fails, the RS MUST consider the Access Token non valid, and MUST respond to the Client with an error response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).

If the Access Token is valid and further checks on its content are successful, the RS proceeds as follows.

In case the POST request to /authz-info was not protected, the RS MUST generate a nonce N2, an OSCORE Recipient ID (ID2), and include them in the 2.01 (Created) response to the Client, as defined in the OSCORE profile of ACE (see Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]).

Instead, in case the POST request to /authz-info was protected, the RS MUST ignore any nonce and identifiers in the request, if any was sent. Then, the RS MUST check that the 'kid' field of the 'cnf' claim in the new Access Token matches the identifier of the OSCORE Input Material of a pairwise OSCORE Security Context such that:

* The pairwise OSCORE Security Context was used to protect the request, if this was protected with OSCORE; or

* The pairwise OSCORE Security Context is bound to the Group OSCORE Security Context used to protect the request, if this was protected with Group OSCORE.

If either verification is successful, the new Access Token supersedes the old one at the RS. Besides, the RS associates the new Access Token to the same pairwise OSCORE Security Context identified above, as also bound to a Group OSCORE Security Context. The RS MUST respond with a 2.01 (Created) response with no payload, protected with the same Security Context used to protect the request. In particular, no new pairwise OSCORE Security Context is established between the Client and the RS. If any verification fails, the RS MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response.

Further recommendations, considerations and behaviors defined in Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] hold for this document.
Once having received the 2.01 (Created) response from the RS, following an unprotected POST request to the /authz-info endpoint, the Client MUST extract the nonce N2 from the 'nonce2' parameter, and the Client identifier from the 'ace_server_recipientid' parameter in the CBOR map of the response payload. Note that this identifier is used by C as Sender ID in the pairwise OSCORE Security Context to be established with the RS, and is different as well as unrelated to the Sender ID of C in the OSCORE group.

Then, the Client performs the following actions, in order to set up and fully derive the pairwise OSCORE Security Context for communicating with the RS.

* The Client MUST set the ID Context of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context as the concatenation of: i) GID, i.e., the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group, as specified by the Client in the 'context_id' parameter of the Client-to-AS request; ii) the nonce N1; iii) the nonce N2; and iv) CID, i.e., the value in the contextId parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material provided in the 'cnf' parameter of the Access Token response from the AS. The concatenation occurs in this order: ID Context = GID | N1 | N2 | CID, where | denotes byte string concatenation.

* The Client MUST set the updated Master Salt of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context as the concatenation of SaltInput, MSalt, the nonce N1, the nonce N2 and GMSalt, where: i) SaltInput is the Sender ID that the Client has in the OSCORE group, which is known to the Client as a member of the OSCORE group; ii) MSalt is the (optional) Master Salt in the pairwise OSCORE Security Context (received from the AS in the Token); and iii) GMSalt is the (optional) Master Salt in the Group OSCORE Security Context, which is known to the Client as a member of the OSCORE group. The concatenation occurs in this order: Master Salt = SaltInput | MSalt | N1 | N2 | GMSalt, where | denotes byte string concatenation. Optional values, if not specified, are not included in the concatenation. The five parameters SaltInput, MSalt, N1, N2 and GMSalt are to be concatenated as encoded CBOR byte strings. An example of Master Salt construction using CBOR encoding is given in Figure 16.
SaltInput, MSalt, N1, N2 and GMSalt, in CBOR diagnostic notation:
SaltInput = h’00’
MSalt = h’f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f’
N1 = h’018a278f7faab55a’
N2 = h’25a8991cd700ac01’
GMSalt = h’99’

SaltInput, MSalt, N1, N2 and GMSalt, as CBOR encoded byte strings:
SaltInput = 0x4100
MSalt = 0x50f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f
N1 = 0x48018a278f7faab55a
N2 = 0x4825a8991cd700ac01
GMSalt = 0x4199

Master Salt = 0x41 00
50 f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f
48 018a278f7faab55a
48 25a8991cd700ac01
41 99

Figure 16: Example of Master Salt construction using CBOR encoding.

* The Client MUST set the Master Secret of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context to the concatenation of MSec and GMSec, where: i) MSec is the value of the ‘ms’ parameter in the OSCORE_Input_Material of the ‘cnf’ parameter, received from the AS in Appendix A.2.2; while ii) GMSec is the Master Secret of the Group OSCORE Security Context, which is known to the Client as a member of the OSCORE group.

* The Client MUST set the Recipient ID as ace_client_recipientid, sent as described in Appendix A.3.1.

* The Client MUST set the Sender ID as ace_server_recipientid, received as described in Appendix A.3.1.

* The Client MUST set the AEAD Algorithm, ID Context, HKDF, and OSCORE Version as indicated in the corresponding parameters received from the AS in Appendix A.2.2, if present in the OSCORE_Input_Material of the ‘cnf’ parameter. In case these parameters are omitted, the default values SHALL be used as described in Sections 3.2 and 5.4 of [RFC8613].

Finally, the client MUST derive the complete pairwise OSCORE Security Context following Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613].
From then on, when communicating with the RS to access the resources as specified by the authorization information, the Client MUST use the newly established pairwise OSCORE Security Context or the Group OSCORE Security Context of the OSCORE Group where both the Client and the RS are members.

If any of the expected parameters is missing (e.g., any of the mandatory parameters from the AS or the RS), or if `ace_client_recipientid` equals `ace_server_recipientid` (and as a consequence the Sender and Recipient Keys derived would be equal, see Section 3.3 of [RFC8613]), then the client MUST stop the exchange, and MUST NOT derive the pairwise OSCORE Security Context. The Client MAY restart the exchange, to get the correct security input material.

The Client can use this pairwise OSCORE Security Context to send requests to the RS protected with OSCORE. Besides, the Client can use the Group OSCORE Security Context for protecting unicast requests to the RS, or multicast requests to the OSCORE group including also the RS. Mutual authentication as group members is only achieved after the client has successfully verified the Group OSCORE protected response from the RS. Similarly, mutual authentication as OSCORE peers is only achieved after the client has successfully verified the OSCORE protected response from the RS, using the pairwise OSCORE Security Context.

Note that the ID Context of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context can be assigned by the AS, communicated and set in both the RS and Client after the exchange specified in this profile is executed. Subsequently, the Client and RS can update their ID Context by running a mechanism such as the one defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] if they both support it and are configured to do so. In that case, the ID Context in the pairwise OSCORE Security Context will not match the "contextId" parameter of the corresponding OSCORE_Input_Material. Running the procedure in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] results in the keying material in the pairwise OSCORE Security Contexts of the Client and RS being updated. The Client can achieve the same result by re-posting the Access Token to the unprotected /authz-info endpoint at the RS, as described in Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], although without updating the ID Context.

A.3.4. OSCORE Setup - Resource Server Side

After validation of the Access Token as defined in Appendix A.3.2 and after sending the 2.01 (Created) response to an unprotected POST request to the /authz-info endpoint, the RS performs the following actions, in order to set up and fully derive the pairwise OSCORE Security Context created to communicate with the Client.
* The RS MUST set the ID Context of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context as the concatenation of: i) GID, i.e., the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group, as specified in the 'contextId' parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material, in the 'cnf' claim of the Access Token received from the Client (see Appendix A.3.1); ii) the nonce N1; iii) the nonce N2; and iv) CID which is the value in the contextId parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material provided in the 'cnf' claim of the Access Token. The concatenation occurs in this order: ID Context = GID | N1 | N2 | CID, where | denotes byte string concatenation.

* The RS MUST set the new Master Salt of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context as the concatenation of SaltInput, MSalt, the nonce N1, the nonce N2 and GMSalt, where: i) SaltInput is the Sender ID that the Client has in the OSCORE group, as specified in the 'salt_input' claim included in the Access Token received from the Client (see Appendix A.3.1); ii) MSalt is the (optional) Master Salt in the pairwise OSCORE Security Context as specified in the 'salt' parameter in the OSCORE_Input_Material of the 'cnf' claim, included in the Access Token received from the Client; and iii) GMSalt is the (optional) Master Salt in the Group OSCORE Security Context, which is known to the RS as a member of the OSCORE group. The concatenation occurs in this order: Master Salt = SaltInput | MSalt | N1 | N2 | GMSalt, where | denotes byte string concatenation. Optional values, if not specified, are not included in the concatenation. The same considerations for building the Master Salt, considering the inputs as encoded CBOR byte strings as in Figure 16, hold also for the RS.

* The RS MUST set the Master Secret of the pairwise OSCORE Security Context to the concatenation of MSec and GMSec, where: i) MSec is the value of the 'ms' parameter in the OSCORE_Input_Material of the 'cnf' claim, included in the Access Token received from the Client (see Appendix A.3.1); while ii) GMSec is the Master Secret of the Group OSCORE Security Context, which is known to the RS as a member of the OSCORE group.

* The RS MUST set the Recipient ID as ace_server_recipientid, sent as described in Appendix A.3.2.

* The RS MUST set the Sender ID as ace_client_recipientid, received as described in Appendix A.3.2.
* The RS MUST set the AEAD Algorithm, ID Context, HKDF, and OSCORE Version from the corresponding parameters received from the Client in the Access Token (see Appendix A.3.1), if present in the OSCORE_input_Material of the 'cnf' claim. In case these parameters are omitted, the default values SHALL be used as described in Sections 3.2 and 5.4 of [RFC8613].

Finally, the RS MUST derive the complete pairwise OSCORE Security Context following Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613].

Once having completed the derivation above, the RS MUST associate the authorization information from the Access Token with the just established pairwise OSCORE Security Context. Furthermore, as defined in Section 4.2, the RS MUST associate the authorization information from the Access Token with the Group OSCORE Security Context.

Then, the RS uses this pairwise OSCORE Security Context to verify requests from and send responses to the Client protected with OSCORE, when this Security Context is used. If OSCORE verification fails, error responses are used, as specified in Section 8 of [RFC8613].

Besides, the RS uses the Group OSCORE Security Context to verify (multicast) requests from and send responses to the Client protected with Group OSCORE. When processing an incoming request protected with Group OSCORE, the RS MUST consider as valid authentication credential of the Client only the authentication credential associated with the stored Access Token. As defined in Appendix A.3.6, a change of authentication credential in the group requires the Client to upload to the RS a new Access Token, where the 'client_cred' claim specifies a COSE Key equivalent to the new authentication credential that the Client has in the group.

If Group OSCORE verification fails, error responses are used, as specified in Sections 8 and 9 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. Additionally, for every incoming request, if OSCORE or Group OSCORE verification succeeds, the verification of access rights is performed as described in Appendix A.3.5.
After the deletion of the Access Token related to a pairwise OSCORE Security Context and to a Group OSCORE Security Context, due to, for example, expiration, the RS MUST NOT use the pairwise OSCORE Security Context. The RS MUST respond with an unprotected 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message to received requests that correspond to a pairwise OSCORE Security Context with a deleted Access Token. Also, if the Client uses the Group OSCORE Security Context to send a request for any resource intended for OSCORE group members and that requires an active Access Token, the RS MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message protected with the Group OSCORE Security Context.

The same considerations, related to the value of the ID Context changing, as in Appendix A.3.3 hold also for the RS.

A.3.5. Access Rights Verification

The RS MUST follow the procedures defined in Section 4.4.

Additionally, if the RS receives an OSCORE-protected request from a Client, the RS processes it according to [RFC8613].

If the OSCORE verification succeeds, and the target resource requires authorization, the RS retrieves the authorization information from the Access Token associated with the pairwise OSCORE Security Context and to the Group OSCORE Security Context. Then, the RS MUST verify that the action requested on the resource is authorized.

The response code MUST be 4.01 (Unauthorized) if the RS has no valid Access Token for the Client.

A.3.6. Change of Client’s Authentication Credential in the Group

During its membership in the OSCORE group, the client might change the authentication credential it uses in the group. When this happens, the Client uploads the new authentication credential to the Group Manager, as defined in Section 11 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

After that, the Client may still have an Access Token previously uploaded to the RS, which is not expired yet and still valid to the best of the Client’s knowledge. Then, in order to continue communicating with the RS, the Client MUST perform the following actions.

1. The Client requests a new Access Token to the AS, as defined in Appendix A.2.1 for the update of access rights, i.e., with the ‘req_cnf’ parameter including only a ‘kid’ field. In particular, when sending the POST request to the AS, the Client indicates:
* The current Group Identifier of the OSCORE group, as value of the 'context_id' parameter.

* The current Sender ID it has in the OSCORE group, as value of the 'salt_input' parameter.

* The public key of the new authentication credential it uses in the OSCORE group, as value of the 'client_cred' parameter. In particular, the specified public key is the COSE Key equivalent to the new authentication credential that the Client uses in the OSCORE group.

* The proof-of-possession (PoP) evidence corresponding to the public key of the new authentication credential, as value of the 'client_cred_verify' or 'client_cred_verify_mac' parameter.

* The same current or instead new set of access rights, as value of the 'scope' parameter.

2. After receiving the response from the AS (see Appendix A.2.2), the Client performs the same exchanges with the RS as defined in Appendix A.3, with the following difference: the POST request to /authz-info for uploading the new Access Token MUST be protected with the pairwise OSCORE Security Context shared with the RS.

When receiving the new Access Token, the RS performs the same steps defined in Appendix A.3.2. In particular, no new pairwise OSCORE Security Context is established between the Client and the RS.

A.4. Secure Communication with the AS

The same considerations for secure communication with the AS as defined in Section 5 hold.

A.5. Discarding the Security Context

The Client and the RS MUST follow what is defined in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] about discarding the pairwise OSCORE Security Context.

Additionally, they MUST follow what is defined in the main mode of the profile (see Section 6), with respect to the Group OSCORE Security Context.

The Client or RS can acquire a new Group OSCORE Security Context, by re-joining the OSCORE group, e.g., by using the approach defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. In such a case, the Client
SHOULD request a new Access Token and post it to the RS, in order to establish a new pairwise OSCORE Security Context and bind it to the Group OSCORE Security Context obtained upon re-joining the group.

A.6. CBOR Mappings

The new parameters defined in this document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 6, with the following addition, using the given integer abbreviation for the map key.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Value Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>client_cred</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>map</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 17: CBOR mappings for new parameters.

The new claims defined in this document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 7, with the following addition, using the given integer abbreviation for the map key.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Value Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>client_cred</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>map</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 18: CBOR mappings for new claims.

A.7. Security Considerations

The dual mode of this profile inherits the security considerations from the main mode (see Section 8), as well as from the security considerations of the OSCORE profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. Also, the security considerations about OSCORE [RFC8613] hold for the dual mode of this profile, as to the specific use of OSCORE.

Unlike the main mode and consistently with Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the dual mode of this profile cannot be used to issue an Access Token for an audience that comprises multiple RSs. This is because the proof-of-possession key bound to an Access Token is the OSCORE Master Secret included in the OSCORE_Input_Material object of the ‘cnf’ claim, and it has to be shared only between the Client and one RS.
A.8. Privacy Considerations

The same privacy considerations as defined in the main mode of this profile apply (see Section 9).

In addition, as this profile mode also uses OSCORE, the privacy considerations from [RFC8613] apply as well, as to the specific use of OSCORE.

Furthermore, this profile mode inherits the privacy considerations from the OSCORE profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].

Appendix B. Profile Requirements

This appendix lists the specifications on this profile based on the requirements of the ACE framework, as requested in Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

* (Optional) discovery process of how the Client finds the right AS for an RS it wants to send a request to: Not specified.

* Communication protocol the Client and the RS must use: CoAP.

* Security protocol(s) the Client and RS must use: Group OSCORE, i.e., exchange of secure messages by using a pre-established Group OSCORE Security Context. The optional dual mode defined in Appendix A additionally uses OSCORE, i.e., establishment of a pairwise OSCORE Security Context and exchange of secure messages.

* How the Client and the RS mutually authenticate: Explicitly, by possession of a common Group OSCORE Security Context, and by either: usage of digital signatures embedded in messages, if protected with the group mode of Group OSCORE; or protection of messages with the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE, by using pairwise symmetric keys, derived from the asymmetric keys of the two peers exchanging the message. Note that the mutual authentication is not completed before the Client has verified an OSCORE or a Group OSCORE response using the corresponding security context.

* Content-format of the protocol messages: "application/ace+cbor".

* Proof-of-Possession protocol(s) and how to select one; which key types (e.g., symmetric/asymmetric) supported: Group OSCORE algorithms; distributed and verified asymmetric keys. In the optional dual mode defined in Appendix A: OSCORE algorithms; pre-established symmetric keys.

* profile identifier: coap_group_oscore
* (Optional) how the RS talks to the AS for introspection: HTTP/CoAP (+ TLS/DTLS/OSCORE).

* How the client talks to the AS for requesting a token: HTTP/CoAP (+ TLS/DTLS/OSCORE).

* How/if the authz-info endpoint is protected: Not protected.

* (Optional) other methods of token transport than the authz-info endpoint: Not specified.

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Admin Interface for the OSCORE Group Manager

draft-tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-admin-02

Abstract

Group communication for CoAP can be secured using Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE). A Group Manager is responsible to handle the joining of new group members, as well as to manage and distribute the group key material. This document defines a RESTful admin interface at the Group Manager, that allows an Administrator entity to create and delete OSCORE groups, as well as to retrieve and update their configuration. The ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization is used to enforce authentication and authorization of the Administrator at the Group Manager. Protocol-specific transport profiles of ACE are used to achieve communication security, proof-of-possession and server authentication.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.
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1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] can be used in group communication environments where messages are also exchanged over IP multicast [I-D.dijk-core-groupcomm-bis]. Applications relying on CoAP can achieve end-to-end security at the application layer by using Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613], and especially Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] in group communication scenarios.

When group communication for CoAP is protected with Group OSCORE, nodes are required to explicitly join the correct OSCORE group. To this end, a joining node interacts with a Group Manager (GM) entity responsible for that group, and retrieves the required key material to securely communicate with other group members using Group OSCORE.

The method in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] specifies how nodes can join an OSCORE group through the respective Group Manager. Such a method builds on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], so ensuring a secure joining process as well as authentication and authorization of joining nodes (clients) at the Group Manager (resource server).

In some deployments, the application running on the Group Manager may know when a new OSCORE group has to be created, as well as how it should be configured and later on updated or deleted, e.g. based on the current application state or on pre-installed policies. In this case, the Group Manager application can create and configure OSCORE groups when needed, by using a local application interface. However, this requires the Group Manager to be application-specific, which in turn leads to error prone deployments and is poorly flexible.

In other deployments, a separate Administrator entity, such as a Commissioning Tool, is directly responsible for creating and configuring the OSCORE groups at a Group Manager, as well as for maintaining them during their whole lifetime until their deletion. This allows the Group Manager to be agnostic of the specific applications using secure group communication.

This document specifies a RESTful admin interface at the Group Manager, intended for an Administrator, as a separate entity external to the Group Manager and its application. The interface allows the Administrator to create and delete OSCORE groups, as well as to configure and update their configuration.

Interaction examples are provided, in Link Format [RFC6690] and CBOR [RFC7049], as well as in CoRAL [I-D.ietf-core-coral]. While all the CoRAL examples use the CoRAL textual serialization format, the CBOR
or JSON [RFC8259] binary serialization format is used when sending such messages on the wire.

The ACE framework is used to ensure authentication and authorization of the Administrator (client) at the Group Manager (resource server). In order to achieve communication security, proof-of-possession and server authentication, the Administrator and the Group Manager leverage protocol-specific transport profiles of ACE, such as [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile][I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. These include also possible forthcoming transport profiles that comply with the requirements in Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to CBOR [RFC7049] and COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], the CoAP protocol [RFC7252], as well as the protection and processing of CoAP messages using OSCORE [RFC8613], also in group communication scenarios using Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. These include the concept of Group Manager, as the entity responsible for a set of groups where communications among members are secured using Group OSCORE.

Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to the management of keying material for groups in ACE defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], and in particular to the joining process for OSCORE groups defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. These include the concept of group-membership resource hosted by the Group Manager, that new members access to join the OSCORE group, while current members can access to retrieve updated keying material.

Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in the ACE framework for authentication and authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The terminology for entities in the considered architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. In particular, this includes Client (C), Resource Server (RS), and Authorization Server (AS).

Note that, unless otherwise indicated, the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition, aimed at denoting resources such
as /token and /introspect at the AS, and /authz-info at the RS. This
document does not use the CoAP definition of "endpoint", which is "An
entity participating in the CoAP protocol".

This document also refers to the following terminology.

- **Administrator**: entity responsible to create, configure and delete
  OSCORE groups at a Group Manager.

- **Group name**: stable and invariant name of an OSCORE group. The
group name MUST be unique under the same Group Manager, and MUST
include only characters that are valid for a URI path segment,
namely unreserved and pct-encoded characters [RFC3986].

- **Group-collection resource**: a single-instance resource hosted by
  the Group Manager. An Administrator accesses a group-collection
  resource to create a new OSCORE group, or to retrieve the list of
  existing OSCORE groups, under that Group Manager. As an example,
  this document uses /manage as the url-path of the group-collection
  resource; implementations are not required to use this name, and
can define their own instead.

- **Group-configuration resource**: a resource hosted by the Group
  Manager, associated to an OSCORE group under that Group Manager.
  A group-configuration resource is identifiable with the invariant
  group name of the respective group. An Administrator accesses a
  group-configuration resource to retrieve or update the
  configuration of the respective OSCORE group, or to delete that
  group. The url-path to a group-configuration resource has NAME as
  last segment, with NAME the invariant group name assigned upon its
  creation. Building on the considered url-path of the group-
  collection resource, this document uses /manage/NAME as the url-
  path of a group-configuration resource; implementations are not
  required to use this name, and can define their own instead.

- **Admin endpoint**: an endpoint at the Group Manager associated to the
  group-collection resource or to a group-configuration resource
  hosted by that Group Manager.

2. Group Administration

With reference to the ACE framework and the terminology defined in
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]:

- The Group Manager acts as Resource Server (RS). It provides one
  single group-collection resource, and one group-configuration
  resource per existing OSCORE group. Each of those is exported by
  a distinct admin endpoint.
The Administrator acts as Client (C), and requests to access the group-collection resource and group-configuration resources, by accessing the respective admin endpoint at the Group Manager.

The Authorization Server (AS) authorizes the Administrator to access the group-collection resource and group-configuration resources at a Group Manager. Multiple Group Managers can be associated to the same AS. The AS MAY release Access Tokens to the Administrator for other purposes than accessing admin endpoints of registered Group Managers.

2.1. Getting Access to the Group Manager

All communications between the involved entities rely on the CoAP protocol and MUST be secured.

In particular, communications between the Administrator and the Group Manager leverage protocol-specific transport profiles of ACE to achieve communication security, proof-of-possession and server authentication. To this end, the AS may explicitly signal the specific transport profile to use, consistently with requirements and assumptions defined in the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

With reference to the AS, communications between the Administrator and the AS (/token endpoint) as well as between the Group Manager and the AS (/introspect endpoint) can be secured by different means, for instance using DTLS [RFC6347] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] or OSCORE [RFC8613]. Further details on how the AS secures communications (with the Administrator and the Group Manager) depend on the specifically used transport profile of ACE, and are out of the scope of this specification.

In order to get access to the Group Manager for managing OSCORE groups, an Administrator performs the following steps.

1. The Administrator requests an Access Token from the AS, in order to access the group-collection and group-configuration resources on the Group Manager. The Administrator will start or continue using secure communications with the Group Manager, according to the response from the AS.

2. The Administrator transfers authentication and authorization information to the Group Manager by posting the obtained Access Token, according to the used profile of ACE, such as [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. After that, the Administrator must have secure communication established with the Group Manager, before performing any admin operation on that Group Manager. Possible ways to provide secure
Communication are DTLS [RFC6347][I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] and OSCORE [RFC8613]. The Administrator and the Group Manager maintain the secure association, to support possible future communications.

3. The Administrator performs admin operations at the Group Manager, as described in the following sections. These include the retrieval of the existing OSCORE groups, the creation of new OSCORE groups, the update and retrieval of group configurations, and the removal of OSCORE groups. Messages exchanged among the Administrator and the Group Manager are specified in Section 2.6.

2.2. Managing OSCORE Groups

Figure 1 shows the resources of a Group Manager available to an Administrator.

```
Group    /   \\                      \   \\                     \   \                         \   \  ...  \   \                         \   \        Group
Collection  (__)                     (__)       (__)                   (__)        Configurations
```

Figure 1: Resources of a Group Manager

The Group Manager exports a single group-collection resource. The full interface for the group-collection resource allows the Administrator to:

- Retrieve the list of existing OSCORE groups, possibly by filters.
- Create a new OSCORE group, specifying its invariant group name and, optionally, its configuration.

The Group Manager exports one group-configuration resource for each of its OSCORE groups. Each group-configuration resource is identified by the group name specified upon creating the group. The full interface for a group-configuration resource allows the Administrator to:

- Retrieve the current configuration of the OSCORE group.
- Update the current configuration of the OSCORE group.
- Delete the OSCORE group.
2.3. Group Configurations

A group configuration consists of a set of parameters.

2.3.1. Group Configuration Representation

The group configuration representation is a CBOR map which MUST include configuration properties and status properties.

2.3.1.1. Configuration Properties

The CBOR map MUST include the following configuration parameters:

- `hkdf`, defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the HKDF algorithm used in the OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string. Possible values are the same ones admitted for the `hkdf` parameter of the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry, defined in Section 3.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].

- `alg`, defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the AEAD algorithm used in the OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string. Possible values are the same ones admitted for the `alg` parameter of the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry, defined in Section 3.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].

- `cs_alg`, defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the countersignature algorithm used in the OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string or integer. Possible values are the same ones admitted for the `cs_alg` parameter of the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry, defined in Section 6.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

- `cs_params`, defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the additional parameters for the countersignature algorithm used in the OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR array. Possible formats and values are the same ones admitted for the `cs_params` parameter of the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry, defined in Section 6.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

- `cs_key_params`, defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the additional parameters for the key used with the countersignature algorithm in the OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR array. Possible formats and values are the same ones admitted for the `cs_key_params` parameter of the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry, defined in Section 6.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].
o 'cs_key_enc', defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the encoding of the public keys of group members, encoded as a CBOR integer. Possible values are the same ones admitted for the 'cs_key_enc' parameter of the "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry, defined in Section 6.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

2.3.1.2. Status Properties

The CBOR map MUST include the following status parameters:

- 'active', encoding the CBOR simple value True if the group is currently active, or the CBOR simple value False otherwise. This parameter is defined in Section 4.1 of this specification.

- 'group_name', with value the group name of the OSCORE group encoded as a CBOR text string. This parameter is defined in Section 4.1 of this specification.

- 'group_title', with value either a human-readable description of the group encoded as a CBOR text string, or the CBOR simple value Null if no description is specified. This parameter is defined in Section 4.1 of this specification.

- 'ace-groupcomm-profile', defined in Section 4.1.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], with value "coap_group_oscore_app".

- 'exp', defined in Section 4.1.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].

- 'joining_uri', with value the URI of the group-membership resource for joining the newly created OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string. This parameter is defined in Section 4.1 of this specification.

The CBOR map MAY include the following status parameters:

- 'group_policies', defined in Section 4.1.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm], and consistent with the format and content defined in Section 6.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

- 'as_uri', defined in Section 4.1 of this document, specifies the URI of the Authorization Server associated to the Group Manager for the OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string. Candidate group members will have to obtain an Access Token from that Authorization Server, before starting the joining process with the Group Manager to join the OSCORE group (see [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]).
2.3.2. Default Values

This section defines the default values that the Group Manager assumes for configuration and status parameters.

2.3.2.1. Configuration Parameters

For each configuration parameter, the Group Manager MUST assume a pre-configured default value, if none is specified by the Administrator.

In particular, the Group Manager SHOULD use the same default values defined in Section 18 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

2.3.2.2. Status Parameters

For the following status parameters, the Group Manager MUST assume a pre-configured default value, if none is specified by the Administrator.

- For ‘active’, the CBOR simple value False.
- For ‘group_title’, the CBOR simple value Null.

2.4. Discovery

The Administrator can discover the group-collection resource from a resource directory, for instance [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] and [I-D.hartke-t2trg-coral-reef], or from .well-known/core, by using the resource type "ace.oscore.gm" defined in Section 4.2 of this specification.

The Administrator can discover group-configuration resources for the group-collection resource as specified below in Section 2.6.1 and Section 2.6.2.

2.5. Collection Representation

A list of group configurations is represented as a document containing the corresponding group-configuration resources in the list. Each group-configuration is represented as a link, where the link target is the URI of the group-configuration resource.

The list can be represented as a Link Format document [RFC6690] or a CoRAL document [I-D.ietf-core-coral]. In the latter case, the CoRAL document contains the group-configuration resources in the list as top-level elements. In particular, the link to each group-
configuration resource has http://coreapps.org/ace.oscore.gm#item as relation type.

2.6. Interactions

This section describes the operations available on the group-collection resource and the group-configuration resources.

When custom CBOR is used, the Content-Format in messages containing a payload is set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor, defined in Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]. Furthermore, the entry labels defined in Section 4.1 MUST be used, when specifying the corresponding configuration and status parameters.

2.6.1. Get All Groups Configurations

The Administrator can send a GET request to the group-collection resource, in order to retrieve the list of the existing OSCORE groups at the Group Manager. This is returned as a list of links to the corresponding group-configuration resources.

Example in Link Format:

=> 0.01 GET
   Uri-Path: manage

<= 2.05 Content
   Content-Format: 40 (application/link-format)

   <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/manage/gp1>,
   <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/manage/gp2>,
   <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/manage/gp3>

Example in CoRAL:

=> 0.01 GET
   Uri-Path: manage

<= 2.05 Content
   Content-Format: TBD1 (application/coral+cbor)

   #using <http://coreapps.org/ace.oscore.gm#>
   #base </manage/>
   item <gp1>
   item <gp2>
   item <gp3>
2.6.2. Fetch Group Configurations By Filters

The Administrator can send a FETCH request to the group-collection resource, in order to retrieve the list of the existing OSCORE groups at the Group Manager that fully match a set of specified filter criteria. This is returned as a list of links to the corresponding group-configuration resources.

The set of filter criteria is specified in the request payload as a CBOR map, where possible entry labels are all the ones used for configuration properties (see Section 2.3.1.1), as well as "group_name" and "active" for the corresponding status property (see Section 2.3.1.2).

Entry values are the ones admitted for the corresponding labels in the POST request for creating a group configuration (see Section 2.6.3). A valid request MUST NOT include the same entry multiple times.

Example in custom CBOR and Link Format:

```
=> 0.05 FETCH
    Uri-Path: manage
    Content-Format: TBD2 (application/ace-groupcomm+cbor)

    {
        "alg" : 10,
        "hkdf" : 5
    }

<= 2.05 Content
    Content-Format: 40 (application/link-format)

    <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/manage/gp1>,
    <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/manage/gp2>,
    <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/manage/gp3>
```

Example in CoRAL:
2.6.3. Create a New Group Configuration

The Administrator can send a POST request to the group-collection resource, in order to create a new OSCORE group at the Group Manager. The request MAY specify the intended group name NAME and group title, and MAY specify pieces of information concerning the group configuration.

The request payload is a CBOR map, whose possible entries are specified in Section 2.3.1. In particular:

- The CBOR map MAY include any of the configuration parameter defined in Section 2.3.1.1.

- The CBOR map MAY include any of the status parameter 'group_name', 'group_title', 'exp', 'group_policies', 'as_uri' and 'active' defined in Section 2.3.1.2.

- The CBOR map MUST NOT include any of the status parameter 'ace-groupcomm-profile' and 'joining_uri' defined in Section 2.3.1.2.

If any of the following occurs, the Group Manager MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) response, which MAY include additional information to clarify what went wrong.

- Any of the received parameters is specified multiple times.

- Any of the received parameters is not recognized, or not valid, or not consistent with respect to other related parameters.

- The 'group_name' parameter specifies the group name of an already existing OSCORE group.
The Group Manager does not trust the Authorization Server with URI specified in the ‘as_uri’ parameter, and has no alternative Authorization Server to consider for the OSCORE group to create.

After a successful processing of the request above, the Group Manager performs the following actions.

First, the Group Manager creates a new group-configuration resource, accessible to the administrator at /manage/NAME, where NAME is the group name as either indicated in the parameter ‘group_name’ of the request or uniquely assigned by the Group Manager. The values specified in the request are used as group configuration information for the newly created OSCORE group. For each configuration parameter not specified in the request, the Group Manager MUST assume the default value specified in Section 2.3.2.

After that, the Group Manager creates a new group-membership resource, accessible to joining nodes and future group members at group-oscore/NAME, as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. In particular, the Group Manager will rely on the current group configuration to build the Joining Response message defined in Section 5.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], when handling the joining of a new group member. Furthermore, the Group Manager generates the following pieces of information, and assigns them to the newly created OSCORE group:

- The OSCORE Master Secret.
- The OSCORE Master Salt (optionally).
- The OSCORE ID Context, acting as Group ID, which MUST be unique within the set of OSCORE groups under the Group Manager.

Finally, the Group Manager replies to the Administrator with a 2.01 (Created) response. The Location-Path option MUST be included in the response, indicating the location of the just created group-configuration resource. The response MUST NOT include a Location-Query option. The response payload is a CBOR map, which MUST include the following parameters:

- ‘group_name’, with value the group name of the OSCORE group encoded as a CBOR text string. This value can be different from the group name possibly specified by the Administrator in the POST request, and reflects the final choice of the Group Manager as ‘group_name’ status property for the OSCORE group.
o ‘joining_uri’, with value the URI of the group-membership resource for joining the newly created OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string.

o ‘as_uri’, with value the URI of the Authorization Server associated to the Group Manager for the newly created OSCORE group, encoded as a CBOR text string. This value can be different from the URI possibly specified by the Administrator in the POST request, and reflects the final choice of the Group Manager as ‘as_uri’ status property for the OSCORE group.

At this point, the Group Manager can register the link to the group-membership resource with URI specified in ‘joining_uri’ to the CoRE Resource Directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], as defined in Section 2 of [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery].

Alternatively, the Administrator can perform the registration to the Resource Directory on behalf of the Group Manager, acting as Commissioning Tool. The Administrator considers the following when specifying additional information for the link to register.

o The name of the OSCORE group MUST take the value specified in ‘group_name’ from the 2.01 (Created) response above.

o If present, parameters describing the cryptographic algorithms used in the group MUST follow the values that the Administrator specified in the POST request above, or the corresponding default values specified in Section 2.3.2.1 otherwise.

o If also registering a related link to the Authorization Server associated to the OSCORE group, the related link MUST have the URI specified in ‘as_uri’ from the 2.01 (Created) response above.

Example in custom CBOR:
=> 0.02 POST
   Uri-Path: manage
   Content-Format: TBD2 (application/ace-groupcomm+cbor)

   {
      "alg" : 10,
      "hkdf" : 5,
      "active" : True,
      "group_title" : "rooms 1 and 2",
      "as_uri" : "coap://as.example.com/token"
   }

<= 2.01 Created
   Location-Path: manage
   Location-Path: gp4
   Content-Format: TBD2 (application/ace-groupcomm+cbor)

   {
      "group_name" : "gp4",
      "joining_uri" : "coap://[2001:db8::ab]/group-oscore/gp4/",
      "as_uri" : "coap://as.example.com/token"
   }

Example in CoRAL:

=> 0.02 POST
   Uri-Path: manage
   Content-Format: TBD1 (application/coral+cbor)

   #using <http://coreapps.org/ace.oscore.gm#>
   alg 10
   hkdf 5
   active True
   group_title "rooms 1 and 2"
   as_uri <coap://as.example.com/token>

<= 2.01 Created
   Location-Path: manage
   Location-Path: gp4
   Content-Format: TBD1 (application/coral+cbor)

   #using <http://coreapps.org/ace.oscore.gm#>
   group_name "gp4"
   joining_uri <coap://[2001:db8::ab]/group-oscore/gp4/>
   as_uri <coap://as.example.com/token>
2.6.4. Retrieve a Group Configuration

The Administrator can send a GET request to the group-configuration resource manage/NAME associated to an OSCORE group with group name NAME, in order to retrieve the current configuration of that group.

After a successful processing of the request above, the Group Manager replies to the Administrator with a 2.05 (Content) response. The response has as payload the representation of the group configuration as specified in Section 2.3.1. The exact content of the payload reflects the current configuration of the OSCORE group. This includes both configuration properties and status properties.

Example in custom CBOR:

```plaintext
=> 0.01 GET
   Uri-Path: manage
   Uri-Path: gp4

<= 2.05 Content
   Content-Format: TBD2 (application/ace-groupcomm+cbor)

{
   "alg" : 10,
   "hkdf" : 5,
   "cs_alg" : -8,
   "cs_params" : [[1], [1, 6]],
   "cs_key_params" : [1, 6],
   "cs_key_enc" : 1,
   "active" : True,
   "group_name" : "gp4",
   "group_title" : "rooms 1 and 2",
   "ace-groupcomm-profile" : "coap_group_oscore_app",
   "exp" : "1360289224",
   "joining_uri" : "coap://[2001:db8::ab]/group-oscore/gp4/",
   "as_uri" : "coap://as.example.com/token"
}
```

Example in CoRAL:
2.6.5. Update a Group Configuration

The Administrator can send a PUT request to the group-configuration resource associated to an OSCORE group, in order to update the current configuration of that group. The payload of the request has the same format of the POST request defined in Section 2.6.3, with the exception of the status parameter 'group_name' that MUST NOT be included.

The error handling for the PUT request is the same as for the POST request defined in Section 2.6.3. If no error occurs, the Group Manager performs the following actions.

First, the Group Manager updates the configuration of the OSCORE group, consistently with the values indicated in the PUT request from the Administrator. For each configuration parameter not specified in the PUT request, the Group Manager MUST use the default value specified in Section 2.3.2. From then on, the Group Manager relies on the latest update configuration to build the Joining Response message defined in Section 5.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], when handling the joining of a new group member.
Then, the Group Manager replies to the Administrator with a 2.04 (Changed) response. The payload of the response has the same format of the 2.01 (Created) response defined in Section 2.6.3.

If the link to the group-membership resource was registered in the Resource Directory (see [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]), the GM is responsible to refresh the registration, as defined in Section 3 of [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery].

Alternatively, the Administrator can update the registration to the Resource Directory on behalf of the Group Manager, acting as Commissioning Tool. The Administrator considers the following when specifying additional information for the link to update.

- The name of the OSCORE group MUST take the value specified in 'group_name' from the 2.04 (Changed) response above.
- If present, parameters describing the cryptographic algorithms used in the group MUST follow the values that the Administrator specified in the POST request above, or the corresponding default values specified in Section 2.3.2.1 otherwise.
- If also registering a related link to the Authorization Server associated to the OSCORE group, the related link MUST have the URI specified in 'as_uri' from the 2.04 (Changed) response above.

Example in custom CBOR:

=> PUT
    Uri-Path: manage
    Uri-Path: gp4
    Content-Format: TBD2 (application/ace-groupcomm+cbor)

    {  
      "alg" : 11 ,  
      "hkdf" : 5  
    }  

<= 2.04 Changed
    Content-Format: TBD2 (application/ace-groupcomm+cbor)

    {  
      "group_name" : "gp4",  
      "joining_uri" : "coap://[2001:db8::ab]/group-oscore/gp4/",  
      "as_uri" : "coap://as.example.com/token"  
    }

Example in CoRAL:
2.6.5.1. Effects on Joining Nodes

If the value of the status parameter ‘active’ is changed from True to False, the Group Manager MUST stop admitting new members in the group. In particular, upon receiving a Joining Request (see Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]), the Group Manager MUST respond with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response to the joining node, and MAY include additional information to clarify what went wrong.

If the value of the status parameter ‘active’ is changed from False to True, the Group Manager resumes admitting new members in the group, by processing their Joining Requests (see Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]).

2.6.5.2. Effects on the Group Members

After having updated a group configuration, the Group Manager informs the group members, over the pairwise secure communication channels established when joining the OSCORE group (see Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]).

To this end, the Group Manager can individually target the ‘control_path’ URI path of each group member (see Section 4.1.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]), if provided by the intended recipient upon joining the group (see Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]). Alternatively, group members can subscribe for updates to the group-membership resource of the OSCORE group, e.g. by using CoAP Observe [RFC7641].
Every group member, upon learning that the group has been deactivated (i.e. ‘active’ has value False), SHOULD stop communicating in the OSCORE group.

Every group member, upon learning that the group has been reactivated (i.e. ‘active’ has value True again), can resume communicating in the OSCORE group.

Every group member, upon receiving updated values for ‘alg’ and ‘hkdf’, MUST either:

- Leave the group (see Section 14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]), e.g. if not supporting the indicated new algorithms; or
- Use the new parameter values, and accordingly re-derive the OSCORE Security Context for the group (see Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

Every group member, upon receiving updated values for ‘cs_alg’, ‘cs_params’, ‘cs_key_params’ and ‘cs_key_enc’, MUST either:

- Leave the group, e.g. if not supporting the indicated new algorithm, parameters and encoding; or
- Leave the group and rejoin it (see Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]), providing the Group Manager with a public key which is compatible with the indicated new algorithm, parameters and encoding; or
- Use the new parameter values, and, if required, provide the Group Manager with a new public key to use in the group, as compatible with the indicated parameters (see Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]).

### 2.6.6. Delete a Group Configuration

The Administrator can send a DELETE request to the group-configuration resource, in order to delete that group. A group deletion would be successful only on an inactive group.

That is, the DELETE request actually yields a successful deletion of the group, only if the corresponding status parameter ‘active’ has current value False. The administrator can ensure that, by first performing an update of the group-configuration resource associated to the group (see Section 2.6.5), and setting the corresponding status parameter ‘active’ to False.
If, upon receiving the DELETE request, the current value of the status parameter 'active' is True, the Group Manager MUST respond with a 4.09 (Conflict) response, which MAY include additional information to clarify what went wrong.

After a successful processing of the request above, the Group Manager performs the following actions.

First, the Group Manager deletes the OSCORE group and deallocates both the group-configuration resource as well as the group-membership resource.

Then, the Group Manager replies to the Administrator with a 2.02 (Deleted) response.

Example:

=> DELETE
   Uri-Path: manage
   Uri-Path: gp4

<= 2.02 Deleted

2.6.6.1. Effects on the Group Members

After having deleted a group, the Group Manager can inform the group members by means of the following two methods. When contacting a group member, the Group Manager uses the pairwise secure communication channel established with that member during its joining process (see Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]).

- The Group Manager sends an individual request message to each group member, targeting the respective resource used to perform the group rekeying process (see Section 16 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]). The Group Manager uses the same format of the Joining Response message in Section 5.4 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], where only the parameters 'gktY', 'key', and 'ace-groupcomm-profile' are present, and the 'key' parameter is empty.

- A group member may subscribe for updates to the group-membership resource of the group. In particular, if this relies on CoAP Observe [RFC7641], a group member would receive a 4.04 (Not Found) notification response from the Group Manager, since the group-configuration resource has been deallocated upon deleting the group.
When being informed about the group deletion, a group member deletes the OSCORE Security Context that it stores as associated to that group, and possibly deallocates any dedicated control resource intended for the Group Manager that it has for that group.

3. Security Considerations

Security considerations are inherited from the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], and from the specific transport ace-groupcomm-profile of ACE used between the Administrator and the Group Manager, such as [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].

4. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

4.1. ACE Groupcomm Parameters Registry

IANA is asked to register the following entries in the "ACE Groupcomm Parameters" Registry defined in Section 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>CBOR Type</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hkdf</td>
<td>TBD3</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alg</td>
<td>TBD4</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cs_algo</td>
<td>TBD5</td>
<td>tstr / int</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cs_params</td>
<td>TBD6</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cs_key_params</td>
<td>TBD7</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cs_key_enc</td>
<td>TBD8</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active</td>
<td>TBD9</td>
<td>simple type</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group_name</td>
<td>TBD10</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group_title</td>
<td>TBD11</td>
<td>tstr / simple type</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>joining_uri</td>
<td>TBD12</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as_uri</td>
<td>TBD13</td>
<td>tstr</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. Resource Types

IANA is asked to enter the following value into the Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values subregistry within the Constrained Restful Environments (CoRE) Parameters registry defined in [RFC6690].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ace.oscore.gm</td>
<td>Group-collection resource of an OSCORE Group Manager</td>
<td>[[this document]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. References

5.1. Normative References

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[COSE.Elliptic.Curves]
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[COSE.Key.Types]
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[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]

[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]

[I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery]

[RFC6347]
Acknowledgments

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Notification of Revoked Access Tokens in the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework
draft-tiloca-ace-revoked-token-notification-06

Abstract

This document specifies a method of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework, which allows an Authorization Server to notify Clients and Resource Servers (i.e., registered devices) about revoked Access Tokens. The method relies on resource observation for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), with Clients and Resource Servers observing a Token Revocation List on the Authorization Server. Resulting unsolicited notifications of revoked Access Tokens complement alternative approaches such as token introspection, while not requiring additional endpoints on Clients and Resource Servers.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (ace@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://gitlab.com/crimson84/draft-tiloca-ace-revoked-token-notification.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] is a framework that enforces access control on IoT devices acting as Resource Servers. In order to use ACE, both Clients and Resource Servers have to register with an Authorization Server and become a registered device. Once registered, a Client can send a request to the Authorization Server, to obtain an Access Token for a Resource Server. For a Client to access the Resource Server, the Client must present the issued Access Token at the Resource Server, which then validates it before storing it (see Section 5.10.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

Even though Access Tokens have expiration times, there are circumstances by which an Access Token may need to be revoked before its expiration time, such as: (1) a registered device has been compromised, or is suspected of being compromised; (2) a registered device is decommissioned; (3) there has been a change in the ACE profile for a registered device; (4) there has been a change in access policies for a registered device; and (5) there has been a change in the outcome of policy evaluation for a registered device (e.g., if policy assessment depends on dynamic conditions in the execution environment, the user context, or the resource utilization).

As discussed in Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], only client-initiated revocation is currently specified [RFC7009] for OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], based on the assumption that Access Tokens in OAuth are issued with a relatively short lifetime. However, this is not expected to be the case for constrained, intermittently connected devices, that need Access Tokens with relatively long lifetimes.
This document specifies a method for allowing registered devices to access and possibly subscribe to a Token Revocation List (TRL) resource on the Authorization Server, in order to get an updated list of revoked, but yet not expired, pertaining Access Tokens. In particular, registered devices can subscribe to the TRL at the Authorization Server by using resource observation [RFC7641] for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

Unlike in the case of token introspection (see Section 5.9 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), a registered device does not provide an owned Access Token to the Authorization Server for inquiring about its current state. Instead, registered devices simply obtain an updated list of revoked, but yet not expired, pertaining Access Tokens, as efficiently identified by corresponding hash values.

In fact, the benefits of this method are that it complements token introspection, and it does not require any additional endpoints on the registered devices. The only additional requirements for registered devices are a request/response interaction with the Authorization Server to access and possibly subscribe to the TRL (see Section 2), and the lightweight computation of hash values as Token identifiers (see Section 3).

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], as well as with terms and concepts related to CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) [RFC8392], and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [RFC7519]. The terminology for entities in the considered architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. In particular, this includes Client, Resource Server, and Authorization Server.

Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to CBOR [RFC8949], JSON [RFC8259], the CoAP protocol [RFC7252], CoAP Observe [RFC7641], and the use of hash functions to name objects as defined in [RFC6920].
Note that, unless otherwise indicated, the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition, aimed at denoting resources such as /token and /introspect at the Authorization Server, and /authz-info at the Resource Server. This document does not use the CoAP definition of "endpoint", which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol."

This specification also refers to the following terminology.

* Token hash: identifier of an Access Token, in binary format encoding. The token hash has no relation to other possibly used token identifiers, such as the "cti" (CWT ID) claim of CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) [RFC8392].

* Token Revocation List (TRL): a collection of token hashes, in which the corresponding Access Tokens have been revoked but are not expired yet.

* TRL resource: a resource on the Authorization Server, with a TRL as its representation.

* TRL endpoint: an endpoint at the Authorization Server associated to the TRL resource. The default name of the TRL endpoint in a uri-path is '/revoke/trl'. Implementations are not required to use this name, and can define their own instead.

* Registered device: a device registered at the Authorization Server, i.e., as a Client, or a Resource Server, or both. A registered device acts as caller of the TRL endpoint.

* Administrator: entity authorized to get full access to the TRL at the Authorization Server, and acting as caller of the TRL endpoint. An administrator is not necessarily a registered device as defined above, i.e., a Client requesting Access Tokens or a Resource Server consuming Access Tokens. How the administrator authorization is established and verified is out of the scope of this specification.

* Pertaining Access Token:
  - With reference to an administrator, an Access Token issued by the Authorization Server.
With reference to a registered device, an Access Token intended to be owned by that device. An Access Token pertains to a Client if the Authorization Server has issued the Access Token and provided it to that Client. An Access Token pertains to a Resource Server if the Authorization Server has issued the Access Token to be consumed by that Resource Server.

2. Protocol Overview

This protocol defines how a CoAP-based Authorization Server informs Clients and Resource Servers, i.e., registered devices, about pertaining revoked Access Tokens. How the relationship between the registered device and the Authorization Server is established is out of the scope of this specification.

At a high level, the steps of this protocol are as follows.

* Upon startup, the Authorization Server creates a single TRL resource. At any point in time, the TRL resource represents the list of all revoked Access Tokens issued by the Authorization Server that are not expired yet.

* When a device registers at the Authorization Server, it receives the url-path to the TRL resource.

After the registration procedure is finished, the registered device sends an Observation Request to that TRL resource as described in [RFC7641], i.e., a GET request with an Observe option set to 0 (register). By doing so, the registered device effectively subscribes to the TRL resource, as interested to receive notifications about its update. Upon receiving the request, the Authorization Server adds the registered device to the list of observers of the TRL resource.

At any time, the registered device can send a GET request to the TRL endpoint. When doing so, it can request for: the current list of pertaining revoked Access Tokens (see Section 5.1); or the most recent TRL updates occurred over the list of pertaining revoked Access Tokens (see Section 5.2). In either case, the registered device may especially rely on an Observation Request for subscribing to the TRL resource as discussed above.

* When an Access Token is revoked, the Authorization Server adds the corresponding token hash to the TRL. Also, when a revoked Access Token eventually expires, the Authorization Server removes the corresponding token hash from the TRL.
In either case, after updating the TRL, the Authorization Server sends Observe Notifications as per [RFC7641]. That is, an Observe Notification is sent to each registered device subscribed to the TRL resource and to which the Access Token pertains.

Depending on the specific subscription established through the observation request, the notification provides the current updated list of revoked Access Tokens in the portion of the TRL pertaining to that device (see Section 5.1), or rather the most recent TRL updates occurred over that list of pertaining revoked Access Tokens (see Section 5.2).

Further Observe Notifications may be sent, consistently with ongoing additional observations of the TRL resource.

* An administrator can access and subscribe to the TRL like a registered device, while getting the full updated representation of the TRL.

Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of the service provided by this protocol. In particular, it shows the Observe Notifications sent by the Authorization Server to one administrator and four registered devices, upon revocation of the issued Access Tokens t1, t2 and t3, with token hash th1, th2 and th3, respectively. Each dotted line associated to a pair of registered devices indicates the Access Token that they both own.

Figure 1: Protocol Overview
Section 8 provides examples of the protocol flow and message exchange between the Authorization Server and a registered device.

3. Token Hash

The token hash of an Access Token is computed as follows.

1. The Authorization Server defines ENCODED_TOKEN, as the content of the 'access_token' parameter in the Authorization Server response (see Section 5.8.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), where the Access Token was included and provided to the requesting Client.

   Note that the content of the 'access_token' parameter is either:

   * A CBOR byte string, if the Access Token was transported using CBOR. With reference to the example in Figure 2, and assuming the string’s length in bytes to be 119 (i.e., 0x77 in hexadecimal), then ENCODED_TOKEN takes the bytes {0x58 0x77 0xd0 0x83 0x44 0xa1 ...}, i.e., the raw content of the parameter 'access_token'.

   * A text string, if the Access Token was transported using JSON. With reference to the example in Figure 3, ENCODED_TOKEN takes "2YotnFZFEjrlzCsicMWpAA", i.e., the raw content of the parameter 'access_token'.

2. The Authorization Server defines HASH_INPUT as follows.

   * If CBOR was used to transport the Access Token (as a CWT or JWT), HASH_INPUT takes the same value of ENCODED_TOKEN.

   * If JSON was used to transport the Access Token (as a CWT or JWT), HASH_INPUT takes the serialization of ENCODED_TOKEN.

   In either case, HASH_INPUT results in the binary representation of the content of the 'access_token' parameter from the Authorization Server response.

3. The Authorization Server generates a hash value of HASH_INPUT as per Section 6 of [RFC6920]. The resulting output in binary format is used as the token hash. Note that the used binary format embeds the identifier of the used hash function, in the first byte of the computed token hash.

   The specifically used hash function MUST be collision-resistant on byte-strings, and MUST be selected from the "Named Information Hash Algorithm" Registry [Named.Information.Hash.Algorithm].
The Authorization Server specifies the used hash function to registered devices during their registration procedure (see Section 6).

2.01 Created
Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
Max-Age: 85800
Payload:
{
  access_token: h'd08344a1...'
  (remainder of the Access Token omitted for brevity)
  token_type: pop,
  expires_in: 86400,
  profile: coap_dtls,
  (remainder of the response omitted for brevity)
}

Figure 2: Example of Authorization Server response using CBOR

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Payload:
{
  "access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA"
  (remainder of the Access Token omitted for brevity)
  "token_type": "pop",
  "expires_in": 86400,
  "profile": "coap_dtls",
  (remainder of the response omitted for brevity)
}

Figure 3: Example of Authorization Server response using JSON

4. The TRL Resource

Upon startup, the Authorization Server creates a single TRL resource, encoded as a CBOR array.

Each element of the array is a CBOR byte string, with value the token hash of an Access Token. The order of the token hashes in the CBOR array is irrelevant, and the CBOR array MUST be treated as a set in which the order has no significant meaning.

The TRL is initialized as empty, i.e., the initial content of the TRL resource representation MUST be an empty CBOR array.
4.1. Update of the TRL Resource

The Authorization Server updates the TRL in the following two cases.

* When a non-expired Access Token is revoked, the token hash of the Access Token is added to the TRL resource representation. That is, a CBOR byte string with the token hash as its value is added to the CBOR array used as TRL resource representation.

* When a revoked Access Token expires, the token hash of the Access Token is removed from the TRL resource representation. That is, the CBOR byte string with the token hash as its value is removed from the CBOR array used as TRL resource representation.

5. The TRL Endpoint

Consistent with Section 6.5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], all communications between a caller of the TRL endpoint and the Authorization Server MUST be encrypted, as well as integrity and replay protected. Furthermore, responses from the Authorization Server to the caller MUST be bound to the caller’s request.

The Authorization Server MUST implement measures to prevent access to the TRL endpoint by entities other than registered devices and authorized administrators.

The TRL endpoint supports only the GET method, and allows two types of query of the TRL.

* Full query: the Authorization Server returns the token hashes of the revoked Access Tokens currently in the TRL and pertaining to the requester. The Authorization Server MUST support this type of query. The processing of a full query and the related response format are defined in Section 5.1.

* Diff query: the Authorization Server returns a list of diff entries. Each diff entry is related to one of the most recent updates, in the portion of the TRL pertaining to the requester. The Authorization Server MAY support this type of query.

The entry associated to one of such updates contains a list of token hashes, such that: i) the corresponding revoked Access Tokens pertain to the requester; and ii) they were added to or removed from the TRL at that update. The processing of a diff query and the related response format are defined in Section 5.2.

The TRL endpoint allows the following query parameter in a GET request.
* 'pmax': if included, it follows the semantics defined in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-conditional-attributes]. This query parameter is relevant only in case the GET request is specifically an Observation Request, i.e., if it includes the CoAP Observe option set to 0 (register). In such a case, this parameter indicates the maximum time, in seconds, between two consecutive notifications for the observation in question, regardless whether the TRL resource has changed or not.

If the Observation Request does not include the 'pmax' parameter, the maximum time to consider is up to the Authorization Server. If the Observation Request includes the 'pmax' parameter, its value MUST be greater than zero, otherwise the Authorization Server MUST return a 4.00 (Bad Request) response.

If the GET request is not an Observation Request, the Authorization Server MUST ignore the 'pmax' parameter, in case this is included.

* 'diff': if included, it indicates to perform a diff query of the TRL. Its value MUST be either:

- the integer 0, indicating that a (notification) response should include as many diff entries as the Authorization Server can provide in the response; or

- a positive integer greater than 0, indicating the maximum number of diff entries that a (notification) response should include.

5.1. Full Query of the TRL

In order to produce a (notification) response to a GET request asking for a full query of the TRL, the Authorization Server performs the following actions.

1. From the current TRL resource representation, the Authorization Server builds a set HASHES, such that:

   * If the requester is a registered device, HASHES specifies the token hashes of the Access Tokens pertaining to that registered device. The Authorization Server can use the authenticated identity of the registered device to perform the necessary filtering on the TRL resource representation.

   * If the requester is an administrator, HASHES specifies all the token hashes in the current TRL resource representation.
2. The Authorization Server sends a 2.05 (Content) Response to the requester, with a CBOR array 'full' as payload. Each element of the array specifies one of the token hashes from the set HASHES, encoded as a CBOR byte string.

The order of the token hashes in the CBOR array is irrelevant, i.e., the CBOR array MUST be treated as a set in which the order has no significant meaning.

The CDDL definition [RFC8610] of the CBOR array 'full' specified as payload in the response from the Authorization Server is provided below.

```cddl
token-hash = bytes
full = [* token-hash]
```

Figure 4: CDDL definition of the response payload following a Full Query request to the TRL endpoint

5.2. Diff Query of the TRL

In order to produce a (notification) response to a GET request asking for a diff query of the TRL, the Authorization Server performs the following actions.

1. The Authorization Server defines the positive integer NUM. If the value N specified in the query parameter 'diff' of the GET request is equal to 0 or greater than a pre-defined positive integer N_MAX, then NUM takes the value of N_MAX. Otherwise, NUM takes N.

2. The Authorization Server prepares U = min(NUM, SIZE) diff entries, where SIZE <= N_MAX is the number of TRL updates pertaining to the requester and currently stored at the Authorization Server. That is, the diff entries are related to the U most recent TRL updates pertaining to the requester. In particular, the first entry refers to the most recent of such updates, the second entry refers to the second from last of such updates, and so on.

Each diff entry is a CBOR array 'diff-entry', which includes the following two elements.

* The first element is a CBOR array 'removed'. Each element of the array is a CBOR byte string, with value the token hash of an Access Token such that: it pertained to the requester; and it was removed from the TRL during the update associated to the diff entry.
* The second element is a CBOR array ‘added’. Each element of the array is a CBOR byte string, with value the token hash of an Access Token such that: it pertains to the requester; and it was added to the TRL during the update associated to the diff entry.

The order of the token hashes in the CBOR arrays ‘removed’ and ‘added’ is irrelevant. That is, the CBOR arrays ‘removed’ and ‘added’ MUST be treated as a set in which the order of elements has no significant meaning.

3. The Authorization Server prepares a 2.05 (Content) Response for the requester, with a CBOR array ‘diff’ of U elements as payload. Each element of the CBOR array ‘diff’ specifies one of the CBOR arrays ‘diff-entry’ prepared at step 2 as diff entries.

Within the CBOR array ‘diff’, the CBOR arrays ‘diff-entry’ MUST be sorted to reflect the corresponding updates to the TRL in reverse chronological order. That is, the first ‘diff-entry’ element of ‘diff’ relates to the most recent update to the portion of the TRL pertaining to the requester. The second ‘diff-entry’ element of ‘diff’ relates to the second from last most recent update to that portion, and so on.

The CDDL definition [RFC8610] of the CBOR array ‘diff’ specified as payload in the response from the Authorization Server is provided below.

```
token-hash = bytes
trl-patch = [* token-hash]
diff-entry = [removed: trl-patch, added: trl-patch]
diff = [* diff-entry]
```

Figure 5: CDDL definition of the response payload following a Diff Query request to the TRL endpoint

If the Authorization Server supports diff queries:

* The Authorization Server MUST return a 4.00 (Bad Request) response in case the ‘diff’ parameter specifies a value other than 0 or than a positive integer.

* The Authorization Server MUST keep track of N_MAX most recent updates to the portion of the TRL that pertains to each caller of the TRL endpoint. The particular method to achieve this is implementation-specific.
* When SIZE is equal to N_MAX, and a new TRL update occurs as pertaining to a registered device, the Authorization Server MUST first delete the oldest stored update for that device, before storing this latest update as the most recent one for that device.

* The Authorization Server SHOULD provide registered devices and administrators with the value of N_MAX, upon their registration (see Section 6).

If the Authorization Server does not support diff queries, it proceeds as when processing a full query (see Section 5.1).

Appendix A discusses how the diff query of the TRL is in fact a usage example of the Series Transfer Pattern defined in [I-D.bormann-t2trg-stp].

Appendix B discusses how the diff query of the TRL can be further improved by using the "Cursor" pattern defined in Section 3.3 of [I-D.bormann-t2trg-stp].

6. Upon Registration

During the registration process at the Authorization Server, an administrator or a registered device receives the following information as part of the registration response.

* The url-path to the TRL endpoint at the Authorization Server.

* The hash function used to compute token hashes. This is specified as an integer or a text string, taking value from the "ID" or "Hash Name String" column of the "Named Information Hash Algorithm" Registry [Named.Information.Hash.Algorithm], respectively.

* Optionally, a positive integer N_MAX, if the Authorization Server supports diff queries of the TRL resource (see Section 5.2).

After the registration procedure is finished, the administrator or registered device performs a GET request to the TRL resource, including the CoAP Observe option set to 0 (register), in order to start an observation of the TRL resource at the Authorization Server, as per Section 3.1 of [RFC7641]. The GET request can express the wish for a full query (see Section 5.1) or a diff query (see Section 5.2) of the TRL.

In case the request is successfully processed, The Authorization Server replies using the CoAP response code 2.05 (Content) and including the CoAP Observe option in the response. The payload of
the response is formatted as defined in Section 5.1 or in Section 5.2, in case the GET request was for a full query or a diff query of the TRL, respectively.

Further details about the registration process at the Authorization Server are out of scope for this specification. Note that the registration process is also out of the scope of the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization (see Section 5.5 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).

7. Notification of Revoked Tokens

When the TRL is updated (see Section 4.1), the Authorization Server sends Observe Notifications to the observers of the TRL resource. Observe Notifications are sent as per Section 4.2 of [RFC7641].

If the 'pmax' query parameter was specified in the Observation Request starting an observation (see Section 5), the Authorization Server might accordingly send additional Observe Notifications to the associated observer. That is, the Authorization Server ensures that no more than pmax seconds elapse between two consecutive notifications sent to that observer, regardless whether the TRL resource has changed or not. If the 'pmax' query parameter was not specified in the Observation Request, a possible maximum time to consider is up to the Authorization Server.

The payload of each Observe Notification is formatted as defined in Section 5.1 or in Section 5.2, in case the original Observation Request was for a full query or a diff query of the TRL, respectively.

Furthermore, an administrator or a registered device can send additional GET requests to the TRL endpoint at any time, in order to retrieve the token hashes of the pertaining revoked Access Tokens. When doing so, the caller of the TRL endpoint can perform a full query (see Section 5.1) or a diff query (see Section 5.2).

8. Interaction Examples

This section provides examples of interactions between a Resource Server RS as registered device and an Authorization Server AS. The Authorization Server supports both full query and diff query of the TRL, as defined in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, respectively.

The details of the registration process are omitted, but it is assumed that the Resource Server sends an unspecified payload to the Authorization Server, which replies with a 2.01 (Created) response.
The payload of the registration response is a CBOR map, which includes the following entries:

* a "trl" parameter, specifying the path of the TRL resource;

* a "trl_hash" parameter, specifying the hash function used to computed token hashes as defined in Section 3;

* an "n_max" parameter, specifying the value of N_MAX, i.e., the maximum number of TRL updates pertaining to each registered device that the Authorization Server retains for that device (see Section 5.2);

* possible further parameters related to the registration process.

Furthermore, ‘h(x)’ refers to the hash function used to compute the token hashes, as defined in Section 3 of this specification and according to [RFC6920]. Assuming the usage of CWTs transported in CBOR, ‘bstr.h(t1)’ and ‘bstr.h(t2)’ denote the byte-string representations of the token hashes for the Access Tokens t1 and t2, respectively.

8.1. Full Query with Observation

Figure 6 shows an interaction example considering a CoAP observation and a full query of the TRL.
(Access Tokens t1 and t2 issued and successfully submitted to RS)

(Access Token t1 is revoked)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 53
Payload: [bstr.h(t1)]

(Access Token t2 is revoked)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 64
Payload: [bstr.h(t1), bstr.h(t2)]

(Access Token t1 expires)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 75
Payload: [bstr.h(t2)]

(Access Token t2 expires)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 86
Payload: []

Figure 6: Interaction for Full Query with Observation
8.2. Diff Query with Observation

Figure 7 shows an interaction example considering a CoAP observation and a diff query of the TRL.

The Resource Server indicates N=3 as value of the query parameter "diff", i.e., as the maximum number of diff entries to be specified in a response from the Authorization Server.

```
RS                              AS
Registration: POST
+--------------------------------------------->
|                                              |
| Registration: POST                           |
|                                              |
|                                              |
|<---------------------------------------------+
|                  2.01 CREATED                |
|                   Payload: {                 |
|                      ...                     |
|                      "trl" = "revoke/trl",   |
|                      "trl_hash" = "sha-256", |
|                      "n_max" = 10            |
|                   }                          |
|                                              |
| GET Observe: 0                               |
|  coap://example.as.com/revoke/trl?diff=3     |
|+--------------------------------------------->|
|                                              |
|<---------------------------------------------+
|                     2.05 CONTENT Observe: 42 |
|                      Payload: []             |
|                        .                     |
|                        .                     |
|                        .                     |
| (Access Tokens t1 and t2 issued and successfully submitted to RS) |
|                        .                     |
|                        .                     |
| (Access Token t1 is revoked)                 |
|<---------------------------------------------+
|                     2.05 CONTENT Observe: 53 |
|                      Payload: [             |
|                          [ [], [bstr.h(t1)] ] |
|                        ]                     |
```
(Access Token t2 is revoked)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 64
Payload: [ ]
   [ [], [bstr.h(t2)] ],
   [ [], [bstr.h(t1)] ]

(Access Token t1 expires)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 75
Payload: [ ]
   [ [bstr.h(t1)], [] ],
   [ [], [bstr.h(t2)] ],
   [ [], [bstr.h(t1)] ]

(Access Token t2 expires)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 86
Payload: [ ]
   [ [bstr.h(t2)], [] ],
   [ [bstr.h(t1)], [] ],
   [ [], [bstr.h(t2)] ]

Figure 7: Interaction for Diff Query with Observation

8.3. Full Query with Observation and Additional Diff Query

Figure 8 shows an interaction example considering a CoAP observation and a full query of the TRL.
The example also considers one of the notifications from the Authorization Server to get lost in transmission, and thus not reaching the Resource Server.

When this happens, and after a waiting time defined by the application has elapsed, the Resource Server sends a GET request with no observation to the Authorization Server, to perform a diff query of the TRL. The Resource Server indicates N=8 as value of the query parameter "diff", i.e., as the maximum number of diff entries to be specified in a response from the Authorization Server.

RS                                            AS
+-----------------------------------------------
|                                              |
| Registration: POST                           |
| 2.01 CREATED                                 |
| Payload: {                                   |
|     "trl" = "revoke/trl",                   |
|     "trl_hash" = "sha-256",                 |
|     "n_max" = 10                             |
| }                                            |
| GET Observe: 0                               |
| coap://example.as.com/revoke/trl/            |
+-----------------------------------------------

RS                                            AS
+-----------------------------------------------
|                                              |
| 2.05 CONTENT Observe: 42                     |
| Payload: []                                  |
| .                                             |
| .                                             |
| .                                             |
| (Access Tokens t1 and t2 issued and successfully submitted to RS) |
| .                                             |
| .                                             |
| (Access Token t1 is revoked)                  |
|                                              |
| 2.05 CONTENT Observe: 53                     |
| Payload: [bstr.h(t1)]                        |

(Access Token t2 is revoked)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 64
Payload: [bstr.h(t1),
bstr.h(t2)]

(Access Token t1 expires)

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 75
Payload: [bstr.h(t2)]

(Access Token t2 expires)

X<---------------------------------------------+

2.05 CONTENT Observe: 86
Payload: []

(Enough time has passed since the latest received notification)

GET
coop://example.as.com/revoke/trl?diff=8

<---------------------------------------------+

2.05 CONTENT
Payload: [
    [ [bstr.h(t2)], [] ],
    [ [bstr.h(t1)], [] ],
    [ [], [bstr.h(t2)] ],
    [ [], [bstr.h(t1)] ]
]
9. Security Considerations

Security considerations are inherited from the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], from [RFC8392] as to the usage of CWTs, from [RFC7519] as to the usage of JWTs, from [RFC7641] as to the usage of CoAP Observe, and from [RFC6920] with regard to resource naming through hashes. The following considerations also apply.

The Authorization Server MUST ensure that each registered device can access and retrieve only its pertaining portion of the TRL. To this end, the Authorization Server can perform the required filtering based on the authenticated identity of the registered device, i.e., a (non-public) identifier that the Authorization Server can securely relate to the registered device and the secure association they use to communicate.

Disclosing any information about revoked Access Tokens to entities other than the intended registered devices may result in privacy concerns. Therefore, the Authorization Server MUST ensure that, other than registered devices accessing their own pertaining portion of the TRL, only authorized and authenticated administrators can retrieve the full TRL. To this end, the Authorization Server may rely on an access control list or similar.

If a registered device has many non-expired Access Tokens associated to itself that are revoked, the pertaining portion of the TRL could grow to a size bigger than what the registered device is prepared to handle upon reception, especially if relying on a full query of the TRL resource (see Section 5.1). This could be exploited by attackers to negatively affect the behavior of a registered device. Issuing Access Tokens with not too long expiration time could help reduce the size of a TRL, but an Authorization Server SHOULD take measures to limit this size.

Most of the communication about revoked Access Tokens presented in this specification relies on CoAP Observe Notifications sent from the Authorization Server to a registered device. The suppression of those notifications by an external attacker that has access to the network would prevent registered devices from ever knowing that their pertaining Access Tokens have been revoked. To avoid this, a registered device SHOULD NOT rely solely on the CoAP Observe notifications. In particular, a registered device SHOULD also regularly poll the Authorization Server for the most current information about revoked Access Tokens, by sending GET requests to the TRL endpoint according to a related application policy.
10. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

10.1. Media Type Registrations

IANA is asked to register the ‘application/ace-trl+cbor’ media type for messages of the protocols defined in this document encoded in CBOR. This registration follows the procedures specified in [RFC6838].

Type name: application
Subtype name: ace-trl+cbor
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A

Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as CBOR map containing the protocol parameters defined in [this document].

Security considerations: See Section 9 of this document.

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [this document]

Applications that use this media type: The type is used by Authorization Servers, Clients and Resource Servers that support the notification of revoked Access Tokens, according to a Token Revocation List maintained by the Authorization Server as specified in [this document].

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information: N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information: <iesg@ietf.org>

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: None

Author: Marco Tiloca <marco.tiloca@ri.se>

Change controller: IESG
10.2.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry

IANA is asked to add the following entry to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group.

Media Type: application/ace-trl+cbor
Encoding: -
ID: TBD
Reference: [this document]

10.3.  Token Revocation List Registry

This specification establishes the "Token Revocation List" IANA registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 10.4. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, to be supplied as well.

The columns of this registry are:

* Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

* CBOR Value: This is the value used as CBOR abbreviation of the item. These values MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer or a negative integer. Different ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.

* CBOR Type: This contains the CBOR type of the item, or a pointer to the registry that defines its type, when that depends on another item.

* Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the item.

This registry has been initially populated with the values from Figure 9 in Appendix B.4.4.
10.4. Expert Review Instructions

The IANA registry established in this document is defined as expert review. This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.

Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

* Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as private use are intended for testing purposes and closed environments, code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.

* Specifications are required for the standards track range of point assignment. Specifications should exist for specification required ranges, but early assignment before a specification is available is considered to be permissible. Specifications are needed for the first-come, first-serve range if they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an interoperable way. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is being used for.

* Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range for standards track documents does not mean that a standards track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range. The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that size.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]


11.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Usage of the Series Transfer Pattern

This section discusses how the diff query of the TRL defined in Section 5.2 is a usage example of the Series Transfer Pattern defined in [I-D.bormann-t2trg-stp].
A diff query enables the transfer of a series of TRL updates, with the Authorization Server specifying \( U \leq N_{\text{MAX}} \) diff entries as the \( U \) most recent updates to the portion of the TRL pertaining to a registered device.

For each registered device, the Authorization Server maintains an update collection of maximum \( N_{\text{MAX}} \) items. Each time the TRL changes, the Authorization Server performs the following operations for each registered device.

1. The Authorization Server considers the portion of the TRL pertaining to that registered device. If the TRL portion is not affected by this TRL update, the Authorization Server stops the processing for that registered device.

2. Otherwise, the Authorization Server creates two sets 'trl_patch' of token hashes, i.e., one "removed" set and one "added" set, as related to this TRL update.

3. The Authorization Server fills the two sets with the token hashes of the removed and added Access Tokens, respectively, from/to the TRL portion from step 1.

4. The Authorization Server creates a new series item including the two sets from step 3, and adds the series item to the update collection associated to the registered device.

When responding to a diff query request from a registered device (see Section 5.2), 'diff' is a subset of the collection associated to the requester, where each 'diff_entry' record is a series item from that collection. Note that 'diff' specifies the whole current collection when the value of \( U \) is equal to \( \text{SIZE} \), i.e., the current number of series items in the collection.

The value \( N \) of the 'diff' query parameter in the diff query request allows the requester and the Authorization Server to trade the amount of provided information with the latency of the information transfer.

Since the collection associated to each registered device includes up to \( N_{\text{MAX}} \) series item, the Authorization Server deletes the oldest series item when a new one is generated and added to the end of the collection, due to a new TRL update pertaining to that registered device. This addresses the question "When can the server decide to no longer retain older items?" in Section 3.2 of [I-D.bormann-t2trg-stp].
Appendix B. Usage of the "Cursor" Pattern

Building on Appendix A, this section describes how the diff query of the TRL defined in Section 5.2 can be further improved by using the "Cursor" pattern of the Series Transfer Pattern (see Section 3.3 of [I-D.bormann-t2trg-stp]).

This has two benefits. First, the Authorization Server can avoid excessively big latencies when several diff entries have to be transferred, by delivering one adjacent subset at the time, in different diff query responses. Second, a requester can retrieve diff entries associated to TRL updates that, even if not the most recent ones, occurred after a TRL update indicated as reference point.

To this end, each series item in an update collection is also associated to an unsigned integer ‘index’, with value the absolute counter of series items added to that collection minus 1. That is, the first series item added to a collection has ‘index’ with value 0. Then, the values of ‘index’ are used as cursor information.

Furthermore, the Authorization Server defines an unsigned integer \( MAX_{DIFF\_BATCH} \leq N_{MAX} \), specifying the maximum number of diff entries to be included in a single diff query response. If supporting diff queries, the Authorization Server SHOULD provide registered devices and administrators with the value of \( MAX_{DIFF\_BATCH} \), upon their registration (see Section 6).

Finally, the full query and diff query exchanges defined in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 are extended as follows.

In particular, successful responses from the TRL endpoint MUST use the Content-Format "application/ace-trl+cbor" defined in Section 10.2 of this specification.

B.1. Full Query Request

No changes apply to what defined in Section 5.1.

B.2. Full Query Response

When sending a 2.05 (Content) response to a full query request (see Appendix B.1), the response payload includes a CBOR map with the following fields, whose CBOR labels are defined in Appendix B.4.4.

* `trl`: this field MUST include a CBOR array of token hashes. The CBOR array is populated and formatted as defined for the CBOR array ‘full’ in Section 5.1.
`'cursor'`: this field MUST include either the CBOR simple value Null or a CBOR unsigned integer.

The CBOR simple value Null MUST be used to indicate that there are currently no TRL updates pertinent to the requester, i.e., the update collection for that requester is empty. This is the case from when the requester registers at the Authorization Server until a first update pertaining to the requester occurs to the TRL.

Otherwise, the field MUST include a CBOR unsigned integer, encoding the ‘index’ value of the last series item in the collection, as corresponding to the most recent update pertaining to the requester occurred to the TRL.

**B.3. Diff Query Request**

In addition to the query parameter ‘diff’ (see Section 5.2), the requester can specify a query parameter ‘cursor’, with value an unsigned integer.

**B.4. Diff Query Response**

The Authorization Server composes a response to a diff query request (see Appendix B.3) as follows, depending on the parameters specified in the request and on the current status of the update collection for the requester.

**B.4.1. Empty Collection**

If the collection associated to the requester has no elements, the Authorization Server returns a 2.05 (Content) diff query response.

The response payload includes a CBOR map with the following fields, whose CBOR labels are defined in Appendix B.4.4.

* ‘diff’: this field MUST include an empty CBOR array.
* ‘cursor’: this field MUST include the CBOR simple value Null.
* ‘more’: this fields MUST include the CBOR simple value False.

**B.4.2. Cursor Not Specified in the Diff Query Request**

If the update collection associated to the requester is not empty and the diff query request does not include the query parameter ‘cursor’, the Authorization Server returns a 2.05 (Content) diff query response.
The response payload includes a CBOR map with the following fields, whose CBOR labels are defined in Appendix B.4.4.

* ‘diff’: this field MUST include a CBOR array, containing \( L = \min(U, \text{MAX\_DIFF\_BATCH}) \) diff entries. In particular, the CBOR array is populated as follows.

- If \( U \leq \text{MAX\_DIFF\_BATCH} \), these diff entries are the last series items in the collection associated to the requester, corresponding to the \( L \) most recent TRL updates pertaining to the requester.

- If \( U > \text{MAX\_DIFF\_BATCH} \), these diff entries are the eldest of the last \( U \) series items in the collection associated to the requester, as corresponding to the first \( L \) of the \( U \) most recent TRL updates pertaining to the requester.

The ‘diff’ CBOR array as well as the individual diff entries have the same format specified in Figure 5 and used for the response payload defined in Section 5.2.

* ‘cursor’: this field MUST include a CBOR unsigned integer. This takes the ‘index’ value of the series element of the collection included as first diff entry in the ‘diff’ CBOR array. That is, it takes the ‘index’ value of the series item in the collection corresponding to the most recent update pertaining to the requester and returned in this diff query response.

Note that ‘cursor’ takes the same ‘index’ value of the last series item in the collection when \( U \leq \text{MAX\_DIFF\_BATCH} \).

* ‘more’: this field MUST include the CBOR simple value False if \( U \leq \text{MAX\_DIFF\_BATCH} \), or the CBOR simple value True otherwise.

If ‘more’ has value True, the requester can send a follow-up diff query request including the query parameter ‘cursor’, with the same value of the ‘cursor’ field included in this diff query response. As defined in Appendix B.4.3, this would result in the Authorization Server transferring the following subset of series items as diff entries, i.e., resuming from where interrupted in the previous transfer.

B.4.3. Cursor Specified in the Diff Query Request

If the update collection associated to the requester is not empty and the diff query request includes the query parameter ‘cursor’ with value \( P \), the Authorization Server proceeds as follows.
The Authorization Server MUST return a 4.00 (Bad Request) response in case the 'cursor' parameter specifies a value other than 0 or than a positive integer.

If no series item X with 'index' having value P is found in the collection associated to the requester, then that item has been previously removed from the history of updates for that requestor (see Appendix A). In this case, the Authorization Server returns a 2.05 (Content) diff query response. The response payload includes a CBOR map with the following fields, whose CBOR labels are defined in Appendix B.4.4.

- 'diff': this field MUST include an empty CBOR array.
- 'cursor': this field MUST include the CBOR simple value Null.
- 'more': this field MUST include the CBOR simple value True.

With the combination ('cursor', 'more') = (Null, True), the Authorization Server is signaling that the update collection is in fact not empty, but that some series items have been lost due to their removal, including the item with 'index' value P that the requester wished to use as reference point.

When receiving this diff query response, the requester should send a new full query request to the Authorization Server, in order to fully retrieve the current pertaining portion of the TRL.

If the series item X with 'index' having value P is found in the collection associated to the requester, the Authorization Server returns a 2.05 (Content) diff query response. The response payload includes a CBOR map with the following fields, whose CBOR labels are defined in Appendix B.4.4.

- 'diff': this field MUST include a CBOR array, containing \( L = \min(\text{SUB} \_\text{U}, \max(\text{DIFF} \_\text{BATCH})) \) diff entries, where \( \text{SUB} \_\text{U} = \min(\text{NUM}, \text{SUB} \_\text{SIZE}) \), and \( \text{SUB} \_\text{SIZE} \) is the number of series items in the collection following the series item X.

That is, these are the \( L \) updates pertaining to the requester that immediately follow the series item X indicated as reference point. In particular, the CBOR array is populated as follows.
o If \( \text{SUB}_U \leq \text{MAX}_\text{DIFF}_\text{BATCH} \), these diff entries are the last
series items in the collection associated to the requester,
corresponding to the \( L \) most recent TRL updates pertaining to
the requester.

o If \( \text{SUB}_U > \text{MAX}_\text{DIFF}_\text{BATCH} \), these diff entries are the eldest
of the last \( \text{SUB}_U \) series items in the collection associated
to the requester, corresponding to the first \( L \) of the \( \text{SUB}_U \)
most recent TRL updates pertaining to the requester.

The 'diff' CBOR array as well as the individual diff entries
have the same format specified in Figure 5 and used for the
response payload defined in Section 5.2.

- 'cursor': this field MUST include a CBOR unsigned integer. In
  particular:

  o If \( L \) is equal to 0, i.e., the series item \( X \) is the last one
    in the collection, 'cursor' takes the same 'index' value of
    the last series item in the collection.

  o If \( L \) is different than 0, 'cursor' takes the 'index' value
    of the series element of the collection included as first
    diff entry in the 'diff' CBOR array. That is, it takes the
    'index' value of the series item in the collection
    corresponding to the most recent update pertaining to the
    requester and returned in this diff query response.

    Note that 'cursor' takes the same 'index' value of the last
    series item in the collection when \( \text{SUB}_U \leq \text{MAX}_\text{DIFF}_\text{BATCH} \).

- 'more': this field MUST include the CBOR simple value False if
  \( \text{SUB}_U \leq \text{MAX}_\text{DIFF}_\text{BATCH} \), or the CBOR simple value True
  otherwise.

  If 'more' has value True, the requester can send a follow-up
diff query request including the query parameter 'cursor', with
the same value of the 'cursor' field specified in this diff
query response. This would result in the Authorization Server
transferring the following subset of series items as diff
entries, i.e., resuming from where interrupted in the previous
transfer.

B.4.4. TRL Parameters

This specification defines a number of fields used in the response to
a diff query request to the TRL endpoint relying on the "Cursor"
pattern, as defined in Appendix B.
The table below summarizes them, and specifies the CBOR value to use as abbreviation instead of the full descriptive name. Note that the Content-Format "application/ace-trl+cbor" defined in Section 10.2 of this specification MUST be used when these fields are transported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CBOR Value</th>
<th>CBOR Type</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>trl</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cursor</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>simple value null / unsigned integer</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diff</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>array</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>simple value True or False</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: CBOR abbreviations for TRL parameters

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