The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture

draft-ietf-mls-architecture-07

Abstract

The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol [MLSPROTO] document has the role of defining a Group Key Agreement, all the necessary cryptographic operations, and serialization/deserialization functions necessary to create a scalable and secure group messaging protocol. The MLS protocol is meant to protect against eavesdropping, tampering, message forgery, and provide good properties such as forward-secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS) in the case of past or future device compromises.

This document, on the other hand is intended to describe a general secure group messaging infrastructure and its security goals. It provides guidance on building a group messaging system and discusses security and privacy tradeoffs offered by multiple security mechanisms that are part of the MLS protocol (i.e. frequency of public encryption key rotation).

The document also extends the guidance to parts of the infrastructure that are not standardized by the MLS Protocol document and left to the application or the infrastructure architects to design.

While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, most will vastly influence the overall security guarantees that are achieved by the overall messaging system. This is especially true in case of active adversaries that are able to compromise clients, the delivery service or the authentication service.

Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the MLS Working Group mailing list (mls@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mls/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mlswg/mls-architecture.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH

The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at https://github.com/mlswg/mls-architecture. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantive change should be discussed on the MLS mailing list.

DISCLAIMER: A lot of work is still ongoing on the current version of this draft. Especially, this preliminary writing of the security considerations has not been reviewed by the working group yet and might contain errors. Please file an issue on the document’s GitHub if you find errors.

[[TODO: Remove disclaimer.]]

End-to-end security is a requirement for instant messaging systems and is commonly deployed in many such systems. In this context, "end-to-end" captures the notion that users of the system enjoy some level of security -- with the precise level depending on the system design -- even when the service provider they are using performs unsatisfactorily.

Messaging Layer Security (MLS) specifies an architecture (this document) and an abstract protocol [MLSPROTO] for providing end-to-end security in this setting. MLS is not intended as a full instant messaging protocol but rather is intended to be embedded in concrete protocols, such as XMPP [RFC6120]. In addition, it does not specify a complete wire encoding, but rather a set of abstract data structures which can then be mapped onto a variety of concrete encodings, such as TLS [RFC8446], CBOR [RFC7049], and JSON [RFC7159]. Implementations which adopt compatible encodings will have some degree of interoperability at the message level, though they may have incompatible identity/authentication infrastructures. The MLS protocol has been designed to provide the same security guarantees to all users, for all group sizes, even when it reduces to only two users.

2. General Setting

Informally, a group is a set of users who possibly use multiple endpoint devices to interact with the Service Provider (SP). A group may be as small as two members (the simple case of person to person messaging) or as large as thousands.
In order to communicate securely, users initially interact with services at their disposal to establish the necessary values and credentials required for encryption and authentication.

The Service Provider presents two abstract functionalities that allow clients to prepare for sending and receiving messages securely:

* An Authentication Service (AS) functionality which is responsible for maintaining a binding between a unique identifier (identity) and the public key material (credential) used for authentication in the MLS protocol. This functionality must also be able to generate these credentials or validate them if they are provided by MLS clients.

* A Delivery Service (DS) functionality which can receive and redistributing messages between group members. In the case of group messaging, the delivery service may also be responsible for acting as a "broadcaster" where the sender sends a single message which is then forwarded to each recipient in the group by the DS. The DS is also responsible for storing and delivering initial public key material required by MLS clients in order to proceed with the group secret key establishment that is part of the MLS protocol.

For convenience, this document adopts the representation of these services being standalone servers, however the MLS protocol design is made so that it is not necessarily the case.

It is important to note that the Authentication Service functionality can be completely abstract in the case of a Service Provider which allows MLS clients to generate, redistribute and validate their credentials themselves.

Similarly to the AS, the Delivery Service can be completely abstract if users are able to distribute credentials and messages without relying on a central Delivery Service. Note, though, that the MLS protocol requires group operation messages to be processed in-order by all MLS clients.

In some sense, a set of MLS clients which can achieve the AS and DS functionalities without relying on an external party do not need a Service Provider.
In many systems, the AS and the DS are actually operated by the same entity and may even be the same server. However, they are logically distinct and, in other systems, may be operated by different entities. Other partitions are also possible, such as having a separate directory functionality or service.

According to this architecture design, a typical group messaging scenario might look like this:

1. Alice, Bob and Charlie create accounts with a service provider and obtain credentials from the AS.

2. Alice, Bob and Charlie authenticate to the DS and store some initial keying material which can be used to send encrypted messages to them for the first time. This keying material is authenticated with their long term credentials.

3. When Alice wants to send a message to Bob and Charlie, she contacts the DS and looks up their initial keying material. She uses these keys to establish a new set of keys which she can use to send encrypted messages to Bob and Charlie. She then sends the encrypted message(s) to the DS, which forwards them to the recipients.

4. Bob and/or Charlie respond to Alice’s message. In addition, they might choose to update their key material which provides post-compromise security Section 3.2.2. As a consequence of that change, the group secrets are updated.

Clients may wish to do the following:

* create a group by inviting a set of other clients;
* add one or more clients to an existing group;
* remove one or more members from an existing group;
* update their own key material
* join an existing group;
* leave a group;
* send a message to everyone in the group;
* receive a message from someone in the group.

At the cryptographic level, clients (and by extension members in groups) have equal permissions. For instance, any member can add or remove another client in a group. This is in contrast to some designs in which there is a single group controller who can modify the group. MLS is compatible with having group administration restricted to certain users, but we assume that those restrictions are enforced by authentication and access control at the application layer.

Thus, for instance, while the MLS protocol allows for any existing member of a group to add a new client, applications which use MLS might enforce additional restrictions for which only a subset of members can qualify, and thus will handle enforcing group policies (such as determining if a user is allowed to add new users to the group) at the application level.

2.1. Group, Members and Clients

While informally, a group can be considered to be a set of users possibly using multiple endpoint devices to interact with the Service Provider, this definition is too simplistic.

Formally, a client is a set of cryptographic objects composed by public values such as a name (an identity), a public encryption key and a public signature key. Ownership of a client by a user is determined by the fact that the user has knowledge of the associated secret values. When a client is part of a Group, it is called a Member and its signature key pair uniquely defines its identity to other clients or members in the Group. In some messaging systems, clients belonging to the same user must all share the same identity key pair, but MLS does not assume this.
Users will typically own multiple clients, potentially one or more per end-user devices (phones, web clients or other devices...) and may choose to authenticate using the same signature key across devices, using one signature key per device or even one signature key per group.

The formal definition of a Group in MLS is the set of clients that have knowledge of the shared group secret established in the group key establishment phase of the protocol and have contributed to it. Until a Member has been added to the group and contributed to the group secret in a manner verifiable by other members of the group, other members cannot assume that the Member is a member of the group.

2.2. Authentication Service

The Authentication Service (AS) has to provide two functionalities:

1. authenticate the credentials (i.e. the identity/signature keypair) used in a group

2. authenticate messages sent in groups given the signature over the message and the sending member’s credential

The AS is considered an abstract layer by the MLS specification, part of this service could be, for instance, running on the members’ devices, while another part is a separate entity entirely.

By the nature of its roles in MLS authentication, the AS is invested with a large amount of trust and the compromise of one of its functionalities could allow an adversary to, among other things, impersonate group members. We discuss security considerations regarding the compromise of the different AS functionalities in detail in Section 3.4.3.

2.2.1. Credential Authentication

In many cases, the first functionality might be provided by a service which fulfills a role similar to a certification authority in the WebPKI: it provides a binding of an identity (e.g., a user name, phone number, email address, etc) to a signature key. The identity/signature key pair can then either be used directly in a group, or as an root of trust which in turn authenticates credentials used in the group.

The flexibility afforded by the latter option allows for multiple infrastructure considerations and has the benefit of providing ways to use different signature keys across different groups by using hierarchical authentication keys. This flexibility also comes at the
price of a security tradeoff, described in the security considerations, between potential unlinkability of the signature keys across groups and the amount of time required to reinstate authentication and secrecy of messages after the compromise of a device.

2.2.2. Message Authentication

MLS messages are authenticated by a signature conforming to the signature scheme of the group’s ciphersuite. To allow for message deniability (see Section Section 3.2.3), messages are not required to be signed by the private key corresponding to a member’s credential, but the key must be authenticated using some mechanism. Thus, message authentication relies on the accuracy of the key’s authentication vice the credential authentication.

While credential authentication can be performed by a separate entity, message authentication should be performed by each member separately due to the encryption layer of the protocol which protects the signature of the message.

2.3. Delivery Service

The Delivery Service (DS) is expected to play multiple roles in the Service Provider architecture:

* To act as a directory service providing the initial keying material for clients to use. This allows a client to establish a shared key and send encrypted messages to other clients even if the other client is offline.

* To route messages between clients and to act as a message broadcaster, taking in one message and forwarding it to multiple clients (also known as "server side fanout").

Because the MLS protocol provides a way for clients to send and receive application messages asynchronously, it only provides causal ordering of application messages from senders while it has to enforce global ordering of group operations to provide Group Agreement. [[TODO: Casual ordering?]]

Depending on the level of trust given by the group to the Delivery Service, the functional and privacy guarantees provided by MLS may differ but the authentication and confidentiality guarantees remain the same.

Unlike the Authentication Service which is trusted for authentication and secrecy, the Delivery Service is completely untrusted regarding this property. While privacy of group membership might be a problem in the case of a Delivery Service server fanout, the Delivery Service can be considered as an active, adaptive network attacker from the point of view of the security analysis.

2.3.1. Key Storage

Upon joining the system, each client stores its initial cryptographic key material with the Delivery Service. This key material, called a KeyPackage, advertises the functional abilities of the client such as supported protocol versions and extensions and the following cryptographic information:

* A credential from the Authentication Service attesting to the binding between the identity and the client’s signature key.

* The client’s asymmetric encryption public key material signed with the signature public key associated with the credential.

As noted above, users may own multiple clients, each with their own keying material, and thus there may be multiple entries stored by each user.

The Delivery Service is also responsible for allowing users to add, remove or update their initial key material, and for ensuring that the identifier for these keys are unique across all keys stored on the Delivery Service.

2.3.2. Key Retrieval

When a client wishes to establish a group, it first contacts the Delivery Service to request a KeyPackage for each other client, authenticates the KeyPackages using the signature keys, and then can use those to form the group.

2.3.3. Delivery of messages and attachments

The main responsibility of the Delivery Service is to ensure delivery of messages. Specifically, we assume that Delivery Services provide:

* Reliable delivery: when a message is provided to the Delivery Service, it is eventually delivered to all clients.

* In-order delivery: messages are delivered to the group in the order they are received by the Delivery Service and in approximately the order in which they are sent by clients. The
latter is an approximate guarantee because multiple clients may send messages at the same time and so the Delivery Service needs some latitude in enforcing ordering across clients.

* Consistent ordering: the Delivery Service must ensure that all clients have the same view of message ordering for cryptographically relevant operations. This means that the Delivery Service MUST enforce global consistency of the ordering of group operation messages.

Note that the protocol provides three important pieces of information within an MLSCiphertext message in order to provide ordering:

* The Group Identifier (GID) to allow for distinguishing the group for which the message has been sent;

* The Epoch number, which represents the number of changes (version) of the group associated with a specific GID, and allows for lexicographical ordering of messages from different epochs within the same group;

* The Content Type of the message, which allows the Delivery Service to determine the ordering requirement on the message.

The MLS protocol itself can verify these properties. For instance, if the Delivery Service reorders messages from a client or provides different clients with inconsistent orderings, then clients can detect this misconduct. However, the protocol relies on the ordering, and on the fact that only one honest group operation message is fanned-out to clients per Epoch, to provide clients with a consistent view of the evolving Group State.

Note that some forms of Delivery Service misbehavior are still possible and difficult to detect. For instance, a Delivery Service can simply refuse to relay messages to and from a given client. Without some sort of side information, other clients cannot generally distinguish this form of Denial of Service (DoS) attack.

2.3.4. Membership knowledge

Group membership is itself sensitive information and MLS is designed to drastically limit the amount of persistent metadata. However, large groups often require an infrastructure which provides server fanout. In the case of client fanout, the destinations of a message is known by all clients, hence the server usually does not need this information. However, they may learn this information through traffic analysis. Unfortunately, in a server side fanout model, the Delivery Service can learn that a given client is sending the same
message to a set of other clients. In addition, there may be applications of MLS in which the group membership list is stored on some server associated with the Delivery Service.

While this knowledge is not a break of authentication or confidentiality, it is a serious issue for privacy. In the case where metadata has to be persisted for functionality, it SHOULD be stored encrypted at rest.

2.3.5. Membership and offline members

Because Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS) rely on the active deletion and replacement of keying material, any client which is persistently offline may still be holding old keying material and thus be a threat to both FS and PCS if it is later compromised.

MLS cannot inherently defend against this problem, especially in the case where the client has not processed messages, but MLS-using systems can enforce some mechanism to try to retain these properties. Typically this will consist of evicting clients which are idle for too long, or mandate a silent key update from clients that is not attached to other messaging traffic, thus containing the threat of compromise. The precise details of such mechanisms are a matter of local policy and beyond the scope of this document.

2.4. Functional Requirements

MLS is designed as a large scale group messaging protocol and hence aims to provide performance and safety to its users. Messaging systems that implement MLS provide support for conversations involving two or more members, and aim to scale to groups as large as 50,000 members, typically including many users using multiple devices.

2.4.1. Membership Changes

MLS aims to provide agreement on group membership, meaning that all group members have agreed on the list of current group members.

Some applications may wish to enforce ACLs to limit addition or removal of group members, to privileged clients or users. Others may wish to require authorization from the current group members or a subset thereof. Regardless, MLS does not allow for or support addition or removal of group members without informing all other members.
Once a client is part of a group, the set of devices controlled by
the user can only be altered by an authorized member of the group.
This authorization could depend on the application: some applications
might want to allow certain members of the group to add or remove
devices on behalf of another member, while other applications might
want a more strict policy and allow only the owner of the devices to
add or remove them at the potential cost of weaker PCS guarantees.
Application setup may also determine other forms of membership
validity, e.g. through an identity key alignment to the member with
separate signature keys per device. If a certificate chain is used
to sign off on device signature keys, then revocation by the owner
adds an alternative flag to prompt membership removal.

[[OPEN ISSUE: Above paragraph conflicts slightly under assumptions
about multiple device memberships vs. those described below under
"Support for Multiple Devices"]]

Members who are removed from a group do not enjoy special privileges:
compromise of a removed group member does not affect the security of
messages sent after their removal but might affect previous messages
if the group secrets have not been deleted properly.

2.4.2. Parallel Groups

Any user may have membership in several groups simultaneously. The
set of members of any group may or may not form a subset of the
members of another group. MLS guarantees that the FS and PCS goals
within a given group are maintained and not weakened by user
membership in multiple groups. However, actions in other groups
likewise do not strengthen the FS and PCS guarantees within a given
group, e.g. key updates within a given group following a device
compromise does not provide PCS healing in other groups; each group
must be updated separately to achieve internal goals. This also
applies to future groups that a member has yet to join, that are
likewise unaffected by updates performed in current groups.

Some applications may strengthen connectivity among parallel groups
by requiring periodic key updates from a user across all groups in
which they have membership, or using the PSK mechanism to link
healing properties among parallel groups. Such application choices
however are outside the scope of MLS.
2.4.3. Security of Attachments

The security properties expected for attachments in the MLS protocol are very similar to the ones expected from messages. The distinction between messages and attachments stems from the fact that the typical average time between the download of a message and the one from the attachments may be different. For many reasons (a typical reason being the lack of high bandwidth network connectivity), the lifetime of the cryptographic keys for attachments is usually higher than for messages, hence slightly weakening the PCS guarantees for attachments.

2.4.4. Asynchronous Usage

No operation in MLS requires two distinct clients or members to be online simultaneously. In particular, members participating in conversations protected using MLS can update shared keys, add or remove new members, and send messages and attachments without waiting for another user’s reply.

Messaging systems that implement MLS have to provide a transport layer for delivering messages asynchronously and reliably.

2.4.5. Access Control

The MLS protocol allows each member of the messaging group to perform operations equally. This is because all clients within a group (members) have access to the shared cryptographic material. However, every service/infrastructure has control over policies applied to its own clients. Applications managing MLS clients can be configured to allow for specific group operations. An application can, for example, decide to provide specific permissions to a group administrator that will be the one to perform add and remove operations, but the flexibility is immense here. On the other hand, in many settings such as open discussion forums, joining can be allowed for anyone.

The MLS protocol can, in certain modes, exchange unencrypted group operation messages. This flexibility is to allow services to perform access control tasks on behalf of the group.

While the Application messages will always be encrypted, having the handshake messages in plaintext has inconveniences in terms of privacy as someone could collect the signatures on the handshake messages and use them for tracking.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Prefer using encrypted group operation messages to avoid privacy issues related to non-encrypted signatures.
Note that in the default case of encrypted handshake messages, the application level must make sure that the access control policies are consistent across all clients to make sure that they remain in sync. If two different policies were applied, the clients might not accept or reject a group operation and end-up in different cryptographic states, breaking their ability to communicate.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Avoid using inconsistent access control policies in the case of encrypted group operations.

2.4.6. Recovery After State Loss

Group members whose local MLS state is lost or corrupted can reinitialize their state and continue participating in the group. This does not provide the member with access to group messages from during the state loss window, but enables proof of prior membership in the group. Applications may choose various configurations for providing lost messages to valid group members that are able to prove prior membership.

[[OPEN ISSUE: The previous statement seems too strong, establish what exact functional requirement we have regarding state recovery. Previously: "This may entail some level of message loss, but does not result in permanent exclusion from the group." -- Statement edited]]

2.4.7. Support for Multiple Devices

It is typically expected for users within a group to own various devices. A new device can be added to a group and be considered as a new client by the protocol. This client will not gain access to the history even if it is owned by someone who owns another member of the group. Restoring history is typically not allowed at the protocol level but applications can elect to provide such a mechanism outside of MLS. Such mechanisms, if used, may undermine the FS and PCS guarantees provided by MLS.

2.4.8. Extensibility / Pluggability

Messages that do not affect the group state can carry an arbitrary payload with the purpose of sharing that payload between group members. No assumptions are made about the format of the payload.
2.4.9. Federation

The protocol aims to be compatible with federated environments. While this document does not specify all necessary mechanisms required for federation, multiple MLS implementations can interoperate to form federated systems if they use compatible authentication mechanisms, ciphersuites, and infrastructure functionalities.

2.4.10. Compatibility with Future Versions of MLS

It is important that multiple versions of MLS be able to coexist in the future. Thus, MLS offers a version negotiation mechanism; this mechanism prevents version downgrade attacks where an attacker would actively rewrite messages with a lower protocol version than the ones originally offered by the endpoints. When multiple versions of MLS are available, the negotiation protocol guarantees that the version agreed upon will be the highest version supported in common by the group.

In MLS 1.0, the creator of the group is responsible for selecting the best ciphersuite supported across clients. Each client is able to verify availability of protocol version, ciphersuites and extensions at all times once he has at least received the first group operation message.

3. Security and Privacy Considerations

MLS adopts the Internet threat model [RFC3552] and therefore assumes that the attacker has complete control of the network. It is intended to provide the security services described in the face of such attackers.

-- The attacker can monitor the entire network.

-- The attacker can read unprotected messages.

-- The attacker can generate and inject any message in the unprotected transport layer.

In addition, these guarantees are intended to degrade gracefully in the presence of compromise of the transport security links as well as of both clients and elements of the messaging system, as described in the remainder of this section.

Generally, MLS is designed under the assumption that the transport layer is present to protect metadata and privacy in general, while the MLS protocol is providing stronger guarantees such as
confidentiality, integrity and authentication guarantees. Stronger properties such as deniability can also be achieved in specific architecture designs.

3.1. Assumptions on Transport Security Links

Any secure channel can be used as a transport layer to protect MLS messages such as QUIC, TLS, WireGuard or TOR. However, the MLS protocol is designed to consider the following threat-model:

-- The attacker can read and write arbitrary messages inside the secure transport channel.

This departs from most threat models where we consider that the secure channel used for transport always provides secrecy. The reason for this consideration is that in the group setting, active malicious insiders or adversarial services are to be considered.

3.1.1. Metadata Protection for Unencrypted Group Operations

The main use of the secure transport layer for MLS is to protect the already limited amount of metadata. Very little information is contained in the unencrypted header of the MLS protocol message format for group operation messages, and application messages are always encrypted in MLS.

Contrary to popular messaging services, the full list of recipients cannot be sent to the server for dispatching messages because that list is potentially extremely large in MLS. Therefore, the metadata typically consists of a pseudo-random Group Identifier (GID), a numerical index referring to the key needed to decrypt the ciphertext content, and another numerical value to determine the epoch of the group (the number of group operations that have been performed).

The MLS protocol provides an authenticated "Authenticated Additional Data" field for applications to make data available outside the MLSCiphertext.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Use the "Authenticated Additional Data" field of the MLSCiphertext message instead of using other unauthenticated means of sending metadata throughout the infrastructure. If the data is private, the infrastructure should use encrypted Application messages instead.
Even though some of this metadata information does not consist of secret payloads, in correlation with other data a network observer might be able to reconstruct sensitive information. Using a secure channel to transfer this information will prevent a network attacker to access this MLS protocol metadata if it cannot compromise the secure channel.

More importantly, there is one specific case where having no secure channel to exchange the MLS messages can have a serious impact on privacy. In the case of unencrypted group operation messages, observing the signatures of the group operation messages may lead an adversary to extract information about the group memberships.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Never use the unencrypted mode for group operations without using a secure channel for the transport layer.

3.1.2. DoS protection

In general we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) resistance to be the responsibility of the protocol. However, it should not be possible for anyone aside from the Delivery Service to perform a trivial DoS attack from which it is hard to recover. This can be achieved through the secure transport layer.

In the centralized setting, DoS protection can typically be performed by using tickets or cookies which identify users to a service for a certain number of connections. Such a system helps in preventing anonymous clients from sending arbitrary numbers of group operation messages to the Delivery Service or the MLS clients.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Anonymous credentials can be used in order to help DoS attacks prevention, in a privacy preserving manner. Note that the privacy of these mechanisms has to be adjusted in accordance with the privacy expected from the secure transport links. (See more discussion further down.)

3.1.3. Message Suppression and Error Correction

The MLS protocol is particularly sensitive about group operation message loss and reordering. This is because in the default setting, MLS clients have to process those specific messages in order to have a synchronized group state, after what the MLS protocol efficiently generates keys for application messages. [[TODO: It is unclear from this text whether MLS is "sensitive" in that it provides additional constraints to prevent this, or is "sensitive" in that it is vulnerable. Need to clarify]]
The Delivery Service can have the role of helping with reliability, but is mainly useful for reliability in the asynchronous aspect of the communication between MLS clients.

While it is difficult or impossible to prevent a network adversary from suppressing payloads in transit, in certain infrastructures such as banks or governments settings, unidirectional transports can be used and be enforced via electronic or physical devices such as diodes. This can lead to payload corruption which does not affect the security or privacy properties of the MLS protocol but does affect the reliability of the service. In that case specific measures can be taken to ensure the appropriate level of redundancy and quality of service for MLS.

*RECOMMENDATION:* If unidirectional transport is used for the secure transport channel, prefer using a protocol which provides Forward Error Correction.

3.2. Intended Security Guarantees

MLS aims to provide a number of security guarantees, covering authentication, as well as confidentiality guarantees to different degrees in different scenarios.

[[TODO: Authentication guarantees at the moment of joining a group are interesting and I don’t see a section where it would fit. I’m thinking in particular about the parent hash and tree hashes in combination with with signatures and the key schedule. I know that several groups have worked on this and results are scattered between a few papers. In particular, I think the guarantees for a member being added to a new group are interesting.]]

3.2.1. Message Secrecy and Authentication

MLS enforces the encryption of application messages and thus generally guarantees authentication and confidentiality of application messages sent in a group.

In particular, this means that only other members of a given group can decrypt the payload of a given application message, which includes information about the sender of the message.

Similarly, group members receiving a message from another group member can authenticate that group member as the sender of the message and verify the message’s integrity.

Message content can be deniable if the signature keys are exchanged over a deniable channel prior to signing messages.
Depending on the group settings, handshake messages can be encrypted as well. If that is the case, the same security guarantees apply.

MLS optionally allows the addition of padding to messages, mitigating the amount of information leaked about the length of the plaintext to an observer on the network.

3.2.2. Forward and Post-Compromise Security

MLS provides additional protection regarding secrecy of past messages and future messages. These cryptographic security properties are Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS).

FS means that access to all encrypted traffic history combined with an access to all current keying material on clients will not defeat the secrecy properties of messages older than the oldest key of the compromised client. Note that this means that clients have the extremely important role of deleting appropriate keys as soon as they have been used with the expected message, otherwise the secrecy of the messages and the security for MLS is considerably weakened.

PCS means that if a group member’s state is compromised at some time t but the group member subsequently performs an update at some time t’, then all MLS guarantees apply to messages sent by the member after time t’, and by other members after they have processed the update. For example, if an attacker learns all secrets known to Alice at time t, including both Alice’s long-term secret keys and all shared group keys, but Alice performs a key update at time t’, then the attacker is unable to violate any of the MLS security properties after the updates have been processed.

Both of these properties are satisfied even against compromised DSs and ASs.

3.2.3. Non-Repudiation vs Deniability

MLS provides strong authentication within a group, such that a group member cannot send a message that appears to be from another group member. Additionally, some services require that a recipient be able to prove to the service provider that a message was sent by a given client, in order to report abuse. MLS supports both of these use cases. In some deployments, these services are provided by mechanisms which allow the receiver to prove a message’s origin to a third party (this if often called "non-repudiation"), but it should also be possible to operate MLS in a "deniable" mode where such proof is not possible.
3.3. Endpoint Compromise

The MLS protocol adopts a threat model which includes multiple forms of endpoint/client compromise. While adversaries are in a very strong position if they have compromised an MLS client, there are still situations where security guarantees can be recovered thanks to the PCS properties achieved by the MLS protocol.

In this section we will explore the consequences and recommendations regarding the following compromise scenarios:

-- The attacker has access to a specific symmetric encryption key
-- The attacker has access to the group secrets for one group
-- The attacker has access to a signature oracle for any group
-- The attacker has access to the signature key for one group
-- The attacker has access to all secrets of a user for all groups (full state compromise)

[[TODO: Cite the research papers in the context of these compromise models]]

Recall that the MLS protocol provides chains of AEAD keys, per sender that are generated from Group Secrets. These keys are used to protect MLS Plaintext messages which can be Group Operation or Application messages. The Group Operation messages offer an additional protection as the secret exchanged within the TreeKEM group key agreement are public-key encrypted to subgroups with HPKE.

3.3.1. Compromise of AEAD key material

In some circumstances, adversaries may have access to specific AEAD keys and nonces which protect an Application or a Group Operation message. While this is a very weak kind of compromise, it can be realistic in cases of implementation vulnerabilities where only part of the memory leaks to the adversary.

When an AEAD key is compromised, the adversary has access to a set of AEAD keys for the same chain and the same epoch, hence can decrypt messages sent using keys of this chain. An adversary cannot send a message to a group which appears to be from any valid client since they cannot forge the signature.
The MLS protocol will ensure that an adversary cannot compute any previous AEAD keys for the same epoch, or any other epochs. Because of its Forward Secrecy guarantees, MLS will also retain secrecy of all other AEAD keys generated for other MLS clients, outside this dedicated chain of AEAD keys and nonces, even within the epoch of the compromise. However the MLS protocol does not provide Post Compromise Secrecy for AEAD encryption within an epoch. This means that if the AEAD key of a chain is compromised, the adversary can compute an arbitrary number of subsequent AEAD keys for that chain.

These guarantees are ensured by the structure of the MLS key schedule which provides Forward Secrecy for these AEAD encryptions, across the messages within the epoch and also across previous epochs. Those chains are completely disjoint and compromising keys across the chains would mean that some Group Secrets have been compromised, which is not the case in this attack scenario (we explore stronger compromise scenarios as part of the following sections).

MLS provides Post-Compromise Secrecy against an active adaptative attacker across epochs for AEAD encryption, which means that as soon as the epoch is changed, if the attacker does not have access to more secret material they won’t be able to access any protected messages from future epochs.

In the case of an Application message, an AEAD key compromise means that the encrypted application message will be leaked as well as the signature over that message. This means, that the compromise has both confidentiality and privacy implications on the future AEAD encryptions of that chain. In the case of a Group Operation message, only the privacy is affected, as the signature is revealed, because the secrets themselves are protected by HPKE encryption.

Note that under that compromise scenario, authentication is not affected in neither of these cases. As every member of the group can compute the AEAD keys for all the chains (they have access to the Group Secrets) in order to send and receive messages, the authentication provided by the AEAD encryption layer of the common framing mechanism is very weak. Successful decryption of an AEAD encrypted message only guarantees that a member of the group sent the message.
### 3.3.2. Compromise of the Group Secrets of a single group for one or more group epochs

The attack scenario considering an adversary gaining access to a set of Group secrets is significantly stronger. This can typically be the case when a member of the group is compromised. For this scenario, we consider that the signature keys are not compromised. This can be the case for instance if the adversary has access to part of the memory containing the group secrets but not to the signature keys which might be stored in a secure enclave.

In this scenario, the adversary gains the ability to compute any number of AEAD encryption keys for any AEAD chains and can encrypt and decrypt all messages for the compromised epochs.

If the adversary is passive, it is expected from the PCS properties of the MLS protocol that, as soon as an honest Commit message is sent by the compromised party, the next epochs will provide message secrecy.

If the adversary is active, the adversary can follow the protocol and perform updates on behalf of the compromised party with no ability to an honest group to recover message secrecy. However, MLS provides PCS against active adaptative attackers through its Remove group operation. This means that, as long as other members of the group are honest, the protocol will guarantee message secrecy for all messages exchanged in the epochs after the compromised party has been removed.

### 3.3.3. Compromise by an active adversary with the ability to sign messages

Under such a scenario, where an active adversary has compromised an MLS client, two different settings emerge. In the strongest compromise scenario, the attacker has access to the signing key and can forge authenticated messages. In a weaker, yet realistic scenario, the attacker has compromised a client but the client signature keys are protected with dedicated hardware features which do not allow direct access to the value of the private key and instead provide a signature API.

When considering an active adaptative attacker with access to a signature oracle, the compromise scenario implies a significant impact on both the secrecy and authentication guarantees of the protocol, especially if the attacker also has access to the group secrets. In that case both secrecy and authentication are broken. The attacker can generate any message, for the current and future epochs until an honest update from the compromised client happens.
Note that under this compromise scenario, the attacker can perform all operations which are available to a legitimate client even without access to the actual value of the signature key.

Without access to the group secrets, the adversary will not have the ability to generate messages which look valid to other members of the group and to the infrastructure as they need to have access to group secrets to compute the encryption keys or the membership tag.

3.3.4. Compromise of the authentication with access to a signature key

DISCLAIMER: Significant work remains in this section. [[TODO: Remove disclaimer.]]

The difference between having access to the value of the signature key and only having access to a signing oracle is not about the ability of an active adaptive network attacker to perform different operations during the time of the compromise, the attacker can perform every operations available to a legitimate client in both cases.

There is a significant difference, however in terms of recovery after a compromise.

Because of the PCS guarantees provided by the MLS protocol, when a previously compromised client performs an honest Commit which is not under the control of the adversary, both secrecy and authentication of messages can be recovered in the case where the attacker didn’t get access to the key. Because the adversary doesn’t have the key and has lost the ability to sign messages, they cannot authenticate messages on behalf of the compromised party, even if they still have control over some group keys by colluding with other members of the group.

This is in contrast with the case where the signature key is leaked. In that case PCS of the MLS protocol will eventually allow recovery of the authentication of messages for future epochs but only after compromised parties refresh their credentials securely.

Beware that in both oracle and private key access, an active adaptive attacker, can follow the protocol and request to update its own credential. This in turn induce a signature key rotation which could provide the attacker with part or the full value of the private key depending on the architecture of the service provider.
Signature private keys should be compartmentalized from other secrets and preferably protected by an HSM or dedicated hardware features to allow recovery of the authentication for future messages after a compromised.

Even if the dedicated hardware approach is used, ideally, neither the Client or the Authentication service alone should provide the signature private key. Both should contribute to the key and it should be stored securely by the client with no direct access.

### 3.3.5. Security consideration in the context of a full state compromise

In real-world compromise scenarios, it is often the case that adversaries target specific devices to obtain parts of the memory or even the ability to execute arbitrary code in the targeted device.

Also, recall that in this setting, the application will often retain the unencrypted messages. If so, the adversary does not have to break encryption at all to access sent and received messages. Messages may also be send by using the application to instruct the protocol implementation.

*RECOMMENDATION:* If messages are stored on the device, they should be protected using encryption at rest, and the keys used should be stored securely using dedicated mechanisms on the device.

*RECOMMENDATION:* If the threat model of the system is against an adversary which can access the messages on the device without even needing to attack MLS, the application should delete plaintext messages and ciphertexts immediately after encryption or decryption.

Even though, from the strict point of view of the security formalization, a ciphertext is always public and will forever be, there is no loss in trying to erase ciphertexts as much as possible.

Note that this document makes a clear distinction between the way signature keys and other group shared secrets must be handled. In particular, a large set of group secrets cannot necessarily assumed to be protected by an HSM or secure enclave features. This is especially true because these keys are extremely frequently used and changed with each message received by a client.

However, the signature private keys are mostly used by clients to send a message. They also are providing the strong authentication guarantees to other clients, hence we consider that their protection by additional security mechanism should be a priority.
Overall there is no way to detect or prevent these compromise, as discussed in the previous sections, performing separation of the application secret states can help recovery after compromise, this is the case for signature keys but similar concern exists for the encryption private key used in the TreeKEM Group Key Agreement.

*RECOMMENDATION:* The secret keys used for public key encryption should be stored similarly to the way the signature keys are stored as key can be used to decrypt the group operation messages and contain the secret material used to compute all the group secrets.

Even if secure enclaves are not perfectly secure, or even completely broken, adopting additional protections for these keys can ease recovery of the secrecy and authentication guarantees after a compromise where for instance, an attacker can sign messages without having access to the key. In certain contexts, the rotation of credentials might only be triggered by the AS through ACLs, hence be outside of the capabilities of the attacker.

[[TODO: Considerations for Signature keys being :reused or not across groups]]

3.3.6. More attack scenarios

[[TODO: Make examples for more complex attacks, cross groups, multi collusions...]]

[[TODO: Do we discuss PCFS in this document? If yes, where?]]

3.4. Service Node Compromise

3.4.1. General considerations

3.4.1.1. Privacy of the network connections

There are many scenarios leading to communication between the application on a device and the Delivery Service or the Authentication Service. In particular when:

* The application connects to the Authentication Service to generate or validate a new credential before distributing it.

* The application fetches credentials at the Delivery Service prior to creating a messaging group (one-to-one or more than two clients).
* The application fetches service provider information or messages on the Delivery Service.

* The application sends service provider information or messages to the Delivery Service.

In all these cases, the application will often connect to the device via a secure transport which leaks information about the origin of the request such as the IP address and depending on the protocol the MAC address of the device.

Similar concerns exist in the peer-to-peer use cases of MLS.

*RECOMMENDATION:* In the case where privacy or anonymity is important, using adequate protection such as TOR or a VPN can improve metadata protection.

More generally, using anonymous credential in an MLS based architecture might not be enough to provide strong privacy or anonymity properties.

3.4.2. Delivery Service Compromise

MLS is intended to provide strong guarantees in the face of compromise of the DS. Even a totally compromised DS should not be able to read messages or inject messages that will be acceptable to legitimate clients. It should also not be able to undetectably remove, reorder or replay messages.

However, a DS can mount a variety of DoS attacks on the system, including total DoS attacks (where it simply refuses to forward any messages) and partial DoS attacks (where it refuses to forward messages to and from specific clients). As noted in Section 2.3.3, these attacks are only partially detectable by clients without an out-of-band channel. Ultimately, failure of the DS to provide reasonable service must be dealt with as a customer service matter, not via technology.

Because the DS is responsible for providing the initial keying material to clients, it can provide stale keys. This does not inherently lead to compromise of the message stream, but does allow it to attack forward security to a limited extent. This threat can be mitigated by having initial keys expire.
3.4.2.1. Privacy of delivery and push notifications

An important mechanism that is often ignored from the privacy considerations are the push-tokens. In many modern messaging architectures, applications are using push notification mechanisms typically provided by OS vendors. This is to make sure that when messages are available at the Delivery Service (or by other mechanisms if the DS is not a central server), the recipient application on a device knows about it. Sometimes the push notification can contain the application message itself which saves a round trip with the DS.

To "push" this information to the device, the service provider and the OS infrastructures use unique per-device, per-application identifiers called push-tokens. This means that the push notification provider and the service provider have information on which devices receive information and at which point in time.

Even though they can't necessarily access the content, which is typically encrypted MLS messages, the service provider and the push notification provider have to be trusted to avoid making correlation on which devices are recipients of the same message.

For secure messaging systems, push notification are often sent real-time as it is not acceptable to create artificial delays for message retrieval.

*RECOMMENDATION:* If real time notification are not necessary and that specific steps must be taken to improve privacy, one can delay notifications randomly across recipient devices using a mixnet or other techniques.

Note that it is quite easy for legal requests to ask the service provider for the push-token associated to an identifier and perform a second request to the company operating the push-notification system to get information about the device, which is often linked with a real identity via a cloud account, a credit card or other information.

*RECOMMENDATION:* If stronger privacy guarantees are needed vis-a-vis of the push notification provider, the client can choose to periodically connect to the Delivery Service without the need of a dedicated push notification infrastructure.
3.4.3. Authentication Service Compromise

The Authentication Service design is left to the infrastructure designers. In most designs, a compromised AS is a serious matter, as the AS can serve incorrect or attacker-provided identities to clients.

-- The attacker can link an identity to a credential
-- The attacker can generate new credentials
-- The attacker can sign new credentials
-- The attacker can publish or distribute credentials

Infrastructures that provide cryptographic material or credentials in place of the MLS client (which is under the control of the user) have often the ability to use the associated secrets to perform operations on behalf of the user, which is unacceptable in many situations. Other mechanisms can be used to prevent this issue, such as the service blessing cryptographic material used by an MLS client.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Make clients submit signature public keys to the AS, this is usually better than the AS generating public key pairs because the AS cannot sign on behalf of the client. This is a benefit of a Public Key Infrastructure in the style of the Internet PKI.

An attacker that can generate or sign new credential may or may not have access to the underlying cryptographic material necessary to perform such operations. In that last case, it results in windows of time for which all emitted credentials might be compromised.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Using HSMs to store the root signature keys to limit the ability of an adversary with no physical access to extract the top-level signature key.

3.4.3.1. Authentication compromise: Ghost users and impersonations

One thing for which the MLS Protocol is designed for is to make sure that all clients know who is in the group at all times. This means that - if all Members of the group and the Authentication Service are honest - no other parties than the members of the current group can read and write messages protected by the protocol for that Group.

Beware though, the link between the cryptographic identity of the Client and the real identity of the User is important. With some Authentication Service designs, a private or centralized authority...
can be trusted to generate or validate signature keypairs used in the MLS protocol. This is typically the case in some of the biggest messaging infrastructures.

While this service is often very well protected from external attackers, it might be the case that this service is compromised. In such infrastructure, the AS could generate or validate a signature keypair for an identity which is not the expected one. Because a user can have many MLS clients running the MLS protocol, it possibly has many signature keypairs for multiple devices.

In the case where an adversarial keypair is generated for a specific identity, an infrastructure without any transparency mechanism or out-of-band authentication mechanism could inject a malicious client into a group by impersonating a user. This is especially the case in large groups where the UI might not reflect all the changes back the users.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Make sure that MLS clients reflect all the membership changes to the users as they happen. If a choice has to be made because the number of notifications is too high, a public log should be maintained in the state of the device so that user can examine it.

While the ways to handle MLS credentials are not defined by the protocol or the architecture documents, the MLS protocol has been designed with a mechanism that can be used to provide out-of-band authentication to users. The "authentication_secret" generated for each user at each epoch of the group is a one-time, per client, authentication secret which can be exchanged between users to prove their identity to each other. This can be done for instance using a QR code that can be scanned by the other parties.

Another way to improve the security for the users is to provide a transparency mechanism which allows each user to check if credentials used in groups have been published in the transparency log. Another benefit of this mechanism is for revocation. The users of a group could check for revoked keys (in case of compromise detection) using a mechanism such as CRLite or some more advanced privacy preserving technology.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Provide a Key Transparency and Out-of-Band authentication mechanisms to limit the impact of an Authentication Service compromise.
We note, again, that as described prior to that section, the Authentication Service is facultative to design a working infrastructure and can be replaced by many mechanisms such as establishing prior one-to-one deniable channels, gossiping, or using TOFU for credentials used by the MLS Protocol.

Another important consideration is the ease of redistributing new keys on client compromise, which helps recovering security faster in various cases.

3.4.3.2. Privacy of the Group Membership

Often, expectation from users is that the infrastructure will not retain the ability to constantly map the user identity to signature public keys of the MLS protocol. Some infrastructures will keep a mapping between signature public keys of clients and user identities. This can benefit an adversary that has compromised the AS (or required access according to regulation) the ability of monitoring unencrypted traffic and correlate the messages exchanged within the same group.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Always use encrypted group operation messages to reduce issues related to privacy.

In certain cases, the adversary can access to specific bindings between public keys and identities. If the signature keys are reused across groups, the adversary can get more information about the targeted user.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Do not use the same signature keypair across groups.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Separate the service binding the identities and the public keys from the service which generates or validates the credentials or cryptographic material of the Clients.

3.5. Considerations for attacks outside of the threat model

Physical attacks on devices storing and executing MLS principals are not considered in depth in the threat model of the MLS protocol. While non-permanent, non-invasive attacks can sometime be equivalent to software attacks, physical attacks are considered outside of the MLS threat model.

Compromise scenarios, typically consist in a software adversary, which can maintain active adaptive compromise and arbitrarily change the behavior of the client or service.
On the other hand, security goals consider that honest clients will always run the protocol according to its specification. This relies on implementations of the protocol to securely implement the specification, which remains non-trivial.

*RECOMMENDATION:* Additional steps should be taken to protect the device and the MLS clients from physical compromise. In such setting, HSMs and secure enclaves can be used to protect signature keys.

More information will be available in the Server-Assist draft.

[[TODO: Reference to server assist when the draft is available.]]

4. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA.

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The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol
draft-ietf-mls-protocol-12

Abstract

Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two clients need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy and post-compromise security for groups in size ranging from two to thousands.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mlswg/mls-protocol (https://github.com/mlswg/mls-protocol).

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
1. Introduction

DISCLAIMER: This is a work-in-progress draft of MLS and has not yet seen significant security analysis. It should not be used as a basis for building production systems.

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at https://github.com/mlswg/mls-protocol. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantive change should be discussed on the MLS mailing list.

A group of users who want to send each other encrypted messages needs a way to derive shared symmetric encryption keys. For two parties, this problem has been studied thoroughly, with the Double Ratchet emerging as a common solution [doubleratchet] [signal]. Channels implementing the Double Ratchet enjoy fine-grained forward secrecy as well as post-compromise security, but are nonetheless efficient enough for heavy use over low-bandwidth networks.

For a group of size greater than two, a common strategy is to unilaterally broadcast symmetric "sender" keys over existing shared symmetric channels, and then for each member to send messages to the group encrypted with their own sender key. Unfortunately, while this improves efficiency over pairwise broadcast of individual messages and provides forward secrecy (with the addition of a hash ratchet), it is difficult to achieve post-compromise security with sender keys. An adversary who learns a sender key can often indefinitely and passively eavesdrop on that member's messages. Generating and distributing a new sender key provides a form of post-compromise security with regard to that sender. However, it requires computation and communications resources that scale linearly with the size of the group.
In this document, we describe a protocol based on tree structures that enable asynchronous group keying with forward secrecy and post-compromise security. Based on earlier work on "asynchronous ratcheting trees" [art], the protocol presented here uses an asynchronous key-encapsulation mechanism for tree structures. This mechanism allows the members of the group to derive and update shared keys with costs that scale as the log of the group size.

1.1. Change Log

RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.

draft-12

* Use the GroupContext to derive the joiner_secret (*)
* Make PreSharedKeys non optional in GroupSecrets (*)
* Update name for this particular key (*)
* Truncate tree size on removal (*)
* Use HPKE draft-08 (*)
* Clarify requirements around identity in MLS groups (*)
* Signal the intended wire format for MLS messages (*)
* Inject GroupContext as HPKE info instead of AAD (*)
* Clarify extension handling and make extension updatable (*)
* Improve extensibility of Proposals (*)
* Constrain proposal in External Commit (*)
* Remove the notion of a 'leaf index' (*)
* Add group_context_extensions proposal ID (*)
* Add RequiredCapabilities extension (*)
* Use cascaded KDF instead of concatenation to consolidate PSKs (*)
* Use key package hash to index clients in message structs (*)
* Don’t require PublicGroupState for external init (*)
* Make ratchet tree section clearer.
* Handle non-member sender cases in MLSPlaintextTBS
* Clarify encoding of signatures with NIST curves
* Remove OPEN ISSUEs and TODOs
* Normalize the description of the zero vector

draft-11
* Include subtree keys in parent hash (*)
* Pin HPKE to draft-07 (*)
* Move joiner secret to the end of the first key schedule epoch (*)
* Add an AppAck proposal
* Make initializations of transcript hashes consistent

draft-10
* Allow new members to join via an external Commit (*)
* Enable proposals to be sent inline in a Commit (*)
* Re-enable constant-time Add (*)
* Change expiration extension to lifetime extension (*)
* Make the tree in the Welcome optional (*)
* PSK injection, re-init, sub-group branching (*)
* Require the initial init_secret to be a random value (*)
* Remove explicit sender data nonce (*)
* Do not encrypt to joiners in UpdatePath generation (*)
* Move MLSPlaintext signature under the confirmation tag (*)
* Explicitly authenticate group membership with MLSPlaintext (*)
* Clarify X509Credential structure (*)
* Remove unneeded interim transcript hash from GroupInfo (*)

* IANA considerations

* Derive an authentication secret

* Use Extract/Expand from HPKE KDF

* Clarify that application messages MUST be encrypted

draft-09

* Remove blanking of nodes on Add (*)

* Change epoch numbers to uint64 (*)

* Add PSK inputs (*)

* Add key schedule exporter (*)

* Sign the updated direct path on Commit, using "parent hashes" and one signature per leaf (*)

* Use structured types for external senders (*)

* Redesign Welcome to include confirmation and use derived keys (*)

* Remove ignored proposals (*)

* Always include an Update with a Commit (*)

* Add per-message entropy to guard against nonce reuse (*)

* Use the same hash ratchet construct for both application and handshake keys (*)

* Add more ciphersuites

* Use HKDF to derive key pairs (*)

* Mandate expiration of ClientInitKeys (*)

* Add extensions to GroupContext and flesh out the extensibility story (*)

* Rename ClientInitKey to KeyPackage

draft-08
* Change ClientInitKeys so that they only refer to one ciphersuite (*)
* Decompose group operations into Proposals and Commits (*)
* Enable Add and Remove proposals from outside the group (*)
* Replace Init messages with multi-recipient Welcome message (*)
* Add extensions to ClientInitKeys for expiration and downgrade resistance (*)
* Allow multiple Proposals and a single Commit in one MLSPlaintext (*)

draft-07
* Initial version of the Tree based Application Key Schedule (*)
* Initial definition of the Init message for group creation (*)
* Fix issue with the transcript used for newcomers (*)
* Clarifications on message framing and HPKE contexts (*)

draft-06
* Reorder blanking and update in the Remove operation (*)
* Rename the GroupState structure to GroupContext (*)
* Rename UserInitKey to ClientInitKey
* Resolve the circular dependency that draft-05 introduced in the confirmation MAC calculation (*)
* Cover the entire MLSPlaintext in the transcript hash (*)

draft-05
* Common framing for handshake and application messages (*)
* Handshake message encryption (*)
* Convert from literal state to a commitment via the "tree hash" (*)
* Add credentials to the tree and remove the "roster" concept (*)
* Remove the secret field from tree node values

draft-04

* Updating the language to be similar to the Architecture document

* ECIES is now renamed in favor of HPKE (*)

* Using a KDF instead of a Hash in TreeKEM (*)

draft-03

* Added ciphersuites and signature schemes (*)

* Re-ordered fields in UserInitKey to make parsing easier (*)

* Fixed inconsistencies between Welcome and GroupState (*)

* Added encryption of the Welcome message (*)

draft-02

* Removed ART (*)

* Allowed partial trees to avoid double-joins (*)

* Added explicit key confirmation (*)

draft-01

* Initial description of the Message Protection mechanism. (*)

* Initial specification proposal for the Application Key Schedule using the per-participant chaining of the Application Secret design. (*)

* Initial specification proposal for an encryption mechanism to protect Application Messages using an AEAD scheme. (*)

* Initial specification proposal for an authentication mechanism of Application Messages using signatures. (*)

* Initial specification proposal for a padding mechanism to improving protection of Application Messages against traffic analysis. (*)
* Inversion of the Group Init Add and Application Secret derivations in the Handshake Key Schedule to be ease chaining in case we switch design. (*)

* Removal of the UserAdd construct and split of GroupAdd into Add and Welcome messages (*)

* Initial proposal for authenticating handshake messages by signing over group state and including group state in the key schedule (*)

* Added an appendix with example code for tree math

* Changed the ECIES mechanism used by TreeKEM so that it uses nonces generated from the shared secret draft-00

* Initial adoption of draft-barnes-mls-protocol-01 as a WG item.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Client: An agent that uses this protocol to establish shared cryptographic state with other clients. A client is defined by the cryptographic keys it holds.

Group: A collection of clients with shared cryptographic state.

Member: A client that is included in the shared state of a group, hence has access to the group’s secrets.

Key Package: A signed object describing a client’s identity and capabilities, and including a hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke]) public key that can be used to encrypt to that client.

Initialization Key (InitKey): A key package that is prepublished by a client, which other clients can use to introduce the client to a new group.

Signature Key: A signing key pair used to authenticate the sender of a message.
Terminology specific to tree computations is described in Section 5.

We use the TLS presentation language [RFC8446] to describe the structure of protocol messages.

3. Basic Assumptions

This protocol is designed to execute in the context of a Service Provider (SP) as described in [I-D.ietf-mls-architecture]. In particular, we assume the SP provides the following services:

* A signature key provider which allows clients to authenticate protocol messages in a group.

* A broadcast channel, for each group, which will relay a message to all members of a group. For the most part, we assume that this channel delivers messages in the same order to all participants. (See Section 13 for further considerations.)

* A directory to which clients can publish key packages and download key packages for other participants.

4. Protocol Overview

The goal of this protocol is to allow a group of clients to exchange confidential and authenticated messages. It does so by deriving a sequence of secrets and keys known only to members. Those should be secret against an active network adversary and should have both forward secrecy and post-compromise security with respect to compromise of any members.

We describe the information stored by each client as _state_, which includes both public and private data. An initial state is set up by a group creator, which is a group containing only itself. The creator then sends _Add_ proposals for each client in the initial set of members, followed by a _Commit_ message which incorporates all of the _Adds_ into the group state. Finally, the group creator generates a _Welcome_ message corresponding to the Commit and sends this directly to all the new members, who can use the information it contains to set up their own group state and derive a shared secret. Members exchange Commit messages for post-compromise security, to add new members, and to remove existing members. These messages produce new shared secrets which are causally linked to their predecessors, forming a logical Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of states.

The protocol algorithms we specify here follow. Each algorithm specifies both (i) how a client performs the operation and (ii) how other clients update their state based on it.
There are three major operations in the lifecycle of a group:

* Adding a member, initiated by a current member;
* Updating the leaf secret of a member;
* Removing a member.

Each of these operations is "proposed" by sending a message of the corresponding type (Add / Update / Remove). The state of the group is not changed, however, until a Commit message is sent to provide the group with fresh entropy. In this section, we show each proposal being committed immediately, but in more advanced deployment cases an application might gather several proposals before committing them all at once.

Before the initialization of a group, clients publish InitKeys (as KeyPackage objects) to a directory provided by the Service Provider.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Group Channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KeyPackageA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KeyPackageB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KeyPackageC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When a client A wants to establish a group with B and C, it first initializes a group state containing only itself and downloads KeyPackages for B and C. For each member, A generates an Add and Commit message adding that member, and broadcasts them to the group. It also generates a Welcome message and sends this directly to the new member (there’s no need to send it to the group). Only after A has received its Commit message back from the server does it update its state to reflect the new member’s addition.

Upon receiving the Welcome message, the new member will be able to read and send new messages to the group. Messages received before the client has joined the group are ignored.
Subsequent additions of group members proceed in the same way. Any
member of the group can download a KeyPackage for a new client and
broadcast an Add message that the current group can use to update
their state, and a Welcome message that the new client can use to
initialize its state and join the group.

To enforce the forward secrecy and post-compromise security of
messages, each member periodically updates their leaf secret. Any
member can update this information at any time by generating a fresh
KeyPackage and sending an Update message followed by a Commit
message. Once all members have processed both, the group’s secrets
will be unknown to an attacker that had compromised the sender’s
prior leaf secret.
Update messages should be sent at regular intervals of time as long as the group is active, and members that don’t update should eventually be removed from the group. It’s left to the application to determine an appropriate amount of time between Updates.

Members are removed from the group in a similar way. Any member of the group can send a Remove proposal followed by a Commit message, which adds new entropy to the group state that’s known to all except the removed member. Note that this does not necessarily imply that any member is actually allowed to evict other members; groups can enforce access control policies on top of these basic mechanism.

5. Ratchet Trees

The protocol uses "ratchet trees" for deriving shared secrets among a group of clients.
5.1. Tree Computation Terminology

Trees consist of _nodes_. A node is a _leaf_ if it has no children, and a _parent_ otherwise; note that all parents in our trees have precisely two children, a _left_ child and a _right_ child. A node is the _root_ of a tree if it has no parents, and _intermediate_ if it has both children and parents. The _descendants_ of a node are that node, its children, and the descendants of its children, and we say a tree _contains_ a node if that node is a descendant of the root of the tree. Nodes are _siblings_ if they share the same parent.

A _subtree_ of a tree is the tree given by the descendants of any node, the _head_ of the subtree. The _size_ of a tree or subtree is the number of leaf nodes it contains. For a given parent node, its _left subtree_ is the subtree with its left child as head (respectively _right subtree_).

All trees used in this protocol are left-balanced binary trees. A binary tree is _full_ (and _balanced_) if its size is a power of two and for any parent node in the tree, its left and right subtrees have the same size.

A binary tree is _left-balanced_ if for every parent, either the parent is balanced, or the left subtree of that parent is the largest full subtree that could be constructed from the leaves present in the parent’s own subtree. Given a list of n items, there is a unique left-balanced binary tree structure with these elements as leaves.

(Note that left-balanced binary trees are the same structure that is used for the Merkle trees in the Certificate Transparency protocol [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis].)

The _direct path_ of a root is the empty list, and of any other node is the concatenation of that node’s parent along with the parent’s direct path. The _copath_ of a node is the node’s sibling concatenated with the list of siblings of all the nodes in its direct path, excluding the root.

For example, in the below tree:

* The direct path of C is (CD, ABCD, ABCDEFG)

* The copath of C is (D, AB, EFG)
Each node in the tree is assigned an _index_, starting at zero and running from left to right. A node is a leaf node if and only if it has an even index. The node indices for the nodes in the above tree are as follows:

* 0 = A
* 1 = AB
* 2 = B
* 3 = ABCD
* 4 = C
* 5 = CD
* 6 = D
* 7 = ABCDEFG
* 8 = E
* 9 = EF
* 10 = F
* 11 = EFG
* 12 = G

A tree with n leaves has 2*n - 1 nodes. For example, the above tree has 7 leaves (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) and 13 nodes. The root of a tree with n leaves is always the node with index 2^k - 1, where k is the largest number such that 2^k < n.
5.2.  Ratchet Tree Nodes

A particular instance of a ratchet tree is defined by the same parameters that define an instance of HPKE, namely:

* A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), including a DeriveKeyPair function that creates a key pair for the KEM from a symmetric secret

* A Key Derivation Function (KDF), including Extract and Expand functions

* An AEAD encryption scheme

Each node in a ratchet tree contains up to five values:

* A private key (only within the member’s direct path, see below)

* A public key

* An ordered list of node indices for "unmerged" leaves (see Section 5.3)

* A credential (only for leaf nodes)

* A hash of certain information about the node’s parent, as of the last time the node was changed (see Section 7.5).

The conditions under which each of these values must or must not be present are laid out in Section 5.3.

A node in the tree may also be _blank_, indicating that no value is present at that node. The _resolution_ of a node is an ordered list of non-blank nodes that collectively cover all non-blank descendants of the node.

* The resolution of a non-blank node comprises the node itself, followed by its list of unmerged leaves, if any

* The resolution of a blank leaf node is the empty list

* The resolution of a blank intermediate node is the result of concatenating the resolution of its left child with the resolution of its right child, in that order

For example, consider the following tree, where the "_" character represents a blank node and unmerged leaves are indicated in square brackets:
In this tree, we can see all of the above rules in play:

* The resolution of node 5 is the list [CD, C]
* The resolution of node 2 is the empty list []
* The resolution of node 3 is the list [A, CD, C]

Every node, regardless of whether the node is blank or populated, has a corresponding _hash_ that summarizes the contents of the subtree below that node. The rules for computing these hashes are described in Section 7.6.

5.3. Views of a Ratchet Tree

We generally assume that each participant maintains a complete and up-to-date view of the public state of the group’s ratchet tree, including the public keys for all nodes and the credentials associated with the leaf nodes.

No participant in an MLS group knows the private key associated with every node in the tree. Instead, each member is assigned to a leaf of the tree, which determines the subset of private keys it knows. The credential stored at that leaf is one provided by the member.

In particular, MLS maintains the members’ views of the tree in such a way as to maintain the _tree invariant_:  
The private key for a node in the tree is known to a member of the group only if that member’s leaf is a descendant of the node.

In other words, if a node is not blank, then it holds a public key. The corresponding private key is known only to members occupying leaves below that node.

The reverse implication is not true: A member may not know the private keys of all the intermediate nodes they’re below. Such a member has an _unmerged_ leaf. Encrypting to an intermediate node
requires encrypting to the node’s public key, as well as the public keys of all the unmerged leaves below it. A leaf is unmerged when it is first added, because the process of adding the leaf does not give it access to all of the nodes above it in the tree. Leaves are "merged" as they receive the private keys for nodes, as described in Section 5.4.

5.4. Ratchet Tree Evolution

A member of an MLS group advances the key schedule to provide forward secrecy and post-compromise security by providing the group with fresh key material to be added into the group’s shared secret. To do so, one member of the group generates fresh key material, applies it to their local tree state, and then sends this key material to other members in the group via an UpdatePath message (see Section 7.8). All other group members then apply the key material in the UpdatePath to their own local tree state to derive the group’s now-updated shared secret.

To begin, the generator of the UpdatePath updates its leaf KeyPackage and its direct path to the root with new secret values. The HPKE leaf public key within the KeyPackage MUST be derived from a freshly generated HPKE secret key to provide post-compromise security.

The generator of the UpdatePath starts by sampling a fresh random value called "leaf_secret", and uses the leaf_secret to generate their leaf HPKE key pair (see Section 7) and to seed a sequence of "path secrets", one for each ancestor of its leaf. In this setting, path_secret[0] refers to the node directly above the leaf, path_secret[1] for its parent, and so on. At each step, the path secret is used to derive a new secret value for the corresponding node, from which the node’s key pair is derived.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{leaf_node_secret} &= \text{DeriveSecret}(\text{leaf_secret}, \text{"node"}) \\
\text{path_secret}[0] &= \text{DeriveSecret}(\text{leaf_secret}, \text{"path"}) \\
\text{path_secret}[n] &= \text{DeriveSecret}(\text{path_secret}[n-1], \text{"path"}) \\
\text{node_secret}[n] &= \text{DeriveSecret}(\text{path_secret}[n], \text{"node"}) \\
\text{leaf_priv, leaf_pub} &= \text{KEM.DeriveKeyPair}(\text{leaf_node_secret}) \\
\text{node_priv}[n], \text{node_pub}[n] &= \text{KEM.DeriveKeyPair}(\text{node_secret}[n])
\end{align*}
\]

For example, suppose there is a group with four members, with C an unmerged leaf at node 5:
If member B subsequently generates an UpdatePath based on a secret "leaf_secret", then it would generate the following sequence of path secrets:

```
|                     |                          
path_secret[0] --> node_secret[0] --> node_priv[0], node_pub[0]  
|                     |                          
leaf_secret    --> leaf_node_secret --> leaf_priv, leaf_pub  
|                          |                          
              --> leaf_key_package
```

After applying the UpdatePath, the tree will have the following structure, where lp and np[i] represent the leaf_priv and node_priv values generated as described above:

```
np[1] -> 3  
|           
np[0] -> 1  5[C]  
|           
A B C D  
|  
lp
```

After performing these operations, the generator of the UpdatePath MUST delete the leaf_secret.
5.5. Synchronizing Views of the Tree

After generating fresh key material and applying it to ratchet forward their local tree state as described in the prior section, the generator must broadcast this update to other members of the group in a Commit message, who apply it to keep their local views of the tree in sync with the sender’s. More specifically, when a member commits a change to the tree (e.g., to add or remove a member), it transmits an UpdatePath containing a set of public keys and encrypted path secrets for intermediate nodes in the direct path of its leaf. The other members of the group use these values to update their view of the tree, aligning their copy of the tree to the sender’s.

An UpdatePath contains the following information for each node in the direct path of the sender’s leaf, including the root:

* The public key for the node

* Zero or more encrypted copies of the path secret corresponding to the node

The path secret value for a given node is encrypted for the subtree corresponding to the parent’s non-updated child, that is, the child on the copath of the sender’s leaf node. There is one encryption of the path secret to each public key in the resolution of the non-updated child.

The recipient of an UpdatePath processes it with the following steps:

1. Compute the updated path secrets.
   * Identify a node in the direct path for which the local member is in the subtree of the non-updated child.
   * Identify a node in the resolution of the copath node for which this node has a private key.
   * Decrypt the path secret for the parent of the copath node using the private key from the resolution node.
   * Derive path secrets for ancestors of that node using the algorithm described above.
   * The recipient SHOULD verify that the received public keys agree with the public keys derived from the new path_secret values.

2. Merge the updated path secrets into the tree.
* For all updated nodes,
  - Replace the public key for each node with the received public key.
  - Set the list of unmerged leaves to the empty list.
  - Store the updated hash of the node’s parent (represented as a ParentNode struct), going from root to leaf, so that each hash incorporates all the nodes above it. The root node always has a zero-length hash for this value.

* For nodes where an updated path secret was computed in step 1, compute the corresponding node key pair and replace the values stored at the node with the computed values.

For example, in order to communicate the example update described in the previous section, the sender would transmit the following values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Key</th>
<th>Ciphertext(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>node_pub[1]</td>
<td>E(pk(5), path_secret[1]), E(pk(C), path_secret[1])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>node_pub[0]</td>
<td>E(pk(A), path_secret[0])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

In this table, the value pk(ns[X]) represents the public key derived from the node secret X, whereas pk(X) represents the public leaf key for user X. The value E(K, S) represents the public-key encryption of the path secret S to the public key K (using HPKE).

After processing the update, each recipient MUST delete outdated key material, specifically:

* The path secrets used to derive each updated node key pair.
* Each outdated node key pair that was replaced by the update.

6. Cryptographic Objects

6.1. Ciphersuites

Each MLS session uses a single ciphersuite that specifies the following primitives to be used in group key computations:
* HPKE parameters:
  - A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)
  - A Key Derivation Function (KDF)
  - An AEAD encryption algorithm
* A hash algorithm
* A signature algorithm

MLS uses draft-08 of HPKE [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke] for public-key encryption. The DeriveKeyPair function associated to the KEM for the ciphersuite maps octet strings to HPKE key pairs.

Ciphersuites are represented with the CipherSuite type. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the underlying protocol (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information).

opaque HPKEPublicKey<1..2^16-1>;

The signature algorithm specified in the ciphersuite is the mandatory algorithm to be used for signatures in MLSPlaintext and the tree signatures. It MUST be the same as the signature algorithm specified in the credential field of the KeyPackage objects in the leaves of the tree (including the InitKeys used to add new members).

The ciphersuites are defined in section Section 16.1.

6.2. Credentials

A member of a group authenticates the identities of other participants by means of credentials issued by some authentication system, like a PKI. Each type of credential MUST express the following data in the context of the group it is used with:

* The public key of a signature key pair matching the SignatureScheme specified by the CipherSuite of the group
* The identity of the holder of the private key

Credentials MAY also include information that allows a relying party to verify the identity / signing key binding.

Additionally, Credentials SHOULD specify the signature scheme corresponding to each contained public key.
// See RFC 8446 and the IANA TLS SignatureScheme registry
uint16 SignatureScheme;

// See IANA registry for registered values
uint16 CredentialType;

struct {
  opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
  SignatureScheme signature_scheme;
  opaque signature_key<0..2^16-1>;
} BasicCredential;

struct {
  opaque cert_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Certificate;

struct {
  CredentialType credential_type;
  select (Credential.credential_type) {
    case basic:
      BasicCredential;
    case x509:
      Certificate chain<1..2^32-1>;
  };
} Credential;

A BasicCredential is a raw, unauthenticated assertion of an identity/key binding. The format of the key in the public_key field is defined by the relevant ciphersuite: the group ciphersuite for a credential in a ratchet tree, the KeyPackage ciphersuite for a credential in a KeyPackage object.

For X509Credential, each entry in the chain represents a single DER-encoded X509 certificate. The chain is ordered such that the first entry (chain[0]) is the end-entity certificate and each subsequent certificate in the chain MUST be the issuer of the previous certificate. The algorithm for the public_key in the end-entity certificate MUST match the relevant ciphersuite.

For ciphersuites using Ed25519 or Ed448 signature schemes, the public key is in the format specified [RFC8032]. For ciphersuites using ECDSA with the NIST curves P-256 or P-521, the public key is the output of the uncompressed Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String conversion according to [SECG].
The signatures used throughout this document are encoded as specified in [RFC8446]. In particular, ECDSA signatures are DER-encoded and EdDSA signatures are defined as the concatenation of r and s as specified in [RFC8032].

Note that each new credential that has not already been validated by the application MUST be validated against the Authentication Service.

7. Key Packages

In order to facilitate asynchronous addition of clients to a group, it is possible to pre-publish key packages that provide some public information about a user. KeyPackage structures provide information about a client that any existing member can use to add this client to the group asynchronously.

A KeyPackage object specifies a ciphersuite that the client supports, as well as providing a public key that others can use for key agreement.

The identity arising from the credential, together with the endpoint_id in the KeyPackage serve to uniquely identify a client in a group.

When used as InitKeys, KeyPackages are intended to be used only once and SHOULD NOT be reused except in case of last resort. (See Section 15.4). Clients MAY generate and publish multiple InitKeys to support multiple ciphersuites.

KeyPackages contain a public key chosen by the client, which the client MUST ensure uniquely identifies a given KeyPackage object among the set of KeyPackages created by this client.

The value for hpke_init_key MUST be a public key for the asymmetric encryption scheme defined by cipher_suite. The whole structure is signed using the client’s signature key. A KeyPackage object with an invalid signature field MUST be considered malformed. The input to the signature computation comprises all of the fields except for the signature field.
enum {
    reserved(0),
    mls10(1),
    (255)
} ProtocolVersion;

// See IANA registry for registered values
uint16 ExtensionType;

struct {
    ExtensionType extension_type;
    opaque extension_data<0..2^32-1>;
} Extension;

struct {
    ProtocolVersion version;
    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
    HPKEPublicKey hpke_init_key;
    opaque endpoint_id<0..255>;
    Credential credential;
    Extension extensions<8..2^32-1>;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} KeyPackage;

KeyPackage objects MUST contain at least two extensions, one of type capabilities, and one of type lifetime. The capabilities extension allow MLS session establishment to be safe from downgrade attacks on the parameters described (as discussed in Section 10), while still only advertising one version / ciphersuite per KeyPackage.

As the KeyPackage is a structure which is stored in the Ratchet Tree and updated depending on the evolution of this tree, each modification of its content MUST be reflected by a change of its signature. This allow other members to control the validity of the KeyPackage at any time and in particular in the case of a newcomer joining the group.

7.1. Key Package IDs

When it is necessary to refer to a specific KeyPackage, protocol messages incorporate a KeyPackageID:

struct { opaque key_package_hash<0..255>; } KeyPackageID

This value is the hash of the KeyPackage, using the hash indicated by the cipher_suite field. KeyPackage hashes are used in a Welcome message to indicate which KeyPackage is being used to include the new member. Since members of a group are uniquely identified by their
leaf KeyPackages, messages within a group use the hash of this key package to refer to group members, e.g., to specify the target of a Remove proposal or the signer of an MLSPlaintext.

7.2. Client Capabilities

The capabilities extension indicates what protocol versions, ciphersuites, protocol extensions, and non-default proposal types are supported by a client. Proposal types defined in this document are considered "default" and thus need not be listed.

struct {
    ProtocolVersion versions<0..255>;
    CipherSuite ciphersuites<0..255>;
    ExtensionType extensions<0..255>;
    ProposalType proposals<0..255>;
} Capabilities;

This extension MUST be always present in a KeyPackage. Extensions that appear in the extensions field of a KeyPackage MUST be included in the extensions field of the capabilities extension.

7.3. Lifetime

The lifetime extension represents the times between which clients will consider a KeyPackage valid. This time is represented as an absolute time, measured in seconds since the Unix epoch (1970-01-01T00:00:00Z). A client MUST NOT use the data in a KeyPackage for any processing before the not_before date, or after the not_after date.

uint64 not_before;
uint64 not_after;

Applications MUST define a maximum total lifetime that is acceptable for a KeyPackage, and reject any KeyPackage where the total lifetime is longer than this duration.

This extension MUST always be present in a KeyPackage.

7.4. KeyPackage Identifiers

Within MLS, a KeyPackage is identified by its hash (see, e.g., Section 11.2.2). The external_key_id extension allows applications to add an explicit, application-defined identifier to a KeyPackage.

opaque external_key_id<0..2^16-1>;

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7.5. Parent Hash

The parent_hash extension carries information to authenticate the structure of the tree, as described below.

opaque parent_hash<0..255>;

Consider a ratchet tree with a parent node P and children V and S. The parent hash of P changes whenever an UpdatePath object is applied to the ratchet tree along a path traversing node V (and hence also P). The new "Parent Hash of P (with Co-Path Child S)" is obtained by hashing P’s ParentHashInput struct using the resolution of S to populate the original_child_resolution field. This way, P’s Parent Hash fixes the new HPKE public keys of all nodes on the path from P to the root. Furthermore, for each such key PK the hash also binds the set of HPKE public keys to which PK’s secret key was encrypted in the commit packet that announced the UpdatePath object.

struct {
    HPKEPublicKey public_key;
    opaque parent_hash<0..255>;
    HPKEPublicKey original_child_resolution<0..2^32-1>;
} ParentHashInput;

The Parent Hash of P with Co-Path Child S is the hash of a ParentHashInput object populated as follows. The field public_key contains the HPKE public key of P. If P is the root, then parent_hash is set to a zero-length octet string. Otherwise parent_hash is the Parent Hash of P’s parent with P’s sibling as the co-path child.

Finally, original_child_resolution is the array of HPKEPublicKey values of the nodes in the resolution of S but with the unmerged_leaves of P omitted. For example, in the ratchet tree depicted in Section 5.2 the ParentHashInput of node 5 with co-path child 4 would contain an empty original_child_resolution since 4’s resolution includes only itself but 4 is also an unmerged leaf of 5. Meanwhile, the ParentHashInput of node 5 with co-path child 6 has an array with one element in it: the HPKE public key of 6.

7.5.1. Using Parent Hashes

The Parent Hash of P appears in three types of structs. If V is itself a parent node then P’s Parent Hash is stored in the parent_hash fields of both V’s ParentHashInput struct and V’s ParentNode struct. (The ParentNode struct is used to encapsulate all public information about V that must be conveyed to a new member joining the group as well as to define the Tree Hash of node V.)
If, on the other hand, V is a leaf and its KeyPackage contains the parent_hash extension then the Parent Hash of P (with V’s sibling as co-path child) is stored in that field. In particular, the extension MUST be present in the leaf_key_package field of an UpdatePath object. (This way, the signature of such a KeyPackage also serves to attest to which keys the group member introduced into the ratchet tree and to whom the corresponding secret keys were sent. This helps prevent malicious insiders from constructing artificial ratchet trees with a node V whose HPKE secret key is known to the insider yet where the insider isn’t assigned a leaf in the subtree rooted at V. Indeed, such a ratchet tree would violate the tree invariant.)

7.5.2. Verifying Parent Hashes

To this end, when processing a Commit message clients MUST recompute the expected value of parent_hash for the committer’s new leaf and verify that it matches the parent_hash value in the supplied leaf_key_package. Moreover, when joining a group, new members MUST authenticate each non-blank parent node P. A parent node P is authenticated by performing the following check:

* Let L and R be the left and right children of P, respectively

* If L.parent_hash is equal to the Parent Hash of P with Co-Path Child R, the check passes

* If R is blank, replace R with its left child until R is either non-blank or a leaf node

* If R is a blank leaf node, the check fails

* If R.parent_hash is equal to the Parent Hash of P with Co-Path Child L, the check passes

* Otherwise, the check fails

The left-child recursion under the right child of P is necessary because the expansion of the tree to the right due to Add proposals can cause blank nodes to be interposed between a parent node and its right child.
7.6. Tree Hashes

To allow group members to verify that they agree on the public cryptographic state of the group, this section defines a scheme for generating a hash value (called the "tree hash") that represents the contents of the group’s ratchet tree and the members’ KeyPackages. The tree hash of a tree is the tree hash of its root node, which we define recursively, starting with the leaves.

As some nodes may be blank while others contain data we use the following struct to include data if present.

```c
struct {
    uint8 present;
    select (present) {
        case 0: struct{};
        case 1: T value;
    }
} optional<T>;
```

The tree hash of a leaf node is the hash of leaf’s `LeafNodeHashInput` object which might include a Key Package depending on whether or not it is blank.

```c
struct {
    uint32 node_index;
    optional<KeyPackage> key_package;
} LeafNodeHashInput;
```

Now the tree hash of any non-leaf node is recursively defined to be the hash of its `ParentNodeTreeHashInput`. This includes an optional `ParentNode` object depending on whether the node is blank or not.

```c
struct {
    HPKEPublicKey public_key;
    opaque parent_hash<0..255>;
    uint32 unmerged_leaves<0..2^32-1>;
} ParentNode;

struct {
    uint32 node_index;
    optional<ParentNode> parent_node;
    opaque left_hash<0..255>;
    opaque right_hash<0..255>;
} ParentNodeTreeHashInput;
```

The `left_hash` and `right_hash` fields hold the tree hashes of the node’s left and right children, respectively.
7.7. Group State

Each member of the group maintains a GroupContext object that summarizes the state of the group:

```c
struct {
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    opaque tree_hash<0..255>;
    opaque confirmed_transcript_hash<0..255>;
    Extension extensions<0..2^32-1>;
} GroupContext;
```

The fields in this state have the following semantics:

* The group_id field is an application-defined identifier for the group.
* The epoch field represents the current version of the group key.
* The tree_hash field contains a commitment to the contents of the group’s ratchet tree and the credentials for the members of the group, as described in Section 7.6.
* The confirmed_transcript_hash field contains a running hash over the messages that led to this state.

When a new member is added to the group, an existing member of the group provides the new member with a Welcome message. The Welcome message provides the information the new member needs to initialize its GroupContext.

Different changes to the group will have different effects on the group state. These effects are described in their respective subsections of Section 11.1. The following general rules apply:

* The group_id field is constant
* The epoch field increments by one for each Commit message that is processed
* The tree_hash is updated to represent the current tree and credentials
* The confirmed_transcript_hash is updated with the data for an MLSPlaintext message encoding a Commit message in two parts:
struct {
    WireFormat wire_format;
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    Sender sender;
    opaque authenticated_data<0..2^32-1>;
    ContentType content_type = commit;
    Commit commit;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} MLSPlaintextCommitContent;

struct {
    optional<MAC> confirmation_tag;
} MLSPlaintextCommitAuthData;

interim_transcript_hash_[0] = ""; // zero-length octet string

confirmed_transcript_hash_[n] =
    Hash(interim_transcript_hash_[n] ||
          MLSPlaintextCommitContent_[n]);

interim_transcript_hash_[n+1] =
    Hash(confirmed_transcript_hash_[n] ||
          MLSPlaintextCommitAuthData_[n]);

Thus the confirmed_transcript_hash field in a GroupContext object
represents a transcript over the whole history of MLSPlaintext Commit
messages, up to the confirmation tag field in the current
MLSPlaintext message. The confirmation tag is then included in the
transcript for the next epoch. The interim transcript hash is
computed by new members using the confirmation tag in the GroupInfo
struct, and enables existing members to incorporate a Commit message
into the transcript without having to store the whole
MLSPlaintextCommitAuthData structure.

As shown above, when a new group is created, the
interim_transcript_hash field is set to the zero-length octet string.

7.8.  Update Paths

As described in Section 11.2, each MLS Commit message may optionally
transmit a KeyPackage leaf and node values along its direct path.
The path contains a public key and encrypted secret value for all
intermediate nodes in the path above the leaf. The path is ordered
from the closest node to the leaf to the root; each node MUST be the
parent of its predecessor.
struct {
    opaque kem_output<0..2^16-1>
    opaque ciphertext<0..2^16-1>
} HPKECiphertext;

struct {
    HPKEPublicKey public_key
    HPKECiphertext encrypted_path_secret<0..2^32-1>
} UpdatePathNode;

struct {
    KeyPackage leaf_key_package
    UpdatePathNode nodes<0..2^32-1>
} UpdatePath;

For each UpdatePathNode, the resolution of the corresponding copath node MUST be filtered by removing all new leaf nodes added as part of this MLS Commit message. The number of ciphertexts in the encrypted_path_secret vector MUST be equal to the length of the filtered resolution, with each ciphertext being the encryption to the respective resolution node.

The HPKECiphertext values are computed as

kem_output, context = SetupBaseS(node_public_key, group_context)
ciphertext = context.Seal("", path_secret)

where node_public_key is the public key of the node that the path secret is being encrypted for, group_context is the current GroupContext object for the group, and the functions SetupBaseS and Seal are defined according to [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke].

Decryption is performed in the corresponding way, using the private key of the resolution node and the ephemeral public key transmitted in the message.

8. Key Schedule

Group keys are derived using the Extract and Expand functions from the KDF for the group’s ciphersuite, as well as the functions defined below:
ExpandWithLabel(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
    KDF.Expand(Secret, KDFLabel, Length)

Where KDFLabel is specified as:

struct {
    uint16 length = Length;
    opaque label<7..255> = "mls10 " + Label;
    opaque context<0..2^32-1> = Context;
} KDFLabel;

DeriveSecret(Secret, Label) =
    ExpandWithLabel(Secret, Label, "", KDF.Nh)

The value KDF.Nh is the size of an output from KDF.Extract, in bytes. In the below diagram:

* KDF.Extract takes its salt argument from the top and its IKM argument from the left
* DeriveSecret takes its Secret argument from the incoming arrow
* 0 represents an all-zero byte string of length KDF.Nh.

When processing a handshake message, a client combines the following information to derive new epoch secrets:

* The init secret from the previous epoch
* The commit secret for the current epoch
* The GroupContext object for current epoch

Given these inputs, the derivation of secrets for an epoch proceeds as shown in the following diagram:
A number of secrets are derived from the epoch secret for different purposes:
### Table 2

The "external secret" is used to derive an HPKE key pair whose private key is held by the entire group:

```plaintext
texturel_prv, texturel_pub = KEM.DeriveKeyPair(external_secret)
```

The public key external_pub can be published as part of the PublicGroupState struct in order to allow non-members to join the group using an external commit.

#### 8.1. External Initialization

In addition to initializing a new epoch via KDF invocations as described above, an MLS group can also initialize a new epoch via an asymmetric interaction using the external key pair for the previous epoch. This is done when a new member is joining via an external commit.

In this process, the joiner sends a new init_secret value to the group using the HPKE export method. The joiner then uses that init_secret with information provided in the PublicGroupState and an external Commit to initialize their copy of the key schedule for the new epoch.

```plaintext
kem_output, context = SetupBaseS(external_pub, "")
init_secret = context.export("MLS 1.0 external init secret", KDF.Nh)
```
Members of the group receive the `kem_output` in an `ExternalInit` proposal and perform the corresponding calculation to retrieve the `init_secret` value.

```python
context = SetupBaseR(kem_output, external_priv, "")
init_secret = context.export("MLS 1.0 external init secret", KDF.Nh)
```

In both cases, the info input to HPKE is set to the `PublicGroupState` for the previous epoch, encoded using the TLS serialization.

### 8.2. Pre-Shared Keys

Groups which already have an out-of-band mechanism to generate shared group secrets can inject those into the MLS key schedule to seed the MLS group secrets computations by this external entropy.

Injecting an external PSK can improve security in the case where having a full run of updates across members is too expensive, or if the external group key establishment mechanism provides stronger security against classical or quantum adversaries.

Note that, as a PSK may have a different lifetime than an update, it does not necessarily provide the same Forward Secrecy (FS) or Post-Compromise Security (PCS) guarantees as a Commit message. Unlike the key pairs populated in the tree by an Update or Commit, which always freshly generated, PSKs may be pre-distributed and stored. This creates the risk that a PSK may be compromised in the process of distribution and storage. The security that the group gets from injecting a PSK thus depends on both the entropy of the PSK and the risk of compromise. These factors are outside of the scope of this document, but should be considered by application designers relying on PSKs.

Each PSK in MLS has a type that designates how it was provisioned. External PSKs are provided by the application, while recovery and re-init PSKs are derived from the MLS key schedule and used in cases where it is necessary to authenticate a member’s participation in a prior group state. In particular, in addition to external PSK types, a PSK derived from within MLS may be used in the following cases:

- Re-Initialization: If during the lifetime of a group, the group members decide to switch to a more secure ciphersuite or newer protocol version, a PSK can be used to carry entropy from the old group forward into a new group with the desired parameters.
Branching: A PSK may be used to bootstrap a subset of current group members into a new group. This applies if a subset of current group members wish to branch based on the current group state.

The injection of one or more PSKs into the key schedule is signaled in two ways: 1) as a PreSharedKey proposal, and 2) in the GroupSecrets object of a Welcome message sent to new members added in that epoch.

```c
enum {
    reserved(0),
    external(1),
    reinit(2),
    branch(3)
} PSKType;

struct {
    PSKType psktype;
    select (PreSharedKeyID.psktype) {
        case external:
            opaque psk_id<0..255>;

        case reinit:
            opaque psk_group_id<0..255>;
            uint64 psk_epoch;

        case branch:
            opaque psk_group_id<0..255>;
            uint64 psk_epoch;
    }
    opaque psk_nonce<0..255>;
} PreSharedKeyID;

struct {
    PreSharedKeyID psks<0..2^16-1>;
} PreSharedKeys;
```

On receiving a Commit with a PreSharedKey proposal or a GroupSecrets object with the psks field set, the receiving Client includes them in the key schedule in the order listed in the Commit, or in the psks field respectively. For resumption PSKs, the PSK is defined as the resumption_secret of the group and epoch specified in the PreSharedKeyID object. Specifically, psk_secret is computed as follows:
struct {
    PreSharedKeyID id;
    uint16 index;
    uint16 count;
} PSKLabel;

psk_extracted_[i] = KDF.Extract(0, psk_[i])
psk_input_[i] = ExpandWithLabel(psk_extracted_[i], "derived psk", PSKLabel, KDF.Nh)

psk_secret_[0] = 0
psk_secret_[i] = KDF.Extract(psk_input_[i-1], psk_secret_[i-1])
psk_secret_ = psk_secret_[n]

    Here 0 represents the all-zero vector of length KDF.Nh. The index field in PSKLabel corresponds to the index of the PSK in the psk array, while the count field contains the total number of PSKs. In other words, the PSKs are chained together with KDF.Extract invocations, as follows:

    0                                  0       = psk_secret_[0]
    |                                   |
    V                                   V
    psk_[0] --> KDF.Extract --> ExpandWithLabel --> KDF.Extract = psk_secret_[1]
    0                                  ...
    |                                   |
    V                                   V
    psk_[1] --> KDF.Extract --> ExpandWithLabel --> KDF.Extract = psk_secret_[1]
    0                                  ...
    |                                   |
    V                                   V
    psk_[n] --> KDF.Extract --> ExpandWithLabel --> KDF.Extract = psk_secret_[n]

    In particular, if there are no PreSharedKey proposals in a given Commit, then the resulting psk_secret is psk_secret_[0], the all-zero vector.
8.3. Secret Tree

For the generation of encryption keys and nonces, the key schedule begins with the encryption_secret at the root and derives a tree of secrets with the same structure as the group’s ratchet tree. Each leaf in the Secret Tree is associated with the same group member as the corresponding leaf in the ratchet tree. Nodes are also assigned an index according to their position in the array representation of the tree (described in Appendix A). If N is a node index in the Secret Tree then left(N) and right(N) denote the children of N (if they exist).

The secret of any other node in the tree is derived from its parent’s secret using a call to DeriveTreeSecret:

DeriveTreeSecret(Secret, Label, Node, Generation, Length) = ExpandWithLabel(Secret, Label, TreeContext, Length)

Where TreeContext is specified as:

struct {
    uint32 node = Node;
    uint32 generation = Generation;
} TreeContext;

If N is a node index in the Secret Tree then the secrets of the children of N are defined to be:

tree_node_[N]_secret
   |    
   +--> DeriveTreeSecret(., "tree", left(N), 0, KDF.Nh)
       = tree_node_[left(N)]_secret
   +--> DeriveTreeSecret(., "tree", right(N), 0, KDF.Nh)
       = tree_node_[right(N)]_secret

The secret in the leaf of the Secret Tree is used to initiate two symmetric hash ratchets, from which a sequence of single-use keys and nonces are derived, as described in Section 8.4. The root of each ratchet is computed as:
tree_node_[N]_secret

++-- DeriveTreeSecret(. , "handshake", N, 0, KDF.Nh)
|    = handshake_ratchet_secret_[N]_[0]
++-- DeriveTreeSecret(. , "application", N, 0, KDF.Nh)
    = application_ratchet_secret_[N]_[0]

8.4. Encryption Keys

As described in Section 9, MLS encrypts three different types of information:

* Metadata (sender information)
* Handshake messages (Proposal and Commit)
* Application messages

The sender information used to look up the key for content encryption is encrypted with an AEAD where the key and nonce are derived from both sender_data_secret and a sample of the encrypted message content.

For handshake and application messages, a sequence of keys is derived via a "sender ratchet". Each sender has their own sender ratchet, and each step along the ratchet is called a "generation".

A sender ratchet starts from a per-sender base secret derived from a Secret Tree, as described in Section 8.3. The base secret initiates a symmetric hash ratchet which generates a sequence of keys and nonces. The sender uses the j-th key/nonce pair in the sequence to encrypt (using the AEAD) the j-th message they send during that epoch. Each key/nonce pair MUST NOT be used to encrypt more than one message.

Keys, nonces, and the secrets in ratchets are derived using DeriveTreeSecret. The context in a given call consists of the index of the sender’s leaf in the ratchet tree and the current position in the ratchet. In particular, the node index of the sender’s leaf in the ratchet tree is the same as the node index of the leaf in the Secret Tree used to initialize the sender’s ratchet.
ratchet_secret_[N]_[j]
  |--- DeriveTreeSecret(., "nonce", N, j, AEAD.Nn)
  |     = ratchet_nonce_[N]_[j]
  |--- DeriveTreeSecret(., "key", N, j, AEAD.Nk)
  |     = ratchet_key_[N]_[j]
V
DeriveTreeSecret(., "secret", N, j, KDF.Nh)
= ratchet_secret_[N]_[j+1]

Here, AEAD.Nn and AEAD.Nk denote the lengths in bytes of the nonce and key for the AEAD scheme defined by the ciphersuite.

8.5. Deletion Schedule

It is important to delete all security-sensitive values as soon as they are _consumed_. A sensitive value S is said to be _consumed_ if

* S was used to encrypt or (successfully) decrypt a message, or if
* a key, nonce, or secret derived from S has been consumed. (This goes for values derived via DeriveSecret as well as ExpandWithLabel.)

Here, S may be the init_secret, commit_secret, epoch_secret, encryption_secret as well as any secret in a Secret Tree or one of the ratchets.

As soon as a group member consumes a value they MUST immediately delete (all representations of) that value. This is crucial to ensuring forward secrecy for past messages. Members MAY keep unconsumed values around for some reasonable amount of time to handle out-of-order message delivery.

For example, suppose a group member encrypts or (successfully) decrypts an application message using the j-th key and nonce in the ratchet of node index N in some epoch n. Then, for that member, at least the following values have been consumed and MUST be deleted:

* the commit_secret, joiner_secret, epoch_secret, encryption_secret of that epoch n as well as the init_secret of the previous epoch n-1,
* all node secrets in the Secret Tree on the path from the root to the leaf with node index N,
* the first j secrets in the application data ratchet of node index N and
* application_ratchet_nonce_[N]_[j] and
  application_ratchet_key_[N]_[j].

Concretely, suppose we have the following Secret Tree and ratchet for participant D:

```
  G
 / \  /
/   \ /  
E   F /   
/ \ /   
A   B C   D
 / \
/  HR0  AR0 --+ K0
 |   |  
|   +- N0
|         
|         AR1 --+ K1
|   |  
|   +- N1
|         
|         AR2
```

Then if a client uses key K1 and nonce N1 during epoch n then it must consume (at least) values G, F, D, AR0, AR1, K1, N1 as well as the key schedule secrets used to derive G (the encryption_secret), namely init_secret of epoch n-1 and commit_secret, joiner_secret, epoch_secret of epoch n. The client MAY retain (not consume) the values K0 and N0 to allow for out-of-order delivery, and SHOULD retain AR2 for processing future messages.

8.6. Exporters

The main MLS key schedule provides an exporter_secret which can be used by an application as the basis to derive new secrets called exported_value outside the MLS layer.

```
MLS-Exporter(Label, Context, key_length) =
  ExpandWithLabel(DeriveSecret(exporter_secret, Label),
    "exporter", Hash(Context), key_length)
```

Each application SHOULD provide a unique label to MLS-Exporter that identifies its use case. This is to prevent two exported outputs from being generated with the same values and used for different functionalities.
The exported values are bound to the group epoch from which the exporter_secret is derived, hence reflects a particular state of the group.

It is RECOMMENDED for the application generating exported values to refresh those values after a Commit is processed.

8.7. Resumption Secret

The main MLS key schedule provides a resumption_secret which can provide extra security in some cross-group operations.

The application SHOULD specify an upper limit on the number of past epochs for which the resumption_secret may be stored.

There are two ways in which a resumption_secret can be used: to re-initialize the group with different parameters, or to create a subgroup of an existing group as detailed in Section 8.2.

Resumption keys are distinguished from exporter keys in that they have specific use inside the MLS protocol, whereas the use of exporter secrets may be decided by an external application. They are thus derived separately to avoid key material reuse.

8.8. State Authentication Keys

The main MLS key schedule provides a per-epoch authentication_secret. If one of the parties is being actively impersonated by an attacker, their authentication_secret will differ from that of the other group members. Thus, members of a group MAY use their authentication_secrets within an out-of-band authentication protocol to ensure that they share the same view of the group.

9. Message Framing

Handshake and application messages use a common framing structure. This framing provides encryption to ensure confidentiality within the group, as well as signing to authenticate the sender within the group.
The two main structures involved are MLSPlaintext and MLSCiphertext. MLSCiphertext represents a signed and encrypted message, with protections for both the content of the message and related metadata. MLSPlaintext represents a message that is only signed, and not encrypted. Applications MUST use MLSCiphertext to encrypt application messages and SHOULD use MLSCiphertext to encode handshake messages, but MAY transmit handshake messages encoded as MLSPlaintext objects in cases where it is necessary for the Delivery Service to examine such messages.

```c
enum {
    reserved(0),
    application(1),
    proposal(2),
    commit(3),
    (255)
} ContentType;

enum {
    reserved(0),
    member(1),
    preconfigured(2),
    new_member(3),
    (255)
} SenderType;

struct {
    SenderType sender_type;
    switch (sender_type) {
        case member:        KeyPackageID member;
        case preconfigured: opaque external_key_id<0..255>;
        case new_member:    struct{};
    }
} Sender;

struct {
    opaque mac_value<0..255>;
} MAC;

enum {
    reserved(0),
    mls_plaintext(1),
    mls_ciphertext(2),
    (255)
} WireFormat;

struct {
    WireFormat wire_format;
}
```
opaque group_id<0..255>;
uint64 epoch;
Sender sender;
opaque authenticated_data<0..2^32-1>;

ContentType content_type;
select (MLSPlaintext.content_type) {
case application:
    opaque application_data<0..2^32-1>;

case proposal:
    Proposal proposal;

case commit:
    Commit commit;
}

opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
optional<MAC> confirmation_tag;
optional<MAC> membership_tag;
} MLSPlaintext;

struct {
    WireFormat wire_format = mls_ciphertext;
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    ContentType content_type;
    opaque authenticated_data<0..2^32-1>;
    opaque encrypted_sender_data<0..255>;
    opaque ciphertext<0..2^32-1>;
} MLSCiphertext;

The field confirmation_tag MUST be present if content_type equals commit. Otherwise, it MUST NOT be present.

External sender types are sent as MLSPlaintext, see Section 11.1.9 for their use.

The remainder of this section describes how to compute the signature of an MLSPlaintext object and how to convert it to an MLSCiphertext object for member sender types. The steps are:

* Set group_id, epoch, content_type and authenticated_data fields from the MLSPlaintext object directly

* Identify the key and key generation depending on the content type
* Encrypt an MLSCiphertextContent for the ciphertext field using the key identified and MLSPlaintext object

* Encrypt the sender data using a key and nonce derived from the sender_data_secret for the epoch and a sample of the encrypted MLSCiphertextContent.

Decryption is done by decrypting the sender data, then the message, and then verifying the content signature.

The following sections describe the encryption and signing processes in detail.

9.1. Content Authentication

The signature field in an MLSPlaintext object is computed using the signing private key corresponding to the public key, which was authenticated by the credential at the leaf of the tree indicated by the sender field. The signature covers the plaintext metadata and message content, which is all of MLSPlaintext except for the signature, the confirmation_tag and membership_tag fields. If the sender is a member of the group, the signature also covers the GroupContext for the current epoch, so that signatures are specific to a given group and epoch.
struct {
    select (MLSPlaintextTBS.sender.sender_type) {
        case member:
            GroupContext context;

        case preconfigured:
        case new_member:
            struct{};
    }

    WireFormat wire_format;
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    Sender sender;
    opaque authenticated_data<0..2^32-1>;

    ContentType content_type;
    select (MLSPlaintextTBS.content_type) {
        case application:
            opaque application_data<0..2^32-1>;

        case proposal:
            Proposal proposal;

        case commit:
            Commit commit;
    }
} MLSPlaintextTBS;

The membership_tag field in the MLSPlaintext object authenticates the sender’s membership in the group. For an MLSPlaintext with a sender type other than member, this field MUST be omitted. For messages sent by members, it MUST be present and set to the following value:

struct {
    MLSPlaintextTBS tbs;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
    optional<MAC> confirmation_tag;
} MLSPlaintextTBM;

membership_tag = MAC(membership_key, MLSPlaintextTBM);

Note that the membership_tag only needs to be computed for MLSPlaintext messages that will be sent over the wire (wire_format == mls_plaintext). It isn’t needed for messages that will be encrypted and transmitted as MLSCiphertext messages (wire_format == mls_ciphertext).
9.2. Content Encryption

The ciphertext field of the MLSCiphertext object is produced by supplying the inputs described below to the AEAD function specified by the ciphersuite in use. The plaintext input contains the content and signature of the MLSPlaintext, plus optional padding. These values are encoded in the following form:

```plaintext
struct {
    select (MLSCiphertext.content_type) {
        case application:
            opaque application_data<0..2^32-1>;
        
        case proposal:
            Proposal proposal;
        
        case commit:
            Commit commit;
    }

    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
    optional<MAC> confirmation_tag;
    opaque padding<0..2^16-1>;
} MLSCiphertextContent;
```

In the MLS key schedule, the sender creates two distinct key ratchets for handshake and application messages for each member of the group. When encrypting a message, the sender looks at the ratchets it derived for its own member and chooses an unused generation from either the handshake or application ratchet depending on the content type of the message. This generation of the ratchet is used to derive a provisional nonce and key.

Before use in the encryption operation, the nonce is XORed with a fresh random value to guard against reuse. Because the key schedule generates nonces deterministically, a client must keep persistent state as to where in the key schedule it is; if this persistent state is lost or corrupted, a client might reuse a generation that has already been used, causing reuse of a key/nonce pair.

To avoid this situation, the sender of a message MUST generate a fresh random 4-byte "reuse guard" value and XOR it with the first four bytes of the nonce from the key schedule before using the nonce for encryption. The sender MUST include the reuse guard in the reuse_guard field of the sender data object, so that the recipient of the message can use it to compute the nonce to be used for decryption.
The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) input to the encryption contains an object of the following form, with the values used to identify the key and nonce:

```c
struct {
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    ContentType content_type;
    opaque authenticated_data<0..2^32-1>;
} MLSCiphertextContentAAD;
```

### 9.3. Sender Data Encryption

The "sender data" used to look up the key for the content encryption is encrypted with the ciphersuite’s AEAD with a key and nonce derived from both the sender_data_secret and a sample of the encrypted content. Before being encrypted, the sender data is encoded as an object of the following form:

```c
struct {
    KeyPackageID sender;
    uint32 generation;
    opaque reuse_guard[4];
} MLSSenderData;
```

MLSSenderData.sender is assumed to be a member sender type. When constructing an MLSSenderData from a Sender object, the sender MUST verify Sender.sender_type is member and use Sender.sender for MLSSenderData.sender.

The reuse_guard field contains a fresh random value used to avoid nonce reuse in the case of state loss or corruption, as described in Section 9.2.
The key and nonce provided to the AEAD are computed as the KDF of the first KDF.Nh bytes of the ciphertext generated in the previous section. If the length of the ciphertext is less than KDF.Nh, the whole ciphertext is used without padding. In pseudocode, the key and nonce are derived as:

ciphertext_sample = ciphertext[0..KDF.Nh-1]

sender_data_key = ExpandWithLabel(sender_data_secret, "key", ciphertext_sample, AEAD.Nk)
sender_data_nonce = ExpandWithLabel(sender_data_secret, "nonce", ciphertext_sample, AEAD.Nn)

The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) for the SenderData ciphertext is all the fields of MLSCiphertext excluding encrypted_sender_data:

```c
struct {
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    ContentType content_type;
} MLSSenderDataAAD;
```

When parsing a SenderData struct as part of message decryption, the recipient MUST verify that the KeyPackageID indicated in the sender field identifies a member of the group.

10. Group Creation

A group is always created with a single member, the "creator". The other members are added when the creator effectively sends itself an Add proposal and commits it, then sends the corresponding Welcome message to the new participants. These processes are described in detail in Section 11.1.1, Section 11.2, and Section 11.2.2.

The creator of a group MUST take the following steps to initialize the group:

* Fetch KeyPackages for the members to be added, and select a version and ciphersuite according to the capabilities of the members. To protect against downgrade attacks, the creator MUST use the capabilities extensions in these KeyPackages to verify that the chosen version and ciphersuite is the best option supported by all members.

* Initialize a one-member group with the following initial values:

  - Ratchet tree: A tree with a single node, a leaf containing an HPKE public key and credential for the creator
  - Group ID: A value set by the creator
- Epoch: 0
- Tree hash: The root hash of the above ratchet tree
- Confirmed transcript hash: The zero-length octet string
- Interim transcript hash: The zero-length octet string
- Init secret: A fresh random value of size KDF.Nh
- Extensions: Any values of the creator’s choosing

* For each member, construct an Add proposal from the KeyPackage for that member (see Section 11.1.1)
* Construct a Commit message that commits all of the Add proposals, in any order chosen by the creator (see Section 11.2)
* Process the Commit message to obtain a new group state (for the epoch in which the new members are added) and a Welcome message
* Transmit the Welcome message to the other new members

The recipient of a Welcome message processes it as described in Section 11.2.2.

In principle, the above process could be streamlined by having the creator directly create a tree and choose a random value for first epoch’s epoch secret. We follow the steps above because it removes unnecessary choices, by which, for example, bad randomness could be introduced. The only choices the creator makes here are its own KeyPackage, the leaf secret from which the Commit is built, and the intermediate key pairs along the direct path to the root.

10.1. Required Capabilities

The configuration of a group imposes certain requirements on clients in the group. At a minimum, all members of the group need to support the ciphersuite and protocol version in use. Additional requirements can be imposed by including a required_capabilities extension in the GroupContext.

```c
struct {
    ExtensionType extensions<0..255>
    ProposalType proposals<0..255>
} RequiredCapabilities;
```
This extension lists the extensions and proposal types that must be supported by all members of the group. For new members, it is enforced by existing members during the application of Add commits. Existing members should of course be in compliance already. In order to ensure this continues to be the case even as the group’s extensions can be updated, a GroupContextExtensions proposal is invalid if it contains a required_capabilities extension that requires capabilities not supported by all current members.

10.2. Linking a New Group to an Existing Group

A new group may be tied to an already existing group for the purpose of re-initializing the existing group, or to branch into a sub-group. Re-initializing an existing group may be used, for example, to restart the group with a different ciphersuite or protocol version. Branching may be used to bootstrap a new group consisting of a subset of current group members, based on the current group state.

In both cases, the psk_nonce included in the PreSharedKeyID object must be a randomly sampled nonce of length KDF.Nh to avoid key re-use.

10.2.1. Sub-group Branching

If a client wants to create a subgroup of an existing group, they MAY choose to include a PreSharedKeyID in the GroupSecrets object of the Welcome message choosing the psktype branch, the group_id of the group from which a subgroup is to be branched, as well as an epoch within the number of epochs for which a resumption_secret is kept.

11. Group Evolution

Over the lifetime of a group, its membership can change, and existing members might want to change their keys in order to achieve post-compromise security. In MLS, each such change is accomplished by a two-step process:

1. A proposal to make the change is broadcast to the group in a Proposal message

2. A member of the group or a new member broadcasts a Commit message that causes one or more proposed changes to enter into effect
The group thus evolves from one cryptographic state to another each time a Commit message is sent and processed. These states are referred to as "epochs" and are uniquely identified among states of the group by eight-octet epoch values. When a new group is initialized, its initial state epoch is 0x0000000000000000. Each time a state transition occurs, the epoch number is incremented by one.

11.1. Proposals

Proposals are included in an MLSPlaintext by way of a Proposal structure that indicates their type:

```c
// See IANA registry for registered values
uint16 ProposalType;

struct {
    ProposalType msg_type;
    select (Proposal.msg_type) {
        case add:                      Add;
        case update:                   Update;
        case remove:                   Remove;
        case psk:                      PreSharedKey;
        case reinit:                   ReInit;
        case external_init:            ExternalInit;
        case app_ack:                  AppAck;
        case group_context_extensions: GroupContextExtensions;
    }
} Proposal;
```

On receiving an MLSPlaintext containing a Proposal, a client MUST verify the signature on the enclosing MLSPlaintext. If the signature verifies successfully, then the Proposal should be cached in such a way that it can be retrieved by hash (as a ProposalOrRef object) in a later Commit message.

11.1.1. Add

An Add proposal requests that a client with a specified KeyPackage be added to the group. The proposer of the Add MUST validate the KeyPackage in the same way as recipients are required to do below.

```c
struct {
    KeyPackage key_package;
} Add;
```
The proposer of the Add does not control where in the group’s ratchet tree the new member is added. Instead, the sender of the Commit message chooses a location for each added member and states it in the Commit message.

An Add is applied after being included in a Commit message. The position of the Add in the list of proposals determines the node index index of the leaf node where the new member will be added. For the first Add in the Commit, index is the leftmost empty leaf in the tree, for the second Add, the next empty leaf to the right, etc.

* Validate the KeyPackage:
  
  - Verify that the signature on the KeyPackage is valid using the public key in the KeyPackage’s credential
  
  - Verify that the following fields in the KeyPackage are unique among the members of the group (including any other members added in the same Commit):
    
    o (credential.identity, endpoint_id) tuple
    o credential.signature_key
    o hpke_init_key
  
  - Verify that the KeyPackage is compatible with the group’s parameters. The ciphersuite and protocol version of the KeyPackage must match those in use in the group. If the GroupContext has a required_capabilities extension, then the required extensions and proposals MUST be listed in the KeyPackage’s capabilities extension.

* If necessary, extend the tree to the right until it has at least index + 1 leaves

* For each non-blank intermediate node along the path from the leaf at position index to the root, add index to the unmerged_leaves list for the node.

* Set the leaf node in the tree at position index to a new node containing the public key from the KeyPackage in the Add, as well as the credential under which the KeyPackage was signed
11.1.2. Update

An Update proposal is a similar mechanism to Add with the distinction that it is the sender’s leaf KeyPackage in the tree which would be updated with a new KeyPackage.

```c
struct {
    KeyPackage key_package;
} Update;
```

The values in the following fields of the KeyPackage contained in an Update proposal MUST be the same as those of the KeyPackage it replaces in the tree. version, cipher_suite, credential.identity, endpoint_id. However, the value of the credential.signature_key field of the new KeyPackage MUST be different from that of all other KeyPackages in the tree. Furthermore, the value of the hpke_init_key field of the new KeyPackage MUST be different from that of the KeyPackage it replaces.

A member of the group applies an Update message by taking the following steps:

* Replace the sender’s leaf KeyPackage with the one contained in the Update proposal
* Blank the intermediate nodes along the path from the sender’s leaf to the root

11.1.3. Remove

A Remove proposal requests that the member with KeyPackageID removed be removed from the group.

```c
struct {
    KeyPackageID removed;
} Remove;
```

A member of the group applies a Remove message by taking the following steps:

* Identify a leaf node containing a key package matching removed. This lookup MUST be done on the tree before any non-Remove proposals have been applied (the "old" tree in the terminology of Section 11.2), since proposals such as Update can change the KeyPackage stored at a leaf. Let removed_index be the node index of this leaf node.
* Replace the leaf node at removed_index with a blank node
* Blank the intermediate nodes along the path from removed_index to the root

* Truncate the tree by reducing the size of tree until the rightmost non-blank leaf node

11.1.4. PreSharedKey

A PreSharedKey proposal can be used to request that a pre-shared key be injected into the key schedule in the process of advancing the epoch.

```c
struct {
    PreSharedKeyID psk;
} PreSharedKey;
```

The psktype of the pre-shared key MUST be external and the psk_nonce MUST be a randomly sampled nonce of length KDF.Nh. When processing a Commit message that includes one or more PreSharedKey proposals, group members derive psk_secret as described in Section 8.2, where the order of the PSKs corresponds to the order of the PreSharedKey proposals in the Commit.

11.1.5. ReInit

A ReInit proposal represents a request to re-initialize the group with different parameters, for example, to increase the version number or to change the ciphersuite. The re-initialization is done by creating a completely new group and shutting down the old one.

```c
struct {
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    ProtocolVersion version;
    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
    Extension extensions<0..2^32-1>;
} ReInit;
```

A member of the group applies a ReInit proposal by waiting for the committer to send the Welcome message and by checking that the group_id and the parameters of the new group corresponds to the ones specified in the proposal. The Welcome message MUST specify exactly one pre-shared key with psktype = reinit, and with psk_group_id and psk_epoch equal to the group_id and epoch of the existing group after the Commit containing the reinit Proposal was processed. The Welcome message may specify the inclusion of other pre-shared keys with a psktype different from reinit.
If a ReInit proposal is included in a Commit, it MUST be the only proposal referenced by the Commit. If other non-ReInit proposals have been sent during the epoch, the committer SHOULD prefer them over the ReInit proposal, allowing the ReInit to be resent and applied in a subsequent epoch. The version field in the ReInit proposal MUST be no less than the version for the current group.

11.1.6. ExternalInit

An ExternalInit proposal is used by new members that want to join a group by using an external commit. This proposal can only be used in that context.

```c
struct {
    opaque kem_output<0..2^16-1>;
} ExternalInit;
```

A member of the group applies an ExternalInit message by initializing the next epoch using an init secret computed as described in Section 8.1. The kem_output field contains the required KEM output.

11.1.7. AppAck

An AppAck proposal is used to acknowledge receipt of application messages. Though this information implies no change to the group, it is structured as a Proposal message so that it is included in the group’s transcript by being included in Commit messages.

```c
struct {
    KeyPackageID sender;
    uint32 first_generation;
    uint32 last_generation;
} MessageRange;
```

An AppAck proposal represents a set of messages received by the sender in the current epoch. Messages are represented by the sender and generation values in the MLSCiphertext for the message. Each MessageRange represents receipt of a span of messages whose generation values form a continuous range from first_generation to last_generation, inclusive.

AppAck proposals are sent as a guard against the Delivery Service dropping application messages. The sequential nature of the generation field provides a degree of loss detection, since gaps in
the generation sequence indicate dropped messages. AppAck completes
this story by addressing the scenario where the Delivery Service
drops all messages after a certain point, so that a later generation
is never observed. Obviously, there is a risk that AppAck messages
could be suppressed as well, but their inclusion in the transcript
means that if they are suppressed then the group cannot advance at
all.

The schedule on which sending AppAck proposals are sent is up to the
application, and determines which cases of loss/suppression are
detected. For example:

* The application might have the committer include an AppAck
  proposal whenever a Commit is sent, so that other members could
  know when one of their messages did not reach the committer.

* The application could have a client send an AppAck whenever an
  application message is sent, covering all messages received since
  its last AppAck. This would provide a complete view of any losses
  experienced by active members.

* The application could simply have clients send AppAck proposals on
  a timer, so that all participants’ state would be known.

An application using AppAck proposals to guard against loss/
suppression of application messages also needs to ensure that AppAck
messages and the Commits that reference them are not dropped. One
way to do this is to always encrypt Proposal and Commit messages, to
make it more difficult for the Delivery Service to recognize which
messages contain AppAcks. The application can also have clients
enforce an AppAck schedule, reporting loss if an AppAck is not
received at the expected time.

11.1.8. GroupContextExtensions

A GroupContextExtensions proposal is used to update the list of
extensions in the GroupContext for the group.

struct { Extension extensions<0..2^32-1>; } GroupContextExtensions;

A member of the group applies a GroupContextExtensions proposal with
the following steps:

* If the new extensions include a required_capabilities extension,
  verify that all members of the group support the required
  capabilities (including those added in the same commit, and
  excluding those removed).
* Remove all of the existing extensions from the GroupContext object for the group and replacing them with the list of extensions in the proposal. (This is a wholesale replacement, not a merge. An extension is only carried over if the sender of the proposal includes it in the new list.)

Note that once the GroupContext is updated, its inclusion in the confirmation_tag by way of the key schedule will confirm that all members of the group agree on the extensions in use.

11.1.9. External Proposals

Add and Remove proposals can be constructed and sent to the group by a party that is outside the group. For example, a Delivery Service might propose to remove a member of a group who has been inactive for a long time, or propose adding a newly-hired staff member to a group representing a real-world team. Proposals originating outside the group are identified by a preconfigured or new_member SenderType in MLSPlaintext.

ReInit proposals can also be sent to the group by a preconfigured sender, for example to enforce a changed policy regarding MLS version or ciphersuite.

The new_member SenderType is used for clients proposing that they themselves be added. For this ID type the sender value MUST be zero and the Proposal type MUST be Add. The MLSPlaintext MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the KeyPackage in the Add message. Recipients MUST verify that the MLSPlaintext carrying the Proposal message is validly signed with this key.

The preconfigured SenderType is reserved for signers that are pre-provisioned to the clients within a group. If proposals with these sender IDs are to be accepted within a group, the members of the group MUST be provisioned by the application with a mapping between these IDs and authorized signing keys. Recipients MUST verify that the MLSPlaintext carrying the Proposal message is validly signed with the corresponding key. To ensure consistent handling of external proposals, the application MUST ensure that the members of a group have the same mapping and apply the same policies to external proposals.

An external proposal MUST be sent as an MLSPlaintext object, since the sender will not have the keys necessary to construct an MLSCiphertext object.
11.2. Commit

A Commit message initiates a new epoch for the group, based on a collection of Proposals. It instructs group members to update their representation of the state of the group by applying the proposals and advancing the key schedule.

Each proposal covered by the Commit is included by a ProposalOrRef value, which identifies the proposal to be applied by value or by reference. Proposals supplied by value are included directly in the Commit object. Proposals supplied by reference are specified by including the hash of the MLSPlaintext in which the Proposal was sent, using the hash function from the group’s ciphersuite. For proposals supplied by value, the sender of the proposal is the same as the sender of the Commit. Conversely, proposals sent by people other than the committer MUST be included by reference.

```
enum {
    reserved(0),
    proposal(1),
    reference(2),
    (255)
} ProposalOrRefType;

struct {
    ProposalOrRefType type;
    select (ProposalOrRef.type) {
        case proposal: Proposal proposal;
        case reference: opaque hash<0..255>;
    }
} ProposalOrRef;

struct {
    ProposalOrRef proposals<0..2^32-1>;
    optional<UpdatePath> path;
} Commit;
```

A group member that has observed one or more proposals within an epoch MUST send a Commit message before sending application data. This ensures, for example, that any members whose removal was proposed during the epoch are actually removed before any application data is transmitted.

The sender of a Commit MUST include all valid proposals that it has received during the current epoch. Invalid proposals include, for example, proposals with an invalid signature or proposals that are semantically invalid, such as an Add when the sender does not have the application-level permission to add new users. Proposals with a
non-default proposal type MUST NOT be included in a commit unless the proposal type is supported by all the members of the group that will process the Commit (i.e., not including any members being added or removed by the Commit).

If there are multiple proposals that apply to the same leaf, the committer chooses one and includes only that one in the Commit, considering the rest invalid. The committer MUST prefer any Remove received, or the most recent Update for the leaf if there are no Removes. If there are multiple Add proposals containing KeyPackages with the same tuple (credential.identity, endpoint_id) the committer again chooses one to include and considers the rest invalid. Add proposals that contain KeyPackages with an (credential.identity, endpoint_id) tuple that matches that of an existing KeyPackage in the group MUST be considered invalid. The committer MUST consider invalid any Add or Update proposal if the Credential in the contained KeyPackage shares the same signature key with a Credential in any leaf of the group, or indeed if the KeyPackage shares the same hpke_init_key with another KeyPackage in the group.

The Commit MUST NOT combine proposals sent within different epochs. In the event that a valid proposal is omitted from the next Commit, the sender of the proposal SHOULD retransmit it in the new epoch.

A member of the group MAY send a Commit that references no proposals at all, which would thus have an empty proposals vector. Such a Commit resets the sender’s leaf and the nodes along its direct path, and provides forward secrecy and post-compromise security with regard to the sender of the Commit. An Update proposal can be regarded as a "lazy" version of this operation, where only the leaf changes and intermediate nodes are blanked out.

The path field of a Commit message MUST be populated if the Commit covers at least one Update or Remove proposal. The path field MUST also be populated if the Commit covers no proposals at all (i.e., if the proposals vector is empty). The path field MAY be omitted if the Commit covers only Add proposals. In pseudocode, the logic for validating a Commit is as follows:
hasUpdates = false
hasRemoves = false

for i, id in commit.proposals:
    proposal = proposalCache[id]
    assert(proposal != null)
    hasUpdates = hasUpdates || proposal.msg_type == update
    hasRemoves = hasRemoves || proposal.msg_type == remove

if len(commit.proposals) == 0 || hasUpdates || hasRemoves:
    assert(commit.path != null)

To summarize, a Commit can have three different configurations, with different uses:

1. An "empty" Commit that references no proposals, which updates the committer’s contribution to the group and provides PCS with regard to the committer.

2. A "partial" Commit that references Add, PreSharedKey, or ReInit proposals but where the path is empty. Such a commit doesn’t provide PCS with regard to the committer.

3. A "full" Commit that references proposals of any type, which provides FS with regard to any removed members and PCS for the committer and any updated members.

When creating or processing a Commit, three different ratchet trees and their associated GroupContexts are used:

1. "Old" refers to the ratchet tree and GroupContext for the epoch before the commit. The old GroupContext is used when signing the MLSPlainText so that existing group members can verify the signature before processing the commit.

2. "Provisional" refers to the ratchet tree and GroupContext constructed after applying the proposals that are referenced by the Commit. The provisional GroupContext uses the epoch number for the new epoch, and the old confirmed transcript hash. This is used when creating the UpdatePath, if the UpdatePath is needed.
3. "New" refers to the ratchet tree and GroupContext constructed after applying the proposals and the UpdatePath (if any). The new GroupContext uses the epoch number for the new epoch, and the new confirmed transcript hash. This is used when deriving the new epoch secrets, and is the only GroupContext that newly-added members will have.

A member of the group creates a Commit message and the corresponding Welcome message at the same time, by taking the following steps:

* Construct an initial Commit object with the proposals field populated from Proposals received during the current epoch, and an empty path field.

* Generate the provisional ratchet tree and GroupContext by applying the proposals referenced in the initial Commit object, as described in Section 11.1. Update proposals are applied first, followed by Remove proposals, and then finally Add proposals. Add proposals are applied in the order listed in the proposals vector, and always to the leftmost unoccupied leaf in the tree, or the right edge of the tree if all leaves are occupied.

  - Note that the order in which different types of proposals are applied should be updated by the implementation to include any new proposals added by negotiated group extensions.

  - PreSharedKey proposals are processed later when deriving the psk_secret for the Key Schedule.

* Decide whether to populate the path field: If the path field is required based on the proposals that are in the commit (see above), then it MUST be populated. Otherwise, the sender MAY omit the path field at its discretion.

* If populating the path field: Create an UpdatePath using the provisional ratchet tree and GroupContext. Any new member (from an add proposal) MUST be excluded from the resolution during the computation of the UpdatePath. The leaf_key_package for this UpdatePath must have a parent_hash extension. Note that the KeyPackage in the UpdatePath effectively updates an existing KeyPackage in the group and thus MUST adhere to the same restrictions as KeyPackages used in Update proposals.

  - Assign this UpdatePath to the path field in the Commit.
- Apply the UpdatePath to the tree, as described in Section 5.5, creating the new ratchet tree. Define commit_secret as the value path_secret[n+1] derived from the path_secret[n] value assigned to the root node.

* If not populating the path field: Set the path field in the Commit to the null optional. Define commit_secret as the all-zero vector of length KDF.Nh (the same length as a path_secret value would be). In this case, the new ratchet tree is the same as the provisional ratchet tree.

* Derive the psk_secret as specified in Section 8.2, where the order of PSKs in the derivation corresponds to the order of PreSharedKey proposals in the proposals vector.

* Construct an MLSPlaintext object containing the Commit object. Sign the MLSPlaintext using the old GroupContext as context.

- Use the MLSPlaintext to update the confirmed transcript hash and generate the new GroupContext.

- Use the init_secret from the previous epoch, the commit_secret and the psk_secret as defined in the previous steps, and the new GroupContext to compute the new joiner_secret, welcome_secret, epoch_secret, and derived secrets for the new epoch.

- Use the confirmation_key for the new epoch to compute the confirmation_tag value, and the membership_key for the old epoch to compute the membership_tag value in the MLSPlaintext.

- Calculate the interim transcript hash using the new confirmed transcript hash and the confirmation_tag from the MLSPlaintext.

* Construct a GroupInfo reflecting the new state:

- Group ID, epoch, tree, confirmed transcript hash, interim transcript hash, and group context extensions from the new state

- The confirmation_tag from the MLSPlaintext object

- Other extensions as defined by the application

- Sign the GroupInfo using the member’s private signing key

- Encrypt the GroupInfo using the key and nonce derived from the joiner_secret for the new epoch (see Section 11.2.2)
* For each new member in the group:

  - Identify the lowest common ancestor in the tree of the new member’s leaf node and the member sending the Commit

  - If the path field was populated above: Compute the path secret corresponding to the common ancestor node

  - Compute an EncryptedGroupSecrets object that encapsulates the init_secret for the current epoch and the path secret (if present).

* Construct a Welcome message from the encrypted GroupInfo object, the encrypted key packages, and any PSKs for which a proposal was included in the Commit. The order of the psks MUST be the same as the order of PreSharedKey proposals in the proposals vector.

* If a ReInit proposal was part of the Commit, the committer MUST create a new group with the parameters specified in the ReInit proposal, and with the same members as the original group. The Welcome message MUST include a PreSharedKeyID with psktype reinit and with psk_group_id and psk_epoch corresponding to the current group and the epoch after the commit was processed.

A member of the group applies a Commit message by taking the following steps:

* Verify that the epoch field of the enclosing MLSPlaintext message is equal to the epoch field of the current GroupContext object

* Verify that the signature on the MLSPlaintext message verifies using the public key from the credential stored at the leaf in the tree indicated by the sender field.

* Verify that all PSKs specified in any PreSharedKey proposals in the proposals vector are available.

* Generate the provisional ratchet tree and GroupContext by applying the proposals referenced in the initial Commit object, as described in Section 11.1. Update proposals are applied first, followed by Remove proposals, and then finally Add proposals. Add proposals are applied in the order listed in the proposals vector, and always to the leftmost unoccupied leaf in the tree, or the right edge of the tree if all leaves are occupied.

  - Note that the order in which different types of proposals are applied should be updated by the implementation to include any new proposals added by negotiated group extensions.
* Verify that the path value is populated if the proposals vector contains any Update or Remove proposals, or if it’s empty. Otherwise, the path value MAY be omitted.

* If the path value is populated: Process the path value using the provisional ratchet tree and GroupContext, to generate the new ratchet tree and the commit_secret:

  - Apply the UpdatePath to the tree, as described in Section 5.5, and store leaf_key_package at the Committer’s leaf.

  - Verify that the KeyPackage has a parent_hash extension and that its value matches the new parent of the sender’s leaf node.

  - Define commit_secret as the value path_secret[n+1] derived from the path_secret[n] value assigned to the root node.

* If the path value is not populated: Define commit_secret as the all-zero vector of length KDF.Nh (the same length as a path_secret value would be).

* Update the confirmed and interim transcript hashes using the new Commit, and generate the new GroupContext.

* Derive the psk_secret as specified in Section 8.2, where the order of PSKs in the derivation corresponds to the order of PreSharedKey proposals in the proposals vector.

* Use the init_secret from the previous epoch, the commit_secret and the psk_secret as defined in the previous steps, and the new GroupContext to compute the new joiner_secret, welcome_secret, epoch_secret, and derived secrets for the new epoch.

* Use the confirmation_key for the new epoch to compute the confirmation tag for this message, as described below, and verify that it is the same as the confirmation_tag field in the MLSPlaintext object.

* If the above checks are successful, consider the new GroupContext object as the current state of the group.

* If the Commit included a ReInit proposal, the client MUST NOT use the group to send messages anymore. Instead, it MUST wait for a Welcome message from the committer and check that
The version, cipher_suite and extensions fields of the new group corresponds to the ones in the ReInit proposal, and that the version is greater than or equal to that of the original group.

The psks field in the Welcome message includes a PreSharedKeyID with psktype = reinit, and psk_epoch and psk_group_id equal to the epoch and group ID of the original group after processing the Commit.

The confirmation tag value confirms that the members of the group have arrived at the same state of the group:

\[
\text{MLSPlaintext.confirmation_tag} = \text{MAC(confirmation_key, GroupContext.confirmed_transcript_hash)}
\]

11.2.1. External Commits

External Commits are a mechanism for new members (external parties that want to become members of the group) to add themselves to a group, without requiring that an existing member has to come online to issue a Commit that references an Add Proposal.

Whether existing members of the group will accept or reject an External Commit follows the same rules that are applied to other handshake messages.

New members can create and issue an External Commit if they have access to the following information for the group’s current epoch:

* group ID
* epoch ID
* ciphersuite
* public tree hash
* interim transcript hash
* group extensions
* external public key

This information is aggregated in a PublicGroupState object as follows:
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struct {
    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    opaque tree_hash<0..255>;
    opaque interim_transcript_hash<0..255>;
    Extension group_context_extensions<0..2^32-1>;
    Extension other_extensions<0..2^32-1>;
    HPKEPublicKey external_pub;
    KeyPackageID signer;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} PublicGroupState;

Note that the tree_hash field is used the same way as in the Welcome message. The full tree can be included via the ratchet_tree extension Section 11.3.

The signature MUST verify using the public key taken from the credential in the leaf node of the member with KeyPackageID signer. The signature covers the following structure, comprising all the fields in the PublicGroupState above signature:

struct {
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    opaque tree_hash<0..255>;
    opaque interim_transcript_hash<0..255>;
    Extension group_context_extensions<0..2^32-1>;
    Extension other_extensions<0..2^32-1>;
    HPKEPublicKey external_pub;
    KeyPackageID signer;
} PublicGroupStateTBS;

This signature authenticates the HPKE public key, so that the joiner knows that the public key was provided by a member of the group. The fields that are not signed are included in the key schedule via the GroupContext object. If the joiner is provided an inaccurate data for these fields, then its external Commit will have an incorrect confirmation_tag and thus be rejected.

The information in a PublicGroupState is not deemed public in general, but applications can choose to make it available to new members in order to allow External Commits.

External Commits work like regular Commits, with a few differences:

* The proposals included by value in an External Commit MUST meet the following conditions:
- There MUST be a single Add proposal that adds the new issuing new member to the group
- There MUST be a single ExternalInit proposal
- There MUST NOT be any Update proposals
- If a Remove proposal is present, then the credential and endpoint_id of the removed leaf MUST be the same as the corresponding values in the Add KeyPackage.

* The proposals included by reference in an External Commit MUST meet the following conditions:
  - There MUST NOT be any ExternalInit proposals

* External Commits MUST contain a path field (and is therefore a "full" Commit)

* External Commits MUST be signed by the new member. In particular, the signature on the enclosing MLSPlaintext MUST verify using the public key for the credential in the leaf_key_package of the path field.

* When processing a Commit, both existing and new members MUST use the external init secret as described in Section 8.1.

* The sender type for the MLSPlaintext encapsulating the External Commit MUST be new_member

In other words, External Commits come in two "flavors" -- a "join" commit that adds the sender to the group or a "resync" commit that replaces a member’s prior appearance with a new one.

Note that the "resync" operation allows an attacker that has compromised a member’s signature private key to introduce themselves into the group and remove the prior, legitimate member in a single Commit. Without resync, this can still be done, but requires two operations, the external Commit to join and a second Commit to remove the old appearance. Applications for whom this distinction is salient can choose to disallow external commits that contain a Remove, or to allow such resync commits only if they contain a "reinit" PSK proposal that demonstrates the joining member’s presence in a prior epoch of the group. With the latter approach, the attacker would need to compromise the PSK as well as the signing key, but the application will need to ensure that continuing, non-resync’ing members have the required PSK.
11.2.2. Welcoming New Members

The sender of a Commit message is responsible for sending a Welcome message to any new members added via Add proposals. The Welcome message provides the new members with the current state of the group, after the application of the Commit message. The new members will not be able to decrypt or verify the Commit message, but will have the secrets they need to participate in the epoch initiated by the Commit message.

In order to allow the same Welcome message to be sent to all new members, information describing the group is encrypted with a symmetric key and nonce derived from the joiner_secret for the new epoch. The joiner_secret is then encrypted to each new member using HPKE. In the same encrypted package, the committer transmits the path secret for the lowest node contained in the direct paths of both the committer and the new member. This allows the new member to compute private keys for nodes in its direct path that are being reset by the corresponding Commit.

If the sender of the Welcome message wants the receiving member to include a PSK in the derivation of the epoch_secret, they can populate the psks field indicating which PSK to use.
struct {
    opaque group_id<0..255>;
    uint64 epoch;
    opaque tree_hash<0..255>;
    opaque confirmed_transcript_hash<0..255>;
    Extension group_context_extensions<0..2^32-1>;
    Extension other_extensions<0..2^32-1>;
    MAC confirmation_tag;
    KeyPackageID signer;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} GroupInfo;

struct {
    opaque path_secret<1..255>;
} PathSecret;

struct {
    opaque joiner_secret<1..255>;
    optional<PathSecret> path_secret;
    PreSharedKeys psks;
} GroupSecrets;

struct {
    KeyPackageID new_member<1..255>;
    HPKECiphertext encrypted_group_secrets;
} EncryptedGroupSecrets;

struct {
    ProtocolVersion version = mls10;
    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
    EncryptedGroupSecrets secrets<0..2^32-1>;
    opaque encrypted_group_info<1..2^32-1>;
} Welcome;

The client processing a Welcome message will need to have a copy of
the group’s ratchet tree. The tree can be provided in the Welcome
message, in an extension of type ratchet_tree. If it is sent
otherwise (e.g., provided by a caching service on the Delivery
Service), then the client MUST download the tree before processing
the Welcome.

On receiving a Welcome message, a client processes it using the
following steps:
* Identify an entry in the secrets array where the new_member value corresponds to one of this client’s KeyPackages, using the hash indicated by the cipher_suite field. If no such field exists, or if the ciphersuite indicated in the KeyPackage does not match the one in the Welcome message, return an error.

* Decrypt the encrypted_group_secrets using HPKE with the algorithms indicated by the ciphersuite and the HPKE private key corresponding to the GroupSecrets. If a PreSharedKeyID is part of the GroupSecrets and the client is not in possession of the corresponding PSK, return an error.

* From the joiner_secret in the decrypted GroupSecrets object and the PSKs specified in the GroupSecrets, derive the welcome_secret and using that the welcome_key and welcome_nonce. Use the key and nonce to decrypt the encrypted_group_info field.

\[
\text{welcome_nonce} = \text{KDF.Expand}(\text{welcome_secret}, "nonce", \text{AEAD.Nn})
\]
\[
\text{welcome_key} = \text{KDF.Expand}(\text{welcome_secret}, "key", \text{AEAD.Nk})
\]

* Verify the signature on the GroupInfo object. The signature input comprises all of the fields in the GroupInfo object except the signature field. The public key and algorithm are taken from the credential in the leaf node of the member with KeyPackageID signer. If there is no matching leaf node, or if signature verification fails, return an error.

* Verify the integrity of the ratchet tree.

  - Verify that the tree hash of the ratchet tree matches the tree_hash field in the GroupInfo.

  - For each non-empty parent node, verify that exactly one of the node’s children are non-empty and have the hash of this node set as their parent_hash value (if the child is another parent) or has a parent_hash extension in the KeyPackage containing the same value (if the child is a leaf). If either of the node’s children is empty, and in particular does not have a parent hash, then its respective children’s parent_hash values have to be considered instead.

  - For each non-empty leaf node, verify the signature on the KeyPackage.

* Identify a leaf in the tree array (any even-numbered node) whose key_package field is identical to the KeyPackage. If no such field exists, return an error. Let index represent the index of this node in the tree.
* Construct a new group state using the information in the GroupInfo object.

- The GroupContext contains the group_id, epoch, tree_hash, confirmed_transcript_hash, and group_context_extensions fields from the GroupInfo object.

- The new member’s position in the tree is index, as defined above.

- Update the leaf at index index with the private key corresponding to the public key in the node.

- If the path_secret value is set in the GroupSecrets object: Identify the lowest common ancestor of the node index index and of the node index of the member with KeyPackageID GroupInfo.signer. Set the private key for this node to the private key derived from the path_secret.

- For each parent of the common ancestor, up to the root of the tree, derive a new path secret and set the private key for the node to the private key derived from the path secret. The private key MUST be the private key that corresponds to the public key in the node.

* Use the joiner_secret from the GroupSecrets object to generate the epoch secret and other derived secrets for the current epoch.

* Set the confirmed transcript hash in the new state to the value of the confirmed_transcript_hash in the GroupInfo.

* Verify the confirmation tag in the GroupInfo using the derived confirmation key and the confirmed_transcript_hash from the GroupInfo.

* Use the confirmed transcript hash and confirmation tag to compute the interim transcript hash in the new state.

11.3. Ratchet Tree Extension

By default, a GroupInfo message only provides the joiner with a commitment to the group’s ratchet tree. In order to process or generate handshake messages, the joiner will need to get a copy of the ratchet tree from some other source. (For example, the DS might provide a cached copy.) The inclusion of the tree hash in the GroupInfo message means that the source of the ratchet tree need not be trusted to maintain the integrity of tree.
In cases where the application does not wish to provide such an external source, the whole public state of the ratchet tree can be provided in an extension of type ratchet_tree, containing a ratchet_tree object of the following form:

```c
enum {
    reserved(0),
    leaf(1),
    parent(2),
    (255)
} NodeType;

struct {
    NodeType node_type;
    select (Node.node_type) {
        case leaf:   KeyPackage key_package;
        case parent: ParentNode node;
    };
} Node;

optional<Node> ratchet_tree<1..2^32-1>;
```

The presence of a ratchet_tree extension in a GroupInfo message does not result in any changes to the GroupContext extensions for the group. The ratchet tree provided is simply stored by the client and used for MLS operations.

If this extension is not provided in a Welcome message, then the client will need to fetch the ratchet tree over some other channel before it can generate or process Commit messages. Applications should ensure that this out-of-band channel is provided with security protections equivalent to the protections that are afforded to Proposal and Commit messages. For example, an application that encrypts Proposal and Commit messages might distribute ratchet trees encrypted using a key exchanged over the MLS channel.

12. Extensibility

This protocol includes a mechanism for negotiating extension parameters similar to the one in TLS [RFC8446]. In TLS, extension negotiation is one-to-one: The client offers extensions in its ClientHello message, and the server expresses its choices for the session with extensions in its ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions messages. In MLS, extensions appear in the following places:

* In KeyPackages, to describe client capabilities and aspects of their participation in the group (once in the ratchet tree)
* In the Welcome message, to tell new members of a group what parameters are being used by the group, and to provide any additional details required to join the group

* In the GroupContext object, to ensure that all members of the group have the same view of the parameters in use

In other words, an application can use GroupContext extensions to ensure that all members of the group agree on a set of parameters. Clients indicate their support for parameters in KeyPackage extensions. New members of a group are informed of the group’s GroupContext extensions via the group_context_extensions field in the GroupInfo or PublicGroupState object. The other_extensions field in a GroupInfo object can be used to provide additional parameters to new joiners that are used to join the group.

This extension mechanism is designed to allow for secure and forward-compatible negotiation of extensions. For this to work, implementations MUST correctly handle extensible fields:

* A client that posts a KeyPackage MUST support all parameters advertised in it. Otherwise, another client might fail to interoperate by selecting one of those parameters.

* A client initiating a group MUST ignore all unrecognized ciphersuites, extensions, and other parameters. Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.

* A client adding a new member to a group MUST verify that the KeyPackage for the new member contains extensions that are consistent with the group’s extensions. For each extension in the GroupContext, the KeyPackage MUST have an extension of the same type, and the contents of the extension MUST be consistent with the value of the extension in the GroupContext, according to the semantics of the specific extension.

* If any extension in a GroupInfo message is unrecognized (i.e., not contained in the corresponding KeyPackage), then the client MUST reject the Welcome message and not join the group.

* The extensions populated into a GroupContext object are drawn from those in the GroupInfo object, according to the definitions of those extensions.

Note that the latter two requirements mean that all MLS extensions are mandatory, in the sense that an extension in use by the group MUST be supported by all members of the group.
This document does not define any way for the parameters of the group to change once it has been created; such a behavior could be implemented as an extension.

13. Sequencing of State Changes

Each Commit message is premised on a given starting state, indicated by the epoch field of the enclosing MLSPlaintext message. If the changes implied by a Commit messages are made starting from a different state, the results will be incorrect.

This need for sequencing is not a problem as long as each time a group member sends a Commit message, it is based on the most current state of the group. In practice, however, there is a risk that two members will generate Commit messages simultaneously, based on the same state.

When this happens, there is a need for the members of the group to deconflict the simultaneous Commit messages. There are two general approaches:

* Have the Delivery Service enforce a total order

* Have a signal in the message that clients can use to break ties

As long as Commit messages cannot be merged, there is a risk of starvation. In a sufficiently busy group, a given member may never be able to send a Commit message, because he always loses to other members. The degree to which this is a practical problem will depend on the dynamics of the application.

It might be possible, because of the non-contributivity of intermediate nodes, that Commit messages could be applied one after the other without the Delivery Service having to reject any Commit message, which would make MLS more resilient regarding the concurrency of Commit messages. The Messaging system can decide to choose the order for applying the state changes. Note that there are certain cases (if no total ordering is applied by the Delivery Service) where the ordering is important for security, i.e. all updates must be executed before removes.

Regardless of how messages are kept in sequence, implementations MUST only update their cryptographic state when valid Commit messages are received. Generation of Commit messages MUST NOT modify a client’s state, since the endpoint doesn’t know at that time whether the changes implied by the Commit message will succeed or not.
13.1. Server-Enforced Ordering

With this approach, the Delivery Service ensures that incoming messages are added to an ordered queue and outgoing messages are dispatched in the same order. The server is trusted to break ties when two members send a Commit message at the same time.

Messages should have a counter field sent in clear-text that can be checked by the server and used for tie-breaking. The counter starts at 0 and is incremented for every new incoming message. If two group members send a message with the same counter, the first message to arrive will be accepted by the server and the second one will be rejected. The rejected message needs to be sent again with the correct counter number.

To prevent counter manipulation by the server, the counter’s integrity can be ensured by including the counter in a signed message envelope.

This applies to all messages, not only state changing messages.

13.2. Client-Enforced Ordering

Order enforcement can be implemented on the client as well, one way to achieve it is to use a two step update protocol: the first client sends a proposal to update and the proposal is accepted when it gets 50%+ approval from the rest of the group, then it sends the approved update. Clients which didn’t get their proposal accepted, will wait for the winner to send their update before retrying new proposals.

While this seems safer as it doesn’t rely on the server, it is more complex and harder to implement. It also could cause starvation for some clients if they keep failing to get their proposal accepted.

14. Application Messages

The primary purpose of the Handshake protocol is to provide an authenticated group key exchange to clients. In order to protect Application messages sent among the members of a group, the Application secret provided by the Handshake key schedule is used to derive nonces and encryption keys for the Message Protection Layer according to the Application Key Schedule. That is, each epoch is equipped with a fresh Application Key Schedule which consist of a tree of Application Secrets as well as one symmetric ratchet per group member.
Each client maintains their own local copy of the Application Key Schedule for each epoch during which they are a group member. They derive new keys, nonces and secrets as needed while deleting old ones as soon as they have been used.

Application messages MUST be protected with the Authenticated-Encryption with Associated-Data (AEAD) encryption scheme associated with the MLS ciphersuite using the common framing mechanism. Note that "Authenticated" in this context does not mean messages are known to be sent by a specific client but only from a legitimate member of the group. To authenticate a message from a particular member, signatures are required. Handshake messages MUST use asymmetric signatures to strongly authenticate the sender of a message.

14.1. Message Encryption and Decryption

The group members MUST use the AEAD algorithm associated with the negotiated MLS ciphersuite to AEAD encrypt and decrypt their Application messages according to the Message Framing section.

The group identifier and epoch allow a recipient to know which group secrets should be used and from which Epoch secret to start computing other secrets and keys. The sender identifier is used to identify the member’s symmetric ratchet from the initial group Application secret. The application generation field is used to determine how far into the ratchet to iterate in order to reproduce the required AEAD keys and nonce for performing decryption.

Application messages SHOULD be padded to provide some resistance against traffic analysis techniques over encrypted traffic. [CLINIC] [HCJ16] While MLS might deliver the same payload less frequently across a lot of ciphertexts than traditional web servers, it might still provide the attacker enough information to mount an attack. If Alice asks Bob: "When are we going to the movie ?" the answer "Wednesday" might be leaked to an adversary by the ciphertext length. An attacker expecting Alice to answer Bob with a day of the week might find out the plaintext by correlation between the question and the length.

Similarly to TLS 1.3, if padding is used, the MLS messages MUST be padded with zero-valued bytes before AEAD encryption. Upon AEAD decryption, the length field of the plaintext is used to compute the number of bytes to be removed from the plaintext to get the correct data. As the padding mechanism is used to improve protection against traffic analysis, removal of the padding SHOULD be implemented in a "constant-time" manner at the MLS layer and above layers to prevent timing side-channels that would provide attackers with information on the size of the plaintext. The padding length length_of_padding can
be chosen at the time of the message encryption by the sender. Recipients can calculate the padding size from knowing the total size of the ApplicationPlaintext and the length of the content.

14.2. Restrictions

During each epoch senders MUST NOT encrypt more data than permitted by the security bounds of the AEAD scheme used.

Note that each change to the Group through a Handshake message will also set a new encryption_secret. Hence this change MUST be applied before encrypting any new application message. This is required both to ensure that any users removed from the group can no longer receive messages and to (potentially) recover confidentiality and authenticity for future messages despite a past state compromise.

14.3. Delayed and Reordered Application messages

Since each Application message contains the group identifier, the epoch and a message counter, a client can receive messages out of order. If they are able to retrieve or recompute the correct AEAD decryption key from currently stored cryptographic material clients can decrypt these messages.

For usability, MLS clients might be required to keep the AEAD key and nonce for a certain amount of time to retain the ability to decrypt delayed or out of order messages, possibly still in transit while a decryption is being done.

15. Security Considerations

The security goals of MLS are described in [I-D.ietf-mls-architecture]. We describe here how the protocol achieves its goals at a high level, though a complete security analysis is outside of the scope of this document.

15.1. Confidentiality of the Group Secrets

Group secrets are partly derived from the output of a ratchet tree. Ratchet trees work by assigning each member of the group to a leaf in the tree and maintaining the following property: the private key of a node in the tree is known only to members of the group that are assigned a leaf in the node’s subtree. This is called the _ratchet tree invariant_ and it makes it possible to encrypt to all group members except one, with a number of ciphertexts that’s logarithmic in the number of group members.
The ability to efficiently encrypt to all members except one allows members to be securely removed from a group. It also allows a member to rotate their keypair such that the old private key can no longer be used to decrypt new messages.

15.2. Authentication

The first form of authentication we provide is that group members can verify a message originated from one of the members of the group. For encrypted messages, this is guaranteed because messages are encrypted with an AEAD under a key derived from the group secrets. For plaintext messages, this is guaranteed by the use of a membership_tag which constitutes a MAC over the message, under a key derived from the group secrets.

The second form of authentication is that group members can verify a message originated from a particular member of the group. This is guaranteed by a digital signature on each message from the sender’s signature key.

The signature keys held by group members are critical to the security of MLS against active attacks. If a member’s signature key is compromised, then an attacker can create KeyPackages impersonating the member; depending on the application, this can then allow the attacker to join the group with the compromised member’s identity. For example, if a group has enabled external parties to join via external commits, then an attacker that has compromised a member’s signature key could use an external commit to insert themselves into the group -- even using a "resync"-style external commit to replace the compromised member in the group.

Applications can mitigate the risks of signature key compromise using pre-shared keys. If a group requires joiners to know a PSK in addition to authenticating with a credential, then in order to mount an impersonation attack, the attacker would need to compromise the relevant PSK as well as the victim’s signature key. The cost of this mitigation is that the application needs some external arrangement that ensures that the legitimate members of the group to have the required PSKs.

15.3. Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security

Post-compromise security is provided between epochs by members regularly updating their leaf key in the ratchet tree. Updating their leaf key prevents group secrets from continuing to be encrypted to previously compromised public keys.
Forward-secrecy between epochs is provided by deleting private keys from past version of the ratchet tree, as this prevents old group secrets from being re-derived. Forward secrecy _within_ an epoch is provided by deleting message encryption keys once they’ve been used to encrypt or decrypt a message.

Post-compromise security is also provided for new groups by members regularly generating new InitKeys and uploading them to the Delivery Service, such that compromised key material won’t be used when the member is added to a new group.

15.4. InitKey Reuse

InitKeys are intended to be used only once. That is, once an InitKey has been used to introduce the corresponding client to a group, it SHOULD be deleted from the InitKey publication system. Reuse of InitKeys can lead to replay attacks.

An application MAY allow for reuse of a "last resort" InitKey in order to prevent denial of service attacks. Since an InitKey is needed to add a client to a new group, an attacker could prevent a client being added to new groups by exhausting all available InitKeys.

15.5. Group Fragmentation by Malicious Insiders

It is possible for a malicious member of a group to "fragment" the group by crafting an invalid UpdatePath. Recall that an UpdatePath encrypts a sequence of path secrets to different subtrees of the group’s ratchet trees. These path secrets should be derived in a sequence as described in Section 5.4, but the UpdatePath syntax allows the sender to encrypt arbitrary, unrelated secrets. The syntax also does not guarantee that the encrypted path secret encrypted for a given node corresponds to the public key provided for that node.

Both of these types of corruption will cause processing of a Commit to fail for some members of the group. If the public key for a node does not match the path secret, then the members that decrypt that path secret will reject the commit based on this mismatch. If the path secret sequence is incorrect at some point, then members that can decrypt nodes before that point will compute a different public key for the mismatched node than the one in the UpdatePath, which also causes the Commit to fail. Applications SHOULD provide mechanisms for failed commits to be reported, so that group members who were not able to recognize the error themselves can reject the commit and roll back to a previous state if necessary.
Even with such an error reporting mechanism in place, however, it is still possible for members to get locked out of the group by a malformed commit. Since malformed commits can only be recognized by certain members of the group, in an asynchronous application, it may be the case that all members that could detect a fault in a commit are offline. In such a case, the commit will be accepted by the group, and the resulting state possibly used as the basis for further commits. When the affected members come back online, they will reject the first commit, and thus be unable to catch up with the group.

Applications can address this risk by requiring certain members of the group to acknowledge successful processing of a commit before the group regards the commit as accepted. The minimum set of acknowledgments necessary to verify that a commit is well-formed comprises an acknowledgement from one member per node in the UpdatePath, that is, one member from each subtree rooted in the copath node corresponding to the node in the UpdatePath.

16. IANA Considerations

This document requests the creation of the following new IANA registries:

* MLS Ciphersuites (Section 16.1)
* MLS Extension Types (Section 16.2)
* MLS Proposal Types (Section 16.3)
* MLS Credential Types (Section 16.4)

All of these registries should be under a heading of "Messaging Layer Security", and assignments are made via the Specification Required policy [RFC8126]. See Section 16.5 for additional information about the MLS Designated Experts (DEs).

RFC EDITOR: Please replace XXXX throughout with the RFC number assigned to this document

16.1. MLS Ciphersuites

A ciphersuite is a combination of a protocol version and the set of cryptographic algorithms that should be used.

Ciphersuite names follow the naming convention:

CipherSuite MLS_LVL_KEM_AEAD_HASH_SIG = VALUE;
Where VALUE is represented as a sixteen-bit integer:

```c
uint16 CipherSuite;
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MLS</td>
<td>The string &quot;MLS&quot; followed by the major and minor version, e.g. &quot;MLS10&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVL</td>
<td>The security level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEM</td>
<td>The KEM algorithm used for HPKE in TreeKEM group operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEAD</td>
<td>The AEAD algorithm used for HPKE and message protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASH</td>
<td>The hash algorithm used for HPKE and the MLS transcript hash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>The Signature algorithm used for message authentication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

The columns in the registry are as follows:

* Value: The numeric value of the ciphersuite
* Name: The name of the ciphersuite
* Recommended: Whether support for this ciphersuite is recommended by the IETF MLS WG. Valid values are "Y" and "N". The "Recommended" column is assigned a value of "N" unless explicitly requested, and adding a value with a "Recommended" value of "Y" requires Standards Action [RFC8126]. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Y->N transition.
* Reference: The document where this ciphersuite is defined

Initial contents:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>MLS10_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>MLS10_128_DHKEMP256_AES128GCM_SHA256_P256</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>MLS10_128_DHKEMX25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256_Ed25519</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>MLS10_256_DHKEMX448_AES256GCM_SHA512_Ed448</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0005</td>
<td>MLS10_256_DHKEMP521_AES256GCM_SHA512_Ed448</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xff00</td>
<td>Reserved for Private Use</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

All of these ciphersuites use HMAC [RFC2104] as their MAC function, with different hashes per ciphersuite. The mapping of ciphersuites to HPKE primitives, HMAC hash functions, and TLS signature schemes is as follows [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke] [RFC8446]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>KEM</th>
<th>KDF</th>
<th>AEAD</th>
<th>Hash</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>0x0020</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>SHA256</td>
<td>ed25519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>0x0010</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>SHA256</td>
<td>ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>0x0010</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>SHA256</td>
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<td>ed448</td>
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<td>0x0012</td>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
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<td>ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512</td>
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<tr>
<td>0x0006</td>
<td>0x0021</td>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>SHA512</td>
<td>ed448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5
The hash used for the MLS transcript hash is the one referenced in the ciphersuite name. In the ciphersuites defined above, "SHA256" and "SHA512" refer to the SHA-256 and SHA-512 functions defined in [SHS].

It is advisable to keep the number of ciphersuites low to increase the chances clients can interoperate in a federated environment, therefore the ciphersuites only include modern, yet well-established algorithms. Depending on their requirements, clients can choose between two security levels (roughly 128-bit and 256-bit). Within the security levels clients can choose between faster X25519/X448 curves and FIPS 140-2 compliant curves for Diffie-Hellman key negotiations. Additionally clients that run predominantly on mobile processors can choose ChaCha20Poly1305 over AES-GCM for performance reasons. Since ChaCha20Poly1305 is not listed by FIPS 140-2 it is not paired with FIPS 140-2 compliant curves. The security level of symmetric encryption algorithms and hash functions is paired with the security level of the curves.

The mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite for MLS 1.0 is MLS10_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519 which uses Curve25519 for key exchange, AES-128-GCM for HPKE, HKDF over SHA2-256, and Ed25519 for signatures.

Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use.

New ciphersuite values are assigned by IANA as described in Section 16.

16.2. MLS Extension Types

This registry lists identifiers for extensions to the MLS protocol. The extension type field is two bytes wide, so valid extension type values are in the range 0x0000 to 0xffff.

Template:

* Value: The numeric value of the extension type
* Name: The name of the extension type
* Message(s): The messages in which the extension may appear, drawn from the following list:
  - KP: KeyPackage messages
- GC: GroupContext objects (and the group_context_extensions field of GroupInfo objects)
- GI: The other_extensions field of GroupInfo objects

* Recommended: Whether support for this extension is recommended by the IETF MLS WG. Valid values are "Y" and "N". The "Recommended" column is assigned a value of "N" unless explicitly requested, and adding a value with a "Recommended" value of "Y" requires Standards Action [RFC8126]. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Y->N transition.

* Reference: The document where this extension is defined

Initial contents:

| Value    | Name            | Message(s) | Recommended | Reference |
|----------+-----------------+------------+-------------+-----------|
| 0x0000   | RESERVED        | N/A        | N/A         | RFC XXXX  |
| 0x0001   | capabilities    | KP         | Y           | RFC XXXX  |
| 0x0002   | lifetime        | KP         | Y           | RFC XXXX  |
| 0x0003   | external_key_id | KP         | Y           | RFC XXXX  |
| 0x0004   | parent_hash     | KP         | Y           | RFC XXXX  |
| 0x0005   | ratchet_tree    | GI         | Y           | RFC XXXX  |
| 0xff00   | Reserved for    | N/A        | N/A         | RFC XXXX  |
| -        | Private Use     |            |             |           |
| 0xffff   |                 |            |             |           |

Table 6

16.3. MLS Proposal Types

This registry lists identifiers for types of proposals that can be made for changes to an MLS group. The extension type field is two bytes wide, so valid extension type values are in the range 0x0000 to 0xffff.

Template:

* Value: The numeric value of the proposal type
* Name: The name of the proposal type

* Recommended: Whether support for this extension is recommended by the IETF MLS WG. Valid values are "Y" and "N". The "Recommended" column is assigned a value of "N" unless explicitly requested, and adding a value with a "Recommended" value of "Y" requires Standards Action [RFC8126]. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Y->N transition.

* Reference: The document where this extension is defined

Initial contents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>add</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>update</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>remove</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>psk</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0005</td>
<td>reinit</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0006</td>
<td>external_init</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0007</td>
<td>app_ack</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0008</td>
<td>group_context_extensions</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xff00 - 0xffff</td>
<td>Reserved for Private Use</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

16.4. MLS Credential Types

This registry lists identifiers for types of credentials that can be used for authentication in the MLS protocol. The credential type field is two bytes wide, so valid credential type values are in the range 0x0000 to 0xffff.
* Value: The numeric value of the credential type

* Name: The name of the credential type

* Recommended: Whether support for this credential is recommended by the IETF MLS WG. Valid values are "Y" and "N". The "Recommended" column is assigned a value of "N" unless explicitly requested, and adding a value with a "Recommended" value of "Y" requires Standards Action [RFC8126]. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Y->N transition.

* Reference: The document where this credential is defined

Initial contents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>basic</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>x509</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xff00 - 0xffff</td>
<td>Reserved for Private Use</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8

16.5. MLS Designated Expert Pool

Specification Required [RFC8126] registry requests are registered after a three-week review period on the MLS DEs’ mailing list: mls-reg-review@ietf.org (mailto:mls-reg-review@ietf.org), on the advice of one or more of the MLS DEs. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the MLS DEs may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.

Registration requests sent to the MLS DEs mailing list for review SHOULD use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register value in MLS Bar registry").
Within the review period, the MLS DEs will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the MLS DEs mailing list and IANA. Denials SHOULD include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG’s attention for resolution using the iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org) mailing list.

Criteria that SHOULD be applied by the MLS DEs includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear. For example, the MLS DEs will apply the ciphersuite-related advisory found in Section 6.1.

IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the MLS DEs and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the MLS DEs’ mailing list.

It is suggested that multiple MLS DEs be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular MLS DE, that MLS DE SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other MLS DEs.

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18. References

18.1. Normative References


18.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Tree Math

One benefit of using left-balanced trees is that they admit a simple flat array representation. In this representation, leaf nodes are even-numbered nodes, with the n-th leaf at 2*n. Intermediate nodes are held in odd-numbered nodes. For example, an 11-element tree has the following structure:

```
X
X
X X X X X X X X X X
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
```

This allows us to compute relationships between tree nodes simply by manipulating indices, rather than having to maintain complicated structures in memory, even for partial trees. The basic rule is that the high-order bits of parent and child nodes have the following relation (where x is an arbitrary bit string):

parent=01x => left=00x, right=10x
The following python code demonstrates the tree computations
necessary for MLS. Test vectors can be derived from the diagram
above.

# The exponent of the largest power of 2 less than x. Equivalent to:
#   int(math.floor(math.log(x, 2))
def log2(x):
    if x == 0:
        return 0
    k = 0
    while (x >> k) > 0:
        k += 1
    return k-1

# The level of a node in the tree. Leaves are level 0, their parents are
# level 1, etc. If a node’s children are at different levels, then its
# level is the max level of its children plus one.
def level(x):
    if x & 0x01 == 0:
        return 0
    k = 0
    while ((x >> k) & 0x01) == 1:
        k += 1
    return k

# The number of nodes needed to represent a tree with n leaves.
def node_width(n):
    if n == 0:
        return 0
    else:
        return 2*(n - 1) + 1

# The index of the root node of a tree with n leaves.
def root(n):
    w = node_width(n)
    return (1 << log2(w)) - 1

# The left child of an intermediate node. Note that because the tree is
# left-balanced, there is no dependency on the size of the tree.
def left(x):
    k = level(x)
    if k == 0:
        raise Exception('leaf node has no children')
    return x ^ (0x01 << (k - 1))
# The right child of an intermediate node. Depends on the number of
# leaves because the straightforward calculation can take you beyond the
# edge of the tree.
def right(x, n):
    k = level(x)
    if k == 0:
        raise Exception('leaf node has no children')
    r = x ^ (0x03 << (k - 1))
    while r >= node_width(n):
        r = left(r)
    return r

# The immediate parent of a node. May be beyond the right edge of the
# tree.
def parent_step(x):
    k = level(x)
    b = (x >> (k + 1)) & 0x01
    return (x | (1 << k)) ^ (b << (k + 1))

# The parent of a node. As with the right child calculation, we have to
# walk back until the parent is within the range of the tree.
def parent(x, n):
    if x == root(n):
        raise Exception('root node has no parent')
    p = parent_step(x)
    while p >= node_width(n):
        p = parent_step(p)
    return p

# The other child of the node’s parent.
def sibling(x, n):
    p = parent(x, n)
    if x < p:
        return right(p, n)
    else:
        return left(p)

# The direct path of a node, ordered from leaf to root.
def direct_path(x, n):
    r = root(n)
    if x == r:
        return []
    d = []
    while x != r:
        x = parent(x, n)
d.append(x)
return d

# The copath of a node, ordered from leaf to root.
def copath(x, n):
    if x == root(n):
        return []

d = direct_path(x, n)
d.insert(0, x)
d.pop()
return [sibling(y, n) for y in d]

# The common ancestor of two nodes is the lowest node that is in the
direct paths of both leaves.
def common_ancestor_semantic(x, y, n):
    dx = set([x]) | set(direct_path(x, n))
    dy = set([y]) | set(direct_path(y, n))
    dxy = dx & dy
    if len(dxy) == 0:
        raise Exception('failed to find common ancestor')
    return min(dxy, key=level)

# The common ancestor of two nodes is the lowest node that is in the
direct paths of both leaves.
def common_ancestor_direct(x, y, _):
    # Handle cases where one is an ancestor of the other
    lx, ly = level(x)+1, level(y)+1
    if (lx <= ly) and (x>>ly == y>>ly):
        return y
    elif (ly <= lx) and (x>>lx == y>>lx):
        return x
    # Handle other cases
    xn, yn = x, y
    k = 0
    while xn != yn:
        xn, yn = xn >> 1, yn >> 1
        k += 1
    return (xn << k) + (1 << (k-1)) - 1

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