

DNS Deep Dive

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
Overview

- Beyond the DNS basics
 - The underlying DNS distributed database model
 - DNS tree navigation basics
 - DNS Packet Evolution -- Some of the sharp / unusual edges of the protocol
 - Resource Record Types
- Resilience of the system
- DNS Software and APIs
- To be continued at IETF109?


DNS as the novice Internet user sees it



DNS as the Techy Internet user sees it




DNS is Much Much More Complex



The example.com web page

You make a single request

- Each line is a DNS request
- The center node is an ISP resolver




Query
Authoritative/DNSSEC

Truncated
Response


ietf.org web page
(without caching)

You are here



webmd.com
(without caching)


You are here



TL;DR: Web pages generate many DNS requests

Webmd.com - after DNS caching

Lots of requests from you
to your ISP



- The resolver remembers some answers
- But must resolve others

The Underlying Distributed Model of the DNS

DNS was created as a replacement for /etc/hosts

Distributed system to replace static information

Back in **my day**:

```
127.0.0.1      localhost localhost.localdomain
```

```
::1           localhost localhost.localdomain
```

```
93.184.216.34 www.example.com
```

is all we needed.


The DNS 'tree'

RFC103{4,5}

The Root (aka ".")


Top Level Domains
(TLDs)

Second Level
Domains
(SLDs)




IMPORTANT: name server records in .net (13), .com (13), and .org (6) are not shown in these slides

Resolvers



Priming Queries -- Bootstrapping Resolvers




When resolvers start:

1. They have minimal information about the DNS tree: just the root server IP addresses.
2. The first thing they do is query them to ensure their hard-coded list is still correct


This is called a “priming query”

The DNS is a **distributed** protocol via **delegations**


The **.net** zone *delegates* everything in **.iana-servers.net** and below to **.iana-servers.net** using *nameserver (NS)* records that point to the **authoritative** servers for that portion of the DNS tree




Some DNS Terminology



Duplicate records needed in parent/child zones



Does this work? -- Yes but actually not well



Trees that refer to the Forest

- Let's query **.com**'s servers about **example.com**:


```
# dig @a.gtld-servers.net. www.example.com A  
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:  
example.com.      172800 IN  NS  a.iana-servers.net.  
example.com.      172800 IN  NS  b.iana-servers.net.
```

← 2 day TTL

- The answer: **.com** doesn't know where **www.example.com** is
- But it does know where to send you next: **to IANA-SERVERS.NET**
- But where is IANA-SERVERS.NET???***
 - (here we go again)*




Finding Authoritative Servers -- Pictorially



If you **ask .com** where ***www.example.com*** is, they tell you to go ask a **completely different part of the tree**

Tricky Tree Grafting -- AKA, what is glue?



```
# dig @c.gtld-servers.net. iana-servers.net ns      (asking .net)
```

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
```

```
iana-servers.net.      956 IN  NS    a.iana-servers.net.  _____
```

```
iana-servers.net.      956 IN  NS    ns.icann.org.
```

```
iana-servers.net.      956 IN  NS    c.iana-servers.net.
```

```
iana-servers.net.      956 IN  NS    b.iana-servers.net.  _____
```

Glue!

How do I talk to *a.iana-servers.net* if it's *inside iana-servers.net* itself??

```
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
```


```
a.iana-servers.net.    956 IN  AAAA   2001:500:8f::53      ←_____
```

```
b.iana-servers.net.    956 IN  AAAA   2001:500:8d::53      ←_____
```

```
...
```



(note the random ordering of the answer section)

Including Glue



- *.net's* nameservers knows where **the authoritative source for iana-servers.net is**
- “**In-balliwick**” name servers are within the zone itself
 - But {a,b,c}.iana-servers.net Must have glue records!
- “**Out-of-balliwick**” servers are external
 - *ns.icann.org* is out-of-balliwick for *iana-servers.net*

DNS Packet Evolution



DNS - A very very simple protocol

- DNS packets ship resource records around
- All **Resource Records** are composed of a triplet
 - A Query Name "www.example.com" (aka a "domain name")
 - A Query Type AAAA = IPv6 address
 - A Query Class IN = Internet (*aka, almost the only value used*)
- Resource Record Sets
 - ALL matching combinations are an atomic unit
 - You can't ask for "just 2"
 - They are **not ordered**
- Response Records also contain
 - A "Time To Live"
 - Response Data

DNS Packet Components

- Header
 - Transaction ID
 - Flags
 - Number of records in each section
- DNS Resource Record Sections
 - Question ←
 - Answer
 - Authoritative
 - Additional

Why are multiple questions a problem?

- Do you wait for all authoritative answers?
- What if one authoritative answer has an error and another doesn't?
- What if there are two different errors?
- ...

RFC1035:
[This] section contains
QDCOUNT (usually 1)
entries

Well yes, but actually no


ONLY ONE

DNS Packet Sections

- Question
 - Where the (single) question goes
 - Repeated in a response
- Answer
 - The answer to the question
- Authoritative
 - What DNS server is the “true” source for the answers
- Additional
 - Anything else you might want to know
 - But shouldn't trust!
 - E.G., Glue

What happens when DNS things go wrong?

The DNS packet headers contain an “response code” (RCODE) field, yay!



Drat, it's only **4 bits**... There are way more than 16 problems

Let's get creative about the RCODE problem

What if....

Now bear with me....

What if....

We stuck the extra bits somewhere else?

And thus, the “**OPT**” (pseudo-) resource record was created

EDNS0's "OPT" record -- more bits!

RFC2671

- An “**extend**” **pseudo resource** record to add to the **additional section**
- DNS servers only respond with one if the **client indicates support**
- **Required** to support some protocol modifications (e.g. DNSSEC)
- Reuses the Resource Record byte format, but **changes many fields**
- **Features:**
 - Total RCODE size becomes $4 + 8 = 12$ bits
 - Supports additional protocol flags
 - Adds application level max message size / PMTU type discovery
 - Adds support for additional DNS extensions
- **Used for other extensions:**
 - Client Subnet in DNS Queries (RFC7871)
 - Extended errors (RFC-TBD)
 - ...

OPT Resource Record Field Reusage

RR Field	New Meaning
NAME	Must be empty
TYPE	OPT(41) (16 bits)
CLASS	UDP Payload Size (16 bits) -- max response accepted
TTL (32 bits)	Extended RCODE (8 bits), version (8 bits = 0) and Flags (16 bits)
RDLEN	Data length (same)
RDATA	Atribute (16-bit)/value (variable length) pairs

Truncation

What happens when a response is too big?

- Greater than the client said it could handle in the OPT/UDP Payload Size

A few things:

- The Truncation bit (TC) is set
- Resource records are removed from the response to make it fit. Maybe.
 - Some try to remove unimportant items (the additional section goes first)
 - Some servers drop everything and just expect clients to use TCP
 - Response Rate Limiting (RRL) -- a DDoS defense -- triggers the TC bit due to query frequency
- Clients need to come back over TCP to get the full answer
 - Sometimes clients come back and sometimes they don't if they got the answer they wanted

Ok, but what if you need MOAR errors, text, etc...

What if....

Now bear with me....

What if....

We stuck the extra bits somewhere else?

A soon to be RFC: extended errors! Another OPT

(it's errors all the way down)





DNS Resource Record Types


Resource Record Types

Type	Content
A	IPv4 Address
AAAA	IPv6 Address
SOA	Zone information at the APEX
TXT	Free-form text blob

IPv4/IPv6 Deployment: Happy Eyeballs (RFC8305)



- Step 1: Send a **AAAA** (IPv6) query
- Step 2: Immediately send an **A** (IPv4) query
- Step 3: **Wait** for answers from either query
- Step 4: If first response is AAAA, open connection. If first response is A, wait a bit (50ms) for a AAAA and then give up and open an IPv4 connection with sadness.
- Step 5: **Profit** from your dual-stack deployment!



CNAMEs and DNAMEs


js.example.org. 3600 IN CNAME javas.example.com.

CNAMEs cannot occur at the apex

example.org. 3600 IN DNAME example.com.

CNAMEs are aliases for other tree elements (can be in the same zone or in another)

DNAMEs are aliases for zones themselves




IMPORTANT: CNAMEs MUST exist alone at a name (minus DNSSEC entries)

IMPORTANT: CNAMEs point to ALL records at the other name (A, AAAA, NS, MX, etc)

MX Records

Mail Exchange (MX) records

- Where should e-mail for a domain-name be sent?
- Prioritized contact list



www.example.org.
www.example.org.

3600 IN AAAA
3600 IN MX

2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946
5 smtp.example.org.

example.org.
example.org.
example.org.

3600 IN AAAA
3600 IN MX
3600 IN MX

93.184.216.34
10 mail1.example.com.
20 mail2.example.com.

Outsourcing mail service
is very common

Wildcards

(RFC4592)

- Generating responses for missing data
 - Left most label must be a "*" (and only a "*")
 - Matches any label that doesn't already exist
 - Including sub-labels under it
 - Causes a nameserver to **synthesize and answer**
 - **Please read RFC4592!** Good examples therein.

- Example records:

```
*.example.com.      3600 IN MX  10 mail.example.com
host1.example.com.  3600 IN A   192.0.2.1
```

- Responses:

```
host1.example.com/MX  MATCHES
host2.example.com/MX  MATCHES
host1.example.com/A   DOESN'T MATCH (returns 192.0.2.1)
host2.example.com/A   DOESN'T MATCH (returns NXDOMAIN)
```

Underbar labels: “_foo”

(RFC855{2,3})

- For a long time people kept putting TXT records at the APEX
 - SPF
 - DKIM
 - DOMAINKEY
 - DNS ownership verification (google, facebook, docusign, ...)
 - ...
- The “right” solution was to use a new RRTYPE rather than TXT
 - But this was slower to deploy
- The new solution: use TXT and RRTYPE records at “_” prefixes
 - _spf.example.com. IN TXT - The right “new” for SPF
 - _domainkey.example.com. IN TXT - DKIM key publishing
 - _25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA - DANE for secured SMTP (RFC7672)
 - _imaps._tcp.example.com. IN SRV - Service host discovery

Summary: DNS is a global distributed identifier DB

Yes, but how does this all scale so well?

I have no idea

Let's ask Geoff

Extended Errors RFC -- in the RFC editor's queue

- **SERVFAIL** error is the standard “I couldn’t” response
 - Operators are clueless as to why
 - e.g. most types of DNSSEC validation failures triggers this
- Extended error **adds context** for SERVFAIL (and others)
- With **optional text** providing greater debugging detail