

DNS Zone Transfer-over-TLS (XoT)

[draft-ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls](#)

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XoT - Background


What is XoT?

- Encryption of DNS zone transfer (AXFR & IXFR) using TLS as a transport


Use cases

- **Confidentiality:** Encrypting zone transfers will defeat zone content leakage that can occur via passive surveillance
- **Authentication:** Use of single or mutual TLS authentication can complement TSIG/ACLs
- **Performance:** Current usage of TCP for XFR is suboptimal in most cases

IXFR : Existing mechanisms vs IXoT




Existing




XOT-Based IXFR

IXFR : Existing mechanisms vs IXoT



IXFR : Existing mechanisms vs IXoT



Current status

- **Draft adopted** by WG in Nov 2019
- -02 was presented at IETF 108
 - **Got a lot of feedback**, particularly on the proposed use of ALPN (not supported)
- -03 version (Oct 2020)
 - Incorporates that feedback
 - Provide details in next few slides
 - Addressed a lot of open questions
 - *Looking for comments today (or on the list) on how close we are to WGLC*

-03 updates (Oct 2020)

- **Terminology:** XFR-over-TCP, XoT, IxOT and AXoT
- **Main elements of draft structure:**
 - Use cases/threat model
 - Existing XFR mechanisms, limitations and data leakage
 - Updates to existing specifications
 - XoT specification
 - Authentication mechanisms
 - Group policies for XoT transfers

-03 draft updates (Oct 2020)

- Use cases/threat model
 - Clarify that **threat considered is exposure of zone contents**, do not try to obfuscate the existence of a zone or that zone transfers are happening
- Updates to existing specs (more detail added)
 - **This draft now updates both RFC1995 (IXFR) and RFC5936 (AXFR)** (in the light of RFC7766 - 'TCP Implementation Requirements for DNS')
 - Clarifies how TCP connection reuse SHOULD be done, e.g.
 - **Persistent connections** and EDNS0 Keepalive to manage idle timeouts
 - Clients should pipeline XFR requests, use same connection for IXFR and AXFR
 - **Updates RFC7766** with regard to concurrent connections of different transports (treat TCP and TLS the same)

-03 draft updates (Oct 2020)

- XoT specification
 - **Authentication** - client **MUST** authenticate server using Strict DoT, server **MUST** authenticate client using mTLS (or IP based ACL) (the later section providing rationale for this approach has been updated)
 - Discuss **TLS connection handling** by primary
 - Potential concerns for authoritative servers now listening on TLS
 - Make clear that support for XoT is distinct from any form of ADoT
 - Outline how **Extended DNS Error codes** can be used to signal why none-XFR traffic might be refused on TLS connections
 - **Appendix which outlines operational and policy options** available to manage which TLS connections are accepted and which queries are answered
 - e.g. using proxies, requiring SNI, requiring TSIG, response policy, etc.

-03 draft updates (Oct 2020)

- **Remaining open questions**

- Largely around new Extended DNS Error codes
 - What servers should return if they REFUSE non-XFR traffic on TLS connections
 - Declining XFRs because quota on concurrent transfers reached?

- **Latest on implementation work**

- Patch to *NSD* to implement XFR-over-TCP connection reuse by default as a secondary, with a fixed idle timeout (EDNS0 Keepalive is a WIP)
- Patch to *NSD* to use XoT as a secondary, tested against a TLS proxy
- *BIND* are implementing DoT (announced an initial code update last week), => interop testing
- Other implementers interested in working on this?

Moving forward

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Reviews please!

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