STIR for Messaging

IETF **110**

STIR WG

Prague, from afar – Mar 2021

J Peterson

draft-peterson-stir-messaging

- A draft about leveraging STIR for text and multimedia instant messaging services
  - Helpful for those that use telephone numbers as identifiers, specifically for the originator of messages
    - For the moment, that's a scope restriction of the draft
- Why?
  - Message spam is a problem, and while email-style content analysis helps, it doesn't help for encrypted messaging
  - STIR certificates bestow authority for communication from a TN
    - Would make little sense to develop a separate PKI for messaging from telephone numbers
- The big question: who would use this?

Is there really a problem?

- Some reports that text-message spam isn't a problem
  - I don't know about anyone else, but I get plenty
  - Here's an example from yesterday
    - Not the first time I've gotten this particular spam, even
- Other mitigation strategies exist
  - But STIR still can play a part



Is it in scope of STIR?

- As I said on the list, once “mky” was in scope, binding PASSporTs to media security became part of STIR
  - Differences between “mky” for DTLS/SRTP vs. MSRPoTLS are very unclear to me
    - “msgi” as well draws on the precedent of “rcdi”
      - Both deliver an immediate text/graphic message to users
- So, do we think there’s a material difference here?

Integrity over messages

- Some reluctance to open the can of worms about different integrity for different message formats
  - SMPP, email-style MMS, others
- Can we just do MIME-level security?
  - Yes, provided everything we want to cover is just MIME…
- Has some interaction with whether we want to do OOB
  - As Ben's recent mail to the list suggested

Next Steps

- No shortage of open issues, but this is really a draft asking if we want to explore STIR for messaging
- Had some review, more welcome
  - Do we need work in this space?
    - If so, where do we set the scope?

- Adoption?