

# L3DL

## Layer 3 Discovery & Liveness

### draft-ietf-lsvr-l3dl-06

LSVR WG


2020.07.30

randy@psg.com, sra@hactrn.net, keyur@arrcus.com

# Primary Goal




Layer 3 Topology  
Discovery and Liveless  
for LSVR / BGP-SPF

# Just a Reminder



This is NOT a  
Routing Protocol

Discovers the  
Layer 3 Addresses  
on a PointToPoint Link



Jörg Ott did a  
Very Helpful  
Transport Directorate  
Early Review

You Read the Draft

Then why did you not  
report the bugs Rob  
did yesterday?

-06 Published  
No Significant Change



We have Two  
Implementations  
One Python3 (LSOE)  
One in Golang

# L3DL-Signing

Layer 3 Discovery and Liveness  
Signing


`draft-ietf-lsvr-l3dl-signing`

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# OPEN PDU



# PDU Sender Signing

- The Key in the OPEN PDU SHOULD be the public key of an asymmetric key pair.
- The sender signs with the private key, of course.
- The device sending the OPEN may use one key for all links, a different key for each link, or some aggregation(s) thereof

# Trust on First Use (TOFU)

- The OPEN key is generated on the sending device
- It is believed without question by the receiver
- Used to verify all subsequent PDUs from the same sender with the same Key Type.

# PKI-Based Keying

- An enrollment step is performed.
- The public key is put into a certificate, which is signed by the the operational environment's trust anchor.
- The relying party can be confident that the public key is under control of the identified L3DL protocol entity.

# Do Not Be Afraid



# This is NOT X.509

- These need not be X.509 certificates
- X.509 is much more complicated than we need
- They are just signatures of one key (the session key supplied in the Key field of the OPEN PDU) by another key (the trust anchor)
- Every device must have TA burned in



# Verify is the Same

- The two methods are indistinguishable
- The key provided in the OPEN PDU is used to verify the signatures of subsequent PDUs.
- The difference that PKI-based keys may be verified against the trust anchor when the OPEN PDU is received.

# The Choice of Which Keying is Left to the Operator

WG Last Call  
was Requested  
Datatracker  
does not show WGLC

# L3DL-ULPC

## Upper Layer Protocol Configuration


draft-ietf-lsvr-l3dl-ulpc-00

LSVR WG

2020.07.30

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# L3DL PDU for ULPC



Provide the minimal set  
of configuration  
parameters for BGP  
OPEN to succeed

Not to replace or  
conflict with data  
exchanged by  
BGP OPEN

Multiple sources of truth  
are a recipe for  
complexity and pain





Yes, there is one  
for IPv6 😊

Requested WGLC  
DataTracker  
does not show it

And For Dessert

An Ops Hack  
(not a draft)  
At Layer 3  
With L3DL