


draft-richardson-secdispatch-idevidconsiderations-02 IETF108 – secdispatch - 2020-07-30

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> JayYang <jay.yang@huawei.com>



My Dad (cjr) [Sociologist!]



My Dad (cjr) [Sociologist!]

Returned from UK



My Dad (cjr) [Sociologist!]



Returned from UK



With Baby Boy (mcr)



My Dad (cjr) [Sociologist!]



Returned from UK



With Baby Boy (mcr)



Alpha version of SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences















































Got a "computer"








And we read An awful lot








Got a "computer"




A PROPERTY AND A WAR



And we read An awful lot







HOW DOES MY COMPUTER KNOW

HOW DOES MY COMPUTER KNOW WHAT TO DO WHEN I TURN IT ON?


HOW DOES MY COMPUTER KNOW WHAT TO DO WHEN I TURN IT ON?

HOW DOES IT KNOW IT WHO IT CAN TRUST?

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
Me, explaining What a BIOS is




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



"So, does every loT device have a secure enclave?"

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
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


HOW DOES MY COMPUTER KNOW WHAT TO DO WHEN I TURN IT ON?


HOW DOES IT KNOW IT WHO IT CAN TRUST?

Me, explaining What a BIOS is






"So, does every loT device have a secure enclave?"



"No, I don't want to securely update right now!!"


- Everytime I thought I'd convinced him, he'd just just complain:
 - You've just added a turtle.

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
You've just added a turtle.



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
At some point, it's gotta stop,



 Everytime I thought I'd convinced him, he'd just just complain:

You've just added a turtle.


At some point, it's gotta stop, There must something down



 Everytime I thought I'd convinced him, he'd just just complain:

You've just added a turtle.

At some point, it's gotta stop, There must something down there, he would complain.



IDevID considerations document

- This document is about the quality of the turtles
 - How do they get there?
 - Can they be trusted?
 - · How much?
 - For what? (Is the risk mitigation appropriate to the user's threat model?)
- Three fundamental ways to provision initial roots of trust.
- Ultimately, the software update trust anchor rules everything.




- Insert parable about blind people examining different parts of an elephant.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_men_and_an_elephant

Confidentiality of IDevID private key...



Adding layer of indirection...




Supply Chain Security Audit

Audit Model

Recognize:

Posessor of Bootloader software update key wins all battles.

- However >pubkey< is provisioned determines insystem risk of entire system.
 - This is the bottom turtle, "Mack", and he'd better not burp.



 Even more critical: how is the private key that can sign code kept?

Non-Goals of the document

- 1) Not aiming to write an ISO27001-ish evaluation process.
- 2) Not going to make any recommendation as to an appropriate solution for a given risk situation.






The PKI part of the document Is still proscriptive, that's a bug left from splitting.

Goals of this document

- Enumerate the reasonable, and maybe some less reasonable ways to provision and secure keys, and give them names.
- Not just the most secure way, because it is not always worth it.





admin:password

ANIMA!

draft-ietf-anima Autonomic-control-plane (ACP). At IESG.

draft-ietf-anima Bootstrapping-keyinfra (BRSKI). In RFC-editor Q

ANIMA!


ANIMA!


draft-ietf-anima Autonomic-control-plane (ACP). At IESG.


draft-ietf-anima Bootstrapping-keyinfra (BRSKI). In RFC-editor Q


ANIMA!

draft-richardson-animaregistrar-considerations (enterprise private CA) ANIMA?!









What to do?

- Supports work in:
 - SUIT
 - TEEP
 - RATS
 - ANIMA
 - LAMPS (CMP)
 - IPsecME, COSE, TLS,...

- But it is not even close to a protocol.
- Also not an applicability draft.
- It would be referenced by an applicability draft
 - Probably one in an outside SDO

What to do?

• Do it in SAAG?

Needs a lot of outside review and contribution

- AD sponsor
 - Would not get enough review

QUESTIONS!!

Useful Links

IDevID discussions

- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/Hqe1lHG2wnW_9NxJLazEYbmGYN0/
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/-2Niz98BNSopDi4GpgxrDfl_Mdc/
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/eMOH3NFbEDjZOi5gZgB9Ekl6yxw/
- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/-6-eQJgtUWrz5v067u9Xb030qnQ/

MASA operational considerations

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/PSkpYZs0C_RLzUFD2BSMipEggfQ/

Useless Links and Irrelevant Facts

- Return of Cat in the Hat https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJf2f_LqnLo
- Yertle the Turtle https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xY5vs2WtlK M
 - ..in which the eponymous Yertle, king of the pond, stands on his subjects in an attempt to reach higher than the moon—until the bottom turtle (Mack) burps and he falls into the mud, ending his rule.



Dr. C. James Richardson

1941-2003

Actually, My brother jirh



Actually, Sardinia, Not London.

