

Open Issues

- LAKE repo
 - https://github.com/lake-wg/edhoc

Self-contained specification (#1)

- Martin Disch: "expanding on the COSE constructs would be helpful"
- Current draft:
 - Appendix A.2. "COSE" lists the COSE constructs used
- Action: Provide more details without duplicating specification

Ciphersuites requiring multiple SHA (#2)

Comment by Rene Struik: "why enforcing both SHA512 and SHA256 at the same time"

— Current draft:

- Ciphersuite 0 and 1 includes Ed25519 which specifies SHA512.
- Ciphersuite 0 and 1 additionally requires SHA256.

```
0.(AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, X25519, EdDSA, Ed25519, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256)
1.(AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, X25519, EdDSA, Ed25519, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256)
```

— Options:

- 1. No change (require both)
- 2. Change hash algorithm to SHA512
- 3. Ed25519 with SHA256?
- 4. ..

Replace PSK ECDHE (#3)

- PSK ECDHE is not in the initial scope
- Specify a non-DH based PSK scheme providing forward security
 - See thread starting with
 https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lake/-Fx-NVLrZohQ7p8Wy8VNpsDC -M/

— Actions:

- Remove Section 5. "EDHOC Authenticated with Symmetric Keys"
- Consequential changes
- What kind of practical attacks on IoT settings should the PSK scheme protect against?
 - Assume long-term keys more protected than session keys?
 - Does the attacker have access to all the traffic information? Some IoT traffic is local.
 - Passive or active attacker?

Other

- What layer for the PSK scheme, within EDHOC or on top of?
- Key rotation between "sessions" or within "sessions"?

Next Steps

- Submit new version w/o PSK ECDHE
- Add issues based on the Tamarin modelling by Norrman, Sundararajan and Bruni
 - https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11427
- Migrate relevant issues from old repo
 - https://github.com/EricssonResearch/EDHOC/issues
- Fix issues
- More reviews welcome!
- Plan plug test