

Deterministic Requests: Cacheable OSCORE

`draft-amsuess-core-cachable-oscore`

Christian Amsüss, Marco Tiloca

2021-03-08, IETF 110

Why caching?

- ▶ Reduce traffic

Firmware updates

- ▶ Hide traffic

Firmware updates, again

- ▶ Increase reliability

- ▶ Decrease latency

- ▶ Makes multicast-notifications work¹

Make protected case as simple as unprotected case

¹It works without Deterministic Requests. It works *better* with.

Why is this hard in (even Group) OSCORE

POST / 2.01 }
Different PIVs } uncacheable

Original KID / PIV unknown }
Foreign KID request is untrusted² } unverifiable

²It'd be a pity if someone requested `/whom-i-know`, but handed you a different request for `/whom-to-trust`

Proposed mechanism⁴

- ▶ Dedicated group member: Deterministic Client
- ▶ Request-Hash option: Hash of DC sender key || external AAD || plaintext
- ▶ “Pairwise” sender key of DC derived from DC sender key and Request-Hash³
- ▶ Server recognizes DC as requester, builds recipient key from Request-Hash, verifies Request-Hash
- ▶ Response bound to request using external AAD (%)

³Details pending processing of received comments

⁴including sneak peek at -02

~~Overriding the Request KID Context~~

- ▶ Request-Hash as an option in the response
- ▶ Request-Hash is Class I for responses
- ▶ Request-Hash may be elided from response on the wire transmission but is reconstructed by recipient before OSCORE processing

Limitations

- ▶ Only safe requests (GET, FETCH)
- ▶ Only resources every group member may access this way
- ▶ Algorithms limited to those doing AEAD deterministically
Currently, all are.
- ▶ Security properties traded for cacheability
 - ▶ No order between request and response
 - ▶ Limited request confidentiality
 - ▶ No source authentication
 - ▶ No replay protection

Status

- ▶ Two implementations interop'd at version between -01 and -02
The things you learn...
- ▶ Addressing pending comments on security.
Then: review with security in mind.
- ▶ Practical testing
- ▶ Further WG input?