

Easing the Conscience with OPC UA

An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments

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- **OPC UA: comparably new industrial communication protocol**

- ▶ Secure by design
- ▶ Prime candidate for communication in the Industry 4.0 and IIoT
 - Control of productions via the Internet
- ▶ **Extensive configuration required**




- **Official OPC UA security configuration recommendations**



? Are Internet-facing OPC UA deployments configured securely?
OPC UA as key example for deployments using secure-by-design protocols

- **Active Internet measurements (weekly over 7 months)**

- ▶ TCP SYN scan via `zmap` on port 4840
- ▶ Application layer scan (retrieval of security configurations and payload data)
 - Extension of `zgrab2`, available on github.com/COMSYS/zgrab2




Between 1761 and 2069 deployments discovered in the IPv4 address space

42% being Discovery Servers
▶ Only publishing information on other OPC UA deployments

? Are these Internet-facing OPC UA servers configured securely?

Deficient Security Configurations



Simply deploying a secure protocol is not sufficient
How can standardization help?



Dataset available online:
doi.org/10.18154/RWTH-2020-09197

Scanner source code:
github.com/COMSYS/zgrab2

Thank you for your attention!