Abstract

insert abstract here

Contributing

This document picks up the popular JSONPath specification dated 2007-02-21 and provides a more normative definition for it. It is intended as a submission to the IETF DISPATCH WG, in order to find the right way to complete standardization of this specification. In its current state, it is a strawman document showing what needs to be covered.

Comments and issues can be directed at the github repository _insert repo here_ as well as (for the time when the more permanent home is being decided) at the dispatch@ietf.org mailing list.

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1. Introduction

This document picks up the popular JSONPath specification dated 2007-02-21 [JSONPath-orig] and provides a more normative definition for it. It is intended as a submission to the IETF DISPATCH WG, in order to find the right way to complete standardization of this specification. In its current state, it is a strawman document showing what needs to be covered.
1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The grammatical rules in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC5234].

The terminology of [RFC8259] applies.

Data Item: A structure complying to the generic data model of JSON, i.e., composed of containers such as arrays and maps (JSON objects), and of atomic data such as null, true, false, numbers, and text strings.

Object: Used in its generic sense, e.g., for programming language objects. When a JSON Object as defined in [RFC8259] is meant, we specifically say JSON Object.

Query: Short name for JSONPath expression.

Argument: Short name for the JSON data item a JSONPath expression is applied to.

Output Path: A simple form of JSONPath expression that identifies a Position by providing a query that results in exactly that position. Similar to, but syntactically different from, a JSON Pointer [RFC6901].

Position: A JSON data item identical to or nested within the JSON data item to which the query is applied to, expressed either by the value of that data item or by providing a JSONPath Output Path.

1.2. Inspired by XPath

A frequently emphasized advantage of XML is the availability of plenty tools to analyse, transform and selectively extract data out of XML documents. [XPath] is one of these powerful tools.

In 2007, the need for something solving the same class of problems for the emerging JSON community became apparent, specifically for:

* Finding data interactively and extracting them out of [RFC8259] data items without special scripting.
* Specifying the relevant parts of the JSON data in a request by a client, so the server can reduce the data in the server response, minimizing bandwidth usage.

So how does such a tool look like when done for JSON? When defining a JSONPath, how should expressions look like?

The XPath expression

```
/store/book[1]/title
```

looks like

```
x.store.book[0].title
```

or

```
x[‘store’][‘book’][0][‘title’]
```

in popular programming languages such as JavaScript, Python and PHP, with a variable `x` holding the JSON data item. Here we observe that such languages already have a fundamentally XPath-like feature built in.

The JSONPath tool in question should:

* be naturally based on those language characteristics.
* cover only essential parts of XPath 1.0.
* be lightweight in code size and memory consumption.
* be runtime efficient.

1.3. Overview of JSONPath Expressions

JSONPath expressions always apply to a JSON data item in the same way as XPath expressions are used in combination with an XML document. Since a JSON data item is usually anonymous and doesn’t necessarily have a "root member object", JSONPath used the abstract name "$" to refer to the top level object of the data item.

JSONPath expressions can use the _dot-notation_

```
$.store.book[0].title
```

or the _bracket-notation_

```
`x[‘store’][‘book’][0][‘title’]`
for paths input to a JSONPath processor. Where a JSONPath processor
uses JSONPath expressions for internal purposes or as output paths,
these will always be converted to the more general _bracket-
notation_.

JSONPath allows the wildcard symbol "*" for member names and array
indices. It borrows the descendant operator "." from [E4X] and the
array slice syntax proposal "[start:end:step]" [SLICE] from
ECMASCRIPT 4.

JSONPath can employ an _underlying scripting language_, expressions
of which, written in parentheses: "(<expr>)", can be used as an
alternative to explicit names or indices as in:

$.store.book[(@.length-1)].title

The symbol "@" is used for the current object. Filter expressions
are supported via the syntax "?(<boolean expr>)" as in

$.store.book[?(@.price < 10)].title

Here is a complete overview and a side by side comparison of the
JSONPath syntax elements with its XPath counterparts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XPath</th>
<th>JSONPath</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>the root object/element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>@</td>
<td>the current object/element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
<td>&quot;.&quot; or &quot;[]&quot;</td>
<td>child operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>parent operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>nested descendants. JSONPath borrows this syntax from E4X.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>wildcard. All objects/elements regardless of their names.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>attribute access. JSON data items don’t have attributes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>subscript operator. XPath uses it to iterate over element collections and for predicates. In JavaScript and JSON it is the native array operator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[,,]</td>
<td>Union operator in XPath results in a combination of node sets. JSONPath allows alternate names or array indices as a set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[]</td>
<td>?()</td>
<td>applies a filter (script) expression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>()</td>
<td>script expression, using the underlying script engine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>grouping in XPath</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overview over JSONPath, comparing to XPath

XPath has a lot more to offer (location paths in unabbreviated syntax, operators and functions) than listed here. Moreover there is a significant difference how the subscript operator works in Xpath and JSONPath:
Square brackets in XPath expressions always operate on the _node set_ resulting from the previous path fragment. Indices always start at 1.

* With JSONPath, square brackets operate on the _object_ or _array_ addressed by the previous path fragment. Indices always start at 0.

2. JSONPath Examples

This section provides some more examples for JSONPath expressions. The examples are based on a simple JSON data item patterned after a typical XML example representing a bookstore (that also has bicycles):

```json
{ "store": {  
  "book": [    
    { "category": "reference",  
      "author": "Nigel Rees",  
      "title": "Sayings of the Century",  
      "price": 8.95
    },
    { "category": "fiction",  
      "author": "Evelyn Waugh",  
      "title": "Sword of Honour",  
      "price": 12.99
    },
    { "category": "fiction",  
      "author": "Herman Melville",  
      "title": "Moby Dick",  
      "isbn": "0-553-21311-3",  
      "price": 8.99
    },
    { "category": "fiction",  
      "author": "J. R. R. Tolkien",  
      "title": "The Lord of the Rings",  
      "isbn": "0-395-19395-8",  
      "price": 22.99
  }
],
  "bicycle": {  
    "color": "red",  
    "price": 19.95
  }
}
```

Figure 1: Example JSON data item
The examples in Table 2 presume an underlying script language that allows obtaining the number of items in an array, testing for the presence of a map member, and performing numeric comparisons of map member values with a constant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XPath</th>
<th>JSONPath</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/store/book/author</td>
<td>$.store.book[*].author</td>
<td>the authors of all books in the store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//author</td>
<td>$..author</td>
<td>all authors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/store/*</td>
<td>$.store.*</td>
<td>all things in store, which are some books and a red bicycle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/store//price</td>
<td>$.store..price</td>
<td>the price of everything in the store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//book[last()]</td>
<td>&quot;$..book[@.length-1]&quot;</td>
<td>the last book in order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//book[position()&lt;3]</td>
<td>&quot;$..book[0,1]&quot;</td>
<td>the first two books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//book[isbn]</td>
<td>$..book[?(@.isbn)]</td>
<td>filter all books with isbn number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/*</td>
<td>$..*</td>
<td>all Elements in XML document. All members of JSON data item.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Example JSONPath expressions applied to the example JSON data item
3. Detailed definition

[TBD: This section needs to be fleshed out in detail. The text given here is intended to give the flavor of that detail, not to be the actual definition that is to be defined.]

JSONPath expressions, "queries" for short in this specification, are character strings, represented in UTF-8 unless otherwise required by the context in which they are used.

When applied to a JSON data item, a query returns a (possibly empty) list of "positions" in the data item that match the JSONPath expression.

JSONPath = root *(step)
root = "$"

step = "." name ; nested descendants
    / "." name ; child (dot notation)
    / "]" value-expression *(""," value-expression) "]" ; child[ren] (bracket notation)
    / "]" value-expression *2(":", value-expression) "]" ; (slice)

value-expression = *DIGIT / name
    / script-expression / filter-expression

name = "" text "";
    / "*" ; wildcard

script-expression = "(" script ")"

filter-expression = "?(" script ")"

script = <To be defined in the course of standardization>

Within a script, @ stands for the position under consideration. [TBD: define underlying scripting language, if there is to be a standard one]

[TBD: define handling of spaces]
A JSONPath starts at the root of the argument; the "current list" of positions is initialized to that root. Each step applies the semantics of that step to each of the positions in the "current list", returning another list; the "current list" is replaced by the concatenation of all these returned lists, and the next step begins. When all steps have been performed, the "current list" is returned, depending on the choices of the context either as a list of data items or as a list of output paths. [TBD: define the order of that list]

[TBD: Define all the steps]

[TBD: Define details of Output Path]

4. Discussion

* Currently only single quotes allowed inside of JSONPath expressions.

* Script expressions inside of JSONPath locations are currently not recursively evaluated by jsonPath. Only the global "$" and local "@" symbols are expanded by a simple regular expression.

* An alternative for jsonPath to return false in case of no match may be to return an empty array in future. [This is already done in the above.]

5. IANA considerations

TBD: Define a media type for JSON Path expressions.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


Appendix A. Early JSONPath implementations

This appendix has been copied from the similar section in [JSONPath-orig], with few changes. It is informative, intended to supply more examples and give an impression for what could be a typical JSONPath API.

A.1. Implementation

JSONPath is implemented in JavaScript for client-side usage and ported over to PHP for use on the server.
A.2. Usage

All you need to do is downloading either of the files

* "jsonpah.js" [JSONPath-impl]
* "jsonpah.php" [JSONPath-impl]

include it in your program and use the simple API consisting of one single function.

```javascript
jsonpah(obj, expr [, args])
```

A.3. Parameters

```javascript
obj (object|array): Object representing the JSON data item.
expr (string): JSONPath expression string.
args (object|undefined): Object controlling path evaluation and output. Currently only one member is supported.
```

```javascript
args.resultType ("VALUE"|"PATH"): causes the result to be either matching values (default) or normalized path expressions.
```

A.4. Return value

```javascript
(array|false): Array holding either values or normalized path expressions matching the input path expression, which can be used for lazy evaluation. "false" in case of no match.
```

A.5. JavaScript Example

```javascript
var o = { /*...*/ }, // the 'store' JSON object from above
    res1 = jsonPath(o, "$..author"),
    res2 = jsonPath(o, "$..author",
    {resultType:"PATH"}),

    .toJSONString();
```

A.6. PHP example

We need here to convert the JSON string to a PHP array first. I am using Michal Migurski’s JSON parser [JSON-PHP] for that.
require_once('json.php'); // JSON parser
require_once('jsonp.php'); // JSONPath evaluator

$json = '{ ... }'; // JSON data item from above

$parser = new Services_JSON(SERVICES_JSON_LOOSE_TYPE);
$o = $parser->decode($json);
$match1 = jsonPath($o, "$..author");
$match2 = jsonPath($o, "$..author",
    array("resultType" => "PATH"));
$res1 = $parser->encode($match1);
$res2 = $parser->encode($match2);

A.7. Results

Both JavaScript and PHP example result in the following JSON arrays (as strings):

res1:
[
  "Nigel Rees",
  "Evelyn Waugh",
  "Herman Melville",
  "J. R. R. Tolkien"
]

res2:
[
  "$["store"]['book'][0]['author']",
  "$["store"]['book'][1]['author']",
  "$["store"]['book'][2]['author']",
  "$["store"]['book'][3]['author']"
]

Please note that the return value of jsonPath is an array, which is also a valid JSON data item. So you might want to apply jsonPath to the resulting data item again or use one of your favorite array methods as sort with it.

Acknowledgements

This specification is based on Stefan Gössner's original online article defining JSONPath [JSONPath-orig].

The books example was taken from http://coli.lili.uni-bielefeld.de/~andreas/Seminare/sommer02/books.xml -- a dead link now.

Authors’ Addresses

Gössner & Bormann    Expires 13 January 2021
Updated registration rules for URI.ARPA
draft-hardie-dispatch-rfc3405-update-04

Abstract

This document updates RFC 3405 by removing references to the IETF tree from the procedures for requesting that a URI scheme be inserted into the uri.arpa zone.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Part five of the Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS), RFC 3405 [RFC3405], describes the registration procedures for assignments in URI.ARPA. The document requires that registrations be in the "IETF tree" of URI registrations. The use of URI scheme name trees was defined in RFC 2717 [RFC2717] but discontinued by RFC 4395 [RFC4395] and its successors. Since the use of trees was discontinued, there is no way in the current process set out in BCP 35 [RFC7595] to meet the requirement to register within that tree.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Updated Requirements

This document removes the normative requirement from RFC 3405 for registrations in URI.ARPA to be from the IETF URI Tree.

All registrations in URI.ARPA MUST now be for schemes which are permanent registrations, as they are described in BCP 35.

3. IANA Considerations

This entire document is updated instructions to IANA.

4. Security Considerations

This update does not change the Security Considerations in RFC 3405

5. References
5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References


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Secure Frame (SFrame)
draft-omara-sframe-03

Abstract

This document describes the Secure Frame (SFrame) end-to-end encryption and authentication mechanism for media frames in a multiparty conference call, in which central media servers (SFUs) can access the media metadata needed to make forwarding decisions without having access to the actual media. The proposed mechanism differs from other approaches through its use of media frames as the encryptable unit, instead of individual RTP packets, which makes it more bandwidth efficient and also allows use with non-RTP transports.

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Modern multi-party video call systems use Selective Forwarding Unit (SFU) servers to efficiently route RTP streams to call endpoints based on factors such as available bandwidth, desired video size, codec support, and other factors. In order for the SFU to work properly though, it needs to be able to access RTP metadata and RTCP feedback messages, which is not possible if all RTP/RTCP traffic is end-to-end encrypted.

As such, two layers of encryptions and authentication are required:

1. Hop-by-hop (HBH) encryption of media, metadata, and feedback messages between the endpoints and SFU

2. End-to-end (E2E) encryption of media between the endpoints

While DTLS-SRTP can be used as an efficient HBH mechanism, it is inherently point-to-point and therefore not suitable for a SFU context. In addition, given the various scenarios in which video calling occurs, minimizing the bandwidth overhead of end-to-end encryption is also an important goal.

This document proposes a new end-to-end encryption mechanism known as SFrame, specifically designed to work in group conference calls with SFUs.
2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

SFU: Selective Forwarding Unit (AKA RTP Switch)

IV: Initialization Vector

MAC: Message Authentication Code

E2EE: End to End Encryption

HBH: Hop By Hop

KMS: Key Management System

3. Goals

SFrame is designed to be a suitable E2EE protection scheme for conference call media in a broad range of scenarios, as outlined by the following goals:
1. Provide an secure E2EE mechanism for audio and video in conference calls that can be used with arbitrary SFU servers.

2. Decouple media encryption from key management to allow SFrame to be used with an arbitrary KMS.

3. Minimize packet expansion to allow successful conferencing in as many network conditions as possible.

4. Independence from the underlying transport, including use in non-RTP transports, e.g., WebTransport.

5. When used with RTP and its associated error resilience mechanisms, i.e., RTX and FEC, require no special handling for RTX and FEC packets.

6. Minimize the changes needed in SFU servers.

7. Minimize the changes needed in endpoints.

8. Work with the most popular audio and video codecs used in conferencing scenarios.

4. SFrame

We propose a frame level encryption mechanism that provides effective end-to-end encryption, is simple to implement, has no dependencies on RTP, and minimizes encryption bandwidth overhead. Because SFrame encrypts the full frame, rather than individual packets, bandwidth overhead is reduced by having a single IV and authentication tag for each media frame.

Also, because media is encrypted prior to packetization, the encrypted frame is packetized using a generic RTP packetizer instead of codec-dependent packetization mechanisms. With this move to a generic packetizer, media metadata is moved from codec-specific mechanisms to a generic frame RTP header extension which, while visible to the SFU, is authenticated end-to-end. This extension includes metadata needed for SFU routing such as resolution, frame beginning and end markers, etc.

The generic packetizer splits the E2E encrypted media frame into one or more RTP packets and adds the SFrame header to the beginning of the first packet and an auth tag to the end of the last packet.
The E2EE keys used to encrypt the frame are exchanged out of band using a secure E2EE channel.
4.1. SFrame Format

Since each endpoint can send multiple media layers, each frame will have a unique frame counter that will be used to derive the encryption IV. The frame counter must be unique and monotonically increasing to avoid IV reuse.

As each sender will use their own key for encryption, so the SFrame header will include the key id to allow the receiver to identify the key that needs to be used for decrypting.

Both the frame counter and the key id are encoded in a variable length format to decrease the overhead. The length is up to 8 bytes and is represented in 3 bits in the SFrame header: 000 represents a length of 1, 001 a length of 2... The first byte in the SFrame header is fixed and contains the header metadata with the following format:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-------------------+
| R | LEN | X | K |
+-------------------+
```

SFrame header metadata

Reserved (R): 1 bit This field MUST be set to zero on sending, and MUST be ignored by receivers. Counter Length (LEN): 3 bits This field indicates the length of the CTR fields in bytes (1-8). Extended Key Id Flag (X): 1 bit Indicates if the key field contains
the key id or the key length. Key or Key Length: 3 bits This field contains the key id (KID) if the X flag is set to 0, or the key length (KLEN) if set to 1.

If X flag is 0 then the KID is in the range of 0-7 and the frame counter (CTR) is found in the next LEN bytes:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
|R|LEN |0| KID |    CTR... (length=LEN)    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```

Frame counter byte length (LEN): 3bits The frame counter length in bytes (1-8). Key id (KID): 3 bits The key id (0-7). Frame counter (CTR): (Variable length) Frame counter value up to 8 bytes long.

If X flag is 1 then KLEN is the length of the key (KID), that is found after the SFrame header metadata byte. After the key id (KID), the frame counter (CTR) will be found in the next LEN bytes:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
|R|LEN |1|KLEN |   KID... (length=KLEN)    |    CTR... (length=LEN)    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```

Frame counter byte length (LEN): 3bits The frame counter length in bytes (1-8). Key length (KLEN): 3 bits The key length in bytes (1-8). Key id (KID): (Variable length) The key id value up to 8 bytes long. Frame counter (CTR): (Variable length) Frame counter value up to 8 bytes long.

4.3. Encryption Schema

SFrame encryption uses an AEAD encryption algorithm and hash function defined by the ciphersuite in use (see Section 4.4). We will refer to the following aspects of the AEAD algorithm below:

* "AEAD.Encrypt" and "AEAD.Decrypt" - The encryption and decryption functions for the AEAD. We follow the convention of RFC 5116 [RFC5116] and consider the authentication tag part of the ciphertext produced by "AEAD.Encrypt" (as opposed to a separate field as in SRTP [RFC3711]).

* "AEAD.Nk" - The size of a key for the encryption algorithm, in bytes

* "AEAD.Nn" - The size of a nonce for the encryption algorithm, in bytes
4.3.1. Key Selection

Each SFrame encryption or decryption operation is premised on a single secret "base\_key", which is labeled with an integer KID value signaled in the SFrame header.

The sender and receivers need to agree on which key should be used for a given KID. The process for provisioning keys and their KID values is beyond the scope of this specification, but its security properties will bound the assurances that SFrame provides. For example, if SFrame is used to provide E2E security against intermediary media nodes, then SFrame keys MUST be negotiated in a way that does not make them accessible to these intermediaries.

For each known KID value, the client stores the corresponding symmetric key "base\_key". For keys that can be used for encryption, the client also stores the next counter value CTR to be used when encrypting (initially 0).

When encrypting a frame, the application specifies which KID is to be used, and the counter is incremented after successful encryption. When decrypting, the "base\_key" for decryption is selected from the available keys using the KID value in the SFrame Header.

A given key MUST NOT be used for encryption by multiple senders. Such reuse would result in multiple encrypted frames being generated with the same (key, nonce) pair, which harms the protections provided by many AEAD algorithms. Implementations SHOULD mark each key as usable for encryption or decryption, never both.

Note that the set of available keys might change over the lifetime of a real-time session. In such cases, the client will need to manage key usage to avoid media loss due to a key being used to encrypt before all receivers are able to use it to decrypt. For example, an application may make decryption-only keys available immediately, but delay the use of encryption-only keys until (a) all receivers have acknowledged receipt of the new key or (b) a timeout expires.

4.3.2. Key Derivation

SFrame encryption and decryption use a key and salt derived from the "base\_key" associated to a KID. Given a "base\_key" value, the key and salt are derived using HKDF [RFC5869] as follows:

\[sframe\_secret = HKDF-Extract(K, 'SFrame10')\]
\[sframe\_key = HKDF-Expand(sframe\_secret, 'key', AEAD.Nk)\]
\[sframe\_salt = HKDF-Expand(sframe\_secret, 'salt', AEAD.Nn)\]
The hash function used for HKDF is determined by the ciphersuite in use.

4.3.3. Encryption

After encoding the frame and before packetizing it, the necessary media metadata will be moved out of the encoded frame buffer, to be used later in the RTP generic frame header extension. The encoded frame, the metadata buffer and the frame counter are passed to SFrame encryptor.

SFrame encryption uses the AEAD encryption algorithm for the ciphersuite in use. The key for the encryption is the "sframe\_key" and the nonce is formed by XORing the "sframe\_salt" with the current counter, encoded as a big-endian integer of length "AEAD.Nn".

The encryptor forms an SFrame header using the S, CTR, and KID values provided. The encoded header is provided as AAD to the AEAD encryption operation, with any frame metadata appended.

```python
def encrypt(S, CTR, KID, frame_metadata, frame):
    sframe_key, sframe_salt = key_store[KID]
    frame_ctr = encode_big_endian(CTR, AEAD.Nn)
    frame_nonce = xor(sframe_salt, frame_ctr)
    header = encode_sframe_header(S, CTR, KID)
    frame_aad = header + frame_metadata
    encrypted_frame = AEAD.Encrypt(sframe_key, frame_nonce, frame_aad, frame)
    return header + encrypted_frame
```

The encrypted payload is then passed to a generic RTP packetized to construct the RTP packets and encrypt it using SRTP keys for the HBH encryption to the media server.
Figure 2: Encryption flow
4.3.4. Decryption

The receiving clients buffer all packets that belong to the same frame using the frame beginning and ending marks in the generic RTP frame header extension, and once all packets are available, it passes it to SFrame for decryption. The KID field in the SFrame header is used to find the right key for the encrypted frame.

```python
def decrypt(frame_metadata, sframe):
    header, encrypted_frame = split_header(sframe)
    S, CTR, KID = parse_header(header)
    sframe_key, sframe_salt = key_store[KID]
    frame_ctr = encode_big_endian(CTR, AEAD.Nn)
    frame_nonce = xor(sframe_salt, frame_ctr)
    frame_aad = header + frame_metadata
    return AEAD.Decrypt(sframe_key, frame_nonce, frame_aad, encrypted_frame)
```

For frames that are failed to decrypt because there is key available for the KID in the SFrame header, the client MAY buffer the frame and retry decryption once a key with that KID is received.

4.3.5. Duplicate Frames

Unlike messaging application, in video calls, receiving a duplicate frame doesn’t necessary mean the client is under a replay attack, there are other reasons that might cause this, for example the sender might just be sending them in case of packet loss. SFrame decryptors use the highest received frame counter to protect against this. It allows only older frame pithing a short interval to support out of order delivery.

4.4. Ciphersuites

Each SFrame session uses a single ciphersuite that specifies the following primitives:

- A hash function used for key derivation and hashing signature inputs
- An AEAD encryption algorithm [RFC5116] used for frame encryption, optionally with a truncated authentication tag
- [Optional] A signature algorithm

This document defines the following ciphersuites:
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nh</th>
<th>Nk</th>
<th>Nn</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA256_8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA256_4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>AES_GCM_128_SHA256</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>AES_GCM_256_SHA512</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the "AES_CM" suites, the length of the authentication tag is indicated by the last value: "_8" indicates an eight-byte tag and "_4" indicates a four-byte tag.

In a session that uses multiple media streams, different ciphersuites might be configured for different media streams. For example, in order to conserve bandwidth, a session might use a ciphersuite with 80-bit tags for video frames and another ciphersuite with 32-bit tags for audio frames.

#### 4.4.1. AES-CM with SHA2

In order to allow very short tag sizes, we define a synthetic AEAD function using the authenticated counter mode of AES together with HMAC for authentication. We use an encrypt-then-MAC approach as in SRTP [RFC3711].

Before encryption or decryption, encryption and authentication subkeys are derived from the single AEAD key using HKDF. The subkeys are derived as follows, where "Nk" represents the key size for the AES block cipher in use and "Nh" represents the output size of the hash function:

```python
def derive_subkeys(sframe_key):
    aead_secret = HKDF-Extract(sframe_key, 'SFrame10 AES CM AEAD')
    enc_key = HKDF-Expand(aead_secret, 'enc', Nk)
    auth_key = HKDF-Expand(aead_secret, 'auth', Nh)
    return enc_key, auth_key
```

The AEAD encryption and decryption functions are then composed of individual calls to the CM encrypt function and HMAC. The resulting MAC value is truncated to a number of bytes "tag_len" fixed by the ciphersuite.
def compute_tag(auth_key, nonce, aad, ct):
    aad_len = encode_big_endian(len(aad), 8)
    ct_len = encode_big_endian(len(ct), 8)
    auth_data = aad_len + ct_len + nonce + aad + ct
    tag = HMAC(auth_key, auth_data)
    return truncate(tag, tag_len)

def AEAD.Encrypt(key, nonce, aad, pt):
    enc_key, auth_key = derive_subkeys(key)
    ct = AES-CM.Encrypt(enc_key, nonce, pt)
    tag = compute_tag(auth_key, nonce, aad, ct)
    return ct + tag

def AEAD.Decrypt(key, nonce, aad, ct):
    inner_ct, tag = split_ct(ct, tag_len)

    enc_key, auth_key = derive_subkeys(key)
    candidate_tag = compute_tag(auth_key, nonce, aad, inner_ct)

    if !constant_time_equal(tag, candidate_tag):
        raise Exception("Authentication Failure")

    return AES-CM.Decrypt(enc_key, nonce, inner_ct)

5. Key Management

SFrame must be integrated with an E2E key management framework to exchange and rotate the keys used for SFrame encryption and/or signing. The key management framework provides the following functions:

* Provisioning KID/"base_key" mappings to participating clients

* (optional) Provisioning clients with a list of trusted signing keys

* Updating the above data as clients join or leave

It is up to the application to define a rotation schedule for keys. For example, one application might have an ephemeral group for every call and keep rotating key when end points joins or leave the call, while another application could have a persistent group that can be used for multiple calls and simply derives ephemeral symmetric keys for a specific call.
5.1. Sender Keys

If the participants in a call have a pre-existing E2E-secure channel, they can use it to distribute SFrame keys. Each client participating in a call generates a fresh encryption key and optionally a signing key pair. The client then uses the E2E-secure channel to send their encryption key and signing public key to the other participants.

In this scheme, it is assumed that receivers have a signal outside of SFrame for which client has sent a given frame, for example the RTP SSRC. SFrame KID values are then used to distinguish generations of the sender’s key. At the beginning of a call, each sender encrypts with KID=0. Thereafter, the sender can ratchet their key forward for forward secrecy:

\[
\text{sender_key}[i+1] = \text{HKDF-Expand(} \\
\text{HKDF-Extract(sender_key}[i], \text{’SFrame10 ratchet’),} \\
\text{’’, AEAD.Nk)}
\]

The sender signals such an update by incrementing their KID value. A receiver who receives from a sender with a new KID computes the new key as above. The old key may be kept for some time to allow for out-of-order delivery, but should be deleted promptly.

If a new participant joins mid-call, they will need to receive from each sender (a) the current sender key for that sender, (b) the signing key for the sender, if used, and (c) the current KID value for the sender. Evicting a participant requires each sender to send a fresh sender key to all receivers.

5.2. MLS

The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol provides group authenticated key exchange [I-D.ietf-mls-architecture] [I-D.ietf-mls-protocol]. In principle, it could be used to instantiate the sender key scheme above, but it can also be used more efficiently directly.

MLS creates a linear sequence of keys, each of which is shared among the members of a group at a given point in time. When a member joins or leaves the group, a new key is produced that is known only to the augmented or reduced group. Each step in the lifetime of the group is known as an "epoch", and each member of the group is assigned an "index" that is constant for the time they are in the group.
In SFrame, we derive per-sender "base\_key" values from the group secret for an epoch, and use the KID field to signal the epoch and sender index. First, we use the MLS exporter to compute a shared SFrame secret for the epoch.

\[
sframe\_epoch\_secret = MLS\text{-}Exporter("SFrame 10 MLS", \"\", AEAD.Nk)
\]

\[
sender\_base\_key[index] = HKDF\text{-}Expand(sframe\_epoch\_secret, encode\_big\_Endian(index, 4), AEAD.Nk)
\]

For compactness, do not send the whole epoch number. Instead, we send only its low-order E bits. Note that E effectively defines a re-ordering window, since no more than \(2^E\) epoch can be active at a given time. Receivers MUST be prepared for the epoch counter to roll over, removing an old epoch when a new epoch with the same E lower bits is introduced. (Sender indices cannot be similarly compressed.)

\[
KID = (sender\_index << E) + (epoch \% (1 << E))
\]

Once an SFrame stack has been provisioned with the "sframe\_epoch\_secret" for an epoch, it can compute the required KIDs and "sender\_base\_key" values on demand, as it needs to encrypt/decrypt for a given member.

```
\[
\text{Epoch 17} +--+-- \text{index=33} \rightarrow KID = 0x211
\quad +-- \text{index=51} \rightarrow KID = 0x331
\]

\[
\text{Epoch 16} +--+-- \text{index=2} \rightarrow KID = 0x20
\]

\[
\text{Epoch 15} +--+-- \text{index=3} \rightarrow KID = 0x3f
\quad +-- \text{index=5} \rightarrow KID = 0x5f
\]

\[
\text{Epoch 14} +--+-- \text{index=3} \rightarrow KID = 0x3e
\quad +-- \text{index=7} \rightarrow KID = 0x7e
\quad +-- \text{index=20} \rightarrow KID = 0x14e
\]
```

...
MLS also provides an authenticated signing key pair for each participant. When SFrame uses signatures, these are the keys used to generate SFrame signatures.

6. Media Considerations

6.1. SFU

Selective Forwarding Units (SFUs) as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7667#section-3.7 receives the RTP streams from each participant and selects which ones should be forwarded to each of the other participants. There are several approaches about how to do this stream selection but in general, in order to do so, the SFU needs to access metadata associated to each frame and modify the RTP information of the incoming packets when they are transmitted to the received participants.

This section describes how this normal SFU modes of operation interacts with the E2EE provided by SFrame

6.1.1. LastN and RTP stream reuse

The SFU may choose to send only a certain number of streams based on the voice activity of the participants. To reduce the number of SDP O/A required to establish a new RTP stream, the SFU may decide to reuse previously existing RTP sessions or even pre-allocate a predefined number of RTP streams and choose in each moment in time which participant media will be sending through it. This means that in the same RTP stream (defined by either SSRC or MID) may carry media from different streams of different participants. As different keys are used by each participant for encoding their media, the receiver will be able to verify which is the sender of the media coming within the RTP stream at any given point in time, preventing the SFU trying to impersonate any of the participants with another participant’s media. Note that in order to prevent impersonation by a malicious participant (not the SFU) usage of the signature is required. In case of video, the a new signature should be started each time a key frame is sent to allow the receiver to identify the source faster after a switch.

6.1.2. Simulcast

When using simulcast, the same input image will produce N different encoded frames (one per simulcast layer) which would be processed independently by the frame encryptor and assigned an unique counter for each.
6.1.3. SVC

In both temporal and spatial scalability, the SFU may choose to drop layers in order to match a certain bitrate or forward specific media sizes or frames per second. In order to support it, the sender MUST encode each spatial layer of a given picture in a different frame. That is, an RTP frame may contain more than one SFrame encrypted frame with an incrementing frame counter.

6.2. Video Key Frames

Forward and Post-Compromise Security requires that the e2ee keys are updated anytime a participant joins/leave the call.

The key exchange happens async and on a different path than the SFU signaling and media. So it may happen that when a new participant joins the call and the SFU side requests a key frame, the sender generates the e2ee encrypted frame with a key not known by the receiver, so it will be discarded. When the sender updates his sending key with the new key, it will send it in a non-key frame, so the receiver will be able to decrypt it, but not decode it.

Receiver will re-request an key frame then, but due to sender and sfu policies, that new key frame could take some time to be generated.

If the sender sends a key frame when the new e2ee key is in use, the time required for the new participant to display the video is minimized.

6.3. Partial Decoding

Some codes support partial decoding, where it can decrypt individual packets without waiting for the full frame to arrive, with SFrame this won’t be possible because the decoder will not access the packets until the entire frame is arrived and decrypted.

7. Overhead

The encryption overhead will vary between audio and video streams, because in audio each packet is considered a separate frame, so it will always have extra MAC and IV, however a video frame usually consists of multiple RTP packets. The number of bytes overhead per frame is calculated as the following 1 + FrameCounter length + 4 The constant 1 is the SFrame header byte and 4 bytes for the HBH authentication tag for both audio and video packets.
7.1. Audio

Using three different audio frame durations 20ms (50 packets/s) 40ms (25 packets/s) 100ms (10 packets/s) Up to 3 bytes frame counter (3.8 days of data for 20ms frame duration) and 4 bytes fixed MAC length.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter len</th>
<th>Packets</th>
<th>Overhead @20ms</th>
<th>Overhead @40ms</th>
<th>Overhead @100ms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-255</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>255-65K</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>65K-16M</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

7.2. Video

The per-stream overhead bits per second as calculated for the following video encodings: 30fps@1000Kbps (4 packets per frame) 30fps@512Kbps (2 packets per frame) 15fps@200Kbps (2 packets per frame) 7.5fps@30Kbps (1 packet per frame) Overhead bps = (Counter length + 1 + 4) * 8 * fps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter len</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Overhead @30fps</th>
<th>Overhead @15fps</th>
<th>Overhead @7.5fps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-255</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>256-65K</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>65K-16M</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16M-4B</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
7.3. SFrame vs PERC-lite

[RFC8723] has significant overhead over SFrame because the overhead is per packet, not per frame, and OHB (Original Header Block) which duplicates any RTP header/extension field modified by the SFU. [I-D.murillo-perc-lite] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/perc/SB0qMHWz6EsDtzz3yIEX0HWp5IEY/ is slightly better because it doesn’t use the OHB anymore, however it still does per packet encryption using SRTP. Below the overhead in [I-D.murillo-perc-lite] implemented by Cosmos Software which uses extra 11 bytes per packet to preserve the PT, SEQ_NUM, TIME_STAMP and SSRC fields in addition to the extra MAC tag per packet.

\[
\text{OverheadPerPacket} = 11 + \text{MAC length} \\
\text{Overhead bps} = \text{PacketPerSecond} \times \text{OverheadPerPacket} \times 8
\]

Similar to SFrame, we will assume the HBH authentication tag length will always be 4 bytes for audio and video even though it is not the case in this [I-D.murillo-perc-lite] implementation.

7.3.1. Audio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overhead bps@20ms</th>
<th>Overhead bps@40ms</th>
<th>Overhead bps@100ms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

7.3.2. Video

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overhead bps@30fps</th>
<th>Overhead bps@15fps</th>
<th>Overhead <a href="mailto:bps@7.5fps">bps@7.5fps</a></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4 packets per frame)</td>
<td>14400</td>
<td>7200</td>
<td>3600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 packets per frame)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 packet per frame)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

For a conference with a single incoming audio stream (0 50 pps) and 4 incoming video streams (0200 Kbps), the savings in overhead is 34800 - 9600 = ~25 Kbps, or ~3%.
8. Security Considerations

8.1. No Per-Sender Authentication

SFrame does not provide per-sender authentication of media data. Any sender in a session can send media that will be associated with any other sender. This is because SFrame uses symmetric encryption to protect media data, so that any receiver also has the keys required to encrypt packets for the sender.

8.2. Key Management

Key exchange mechanism is out of scope of this document, however every client MUST change their keys when new clients joins or leaves the call for "Forward Secrecy" and "Post Compromise Security".

8.3. Authentication tag length

The cipher suites defined in this draft use short authentication tags for encryption, however it can easily support other ciphers with full authentication tag if the short ones are proved insecure.

9. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA.

10. Test Vectors

This section provides a set of test vectors that implementations can use to verify that they correctly implement SFrame encryption and decryption. For each ciphersuite, we provide:

* [in] The "base_key" value (hex encoded)
* [out] The "secret", "key", and "salt" values derived from the "base_key" (hex encoded)

* A plaintext value that is encrypted in the following encryption cases

* A sequence of encryption cases, including:
  - [in] The "KID" and "CTR" values to be included in the header
  - [out] The resulting encoded header (hex encoded)
  - [out] The nonce computed from the "salt" and "CTR" values
The ciphertext resulting from encrypting the plaintext with these parameters (hex encoded)

An implementation should reproduce the output values given the input values: * An implementation should be able to encrypt with the input values and the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. * An implementation must be able to decrypt with the input values and the ciphertext to generate the plaintext.

Line breaks and whitespace within values are inserted to conform to the width requirements of the RFC format. They should be removed before use. These test vectors are also available in JSON format at [TestVectors].

10.1. AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA256_4

CipherSuite: 0x01
Base Key: 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
Key: 343d3290f5c0b936415bea9a43c6f5a2
Salt: 42d662fbd5cd81eb3aad79a
Plaintext: 46726f6d20686561766e6c7920726d6f6e79202f2f205468697320756e6976657273616c206265616e
KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x0
Header: 1700
Nonce: 42d662fbd5cd81eb3aad79a
Ciphertext: 170065c67c6fb784631a7db1b589ffb6 2d75b78e28b0899e632fbb3b944747a6382d75b6bd3788dc7b71b9295c7fb90b5098f7add14ef329
KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x1
Header: 1701
Nonce: 42d662fbd5cd81eb3aad79b
Ciphertext: 1701ec742e98d667be810f153ff0d4da
d7969f69b310aa7c6b9cb911e83af09b0f0a6d74772d8195c8c9dae3878fd1cb10edb4176d12e2387a
KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x2
Header: 1702
Nonce: 42d662fbad5cd81eb3ada798
Ciphertext: 1702ac9b495d37a1e48c712ade5cba72
df0bf90f24aa022a454cfb92d8b87cd5
4335fb6b9eeded6a5aa4e2643d7a0994
6646001d0a41b09557

KID: 0xf
CTR: 0xaa
Header: 190faa
Nonce: 42d662fbad5cd81eb3ada730
Ciphertext: 190faeeaa5adc70ca9d6ebd36805fa8
7d2351dd02c55c751cd351a7fcbd7f092
7b474eae3e800033e08100a440002da1
7579678b36dc275789d5

KID: 0x1ff
CTR: 0xaaa
Header: 1a01ffaa
Nonce: 42d662fbad5cd81eb3ada730
Ciphertext: 1a01ffaeaa5adc70ca9d6ebd36805fa8
97d2351dd02c55c751cd351a7fcbd7f092
927b474eae3e800033e08100a440002da1
a17579678b36dc9bbe558b

KID: 0x1ff
CTR: 0xaaa
Header: 2a01ffaaaa
Nonce: 42d662fbad5cd81eb3ada7d30
Ciphertext: 2a01ffaaaa170500225053f1a044e51c
4e91a6b783f69b174fb31531d95d5b8
dd7926c9d430b4f32b9b49dd6e0a5
aba2427a94ff97f81dcd2826

KID: 0xffffffffffffff
CTR: 0xffffffffffffff
Header: 7fffffffffffffff
Nonce: 42d662fbada327e14c552865
Ciphertext: 7fffffffffffffff7fffffffffffffff1355d5117bc8386f4382ca468a4f99
2ff77bf7d12f4391be6b33e8fb638dc4
8aa82f57fd91430c714def0b2089c8bf
b2ac9da92415

10.2. AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA256_8
CipherSuite: 0x02
Base Key: 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
Key: 3fce747d505e46ec9b92d9f58ee7a5d4
Salt: 77fbf5f1d82c73f6d2b353c9
Plaintext: 46726f6d2068656176696c792068726d6f6e79202f2f205468697320756e6976657273616c206672616d65206265
67616e

KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x0
Header: 1700
Nonce: 77fbf5f1d82c73f6d2b353c9
Ciphertext: 1700647513fcee71ae4233747d505e46ec9b92d9f58ee7a5d4

KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x1
Header: 1701
Nonce: 77fbf5f1d82c73f6d2b353c8
Ciphertext: 17019e1bdf713b0d4c02f3dbf50a72ea

KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x2
Header: 1702
Nonce: 77fbf5f1d82c73f6d2b353cb
Ciphertext: 170220ad36fd9191453ace2d36a175ad

KID: 0xf
CTR: 0x0aa
Header: 190faa
Nonce: 77fbf5f1d82c73f6d2b35363
Ciphertext: 190faadab9b284a4b9e3a6b9cdcae

Omara, et al. Expires 17 February 2022
10.3. AES_GCM_128_SHA256

CipherSuite: 0x03
Base Key: 303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f
Key: 2ea2e8163ff5c0613e6fa9f20a213da
Salt: a80478b3f6fba19983d540d5
Plaintext: 46726f6d2068656c7973202f2f2068616e6976657273616c20626567616e

KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x0
Header: 1700
Nonce: a80478b3f6fba19983d540d5
Ciphertext: 170000e426255e47ed70dd7d15d69d759
                  bf459032ca15f5e8b2a917e7d348aa7c1
                  86d403f620801c495b1717a35097411a
                  a97cbb140671eb3b49ac3775926db74d
                  57b91e8e6c
KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x1
Header: 1701
Nonce: a80478b3f6fba19983d540d4
Ciphertext: 170103bbafa34ada8a6b9f2066bc34a1959d87384c9f4bfce34fed58e938bde14339310b1aeb55b48d91d5b0db3ea67e3d0e02b843af4d41630c940b1948e72dd45396a43a

KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x2
Header: 1702
Nonce: a80478b3f6fba19983d540d7
Ciphertext: 170258d58adebd8bf6f3cc0c1fcacf34ba4d7a763b2683fe302a57f1be7f2a274bf81b2236995fec1203cadb146cd402e1c52d5e6a10989dfe0f4116da1ee4c2fad0d21f8f

KID: 0xf
CTR: 0xaa
Header: 190faa
Nonce: a80478b3f6fba19983d5407f
Ciphertext: 190faad0b1743bf5248f90869c945636655724d16bbe08060875815565e90b114f9ccdbba192422b33848a1ae1e3bd266a001b2f5bb727112772e0072ea8679ca1850cf11d8

KID: 0x1ff
CTR: 0xaaa
Header: 1a01ffaa
Nonce: a80478b3f6fba19983d5407f
Ciphertext: 1a01ffaad0b1743bf5248f90869c945636655724d16bbe08060875815565e90b114f9ccdbba192422b33848a1ae1e3bd2d266a001b2f5bb7c63bd3973c19bd57127f565380ed4a
10.4. AES_GCM_256_SHA512

CipherSuite: 0x04
Base Key: 404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
Key: 436774b0b5ae45633d96547f8f3cb06c
Salt: 31ed26f90a072e6aee562298
Plaintext: 46726f6d2068656e74657374207468697320616e796d6520626567696e616c
KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x0
Header: 1700
Nonce: 31ed26f90a072e6aee562298
Ciphertext: 1700f3e297c1e95207710bd31ccc4ba3
96fbe7b257440bde638ff0f3c891154
0136df61b26220249d6c432c245ae8d5
5ef45bfcff32530a15aeaaaf313a03838
e51bd45652
KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x1
Header: 1701
Nonce: 31ed26f90a072e6ae646299
Ciphertext: 170193268b0bf030071bf443b6b447
1bd6fb1cc81bc9625f4697b0336ff4665
d15f152f02169448d8a967fb06359a87
d2145398de0ce3fbeb257b0992a3da153
7590459f3c

KID: 0x7
CTR: 0x2
Header: 1702
Nonce: 31ed26f90a072e6ae64629a
Ciphertext: 1702649691ba27c401a41280fba4657
c03fa7fe21c8f5c862e9094227c3ca3e
c0d9468b1a2cb060ff0978f25a24e6b1
06f5a6e1053c1b8f5fce794d88a0e481
8c081e18ea

KID: 0xf
CTR: 0xaaa
Header: 190fafa
Nonce: 31ed26f90a072e6ae646232
Ciphertext: 190fafa2858c01b5dd231c1f26819490
521678603a050448d563c50b1fd890d
02ead01d75f4f074ecb6f32da9b2f3859
f380b4f47d4edd1e15f42f9a2d7ecfac
99067e238321

KID: 0x1ff
CTR: 0xaaa
Header: la01ffaaa
Nonce: 31ed26f90a072e6ae646232
Ciphertext: 1a01ffaaa2858c01b5dd231c1f268194
90521678603a050448d563c50b1fd89
0d0ebead01d75f4f074ecb6f32da9b2f38
59f380bb4f47d4e3b7f040eb10ec25b81
26b2ce7b1d9d31
KID: 0x1ff
CTR: 0xaaaa
Header: 2a01ffaaaa
Nonce: 31ed26f90a072e6ae64c832
Ciphertext: 2a01ffaaaad9bc6a258a07d210a814d5
            45eca70321c0e87498ada65c708b7ea
d162ffcf4fbaab1e8b2650590a87122b
            4d95fe36bd88b278812166d26e046ed0
            a530b7ee232ee0f2

KID: 0xffffffffffffff
CTR: 0xffffffffffffff
Header: 7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Nonce: 31ed26f90af8d195119b9d67
Ciphertext: 7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffaf
            480d4779ce0c02b5137ee6a61e026c04
            ac999cb0c97319feceeb258d58df23bc
e14979e5c67a43177b34498062e72f9
            39ca42ec84fbbc7b50eff923f515a2df
            760c

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