Abstract

This document updates RFC 5905 to specify an alternative port for the Network Time Protocol (NTP) which is restricted to NTP messages that do not allow traffic amplification.

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1. Introduction

There are several modes specified for NTP. NTP packets in versions 2, 3, and 4 have a 3-bit field for the mode. Modes 1 (active), 2 (passive), 3 (client), 4 (server), and 5 (broadcast) are used for synchronization of clocks. They are specified in RFC 5905 [RFC5905]. Modes 6 and 7 are used for other purposes, like monitoring and remote management of NTP servers and clients. The mode 6 is specified in Control Messages Protocol for Use with Network Time Protocol Version 4 [I-D.ietf-ntp-mode-6-cmds].

The first group of modes typically does not allow any traffic amplification, i.e. the response is not larger than the request. An exception is Autokey [RFC5906], which allows an NTP response to be longer than the request, e.g. packets containing the Certificate Message or Cookie Message extension field. Autokey is rarely used. If it is enabled on a publicly accessible server, the access needs to be tightly controlled to limit denial-of-service (DoS) attacks exploiting the amplification.

The modes 6 and 7 of NTP allow significant traffic amplification, which has been exploited in large-scale DoS attacks on the Internet. Publicly accessible servers that support these modes need to be configured to not respond to requests using the modes, as recommended in BCP 233 [RFC8633], but the number of servers that still do that is significant enough to require specific mitigations.

Network operators have implemented different mitigations. They are not documented and may change over time. Some of the mitigations that have been observed are:

1. Blocked UDP packets with destination or source port 123
2. Blocked UDP packets with destination or source port 123 and specific length (e.g. longer than 48 octets)
3. Blocked UDP packets with destination or source port 123 and NTP mode 6 or 7

4. Limited rate of UDP packets with destination or source port 123

From those, only the 3rd approach does not have an impact on synchronization of clocks with NTP. However, this mitigation can be implemented only on devices which can inspect the UDP payload.

The number of public servers in the pool.ntp.org project has dropped since 2013, when the large-scale attacks started.

The length-specific filtering and rate limiting has an impact on the Network Time Security [RFC8915] authentication, which uses extension fields in NTPv4 packets.

This document specifies an alternative port for NTP which is restricted to a subset of the NTP protocol which does not allow amplification in order to enable safe synchronization of clocks in networks where the port 123 is blocked or rate limited.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Alternative port - update to RFC 5905

The table in "Figure 6: Global Parameters" in Section 7.2 of [RFC5905] is extended with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALTPORT</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Alternative NTP port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

The following text from Section 9.1 of [RFC5905]:

Lichvar             Expires 21 April 2022    [Page 3]
srcport: UDP port number of the server or reference clock. This becomes the destination port number in packets sent from this association. When operating in symmetric modes (1 and 2), this field must contain the NTP port number PORT (123) assigned by the IANA. In other modes, it can contain any number consistent with local policy.

is replaced with:

srcport: UDP port number of the server or reference clock. This becomes the destination port number in packets sent from this association. When operating in symmetric modes (1 and 2), this field must contain the NTP port number PORT (123) or the alternative NTP port ALTPORT (TBD) assigned by the IANA. In other modes, it can contain any number consistent with local policy.

The following text is added to the Section 9.1:

The port ALTPORT (TBD) is an alternative port to the port PORT (123). The protocol and the format of NTP packets sent from and to this port is unchanged. Both NTP requests and responses MAY be sent from the alternative port. An NTP packet MUST NOT be sent from the alternative port if it is a response which has a longer UDP payload than the request, or the number of NTP packets in a single response is larger than one.

Only modes 1 (active), 2 (passive), 3 (client), 4 (server), and 5 (broadcast) are generally usable on this port.

An NTP server that supports the alternative port MUST receive requests in the client mode on both the PORT (123) and ALTPORT (TBD) ports. If it responds, it MUST send the response from the port which received the request. If the server supports an NTP extension field, it MUST verify for each response that it is not longer than the request.

When an NTP client is started, it SHOULD send the first request to the alternative port. The client SHOULD alternate between the two ports until a valid response is received. The client MAY send a limited number of requests to both ports at the same time in order to speed up the discovery of the responding port. When both ports are responding, the client SHOULD prefer the alternative port.

An NTP server which supports NTS SHOULD include the NTPv4 Port Negotiation record in NTS-KE responses to specify the alternative port as the port to which the client should send NTP requests.
In the symmetric modes (active and passive) NTP packets are considered to be requests and responses at the same time. Therefore, two peers using the alternative port MUST send packets with an equal length in order to synchronize with each other. The peers MAY still use different polling intervals as packets sent at subsequent polls are considered to be separate requests and responses.

3. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate the following port in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry [RFC6335]:

Service Name: ntp-alt
Transport Protocol: udp
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: Network Time Protocol
Reference: [[this memo]]
Port Number: [[TBD]], selected by IANA from the System Port range

4. Security Considerations

A Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker can selectively block requests sent to the alternative port to force a client to select the original port and get a degraded NTP service with a significant packet loss. The client needs to periodically try the alternative port to recover from the degraded service when the attack stops.

5. Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Daniel Franke, Dhruv Dhody, Ragnar Sundblad, and Steven Sommars for their useful comments.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

6.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ntp-mode-6-cmds]


Author’s Address

Miroslav Lichvar
Red Hat
Purkynova 115
612 00 Brno
Czech Republic

Lichvar Expires 21 April 2022
Email: mlichvar@redhat.com
A Secure Selection and Filtering Mechanism for the Network Time Protocol with Chronos

draft-ietf-ntp-chronos-05

Abstract

The Network Time Protocol version 4 (NTPv4), as defined in RFC 5905, is the mechanism used by NTP clients to synchronize with NTP servers across the Internet. This document specifies an extension to the NTPv4 client, named Chronos, which is used as a "watchdog" alongside NTPv4, and provides improved security against time shifting attacks. Chronos involves changes to the NTP client’s system process only and is backwards compatible with NTPv4 servers. Chronos is also applicable to the emerging NTPv5, since it does not affect the wire protocol.

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1. Introduction

NTPv4, as defined in RFC 5905 [RFC5905], is vulnerable to time shifting attacks, in which the attacker’s goal is to shift the local time at an NTP client. See [Chronos_paper] for details. Time shifting attacks on NTP are possible even if NTP communication is encrypted and authenticated. A weaker man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker can shift time simply by dropping or delaying packets, whereas a powerful attacker, who has full control over an NTP server, can determine the response content. This document introduces a time shifting mitigation mechanism called Chronos. Chronos is backwards compatible with NTPv4 and serves as an NTPv4 client’s "watchdog" for time shifting attacks. An NTP client that runs Chronos is interoperable with [RFC5905]-compatible NTPv4 servers. Chronos is also applicable to the emerging NTPv5, since it does not affect the wire protocol.
Chronos is a background mechanism that continuously maintains a virtual "Chronos" clock update and compares it to NTPv4’s clock update. When the gap between the two updates exceeds a certain threshold (specified in Section 6), this is interpreted as the client experiencing a time shifting attack. In this case, Chronos is used to update the client’s clock, and the conventional NTPv4 client algorithm is run in the background until the gap between the two algorithms is again below this threshold, and hence the conventional NTPv4 client algorithm is safe to use again.

Due to Chronos operating in the background, the client clock’s precision and accuracy are precisely as in NTPv4 while not experiencing a time-shifting attack. When under attack, Chronos prevents the clock from being shifted by the attacker, thus still preserving high accuracy and precision (as discussed in Section 6).

Chronos achieves accurate synchronization even in the presence of powerful attackers who are in direct control of a large number of NTP servers: up to 1/3 of the servers in the pool (where the pool may consist of hundreds or even thousands of servers). NTPv4 chooses a small subset of the NTP server pool (e.g. 4 servers), and periodically queries this subset of servers. Thus, even if only 1/3 of the servers in the pool are compromised, the small subset that is used by NTPv4 may consist of a majority of faulty servers. Conversely, Chronos constantly updates the set of servers it queries; in each poll interval Chronos randomly chooses a different subset of servers from the pool. Thus, even if an attack is not detected in a given poll interval, Chronos is able to detect the attack within a relatively small number of poll intervals.

A Chronos client iteratively "crowdsources" time queries across NTP servers and applies a provably secure algorithm for eliminating "suspicious" responses and for averaging over the remaining responses. Chronos is carefully engineered to minimize communication overhead so as to avoid overloading NTP servers. Chronos’ security was evaluated both theoretically and experimentally with a prototype implementation. These evaluation results indicate that in order to successfully shift time at a Chronos client by over 100 milliseconds from the UTC, even a powerful man-in-the-middle attacker requires over 20 years of effort in expectation. The full paper is available at [Chronos_paper].

Chronos introduces a watchdog mechanism that is added to the client’s system process and maintains a virtual clock value that is used as a reference for detecting attacks. The virtual clock value computation differs from the current NTPv4 in two key aspects. First, a Chronos client relies on a large number of NTP servers, from which only few servers to synchronize with are periodically chosen at random, in
order to avoid overloading the servers. Second, the selection
algorithm of the virtual clock uses an approximate agreement
technique to remove outliers, thus limiting the attacker’s ability to
contaminate the "time samples" (offsets) derived from the queried NTP
servers. These two elements of Chronos’ design provide provable
security guarantees against both man-in-the-middle attackers and
attackers capable of compromising a large number of NTP servers.

2. Conventions Used in This Document

2.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.2. Terms and Abbreviations

NTPv4                  Network Time Protocol version 4 [RFC5905].
Selection process      Clock filter algorithm and system process
                      [RFC5905].

2.3. Notations

Describing Chronos algorithm, the following notation are used.

+-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>The number of candidate servers in the pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>that Chronos can query (potentially hundreds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>The number of servers that Chronos queries in each poll interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(up to tens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w</td>
<td>An upper bound on the distance of the local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>time from any NTP server with an accurate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>clock (termed &quot;truechimer&quot; in [RFC5905])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cest</td>
<td>The client’s estimation for the time that has</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>passed since its last synchronization to the server pool (sec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>An upper bound on the client’s time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimation error (ms/sec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERR</td>
<td>An upper bound on the client’s error</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
regarding its estimation of the time passed from the last update, equals to B*Cest (ms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K</th>
<th>Panic trigger - the number of pool re-sampling until reaches &quot;Panic mode&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tc</td>
<td>The current time [sec], as indicated by the virtual clock value that is computed by Chronos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Chronos Notations

The recommended values are discussed in Section 3.2.

3. Extension to the NTP System Process

A client that runs Chronos as a watchdog, uses NTPv4 as in [RFC5905] and in the background runs a modification to the elements of the system process described in Section 11.2.1 and 11.2.2 in [RFC5905] (namely, the Selection Algorithm and the Cluster Algorithm). The NTPv4 conventional protocol periodically queries m servers in each poll interval. In parallel the Chronos watchdog periodically queries a set of m servers in each Chronos poll interval. Specifically, in Chronos, after executing the "Clock Filter Algorithm" as defined in Section 10 in [RFC5905], the client discards outliers by executing the procedure described in this section and the next. Then, the NTPv4 "Combine Algorithm" is used for computing the system peer offset, as specified in Section 11.2.3 in [RFC5905]. In each poll interval the Chronos virtual clock value is compared with the NTPv4 clock value, and if the difference exceeds a predetermined value, an attack is detected. This process holds also for Chronos as a watchdog of future NTPv5.

3.1. Chronos’ System Process

At the first time the Chronos system process is executed, calibration is needed. The calibration process generates a local pool of servers the client can synchronize with, consisting of n servers (up to hundreds). To this end, the NTP client executes the "Peer Process" and "Clock Filter Algorithm" as in Sections 9,10 in [RFC5905] (respectively), on an hourly basis, for 24 consecutive hours, and generates the union of all received NTP servers’ IP addresses. Importantly, this process can also be executed in the background periodically, once in a long time (e.g., every few weeks/months).
In each Chronos poll interval the Chronos system process randomly chooses a set of \( m \) servers (where \( n \) with magnitude of hundreds and \( m \) of tens) out of the local pool of \( n \) servers. Then, out of the time-samples received from this chosen subset of servers, a lowest third of the samples’ offset values and highest third of the samples’ offset values are discarded.

Chronos checks that the following two conditions hold for the remaining samples:

* The maximal distance between every two time samples does not exceed \( 2w \).

* The average value of the remaining samples is at distance at most \( \text{ERR}+2w \) from the client’s local clock (as computed by Chronos).

(where \( w, \text{ERR} \) are as described in Table 1. Notice that \( \text{ERR} \) magnitude is approximately \( \text{LAMBDA} \) as defined in [RFC5905]).

In the event that both of these conditions are satisfied, the average of the remaining samples is the "final offset". Otherwise, a random partial of the interval is chosen, after which a new subset of servers is sampled, in the exact same manner. This way, Chronos client queries are spread across the time interval better in case of DoS attack on the NTP servers. This resampling process continues in subsequent Chronos poll intervals until the two conditions are both satisfied or the number of times the servers are re-sampled exceeds a "Panic Trigger" (\( K \) in Table 1), in which case, Chronos enters a "Panic Mode". Note that it is configurable whether the client allows panic mode or not.

In panic mode, Chronos queries all the servers in the local server pool, orders the collected time samples from lowest to highest and eliminates the bottom third and the top third of the samples. The client then averages over the remaining samples, and sets this average to be the new "final offset".

As in [RFC5905], the final offset is passed on to the clock discipline algorithm for the purpose of steering the Chronos virtual clock to the correct time. The Chronos virtual clock is then compared to the NTPv4 (or to the future NTPv5) clock as part of the watchdog process.
3.2. Chronos’ Recommended Parameters

According to empirical observations (presented in [Chronos_paper]), querying 15 servers at each poll interval (i.e., m=15) out of 500 servers (i.e., n=500), and setting w to be around 25 milliseconds provides both high time accuracy and good security. Moreover, empirical analyses showed that, on average, when selecting w=25ms, approximately 83% of the servers’ clocks are at most w-away from the UTC, and within 2w from each other, satisfying the first condition of Chronos’ system process.

Furthermore, according to Chronos security analysis, setting K to be 3 (i.e., if after 3 re-sampling, the two conditions are not satisfied, then Chronos reaches "panic mode") is both safe when facing time shifting attacks and the probability of reaching the "panic mode" is negligible (less than 0.000002).

Chronos effect on precision and accuracy are discussed in Section 5 and Section 6.

4. Chronos’ Pseudocode

The pseudocode for Chronos’ Time Sampling Scheme, which is invoked in each Chronos poll interval is as follows:

counter := 0
S = []
T = []
While counter < K do
    S := sample(m) //gather samples from (tens of) randomly chosen servers
    T := bi-side-trim(S,1/3) //trim the third lowest and highest values
    if (max(T) -min(T) <= 2w) and (|avg(T)-tc| < ERR + 2w) Then
        return avg(t)
    end
    counter ++
    sleep(rand(0,1)*poll interval)
end
// panic mode
S := sample(n)
T := bi-sided-trim(S,1/3) //trim bottom and top thirds;
return avg(T)
5. Precision vs. Security

Since NTPv4 (and future NTPv5) updates the clock as long as time-shifting attacks are not detected, the precision and accuracy of a Chronos client are the same as NTPv4 when not under attack. Under attack, Chronos, changes the list of the sampled servers more frequently than NTPv4 [Chronos_paper], and does not use some of the filters in NTPv4’s system process, can potentially be less precise (though provably more secure than NTPv4, which is vulnerable to time-shifting attacks [RFC5905]).

6. Security Considerations

As explained above, Chronos repeatedly gathers time samples from small subsets of a large local pool of NTP servers. The following form of a man-in-the-middle (MitM) Byzantine attacker is considered: the MitM attacker is assumed to control a subset of the servers in the local pool of servers and is capable of determining precisely the values of the time samples gathered by the Chronos client from these NTP servers. The threat model thus encompasses a broad spectrum of MitM attackers, ranging from fairly weak (yet dangerous) MitM attackers only capable of delaying and dropping packets to extremely powerful MitM attackers who are in control of (even authenticated) NTP servers. MitM attackers captured by this framework might be, for example, (1) in direct control of a fraction of the NTP servers (e.g., by exploiting a software vulnerability), (2) an ISP (or other Autonomous-System-level attacker) on the default BGP paths from the NTP client to a fraction of the available servers, (3) a nation state with authority over the owners of NTP servers in its jurisdiction, or (4) an attacker capable of hijacking (e.g., through DNS cache poisoning or BGP prefix hijacking) traffic to some of the available NTP servers. The details of the specific attack scenario are abstracted by reasoning about MitM attackers in terms of the fraction of servers with respect to which the attacker has MitM capabilities.

Chronos detects time-shifting attacks by constantly monitoring NTPv4’s (or NTPv5’s) offset and the offset computed by Chronos, as explained above, and checking whether it exceeds a certain threshold (10 milliseconds by default).

Analytical results (in [Chronos_paper]) indicate that in order to succeed in shifting time at a Chronos client by even a small amount (e.g., 100 milliseconds), even a powerful MitM attacker requires many years of effort (e.g., over 20 years in expectation). See a brief overview of Chronos’ security analysis below.
Notably, Chronos provides protection from MitM attacks that cannot be achieved by cryptographic authentication protocols since even with such measures in place an attacker can still influence time by dropping/delaying packets. However, adding an authentication and crypto-based security layer to Chronos will enhance its security guarantees and enable the detection of various spoofing and modification attacks.

Chronos' security analysis is briefly described next.

6.1. Security Analysis Overview

Time-samples that are at most w away from the UTC are considered "good", whereas other samples are considered "malicious". Two scenarios are considered:

* Less than 2/3 of the queried servers are under the attacker’s control.

* The attacker controls more than 2/3 of the queried servers.

The first scenario, where there are more than 1/3 good samples, consists of two sub-cases: (i) there is at least one good sample in the set of samples not eliminated by Chronos (for example, in the middle third of samples), and (ii) there are no good samples in the remaining set of samples. In the first of these two cases (at least one good sample in the set of samples that was not eliminated by Chronos), the other remaining samples, including those provided by the attacker, must be close to a good sample (for otherwise, the first condition of Chronos’ system process in Section 3.1 is violated and a new set of servers is chosen). This implies that the average of the remaining samples must be close to the UTC. In the second sub-case (where there are no good samples in the set of remaining samples), since more than a third of the initial samples were good, both the (discarded) third lowest-value samples and the (discarded) third highest-value samples must each contain a good sample. Hence, all the remaining samples are bounded from both above and below by good samples, and so is their average value, implying that this value is close to the UTC [RFC5905].
In the second scenario, where the attacker controls more than 2/3 of the queried servers, the worst possibility for the client is that all remaining samples are malicious (i.e., more than w away from the UTC). However, as proved in [Chronos_paper], the probability of this scenario is extremely low even if the attacker controls a large fraction (e.g., 1/4) of the servers in the local pool. Therefore, the probability that the attacker repeatedly succeeds in realising this scenario decreases exponentially, rendering the probability of a significant time shift negligible. See [Chronos_paper] for details.

Beyond evaluating the probability of an attacker successfully shifting time at the client’s clock, we also evaluated the probability that the attacker succeeds in launching a DoS attack on the servers by causing many clients to enter panic mode (and so query all the servers in their local pools). This probability (with the previous parameters of n=500, m=15, w=25 and k=30) is negligible even for an attacker in control of a large number of servers in clients’ local server pools, and it will take attacker decades to force panic mode.

Further details about Chronos’s security considerations can be found in [Chronos_paper].

7. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Erik Kline, Miroslav Lichvar, Danny Mayer, Karen O’Donoghue, Dieter Sibold, Yaakov. J. Stein, and Harlan Stenn, for valuable contributions to this document and helpful discussions and comments.

8. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References

[Chronos_paper]

Authors’ Addresses

Neta Rozen-Schiff
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem
Israel
Phone: +972 2 549 4599
Email: neta.r.schiff@gmail.com

Danny Dolev
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem
Israel
Phone: +972 2 549 4588
Email: danny.dolev@mail.huji.ac.il

Tal Mizrahi
Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab
Israel
Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com

Michael Schapira
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem
Israel
Phone: +972 2 549 4570
Email: schapiram@huji.ac.il
Internet Engineering Task Force  M. Lichvar
Internet-Draft  Red Hat
Updates: 5905 (if approved)  A. Malhotra
Intended status: Standards Track  Boston University
Expires: 21 April 2022  18 October 2021

NTP Interleaved Modes
draft-ietf-ntp-interleaved-modes-07

Abstract

This document extends the specification of Network Time Protocol (NTP) version 4 in RFC 5905 with special modes called the NTP interleaved modes, that enable NTP servers to provide their clients and peers with more accurate transmit timestamps that are available only after transmitting NTP packets. More specifically, this document describes three modes: interleaved client/server, interleaved symmetric, and interleaved broadcast.

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1. Introduction

RFC 5905 [RFC5905] describes the operations of NTPv4 in a client/server, symmetric, and broadcast mode. The transmit and receive timestamps are two of the four timestamps included in every NTPv4 packet used for time synchronization.

For a highly accurate and stable synchronization, the transmit and receive timestamp should be captured close to the beginning of the actual transmission and the end of the reception respectively. An asymmetry in the timestamping causes the offset measured by NTP to have an error.

There are at least four options where a timestamp of an NTP packet may be captured with a software NTP implementation running on a general-purpose operating system:

1. User space (software)
2. Network device driver or kernel (software)
3. Data link layer (hardware - MAC chip)
4. Physical layer (hardware - PHY chip)

Software timestamps captured in user space in the NTP implementation itself are least accurate. They do not include system calls used for sending and receiving packets, processing and queuing delays in the system, network device drivers, and hardware. Hardware timestamps captured at the physical layer are most accurate.

A transmit timestamp captured in the driver or hardware is more accurate than the user-space timestamp, but it is available to the NTP implementation only after it sent the packet using a system call. The timestamp cannot be included in the packet itself unless the driver or hardware supports NTP and can modify the packet before or during the actual transmission.

The protocol described in RFC 5905 does not specify any mechanism for a server to provide its clients and peers with a more accurate transmit timestamp that is known only after the transmission. A packet that strictly follows RFC 5905, i.e. it contains a transmit timestamp corresponding to the packet itself, is said to be in basic mode.

Different mechanisms could be used to exchange timestamps known after the transmission. The server could respond to each request with two packets. The second packet would contain the transmit timestamp corresponding to the first packet. However, such a protocol would enable a traffic amplification attack, or it would use packets with an asymmetric length, which would cause an asymmetry in the network delay and an error in the measured offset.

This document describes an interleaved client/server, interleaved symmetric, and interleaved broadcast mode. In these modes, the server sends a packet which contains a transmit timestamp corresponding to the transmission of the previous packet that was sent to the client or peer. This transmit timestamp can be captured in any software or hardware component involved in the transmission of the packet. Both servers and clients/peers are required to keep some state specific to the interleaved mode.

An NTPv4 implementation that supports the client/server and broadcast interleaved modes interoperates with NTPv4 implementations without this capability. A peer using the symmetric interleaved mode does not fully interoperate with a peer which does not support it. The mode needs to be configured specifically for each symmetric association.
The interleaved modes do not change the NTP packet header format and do not use new extension fields. The negotiation is implicit. The protocol is extended with new values that can be assigned to the origin and transmit timestamp. Servers and peers check the origin timestamp to detect requests conforming to the interleaved mode. A response can be valid only in one mode. If a client or peer that does not support interleaved mode received a response conforming to the interleaved mode, it would be rejected as bogus.

An explicit negotiation would require a new extension field. RFC 5905 does not specify how servers should handle requests with an unknown extension field. The original use of extension fields was authentication with Autokey [RFC5906], which cannot be negotiated. Some existing implementations do not respond to requests with unknown extension fields. This behavior would prevent clients from reliably detecting support for the interleaved mode.

Requests and responses cannot always be formed in interleaved mode. It cannot be used exclusively. Servers, clients, and peers that support the interleaved mode need to support also the basic mode.

This document assumes familiarity with RFC 5905.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Interleaved Client/server mode

The interleaved client/server mode is similar to the basic client/server mode. The difference between the two modes is in the values saved to the origin and transmit timestamp fields.

The origin timestamp is a cookie which is used to detect that a received packet is a response to the last packet sent in the other direction of the association. It is a copy of one of the timestamps from the packet to which it is responding, or zero if it is not a response. Servers following RFC 5905 ignore the origin timestamp in client requests. A server response which does not have a matching origin timestamp is called bogus.

A client request in the basic mode has an origin timestamp equal to the transmit timestamp from the last valid server response, or is zero (which indicates the first request of the association). A
server response in the basic mode has an origin timestamp equal to
the transmit timestamp from the client request. The transmit
timestamp in the response corresponds to the transmission of the
response in which the timestamp is contained.

A client request in the interleaved mode has an origin timestamp
equal to the receive timestamp from the last valid server response.
A server response in the interleaved mode has an origin timestamp
equal to the receive timestamp from the client request. The transmit
timestamp in the response corresponds to the transmission of the
previous response which had the receive timestamp equal to the origin
timestamp from the request.

A server which supports the interleaved mode needs to save pairs of
local receive and transmit timestamps. The server SHOULD discard old
timestamps to limit the amount of memory needed to support clients
using the interleaved mode. The server MAY separate the timestamps
by IP addresses, but it SHOULD NOT separate them by port numbers to
support clients that change their port between requests, as
recommended in RFC 9109 [RFC9109].

The server MAY restrict the interleaved mode to specific IP addresses
and/or authenticated clients.

Both servers and clients that support the interleaved mode MUST NOT
send a packet that has a transmit timestamp equal to the receive
timestamp in order to reliably detect whether received packets
conform to the interleaved mode. One way to ensure that is to
increment the transmit timestamp by 1 unit (i.e. about 1/4 of a
nanosecond) if the two timestamps are equal, or a new timestamp can
be generated.

The transmit and receive timestamps in server responses need to be
unique to prevent two different clients from sending requests with
the same origin timestamp and the server responding in the
interleaved mode with an incorrect transmit timestamp. If the
timestamps are not guaranteed to be monotonically increasing, the
server SHOULD check that the transmit and receive timestamps are not
already saved as a receive timestamp of a previous request (from the
same IP address if the server separates timestamps by addresses), and
generate a new timestamp if necessary.

When the server receives a request from a client, it SHOULD respond
in the interleaved mode if the following conditions are met:

1. The request does not have a receive timestamp equal to the
   transmit timestamp.
2. The origin timestamp from the request matches the local receive
timestamp of a previous request that the server has saved (for
the IP address if it separates timestamps by addresses).

A response in the interleaved mode MUST contain the transmit
timestamp of the response which contained the receive timestamp
matching the origin timestamp from the request. The server SHOULD
drop the timestamps after sending the response. The receive
timestamp MUST NOT be used again to detect a request conforming to
the interleaved mode.

If the conditions are not met (i.e. the request is not detected to
conform to the interleaved mode), the server MUST NOT respond in the
interleaved mode. The server MAY always respond in the basic mode.
In any case, the server SHOULD save the new receive and transmit
timestamps.

The first request from a client is always in the basic mode and so is
the server response. It has a zero origin timestamp and zero receive
timestamp. Only when the client receives a valid response from the
server, it will be able to send a request in the interleaved mode.

The protocol recovers from packet loss. When a client request or
server response is lost, the client will use the same origin
timestamp in the next request. The server can respond in the
interleaved mode if it still has the timestamps corresponding to the
origin timestamp. If the server already responded to the timestamp
in the interleaved mode, or it had to drop the timestamps for other
reasons, it will respond in the basic mode and save new timestamps,
which will enable an interleaved response to the subsequent request.
The client SHOULD limit the number of requests in the interleaved
mode between server responses to prevent processing of very old
timestamps in case a large number of consecutive requests is lost.

An example of packets in a client/server exchange using the
interleaved mode is shown in Figure 1. The packets in the basic and
interleaved mode are indicated with B and I respectively. The
timestamps $t_1^-$, $t_3^-$ and $t_{11}^-$ point to the same transmissions as $t_1$,
t$3$ and $t_{11}$, but they may be less accurate. The first exchange is in
the basic mode followed by a second exchange in the interleaved mode.
For the third exchange, the client request is in the interleaved
mode, but the server response is in the basic mode, because the
server did not have the pair of timestamps $t_6$ and $t_7$ (e.g. they were
dropped to save timestamps for other clients using the interleaved
mode).
When the client receives a response from the server, it performs the tests described in RFC 5905. Two of the tests are modified for the interleaved mode:

1. The check for duplicate packets SHOULD compare both receive and transmit timestamps in order to not drop a valid response in the interleaved mode if it follows a response in the basic mode and they contain the same transmit timestamp.

2. The check for bogus packets SHOULD compare the origin timestamp with both transmit and receive timestamps from the request. If the origin timestamp is equal to the transmit timestamp, the response is in the basic mode. If the origin timestamp is equal to the receive timestamp, the response is in the interleaved mode.

The client SHOULD NOT update its NTP state when an invalid response is received, to not lose the timestamps which will be needed to complete a measurement when the subsequent response in the interleaved mode is received.

If the packet passed the tests and conforms to the interleaved mode, the client can compute the offset and delay using the formulas from RFC 5905 and one of two different sets of timestamps. The first set is RECOMMENDED for clients that filter measurements based on the delay. The corresponding timestamps from Figure 1 are written in parentheses.

T1 - local transmit timestamp of the previous request (t1)

T2 - remote receive timestamp from the previous response (t2)
T3 - remote transmit timestamp from the latest response (t3)

T4 - local receive timestamp of the previous response (t4)

The second set gives a more accurate measurement of the current offset, but the delay is much more sensitive to a frequency error between the server and client due to a much longer interval between T1 and T4.

T1 - local transmit timestamp of the latest request (t5)

T2 - remote receive timestamp from the latest response (t6)

T3 - remote transmit timestamp from the latest response (t3)

T4 - local receive timestamp of the previous response (t4)

Clients MAY filter measurements based on the mode. The maximum number of dropped measurements in the basic mode SHOULD be limited in case the server does not support or is not able to respond in the interleaved mode. Clients that filter measurements based on the delay will implicitly prefer measurements in the interleaved mode over the basic mode, because they have a shorter delay due to a more accurate transmit timestamp (T3).

The server MAY limit saving of the receive and transmit timestamps to requests which have an origin timestamp specific to the interleaved mode in order to not waste resources on clients using the basic mode. Such an optimization will delay the first interleaved response of the server to a client by one exchange.

A check for a non-zero origin timestamp works with SNTP clients that always set the timestamp to zero and clients that implement NTP data minimization [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]. From the server’s point of view, such clients start a new association with each request.

To avoid searching the saved receive timestamps for non-zero origin timestamps from requests conforming to the basic mode, the server can encode in low-order bits of the receive and transmit timestamps below precision of the clock a flag indicating whether the timestamp is a receive timestamp. If the server receives a request with a non-zero origin timestamp which does not indicate it is a receive timestamp of the server, the request does not conform to the interleaved mode and it is not necessary to perform the search and/or save the new receive and transmit timestamp.
3. Interleaved Symmetric mode

The interleaved symmetric mode uses the same principles as the interleaved client/server mode. A packet in the interleaved symmetric mode has a transmit timestamp which corresponds to the transmission of the previous packet sent to the peer and an origin timestamp equal to the receive timestamp from the last packet received from the peer.

To enable synchronization in both directions of a symmetric association, both peers need to support the interleaved mode. For this reason, it SHOULD be disabled by default and enabled with an option in the configuration of the active side of the association.

In order to prevent the peer from matching the transmit timestamp with an incorrect packet when the peers' transmissions do not alternate (e.g. they use different polling intervals) and a previous packet was lost, the use of the interleaved mode in symmetric associations requires additional restrictions.

Peers which have an association need to count valid packets received between their transmissions to determine in which mode a packet should be formed. A valid packet in this context is a packet which passed all NTP tests for duplicate, replayed, bogus, and unauthenticated packets. Other received packets may update the NTP state to allow the (re)initialization of the association, but they do not change the selection of the mode.

A peer A SHOULD send a peer B a packet in the interleaved mode only when all of the following conditions are met:

1. The peer A has an active association with the peer B which was specified with the option enabling the interleaved mode, OR the peer A received at least one valid packet in the interleaved mode from the peer B.
2. The peer A did not send a packet to the peer B since it received the last valid packet from the peer B.
3. The previous packet that the peer A sent to the peer B was the only response to a packet received from the peer B.

The first condition is needed for compatibility with implementations that do not support or are not configured for the interleaved mode. The other conditions prevent a missing response from causing a mismatch between the remote transmit (T2) and local receive timestamp (T3), which would cause a large error in the measured offset and delay.
An example of packets exchanged in a symmetric association is shown in Figure 2. The minimum polling interval of the peer A is twice as long as the maximum polling interval of the peer B. The first packets sent by the peers are in the basic mode. The second and third packet sent by the peer A is in the interleaved mode. The second packet sent by the peer B is in the interleaved mode, but the following packets sent by the peer B are in the basic mode, because multiple responses are sent per request.

Peer A | t2 t3 | t6 | t8 t9 | t12 | t14 t15
---+----+----+------|-----+-----+-----
Peer B | /   | /   | /     | /   | /   | /   |

---+-------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
/      | /     | /   | /   | /   | /   | /   |
---+-------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

Figure 2: Packet timestamps in interleaved symmetric mode

If the peer A has no association with the peer B and it responds with symmetric passive packets, it does not need to count the packets in order to meet the restrictions, because each request has at most one response. The peer SHOULD process the requests in the same way as a server which supports the interleaved client/server mode. It MUST NOT respond in the interleaved mode if the request was not in the interleaved mode.

The peers SHOULD compute the offset and delay using one of the two sets of timestamps specified in the client/server section. They MAY switch between them to minimize the interval between T1 and T4 in order to reduce the error in the measured delay.

4. Interleaved Broadcast mode

A packet in the interleaved broadcast mode contains two transmit timestamps. One corresponds to the packet itself and is saved in the transmit timestamp field. The other corresponds to the previous packet and is saved in the origin timestamp field. The packet is compatible with the basic mode, which uses a zero origin timestamp.

An example of packets sent in the broadcast mode is shown in Figure 3.
A client which does not support the interleaved mode ignores the origin timestamp and processes all packets as if they were in the basic mode.

A client which supports the interleaved mode SHOULD check if the origin timestamp is not zero to detect packets in the interleaved mode. The client SHOULD also compare the origin timestamp with the transmit timestamp from the previous packet to detect lost packets. If the difference is larger than a specified maximum (e.g. 1 second), the packet SHOULD NOT be used for synchronization in the interleaved mode.

The client SHOULD compute the offset using the origin timestamp from the received packet and the local receive timestamp of the previous packet. If the client needs to measure the network delay, it SHOULD use the interleaved client/server mode.

5. Protocol Failures

An incorrect client implementation of the basic mode (RFC 5905) can work reliably with servers that implement only the basic mode, but the protocol can fail intermittently with servers that implement the interleaved mode.

If the client sets the origin timestamp to other values than the transmit timestamp from the last valid server response, or zero, the origin timestamp can match a receive timestamp of a previous server response (possibly to a different client), causing an unexpected interleaved response. The client is expected to drop the response as bogus. If it did not check for bogus packets, it would be vulnerable to off-path attacks.
If the client set the origin timestamp to a constant non-zero value, this mismatch would be expected to happen once per the NTP era (about 136 years) if the NTP server was responding at the maximum rate needed to go through all timestamp values (about 2 billion responses per second). With lower rates of requests the chance of hitting a server timestamp decreases proportionally.

The worst case of this failure would be a client that specifically sets the origin timestamp to the server’s receive timestamp, i.e. the client accidentally implemented the interleaved mode, but it does not accept interleaved responses. This client would still be able to synchronize its clock. It would drop interleaved responses as bogus and set the origin timestamp to the receive timestamp from the last valid response in the basic mode. As servers are required to not respond twice to the same origin timestamp in the interleaved mode, at least every other response would be in the basic mode and accepted by the client.

Intermittent protocol failures can be caused also by an incorrect server implementation of the interleaved mode. A server which does not ensure the receive and transmit timestamps in its responses are unique in a sufficiently long interval can misinterpret requests formed correctly in the basic mode as interleaved and respond in the interleaved mode. The response would be dropped by the client as bogus.

A duplicated server receive timestamp can cause an expected interleaved response to contain a transmit timestamp which does not correspond to the transmission of the previous response from which the client copied the receive timestamp to the origin timestamp in the request, but a different response which contained the same receive timestamp. The response would be accepted by the client with a small error in the transmit timestamp equal to the difference between the transmit timestamps of the two different responses. As the two requests to which the responses responded were received at the same time (according to the server’s clock), the two transmissions would be expected to be close to each other and the difference between them would be comparable to the error a basic response normally has in its transmit timestamp.

One reason for a duplicated server timestamp can be a large backward step of the server’s clock. If the timestamps the server has saved do not fully cover the second pass of the clock over the repeated interval, two requests received in different passes of the clock can get the same receive timestamp. The client which made the first request can get the transmit timestamp corresponding to the transmission of the second response. From the server’s point of view, the error of the transmit timestamp would be still small, but
from the client’s point of view the server already failed when it made the step as it was serving wrong time before or after the step with a much larger error than the error caused by the protocol failure.

6. Security Considerations

The security considerations of time protocols in general are discussed in RFC 7384 [RFC7384], and specifically the security considerations of NTP are discussed in RFC 5905.

Security issues that apply to the basic modes apply also to the interleaved modes. They are described in The Security of NTP’s Datagram Protocol [SECNTP].

Clients and peers SHOULD NOT leak the receive timestamp in packets sent to other peers or clients (e.g. as a reference timestamp) to prevent off-path attackers from easily getting the origin timestamp needed to make a valid response in the interleaved mode.

Clients using the interleaved mode SHOULD randomize all bits of both receive and transmit timestamps, as recommended for the transmit timestamp in the NTP client data minimization [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization], to make it more difficult for off-path attackers to guess the origin timestamp in the server response.

The client data minimization cannot be fully implemented in the interleaved mode. The origin timestamp cannot be zeroed out, which makes the clients more vulnerable to tracking as they move between networks.

Attackers can force the server to drop its timestamps in order to prevent clients from getting an interleaved response. They can send a large number of requests, send requests with a spoofed source address, or replay an authenticated request if the interleaved mode is enabled only for authenticated clients. Clients SHOULD NOT rely on servers to be able to respond in the interleaved mode.
Protecting symmetric associations in the interleaved mode against replay attacks is even more difficult than in the basic mode. In both modes, the NTP state needs to be protected between the reception of the last non-replayed response and transmission of the next request in order for the request to contain the origin timestamp expected by the peer. The difference is in the timestamps needed to complete a measurement. In the basic mode only one valid response is needed at a time and it is used as soon as it is received, but the interleaved mode needs two consecutive valid responses. The NTP state needs to be protected all the time to not lose the timestamps which are needed to complete the measurement when the second response is received.

7. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

8. Acknowledgements

The interleaved modes described in this document are based on the implementation written by David Mills in the NTP project (http://www.ntp.org). The specification of the broadcast mode is based purely on this implementation. The specification of the symmetric mode has some modifications. The client/server mode is specified as a new mode compatible with the symmetric mode, similarly to the basic symmetric and client/server modes.

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9. References

9.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]


9.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses

Miroslav Lichvar
Red Hat
Purkynova 115
612 00 Brno
Czech Republic

Email: mlichvar@redhat.com

Aanchal Malhotra
Boston University
111 Cummington St
Boston, 02215
United States of America

Email: aanchal4@bu.edu

Lichvar & Malhotra Expires 21 April 2022 [Page 15]
Control Messages Protocol for Use with Network Time Protocol Version 4
draft-ietf-ntp-mode-6-cmds-11

Abstract

This document describes the structure of the control messages that were historically used with the Network Time Protocol before the advent of more modern control and management approaches. These control messages have been used to monitor and control the Network Time Protocol application running on any IP network attached computer. The information in this document was originally described in Appendix B of RFC 1305. The goal of this document is to provide an updated description of the control messages described in RFC 1305 in order to conform with the updated Network Time Protocol specification documented in RFC 5905.

The publication of this document is not meant to encourage the development and deployment of these control messages. This document is only providing a current reference for these control messages given the current status of RFC 1305.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

RFC 1305 [RFC1305] described a set of control messages for use within the Network Time Protocol (NTP) when a comprehensive network management solution was not available. The definitions of these control messages were not promulgated to RFC 5905 [RFC5905] when NTP version 4 was documented. These messages were intended for use only in systems where no other management facilities were available or appropriate, such as in dedicated-function bus peripherals. Support for these messages is not required in order to conform to RFC 5905 [RFC5905]. The control messages are described here as a current reference for use with an RFC 5905 implementation of NTP.

The publication of this document is not meant to encourage the development and deployment of these control messages. This document is only providing a current reference for these control messages given the current status of RFC 1305.

1.1. Control Message Overview

The NTP Mode 6 control messages are used by NTP management programs (e.g., ntpq) when a more robust network management facility (e.g., SNMP) is not available. These control messages provide rudimentary control and monitoring functions to manage a running instance of an NTP server. These commands are not designed to be used for communication between instances of running NTP servers.

The NTP Control Message has the value 6 specified in the mode field of the first octet of the NTP header and is formatted as shown in Figure 1. The format of the data field is specific to each command or response; however, in most cases the format is designed to be constructed and viewed by humans and so is coded in free-form ASCII. This facilitates the specification and implementation of simple management tools in the absence of fully evolved network-management facilities. As in ordinary NTP messages, the authenticator field follows the data field. If the authenticator is used the data field is zero-padded to a 32-bit boundary, but the padding bits are not considered part of the data field and are not included in the field count.
IP hosts are not required to reassemble datagrams over a certain size (576 octets for IPv4 [RFC0791] and 1280 octets for IPv6 [RFC2460]); however, some commands or responses may involve more data than will fit into a single datagram. Accordingly, a simple reassembly feature is included in which each octet of the message data is numbered starting with zero. As each fragment is transmitted the number of its first octet is inserted in the offset field and the number of octets is inserted in the count field. The more-data (M) bit is set in all fragments except the last.

Most control functions involve sending a command and receiving a response, perhaps involving several fragments. The sender chooses a distinct, nonzero sequence number and sets the status field and "R" and "E" bits to zero. The responder interprets the opcode and additional information in the data field, updates the status field, sets the "R" bit to one and returns the three 32-bit words of the header along with additional information in the data field. In case of invalid message format or contents the responder inserts a code in the status field, sets the "R" and "E" bits to one and, optionally, inserts a diagnostic message in the data field.

Some commands read or write system variables (e.g., s.offset) and peer variables (e.g., p.stratum) for an association identified in the command. Others read or write variables associated with a radio clock or other device directly connected to a source of primary synchronization information. To identify which type of variable and association the Association ID is used. System variables are indicated by the identifier zero. As each association is mobilized a unique, nonzero identifier is created for it. These identifiers are used in a cyclic fashion, so that the chance of using an old identifier which matches a newly created association is remote. A management entity can request a list of current identifiers and subsequently use them to read and write variables for each association. An attempt to use an expired identifier results in an exception response, following which the list can be requested again.

Some exception events, such as when a peer becomes reachable or unreachable, occur spontaneously and are not necessarily associated with a command. An implementation may elect to save the event information for later retrieval or to send an asynchronous response (called a trap) or both. In case of a trap the IP address and port number is determined by a previous command and the sequence field is set as described below. Current status and summary information for the latest exception event is returned in all normal responses. Bits in the status field indicate whether an exception has occurred since the last response and whether more than one exception has occurred.
Commands need not necessarily be sent by an NTP peer, so ordinary access-control procedures may not apply; however, the optional mask/match mechanism suggested in Section Section 6 elsewhere in this document provides the capability to control access by mode number, so this could be used to limit access for control messages (mode 6) to selected address ranges.

1.2. Remote Facility Message Overview

The original development of the NTP daemon included a remote facility for monitoring and configuration. This facility used mode 7 commands to communicate with the NTP daemon. This document illustrates the mode 7 packet format only. The commands embedded in the mode 7 messages are implementation specific and not standardized in any way. The mode 7 message format is described in Appendix A.

2. NTP Control Message Format

The format of the NTP Control Message header, which immediately follows the UDP header, is shown in Figure 1. Following is a description of its fields.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|LI |  VN |Mode |R|E|M| OpCode  |       Sequence Number         |
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|            Status             |       Association ID          |
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|            Offset             |            Count              |
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+----------------------------------+
Data (up to 468 bytes)
+----------------------------------+
Padding (optional)
+----------------------------------+
Authenticator (optional, 20 or 24 bits)
+----------------------------------+
```

Figure 1: NTP Control Message Header

Leap Indicator (LI): This is a two-bit integer that is set to b00 for control message requests and responses. The Leap Indicator value used at this position in most NTP modes is in the System Status Word provided in some control message responses.
Version Number (VN): This is a three-bit integer indicating a minimum NTP version number. NTP servers do not respond to control messages with an unrecognized version number. Requests may intentionally use a lower version number to enable interoperability with earlier versions of NTP. Responses carry the same version as the corresponding request.

Mode: This is a three-bit integer indicating the mode. The value 6 indicates an NTP control message.

Response Bit (R): Set to zero for commands, one for responses.

Error Bit (E): Set to zero for normal response, one for error response.

More Bit (M): Set to zero for last fragment, one for all others.

Operation Code (OpCode): This is a five-bit integer specifying the command function. Values currently defined include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>read status command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>read variables command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>write variables command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>read clock variables command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>write clock variables command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>set trap address/port command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>trap response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>runtime configuration command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>export configuration to file command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>retrieve remote address stats command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>retrieve ordered list command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>request client-specific nonce command/response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-30</td>
<td>reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>unset trap address/port command/response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sequence Number: This is a 16-bit integer indicating the sequence number of the command or response. Each request uses a different sequence number. Each response carries the same sequence number as its corresponding request. For asynchronous trap responses, the responder increments the sequence number by one for each response, allowing trap receivers to detect missing trap responses. The sequence number of each fragment of a multiple-datagram response carries the same sequence number, copied from the request.
Status: This is a 16-bit code indicating the current status of the system, peer or clock, with values coded as described in following sections.

Association ID: This is a 16-bit unsigned integer identifying a valid association, or zero for the system clock.

Offset: This is a 16-bit unsigned integer indicating the offset, in octets, of the first octet in the data area. The offset is set to zero in requests. Responses spanning multiple datagrams use a positive offset in all but the first datagram.

Count: This is a 16-bit unsigned integer indicating the length of the data field, in octets.

Data: This contains the message data for the command or response. The maximum number of data octets is 468.

Padding (optional): Contains zero to three octets with value zero, as needed to ensure the overall control message size is a multiple of 4 octets.

Authenticator (optional): When the NTP authentication mechanism is implemented, this contains the authenticator information defined in Appendix C of [RFC1305].

3. Status Words

Status words indicate the present status of the system, associations and clock. They are designed to be interpreted by network-monitoring programs and are in one of four 16-bit formats shown in Figure 2 and described in this section. System and peer status words are associated with responses for all commands except the read clock variables, write clock variables and set trap address/port commands. The association identifier zero specifies the system status word, while a nonzero identifier specifies a particular peer association. The status word returned in response to read clock variables and write clock variables commands indicates the state of the clock hardware and decoding software. A special error status word is used to report malformed command fields or invalid values.
3.1. System Status Word

The system status word appears in the status field of the response to a read status or read variables command with a zero association identifier. The format of the system status word is as follows:

Leap Indicator (LI): This is a two-bit code warning of an impending leap second to be inserted/deleted in the last minute of the current day, with bit 0 and bit 1, respectively, coded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LI</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>no warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>insert second after 23:59:59 of the current day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>delete second 23:59:59 of the current day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>unsynchronized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clock Source (Clock Src): This is a six-bit integer indicating the current synchronization source, with values coded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>unspecified or unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Calibrated atomic clock (e.g., PPS, HP 5061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>VLF (band 4) or LF (band 5) radio (e.g., OMEGA, WWVB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HF (band 7) radio (e.g., CHU, MSF, WWV/H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UHF (band 9) satellite (e.g., GOES, GPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>local net (e.g., DCN, TSP, DTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UDP/NTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UDP/TIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>eyeball-and-wristwatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>telephone modem (e.g., NIST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-63</td>
<td>reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

System Event Counter (Count): This is a four-bit integer indicating the number of system events occurring since the last time the System Event Code changed. Upon reaching 15, subsequent events with the same code are not counted.

System Event Code (Code): This is a four-bit integer identifying the latest system exception event, with new values overwriting previous values, and coded as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>frequency correction (drift) file not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>frequency correction started (frequency stepped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>spike detected and ignored, starting stepout timer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>frequency training started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>clock synchronized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>system restart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>panic stop (required step greater than panic threshold)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>no system peer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>leap second insertion/deletion armed for the current month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>leap second disarmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>leap second inserted or deleted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>clock stepped (stepout timer expired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>kernel loop discipline status changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>leapseconds table loaded from file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>leapseconds table outdated, updated file needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2. Peer Status Word

A peer status word is returned in the status field of a response to a read status, read variables or write variables command and appears also in the list of association identifiers and status words returned by a read status command with a zero association identifier. The format of a peer status word is as follows:

**Peer Status (Status):** This is a five-bit code indicating the status of the peer determined by the packet procedure, with bits assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peer Status bit</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>configured (peer.config)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>authentication enabled (peer.authenable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>authentication okay (peer.authentic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>reachability okay (peer.reach != 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>broadcast association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peer Selection (SEL):** This is a three-bit integer indicating the status of the peer determined by the clock-selection procedure, with values coded as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sel</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>discarded by intersection algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>discarded by table overflow (not currently used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>discarded by the cluster algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>included by the combine algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>backup source (with more than sys.maxclock survivors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>system peer (synchronization source)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PPS (pulse per second) peer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peer Event Counter (Count): This is a four-bit integer indicating the number of peer exception events that occurred since the last time the peer event code changed. Upon reaching 15, subsequent events with the same code are not counted.

Peer Event Code (Code): This is a four-bit integer identifying the latest peer exception event, with new values overwriting previous values, and coded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peer Event Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>association mobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>association demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>peer unreachable (peer.reach was nonzero now zero)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>peer reachable (peer.reach was zero now nonzero)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>association restarted or timed out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>no reply (only used with one-shot clock set command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>peer rate limit exceeded (kiss code RATE received)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>access denied (kiss code DENY received)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>leap second insertion/deletion at month’s end armed by peer vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>became system peer (sys.peer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>reference clock event (see clock status word)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>authentication failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>popcorn spike suppressed by peer clock filter register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>entering interleaved mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>recovered from interleave error</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Clock Status Word

There are two ways a reference clock can be attached to a NTP service host, as a dedicated device managed by the operating system and as a synthetic peer managed by NTP. As in the read status command, the association identifier is used to identify which one, zero for the system clock and nonzero for a peer clock. Only one system clock is supported by the protocol, although many peer clocks can be supported. A system or peer clock status word appears in the status field of the response to a read clock variables or write clock variables command. This word can be considered an extension of the system status word or the peer status word as appropriate. The format of the clock status word is as follows:

Reserved: An eight-bit integer that is ignored by requesters and zeroed by responders.

Count: This is a four-bit integer indicating the number of clock events that occurred since the last time the clock event code changed. Upon reaching 15, subsequent events with the same code are not counted.

Clock Code (Code): This is a four-bit integer indicating the current clock status, with values coded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clock Status</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>clock operating within nominals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>reply timeout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>bad reply format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>hardware or software fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>propagation failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>bad date format or value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>bad time format or value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-15</td>
<td>reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4. Error Status Word

An error status word is returned in the status field of an error response as the result of invalid message format or contents. Its presence is indicated when the E (error) bit is set along with the response (R) bit in the response. It consists of an eight-bit integer coded as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Status</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>authentication failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>invalid message length or format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>invalid opcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>unknown association identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>unknown variable name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>invalid variable value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>administratively prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-255</td>
<td>reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Commands

Commands consist of the header and optional data field shown in Figure 1. When present, the data field contains a list of identifiers or assignments in the form

`<<identifier>>[=<<value>>],[<<identifier>>[=<<value>>]],...` where

`<<identifier>>` is the ASCII name of a system or peer variable such as the ones specified in RFC 5905 and `<<value>>` is expressed as a decimal, hexadecimal or string constant in the syntax of the C programming language. Where no ambiguity exists, the "sys." or "peer." prefixes can be suppressed. Whitespace (ASCII nonprinting format effectors) can be added to improve readability for simple monitoring programs that do not reformat the data field. Internet addresses are represented as follows: IPv4 addresses are written in the form `[n.n.n.n]`, where n is in decimal notation and the brackets are optional; IPv6 addresses are formulated based on the guidelines defined in [RFC5952]. Timestamps, including reference, originate, receive and transmit values, as well as the logical clock, are represented in units of seconds and fractions, preferably in hexadecimal notation. Delay, offset, dispersion and distance values are represented in units of milliseconds and fractions, preferably in decimal notation. All other values are represented as-is, preferably in decimal notation.

Implementations may define variables other than those described in RFC 5905. Called extramural variables, these are distinguished by the inclusion of some character type other than alphanumeric or "." in the name. For those commands that return a list of assignments in the response data field, if the command data field is empty, it is expected that all available variables defined in RFC 5905 will be included in the response. For the read commands, if the command data field is nonempty, an implementation may choose to process this field to individually select which variables are to be returned.
Commands are interpreted as follows:

Read Status (1): The command data field is empty or contains a list of identifiers separated by commas. The command operates in two ways depending on the value of the association identifier. If this identifier is nonzero, the response includes the peer identifier and status word. Optionally, the response data field may contain other information, such as described in the Read Variables command. If the association identifier is zero, the response includes the system identifier (0) and status word, while the data field contains a list of binary-coded pairs <<association identifier>> <<status word>>, one for each currently defined association.

Read Variables (2): The command data field is empty or contains a list of identifiers separated by commas. If the association identifier is nonzero, the response includes the requested peer identifier and status word, while the data field contains a list of peer variables and values as described above. If the association identifier is zero, the data field contains a list of system variables. If a peer has been selected as the synchronization source, the response includes the peer identifier and status word; otherwise, the response includes the system identifier (0) and status word.

Write Variables (3): The command data field contains a list of assignments as described above. The variables are updated as indicated. The response is as described for the Read Variables command.

Read Clock Variables (4): The command data field is empty or contains a list of identifiers separated by commas. The association identifier selects the system clock variables or peer clock variables in the same way as in the Read Variables command. The response includes the requested clock identifier and status word and the data field contains a list of clock variables and values, including the last timecode message received from the clock.

Write Clock Variables (5): The command data field contains a list of assignments as described above. The clock variables are updated as indicated. The response is as described for the Read Clock Variables command.

Set Trap Address/Port (6): The command association identifier, status and data fields are ignored. The address and port number for subsequent trap messages are taken from the source address and port of the control message itself. The initial trap counter for trap response messages is taken from the sequence field of the command. The response association identifier, status and data fields are not
significant. Implementations should include sanity timeouts which prevent trap transmissions if the monitoring program does not renew this information after a lengthy interval.

Trap Response (7): This message is sent when a system, peer or clock exception event occurs. The opcode field is 7 and the R bit is set. The trap counter is incremented by one for each trap sent and the sequence field set to that value. The trap message is sent using the IP address and port fields established by the set trap address/port command. If a system trap the association identifier field is set to zero and the status field contains the system status word. If a peer trap the association identifier field is set to that peer and the status field contains the peer status word. Optional ASCII-coded information can be included in the data field.

Configure (8): The command data is parsed and applied as if supplied in the daemon configuration file.

Save Configuration (9): Write a snapshot of the current configuration to the file name supplied as the command data. Further, the command is refused unless a directory in which to store the resulting files has been explicitly configured by the operator.

Read Most Recently Used (MRU) list (10): Retrieves records of recently seen remote addresses and associated statistics. This command supports all of the state variables defined in Section 9 of [RFC5905]. Command data consists of name=value pairs controlling the selection of records, as well as a requestor-specific nonce previously retrieved using this command or opcode 12, Request Nonce. The response consists of name=value pairs where some names can appear multiple times using a dot followed by a zero-based index to distinguish them, and to associate elements of the same record with the same index. A new nonce is provided with each successful response.

Read ordered list (11): Retrieves a list ordered by IP address (IPv4 information precedes IPv6 information). If the command data is empty or the seven characters "ifstats", the associated statistics, status and counters for each local address are returned. If the command data is the characters "addr_restrictions" then the set of IPv4 remote address restrictions followed by the set of IPv6 remote address restrictions (access control lists) are returned. Other command data returns error code 5 (unknown variable name). Similar to Read MRU, response information uses zero-based indexes as part of the variable name preceding the equals sign and value, where each index relates information for a single address or network. This opcode requires authentication.
Request Nonce (12): Retrieves a 96-bit nonce specific to the requesting remote address, which is valid for a limited period. Command data is not used in the request. The nonce consists of a 64-bit NTP timestamp and 32 bits of hash derived from that timestamp, the remote address, and salt known only to the server which varies between daemon runs. Inclusion of the nonce by a management agent demonstrates to the server that the agent can receive datagrams sent to the source address of the request, making source address "spoofing" more difficult in a similar way as TCP’s three-way handshake.

Unset Trap (31): Removes the requesting remote address and port from the list of trap receivers. Command data is not used in the request. If the address and port are not in the list of trap receivers, the error code is 4, bad association.

5. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

6. Security Considerations

A number of security vulnerabilities have been identified with these control messages.

NTP’s control query interface allows reading and writing of system, peer, and clock variables remotely from arbitrary IP addresses using commands mentioned in Section 4. Traditionally, overwriting these variables, but not reading them, requires authentication by default. However, this document argues that an NTP host must authenticate all control queries and not just ones that overwrite these variables. Alternatively, the host can use an access control list to explicitly list IP addresses that are allowed to control query the clients. These access controls are required for the following reasons:

* NTP as a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) vector. NTP timing query and response packets (modes 1-2, 3-4, 5) are usually short in size. However, some NTP control queries generate a very long packet in response to a short query. As such, there is a history of use of NTP’s control queries, which exhibit such behavior, to perform DDoS attacks. These off-path attacks exploit the large size of NTP control queries to cause UDP-based amplification attacks (e.g., mode 7 monlist command generates a very long packet in response to a small query [CVE-DOS]). These attacks only use NTP as a vector for DoS attacks on other protocols, but do not
affect the time service on the NTP host itself. To limit the
sources of these malicious commands, NTP server operators are
recommended to deploy ingress filtering [RFC3704].

* Time-shifting attacks through information leakage/overwriting.
NTP hosts save important system and peer state variables. An off-
path attacker who can read these variables remotely can leverage
the information leaked by these control queries to perform time-
shifting and DoS attacks on NTP clients. These attacks do affect
time synchronization on the NTP hosts. For instance,

- In the client/server mode, the client stores its local time
  when it sends the query to the server in its xmt peer variable.
  This variable is used to perform TEST2 to non-cryptographically
  authenticate the server, i.e., if the origin timestamp field in
  the corresponding server response packet matches the xmt peer
  variable, then the client accepts the packet. An off-path
  attacker, with the ability to read this variable can easily
  spoof server response packets for the client, which will pass
  TEST2, and can deny service or shift time on the NTP client.
  The specific attack is described in [CVE-SPOOF].

- The client also stores its local time when the server response
  is received in its rec peer variable. This variable is used
  for authentication in interleaved-pivot mode. An off-path
  attacker with the ability to read this state variable can
  easily shift time on the client by passing this test. This
  attack is described in [CVE-SHIFT].

* Fast-Scanning. NTP mode 6 control messages are usually small UDP
  packets. Fast-scanning tools like ZMap can be used to spray the
  entire (potentially reachable) Internet with these messages within
  hours to identify vulnerable hosts. To make things worse, these
  attacks can be extremely low-rate, only requiring a control query
  for reconnaissance and a spoofed response to shift time on
  vulnerable clients.

* The mode 6 and 7 messages are vulnerable to replay attacks
  [CVE-Replay]. If an attacker observes mode 6/7 packets that
  modify the configuration of the server in any way, the attacker
  can apply the same change at any time later simply by sending the
  packets to the server again. The use of the nonce (Request Nonce
  command) provides limited protection against replay attacks.

NTP best practices recommend configuring NTP with the no-query
parameter. The no-query parameter blocks access to all remote
control queries. However, sometimes the hosts do not want to block
all queries and want to give access for certain control queries.
remotely. This could be for the purpose of remote management and configuration of the hosts in certain scenarios. Such hosts tend to use firewalls or other middleboxes to blacklist certain queries within the network.

Significantly fewer hosts respond to mode 7 monlist queries as compared to other control queries because it is a well-known and exploited control query. These queries are likely blocked using blacklists on firewalls and middleboxes rather than the no-query option on NTP hosts. The remaining control queries that can be exploited likely remain out of the blacklist because they are undocumented in the current NTP specification [RFC5905].

This document describes all of the mode 6 control queries allowed by NTP and can help administrators make informed decisions on security measures to protect NTP devices from harmful queries and likely make those systems less vulnerable. The use of the legacy mode 6 interface is NOT RECOMMENDED. Regardless of which mode 6 commands an administrator may elect to allow, remote access to this facility needs to be protected from unauthorized access (e.g., strict ACLs). Additionally, the legacy interface for mode 6 commands SHOULD NOT be utilized in new deployments or implementation of NTP.

7. Contributors

Dr. David Mills specified the vast majority of the mode 6 commands during the development of RFC 1305 [RFC1305] and deserves the credit for their existence and use.

8. Acknowledgements

Tim Plunkett created the original version of this document. Aanchal Malhotra provided the initial version of the Security Considerations section.

Karen O’Donoghue, David Hart, Harlan Stenn, and Philip Chimento deserve credit for portions of this document due to their earlier efforts to document these commands.

Miroshav Lichvar, Ulrich Windl, Dieter Sibold, J Ignacio Alvarez-Hamelin, and Alex Campbell provided valuable comments on various versions of this document.

9. References

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Appendix A.  NTP Remote Facility Message Format

The format of the NTP Remote Facility Message header, which immediately follows the UDP header, is shown in Figure 3. Following is a description of its fields. Bit positions marked as zero are reserved and should always be transmitted as zero.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R|M| VN |Mode |A|  Sequence  | Implementation|   Req Code    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Err |        Count          |  MBZ  |       Size            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
|  Data (up to 500 bytes)                                      |
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                Encryption KeyID (when A bit set)              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
|  Message Authentication Code (when A bit set)               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 3: NTP Remote Facility Message Header

Response Bit (R) : Set to 0 if the packet is a request. Set to 1 if the packet is a response.

More Bit (M) : Set to 0 if this is the last packet in a response, otherwise set to 1 in responses requiring more than one packet.

Version Number (VN) : Set to the version number of the NTP daemon.

Mode : Set to 7 for Remote Facility messages.

Authenticated Bit (A) : If set to 1, this packet contains authentication information.

Sequence : For a multi-packet response, this field contains the sequence number of this packet. Packets in a multi-packet response are numbered starting with 0. The More Bit is set to 1 for all packets but the last.
Implementation: The version number of the implementation that defined the request code used in this message. An implementation number of 0 is used for a Request Code supported by all versions of the NTP daemon. The value 255 is reserved for future extensions.

Request Code (Req Code): An implementation-specific code which specifies the operation being requested. A Request Code definition includes the format and semantics of the data included in the packet.

Error (Err): Set to 0 for a request. For a response, this field contains an error code relating to the request. If the Error is non-zero, the operation requested wasn’t performed.

0 - no error
1 - incompatible implementation number
2 - unimplemented request code
3 - format error
4 - no data available
7 - authentication failure

Count: The number of data items in the packet. Range is 0 to 500.

Must Be Zero (MBZ): A reserved field set to 0 in requests and responses.

Size: The size of each data item in the packet. Range is 0 to 500.

Data: A variable-sized field containing request/response data. For requests and responses, the size in octets must be greater than or equal to the product of the number of data items (Count) and the size of a data item (Size). For requests, the data area is exactly 40 octets in length. For responses, the data area will range from 0 to 500 octets, inclusive.

Encryption KeyID: A 32-bit unsigned integer used to designate the key used for the Message Authentication Code. This field is included only when the A bit is set to 1.

Message Authentication Code: An optional Message Authentication Code defined by the version of the NTP daemon indicated in the Implementation field. This field is included only when the A bit is set to 1.
Author’s Address

Brian Haberman (editor)
JHU

Email: brian@innovationslab.net
Abstract

The Network Time Protocol can operate in several modes. Some of these modes are based on the receipt of unsolicited packets, and therefore require the use of a well-known port as the local port number. However, in the case of NTP modes where the use of a well-known port is not required, employing such well-known port unnecessarily facilitates the ability of attackers to perform blind/off-path attacks. This document formally updates RFC5905, recommending the use of transport-protocol ephemeral port randomization for those modes where use of the NTP well-known port is not required.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is one of the oldest Internet protocols, and currently specified in [RFC5905]. Since its original implementation, standardization, and deployment, a number of vulnerabilities have been found both in the NTP specification and in some of its implementations [NTP-VULN]. Some of these vulnerabilities allow for off-path/blind attacks, where an attacker can send forged packets to one or both NTP peers for achieving Denial of Service (DoS), time-shifts, or other undesirable outcomes. Many of these attacks require the attacker to guess or know at least a target NTP association, typically identified by the tuple {srcaddr, srcport, dstaddr, dstport, keyid} (see section 9.1 of [RFC5905]). Some of these parameters may be easily known or guessed.

NTP can operate in several modes. Some of these modes rely on the ability of nodes to receive unsolicited packets, and therefore require the use of the NTP well-known port (123). However, for modes where the use of a well-known port is not required, employing the NTP well-known port unnecessarily facilitates the ability of an attacker to perform blind/off-path attacks (since knowledge of the port...
numbers is typically required for such attacks). A recent study
[NIST-NTP] that analyzes the port numbers employed by NTP clients
suggests that a considerable number of NTP clients employ the NTP
well-known port as their local port, or select predictable ephemeral
port numbers, thus unnecessarily facilitating the ability of
attackers to perform blind/off-path attacks against NTP.

BCP 156 [RFC6056] already recommends the randomization of transport-
protocol ephemeral ports. This document aligns NTP with the
recommendation in BCP 156 [RFC6056], by formally updating [RFC5905]
such that port randomization is employed for those NTP modes for
which the use of the NTP well-known port is not needed.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

3. Considerations About Port Randomization in NTP

The following subsections analyze a number of considerations about
transport-protocol ephemeral port randomization when applied to NTP.

3.1. Mitigation Against Off-path Attacks

There has been a fair share of work in the area of off-path/blind
attacks against transport protocols and upper-layer protocols, such as [RFC5927] and [RFC4953]. Whether the target of the attack is a
transport protocol instance (e.g., TCP connection) or an upper-layer
protocol instance (e.g., an application protocol instance), the
attacker is required to know or guess the five-tuple (Protocol, IP
Source Address, IP Destination Address, Source Port, Destination
Port) that identifies the target transport protocol instance or the
transport protocol instance employed by the target upper-layer
protocol instance. Therefore, increasing the difficulty of guessing
this five-tuple helps mitigate blind/off-path attacks.

As a result of these considerations, transport-protocol ephemeral
port randomization is a best current practice (BCP 156) that helps
mitigate off-path attacks at the transport-layer. This document
aligns the NTP specification [RFC5905] with the existing best current
practice on ephemeral port selection, irrespective of other
techniques that may (and should) be implemented for mitigating off-
path attacks.
We note that transport-protocol ephemeral port randomization is a transport-layer mitigation against off-path/blind attacks, and does not preclude (nor is it precluded by) other possible mitigations for off-path attacks that might be implemented at other layers (e.g. [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]). For instance, some of the aforementioned mitigations may be ineffective against some off-path attacks [NTP-FRAG] or may benefit from the additional entropy provided by port randomization [NTP-security].

3.2. Effects on Path Selection

Intermediate systems implementing the Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) algorithm may select the outgoing link by computing a hash over a number of values, that include the transport-protocol source port. Thus, as discussed in [NTP-CHLNG], the selected client port may have an influence on the measured offset and delay.

If the source port is changed with each request, packets in different exchanges will be more likely to take different paths, which could cause the measurements to be less stable and have a negative impact on the stability of the clock.

Network paths to/from a given server are less likely to change between requests if port randomization is applied on a per-association basis. This approach minimizes the impact on the stability of NTP measurements, but may cause different clients in the same network synchronized to the same NTP server to have a significant stable offset between their clocks due to their NTP exchanges consistently taking different paths with different asymmetry in the network delay.

Section 4 recommends NTP implementations to randomize the ephemeral port number of client/server associations. The choice of whether to randomize the port number on a per-association or a per-request basis is left to the implementation.

3.3. Filtering of NTP traffic

In a number of scenarios (such as when mitigating DDoS attacks), a network operator may want to differentiate between NTP requests sent by clients, and NTP responses sent by NTP servers. If an implementation employs the NTP well-known port for the client port number, requests/responses cannot be readily differentiated by inspecting the source and destination port numbers. Implementation of port randomization for non-symmetrical modes allows for simple differentiation of NTP requests and responses, and for the enforcement of security policies that may be valuable for the
mitigation of DDoS attacks, when all NTP clients in a given network employ port randomization.

3.4. Effect on NAPT devices

Some NAPT devices will reportedly not translate the source port of a packet when a system port number (i.e., a port number in the range 0-1023) [RFC6335] is employed. In networks where such NAPT devices are employed, use of the NTP well-known port for the client port may limit the number of hosts that may successfully employ NTP client implementations at any given time.

NOTES:

NAPT devices are defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC2663].

The reported behavior is similar to the special treatment of UDP port 500 that has been documented in Section 2.3 of [RFC3715].

In the case of NAPT devices that will translate the source port even when a system port is employed, packets reaching the external realm of the NAPT will not employ the NTP well-known port as the source port, as a result of the port translation function performed by the NAPT device.

4. Update to RFC5905

The following text from Section 9.1 ("Peer Process Variables") of [RFC5905]:

\[dstport: \text{UDP port number of the client, ordinarily the NTP port number PORT (123) assigned by the IANA. This becomes the source port number in packets sent from this association.}\]

is replaced with:

\[dstport: \text{UDP port number of the client. In the case of broadcast server mode (5) and symmetric modes (1 and 2), it SHOULD contain the NTP port number PORT (123) assigned by the IANA. In the client mode (3), it SHOULD contain a randomized port number, as specified in [RFC6056]. The value in this variable becomes the source port number of packets sent from this association. The randomized port number SHOULD NOT be shared with other associations, to avoid revealing the randomized port to other associations.}\]

If a client implementation performs ephemeral port randomization on a per-request basis, it SHOULD close the corresponding socket/port after each request/response exchange. In order to prevent
duplicate or delayed server packets from eliciting ICMP port unreachable error messages at the client, the client MAY wait for more responses from the server for a specific period of time (e.g. 3 seconds) before closing the UDP socket/port.

NOTES:
Randomizing the ephemeral port number on a per-request basis will better mitigate off-path/blind attacks, particularly if the socket/port is closed after each request/response exchange, as recommended above. The choice of whether to randomize the ephemeral port number on a per-request or a per-association basis is left to the implementation, and should consider the possible effects on path selection along with its possible impact on time measurement.

On most current operating systems, which implement ephemeral port randomization [RFC6056], an NTP client may normally rely on the operating system to perform ephemeral port randomization. For example, NTP implementations using POSIX sockets may achieve ephemeral port randomization by *not* binding the socket with the bind() function, or binding it to port 0, which has a special meaning of "any port". connect()ing the socket will make the port inaccessible by other systems (that is, only packets from the specified remote socket will be received by the application).

5. Implementation Status

[RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

OpenNTPD:
[OpenNTPD] has never explicitly set the local port of NTP clients, and thus employs the ephemeral port selection algorithm implemented by the operating system. Thus, on all operating systems that implement port randomization (such as current versions of OpenBSD, Linux, and FreeBSD), OpenNTPD will employ port randomization for client ports.

chrony:
[chrony] by default does not set the local client port, and thus employs the ephemeral port selection algorithm implemented by the operating system. Thus, on all operating systems that implement port randomization (such as current versions of OpenBSD, Linux, and FreeBSD), chrony will employ port randomization for client ports.

nwtime.org’s sntp client:
sntp does not explicitly set the local port, and thus employs the ephemeral port selection algorithm implemented by the operating system. Thus, on all operating systems that implement port randomization (such as current versions of OpenBSD, Linux, and FreeBSD), it will employ port randomization for client ports.

6. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

7. Security Considerations

The security implications of predictable numeric identifiers [I-D.irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-generation] (and of predictable transport-protocol port numbers [RFC6056] in particular) have been known for a long time now. However, the NTP specification has traditionally followed a pattern of employing common settings even when not strictly necessary, which at times has resulted in negative security and privacy implications (see e.g. [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]). The use of the NTP well-known port (123) for the srcport and dstport variables is not required for all operating modes. Such unnecessary usage comes at the expense of reducing the amount of work required for an attacker to successfully perform off-path/blind attacks against NTP. Therefore, this document formally updates [RFC5905], recommending the use of transport-protocol port randomization when use of the NTP well-known port is not required.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2019-11331 [VULN-REPORT] in the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
8. Acknowledgments

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Watson Ladd raised the problem of DDoS mitigation when the NTP well-known port is employed as the client port (discussed in Section 3.3 of this document).

The authors would like to thank Harlan Stenn for answering questions about ntptime.org’s NTP implementation.

Fernando would like to thank Nelida Garcia and Jorge Oscar Gont, for their love and support.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]

[I-D.irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-generation]

[NIST-NTP]

[NTP-CHLNG]

[NTP-FRAG]

[NTP-security]

[NTP-VULN]

[OpenNTPD]


Authors' Addresses

Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
Evaristo Carriego 2644
Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706
Argentina

Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
Email: fgont@si6networks.com
URI: https://www.si6networks.com
Guillermo Gont
SI6 Networks
Evaristo Carriego 2644
Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706
Argentina

Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
Email: ggont@si6networks.com
URI: https://www.si6networks.com

Miroslav Lichvar
Red Hat
Purkynova 115
Brno 612 00
Czech Republic

Email: mlichvar@redhat.com
Roughtime

draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-06

Abstract

This document specifies Roughtime - a protocol that aims to achieve rough time synchronization while detecting servers that provide inaccurate time and providing cryptographic proof of their malfeasance.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Time synchronization is essential to Internet security as many security protocols and other applications require synchronization [RFC7384] [MCG]. Unfortunately widely deployed protocols such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905] lack essential security features, and even newer protocols like Network Time Security (NTS) [RFC8915] lack mechanisms to ensure that the servers behave correctly. Authenticating time servers prevents network adversaries from modifying time packets, but an authenticated time server still has full control over the contents of the time packet and may transmit incorrect time. The Roughtime protocol provides cryptographic proof of malfeasance, enabling clients to detect and prove to a third party a server’s attempts to influence the time a client computes.

+================================+===============+===============================+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Authenticated Server</th>
<th>Server Malfeasance Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTP,</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTP-MAC</td>
<td>Y*</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTP-Autokey</td>
<td>Y**</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roughtime</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Security Properties of current protocols.

Y* For security issues with symmetric-key based NTP-MAC authentication, please refer to RFC 8573 [RFC8573].

Y** For security issues with Autokey Public Key Authentication, refer to [Autokey].
* If a server’s timestamps do not fit into the time context of other servers’ responses, then a Roughtime client can cryptographically prove this misbehavior to third parties. This helps detect dishonest or malfunctioning servers.

* A Roughtime client can roughly detect (with no absolute guarantee) a delay attack [DelayAttacks] but can not cryptographically prove this to a third party. However such attacks expand the round trip time between request and response.

* Note that delay attacks cannot be detected/stopped by any protocol. Delay attacks can not, however, undermine the security guarantees provided by Roughtime.

* Although delay attacks cannot be prevented, they can be limited to a predetermined upper bound. This can be done by defining a maximal tolerable Round Trip Time (RTT) value, MAX-RTT, that a Roughtime client is willing to accept. A Roughtime client can measure the RTT of every request-response handshake and compare it to MAX-RTT. If the RTT exceeds MAX-RTT, the corresponding measurement is discarded. When this approach is used, the maximal time error that can be caused by a delay attack is MAX-RTT/2. It should be noted that this approach assumes that the nature of the system is known to the client, including reasonable upper bounds on the RTT value.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Protocol Overview

Roughtime is a protocol for rough time synchronization that enables clients to provide cryptographic proof of server malfeasance. It does so by having responses from servers include a signature over a value derived from a nonce in the client request. This provides cryptographic proof that the timestamp was issued after the server received the client’s request. The derived value included in the server’s response is the root of a Merkle tree which includes the hash of the client’s nonce as the value of one of its leaf nodes. This enables the server to amortize the relatively costly signing operation over a number of client requests.
Single server mode: At its most basic level, Roughtime is a one round protocol in which a completely fresh client requests the current time and the server sends a signed response. The response includes a timestamp and a radius used to indicate the server’s certainty about the reported time. For example, a radius of 1,000,000 microseconds means the server is absolutely confident that the true time is within one second of the reported time.

The server proves freshness of its response as follows. The client’s request contains a nonce which the server incorporates into its signed response. The client can verify the server’s signatures and - provided that the nonce has sufficient entropy - this proves that the signed response could only have been generated after the nonce.

4. The Guarantee

A Roughtime server guarantees that a response to a query sent at \( t_1 \), received at \( t_2 \), and with timestamp \( t_3 \) has been created between the transmission of the query and its reception. If \( t_3 \) is not within that interval, a server inconsistency may be detected and used to impeach the server. The propagation of such a guarantee and its use of type synchronization is discussed in Section 7. No delay attacker may affect this: they may only expand the interval between \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \), or of course stop the measurement in the first place.

5. Message Format

Roughtime messages are maps consisting of one or more (tag, value) pairs. They start with a header, which contains the number of pairs, the tags, and value offsets. The header is followed by a message values section which contains the values associated with the tags in the header. Messages MUST be formatted according to Figure 1 as described in the following sections.

Messages MAY be recursive, i.e. the value of a tag can itself be a Roughtime message.
5.1. Data Types

5.1.1. int32

An int32 is a 32 bit signed integer. It is serialized least significant byte first in sign-magnitude representation with the sign bit in the most significant bit. The negative zero value (0x80000000) MUST NOT be used and any message with it is syntactically invalid and MUST be ignored.

5.1.2. uint32

A uint32 is a 32 bit unsigned integer. It is serialized with the least significant byte first.

5.1.3. uint64

A uint64 is a 64 bit unsigned integer. It is serialized with the least significant byte first.
5.1.4. Tag

Tags are used to identify values in Roughtime messages. A tag is a uint32 but may also be listed in this document as a sequence of up to four ASCII characters [RFC0020]. ASCII strings shorter than four characters can be unambiguously converted to tags by padding them with zero bytes. For example, the ASCII string "NONC" would correspond to the tag 0x434e4f4e and "PAD" would correspond to 0x000444150. Note that when encoded into a message the ASCII values will be in the corresponding order.

5.1.5. Timestamp

A timestamp is a uint64 interpreted in the following way. The most significant 3 bytes contain the integer part of a Modified Julian Date (MJD). The least significant 5 bytes is a count of the number of microseconds since midnight on that day.

The MJD is the number of UTC days since 17 November 1858 [ITU-R_TF.457-2]. It is useful to note that 1 January 1970 is 40,587 days after 17 November 1858.

Note that, unlike NTP, this representation does not use the full number of bits in the fractional part and that days with leap seconds will have more or fewer than the nominal 86,400,000,000 microseconds.

5.2. Header

All Roughtime messages start with a header. The first four bytes of the header is the uint32 number of tags N, and hence of (tag, value) pairs. The following 4*(N-1) bytes are offsets, each a uint32. The last 4*N bytes in the header are tags.

Offsets refer to the positions of the values in the message values section. All offsets MUST be multiples of four and placed in increasing order. The first post-header byte is at offset 0. The offset array is considered to have a not explicitly encoded value of 0 as its zeroth entry. The value associated with the ith tag begins at offset[i] and ends at offset[i+1]-1, with the exception of the last value which ends at the end of the message. Values may have zero length.

Tags MUST be listed in the same order as the offsets of their values and MUST also be sorted in ascending order by numeric value. A tag MUST NOT appear more than once in a header.
6. Protocol Details

As described in Section 3, clients initiate time synchronization by sending requests containing a nonce to servers who send signed time responses in return. Roughtime packets can be sent between clients and servers either as UDP datagrams or via TCP streams. Servers SHOULD support the UDP transport mode, while TCP transport is OPTIONAL.

A Roughtime packet MUST be formatted according to Figure 2 and as described here. The first field is a uint64 with the value 0x4d49544847554f52 ("ROUGHTIM" in ASCII). The second field is a uint32 and contains the length of the third field. The third and last field contains a Roughtime message as specified in Section 5.1.

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                  0x4d49544847554f52 (uint64)                  |
|                        ("ROUGHTIM")                           |
|+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                    Message length (uint32)                    |
|+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
|                    Roughtime message                        |
|                                                               |
|+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 2: Roughtime Packet Format

Roughtime request and response packets MUST be transmitted in a single datagram when the UDP transport mode is used. Setting the packet’s don’t fragment bit [RFC0791] is OPTIONAL in IPv4 networks.

Multiple requests and responses can be exchanged over an established TCP connection. Clients MAY send multiple requests at once and servers MAY send responses out of order. The connection SHOULD be closed by the client when it has no more requests to send and has received all expected responses. Either side SHOULD close the connection in response to synchronization, format, implementation-defined timeouts, or other errors.

All requests and responses MUST contain the VER tag. It contains a list of one or more uint32 version numbers. The version of Roughtime specified by this memo has version number 1.
NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: remove this paragraph before publication. For testing drafts of this memo, a version number of 0x80000000 plus the draft number is used.

6.1. Requests

A request MUST contain the tags VER and NONC. Tags other than NONC and VER SHOULD be ignored by the server. A future version of this protocol may mandate additional tags in the message and assign them semantic meaning.

The size of the request message SHOULD be at least 1024 bytes when the UDP transport mode is used. To attain this size the PAD tag SHOULD be added to the message. Its value SHOULD be all zeros. Responding to requests shorter than 1024 bytes is OPTIONAL and servers MUST NOT send responses larger than the requests they are replying to.

6.1.1. VER

In a request, the VER tag contains a list of versions. The VER tag MUST include at least one Roughtime version supported by the client. The client MUST ensure that the version numbers and tags included in the request are not incompatible with each other or the packet contents.

6.1.2. NONC

The value of the NONC tag is a 32 byte nonce. It SHOULD be generated in a manner indistinguishable from random. BCP 106 contains specific guidelines regarding this [RFC4086].

6.2. Responses

A response MUST contain the tags SIG, VER, NONC, PATH, SREP, CERT, and INDX.

6.2.1. SIG

In general, a SIG tag value is a 64 byte Ed25519 signature [RFC8032] over a concatenation of a signature context ASCII string and the entire value of a tag. All context strings MUST include a terminating zero byte.

The SIG tag in the root of a response MUST be a signature over the SREP value using the public key contained in CERT. The context string MUST be "RoughTime v1 response signature".

Malhotra, et al. Expires 9 December 2022
6.2.2. VER

In a response, the VER tag MUST contain a single version number. It SHOULD be one of the version numbers supplied by the client in its request. The server MUST ensure that the version number corresponds with the rest of the packet contents.

6.2.3. NONC

The NONC tag MUST contain the nonce of the message being responded to.

6.2.4. PATH

The PATH tag value MUST be a multiple of 32 bytes long and represent a path of 32 byte hash values in the Merkle tree used to generate the ROOT value as described in Section 6.3. In the case where a response is prepared for a single request and the Merkle tree contains only the root node, the size of PATH MUST be zero.

6.2.5. SREP

The SREP tag contains a time response. Its value MUST be a Roughtime message with the tags ROOT, MIDP, and RADI. The server MAY include any of the tags DUT1, DTAI, and LEAP in the contents of the SREP tag.

The ROOT tag MUST contain a 32 byte value of a Merkle tree root as described in Section 6.3.

The MIDP tag value MUST be timestamp of the moment of processing.

The RADI tag value MUST be a uint32 representing the server’s estimate of the accuracy of MIDP in microseconds. Servers MUST ensure that the true time is within (MIDP-RADI, MIDP+RADI) at the time they transmit the response message.

The DUT1 tag value MUST be an int32 indicating the predicted difference between UT1 and UTC (UT1 - UTC) in milliseconds as given by the International Earth Rotation and Reference Systems Service (IERS).

The DTAI tag value MUST be an int32 indicating the current difference between International Atomic Time (TAI) and UTC (TAI - UTC) in milliseconds as published in the International Bureau of Weights and Measures’ (BIPM) Circular T.
The LEAP tag MUST contain zero or more int32 values, each representing a past or future leap second event. Positive values represent the addition of a second and negative values represent the removal of a second. The absolute value represents the MJD of the day that begins immediately after the leap second event.

By way of illustration, there was a leap second 31 December 2016 23:59:60. This event would be represented by the tag with numeric value 57754. The positive sign represents that there was an additional second inserted, the numeric value indicates 1 January 2017, the following day that began at midnight after the addition.

The leap second events MUST be sorted in reverse chronological order and the first item MUST be the last (past or future) leap second event that the server knows about. A LEAP tag with zero int32 values indicates that the server does not hold any updated leap second information.

6.2.6. CERT

The CERT tag contains a public-key certificate signed with the server’s long-term key. Its value is a Roughtime message with the tags DELE and SIG, where SIG is a signature over the DELE value. The context string used to generate SIG MUST be "RoughTime v1 delegation signature--".

The DELE tag contains a delegated public-key certificate used by the server to sign the SREP tag. Its value is a Roughtime message with the tags MINT, MAXT, and PUBK. The purpose of the DELE tag is to enable separation of a long-term public key from keys on devices exposed to the public Internet.

The MINT tag is the minimum timestamp for which the key in PUBK is trusted to sign responses. MIDP MUST be more than or equal to MINT for a response to be considered valid.

The MAXT tag is the maximum timestamp for which the key in PUBK is trusted to sign responses. MIDP MUST be less than or equal to MAXT for a response to be considered valid.

The PUBK tag contains a temporary 32 byte Ed25519 public key which is used to sign the SREP tag.

6.2.7. INDX

The INDX tag value is a uint32 determining the position of NONC in the Merkle tree used to generate the ROOT value as described in Section 6.3.
6.3. The Merkle Tree

A Merkle tree is a binary tree where the value of each non-leaf node is a hash value derived from its two children. The root of the tree is thus dependent on all leaf nodes.

In Roughtime, each leaf node in the Merkle tree represents the nonce in one request. Leaf nodes are indexed left to right, beginning with zero.

The values of all nodes are calculated from the leaf nodes and up towards the root node using the first 32 bytes of the output of the SHA-512 hash algorithm [SHS]. For leaf nodes, the byte 0x00 is prepended to the nonce before applying the hash function. For all other nodes, the byte 0x01 is concatenated with first the left and then the right child node value before applying the hash function.

The value of the Merkle tree’s root node is included in the ROOT tag of the response.

The index of a request’s nonce node is included in the INDX tag of the response.

The values of all sibling nodes in the path between a request’s nonce node and the root node is stored in the PATH tag so that the client can reconstruct and validate the value in the ROOT tag using its nonce. These values are each 32 bytes and are stored one after the other with no additional padding or structure. The order in which they are stored is described in Section 6.3.1

6.3.1. Root Value Validity Check Algorithm

We describe how to compute the hash of the Merkel tree from the values in the tags PATH, INDX, and NONC. Our algorithm maintains a current hash value. The bits of INDX are ordered from least to most significant in this algorithm.

At initialization hash is set to $H(0x00 \ || \ nonce)$.

If no more entries remain in PATH the current hash is the hash of the Merkel tree. All remaining bits of INDX must be zero.

Otherwise let node be the next 32 bytes in PATH. If the current bit in INDX is 0 then $\text{hash} = H(0x01 \ || \ node \ || \ \text{hash})$, else $\text{hash} = H(0x01 \ || \ \text{hash} \ || \ node)$. 
6.4. Validity of Response

A client MUST check the following properties when it receives a response. We assume the long-term server public key is known to the client through other means.

* The signature in CERT was made with the long-term key of the server.

* The DELE timestamps and the MIDP value are consistent.

* The INDX and PATH values prove NONC was included in the Merkle tree with value ROOT using the algorithm in Section 6.3.1.

* The signature of SREP in SIG validates with the public key in DELE.

A response that passes these checks is said to be valid. Validity of a response does not prove the time is correct, but merely that the server signed it, and thus promises that it began to compute the signature at a time in the interval (MIDP-RADI, MIDP+RADI).

7. Integration Into NTP

We assume that there is a bound PHI on the frequency error in the clock on the machine. Given a measurement taken at a local time t, we know the true time is in (t-delta-sigma, t-delta+sigma). After d seconds have elapsed we know the true time is within (t-delta-sigma-d*PHI, t-delta+sigma+d*PHI). A simple and effective way to mix with NTP or PTP discipline of the clock is to trim the observed intervals in NTP to fit entirely within this window or reject measurements that fall to far outside. This assumes time has not been stepped. If the NTP process decides to step the time, it MUST use Roughtime to ensure the new truetime estimate that will be stepped to is consistent with the true time.

Should this window become too large, another Roughtime measurement is called for. The definition of "too large" is implementation defined.

Implementations MAY use other, more sophisticated means of adjusting the clock respecting Roughtime information. Other applications such as X.509 verification may wish to
8. Grease

Servers MAY send back a fraction of responses that are syntactically invalid or contain invalid signatures as well as incorrect times. Clients MUST properly reject such responses. Servers MUST NOT send back responses with incorrect times and valid signatures. Either signature MAY be invalid for this application.

9. Roughtime Servers

NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: remove this section before publication.

The below list contains a list of servers with their public keys in Base64 format. These servers may implement older versions of this specification.

address: roughtime.cloudflare.com
port: 2002
long-term key: gD63hSj3ScS+wuOeGrubX1q35N1c5Lby/S+T7MNTjxo=

address: roughtime.int08h.com
port: 2002
long-term key: AW5uAoTSTDfG5NfY1bTh08GU0q1Rb+HVhbJ3ODJvsE=

address: roughtime.sandbox.google.com
port: 2002
long-term key: etPaaIXcBMY1oUeGpwwPMCMw1RVNv51KK/tktoJTQ=

address: roughtime.se
port: 2002
long-term key: S3AzfZJ5CjSdkJ21ZJGbxdYp/SoE8fXKY0+aicsehI=

10. Acknowledgements

Thomas Peterson corrected multiple nits. Peter Loethberg, Tal Mizrahi, Ragnar Sundblad, Kristof Teichel, and the other members of the NTP working group contributed comments and suggestions.

11. IANA Considerations

11.1. Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry

IANA is requested to allocate the following entry in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry [RFC6335]:

Service Name: Roughtime
Transport Protocol: tcp, udp
11.2. Roughtime Version Registry

IANA is requested to create a new registry entitled "Roughtime Version Registry". Entries shall have the following fields:

- **Version ID (REQUIRED):** a 32-bit unsigned integer
- **Version name (REQUIRED):** A short text string naming the version being identified.
- **Reference (REQUIRED):** A reference to a relevant specification document.

The policy for allocation of new entries SHOULD be: IETF Review.

The initial contents of this registry shall be as follows:

| Version ID            | Version name         | Reference     |
|-----------------------+----------------------+---------------|
| 0x0                   | Reserved             | [[[this memo]]]|            |
|                       |                      |               |
| 0x1                   | Roughtime version 1  | [[[this memo]]]|
|                       |                      |               |
| 0x2-0xffffffff       | Unassigned           |               |
|                       |                      |               |
| 0x80000000-0xffffffff | Reserved for Private | [[[this memo]]]|
|                       | or Experimental use  |               |

Table 2: Roughtime version assignments.

11.3. Roughtime Tag Registry

IANA is requested to create a new registry entitled "Roughtime Tag Registry". Entries SHALL have the following fields:

- **Tag (REQUIRED):** A 32-bit unsigned integer in hexadecimal format.
ASCII Representation (OPTIONAL): The ASCII representation of the tag in accordance with Section 5.1.4 of this memo, if applicable.

Reference (REQUIRED): A reference to a relevant specification document.

The policy for allocation of new entries in this registry SHOULD be: Specification Required.

The initial contents of this registry SHALL be as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>ASCII Representation</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00444150</td>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x00474953</td>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x00524556</td>
<td>VER</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x31545544</td>
<td>DUT1</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x434e4f4e</td>
<td>NONC</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x454c4544</td>
<td>DELE</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x48544150</td>
<td>PATH</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x49415444</td>
<td>DTAI</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x49444152</td>
<td>RADI</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4b425550</td>
<td>PUBK</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5041454c</td>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5044494d</td>
<td>MIDP</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x50455253</td>
<td>SREP</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x544e494d</td>
<td>MINT</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x544f4f52</td>
<td>ROOT</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x54524543</td>
<td>CERT</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5458414d</td>
<td>MAXT</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x584444e9</td>
<td>INDX</td>
<td>[[this memo]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Roughtime tags.

12. Security Considerations

Since the only supported signature scheme, Ed25519, is not quantum resistant, the Roughtime version described in this memo will not survive the advent of quantum computers.
Maintaining a list of trusted servers and adjudicating violations of the rules by servers is not discussed in this document and is essential for security. Roughtime clients MUST regularly update their view of which servers are trustworthy in order to benefit from the detection of misbehavior.

Validating timestamps made on different dates requires knowledge of leap seconds in order to calculate time intervals correctly.

Servers carry out a significant amount of computation in response to clients, and thus may experience vulnerability to denial of service attacks.

This protocol does not provide any confidentiality. Given the nature of timestamps such impact is minor.

The compromise of a PUBK’s private key, even past MAXT, is a problem as the private key can be used to sign invalid times that are in the range MINT to MAXT, and thus violate the good behavior guarantee of the server.

Servers MUST NOT send response packets larger than the request packets sent by clients, in order to prevent amplification attacks.

13. Privacy Considerations

This protocol is designed to obscure all client identifiers. Servers necessarily have persistent long-term identities essential to enforcing correct behavior.

Generating nonces in a nonrandom manner can cause leaks of private data or enable tracking of clients as they move between networks.

14. References

14.1. Normative References

[ITU-R_TF.457-2]

[ITU-R_TF.460-6]
14.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Terms and Abbreviations

ASCII  American Standard Code for Information Interchange
IANA   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
JSON   JavaScript Object Notation [RFC8259]
MJD    Modified Julian Date
NTP    Network Time Protocol [RFC5905]
NTS  Network Time Security [RFC8915]

TAI  International Atomic Time (Temps Atomique International) [ITU-R_TF.460-6]

TCP  Transmission Control Protocol [RFC0793]

UDP  User Datagram Protocol [RFC0768]

UT  Universal Time [ITU-R_TF.460-6]

UTC  Coordinated Universal Time [ITU-R_TF.460-6]

Authors’ Addresses

Aanchal Malhotra
Boston University
111 Cummington Mall
Boston, MA 02215
United States of America
Email: aanchal4@bu.edu

Adam Langley
Google
Email: agl@google.com

Watson Ladd
Sealance, Inc.
Email: watsonbladd@gmail.com

Marcus Dansarie
Email: marcus@dansarie.se
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9246-0263
A YANG Data Model for NTP
draft-ietf-ntp-yang-data-model-17

Abstract

This document defines a YANG data model for Network Time Protocol (NTP) version 4 implementations. It can also be used to configure version 3. The data model includes configuration data and state data.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] data model for Network Time Protocol [RFC5905] implementations. Note that the model could also be used to configure NTPv3 [RFC1305] (see Section 7).

The data model covers configuration of system parameters of NTP, such as access rules, authentication and VPN Routing and Forwarding (VRF) binding, and also various modes of NTP and per-interface parameters. It also provides access to information about running state of NTP implementations.

1.1. Operational State

NTP Operational State is included in the same tree as NTP configuration, consistent with Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. NTP current state and statistics are also maintained in the operational state. The operational state also includes the NTP association state.

1.2. Terminology

The terminology used in this document is aligned to [RFC5905] and [RFC1305].

1.3. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the data model is used in this document. This document uses the graphical representation of data models defined in [RFC8340].

1.4. Prefixes in Data Node Names

In this document, names of data nodes and other data model objects are often used without a prefix, as long as it is clear from the context in which YANG module each name is defined. Otherwise, names are prefixed using the standard prefix associated with the corresponding YANG module, as shown in Table 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>YANG module</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yang</td>
<td>ietf-yang-types</td>
<td>[RFC6991]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inet</td>
<td>ietf-inet-types</td>
<td>[RFC6991]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if</td>
<td>ietf-interfaces</td>
<td>[RFC8343]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sys</td>
<td>ietf-system</td>
<td>[RFC7317]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl</td>
<td>ietf-access-control-list</td>
<td>[RFC8519]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rt-types</td>
<td>ietf-routing-types</td>
<td>[RFC8294]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nacm</td>
<td>ietf-netconf-acm</td>
<td>[RFC8341]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Prefixes and corresponding YANG modules

1.5. References in the Model

Following documents are referenced in the model defined in this document -
2. NTP data model

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-ntp", which has the following condensed structure:
module: ietf-ntp
  +--rw ntp!
    +--rw port?      inet:port-number {ntp-port}?
    +--rw refclock-master!
      |  +--rw master-stratum?  ntp-stratum
    +--rw authentication {authentication}?
      |  +--rw auth-enabled?  boolean
      |  +--rw authentication-keys* [key-id]
      |     +--rw key-id       uint32
      +--...
    +--rw access-rules {access-rules}?
      +--rw access-rule* [access-mode]
      |  +--rw access-mode  identityref
      +--rw acl?       -> /acl:acls/acl/name
    +--ro clock-state
      +--ro system-status
      |  +--ro clock-state  identityref
      |  +--ro clock-stratum  ntp-stratum
      |  +--ro clock-refid  refid
      +--...
    +--rw unicast-configuration* [address type]
      (unicast-configuration)?
      +--rw address      inet:ip-address
      +--rw type         identityref
      +--...
    +--rw associations
      +--ro association* [address local-mode isconfigured]
      |  +--ro address      inet:ip-address
      |  +--ro local-mode  identityref
      |  +--ro isconfigured  boolean
      +--...
      +--ro ntp-statistics
      +--...
    +--rw interfaces
      +--rw interface* [name]
      |  +--rw name    if:interface-ref
      |  +--rw broadcast-server! {broadcast-server}? 
      |      +--...
      |  +--rw broadcast-client! {broadcast-client}?
      |  +--rw multicast-server* [address] {multicast-server}?
      |     +--rw address
      |     |   rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
      |     +--...
      |  +--rw multicast-client* [address] {multicast-client}?
      |     +--rw address  rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
      |     +--rw manycast-server* [address] {manycast-server}?
      |     |   rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
      |     +--rw manycast-client* [address] {manycast-client}?
The full data model tree for the YANG module "ietf-ntp" is in Appendix A.

This data model defines one top-level container which includes both the NTP configuration and the NTP running state including access rules, authentication, associations, unicast configurations, interfaces, system status and associations.

3. Relationship with NTPv4-MIB

If the device implements the NTPv4-MIB [RFC5907], data nodes from YANG module can be mapped to table entries in NTPv4-MIB.

The following tables list the YANG data nodes with corresponding objects in the NTPv4-MIB.

YANG NTP Configuration Data Nodes and Related NTPv4-MIB Objects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YANG data nodes in /ntp/clock-state/system-status</th>
<th>NTPv4-MIB objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clock-state</td>
<td>ntpEntStatusCurrentMode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clock-stratum</td>
<td>ntpEntStatusStratum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clock-refid</td>
<td>ntpEntStatusActiveRefSourceId</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ntpEntStatusActiveRefSourceName</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clock-precision</td>
<td>ntpEntTimePrecision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clock-offset</td>
<td>ntpEntStatusActiveOffset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>root-dispersion</td>
<td>ntpEntStatusDispersion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YANG data nodes in /ntp/associations/</th>
<th>NTPv4-MIB objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>address</td>
<td>ntpAssocAddressType</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ntpAssocAddress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stratum</td>
<td>ntpAssocStratum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refid</td>
<td>ntpAssocRefId</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offset</td>
<td>ntpAssocOffset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delay</td>
<td>ntpAssocStatusDelay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispersion</td>
<td>ntpAssocStatusDispersion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ntp-statistics/packet-sent</td>
<td>ntpAssocStatOutPkts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ntp-statistics/packet-received</td>
<td>ntpAssocStatInPkts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ntp-statistics/packet-dropped</td>
<td>ntpAssocStatProtocolError</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

YANG NTP State Data Nodes and Related NTPv4-MIB Objects
4. Relationship with RFC 7317

This section describes the relationship with NTP definition in Section 3.2 System Time Management of [RFC7317]. YANG data nodes in /ntp/ also support per-interface configuration which is not supported in /system/ntp. If the yang model defined in this document is implemented, then /system/ntp SHOULD NOT be used and MUST be ignored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YANG data nodes in /ntp/</th>
<th>YANG data nodes in /system/ntp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>enabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unicast-configuration</td>
<td>server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server/name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unicast-configuration/address</td>
<td>server/transport/udp/address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unicast-configuration/port</td>
<td>server/transport/udp/port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unicast-configuration/type</td>
<td>server/association-type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unicast-configuration/iburst</td>
<td>server/iburst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unicast-configuration/prefer</td>
<td>server/prefer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

YANG NTP Configuration Data Nodes and counterparts in RFC 7317 Objects

5. Access Rules

The access rules in this section refers to the on-the-wire access control to the NTP service and completely independent of any management API access control, e.g., NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) ([RFC8341]).

An Access Control List (ACL) is one of the basic elements used to configure device-forwarding behavior. An ACL is a user-ordered set of rules that is used to filter traffic on a networking device.

As per [RFC1305] (for NTPv3) and [RFC5905] (for NTPv4), NTP could include an access-control feature that prevents unauthorized access and controls which peers are allowed to update the local clock. Further it is useful to differentiate between the various kinds of
access and attach a different acl-rule to each. For this, the YANG module allows such configuration via /ntp/access-rules. The access-rule itself is configured via [RFC8519].

Following access modes are supported -

* Peer: Permit others to synchronize their time with the NTP entity or it can synchronize its time with others. NTP control queries are also accepted.

* Server: Permit others to synchronize their time with the NTP entity, but vice versa is not supported. NTP control queries are accepted.

* Server-only: Permit others to synchronize their time with NTP entity, but vice versa is not supported. NTP control queries are not accepted.

* Query-only: Only control queries are accepted.

Query-only is the most restricted where as the peer is the full access authority. The ability to give different ACL rules for different access modes allows for a greater control by the operator.

6. Key Management

As per [RFC1305] (for NTPv3) and [RFC5905] (for NTPv4), when authentication is enabled, NTP employs a crypto-checksum, computed by the sender and checked by the receiver, together with a set of predistributed algorithms, and cryptographic keys indexed by a key identifier included in the NTP message. This key-id is a 32-bit unsigned integer that MUST be configured on the NTP peers before the authentication could be used. For this reason, this YANG module allows such configuration via /ntp/authentication/authentication-keys/. Further at the time of configuration of NTP association (for example unicast-server), the key-id is specified.

The ‘nacm:default-deny-all’ is used to prevent retrieval of the actual key information after it is set.

7. NTP Version

This YANG model allow a version to be configured for the NTP association i.e. an operator can control the use of NTPv3 [RFC1305] or NTPv4 [RFC5905] for each association it forms. This allows backward compatibility with a legacy system. Note that the version 3 of NTP [RFC1305] is obsoleted by NTPv4 [RFC5905].
8. NTP YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ntp@2022-03-21.yang"
module ietf-ntp {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp";
  prefix ntp;

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference
      "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
  }

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference
      "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
  }

  import ietf-interfaces {
    prefix if;
    reference
      "RFC 8343: A YANG Data Model for Interface Management";
  }

  import ietf-system {
    prefix sys;
    reference
      "RFC 7317: A YANG Data Model for System Management";
  }

  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix acl;
    reference
      "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)";
  }

  import ietf-routing-types {
    prefix rt-types;
    reference
      "RFC 8294: Common YANG Data Types for the Routing Area";
  }

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
      "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NTP (Network Time Protocol) Working Group";
}
This document defines a YANG data model for Network Time Protocol (NTP) implementations. The data model includes configuration data and state data.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.;

revision 2022-03-21 {
    description
        "Initial revision.";
    reference
        "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for NTP.";
}

/* Note: The RFC Editor will replace XXXX with the number assigned to this document once it becomes an RFC.*/
/* Typedef Definitions */
typedef ntp-stratum {
    type uint8 {
        range "1..16";
    }
    description
        "The level of each server in the hierarchy is defined by..."
a stratum. Primary servers are assigned with stratum one; secondary servers at each lower level are assigned with one stratum greater than the preceding level; reference
}

typedef ntp-version {
  type uint8 {
    range "3..max";
  }
  default "4";
  description
  "The current NTP version supported by corresponding association.";
  reference
}

typedef refid {
  type union {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    type uint32;
    type string {
      length "4";
    }
  }
  description
  "A code identifying the particular server or reference clock. The interpretation depends upon stratum. It could be an IPv4 address or first 32 bits of the MD5 hash of the IPv6 address or a string for the Reference Identifier and KISS codes. Some examples:
-- a refclock ID like '127.127.1.0' for local clock sync
-- uni/multi/broadcast associations for IPv4 will look like '203.0.113.1' and '0x4321FEDC' for IPv6
-- sync with primary source will look like 'DCN', 'NIST', 'ATOM'
-- KISS codes will look like 'AUTH', 'DROP', 'RATE'
Note that the use of MD5 hash for IPv6 address is not for cryptographic purposes ";
  reference
}
typedef ntp-date-and-time {
  type union {
    type yang:date-and-time;
    type uint8;
  }
  description
    "Follows the date-and-time format when valid value exist,
    otherwise allows for setting special value such as
    zero.";
  reference
    "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}

typedef log2seconds {
  type int8;
  description
    "An 8-bit signed integer that represents signed log2
    seconds.";
}

/*@ features */

feature ntp-port {
  description
    "Support for NTP port configuration";
  reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
    Algorithms Specification, Section 7.2";
}

feature authentication {
  description
    "Support for NTP symmetric key authentication";
  reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
    Algorithms Specification, Section 7.3";
}

feature deprecated {
  description
    "Support deprecated MD5-based authentication (RFC 8573) or
    SHA-1 or any other deprecated authentication mechanism.
    It is enabled to support legacy compatibility when secure
    cryptographic algorithms are not available to use.
    It is also used to configure keystrings in ASCII format.";
  reference
    "RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
    RFC 3174: US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)
FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS); 
}

feature hex-key-string {
    description
    "Support hexadecimal key string.";
}

feature access-rules {
    description
    "Support for NTP access control";
    reference
}

feature unicast-configuration {
    description
    "Support for NTP client/server or active/passive in unicast";
    reference
}

feature broadcast-server {
    description
    "Support for broadcast server";
    reference
}

feature broadcast-client {
    description
    "Support for broadcast client";
    reference
}

feature multicast-server {
    description
    "Support for multicast server";
    reference
}
feature multicast-client {
    description
        "Support for multicast client";
    reference
        "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
        Algorithms Specification, Section 3.1";
}

feature manycast-server {
    description
        "Support for manycast server";
    reference
        "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
        Algorithms Specification, Section 3.1";
}

feature manycast-client {
    description
        "Support for manycast client";
    reference
        "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
        Algorithms Specification, Section 3.1";
}

identity unicast-configuration-type {
    if-feature "unicast-configuration";
    description
        "This defines NTP unicast mode of operation as used
        for unicast-configurations.";
}

identity uc-server {
    if-feature "unicast-configuration";
    base unicast-configuration-type;
    description
        "Use client association mode where the unicast server
        address is configured.";
}

identity uc-peer {
    if-feature "unicast-configuration";
    base unicast-configuration-type;
    description
        "Use symmetric active association mode where the peer
        address is configured.";
}
identity association-mode {
    description "The NTP association modes.";
    reference "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
    Algorithms Specification, Section 3";
}

identity active {
    base association-mode;
    description "Use symmetric active association mode (mode 1).
    This device may synchronize with its NTP peer,
    or provide synchronization to configured NTP peer.";
}

identity passive {
    base association-mode;
    description "Use symmetric passive association mode (mode 2).
    This device has learned this association dynamically.
    This device may synchronize with its NTP peer.";
}

identity client {
    base association-mode;
    description "Use client association mode (mode 3).
    This device will not provide synchronization
    to the configured NTP server.";
}

identity server {
    base association-mode;
    description "Use server association mode (mode 4).
    This device will provide synchronization to
    NTP clients.";
}

identity broadcast-server {
    base association-mode;
    description "Use broadcast server mode (mode 5).";
This mode defines that its either working as broadcast-server or multicast-server.

identity broadcast-client {
  base association-mode;
  description
    "This mode defines that its either working
    as broadcast-client (mode 6) or multicast-client.";
}

identity access-mode {
  if-feature "access-rules";
  description
    "This defines NTP access modes. These identify how the ACL is applied with NTP.";
  reference
}

identity peer-access-mode {
  if-feature "access-rules";
  base access-mode;
  description
    "Permit others to synchronize their time with this NTP entity or it can synchronize its time with others. NTP control queries are also accepted. This enables full access authority.";
}

identity server-access-mode {
  if-feature "access-rules";
  base access-mode;
  description
    "Permit others to synchronize their time with this NTP entity, but vice versa is not supported. NTP control queries are accepted.";
}

identity server-only-access-mode {
  if-feature "access-rules";
  base access-mode;
  description
    "Permit others to synchronize their time with this NTP entity, but vice versa is not supported. NTP control
queries are not accepted."
}

identity query-only-access-mode {
  if-feature "access-rules";
  base access-mode;
  description
  "Only control queries are accepted.";
}

/* clock-state */

identity clock-state {
  description
  "This defines NTP clock status at a high level.";
}

identity synchronized {
  base clock-state;
  description
  "Indicates that the local clock has been synchronized with
  an NTP server or the reference clock.";
}

identity unsynchronized {
  base clock-state;
  description
  "Indicates that the local clock has not been synchronized
  with any NTP server.";
}

/* ntp-sync-state */

identity ntp-sync-state {
  description
  "This defines NTP clock sync state at a more granular
  level. Referred as 'Clock state definitions' in RFC 5905";
  reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Appendix A.1.1";
}

identity clock-never-set {
  base ntp-sync-state;
  description
  "Indicates the clock was never set.";
}
identity freq-set-by-cfg {
    base ntp-sync-state;
    description
        "Indicates the clock frequency is set by
         NTP configuration or file.";
}

identity spike {
    base ntp-sync-state;
    description
        "Indicates a spike is detected.";
}

identity freq {
    base ntp-sync-state;
    description
        "Indicates the frequency mode.";
}

identity clock-synchronized {
    base ntp-sync-state;
    description
        "Indicates that the clock is synchronized";
}

/* crypto-algorithm */

identity crypto-algorithm {
    description
        "Base identity of cryptographic algorithm options.";
}

identity md5 {
    if-feature "deprecated";
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "The MD5 algorithm. Note that RFC 8573
         deprecates the use of MD5-based authentication.";
    reference
        "RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm";
}

identity sha-1 {
    if-feature "deprecated";
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "The SHA-1 algorithm.";
    reference

"RFC 3174: US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)";

identity hmac-sha-1 {
    if-feature "deprecated";
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description "HMAC-SHA-1 authentication algorithm.";
    reference "FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}

identity hmac-sha1-12 {
    if-feature "deprecated";
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description "The HMAC-SHA1-12 algorithm.";
}

identity hmac-sha-256 {
    description "HMAC-SHA-256 authentication algorithm.";
    reference "FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}

identity hmac-sha-384 {
    description "HMAC-SHA-384 authentication algorithm.";
    reference "FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}

identity hmac-sha-512 {
    description "HMAC-SHA-512 authentication algorithm.";
    reference "FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}

identity aes-cmac {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description "The AES-CMAC algorithm - required by
    RFC 8573 for MAC for the NTP";
    reference
    "RFC 4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm
    RFC 8573: Message Authentication Code for the Network"
grouping key {
    description "The key.";
    nacm:default-deny-all;
    choice key-string-style {
        description "Key string styles";
        case keystring {
            leaf keystring {
                if-feature "deprecated";
                type string;
                description "Key string in ASCII format.";
            }
        }
        case hexadecimal {
            if-feature "hex-key-string";
            leaf hexadecimal-string {
                type yang:hex-string;
                description "Key in hexadecimal string format. When compared to ASCII, specification in hexadecimal affords greater key entropy with the same number of internal key-string octets. Additionally, it discourages usage of well-known words or numbers.";
            }
        }
    }
}

grouping authentication-key {
    description "To define an authentication key for a Network Time Protocol (NTP) time source.";
    leaf key-id {
        type uint32 {
            range "1..max";
        }
        description "Authentication key identifier.";
    }
    leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
  base crypto-algorithm;
}

description
  "Authentication algorithm. Note that RFC 8573
deprecates the use of MD5-based authentication
and recommends AES-CMAC."
}

carrier key {
  uses key;
  description
    "The key. Note that RFC 8573 deprecates the use
    of MD5-based authentication."
}

leaf istrusted {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Key-id is trusted or not"
}

reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
   Algorithms Specification, Section 7.3 and 7.4"
}

grouping authentication {
  description
    "Authentication."
  choice authentication-type {
    description
      "Type of authentication."
    case symmetric-key {
      leaf key-id {
        type leafref {
          path "/ntp/ntp/authentication/"
          + "/ntp/authentication-keys/ntp:key-id";
        }
        description
          "Authentication key id referenced in this
           association."
      }
    }
  }
}


grouping statistics {
  description
    "NTP packet statistic."
  leaf discontinuity-time {
    type identityref {
      base crypto-algorithm;
    }
    description
      "Authentication algorithm. Note that RFC 8573
deprecates the use of MD5-based authentication
and recommends AES-CMAC."
    }
  }
}
type ntp-date-and-time;
description
  "The time on the most recent occasion at which any one or
  more of this NTP counters suffered a discontinuity. If
  no such discontinuities have occurred, then this node
  contains the time the NTP association was
  (re-)initialized.";
}
leaf packet-sent {
  type yang:counter32;
  description
  "The total number of NTP packets delivered to the
  transport service by this NTP entity for this
  association.
  Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur
  upon cold start or reinitialization of the NTP entity, the
  management system and at other times.";
}
leaf packet-sent-fail {
  type yang:counter32;
  description
  "The number of times NTP packets sending failed.";
}
leaf packet-received {
  type yang:counter32;
  description
  "The total number of NTP packets delivered to the
  NTP entity from this association.
  Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur
  upon cold start or reinitialization of the NTP entity, the
  management system and at other times.";
}
leaf packet-dropped {
  type yang:counter32;
  description
  "The total number of NTP packets that were delivered
  to this NTP entity from this association and this entity
  was not able to process due to an NTP protocol error.
  Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur
  upon cold start or reinitialization of the NTP entity, the
  management system and at other times.";
}
}
grouping common-attributes {
  description
  "NTP common attributes for configuration.";
  leaf minpoll {

type log2seconds;
default "6";
description 
  "The minimum poll interval used in this association.";
reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 7.2";
}
leaf maxpoll {
  type log2seconds;
default "10";
description
  "The maximum poll interval used in this association.";
reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 7.2";
}
leaf port {
  if-feature "ntp-port";
type inet:port-number {
    range "123 | 1024..max";
  }
default "123";
description
  "Specify the port used to send NTP packets.";
reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 7.2";
}
leaf version {
type ntp-version;
description
  "NTP version.";
}
reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification";
}
grouping association-ref {
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
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type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
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type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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leaf associations-address {
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  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
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  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {
type leafref {
  path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association" + "/ntp:address";
}
description
  "Reference to NTP association mode";
leaf associations-address {

"Indicates the association’s address which result in clock synchronization.";
}
leaf associations-local-mode {
  type leafref {
    path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association/
    + "/ntp:local-mode";
  }
  description
  "Indicates the association’s local-mode which result in clock synchronization.";
}
leaf associations-isconfigured {
  type leafref {
    path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:associations/ntp:association/"
    + "ntp:isconfigured";
  }
  description
  "Indicates if the association (that resulted in the clock synchronization) is explicitly configured.";
}
}

container ntp {
  when 'false() = boolean(/sys:system/sys:ntp)' {
    description
    "Applicable when the system /sys/ntp/ is not used.";
  }
  presence "NTP is enabled and system should attempt to synchronize the system clock with an NTP server from the 'ntp/associations’ list.";
  description
  "Configuration parameters for NTP.";
  leaf port {
    if-feature "ntp-port";
    type inet:port-number {
      range "123 | 1024..max";
    }
    default "123";
    description
    "Specify the port used to send and receive NTP packets.";
    reference
  }
  container refclock-master {
    presence "NTP master clock is enabled.";
    description
"Configures the local clock of this device as NTP server."
leaf master-stratum {
  type ntp-stratum;
  default "16";
  description
    "Stratum level from which NTP clients get their time synchronized.";
}

container authentication {
  if-feature "authentication";
  description
    "Configuration of authentication.";
  leaf auth-enabled {
    type boolean;
    default "false";
    description
      "Controls whether NTP authentication is enabled or disabled on this device.";
  }
  list authentication-keys {
    key "key-id";
    uses authentication-key;
    description
      "List of authentication keys.";
  }
}

container access-rules {
  if-feature "access-rules";
  description
    "Configuration to control access to NTP service by using NTP access-group feature. The access-mode identifies how the ACL is applied with NTP.";
  list access-rule {
    key "access-mode";
    description
      "List of access rules.";
    leaf access-mode {
      type identityref {
        base access-mode;
      }
      description
        "The NTP access mode. Some of the possible value includes peer, server, synchronization, query etc.";
    }
    leaf acl {
type leafref {
    path "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:name";
}

description "Control access configuration to be used.";


}

container clock-state {
    config false;
    description "Clock operational state of the NTP.";
    container system-status {
        description "System status of NTP.";
        leaf clock-state {
            type identityref {
                base clock-state;
            }
            mandatory true;
            description "The state of system clock. Some of the possible value includes synchronized and unsynchronized";
        }
        leaf clock-stratum {
            type ntp-stratum;
            mandatory true;
            description "The NTP entity’s own stratum value. Should be one greater than preceeding level. 16 if unsynchronized.";
        }
        leaf clock-refid {
            type refid;
            mandatory true;
            description "A code identifying the particular server or reference clock. The interpretation depends upon stratum. It could be an IPv4 address or first 32 bits of the MD5 hash of the IPv6 address or a string for the Reference Identifier and KISS codes. Some examples:
-- a refclock ID like ’127.127.1.0’ for local clock sync
-- uni/multi/broadcast associations for IPv4 will look like
";
        }
    }
}

'203.0.113.1' and '0x4321FEDC' for IPv6
-- sync with primary source will look like 'DCN', 'NIST', 'ATOM'
-- KISS codes will look like 'AUTH', 'DROP', 'RATE'
Note that the use of MD5 hash for IPv6 address is not for cryptographic purposes
reference
}
uses association-ref {
  description
    "Reference to Association.";
}
leaf nominal-freq {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 4;
  }
  units "Hz";
  mandatory true;
  description
    "The nominal frequency of the local clock. An ideal frequency with zero uncertainty.";
}
leaf actual-freq {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 4;
  }
  units "Hz";
  mandatory true;
  description
    "The actual frequency of the local clock.";
}
leaf clock-precision {
  type log2seconds;
  mandatory true;
  description
    "Clock precision of this system in signed integer format, in log 2 seconds - (prec=2^(-n)). A value of 5 would mean 2^-5 = 0.03125 seconds = 31.25 ms.";
  reference
}
leaf clock-offset {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 3;
  }
}
units "milliseconds";

description
  "The signed time offset to the current selected reference
time source e.g., '0.032ms' or '1.232ms'. The negative
value indicates that the local clock is behind the
current selected reference time source.";

reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 9.1";

} leaf root-delay {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 3;
  }

  units "milliseconds";

description
  "Total delay along the path to root clock.";

reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 4 and 7.3";

} leaf root-dispersion {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 3;
  }

  units "milliseconds";

description
  "The dispersion between the local clock
  and the root clock, e.g., '6.927ms'.";

reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 4, 7.3 and 10.";

} leaf reference-time {
  type ntp-date-and-time;

description
  "The reference timestamp. Time when the system clock was
  last set or corrected";

reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 7.3";

} leaf sync-state {
  type identityref {
    base ntp-sync-state;
  }

  mandatory true;

description
"The synchronization status of the local clock. Referred to as 'Clock state definitions' in RFC 5905";
reference
}
}
list unicast-configuration {
  if-feature "unicast-configuration";
  key "address type";
  description
    "List of NTP unicast-configurations.";
  leaf address {
    type inet:ip-address;
    description
      "Address of this association.";
  }
  leaf type {
    type identityref {
      base unicast-configuration-type;
    }
    description
      "The unicast configuration type, for example unicast-server";
  }
  container authentication {
    if-feature "authentication";
    description
      "Authentication used for this association.";
    uses authentication;
  }
  leaf prefer {
    type boolean;
    default "false";
    description
      "Whether this association is preferred or not.";
  }
  leaf burst {
    type boolean;
    default "false";
    description
      "If set, a series of packets are sent instead of a single packet within each synchronization interval to achieve faster synchronization.";
    reference
    }
leaf iburst {
  type boolean;
  default "false";
  description "If set, a series of packets are sent instead of a single packet within the initial synchronization interval to achieve faster initial synchronization."
}

leaf source {
  type if:interface-ref;
  description "The interface whose IP address is used by this association as the source address."
}

uses common-attributes {
  description "Common attributes like port, version, min and max poll."
}

container associations {
  description "Association parameters"
  list association {
    key "address local-mode isconfigured";
    config false;
    description "List of NTP associations. Here address, local-mode and isconfigured are required to uniquely identify a particular association. Lets take following examples -

1) If RT1 acting as broadcast server, and RT2 acting as broadcast client, then RT2 will form dynamic association with address as RT1, local-mode as client and isconfigured as false.

2) When RT2 is configured with unicast-server RT1, then RT2 will form association with address as RT1, local-mode as client and isconfigured as true.

Thus all 3 leaves are needed as key to unique identify the association."
  leaf address {

type inet:ip-address;
description
"The remote address of this association. Represents the
IP address of a unicast/multicast/broadcast address."
}
leaf local-mode {
    type identityref {
        base association-mode;
    }
    description
"Local mode of this NTP association."
}
leaf isconfigured {
    type boolean;
    description
"Indicates if this association is configured (true) or
dynamically learned (false)."
}
leaf stratum {
    type ntp-stratum;
    description
"The association stratum value."
    reference
"RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
Algorithms Specification, Section 3"
}
leaf refid {
    type refid;
    description
"A code identifying the particular server or reference
clock. The interpretation depends upon stratum. It
could be an IPv4 address or first 32 bits of the MD5 hash of
the IPv6 address or a string for the Reference Identifier
and KISS codes. Some examples:
-- a refclock ID like '127.127.1.0' for local clock sync
-- uni/multi/broadcast associations for IPv4 will look like
'203.0.113.1' and '0x4321FEDC' for IPv6
-- sync with primary source will look like 'DCN', 'NIST',
'ATOM'
-- KISS codes will look like 'AUTH', 'DROP', 'RATE'
Note that the use of MD5 hash for IPv6 address is not for
cryptographic purposes"
    reference
"RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
Algorithms Specification, Section 7.3"
}
leaf authentication {
    if-feature "authentication";
}
type leafref {
    path "/ntp:ntp/ntp:authentication/" + "ntp:authentication-keys/ntp:key-id";
} description "Authentication Key used for this association.";

leaf prefer {
    type boolean;
    default "false";
    description "Indicates if this association is preferred.";
}

leaf peer-interface {
    type if:interface-ref;
    description 
        "The interface which is used for communication.";
}

uses common-attributes {
    description 
        "Common attributes like port, version, min and max poll.";
}

leaf reach {
    type uint8;
    description 
        "It is an 8-bit shift register that tracks packet generation and receipt. It is used to determine whether the server is reachable and the data are fresh.";
    reference 
}

leaf unreach {
    type uint8;
    units "seconds";
    description 
        "It is a count of how long in second the server has been unreachable i.e. the reach value has been zero.";
    reference 
}

leaf poll {
    type log2seconds;
    description 
        "The polling interval for current association in signed
log2 seconds.

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}

leaf now {
  type uint32;
  units "seconds";
  description
    "The time since the last NTP packet was received or last synchronized.";
}

leaf offset {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 3;
  }
  units "milliseconds";
  description
    "The signed offset between the local clock and the peer clock, e.g., '0.032ms' or '1.232ms'. The negative value indicates that the local clock is behind the peer.";
  reference
}

leaf delay {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 3;
  }
  units "milliseconds";
  description
    "The network delay between the local clock and the peer clock.";
  reference
}

leaf dispersion {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 3;
  }
  units "milliseconds";
  description
    "The root dispersion between the local clock and the peer clock.";
  reference
}
leaf originate-time {
  type ntp-date-and-time;
  description
    "This is the local time, in timestamp format,
     when latest NTP packet was sent to peer (called T1).";
  reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
     Algorithms Specification, Section 8";
}

leaf receive-time {
  type ntp-date-and-time;
  description
    "This is the local time, in timestamp format,
     when latest NTP packet arrived at peer (called T2).
     If the peer becomes unreachable the value is set to zero.";
  reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
     Algorithms Specification, Section 8";
}

leaf transmit-time {
  type ntp-date-and-time;
  description
    "This is the local time, in timestamp format,
     at which the NTP packet departed the peer (called T3).
     If the peer becomes unreachable the value is set to zero.";
  reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
     Algorithms Specification, Section 8";
}

leaf input-time {
  type ntp-date-and-time;
  description
    "This is the local time, in timestamp format,
     when the latest NTP message from the peer arrived (called
     T4). If the peer becomes unreachable the value is set to
     zero.";
  reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
     Algorithms Specification, Section 8";
}

container ntp-statistics {
  description
    "Per Peer packet send and receive statistics.";
  uses statistics {
    description
      "NTP send and receive packet statistics.";
  }
}
container interfaces {
  description
    "Configuration parameters for NTP interfaces.";
  list interface {
    key "name";
    description
      "List of interfaces.";
    leaf name {
      type if:interface-ref;
      description
        "The interface name.";
    }
  }
  container broadcast-server {
    if-feature "broadcast-server";
    presence "NTP broadcast-server is configured on this interface";
    description
      "Configuration of broadcast server.";
    leaf ttl {
      type uint8;
      description
        "Specifies the time to live (TTL) for a broadcast packet.";
      reference
    }
  }
  container authentication {
    if-feature "authentication";
    description
      "Authentication used on this interface.";
    uses authentication;
  }
  uses common-attributes {
    description
      "Common attributes such as port, version, min and max poll.";
  }
  reference
}

container broadcast-client {
  if-feature "broadcast-client";

presence "NTP broadcast-client is configured on this interface.";
description
"Configuration of broadcast-client.";
reference
}
list multicast-server {
  if-feature "multicast-server";
  key "address";
  description
  "Configuration of multicast server.";
  leaf address {
    type rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address;
    description
    "The IP address to send NTP multicast packets.";
  }
  leaf ttl {
    type uint8;
    description
    "Specifies the time to live (TTL) for a multicast packet.";
    reference
  }
  container authentication {
    if-feature "authentication";
    description
    "Authentication used on this interface.";
    uses authentication;
  }
  uses common-attributes {
    description
    "Common attributes such as port, version, min and max poll.";
  }
  reference
}
list multicast-client {
  if-feature "multicast-client";
  key "address";
  description
  "Configuration of multicast-client.";
  leaf address {
type rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address;
description
"The IP address of the multicast group to
join.";
}
reference
"RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
Algorithms Specification, Section 3.1";
}

list manycast-server {
  if-feature "manycast-server";
  key "address";
  description
  "Configuration of manycast server.";
  leaf address {
    type rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address;
    description
    "The multicast group IP address to receive
    manycast client messages.";
  }
  reference
  "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
  Algorithms Specification, Section 3.1";
}

list manycast-client {
  if-feature "manycast-client";
  key "address";
  description
  "Configuration of manycast-client.";
  leaf address {
    type rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address;
    description
    "The group IP address that the manycast client
    broadcasts the request message to.";
  }
  container authentication {
    if-feature "authentication";
    description
    "Authentication used on this interface.";
    uses authentication;
  }
  leaf ttl {
    type uint8;
    description
    "Specifies the maximum time to live (TTL) for
    the expanding ring search.";
    reference
    "RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
leaf minclock {
  type uint8;
  description "The minimum manycast survivors in this association.";
}
leaf maxclock {
  type uint8;
  description "The maximum manycast candidates in this association.";
}
leaf beacon {
  type log2seconds;
  description "The beacon is the upper limit of poll interval. When the ttl reaches its limit without finding the minimum number of manycast servers, the poll interval increases until reaching the beacon value, when it starts over from the beginning.";
}
uses common-attributes {
  description "Common attributes like port, version, min and max poll.";
}
}
}
}
container ntp-statistics {
  config false;
  description "Total NTP packet statistics.";
  uses statistics {

description
  "NTP send and receive packet statistics.";
}
}
}
}
rpc statistics-reset {
  description
  "Reset statistics collected.";
  input {
    choice association-or-all {
      description
        "Resets statistics for a particular association or all";
      case association {
        uses association-ref;
        description
          "This resets all the statistics collected for the association.";
      }
      case all {
        description
          "This resets all the statistics collected.";
      }
    }
  }
}

9. Usage Example

This section include examples for illustration purposes.

Note: '\
' line wrapping per [RFC8792].

9.1. Unicast association

This example describes how to configure a preferred unicast server present at 192.0.2.1 running at port 1025 with authentication-key 10 and version 4 (default).
<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <unicast-configuration>
        <address>192.0.2.1</address>
        <type>uc-server</type>
        <prefer>true</prefer>
        <port>1025</port>
        <authentication>
          <symmetric-key>
            <key-id>10</key-id>
          </symmetric-key>
        </authentication>
      </unicast-configuration>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>

An example with IPv6 would use an IPv6 address (say 2001:db8::1) in the "address" leaf with no change in any other data tree.

<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <unicast-configuration>
        <address>2001:db8::1</address>
        <type>uc-server</type>
        <prefer>true</prefer>
        <port>1025</port>
        <authentication>
          <symmetric-key>
            <key-id>10</key-id>
          </symmetric-key>
        </authentication>
      </unicast-configuration>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>

This example is for retrieving unicast configurations -
<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <unicast-configuration />
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>

<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <unicast-configuration>
      <address>192.0.2.1</address>
      <type>uc-server</type>
      <authentication>
        <symmetric-key>
          <key-id>10</key-id>
        </symmetric-key>
      </authentication>
      <prefer>true</prefer>
      <burst>false</burst>
      <iburst>true</iburst>
      <source/>
      <minpoll>6</minpoll>
      <maxpoll>10</maxpoll>
      <port>1025</port>
      <stratum>9</stratum>
      <refid>203.0.113.1</refid>
      <reach>255</reach>
      <unreach>0</unreach>
      <poll>128</poll>
      <wait>10</wait>
      <offset>0.025</offset>
      <delay>0.5</delay>
      <dispersion>0.6</dispersion>
      <originate-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.253 Z+05:30</originate-time>
      <receive-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.258 Z+05:30</receive-time>
      <transmit-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.300 Z+05:30</transmit-time>
      <input-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.305 Z+05:30</input-time>
    </unicast-configuration>
    <ntp-statistics>
      <packet-sent>20</packet-sent>
      <packet-sent-fail>0</packet-sent-fail>
      <packet-received>20</packet-received>
      <packet-dropped>0</packet-dropped>
    </ntp-statistics>
  </ntp>
</data>
9.2. Refclock master

This example describes how to configure reference clock with stratum 8 -

```xml
<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <refclock-master>
        <master-stratum>8</master-stratum>
      </refclock-master>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>
```

This example describes how to get reference clock configuration -

```xml
<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <refclock-master>
        <master-stratum>8</master-stratum>
      </refclock-master>
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>
```

```xml
<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <refclock-master>
      <master-stratum>8</master-stratum>
    </refclock-master>
  </ntp>
</data>
```

9.3. Authentication configuration

This example describes how to enable authentication and configure trusted authentication key 10 with mode as AES-CMAC and an hexadecimal string key -
9.4. Access configuration

This example describes how to configure access mode "peer" associated with ACL 2000 -

<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<target>
<running/>
</target>
<config>
<ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
<access-rules>
<access-rule>
<access-mode>peer-access-mode</access-mode>
<acl>2000</acl>
</access-rule>
</access-rules>
</ntp>
</config>
</edit-config>

This example describes how to get access related configuration -
9.5. Multicast configuration

This example describes how to configure multicast-server with address as "224.0.1.1", port as 1025, and version as 3 and authentication keyid as 10.
<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
          <multicast-server>
            <address>224.0.1.1</address>
            <authentication>
              <symmetric-key>
                <key-id>10</key-id>
              </symmetric-key>
            </authentication>
            <port>1025</port>
            <version>3</version>
          </multicast-server>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>

This example describes how to get multicast-server related configuration –
<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <multicast-server>
            </multicast-server>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>

<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <interfaces>
      <interface>
        <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
        <multicast-server>
          <address>224.0.1.1</address>
          <ttl>8</ttl>
          <authentication>
            <symmetric-key>
              <key-id>10</key-id>
            </symmetric-key>
          </authentication>
        </multicast-server>
        <minpoll>6</minpoll>
        <maxpoll>10</maxpoll>
        <version>3</version>
      </interface>
    </interfaces>
  </ntp>
</data>

This example describes how to configure multicast-client with address as "224.0.1.1" -
<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
          <multicast-client>
            <address>224.0.1.1</address>
          </multicast-client>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>

This example describes how to get multicast-client related configuration -

<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <multicast-client/>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>

<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <interfaces>
      <interface>
        <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
        <multicast-client>
          <address>224.0.1.1</address>
        </multicast-client>
      </interface>
    </interfaces>
  </ntp>
</data>
9.6. Manycast configuration

This example describes how to configure manycast-client with address as "224.0.1.1", port as 1025 and authentication keyid as 10 -

```xml
<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
          <manycast-client>
            <address>224.0.1.1</address>
            <authentication>
              <symmetric-key>
                <key-id>10</key-id>
              </symmetric-key>
            </authentication>
            <port>1025</port>
          </manycast-client>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>
```

This example describes how to get manycast-client related configuration -
This example describes how to configure manycast-server with address as "224.0.1.1" -
<edit-config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <target>
    <running/>
  </target>
  <config>
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
          <manycast-server>
            <address>224.0.1.1</address>
          </manycast-server>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </config>
</edit-config>

This example describes how to get manycast-server related configuration -

<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <interfaces>
        <interface>
          <manycast-server/>
        </interface>
      </interfaces>
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>

<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <interfaces>
      <interface>
        <name>Ethernet3/0/0</name>
        <manycast-server>
          <address>224.0.1.1</address>
        </manycast-server>
      </interface>
    </interfaces>
  </ntp>
</data>
9.7. Clock state

This example describes how to get clock current state -

```xml
<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <clock-state/>
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>
```

```xml
<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <clock-state>
      <system-status>
        <clock-state>synchronized</clock-state>
        <clock-stratum>7</clock-stratum>
        <clock-refid>192.0.2.1</clock-refid>
        <associations-address>192.0.2.1</associations-address>
        <associations-local-mode>client</associations-local-mode>
        <associations-isconfigured>yes</associations-isconfigured>
        <nominal-freq>100.0</nominal-freq>
        <actual-freq>100.0</actual-freq>
        <clock-precision>18</clock-precision>
        <clock-offset>0.025</clock-offset>
        <root-delay>0.5</root-delay>
        <root-dispersion>0.8</root-dispersion>
        <reference-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.258 Z+05:30</reference-time>
      </system-status>
    </clock-state>
  </ntp>
</data>
```

9.8. Get all association

This example describes how to get all association present in the system -
<get>
   <filter type="subtree">
      <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
         <associations>
         </associations>
      </ntp>
   </filter>
</get>

<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
   <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <associations>
         <association>
            <address>192.0.2.1</address>
            <stratum>9</stratum>
            <refid>203.0.113.1</refid>
            <local-mode>client</local-mode>
            <isconfigured>true</isconfigured>
            <authentication-key>10</authentication-key>
            <prefer>true</prefer>
            <peer-interface>Ethernet3/0/0</peer-interface>
            <minpoll>6</minpoll>
            <maxpoll>10</maxpoll>
            <port>1025</port>
            <version>4</version>
            <reach>255</reach>
            <unreach>0</unreach>
            <poll>128</poll>
            <now>10</now>
            <offset>0.025</offset>
            <delay>0.5</delay>
            <dispersion>0.6</dispersion>
            <origin-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.253 Z+05:30</origin-time>
            <receive-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.258 Z+05:30</receive-time>
            <transmit-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.300 Z+05:30</transmit-time>
            <input-time>10-10-2017 07:33:55.305 Z+05:30</input-time>
            <ntp-statistics>
               <packet-sent>20</packet-sent>
               <packet-sent-fail>0</packet-sent-fail>
               <packet-received>20</packet-received>
               <packet-dropped>0</packet-dropped>
            </ntp-statistics>
         </association>
      </associations>
   </ntp>
</data>
9.9. Global statistic

This example describes how to get global statistics -

```xml
<get>
  <filter type="subtree">
    <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
      <ntp-statistics>
      </ntp-statistics>
    </ntp>
  </filter>
</get>

<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <ntp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp">
    <ntp-statistics>
      <packet-sent>30</packet-sent>
      <packet-sent-fail>5</packet-sent-fail>
      <packet-received>20</packet-received>
      <packet-dropped>2</packet-dropped>
    </ntp-statistics>
  </ntp>
</data>
```

10. IANA Considerations

10.1. IETF XML Registry

This document registers a URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]. Following the format in RFC 3688, the following registration has been made.


Registrant Contact: The IESG.

XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

10.2. YANG Module Names

This document registers a YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020].

Name: ietf-ntp
11. Security Considerations

The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].

The NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. The 'nacm:default-deny-all' is used to prevent retrieval of the key information.

There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/ntp/port - This data node specify the port number to be used to send NTP packets. Unexpected changes could lead to disruption and/or network misbehavior.

/ntp/authentication and /ntp/access-rules - The entries in the list include the authentication and access control configurations. Care should be taken while setting these parameters.

/ntp/unicast-configuration - The entries in the list include all unicast configurations (server or peer mode), and indirectly creates or modify the NTP associations. Unexpected changes could lead to disruption and/or network misbehavior.
/ntp/interfaces/interface - The entries in the list include all per-interface configurations related to broadcast, multicast and manycast mode, and indirectly creates or modify the NTP associations. Unexpected changes could lead to disruption and/or network misbehavior. It could also lead to synchronization over untrusted source over trusted ones.

Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/ntp/authentication/authentication-keys - The entries in the list includes all the NTP authentication keys. Unauthorized access to the keys can be easily exploited to permit unauthorized access to the NTP service. This information is sensitive and thus unauthorized access to this needs to be curtailed.

/ntp/associations/association/ - The entries in the list includes all active NTP associations of all modes. Exposure of these nodes could reveal network topology or trust relationship. Unauthorized access to this also needs to be curtailed.

/ntp/authentication and /ntp/access-rules - The entries in the list include the authentication and access control configurations. Exposure of these nodes could reveal network topology or trust relationship.

Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

statistics-reset - The RPC is used to reset statistics. Unauthorized reset could impact monitoring.

The leaf /ntp/authentication/authentication-keys/algorithm can be set to cryptographic algorithms that are no longer considered to be secure. As per [RFC8573], AES-CMAC is the recommended algorithm.

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13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References


13.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Full YANG Tree

The full tree for ietf-ntp YANG model is:

Wu, et al. Expires 21 September 2022
module: ietf-ntp
  +--rw ntp!
    |  +--rw port?  inet:port-number {ntp-port}?
    |  +--rw refclock-master!
    |     +--rw master-stratum?  ntp-stratum
    |  +--rw authentication {authentication}?
    |     +--rw auth-enabled?  boolean
    |     +--rw authentication-keys* [key-id]
    |         +--rw key-id    uint32
    |     +--rw algorithm?  identityref
    |  +--rw key
    |     +--rw (key-string-style)?
    |         +--:(keystring)
    |     |  +--rw keystring?  string {deprecated}?
    |     |  +--:(hexadecimal)  {hex-key-string}?
    |     |     +--rw hexadecimal-string?  yang:hex-string
    |     +--rw istrusted?  boolean
    +--rw access-rules {access-rules}?
      |  +--rw access-rule* [access-mode]
      |      +--rw access-mode  identityref
      |      +--rw acl?  -> /acl:acls/acl/name
    +--ro clock-state
      |  +--ro clock-state  identityref
      |  +--ro clock-stratum  ntp-stratum
      |  +--ro clock-refid  refid
      |  +--ro associations-address?
      |      -> /ntp/associations/association/address
      |  +--ro associations-local-mode?
      |      -> /ntp/associations/association/local-mode
      |  +--ro associations-isconfigured?
      |      -> /ntp/associations/association/isconfigured
      +--ro nominal-freq  decimal64
      +--ro actual-freq  decimal64
      +--ro clock-precision  log2seconds
      +--ro clock-offset?  decimal64
      +--ro root-delay?  decimal64
      +--ro root-dispersion?  decimal64
      +--ro reference-time?  ntp-date-and-time
      +--ro sync-state  identityref
    +--rw unicast-configuration* [address type]
      |  (unicast-configuration)?
      |  +--rw address  inet:ip-address
      |  +--rw type  identityref
      +--rw authentication {authentication}?
        |  +--rw (authentication-type)?
        |     +--:(symmetric-key)
        |        +--rw key-id?  leafref
| ++-rw prefer?       | boolean       |
| ++-rw burst?       | boolean       |
| ++-rw iburst?      | boolean       |
| ++-rw source?      | if:interface-ref |
| ++-rw minpoll?     | log2seconds   |
| ++-rw maxpoll?     | log2seconds   |
| ++-rw port?        | inet:port-number {ntp-port}? |
| ++-rw version?     | ntp-version   |

++-rw associations

| ++-ro association* [address local-mode isconfigured] |
| ++-ro address        | inet:ip-address |
| ++-ro local-mode     | identityref    |
| ++-ro isconfigured   | boolean        |
| ++-ro stratum?       | ntp-stratum    |
| ++-ro refid?         | refid          |
| ++-ro authentication? |
|        -> /ntp/authentication/authentication-keys/key-id |
|                {authentication}? |
| ++-ro prefer?       | boolean        |
| ++-ro peer-interface? | if:interface-ref |
| ++-ro minpoll?      | log2seconds    |
| ++-ro maxpoll?      | log2seconds    |
| ++-ro port?         | inet:port-number {ntp-port}? |
| ++-ro version?      | ntp-version    |
| ++-ro reach?        | uint8          |
| ++-ro unreachable?  | uint8          |
| ++-ro poll?         | log2seconds    |
| ++-ro now?          | uint32         |
| ++-ro offset?       | decimal64      |
| ++-ro delay?        | decimal64      |
| ++-ro dispersion?   | decimal64      |
| ++-ro originate-time? | ntp-date-and-time |
| ++-ro receive-time? | ntp-date-and-time |
| ++-ro transmit-time? | ntp-date-and-time |
| ++-ro input-time?   | ntp-date-and-time |
| ++-ro ntp-statistics |
|        ++-ro discontinuity-time? | ntp-date-and-time |
|        ++-ro packet-sent? | yang:counter32 |
|        ++-ro packet-sent-fail? | yang:counter32 |
|        ++-ro packet-received? | yang:counter32 |
|        ++-ro packet-dropped? | yang:counter32 |

++-rw interfaces

| ++-rw interface* [name] |
| ++-rw name              | if:interface-ref |
| ++-rw broadcast-server! {broadcast-server}? |
|        ++-rw ttl?       | uint8          |
|        ++-rw authentication {authentication}? |
|                ++-rw (authentication-type)? |
```yang
+-: (symmetric-key)
  +---rw key-id?  leafref
  +---rw minpoll?  log2seconds
  +---rw maxpoll?  log2seconds
  +---rw port?  inet:port-number {ntp-port}?
  +---rw version?  ntp-version
+-rw broadcast-client!  {broadcast-client}?
+-rw multicast-server*  [address]  {multicast-server}?
  +---rw address
    rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
    +---rw ttl?  uint8
    +---rw authentication  {authentication}?
      +---rw (authentication-type)?
      +---: (symmetric-key)
        +---rw key-id?  leafref
        +---rw minpoll?  log2seconds
        +---rw maxpoll?  log2seconds
        +---rw port?  inet:port-number {ntp-port}?
        +---rw version?  ntp-version
      +---rw multicast-client*  [address]  {multicast-client}?
      |  +---rw address  rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
      +---rw manycast-server*  [address]  {manycast-server}?
      |  +---rw address  rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
      +---rw manycast-client*  [address]  {manycast-client}?
      |  +---rw address
        rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address
        +---rw authentication  {authentication}?
        |  +---rw (authentication-type)?
        |  +---: (symmetric-key)
        |     +---rw key-id?  leafref
        |     +---rw ttl?  uint8
        |     +---rw minclock?  uint8
        |     +---rw maxclock?  uint8
        |     +---rw beacon?  log2seconds
        |     +---rw minpoll?  log2seconds
        |     +---rw maxpoll?  log2seconds
      +---ro ntp-statistics
      |  +---ro discontinuity-time?  ntp-date-and-time
      |  +---ro packet-sent?  yang:counter32
      |  +---ro packet-sent-fail?  yang:counter32
      |  +---ro packet-received?  yang:counter32
      |  +---ro packet-dropped?  yang:counter32

rpcs:
  +---x statistics-reset
  +---w input
```
```plaintext
++++w (association-or-all)?
   +++:(association)
   |   +++w associations-address?
   |   |    -> /ntp/associations/association/address
   |   +++w associations-local-mode?
   |   |    -> /ntp/associations/association/local-mode
   |   +++w associations-isconfigured?
   |   |    -> /ntp/associations/association/isconfigured
   ++:(all)
```

Authors’ Addresses

Nan Wu
Huawei
Huawei Bld., No.156 Beiqing Rd.
Beijing
100095
China
Email: eric.wu@huawei.com

Dhruv Dhody (editor)
Huawei
Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield
Bangalore 560066
Kanataka
India
Email: dhruv.ietf@gmail.com

Ankit kumar Sinha (editor)
RtBrick Inc.
Bangalore
Kanataka
India
Email: ankit.ietf@gmail.com

Anil Kumar S N
RtBrick Inc.
Bangalore
Kanataka
India
Email: anil.ietf@gmail.com
Yi Zhao
Ericsson
China Digital Kingdom Bld., No.1 WangJing North Rd.
Beijing
100102
China
Email: yi.z.zhao@ericsson.com