

SFrame

E2EE for Video Conferencing


IETF 108 Dispatch
emadomara@google.com

Goals

- **Security**
 - Secure end to end communications between the end points
- **Simplicity**
 - Minimize the changes needed in the group media server and end points
- **Efficiency**
 - Minimized the encryption overhead between the endpoints
- **Compatibility**
 - Works with existing RTC protocols like WebRTC
 - Works with RTC error correction mechanisms like FEC and RTX
- **Transport agnostic**


Conference Calls System Overview

- Endpoints sends multiple media streams to a central media server
- These streams are encrypted to the server HBH like DTLS-SRTP
- The server routes the streams to other endpoints in the call
- The server **has access** to the entire media contents




SFrame (Secure Frame)

- Mechanism to efficiently encrypt RTC traffic end to end
 - Encrypts the entire media frame rather than individual packets to minimize the overhead
 - Exposes only the metadata needed by the server to route the streams
 - Individual packets are still HBH encrypted
- SFrame keys are exchanged securely out of band between the endpoints
 - Each user has their own key to encrypt their outgoing traffic
 - Can be used with any KMS like Signal or MLS
 - Keys are exchanged via the signaling channel at the call setup and when the call participants changes
- The server can only access the media metadata




SFrame in WebRTC

- SFrame works with existing RTC frameworks like WebRTC
- The encryptor is injected after the frame is encoded and before it is packetized
- Media metadata are passed to the server using a special RTP header extension
- The server can construct the encrypted frame without accessing the contents



Encryption Schema

- Each endpoint creates and securely exchange their master key
- From the master key, SFrame derives 3 keys
 - Encryption key to encrypt the media frame
 - Authentication key to authenticate the encrypted frame. SFrame header and the media metadata
 - Salt key to derive the IV
- The entire payload is then split into smaller packets



Wire Format



SFrame payload



SFrame short header



SFrame long header

Encryption Overhead

- The encryption overhead mostly comes from the IV and authentication tag
- SFrame beats existing E2EE protocols because the overhead is amortized over the frame instead of per-packets
- SFrame also uses var-int encoding for the IV to reduce the overhead even more

Current Status

- Specs

- SFrame draft
 - Mostly complete
 - Signature schema and keyID still WIP
- Other documents needed
 - MLS-SFrame
 - KMS integration document
 - WebRTC-SFrame
 - The changes needed to WebRTC to support SFrame
 - Payload type
 - RTP metadata header ext

- Implementation

- Implemented and launched in Google Duo since April 2019
- Believe other implementations will be out soon

Next steps

- Are people interested in this?
- If Yes, where this should go ?
 - i. New WG
 - ii. Existing WG

Questions ?

Please submit your questions to

sframe@ietf.org