# Attacking the Quantum Internet

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### Multi QDDOS

- Summary
- Education

### **Quantum Internet Application**



# Attacking the Quantum Internet

- 1. How can attackers attack elements of the Quantum Internet?
- 2. What attacker(s) can do if they successfully hijack full control of Quantum Node(s)?



# Quantum Internet nodes (QNodes)



### Management of Quantum Internet



### Quantum state tomography

• By consuming a large number of copies, we can estimate the quantum state.

By tomography, we can find  $\hat{\rho}_{estimated}$ !

We cannot know actual states  $\hat{\rho}_{actual}$ .

Application examples:

- 1. We can monitor the optical fiber status between QNodes.
- 2. We can detect a rogue quantum manipulation.





Illegal modification

Creating illegal entanglements.

### Composite attack violates the confidentiality of quantum plane.

Ex. Qubit theft + eavesdropping on classical channel

### Attacking the Quantum Internet, IRTF108 (QIRG)

# QNodes internal structures





We introduced the elemental classification planes.

**Primitive attacks on QNodes** 

- **Classical Plane** 
  - Realtime controller, Classical channel to Internet and more...
  - Not much different from an attack on *classical* Internet device.

### Quantum Plane

- Qubits, Detector, Quantum channel and more...
- Since Qubit **cannot be copied**, proper tomography keep confidentiality.
  - No-cloning theorem.
- Integrity and availability: QNodes may not be much different from classical network systems.

# Attacks using hijacked QNode

Framing innocent Qnodes [TS, SN, T.Oka, RDV (QST 2018), arXiv:1701.04587]

- A malicious router can "frame" other repeaters or routers by subverting tomography.
- Prompt verification and response to tomography results is important.



A network partitioned by the isolation of innocent QNodes.

# Attacks using hijacked QNode

### Switching disruptions by a malicious router node

- Entanglement Swapping and transfers without following pre-shared rulesets.
  - Ruleset [TM, Clément Durand, RDV (PRA 2019), arXiv: 1904.08605]
- > The impact of packet loss is greater than classical Internet.
  - ✓ We cannot copy quantum states.



Monitoring entanglement swapping (ES) is important. The impact of packet loss is more severe in direct transfer (DT) than in ES.

# Attacks using multiple hijacked QNodes

### QDDoS: the DDoS in the Quantum Internet

- The possible attack methods for cooperating malicious ENodes and MNodes.
- More serious QDDoS (QDoS) by future improved bandwidth quantum computer (ENode).
- A system down due to (classical) DDoS to the classical plane may cause irreparable damage to the quantum state.
- Framing using multiple hijacked QNodes
  - False reports from multiple QNodes could more easily fool the network.

- We provide the first attempt to summarize the safety of the quantum repeater architecture.
  - Based on current knowledge, by referring to proposed classical system taxonomies.
- Quantum tomography is a key technology for detecting the presence of attacker.
- > The <u>confidentiality</u> of the quantum state is difficult to violate by *only* quantum plane attacking.
- From the point of view of <u>integrity</u> and <u>availability</u>,
  - a quantum repeater system seems to be not so different from a classical network system.
- One big difference is that quantum mechanics has the no-cloning theorem.
  - Quantum information cannot be copied to defend against loss in the network like classical networking.
- > This work represents **only** the first step in assessing the security of quantum networks.

### Education