# draft-friel-acme-subdomains-04

Friel, Barnes	Cisco
Hollebeek	DigiCert
Richardson	Sandelman Software Works

#### Sub-domain certificates

- ACME (RFC 8555) allows an ACME server to issue certificates for a given identifier (e.g. a subdomain) without requiring a challenge to be explicitly fulfilled against that identifier
- For example, an ACME server could issue a certificate for foo.bar.example.com where the ACME client has only fulfilled a challenge for bar.example.com or example.com
- An ACME server could issue certificates for a number of sub-domain certificates and only require a single challenge to be fulfilled against the parent domain
  - Scale benefits when issuing a large number of end entity certificates
- ACME for subdomains may optionally be used with pre-authorizations but preauthorizations are not required

### Changes in -04 since IETF109

- Incorporates mailer feedback on -03
- Restricts challenge type to "dns-01" for subdomains
  - i.e. "dns-01" challenge must be fulfilled against a parent Authorized Domain Name in order to issue certs for a subdomain identifier
- Incorporates proposals to address 2 Open Items

## Open Items 1

**Open Item:** Does the **client** need a mechanism to indicate that they want to authorize a parent domain and not the explicit subdomain identifier? Or a mechanism to indicate that they are happy to authorize against a choice of identifiers?

E.g. for foo.bar.example.com, should the client be able to specify anywhere from 1 to 3 identifiers they are willing to fulfill challenges for?

**Mailer discussion:** Want to avoid server issuing challenges that the client is unable to fulfil e.g. client does not have DNT TXT control over parent ADN.

**Proposal:** Include an optional "parentDomainAuthorization" boolean flag with newOrder/newAuthz "identifiers" indicating if the client has control over all parent ADNs.

If true: the server may issue a challenge against the identifier FQDN or any parent ADN

If false: the server must only issue a challenge against the identifier FQDN

```
{
    "identifiers": [
        { "type": "dns", "value": "foo.bar.example.org", "parentDomainAuthorization": true } In this examp
    ],
        "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:04:00+04:00",
        "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00"
}
```

In this example, client indicates it can fulfill challenges against foo.bar.example.com, bar.example.com and example.com

## Follow on to Open Item 1 Proposal

- Is "parentDomainAuthorization" boolean flag granular enough? Is there any need for a client to be able to specify a subset of parent ADNs it has control over?
  - e.g. if a client wants a cert for "foo.bar.example.org" and has control over "bar.example.org" but not "example.org"
  - Could include an array of ADNs that client has control over in newAuthz/newOrder requests
  - Is this necessary? Draft -04 says "parentDomainAuthorization" is sufficient...

```
{
    [
    [
        [ dentifiers": [
        [ "identifiers": [
        [ "type": "dns", "value": "foo.bar.example.org", "parentDomainAuthorization": true }
    VS.
    [
        [ "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:04:00+04:00",
        "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00"
    }
}

// US.

{
    [
        [ "identifiers": [
        [ "type": "dns",
        "value": "foo.bar.example.org",
        "bar.example.org",
        "bar.example.org",
        "bar.example.org",
        "bar.example.org",
        "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00",
        "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00",
        "notBefore": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00",
        "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:04:00+04:00",
        "no
```

#### Open Items 2

**Open Item:** Does the **server** need a mechanism to provide a choice of identifiers to the client and let the client chose which challenge to fulfil?

E.g. for foo1.foo2.bar.example.com, should the server be able to specify anywhere from 1 to 4 identifiers that the client can pick from to fulfil?

**Mailer Discussion:** Not needed and makes server state machine and tracking too complex. It is sufficient for client to be able to signal the identifiers that it can fulfill challenges against.

**Proposal:** No provision in draft for this. Clarifying statements added that if client indicates "parentDomainAuthorization" true, then server policy controls which identifier to issue challenge against.

#### Next steps

- Open item proposals review
- Draft -04 review
- Adoption?