

Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) using Prime-Order Groups

Alex Davidson, *Armando Faz Hernández*, Nick Sullivan, Christopher Wood
draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf@ietf.org

Sources: github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf

Data Tracker: datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf

OPRF: Oblivious Pseudorandom Function

Two-party 1-RRT protocol between a server and a client

Client holds some input x

Server holds a private key k

$$y = \text{PRF}(k, x)$$

Oblivious

Client learns y ,
but nothing about k .

Server does not learn
anything about x or y .

Verifiable

Client verifies proof that
PRF was computed with k .

Server commits to the
key k , and gives a proof.

Issue #219 Folding Unblind into Finalize API

Finalize uses Unblind as a subroutine, no intermediate values are exposed

Issue #226 Removed the info parameter

Domain separation must now be provided as part of the input

Issue #239 Updates on proof generation

Improved interface for DLEQ proof of knowledge

Issue #234: Use SHAKE-256 for Decaf group

Implementations of Curve448 are likely accompanied by SHAKE

Issue #225: “Weakly” Verifiable construction without NIZK proofs

- Construction 4 eprint.iacr.org/2020/072
- No explicit proof is transmitted
- Only client-side changes (server does $R = k * T_0$)

$$\begin{array}{l} T_0 = \underline{r} * [H(x)] \\ T_1 = (1/\underline{r}) * R \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} T_0 = \underline{r} * [H(x) - \underline{s} * G] \\ T_1 = (1/\underline{r}) * R + \underline{s} * K_{\text{pub}} \end{array}$$

- Verify a linear combination of tokens at the cost of one issuance operation

Unsafe blinding (eprint.iacr.org/2021/273)

Let G be a group in multiplicative (additive) notation

- Exponential (multiplicative) blinding is safe
- Some uses of multiplicative (additive) blinding are unsafe

Questions?

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Issues: github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf/issues