### SRv6 Midpoint Protection draft-chen-rtgwg-srv6-midpoint-protection-03

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## Outline

- Motivations and Goals
- SRv6 midpoint protection mechanism
- Security Considerations
- Q&A
- Next Steps

## **Motivations and Goals**

#### Motivations

- Scenario: When an SRv6 Policy Endpoint is failed, the existing FRR mechanism cannot be used to restore the reachability;
- Requirement: SRv6 E2E protection could work, but a simpler and faster local repair mechanism is also requested;
- Existing work: The mechanism defined in [draft-ietf-spring-segment-protection-sr-tepaths-00] is able to provide endpoint protection for SR MPLS endpoint protection;

**Goals:** This document introduces a SRv6 proxy forwarding mechanism: when an SRv6 endpoint fails, an SRv6 proxy forwarding node can replace the failed endpoint to perform SRv6 end function.

# **SRv6 midpoint protection mechanism**

#### Mechanism:

• If the Repair Node is adjacent to the failed Endpoint: the node executes the following proxy forwarding behavior to perform the end function and replace the

failed node:

```
IF the primary outbound interface used to forward the packet failed
IF NH = SRH && SL != 0, and
    the failed endpoint is directly connected to the Repair Node THEN
    SL decreases*; update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL];
    FIB lookup on the updated DA;
    forward the packet according to the matched entry;
ELSE
    forward the packet according to the backup nexthop;
```

• If the Repair Node is remote to the failed Endpoint : FIB miss happens in the

remote node after IGP convergence, and the node executes the following proxy

forwarding behavior to perform the end function and replace the failed node:

```
ELSE // there is no FIB entry for forwarding the packet
IF NH = SRH && SL != 0 THEN
SL decreases*; update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL];
FIB lookup on the updated DA;
forward the packet according to the matched entry;
ELSE
drop the packet;
```

# **Security Considerations**

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- Scenario #1: The PLR node and the failed node must belong to the same trusted domain.
  - Trusted domain is identified by same SRv6 SID block as defined in RFC 8986
- Scenario #2: A mechanism is requested to ensure that security-related segments (or other important functions) cannot be bypassed. Refer to [draft-li-rtgwgenhanced-ti-lfa-03]



**Question 1:** How to differentiate the condition the route is node down vs. link down?

• link failure and node failure are both treated as node failure, just as FRR mechanism;

**Question 2:** What about the function supposed to be executed at node E?

• The proxy behavior is for path repair which guarantees the reachability and other functions can't be agented. So only end function is executed;

**Question 3:** Could TE path be changed when doing protection?

 Middle point protection is for temporary reachability repair when failure happens in the TE path; If SLA of the TE path is supposed to be guaranteed during the protection process, E2E protection could be considered;

## **Next Steps**

- Comments and questions are welcome
- Ready for WG adoption

# **Thanks!**