

Extension Encryption

(Preview)

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Problem Statement

- WebRTC implementations use a lot of extensions (e.g., Safari)

```
a=extmap:1 urn:ietf:params:rtp-hdrext:ssrc-audio-level
a=extmap:14 urn:ietf:params:rtp-hdrext:toffset
a=extmap:2 http://www.webrtc.org/experiments/rtp-hdrext/abs-send-time
a=extmap:13 urn:3gpp:video-orientation
a=extmap:3 http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-holmer-rmcat-transport-wide-cc-extensions-01
a=extmap:12 http://www.webrtc.org/experiments/rtp-hdrext/playout-delay
a=extmap:11 http://www.webrtc.org/experiments/rtp-hdrext/video-content-type
a=extmap:7 http://www.webrtc.org/experiments/rtp-hdrext/video-timing
a=extmap:8 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtext-framemarking-07
a=extmap:9 http://www.webrtc.org/experiments/rtp-hdrext/color-space
a=extmap:4 urn:ietf:params:rtp-hdrext:sdes:mid
a=extmap:5 urn:ietf:params:rtp-hdrext:sdes:rtp-stream-id
a=extmap:6 urn:ietf:params:rtp-hdrext:sdes:repaired-rtp-stream-id
```

- Some of these are at least somewhat sensitive
 - e.g., ssrc-audio-level, video-content-type
- All of these leak some amount of metadata
 - e.g., application type, HDR support, HW/SW encoder

Current

None of the RTP header is encrypted, including extensions

```
0      1      2      3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+
|V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number |
+-----+-----+-----+
| timestamp |
+-----+
| synchronization source (SSRC) identifier |
+=====+
| contributing source (CSRC) identifiers |
|
| .... |
+-----+
| 0xBE | 0xDE | length=6 |
+-----+
| ID=1 | len=7 | SMTPE timecode (long form) |
+-----+
| SMTPE timecode (continued) |
+-----+
| SMTPE (cont'd) | ID=2 | len=2 | toffset |
+-----+
| toffset (ct'd) | ID=3 | len=0 | audio level | ID=4 | len=6 |
+-----+
| NTP timestamp (Variant B) |
+-----+
| NTP timestamp (Variant B, cont'd) | padding = 0 |
+-----+
```

Solution

- To prevent metadata leaks, we should encrypt RTP header extensions, and make this MTI for WebRTC implementations

Option A: RFC 6904

```

0      1      2      3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| timestamp |
+-----+
| synchronization source (SSRC) identifier |
+-----+
| contributing source (CSRC) identifiers |
|
| .... |
+-----+
| 0xBE | 0xDE | length=6 |
+-----+
| ID=1 | len=7 | SMTPE timecode (long form) |
+-----+
| SMTPE timecode (continued) |
+-----+
| SMTPE (cont'd)| ID=2 | len=2 | toffset |
+-----+
| toffset (ct'd)| ID=3 | len=0 | audio level | ID=4 | len=6 |
+-----+
| NTP timestamp (Variant B) |
+-----+
| NTP timestamp (Variant B, cont'd) | padding = 0 |
+-----+

```

Challenges

- RFC 6904 defines a mechanism to encrypt header extension values, but is complicated; this complexity has hindered adoption
- RFC 6904 also has some technical deficiencies

Opportunity

- Could we find an approach that is both easier to deploy and more secure?