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DCCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses
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Abstract

DCCP communication is currently restricted to a single path per connection, yet multiple paths often exist between peers. The simultaneous use of these multiple paths for a DCCP session could improve resource usage within the network and, thus, improve user experience through higher throughput and improved resilience to network failures. Use cases for a Multipath DCCP (MP-DCCP) are mobile devices (handsets, vehicles) and residential home gateways simultaneously connected to distinct paths as, e.g., a cellular link and a WiFi link or to a mobile radio station and a fixed access network. Compared to existing multipath protocols such as MPTCP, MP-DCCP provides specific support for non-TCP user traffic as UDP or plain IP. More details on potential use cases are provided in [website], [slide] and [paper]. All these use cases profit from an Open Source Linux reference implementation provided under [website].

This document presents a set of extensions to traditional DCCP to support multipath operation. Multipath DCCP provides the ability to simultaneously use multiple paths between peers. The protocol offers the same type of service to applications as DCCP and it provides the components necessary to establish and use multiple DCCP flows across potentially disjoint paths.

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1. Introduction

Multipath DCCP (MP-DCCP) is a set of extensions to regular DCCP [RFC4340], i.e. the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol denoting a transport protocol that provides bidirectional unicast connections of congestion-controlled unreliable datagrams. A multipath extension to DCCP enables the transport of user data across multiple paths simultaneously. This is beneficial to applications that transfer fairly large amounts of data, due to the possibility to aggregate capacity of the multiple paths. In addition, it enables to tradeoff timeliness and reliability, which is important for low latency applications that do not require guaranteed delivery services such as Audio/Video streaming. DCCP multipath operation is suggested in the context of ongoing 3GPP work on 5G multi-access solutions [I-D.amend-tsvwg-multipath-framework-mpdccp] and for hybrid access networks [I-D.lhwxyz-hybrid-access-network-architecture][I-D.muley-net-work-based-bonding-hybrid-access]. It can be applied for load-balancing, seamless session handover, and aggregation purposes (referred to as ATSSS; Access steering, switching, and splitting in 3GPP terminology [TS23.501]).

This document presents the protocol changes required to add multipath capability to DCCP; specifically, those for signaling and setting up multiple paths ("subflows"), managing these subflows, re-assembly of data, and termination of sessions. DCCP, as stated in [RFC4340] does not provide reliable and ordered delivery. Consequently, multiple application subflows may be multiplexed over a single DCCP connection with no inherent performance penalty for flows that do not require in-ordered delivery. DCCP does not provide built-in support for those multiple application subflows.

In the following, use of the term subflow will refer to physical separate DCCP subflows transmitted via different paths, but not to application subflows. Application subflows are differing content-wise by source and destination port per application as, for example, enabled by Service Codes introduced to DCCP in [RFC5595], and those subflows can be multiplexed over a single DCCP connection. For sake of consistency we assume that only a single application is served by a DCCP connection here as shown in Figure 1 while use of that feature should not impact DCCP operation on each single path as noted in ([RFC5595], sect. 2.4).

1.1. Multipath DCCP in the Networking Stack

MP-DCCP operates at the transport layer and aims to be transparent to both higher and lower layers. It is a set of additional features on top of standard DCCP; Figure 1 illustrates this layering. MP-DCCP is designed to be used by applications in the same way as DCCP with no changes to the application itself.




Figure 1: Comparison of Standard DCCP and MP-DCCP Protocol Stacks

1.2. Terminology

Throughout this document we make use of terms that are either specific for multipath transport or are defined in the context of MP-DCCP, similar to [RFC8684], as follows:

Path: A sequence of links between a sender and a receiver, defined in this context by a 4-tuple of source and destination address/ port pairs.

Subflow: A flow of DCCP segments operating over an individual path, which forms part of a larger MP-DCCP connection. A subflow is started and terminated similar to a regular (single-path) DCCP connection.

(MP-DCCP) Connection: A set of one or more subflows, over which an application can communicate between two hosts. There is a one-to-one mapping between a connection and an application socket.

Token: A locally unique identifier given to a multipath connection by a host. May also be referred to as a "Connection ID".

Host: An end host operating an MP-DCCP implementation, and either initiating or accepting an MP-DCCP connection. In addition to these terms, within framework of MP-DCCP the interpretation of, and effect on, regular single-path DCCP semantics is discussed in Section 3.

1.3. MP-DCCP Concept




Figure 2: Example MP-DCCP Usage Scenario

1.4. Differences from Multipath TCP

Multipath DCCP is similar to Multipath TCP [RFC8684], in that it extends the related basic DCCP transport protocol [RFC4340] with multipath capabilities in the same way as Multipath TCP extends TCP [RFC0793]. However, because of the differences between the underlying TCP and DCCP protocols, the transport characteristics of MPTCP and MP-DCCP are different.

Table 1 compares the protocol characteristics of TCP and DCCP, which are by nature inherited by their respective multipath extensions. A major difference lies in the delivery of payload, which is for TCP an exact copy of the generated byte-stream. DCCP behaves in a different way and does not guarantee to deliver any payload nor the order of delivery. Since this is mainly affecting the receiving endpoint of a TCP or DCCP communication, many similarities on the sender side can be identified. Both transport protocols share the 3-way initiation of a communication and both employ congestion control to adapt the sending rate to the path characteristics.

Feature	TCP	DCCP
Full-Duplex	yes	yes
Connection-Oriented	yes	yes
Header option space	40 bytes	< 1008 bytes or PMTU
Data transfer	reliable	unreliable
Packet-loss handling	re-transmission	report only
Ordered data delivery	yes	no
Sequence numbers	one per byte	one per PDU
Flow control	yes	no
Congestion control	yes	yes
ECN support	yes	yes
Selective ACK	yes	depends on congestion control
Fix message boundaries	no	yes
Path MTU discovery	yes	yes
Fragmentation	yes	no
SYN flood protection	yes	no
Half-open connections	yes	no

Table 1: TCP and DCCP protocol comparison

Consequently, the multipath features, shown in Table 2, are the same, supporting volatile paths having varying capacity and latency, session handover and path aggregation capabilities. All of them profit by the existence of congestion control.

Feature	MPTCP	MP-DCCP
Volatile paths	yes	yes
Session handover	yes	yes
Path aggregation	yes	yes
Robust session establishment	no	yes
Data re-assembly	yes	optional / modular
Expandability	limited by TCP header	flexible

Table 2: MPTCP and MP-DCCP protocol comparison

Therefore, the sender logic is not much different between MP-DCCP and MPTCP, even if the multipath session initiation differs. MP-DCCP inherits a robust session establishment feature, which guarantees communication establishment if at least one functional path is available. MPTCP relies on an initial path, which has to work; otherwise no communication can be established.

The receiver side for MP-DCCP has to deal with the unreliable transport character of DCCP and a possible re-assembly of the data stream while not advocating it. As many unreliable applications have built-in application support for reordering (such as adaptive audio and video buffers), those applications might not need support for re-assembly. However, for applications that benefit from partial or full support of reordering, MP-DCCP can provide flexible support for re-assembly, even if for DCCP the order of delivery is unreliable by nature. Such optional re-assembly mechanisms may account for the fact that packet loss may occur for any of the DCCP subflows. Another issue may occur as packet reordering may happen when the different DCCP subflows are routed across paths with different latencies. In theory, applications using DCCP are aware that packet reordering might happen, since DCCP has no mechanisms to prevent it.

The receiving process for MPTCP is on the other hand a rigid "just wait" approach, since TCP guarantees reliable delivery.

1.5. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Operation Overview

RFC 4340 states that some applications might want to share congestion control state among multiple DCCP flows between same source and destination addresses. This functionality could be provided by the Congestion Manager (CM) [RFC3124], a generic multiplexing facility. However, the CM would not fully support MP-DCCP without change; it does not gracefully handle multiple congestion control mechanisms, for example.

The operation of MP-DCCP for data transfer takes one input data stream from an application, and splits it into one or more subflows, with sufficient control information to allow received data to be re-assembled and delivered in order to the recipient application. The following subsections define this behavior in detail.

The Multipath Capability for MP-DCCP can be negotiated with a new DCCP feature, as described in Section 3. Once negotiated, all subsequent MP-DCCP operations are signalled with a variable length multipath-related option, as described in Section 3.1.

3. MP-DCCP Protocol

The DCCP protocol feature list ([RFC4340] section 6.4) will be enhanced by a new Multipath related feature with Feature number 10, as shown in Table 3.

Number	Meaning	Rule	Rec'n Value	Initial Req'd
0	Reserved			
1	Congestion Control ID (CCID)	SP	2	Y
2	Allow Short Seqnos	SP	0	Y
3	Sequence Window	NN	100	Y
4	ECN Incapable	SP	0	N
5	Ack Ratio	NN	2	N
6	Send Ack Vector	SP	0	N
7	Send NDP Count	SP	0	N
8	Minimum Checksum Coverage	SP	0	N
9	Check Data Checksum	SP	0	N
10	Multipath Capable	SP	0	N
11-127	Reserved			
128-255	CCID-specific features			

Table 3: Proposed Feature Set

The DCCP protocol options as defined in ([RFC4340] section 5.8) and ([RFC5634] section 2.2.1) will be enhanced by a new Multipath related variable-length option with option type 46, as shown in Table 4.

Type	Option Length	Meaning	DCCP-Data?
0	1	Padding	Y
1	1	Mandatory	N
2	1	Slow Receiver	Y
3-31	1	Reserved	
32	variable	Change L	N
33	variable	Confirm L	N
34	variable	Change R	N
35	variable	Confirm R	N
36	variable	Init Cookie	N
37	3-8	NDP Count	Y
38	variable	Ack Vector [Nonce 0]	N
39	variable	Ack Vector [Nonce 1]	N
40	variable	Data Dropped	N
41	6	Timestamp	Y
42	6/8/10	Timestamp Echo	Y
43	4/6	Elapsed Time	N
44	6	Data Checksum	Y
45	8	Quick-Start Response	?
46	variable	Multipath	Y
47-127	variable	Reserved	
128-255	variable	CCID-specific options	-

Table 4: Proposed Option Set

[Tbd/tbv] In addition to the multipath option, MP-DCCP requires particular considerations for:

- * The minimum PMTU of the individual paths must be announced to the application. Changes of individual path PMTUs must be re-announced to the application if they result in a value lower than the currently announced PMTU.
- * Overall sequencing for optional re-assembly procedure
- * Congestion control
- * Robust MP-DCCP session establishment (no dependency on an initial path setup)

3.1. Multipath Capable Feature

DCCP endpoints are multipath-disabled by default and multipath capability can be negotiated with the Multipath Capable Feature.

Multipath Capable has feature number 10 and is server-priority. It takes one-byte values. The first four bits are used to specify compatible versions of the MP-DCCP implementation. The following four bits are reserved for further use.

3.2. Multipath Option

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00101110| Length | MP_OPT | Value(s) ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=46

```

Type	Option Length	MP_OPT	Meaning
46	var	0 =MP_CONFIRM	Confirm reception and processing of an MP_OPT option
46	11	1 =MP_JOIN	Join path to an existing MP-DCCP flow
46	3	2 =MP_FAST_CLOSE	Close MP-DCCP flow
46	var	3 =MP_KEY	Exchange key material for MP_HMAC
46	7	4 =MP_SEQ	Multipath Sequence Number
46	23	5 =MP_HMAC	HMA Code for authentication
46	12	6 =MP_RTT	Transmit RTT values
46	var	7 =MP_ADDADDR	Advertise additional Address
46	var	8 =MP_REMOVEADDR	Remove Address
46	4	9 =MP_PRIO	Change Subflow Priority

Table 5: MP_OPT Option Types

3.2.1. MP_CONFIRM

00101110	Length	00000000	List of options ...
Type=46	MP_OPT=0		

MP_CONFIRM can be used to send confirmation of received and processed options. Confirmed options are copied verbatim and appended as List of options. The length varies dependent on the amount of options.

[Tbd] Encoding "list of options"

3.2.2. MP_JOIN

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00101110|00001011|00000001| Path Token |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Nonce |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=46 Length=11 MP_OPT=1

```

The MP_JOIN option is used to add a new path to an existing MP-DCCP flow. The Path Token is the SHA-1 HASH of the derived key (d-key), which was previously exchanged with the MP_KEY option. MP_HMAC MUST be set when using MP_JOIN to provide authentication (See MP_HMAC for details). Also MP_KEY MUST be set to provide key material for authentication purposes.

3.2.3. MP_FAST_CLOSE

```

+-----+-----+-----+
|00101110|00000011|00000010|
+-----+-----+-----+
Type=46 Length=3 MP_OPT=2

```

MP_FAST_CLOSE terminates the MP-DCCP flow and all corresponding subflows.

3.2.4. MP_KEY

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00101110| Length |00000011| Key Type | Key Data ... |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=46 MP_OPT=3

```

The MP_KEY suboption is used to exchange key material between hosts. The Length varies between 5 and 8 Bytes. The Key Type field is used to specify the key type. Key types are shown in Table 6.

Key Type	Key Length	Meaning
0 =Plain Text	8	Plain Text Key
1 =ECDHE-C25519-SHA256	32	ECDHE with SHA256 and Curve25519
2 =ECDHE-C25519-SHA512	32	ECDHE with SHA512 and Curve25519
3-255		Reserved

Table 6: MP_KEY Key Types

Plain Text

Key Material is exchanged in plain text between hosts, and the key parts (key-a, key-b) are used by each host to generate the derived key (d-key) by concatenating the two parts with the local key in front (e.g. hostA d-key=(key-a+key-b), hostB d-key=(key-b+key-a)).

ECDHE-SHA256-C25519

Key Material is exchanged via ECDHE key exchange with SHA256 and Curve 25519 to generate the derived key (d-key).

ECDHE-SHA512-C25519

Key Material is exchanged via ECDHE key exchange with SHA512 and Curve 25519 to generate the derived key (d-key).

3.2.5. MP_SEQ

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 00101110 | 00000111 | 00000100 | Multipath Sequence Number |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=46 Length=7 MP_OPT=4

```

The MP_SEQ option is used for end-to-end datagram-based sequence numbers of an MP-DCCP connection. The initial data sequence number (IDSN) SHOULD be set randomly. The MP_SEQ number space is different from path individual sequence number space.

3.2.6. MP_HMAC


```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 00101110 | 00001011 | 00000101 | HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes) ... |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=46 Length=23 MP_OPT=5

```

The MP_HMAC option is used to provide authentication for the MP_JOIN option. The HMAC is built using the derived key (d-key) calculated previously from the handshake key material exchanged with the MP_KEY option. The Message for the HMAC is the header of the MP_JOIN for which authentication shall be performed. By including a nonce in these datagrams, possible replay-attacks are remedied.

3.2.7. MP_RTT



The MP_RTT option is used to transmit RTT values in milliseconds and MUST belong to the path over which this information is transmitted. Additionally, the age of the measurement is specified in milliseconds.

Raw RTT (=0)

Raw RTT value of the last Datagram Round-Trip. The Age parameter is set to the age of when the Ack for the datagram was received.

Min RTT (=1)

Min RTT value. The period for computing the Minimum can be specified by the Age parameter.

Max RTT (=2)

Max RTT value. The period for computing the Maximum can be specified by the Age parameter.

Smooth RTT (=3)


Averaged RTT value. The period for computing the smoothed RTT can be specified by the Age parameter.

Age (=4)

The Age parameter is a 4-byte value which is set to the age or timestamp when the Ack for the datagram was received in case of RTT type = 0 and may contain the periods for computing of derived RTT values depending on other RTT types, i.e., the Minimum (=1) and Maximum (=2) as well as the averaged smoothed RTT value (=3). [TBD/TBV]

3.2.8. MP_ADDADDR

The MP_ADDADDR option announces additional addresses (and, optionally, ports) on which a host can be reached. This option can be used at any time during an existing DCCP connection, when the sender wishes to enable multiple paths and/or when additional paths become available. Length is variable depending on IPv4 or IPv6 and whether port number is used and is in range between 28 and 42 bytes.



Every address has an Address ID that can be used for uniquely identifying the address within a connection for address removal. The Address ID is also used to identify MP_JOIN options (see Section 3.2.2) relating to the same address, even when address translators are in use. The Address ID MUST uniquely identify the address for the sender of the option (within the scope of the connection); the mechanism for allocating such IDs is implementation specific.

All Address IDs learned via either MP_JOIN or ADD_ADDR SHOULD be stored by the receiver in a data structure that gathers all the Address-ID-to-address mappings for a connection (identified by a token pair). In this way, there is a stored mapping between the Address ID, observed source address, and token pair for future processing of control information for a connection.

Ideally, ADD_ADDR and REMOVE_ADDR options would be sent reliably, and in order, to the other end. This would ensure that this address management does not unnecessarily cause an outage in the connection when remove/add addresses are processed in reverse order, and also to ensure that all possible paths are used. Note, however, that losing

reliability and ordering will not break the multipath connections, it will just reduce the opportunity to open new paths and to survive different patterns of path failures.

Therefore, implementing reliability signals for these DCCP options is not necessary. In order to minimize the impact of the loss of these options, however, it is RECOMMENDED that a sender should send these options on all available subflows. If these options need to be received in order, an implementation SHOULD only send one ADD_ADDR/REMOVE_ADDR option per RTT, to minimize the risk of misordering. A host that receives an ADD_ADDR but finds a connection set up to that IP address and port number is unsuccessful SHOULD NOT perform further connection attempts to this address/port combination for this connection. A sender that wants to trigger a new incoming connection attempt on a previously advertised address/port combination can therefore refresh ADD_ADDR information by sending the option again.

[TBD/TBV]

3.2.9. MP_REMOVEADDR


If, during the lifetime of an MP-DCCP connection, a previously announced address becomes invalid (e.g., if the interface disappears), the affected host SHOULD announce this so that the peer can remove subflows related to this address.

This is achieved through the Remove Address (REMOVE_ADDR) option which will remove a previously added address (or list of addresses) from a connection and terminate any subflows currently using that address.

For security purposes, if a host receives a REMOVE_ADDR option, it must ensure the affected path(s) are no longer in use before it instigates closure. Typical DCCP validity tests on the subflow (e.g., packet type specific sequence and acknowledgement number check) MUST also be undertaken. An implementation can use indications of these test failures as part of intrusion detection or error logging.

The sending and receipt of this message SHOULD trigger the sending of DCCP-Close and DCCP-Reset by client and server, respectively on the affected subflow(s) (if possible), as a courtesy to cleaning up middlebox state, before cleaning up any local state.

Address removal is undertaken by ID, so as to permit the use of NATs and other middleboxes that rewrite source addresses. If there is no address at the requested ID, the receiver will silently ignore the request.




Minimum length of this option is 4 bytes (for one address to remove).

[TBD/TBV]

3.2.10. MP_PRIO

In the event that a single specific path out of the set of available paths shall be treated with higher priority compared to the others, a host may wish to signal such change in priority of subflows to the peer. Therefore, the MP_PRIO option, shown below, can be used to set a priority flag for the subflow on which it is sent.



Whether more than two values for priority (e.g., B for backup and P for prioritized path) are defined in case of more than two parallel paths is for further consideration.

[TBD/TBV]

3.3. MP-DCCP Handshaking Procedure




Figure 3: Example MP-DCCP Handshake

The basic initial handshake for the first flow is as follows:

- * Host A sends a DCCP-Request with the MP-Capable feature Change request and the MP_KEY option with Host-specific Key-A
- * Host B sends a DCCP-Response with Confirm feature for MP-Capable and the MP_Key option with Host-specific Key-B
- * Host A sends a DCCP-Ack with both Keys echoed to Host B.

The handshake for subsequent flows based on a successful initial handshake is as follows:

- * Host A sends a DCCP-Request with the MP-Capable feature Change request and the MP_JOIN option with Host B's Token TB, generated from the derived key by applying a SHA-1 hash and truncating to the first 32 bits. Additionally, an own random nonce RA is transmitted with the MP_JOIN.
- * Host B computes the HMAC of the DCCP-Request and sends a DCCP-Response with Confirm feature option for MP-Capable and the MP_JOIN option with the Token TB and a random nonce RB together with the computed MP_HMAC.

- * Host A sends a DCCP-Ack with the HMAC computed for the DCCP-Response.
- * Host B sends a DCCP-Ack confirm the HMAC and to conclude the handshaking.

4. Security Considerations

Similar to DCCP, MP-DCCP does not provide cryptographic security guarantees inherently. Thus, if applications need cryptographic security (integrity, authentication, confidentiality, access control, and anti-replay protection) the use of IPsec or some other kind of end-to-end security is recommended; Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711] is one candidate protocol for authentication. Together with Encryption of Header Extensions in SRTP, as provided by [RFC6904], also integrity would be provided.

As described in [RFC4340], DCCP provides protection against hijacking and limits the potential impact of some denial-of-service attacks, but DCCP provides no inherent protection against attackers' snooping on data packets. Regarding the security of MP-DCCP no additional risks should be introduced compared to regular DCCP of today. Thereof derived are the following key security requirements to be fulfilled by MP-DCCP:

- * Provide a mechanism to confirm that parties involved in a subflow handshake are identical to those in the original connection setup.
- * Provide verification that the new address to be included in a MP connection is valid for a peer to receive traffic at before using it.
- * Provide replay protection, i.e., ensure that a request to add/remove a subflow is 'fresh'.

In order to achieve these goals, MP-DCCP includes a hash-based handshake algorithm documented in Sections Section 3.2.4 and Section 3.3. The security of the MP-DCCP connection depends on the use of keys that are shared once at the start of the first subflow and are never sent again over the network. To ease demultiplexing while not giving away any cryptographic material, future subflows use a truncated cryptographic hash of this key as the connection identification "token". The keys are concatenated and used as keys for creating Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) used on subflow setup, in order to verify that the parties in the handshake are the same as in the original connection setup. It also provides verification that the peer can receive traffic at this new address. Replay attacks would still be possible when only keys are used;

therefore, the handshakes use single-use random numbers (nonces) at both ends -- this ensures that the HMAC will never be the same on two handshakes. Guidance on generating random numbers suitable for use as keys is given in [RFC4086]. During normal operation, regular DCCP protection mechanisms (such as header checksum to protect DCCP headers against corruption) will provide the same level of protection against attacks on individual DCCP subflows as exists for regular DCCP today.

5. Interactions with Middleboxes

Issues from interaction with on-path middleboxes such as NATs, firewalls, proxies, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), and others have to be considered for all extensions to standard protocols since otherwise unexpected reactions of middleboxes may hinder its deployment. DCCP already provides means to mitigate the potential impact of middleboxes, also in comparison to TCP (see [RFC4043], sect. 16). In case, however, both hosts are located behind a NAT or firewall entity, specific measures have to be applied such as the [RFC5596]-specified simultaneous-open technique that update the (traditionally asymmetric) connection-establishment procedures for DCCP. Further standardized technologies addressing NAT type middleboxes are covered by [RFC5597].

[RFC6773] specifies UDP Encapsulation for NAT Traversal of DCCP sessions, similar to other UDP encapsulations such as for SCTP [RFC6951]. The alternative U-DCCP approach proposed in [I-D.amend-tsvwg-dccp-udp-header-conversion] would reduce tunneling overhead. The handshaking procedure for DCCP-UDP header conversion or use of a DCCP-UDP negotiation procedure to signal support for DCCP-UDP header conversion would require encapsulation during the handshakes and use of two additional port numbers out of the UDP port number space, but would require zero overhead afterwards.

6. Implementation

The approach described above has been implemented in open source across different testbeds and a new scheduling algorithm has been extensively tested. Also demonstrations of a laboratory setup have been executed and have been published at [website].

7. Acknowledgments

1. Notes

This document is inspired by Multipath TCP [RFC6824]/[RFC8684] and some text passages for the -00 version of the draft are copied almost unmodified.

8. IANA Considerations

This document defines one new value to DCCP feature list and one new DCCP Option with ten corresponding Subtypes as follows. This document defines a new DCCP feature parameter for negotiating the support of multipath capability for DCCP sessions between hosts as described in Section 3. The following entry in Table 7 should be added to the "Feature Numbers Registry" according to [RFC4340], Section 19.4. under the "DCCP Protocol" heading.

Value	Feature Name	Specification
0x10	MP-DCCP capability feature	Section 3.1

Table 7: Addition to DCCP Feature list Entries

This document defines a new DCCP protocol option of type=46 as described in Section 3.2 together with 10 additional sub-options. The following entries in Table 8 should be added to the "DCCP Protocol options" and assigned as "MP-DCCP sub-options", respectively.

Value	Symbol	Name	Reference
TBD or Type=46	MP_OPT	DCCP Multipath option	Section 3.2
TBD or MP_OPT=0	MP_CONFIRM	Confirm reception/ processing of an MP_OPT option	Section 3.2.1
TBD or MP_OPT=1	MP_JOIN	Join path to existing MP-DCCP flow	Section 3.2.2
TBD or MP_OPT=2	MP_FAST_CLOSE	Close MP-DCCP flow	Section 3.2.3
TBD or MP_OPT=3	MP_KEY	Exchange key material for MP_HMAC	Section 3.2.4
TBD or MP_OPT=4	MP_SEQ	Multipath Sequence Number	Section 3.2.5
TBD or MP_OPT=5	MP_HMAC	Hash-based Message Auth. Code for MP- DCCP	Section 3.2.6
TBD or MP_OPT=6	MP_RTT	Transmit RTT values and calculation parameters	Section 3.2.7
TBD or MP_OPT=7	MP_ADDADDR	Advertise additional Address(es)/Port(s)	Section 3.2.8
TBD or MP_OPT=8	MP_REMOVEADDR	Remove Address(es)/ Port(s)	Section 3.2.9
TBD or MP_OPT=9	MP_PRIO	Change Subflow Priority	Section 3.2.10

Table 8: Addition to DCCP Protocol options and
corresponding sub-options

[Tbd], must include options for:

- * handshaking procedure to indicate MP support
- * handshaking procedure to indicate JOINING of an existing MP connection
- * signaling of new or changed addresses
- * setting handover or aggregation mode
- * setting reordering on/off

should include options carrying:

- * overall sequence number for restoring purposes
- * sender time measurements for restoring purposes
- * scheduler preferences
- * reordering preferences

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Considerations for Assigning a new Recommended DiffServ Codepoint (DSCP)
draft-custura-tsvwg-dscp-considerations-02

Abstract

This document discusses considerations for assigning a new recommended DiffServ Code Point (DSCP). It considers the common remarking behaviours that the Diffserv field might be subjected to along an Internet path. It also notes some implications of using a specific DSCP.

This individual draft aims to seek comments and contributions from the TSVWG working group.

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1. Introduction

The Differentiated Services (DiffServ) architecture has been deployed in many networks. It provides differentiated traffic forwarding

based on the value of the Diffserv field [RFC2474] carried in the IP packet header.

Internet traffic can be associated with a service class, and categorised into Behavior Aggregates [RFC4594]. In IP networks, these are associated with a DiffServ Code Point (DCSP) [RFC2474]. Each DSCP is mapped to a Per Hop Behaviour (PHB). A treatment aggregate is concerned only with the forwarding treatment of the aggregated traffic, which could be marked with multiple DSCPs [RFC5127]. Treatment differentiation can be realised using a variety of schedulers and queues, and also by algorithms that implement access to the physical media.




Figure showing the role of DSCPs in classifying IP traffic for differential network treatment.

This document discusses considerations for assigning a new DSCP. It considers some commonly observed DSCP remarking behaviours that might be expected to be experienced along an Internet path. It also notes some packet forwarding treatments that a packet can receive as a packet with a specific DSCP is forwarded across a link or subnetwork.

The document is motivated by new opportunities to use DiffServ end-to-end across multiple domains, such as [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-nqb], proposals to build mechanisms using DSCPs in other standards-setting organisations, and the desire to use a common set of DSCPs across a range of infrastructure (e.g., [RFC8622], [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-nqb], [I-D.learmonth-rfc1226-bis]).

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Current usage of DSCPs

This section describes current usage of DSCPs.

3.1. IP-Layer Semantics

The DiffServ architecture specifies use of the Diffserv field in the IPv4 and IPv6 packet headers to carry one of 64 distinct DSCP values. Within a given administrative boundary, each DSCP value can be mapped to a distinct PHB[RFC2474]. When a new PHB is standardized, a recommended DSCP value among those 64 values is normally reserved for that PHB.

The DSCP space is divided into three pools for the purpose of assignment and management [DSCP-registry]. The pools are defined in the following table (where 'x' refers to either a bit position with value '0' or '1').

DSCP Pool 1 A pool of 32 codepoints with a format 0bxxxxx0, to be assigned by IANA Standards Action [RFC8126].

DSCP Pool 2 A pool of 16 codepoints with a format 0bxxxx11, reserved for experimental or local (private) use by network operators (see sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [RFC8126]).

DSCP Pool 3 A pool of 16 codepoints with a 0bxxxx01. This was initially available for experimental or local use, but which was originally specified to be preferentially utilised for standardized assignments if Pool 1 is ever exhausted. Pool 3 codepoints are now utilised for standardized assignments and are no longer available for experimental or local use [RFC8436].

The DiffServ architecture allows forwarding treatments to be associated with each DSCP, and the RFC series describes some of these as PHBs. Although DSCPs are intended to identify specific treatment requirements, multiple DSCPs might also be mapped (aggregated) to the same forwarding treatment. Several IP standards map treatment aggregates to DSCPs, that might result in remarking: RFC5160 [RFC5160] suggests Meta-QoS-Classes to help enable deployment of standardized end-to-end QoS classes.

Note: A DSCP is sometimes referred to by name, such as "CS1", and sometimes by a decimal, hex, or binary value [DSCP-registry].

3.2. Network Control Traffic

Network Control Traffic is defined as packet flows that are essential for stable operation of the administered network (see [RFC4594], Section 3). This traffic is marked using a set of Class Selector (CS) DSCPs. Such network control traffic is often a special case within a provider network, and ingress traffic with these DSCP markings can be remarked.

DSCP CS2 is recommended for the OAM (Operations, Administration, and Maintenance) service class (see [RFC4594], Section 3.3).

The DSCP CS6 is recommended for local network control traffic. This includes routing protocols and OAM traffic that are essential to network operation administration, control and management. Section 3.2 of RFC4594 [RFC4594] recommends that "CS6 marked packet flows from untrusted sources (for example, end user devices) SHOULD be dropped or remarked at ingress to the DiffServ network".

DSCP CS7 is reserved for future use by network control traffic. "CS7 marked packets SHOULD NOT be sent across peering points" [RFC4594].

4. Remarking the DSCP

It is a feature of the DiffServ architecture that the Diffserv field of packets can be remarked at domain boundaries (see section 2.3.4.2 of RFC2475 [RFC2475]). A DSCP can be remarked at the ingress of a DiffServ domain. This can be with or without restoring the initial DSCP marking at the egress of the same domain. The Diffserv field can also be re-marked based upon common semantics and agreements between providers at an exchange point.

If packets are received that are marked with an unknown or an unexpected DSCP, RFC2474 [RFC2474] recommends forwarding the packet using a default (best effort) treatment, but without changing the DSCP. This seeks to support incremental DiffServ deployment in existing networks as well as preserving DSCP markings by routers that have not been configured to support DiffServ. (See also Section 4.3).

Reports measuring existing deployments have categorised DSCP remarking [Custura] [Barik] into the following five behaviours:

Bleach: bleaches all traffic (sets the DSCP to zero);

Bleach-ToS-Precedence: set the first three bits of the DSCP field to 0b000 (reset the 3 bits of the former ToS Precedence field) ;

Remark-ToS: set the first three bits of the DCSP field to any value different than 0b000 (replace the 3 bits of the former ToS Precedence field);

Bleach-low: set the last three bits of the DCSP field to 0b000;

Bleach-some-low: set the last three bits of the DSCP field to 0b000, unless the first two bits of the DSCP field are 0b11;

Remark: remarks all traffic to one or more particular (non-zero) DSCP values.

4.1. Bleaching the DSCP Field

A specific form of remarking occurs when the DiffServ field is re-assigned to the default treatment, CS0 (0x00). This results in traffic being forwarded using the BE PHB. For example, AF31 (0x1a) would be bleached to CS0.

Resetting all the bits of the DiffServ field to 0 is more prevalent at the edge of the network, and rather less common in core networks [Custura].

4.2. IP Type of Service manipulations

The IETF first defined ToS precedence for IP packets [RFC0791], updated by specification as a part of the ToS Field RFC1349 [RFC1349]. Since 1998, this practice has been deprecated by RFC2474 [RFC2474]. RFC 2474 defines codepoints 0x xxx000 as the Class Selector codepoints, where PHBs selected by these codepoints MUST meet the Class Selector PHB Requirements" described in Sec. 4.2.2.2 of that RFC.

However, practices based on ToS semantics have not yet been eliminated from Internet, and need to still be considered when making new DCSP assignments.

4.2.1. Impact of ToS Precedence Bleaching

ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) is a practice that resets to zero the upper 3 bits of the DSCP field (the former ToS Precedence field), leaving the lower bits unchanged (see section 4.2.1 of RFC2474 [RFC2474]). This behaviour is distinctive of non-DiffServ aware routers and one of the more common manipulations of the DiffServ field.

```

+--+--+--+--+
|0 0 0|x x x|
+--+--+--+--+

```

Figure showing the ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) pathology, based on Section 3 of RFC1349 [RFC1349].

If ToS Precedence Bleaching occurs, packets with a DSCP 'x' would be remarked and then would be treated according to the PHB specified for 'x' & 0x07. For example, AF31 (0x1a) would be remarked to DSCP 2 (0x02).

A variation of this behaviour clears the top three bits of a DSCP, unless these have values 0b110 or 0b111 (corresponding to the CS6 and CS7 codepoints). As a result, a DSCP value greater than 48 decimal (0x30) is less likely to be impacted by ToS Precedence Bleaching.

4.2.2. Impact of ToS Precedence Marking

Practices based on ToS Precedence Marking (/Remark-ToS/) RFC1349 [RFC1349] were deprecated by RFC2474 [RFC2474]. These practices based on ToS semantics have not yet been eliminated from deployed networks.

```

+--+--+--+--+
|0 0 1|x x x|
+--+--+--+--+

```

Figure showing the ToS Remarking (/Remark/) pathology, based on Section 3 of RFC1349 [RFC1349].

A less common behaviour, ToS precedence remarking sets the upper three bits of the DSCP field to a non-zero value corresponding to a CS PHB. This behaviour is distinctive of non-DiffServ aware routers.

If remarking occurs, packets are treated using the PHB specified for the resulting codepoint. For example, the AF31 DSCP (0x1a) could be remarked to either AF11 or AF21.

4.3. Remarking to a Particular DSCP

A network device might remark the Diffserv field of an IP packet based on a local policy with a specific (set of) DSCPs, /Remark/. This is sometimes performed using a Multi-Field (MF) classifier [RFC2475] [RFC3290] [RFC4594]. For example, a common behaviour is to mark all traffic to a single DSCP, thus removing any traffic

differentiation (see Section 4.1). Bleaching (/Bleach/) is a specific example of this that remarks to a zero codepoint.

In another example, some networks do not follow the recommendation in RFC2475 [RFC2475], and instead remark packets with an unknown or unexpected DSCP to the default class, CS0 (0x00) to ensure that appropriate DSCPs are used within a DiffServ domain. (e.g., see [RFC8100]).

5. Interpretation of the IP DSCP at Lower Layers

Transmission systems and subnetworks can, and do, utilise the Diffserv field in an IP packet to select a lower layer forwarding treatment. In many cases, this use is constrained by designs that utilise fewer than 6 bits to express the service class, and therefore infer mappings to a smaller L2 QoS field, for example, WiFi or Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS).

5.1. Mapping Specified for IEEE 802.11

<< This section is currently seeking more input. >>

A 3-bit Priority Code Point (PCP) is specified in the IEEE 802.1Q tag to mark Ethernet frames to one of eight priority values. The value zero indicates the default best effort treatment, and the value one indicates a background traffic class. The remaining values indicate increasing priority. Internet control traffic can be marked as six, and network control is marked as seven.

Section 6 of RFC 8325 [RFC8325] provides a brief overview of IEEE 802.11 QoS. The IEEE 802.11 standards [IEEE-802-11] provides MAC functions to support QoS in WLANs using Access Classes (AC). The upstream User Priority (UP) in the 802.11 header has a 3-bit QoS value. A DSCP can be mapped to the UP. Most existing WiFi implementations [RFC8325] use a default mapping that utilises the three most significant bits of the DiffServ Field to the 802.11 UP. This is then in turn mapped to the four WiFi Multimedia (WMM) Access Categories.

RFC 8325 [RFC8325] proposes several recommendations for mapping a DSCP to an IEEE 802.11 UP for wired-to-wireless interconnection. The DSCP value of a downstream IP packet can be used (e.g., the Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) protocol, RFC5415, maps an IP packet Diffserv field to the Diffserv field of outer IP header in a CAPWAP tunnel).

Some current constraints of WiFi mapping are discussed in section 2 of RFC 8325 [RFC8325]. A QoS profile can be used to limit the maximum DSCP value used for the upstream and downstream traffic.

```
+--+--+--+--+
|x x x|. . .|
+--+--+--+--+
```

Figure showing the DSCP bits commonly mapped to the UP in 802.11.

This UP mapping can result in a specific DSCP remarking pathology. In the upstream direction, some Access Points (APs) currently use a default UP-to-DSCP mapping RFC8325 [RFC8325], wherein "DSCP values are derived from the layer 2 UP values by multiplying the UP values by eight (i.e., shifting the three UP bits to the left and adding three additional zeros to generate a 6 bit DSCP value). This derived DSCP value is then used for QoS treatment between the wireless AP and the nearest classification and marking policy enforcement point (which may be the centralized wireless LAN controller, relatively deep within the network). Alternatively, in the case where there is no other classification and marking policy enforcement point, then this derived DSCP value will be used on the remainder of the Internet path." This behaviour can result in remarking /Reset-low/.

RFC8325 [RFC8325] notes inconsistencies that can result from such remarking, and recommends how to perform this remarking.

```
+--+--+--+--+
|x x x|0 0 0|
+--+--+--+--+
```

Figure showing the DSCP bits commonly mapped to the UP in 802.11.

5.2. Mappings Specified for MPLS

<< This section is currently seeking more input. >>

Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) specified eight MPLS Traffic Classes (TCs), which restricts the number of different treatments (e.g., see [RFC5129]). RFC 5127 describes aggregation of DiffServ TCs [RFC5127], and introduces four DiffServ Treatment Aggregates. Traffic marked with multiple DSCPs can be forwarded in a single MPLS TC.

5.2.1. Mappings Specified for MPLS Short Pipe

<< This section is currently seeking more input. >>

ITU-T Y.1566 [ITU-T-Y-1566] further defined a set of four common QoS classes and four auxiliary classes to which a DSCP can be mapped when interconnecting Ethernet, IP and MPLS networks. RFC8100 [RFC8100] proposes four treatment aggregates for interconnection with four defined DSCPs. This was motivated by the requirements of MPLS network operators that use Short-Pipe tunnels, but can be applicable to other networks, both MPLS and non-MPLS.

RFC8100 recommends preserving the notion of end-to-end service classes, and recommends that the original DSCP marking is not changed when treatment aggregates are used. The key requirement is that the DSCP at the network ingress is restored at the network egress. This is only feasible in general for a small number of DSCPs. In this design, packets marked with other DSCPs can be re-marked (This can result in the /Remark/ behaviour) or dealt with via an additional agreement(s) among the operators of the interconnected networks. Use of the MPLS Short Pipe Model favours re-marking unexpected DSCP values to zero in the absence of an additional agreement(s), as explained in RFC8100 [RFC8100]. This can result in the Bleaching (/Bleach/).

RFC8100 Agg. Class	PHB
Conversational	EF
Streaming	AF41
Interactive	AF31
(ordered by priority, AF3 highest)	AF32
	AF21
	AF11
Background	CS0

Figure showing the MPLS mapping from RFC 8100.

5.3. Mapping Specified for Mobile Networks

<< This section is currently seeking more input. >>

Mobile LTE and 5G standards have evolved from older UMTS standards, and are Diffserv aware. LTE (4G) and 5G standards [SA-5G] identify traffic classes at the interface between User Equipment (UE) and the mobile Packet Core; network by QCI (QoS Class Identifiers) and 5QI (5G QoS Identifier). The 3GPP standards do not define or recommend any specific mappings between each QCI or 5QI and Diffserv (and mobile QCIs are based on several criteria service class definitions). The way packets are mapped at the Packet Gateway (P-GW) boundary is determined by operators. However, TS 23.107 (version 16.0.0, applies to LTE and below) mandates that "Differentiated Services defined by IETF shall be used" to interoperate with IP backbone networks.

The GSM Association (GSMA) has defined four aggregated classes and seven associated PHBs in their guidelines for IPX Provider networks GSMA IR.34 [GSMA-IR-34]. This was previously specified as the Inter-Service Provider IP Backbone Guidelines, and provides a mobile ISP to ISP QoS mapping mechanism, and interconnection with other IP networks in the general Internet. This describes the case where the DSCP marking from a Service Provider cannot be trusted (depending on the agreement between the Service Provider and its IPX Provider), allowing the IPX Provider to correct the DSCP value to a static default value.

GSMA IR.34 Agg. Class	PHB
Conversational	EF
Streaming	AF41
Interactive	AF31
(ordered by priority, AF3 highest)	AF32
	AF21
	AF11
Background	CS0

Figure showing the PHB mapping from GSMA IR.34 [GSMA-IR-34].

5.4. Mappings Specified for Carrier Ethernet

<< This section is currently seeking more input on Metro Ethernet Forum mapping is currently incomplete. >>

Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) provides mappings of DSCP codepoints at the IP layer to quality of service markings in the Ethernet frame headers {{Ref to MEF23.1 ??}}.

5.5. Remarking as a Side-effect of Another Policy

The result of applying a QoS policy (such as matching the IP address, or traffic reaching a rate limit) could also result in a packet being remarked to a different DSCP (/Remark/) when it is not admitted to a service. Traffic marked with an EF and VA DSCP are often policed by such policies.

Policies and L2 procedures can also result in remarking traffic as a side-effect of other functions (e.g., in response to DDos).

5.6. Summary

<< This section might contain a summary table >>

6. Considerations for DSCP Selection

This section provides advice for the assignment of a new DSCP value. It identifies known issues that might influence the finally assigned DSCP, followed by a summary of considerations for assignment of a new DSCP.

6.1. Effect of Bleaching

New DSCP assignments should consider the impact of bleaching, which can limit the ability to provide the expected treatment end-to-end. This is particularly important for cases where the codepoint is intended to result in lower than best effort treatment, as was the case when defining the LE PHB [RFC8622]. In this case, bleaching, or remarking to "CS0" would result in elevating the lower effort traffic to the default class. This is an example of priority inversion.

6.2. Where the proposed DSCP > 0x07 (7)

Although the IETF specifications require systems to use DSCP marking semantics in place of methods based on the former ToS field, the current recommendation is that any new assignment where the codepoint is greater than 0x07 should consider the semantics associated with the resulting DSCP when ToS precedence bleaching is experienced. For

example, it can be desirable to avoid choosing a DSCP that could be remarked to LE, Lower Effort [RFC8622], which could otherwise potentially result in a priority inversion in the treatment.

6.3. Where the proposed DSCP < 0x07 (7)

ToS bleaching can unintentionally result in extra traffic aggregated to the same DSCP. For example, after experiencing ToS Bleaching, all traffic marked AF11, AF21, AF31 and AF41 would be aggregated with traffic marked with DSCP 2 (0x02), increasing the volume of traffic which receives the treatment associated with DSCP 2. New DiffServ codepoint assignments should consider unexpected consequences arising from ToS bleaching.

6.3.1. Where the proposed DSCP & 0x07=0x01

As a consequence of assigning the LE PHB [RFC8622], the IETF allocated the DSCP 000001b from Pool 3.

When making assignments where the DSCP has a format: xxx 001b, the case of ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) of a DSCP to a value of 0x01 needs to be considered. ToS Precedence Bleaching will result in demoting the traffic to the lower effort traffic class. Care should be taken to consider the implications that a DSCP in this category could be remarked as LE.

6.4. Impact on deployed infrastructure

Behaviour of deployed PHBs and conditioning treatments also needs to be considered when assigning a new DSCP. In some domains, a network operator can provide transparent transport of unknown or unassigned DSCPs across their domain. In other domains, policing can ensure that only traffic that matches a policy is permitted to use a specific DSCP (e.g., as in MPLS TC).

6.5. Questions to guide discussion of a proposed new DSCP

A series of questions emerge that need to be answered when considering a proposal to the IETF that requests a new assignment. These questions include:

- o How is the proposed service class characterised? - What are the characteristics of the traffic to be carried? What are the expectations for treatment?
- o Service Classes that can utilise existing PHBs should use assigned DSCPs to mark their traffic: Could the request be met by using an

existing IETF DSCP? How would the proposed new DSCP be used to map traffic to a new or existing PHB?

- o Diffserv domains can use the codepoints in Pool 2 for local or experimental use, without any IETF specification for the DSCP or associated PHB: Could the request be met by using a DSCP chosen from Pool 2?
- o This documents describes some observed marking behaviors (see also below): What is the expected effect of currently-deployed remarking on the end-to-end service?
- o Many DiffServ domains support only a small number of treatment aggregates: What are the effects of treatment aggregation on the proposed method?
- o This documents describes some observed treatments by layers below IP: What are the implications of using the proposed DSCP on the expected lower layers over which the traffic may be forwarded?

If approved, new IETF assignments are normally made by IANA in Pool 1, but the IETF can request assignments to be made from Pool 3 [RFC8436].

XXX Note: Is it possible to assign a DSCP without defining a new PHB?

7. Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the helpful discussions and analysis by Greg White and Thomas Fossati in a draft concerning NQB. We look forward to further comments and review.

8. IANA Considerations

This memo provides information to assist in considering new assignments to the IANA DSCP registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xhtml>).

This memo includes no request to IANA, or update to the IANA procedures.

9. Security Considerations

The security considerations are discussed in the security considerations of each cited RFC.

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Appendix A. Revision Notes

Note to RFC-Editor: please remove this entire section prior to publication.

- o Individual draft -00
- o Individual draft -01; Comments from Martin Duke; Brian Carpenter; Ruediger Geib, and revisions to improve language consistency.
- o Individual draft -02; Revisions to improve language consistency.

Appendix B. Table of DSCP Values

This table may help in the discussion of DSCP remarking. The current assignments are at: Section 8.

Hi \ Lo	0b 000	0b 001	0b 010	0b 011	0b 100	0b 101	0b 110	0b 111
0b 000	BE/DE CSO	LE	CU	Pool 3 LU/EXP	CU	CU	CU	Pool 3 LU/EXP
0b 001	CS1	CU	AF11	LU/EXP	AF12	CU	AF13	LU/EXP
0b 010	CS2	CU	AF21	LU/EXP	AF22	CU	AF23	LU/EXP
0b 011	CS3	CU	AF31	LU/EXP	AF32	CU	AF33	LU/EXP
0b 100	CS4	CU	AF41	LU/EXP	AF42	CU	AF43	LU/EXP
0b 101	CS5	CU	CU	LU/EXP	VA	CU	EF	LU/EXP
0b 110	CS6	CU	CU	LU/EXP	CU	CU	CU	LU/EXP
0b 111	CS7	CU	CU	LU/EXP	CU	CU	CU	LU/EXP

LU/EXP - Local or Experimental Use

CU - Currenty Unassigned (reserved for IANA allocation)

Table: Summary of Currently Assigned DSCP Values

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Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (PLMTUD) For UDP Transports Using
Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-20

Abstract

The datagram exchanged between two Internet endpoints have to go through a series of physical and virtual links that may have different limits on the upper size of the datagram they can transmit without fragmentation. Because fragmentation is considered harmful, most transports and protocols are designed with a mechanism that permits dynamic measurement of the maximum size of a datagram. This mechanism is called Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (PLPMTUD). But the UDP transport and some of the protocols that use UDP were designed without that feature. The Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage described in this document permits retrofitting an existing UDP-based protocol with such a feature. Similarly, a new UDP-based protocol could simply reuse the mechanism described in this document.

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1. Introduction

The Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) specification [RFC4821] describes a method to discover the Path MTU, but does not describe a practical protocol to do so with UDP. Many application layer protocols based on the transport layer protocol UDP do not implement the Path MTU discovery mechanism described in [RFC4821]. These application layer protocols can make use of the probing mechanisms described in this document instead of designing their own adhoc extension. These probing mechanisms are implemented with Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), but their usage is not limited to STUN-based protocols.

The STUN usage defined in this document for Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (PLPMTUD) between a client and a server permits proper measurement of the Path MTU for application layer protocols based on the transport layer protocol UDP in the network. It also simplifies troubleshooting and has multiple other applications across a wide variety of technologies.

Complementary techniques can be used to discover additional network characteristics, such as the network path (using the STUN Traceroute mechanism described in [I-D.martinsen-tram-stuntrace]) and bandwidth availability (using the mechanism described in [I-D.martinsen-tram-turnbandwidthprobe]). In addition, [RFC8899] provides a robust method for Path MTU Discovery for a broader range of protocols and applications.

2. Overview of Operations

This section is meant to be informative only and is not intended as a substitute for [RFC4821].

A UDP endpoint that uses this specification to discover the Path MTU over UDP and knows that the endpoint it is communicating with also supports this specification can choose to use either the Simple Probing mechanism (as described in Section 4.1) or the Complete Probing mechanism (as described in Section 4.2). The selection of which Probing Mechanism to use is dependent on performance and security and complexity trade-offs.

If the Simple Probing mechanism is chosen, then the client initiates Probe transactions, as shown in Figure 1, which decrease in size until transactions succeed, indicating that the Path MTU has been discovered. It then uses that information to update the Path MTU.




Figure 1: Simple Probing Example

If the Complete Probing mechanism (as described in Section 4.2) is chosen, then the client sends Probe Indications of various sizes (as specified in [RFC4821]) interleaved with UDP packets sent by the UDP protocol. The client then sends a Report Request for the ordered list of identifiers for the UDP packets and Probe Indications received by the server. The client then compares the list returned in the Report Response with its own list of identifiers for the UDP packets and Probe Indications it sent. The client examines the received reports to determine which probes were successful. When a probe succeeds with a larger size than the current PMTU, the PMTU is increased. When the probes indicate the current PMTU is not supported the size is decreased. This mechanism acts to detect that traffic is being back holed.

Because of the possibility of amplification attack, the Complete Probing mechanism must be authenticated as specified in Section 5.1. Particular care must be taken to prevent amplification when an external mechanism is used to trigger the Complete Probing mechanism.




Figure 2: Complete Probing Example

3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

4. Probing Mechanisms

The Probing mechanism is used to discover the Path MTU in one direction only: from the client to the server. Both endpoints MAY behave as a client and a server to achieve bi-directional path discovery.

Two Probing mechanisms are described: a Simple Probing mechanism and a more complete mechanism that can converge more quickly and find an appropriate Path MTU in the presence of congestion. Additionally, the Simple Probing mechanism does not require authentication except where used as an implicit signaling mechanism, whereas the complete mechanism does.

Implementations supporting this specification MUST implement the server side of both the Simple Probing mechanism (Section 4.1) and the Complete Probing mechanism (Section 4.2).

Implementations supporting this specification MUST implement the client side of the Complete Probing mechanism. They MAY implement the client side of the Simple Probing mechanism.

The FINGERPRINT mechanism described in section 7 of [RFC8489] MUST be used for both probing mechanisms.

4.1. Simple Probing Mechanism

The Simple Probing mechanism is implemented by sending a Probe Request with a PADDING attribute over UDP with the DF bit set in the IP header for IPv4 packets and IPv6 packets without the Fragment Header included.

NOTE: Routers might be configured to clear the DF bit or ignore the DF bit which can be difficult or impossible to detect if reassembly occurs prior to receiving the packet.

The Simple Probing Mechanism uses only STUN Requests/Responses, which are subject to the congestion control mechanism in [RFC8489] section 6.2.1. The default Rc and Rm values may be defined differently for a combination of the Simple Probing Mechanism and the protocol running on the same port.

4.1.1. Sending a Probe Request

A client forms a Probe Request by using the Probe Method and following the rules in Section 6.1 of [RFC8489].

The Probe transaction MUST be authenticated if the Simple Probing mechanism is used in conjunction with the Implicit Probing Support mechanism described in Section 5.2. If not, the Probe transaction MAY be authenticated.

The client adds a PADDING attribute with a length that, when added to the IP and UDP headers and the other STUN components, is equal to the Selected Probe Size, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.3. The PADDING bits MUST be set to zero. The client MUST add the FINGERPRINT attribute so the STUN messages are disambiguated from the other protocol packets as specified in Section 7 of [RFC8489].

Then the client sends the Probe Request to the server over UDP with the DF bit set for IPv4 packets and IPv6 packets without the Fragment Header included. For the purpose of this transaction, the Rc parameter is set to 3 and the initial value for RTO stays at 500 ms as specified in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC8489].

To be able to determine the reason STUN messages may be blocked, a client MUST NOT send a probe if it does not have knowledge that the server supports this specification. This is done either by external signalling or by a mechanism specific to the UDP protocol to which PMTUD capabilities are added or by one of the mechanisms specified in Section 5.

4.1.2. Receiving a Probe Request

A server receiving a Probe Request MUST process it as specified in [RFC8489].

The server then creates a Probe Response. The server MUST add the FINGERPRINT attribute so the STUN messages are disambiguated from the other protocol packets as specified in Section 7 of [RFC8489]. The server then sends the response to the client.

4.1.3. Receiving a Probe Response

A client receiving a Probe Response MUST process it as specified in section 6.3.3 of [RFC8489] and MUST ignore the PADDING attribute. If a response is received this is interpreted as a Probe Success, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.6.1. If an ICMP packet "Fragmentation needed" or "Packet Too Big" is received then this is interpreted as a Probe Failure, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.6.2. If the Probe transaction times out, then this is interpreted as a Probe Inconclusive, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.6.4. Validation MUST be performed on the ICMP packet as specified in [RFC8899].

4.2. Complete Probing Mechanism

The Complete Probing mechanism is implemented by sending one or more Probe Indications with a PADDING attribute over UDP with the DF bit set in the IP header for IPv4 packets and IPv6 packets without the Fragment Header included followed by a Report Request to the same server. A router on the path to the server can reject this Indication with an ICMP message or drop it. The server keeps a chronologically ordered list of identifiers for all packets received (including retransmitted packets) and sends this list back to the client in the Report Response. The client analyzes this list to find which packets were not received. Because UDP packets do not contain an identifier, the Complete Probing mechanism needs a way to identify each packet received.

Some application layer protocols may already have a way of identifying each individual UDP packet, in which case these identifiers SHOULD be used in the IDENTIFIERS attribute of the Report Response. While there are other possible packet identification schemes, this document describes two different ways to identify a specific packet when no application layer protocol-specific identification mechanism is available.

In the first packet identification mechanism, the server computes a checksum over each packet received and sends back to the sender the list of checksums ordered chronologically. The client compares this list to its own list of checksums.

In the second packet identification mechanism, the client prepends the UDP data with a header that provides a sequence number. The server sends back the chronologically ordered list of sequence numbers received that the client then compares with its own list.

The Simple Probing Mechanism uses STUN indications, which are not subject to the congestion control mechanism in [RFC8489] section 6.2.1. As it will have to be intricately related to the protocol that runs on the same port, each implementation of the Complete Probing Mechanism in association MUST define the congestion control that will be applied to the STUN Indications. The default Rc and Rm values for the STUN Requests/Responses may be defined differently for a combination of the Simple Probing Mechanism and the protocol running on the same port.

4.2.1. Sending a Probe Indications and Report Request

A client forms a Probe Indication by using the Probe Method and following the rules in [RFC8489] Section 6.1. The client adds to a Probe Indication a PADDING attribute with a size that, when added to the IP and UDP headers and the other STUN components, is equal to the Selected Probe Size, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.3. The PADDING bits MUST be set to zero. If the authentication mechanism permits it, then the Indication MUST be authenticated. The client MUST add the FINGERPRINT attribute so the STUN messages are disambiguated from the other protocol packets.

Then the client sends a Probe Indication to the server over UDP with the DF bit set for IPv4 packets and IPv6 packets without the Fragment Header included.

Then the client forms a Report Request by following the rules in [RFC8489] Section 6.1. The Report transaction MUST be authenticated to prevent amplification attacks. The client MUST add the FINGERPRINT attribute so the STUN messages are disambiguated from the other protocol packets.

Then the client waits half the RTO after sending the last Probe Indication and then sends the Report Request to the server over UDP.

4.2.2. Receiving an ICMP Packet

If an ICMP packet "Fragmentation needed" or "Packet Too Big" is received then this is interpreted as a Probe Failure, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.5. Validation MUST be performed on the ICMP packet as specified in [RFC8899].

4.2.3. Receiving a Probe Indication and Report Request

A server supporting this specification will keep the identifiers of all packets received in a chronologically ordered list. The packets that are to be associated to a given flow's identifier are selected according to Section 5.2 of [RFC4821]. The same identifier can appear multiple times in the list because of retransmissions. The maximum size of this list is calculated such that when the list is added to the Report Response, the total size of the packet does not exceed the unknown Path MTU, as defined in [RFC8489] Section 6.1. Older identifiers are removed when new identifiers are added to a list that is already full.

A server receiving a Report Request MUST process it as specified in [RFC8489] and MUST ignore the PADDING attribute.

The server creates a Report Response and adds an IDENTIFIERS attribute that contains the chronologically ordered list of all identifiers received so far. The server MUST add the FINGERPRINT attribute. The server then sends the response to the client.

The exact content of the IDENTIFIERS attribute depends on what type of identifiers have been chosen for the protocol. Each protocol adding PMTUD capabilities as specified by this specification MUST describe the format of the contents of the IDENTIFIERS attribute, unless it is using one of the formats described in this specification. See Section 6.1 for details about the IDENTIFIERS attribute.

4.2.4. Receiving a Report Response

A client receiving a Report Response processes it as specified in [RFC8489]. If the response IDENTIFIERS attribute contains the identifier of a Probe Indication, then this is interpreted as a Probe Success for this probe, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.5. If a Probe Indication identifier cannot be found in the Report Response, this is interpreted as a Probe Failure, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.5. If a Probe Indication identifier cannot be found in the Report Response but identifiers for other packets sent before or after the Probe Indication can all be found, this is interpreted as a Probe Failure as defined in [RFC4821] Section 7.5. If the Report Transaction times out, this is interpreted as a Full-Stop Timeout, as defined in [RFC4821] Section 3.

4.2.5. Using Checksums as Packet Identifiers

When using a checksum as a packet identifier, the client keeps a chronologically ordered list of the packets it transmits, along with an associated checksum value. For STUN Probe Indication or Request packets, the associated checksum value is the FINGERPRINT value from the packet; for other packets a checksum value is computed. The value of the checksum is computed as the CRC-32 of the UDP payload, as defined by the Length field of the UDP datagram [RFC4821], XOR'ed with the 32-bit value 0x5354554e. The 32-bit CRC is the one defined in ITU V.42 [ITU.V42.2002], which has a generator polynomial of $x^{32} + x^{26} + x^{23} + x^{22} + x^{16} + x^{12} + x^{11} + x^{10} + x^8 + x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1$.

For each STUN Probe Indication or Request, the server retrieves the STUN FINGERPRINT value. For all other packets, the server calculates the checksum as described above. It puts these FINGERPRINT and checksum values in a chronologically ordered list that is sent back in the Report Response.

The contents of the IDENTIFIERS attribute is a list of 4 byte numbers, each using the same encoding that is used for the contents of the FINGERPRINT attribute.

4.2.6. Using Sequence Numbers as Packet Identifiers

When using sequence numbers, a small header similar to the TURN ChannelData header, as defined in Section 11.4 of [RFC5766], is added in front of all packets that are not a STUN Probe Indication or Request. The initial sequence number MUST be randomized and is monotonically incremented by one for each packet sent. The most significant bit of the sequence number is always 0. The server collects the sequence number of the packets sent, or the 4 first bytes of the transaction ID if a STUN Probe Indication or Request is sent. In that case, the most significant bit of the 4 first bytes is set to 1.




Figure 3

The Channel Number is always 0xFFFF. The Length field specifies the length in bytes of the sequence number and application data fields. The header values are encoded using network order.

The contents of the IDENTIFIERS attribute is a chronologically ordered list of 4 byte numbers, each containing either a sequence number, if the packet was not a STUN Probe Indication or Request, or the 4 first bytes of the transaction ID, with the most significant bit forced to 1, if the packet is a STUN Probe Indication or Request.

5. Probe Support Signaling Mechanisms

The PMTUD mechanism described in this document is intended to be used by any UDP-based protocols that do not have built-in PMTUD capabilities, irrespective of whether those UDP-based protocols are STUN-based or not. So the manner in which a specific protocol discovers that it is safe to send PMTUD probes is largely dependent on the details of that specific protocol, with the exception of the Implicit Mechanism described below, which applies to any protocol.

5.1. Explicit Probe Support Signaling Mechanism

Some of these mechanisms can use a separate signalling mechanism (for instance, an SDP attribute in an Offer/Answer exchange [RFC3264]), or an optional flag that can be set in the protocol that is augmented with PMTUD capabilities. STUN Usages that can benefit from PMTUD capabilities can signal in-band that they support probing by inserting a PMTUD-SUPPORTED attribute in some STUN methods. The decision of which methods support this attribute is left to each specific STUN Usage.

UDP-based protocols that want to use any of these mechanisms, including the PMTUD-SUPPORTED attribute, to signal PMTUD capabilities MUST ensure that it cannot be used to launch an amplification attack.

An amplification attack can be prevented using techniques such as:

- * Authentication, where the source of the packet and the destination share a secret.
- * 3 way handshake with some form of unpredictable cookie.
- * Make sure that the total size of the traffic potentially generated is lower than the size of the request that generated it.

5.2. Implicit Probe Support Signaling Mechanism

As a result of the fact that all endpoints implementing this specification are both clients and servers, a Probe Request or Indication received by an endpoint acting as a server implicitly signals that this server can now act as a client and MAY send a Probe Request or Indication to probe the Path MTU in the reverse direction toward the former client, that will now be acting as a server.

The Probe Request or Indication that are used to implicitly signal probing support in the reverse direction MUST be authenticated to prevent amplification attacks.

6. STUN Attributes

6.1. IDENTIFIERS

The IDENTIFIERS attribute carries a chronologically ordered list of UDP packet identifiers.

While Section 4.2.5 and Section 4.2.6 describe two possible methods for acquiring and formatting the identifiers used for this purpose, ultimately each protocol has to define how these identifiers are acquired and formatted. Therefore, the contents of the IDENTIFIERS attribute is opaque.

6.2. PMTUD-SUPPORTED

The PMTUD-SUPPORTED attribute indicates that its sender supports this mechanism, as incorporated into the STUN usage or protocol being used. This attribute has no value part and thus the attribute length field is 0.

6.3. PADDING

The PADDING attribute allows for the entire message to be padded to force the STUN message to be divided into IP fragments. The PADDING bits MUST be set to zero. PADDING can be used in either Binding Requests or Binding Responses.

PADDING MUST NOT be longer than the length that brings the total IP datagram size to 64K, minus the IP and UDP headers and the other STUN components. It SHOULD be equal in length to the MTU of the outgoing interface, rounded up to an even multiple of four bytes and SHOULD ensure a probe does not result in a packet larger than the MTU for the outgoing interface. STUN messages sent with PADDING are intended to test the behavior of UDP fragmentation, therefore they are an exception to the usual rule that STUN messages need to be less than the PMTU for the path.

7. DPLPMTUD Considerations

This section specifies how the PMTUD mechanism described in this document conforms to Sections 3 and 6.1 of [RFC8899] and indicates where each requirement is addressed. The text in this section must be compared side-by-side with [RFC8899] to understand the relationship between the two.

7.1. Features Required to provide Datagram PLPMTUD

This section covers Section 3 of [RFC8899] and refers back to sections in this document covering each of the feature requirements.

1. Managing the PLMPTU: This requirement is fulfilled by the Simple Probing and Complete Probing mechanisms as discussed in Section 2, Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 of this document.
2. Probe packets: This requirement is fulfilled by including a PADDING attribute which indicates that the DF bit is set in the IP header for IPv4 packets and not including the Don't Fragment header in IPv6 packets as discussed in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 of this document.
3. Reception feedback: This requirement fulfilled by the Probe Response and Report Response in Section 2 of this document.
4. Probe loss recovery: This requirement is fulfilled by requiring that the PADDING bits MUST be set to zero as discussed in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.2.1 of this document. No retransmission is required as no user data is being transmitted in the probe.
5. PMTU parameters: This requirement is fulfilled by setting the Selected Probe Size as defined in [RFC4821] and discussed in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 of this document.
6. Processing PTB messages: This requirement is fulfilled by the Probe Response and Report Response in Section 4.1.3 and Section 4.2.2 of this document.
7. Probing and congestion control: This requirement is fulfilled by the Probe Request and Probe Indication discussed in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.2.1 of this document. It conforms to Section 6.2.1 of [RFC8489].
8. Probing and flow control: This requirement is out of scope and is not discussed in this document.
9. Shared PLPMTU state: An implementation follows the same guidelines to share state than in [RFC8899].

Datagram reordering: This requirement is fulfilled by the Report Response in Section 4.2 of this document.

Datagram delay and duplication: This requirement is fulfilled by the Report Response in Section 4.2 of this document.

When to probe: This requirement is discussed in Section 2 of this document.

7.2. Application Support for DPLPMTUD with UDP

This section covers Section 6.1 of [RFC8899] and refers back to which sections in this document covers each of the feature requirements.

6.1.1 Application Request: This requirement is fulfilled by the Simple Probing and Complete Probing mechanisms as discussed in Section 2, Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 of this document.

6.1.2 Application Response: This requirement is fulfilled by the Simple Probing and Complete Probing mechanisms as discussed in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 of this document.

6.1.3 Sending Application Probe Packets: This requirement is fulfilled by the requirement that the PADDING bits MUST be set to zero as discussed in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.2.1 of this document.

6.1.4 Initial Connectivity: This requirement is fulfilled by the Implicit and Explicit Probe Support Signaling mechanisms as discussed in Section 5 of this document.

6.1.5 Validating the Path: This requirement is fulfilled by the Report Request and Report Response mechanisms as discussed in Section 4.2 of this document.

6.1.6 Handling of PTB Messages: This requirement is fulfilled by the Probe Response and Report Response in Section 4.1.3 and Section 4.2.2 of this document.

8. Security Considerations

The PMTUD mechanism described in this document, when used without the signalling mechanism described in Section 5.1, does not introduce any specific security considerations beyond those described in [RFC4821] and [RFC8899].

The attacks described in Section 11 of [RFC4821] apply equally to the mechanism described in this document.

The amplification attacks introduced by the signalling mechanism described in Section 5.1 can be prevented by using one of the techniques described in that section.

The Simple Probing mechanism may be used without authentication because this usage by itself cannot trigger an amplification attack as the Probe Response is smaller than the Probe Request except when used in conjunction with the Implicit Probing Support Signaling mechanism.

9. IANA Considerations

This specification defines two new STUN methods and two new STUN attributes.

9.1. New STUN Methods

IANA is requested to add the following methods to the STUN Method Registry:

0xXXX : Probe

0xXXX : Report

See Sections Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 for the semantics of these new methods.

9.2. New STUN Attributes

IANA is requested to add the following attributes to the STUN Method Registry:

Comprehension-required range (0x0000-0x7FFF):

0XXXXX: IDENTIFIERS

Comprehension-optional range (0x8000-0xFFFF):

0XXXXX: PMTUD-SUPPORTED

IANA is requested to add a reference to RFC-to-be (in addition to RFC 5780) for the following STUN attribute:

0x0026: PADDING

The IDENTIFIERS STUN attribute is defined in Section 6.1, the PMTUD-SUPPORTED STUN attribute is defined in Section 6.2; the PADDING STUN attribute is redefined in Section 6.3.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

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- [RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>>.

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Changelog

This section must be removed before publication as an RFC.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-20:

- * Modifications following reviews by Gorrry and Magnus.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-19:

- * Nits.
- * Update references, including sections number.
- * Move co-editor to contributor section.
- * Changelog (formerly Release Notes) is more compact.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-18:

- * Modifications to address DISCUSS and COMMENT from IESG review. updated section 7.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-17:

- * Modifications to address DISCUSS and COMMENT from IESG review. Added section 7.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-16:

- * Modifications to address DISCUSS and COMMENT from IESG review

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-15:

- * Modifications to address DISCUSS and COMMENT from IESG review

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-14:

- * Modifications to address COMMENTS from IESG review

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-13:

- * Modifications to address nits

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-12:

- * Modifications following IESG review. Incorporated RFC5780 PADDING attribute (Adam's Discuss) and added IPv6 language (Suresh's Discuss).

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-11:

- * Modifications following IESG review.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-10:

- * Modifications following reviews for gen-art (Roni Even) and secdir (Carl Wallace).

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-09:

- * Add 3 ways of preventing amplification attacks.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-08:

- * Updates following Spencer's review.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-07:

- * Updates following Shepherd review.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-06:

- * Nits.
- * Restore missing changelog for previous version.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-05:

- * Modifications following Brandon Williams review.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-04:

- * Modifications following Simon Perreault and Brandon Williams reviews.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-03:

- * Add new Overview of Operations section with ladder diagrams.
- * Authentication is mandatory for the Complete Probing mechanism, optional for the Simple Probing mechanism.
- * All the ICE specific text moves to a separate draft to be discussed in the ICE WG.
- * The TURN usage is removed because probing between a TURN server and TURN client is not useful.

- * Any usage of PMTUD-SUPPORTED or other signaling mechanisms (formerly known as discovery mechanisms) must now be authenticated.
- * Both probing mechanisms are MTI in the server, the complete probing mechanism is MTI in the client.
- * Make clear that stopping after 3 retransmission is done by changing the STUN parameter.
- * Define the format of the attributes.
- * Make clear that the specification is for any UDP protocol that does not already have PMTUD capabilities, not just STUN based protocols.
- * Change the default delay to send the Report Request to 250 ms after the last Indication if the RTO is unknown.
- * Each usage of this specification must the format of the IDENTIFIERS attribute contents.
- * Better define the implicit signaling mechanism.
- * Extend the Security Consideration section.
- * Tons of nits.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-02:

- * Cleaned up references.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-01:

- * Added Security Considerations Section.
- * Added IANA Considerations Section.

draft-ietf-tram-stun-pmtud-00:

- * Adopted by WG - Text unchanged.

draft-petithuguenin-tram-stun-pmtud-01:

- * Moved some Introduction text to the Probing Mechanism section.
- * Added cross-reference to the other two STUN troubleshooting mechanism drafts.
- * Updated references.
- * Added Gonzalo Salgueiro as co-author.

draft-petithuguenin-tram-stun-pmtud-00:

- * General refresh for republication.

draft-petithuguenin-behave-stun-pmtud-03:

- * Changed author address.
- * Changed the IPR to trust200902.

draft-petithuguenin-behave-stun-pmtud-02:

- * Defined checksum and sequential numbers as possible packet identifiers.
- * Updated the reference to RFC 5389
- * The FINGERPRINT attribute is now mandatory.
- * Changed the delay between Probe indication and Report request to be RT0/2 or 50 milliseconds.
- * Added ICMP packet processing.
- * Added Full-Stop Timeout detection.
- * Stated that Binding request with PMTUD-SUPPORTED does not start the PMTUD process if already started.

draft-petithuguenin-behave-stun-pmtud-01:

- * Removed the use of modified STUN transaction but shorten the retransmission for the simple probing mechanism.
- * Added a complete probing mechanism.
- * Removed the PADDING-RECEIVED attribute.
- * Added release notes.

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DualQ Coupled AQMs for Low Latency, Low Loss and Scalable Throughput
(L4S)
draft-ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled-23

Abstract

This specification defines a framework for coupling the Active Queue Management (AQM) algorithms in two queues intended for flows with different responses to congestion. This provides a way for the Internet to transition from the scaling problems of standard TCP Reno-friendly ('Classic') congestion controls to the family of 'Scalable' congestion controls. These are designed for consistently very Low queuing Latency, very Low congestion Loss and Scaling of per-flow throughput (L4S) by using Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) in a modified way. Until the Coupled DualQ, these L4S senders could only be deployed where a clean-slate environment could be arranged, such as in private data centres. The coupling acts like a semi-permeable membrane: isolating the sub-millisecond average queuing delay and zero congestion loss of L4S from Classic latency and loss; but pooling the capacity between any combination of Scalable and Classic flows with roughly equivalent throughput per flow. The DualQ achieves this indirectly, without having to inspect transport layer flow identifiers and without compromising the performance of the Classic traffic, relative to a single queue. The DualQ design has low complexity and requires no configuration for the public Internet.

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1. Introduction

This document specifies a framework for DualQ Coupled AQMs, which is the network part of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]. L4S enables both very low queuing latency (sub-millisecond on average) and high throughput at the same time, for ad hoc numbers of capacity-seeking applications all sharing the same capacity.

1.1. Outline of the Problem

Latency is becoming the critical performance factor for many (most?) applications on the public Internet, e.g. interactive Web, Web services, voice, conversational video, interactive video, interactive remote presence, instant messaging, online gaming, remote desktop, cloud-based applications, and video-assisted remote control of machinery and industrial processes. In the developed world, further increases in access network bit-rate offer diminishing returns, whereas latency is still a multi-faceted problem. In the last decade or so, much has been done to reduce propagation time by placing caches or servers closer to users. However, queuing remains a major intermittent component of latency.

Traditionally very low latency has only been available for a few selected low rate applications, that confine their sending rate within a specially carved-off portion of capacity, which is prioritized over other traffic, e.g. Diffserv EF [RFC3246]. Up to now it has not been possible to allow any number of low latency, high throughput applications to seek to fully utilize available capacity, because the capacity-seeking process itself causes too much queuing delay.

To reduce this queuing delay caused by the capacity seeking process, changes either to the network alone or to end-systems alone are in progress. L4S involves a recognition that both approaches are yielding diminishing returns:

- * Recent state-of-the-art active queue management (AQM) in the network, e.g. FQ-CoDel [RFC8290], PIE [RFC8033], Adaptive RED [ARED01]) has reduced queuing delay for all traffic, not just a select few applications. However, no matter how good the AQM, the capacity-seeking (sawtooth) rate of TCP-like congestion controls represents a lower limit that will either cause queuing delay to vary or cause the link to be under-utilized. These AQMs are tuned to allow a typical capacity-seeking Reno-friendly flow to induce an average queue that roughly doubles the base RTT, adding 5-15 ms of queuing on average (cf. 500 microseconds with L4S for the same mix of long-running and web traffic). However, for many applications low delay is not useful unless it is consistently low. With these AQMs, 99th percentile queuing delay is 20-30 ms (cf. 2 ms with the same traffic over L4S).
- * Similarly, recent research into using e2e congestion control without needing an AQM in the network (e.g. BBR [I-D.cardwell-iccr-g-bbr-congestion-control]) seems to have hit a similar lower limit to queuing delay of about 20ms on average but there are also regular 25ms delay spikes due to bandwidth probes and 60ms spikes due to flow-starts.

L4S learns from the experience of Data Center TCP [RFC8257], which shows the power of complementary changes both in the network and on end-systems. DCTCP teaches us that two small but radical changes to congestion control are needed to cut the two major outstanding causes of queuing delay variability:

1. Far smaller rate variations (sawteeth) than Reno-friendly congestion controls;
2. A shift of smoothing and hence smoothing delay from network to sender.

Without the former, a 'Classic' (e.g. Reno-friendly) flow's round trip time (RTT) varies between roughly 1 and 2 times the base RTT between the machines in question. Without the latter a 'Classic' flow's response to changing events is delayed by a worst-case (transcontinental) RTT, which could be hundreds of times the actual smoothing delay needed for the RTT of typical traffic from localized CDNs.

These changes are the two main features of the family of so-called 'Scalable' congestion controls (which includes DCTCP, TCP Prague and SCReAM). Both these changes only reduce delay in combination with a complementary change in the network and they are both only feasible with ECN, not drop, for the signalling:

1. The smaller sawteeth allow an extremely shallow ECN packet-marking threshold in the queue.
2. And no smoothing in the network means that every fluctuation of the queue is signalled immediately.

Without ECN, either of these would lead to very high loss levels. But, with ECN, the resulting high marking levels are just signals, not impairments. BBRv2 combines the best of both worlds - it works as a scalable congestion control when ECN is available, but also aims to minimize delay when it isn't.

However, until now, Scalable congestion controls (like DCTCP) did not co-exist well in a shared ECN-capable queue with existing ECN-capable TCP Reno [RFC5681] or Cubic [RFC8312] congestion controls -- Scalable controls are so aggressive that these 'Classic' algorithms would drive themselves to a small capacity share. Therefore, until now, L4S controls could only be deployed where a clean-slate environment could be arranged, such as in private data centres (hence the name DCTCP).

This document specifies a 'DualQ Coupled AQM' extension that solves the problem of coexistence between Scalable and Classic flows, without having to inspect flow identifiers. It is not like flow-queuing approaches [RFC8290] that classify packets by flow identifier into separate queues in order to isolate sparse flows from the higher latency in the queues assigned to heavier flows. If a flow needs both low delay and high throughput, having a queue to itself does not isolate it from the harm it causes to itself. In contrast, DualQ Coupled AQMs address the root cause of the latency problem -- they are an enabler for the smooth low latency scalable behaviour of Scalable congestion controls, so that every packet in every flow can potentially enjoy very low latency, then there would be no need to isolate each flow into a separate queue.

1.2. Scope

L4S involves complementary changes in the network and on end-systems:

Network: A DualQ Coupled AQM (defined in the present document) or a modification to flow-queue AQMs (described in section 4.2.b of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]);

End-system: A Scalable congestion control (defined in section 4 of the L4S ECN protocol [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]).

Packet identifier: The network and end-system parts of L4S can be deployed incrementally, because they both identify L4S packets using the experimentally assigned explicit congestion notification (ECN) codepoints in the IP header: ECT(1) and CE [RFC8311] [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id].

Data Center TCP (DCTCP [RFC8257]) is an example of a Scalable congestion control for controlled environments that has been deployed for some time in Linux, Windows and FreeBSD operating systems. During the progress of this document through the IETF a number of other Scalable congestion controls were implemented, e.g. TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control] [PragueLinux], BBRv2 [BBRv2], [I-D.cardwell-iccrp-bbr-congestion-control], QUIC Prague and the L4S variant of SCREAM for real-time media [RFC8298].

The focus of this specification is to enable deployment of the network part of the L4S service. Then, without any management intervention, applications can exploit this new network capability as their operating systems migrate to Scalable congestion controls, which can then evolve while their benefits are being enjoyed by everyone on the Internet.

The DualQ Coupled AQM framework can incorporate any AQM designed for a single queue that generates a statistical or deterministic mark/drop probability driven by the queue dynamics. Pseudocode examples of two different DualQ Coupled AQMs are given in the appendices. In many cases the framework simplifies the basic control algorithm, and requires little extra processing. Therefore it is believed the Coupled AQM would be applicable and easy to deploy in all types of buffers; buffers in cost-reduced mass-market residential equipment; buffers in end-system stacks; buffers in carrier-scale equipment including remote access servers, routers, firewalls and Ethernet switches; buffers in network interface cards, buffers in virtualized network appliances, hypervisors, and so on.

For the public Internet, nearly all the benefit will typically be achieved by deploying the Coupled AQM into either end of the access link between a 'site' and the Internet, which is invariably the bottleneck (see section 6.4 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] about deployment, which also defines the term 'site' to mean a home, an office, a campus or mobile user equipment).

Latency is not the only concern of L4S:

- * The "Low Loss" part of the name denotes that L4S generally achieves zero congestion loss (which would otherwise cause retransmission delays), due to its use of ECN.
- * The "Scalable throughput" part of the name denotes that the per-flow throughput of Scalable congestion controls should scale indefinitely, avoiding the imminent scaling problems with 'TCP-Friendly' congestion control algorithms [RFC3649].

The former is clearly in scope of this AQM document. However, the latter is an outcome of the end-system behaviour, and therefore outside the scope of this AQM document, even though the AQM is an enabler.

The overall L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] gives more detail, including on wider deployment aspects such as backwards compatibility of Scalable congestion controls in bottlenecks where a DualQ Coupled AQM has not been deployed. The supporting papers [DualPI2Linux], [PI2], [DCTtH19] and [PI2param] give the full rationale for the AQM's design, both discursively and in more precise mathematical form, as well as the results of performance evaluations. The main results have been validated independently when using the Prague congestion control [Boru20] (experiments are run using Prague and DCTCP, but only the former are relevant for validation, because Prague fixes a number of problems with the Linux DCTCP code that make it unsuitable for the public Internet).

1.3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The DualQ Coupled AQM uses two queues for two services. Each of the following terms identifies both the service and the queue that provides the service:

Classic service/queue: The Classic service is intended for all the

congestion control behaviours that co-exist with Reno [RFC5681] (e.g. Reno itself, Cubic [RFC8312], TFRC [RFC5348]).

Low-Latency, Low-Loss Scalable throughput (L4S) service/queue: The 'L4S' service is intended for traffic from scalable congestion control algorithms, such as TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], which was derived from Data Center TCP [RFC8257]. The L4S service is for more general traffic than just TCP Prague -- it allows the set of congestion controls with similar scaling properties to Prague to evolve, such as the examples listed earlier (Relentless, SCReAM, etc.).

Classic Congestion Control: A congestion control behaviour that can co-exist with standard TCP Reno [RFC5681] without causing significantly negative impact on its flow rate [RFC5033]. With Classic congestion controls, such as Reno or Cubic, because flow rate has scaled since TCP congestion control was first designed in 1988, it now takes hundreds of round trips (and growing) to recover after a congestion signal (whether a loss or an ECN mark) as shown in the examples in section 5.1 of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] and in [RFC3649]. Therefore control of queuing and utilization becomes very slack, and the slightest disturbances (e.g. from new flows starting) prevent a high rate from being attained.

Scalable Congestion Control: A congestion control where the average time from one congestion signal to the next (the recovery time) remains invariant as the flow rate scales, all other factors being equal. This maintains the same degree of control over queueing and utilization whatever the flow rate, as well as ensuring that high throughput is robust to disturbances. For instance, DCTCP averages 2 congestion signals per round-trip whatever the flow rate, as do other recently developed scalable congestion controls, e.g. Relentless TCP [Mathis09], TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], [PragueLinux], BBRv2 [BBRv2], [I-D.cardwell-iccrp-bbr-congestion-control] and the L4S variant of SCREAM for real-time media [SCReAM], [RFC8298]). For the public Internet a Scalable transport has to comply with the requirements in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] (aka. the 'Prague L4S requirements').

C: Abbreviation for Classic, e.g. when used as a subscript.

L: Abbreviation for L4S, e.g. when used as a subscript.

The terms Classic or L4S can also qualify other nouns, such as 'codepoint', 'identifier', 'classification', 'packet', 'flow'. For example: an L4S packet means a packet with an L4S identifier sent from an L4S congestion control.

Both Classic and L4S services can cope with a proportion of unresponsive or less-responsive traffic as well, but in the L4S case its rate has to be smooth enough or low enough not to build a queue (e.g. DNS, VoIP, game sync datagrams, etc). The DualQ Coupled AQM behaviour is defined to be similar to a single FIFO queue with respect to unresponsive and overload traffic.

Reno-friendly: The subset of Classic traffic that is friendly to the standard Reno congestion control defined for TCP in [RFC5681]. Reno-friendly is used in place of 'TCP-friendly', given the latter has become imprecise, because the TCP protocol is now used with so many different congestion control behaviours, and Reno is used in non-TCP transports such as QUIC.

Classic ECN: The original Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) protocol [RFC3168], which requires ECN signals to be treated the same as drops, both when generated in the network and when responded to by the sender.

For L4S, the names used for the four codepoints of the 2-bit IP-ECN field are unchanged from those defined in [RFC3168]: Not ECT, ECT(0), ECT(1) and CE, where ECT stands for ECN-Capable Transport and CE stands for Congestion Experienced. A packet marked with the CE codepoint is termed 'ECN-marked' or sometimes just 'marked' where the context makes ECN obvious.

1.4. Features

The AQM couples marking and/or dropping from the Classic queue to the L4S queue in such a way that a flow will get roughly the same throughput whichever it uses. Therefore both queues can feed into the full capacity of a link and no rates need to be configured for the queues. The L4S queue enables Scalable congestion controls like DCTCP or TCP Prague to give very low and predictably low latency, without compromising the performance of competing 'Classic' Internet traffic.

Thousands of tests have been conducted in a typical fixed residential broadband setting. Experiments used a range of base round trip delays up to 100ms and link rates up to 200 Mb/s between the data centre and home network, with varying amounts of background traffic in both queues. For every L4S packet, the AQM kept the average queuing delay below 1ms (or 2 packets where serialization delay

exceeded 1ms on slower links), with 99th percentile no worse than 2ms. No losses at all were introduced by the L4S AQM. Details of the extensive experiments are available [DualPI2Linux], [PI2], [DCTtH19].

In all these experiments, the host was connected to the home network by fixed Ethernet, in order to quantify the queuing delay that can be achieved by a user who cares about delay. It should be emphasized that L4S support at the bottleneck link cannot 'undelay' bursts introduced by another link on the path, for instance by legacy WiFi equipment. However, if L4S support is added to the queue feeding the `_outgoing_` WAN link of a home gateway, it would be counterproductive not to also reduce the burstiness of the `_incoming_` WiFi. Also, trials of WiFi equipment with an L4S DualQ Coupled AQM on the `_outgoing_` WiFi interface are in progress, and early results of an L4S DualQ Coupled AQM in a 5G radio access network testbed with emulated outdoor cell edge radio fading are given in [L4S_5G].

Subjective testing has also been conducted by multiple people all simultaneously using very demanding high bandwidth low latency applications over a single shared access link [L4Sdemo16]. In one application, each user could use finger gestures to pan or zoom their own high definition (HD) sub-window of a larger video scene generated on the fly in 'the cloud' from a football match. Another user wearing VR goggles was remotely receiving a feed from a 360-degree camera in a racing car, again with the sub-window in their field of vision generated on the fly in 'the cloud' dependent on their head movements. Even though other users were also downloading large amounts of L4S and Classic data, playing a gaming benchmark and watchings videos over the same 40Mb/s downstream broadband link, latency was so low that the football picture appeared to stick to the user's finger on the touch pad and the experience fed from the remote camera did not noticeably lag head movements. All the L4S data (even including the downloads) achieved the same very low latency. With an alternative AQM, the video noticeably lagged behind the finger gestures and head movements.

Unlike Diffserv Expedited Forwarding, the L4S queue does not have to be limited to a small proportion of the link capacity in order to achieve low delay. The L4S queue can be filled with a heavy load of capacity-seeking flows (TCP Prague etc.) and still achieve low delay. The L4S queue does not rely on the presence of other traffic in the Classic queue that can be 'overtaken'. It gives low latency to L4S traffic whether or not there is Classic traffic. The tail latency of traffic served by the Classic AQM is sometimes a little better sometimes a little worse, when a proportion of the traffic is L4S.

The two queues are only necessary because:

- * the large variations (sawteeth) of Classic flows need roughly a base RTT of queuing delay to ensure full utilization
- * Scalable flows do not need a queue to keep utilization high, but they cannot keep latency predictably low if they are mixed with Classic traffic,

The L4S queue has latency priority within sub-round trip timescales, but over longer periods the coupling from the Classic to the L4S AQM (explained below) ensures that it does not have bandwidth priority over the Classic queue.

2. DualQ Coupled AQM

There are two main aspects to the approach:

- * The Coupled AQM that addresses throughput equivalence between Classic (e.g. Reno, Cubic) flows and L4S flows (that satisfy the Prague L4S requirements).
- * The Dual Queue structure that provides latency separation for L4S flows to isolate them from the typically large Classic queue.

2.1. Coupled AQM

In the 1990s, the 'TCP formula' was derived for the relationship between the steady-state congestion window, $cwnd$, and the drop probability, p of standard Reno congestion control [RFC5681]. To a first order approximation, the steady-state $cwnd$ of Reno is inversely proportional to the square root of p .

The design focuses on Reno as the worst case, because if it does no harm to Reno, it will not harm Cubic or any traffic designed to be friendly to Reno. TCP Cubic implements a Reno-compatibility mode, which is relevant for typical RTTs under 20ms as long as the throughput of a single flow is less than about 350Mb/s. In such cases it can be assumed that Cubic traffic behaves similarly to Reno. The term 'Classic' will be used for the collection of Reno-friendly traffic including Cubic and potentially other experimental congestion controls intended not to significantly impact the flow rate of Reno.

A supporting paper [PI2] includes the derivation of the equivalent rate equation for DCTCP, for which `cwnd` is inversely proportional to `p` (not the square root), where in this case `p` is the ECN marking probability. DCTCP is not the only congestion control that behaves like this, so the term 'Scalable' will be used for all similar congestion control behaviours (see examples in Section 1.2). The term 'L4S' is used for traffic driven by a Scalable congestion control that also complies with the additional 'Prague L4S' requirements [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id].

For safe co-existence, under stationary conditions, a Scalable flow has to run at roughly the same rate as a Reno TCP flow (all other factors being equal). So the drop or marking probability for Classic traffic, `p_C` has to be distinct from the marking probability for L4S traffic, `p_L`. The original ECN specification [RFC3168] required these probabilities to be the same, but [RFC8311] updates RFC 3168 to enable experiments in which these probabilities are different.

Also, to remain stable, Classic sources need the network to smooth `p_C` so it changes relatively slowly. It is hard for a network node to know the RTTs of all the flows, so a Classic AQM adds a `_worst-case_` RTT of smoothing delay (about 100-200 ms). In contrast, L4S shifts responsibility for smoothing ECN feedback to the sender, which only delays its response by its `_own_` RTT, as well as allowing a more immediate response if necessary.

The Coupled AQM achieves safe coexistence by making the Classic drop probability `p_C` proportional to the square of the coupled L4S probability `p_CL`. `p_CL` is an input to the instantaneous L4S marking probability `p_L` but it changes as slowly as `p_C`. This makes the Reno flow rate roughly equal the DCTCP flow rate, because the squaring of `p_CL` counterbalances the square root of `p_C` in the 'TCP formula' of Classic Reno congestion control.

Stating this as a formula, the relation between Classic drop probability, `p_C`, and the coupled L4S probability `p_CL` needs to take the form:

$$p_C = (p_{CL} / k)^2 \quad (1)$$

where `k` is the constant of proportionality, which is termed the coupling factor.

2.2. Dual Queue

Classic traffic needs to build a large queue to prevent under-utilization. Therefore a separate queue is provided for L4S traffic, and it is scheduled with priority over the Classic queue. Priority is conditional to prevent starvation of Classic traffic in certain conditions (see Section 2.4).

Nonetheless, coupled marking ensures that giving priority to L4S traffic still leaves the right amount of spare scheduling time for Classic flows to each get equivalent throughput to DCTCP flows (all other factors such as RTT being equal).

2.3. Traffic Classification

Both the Coupled AQM and DualQ mechanisms need an identifier to distinguish L4S (L) and Classic (C) packets. Then the coupling algorithm can achieve coexistence without having to inspect flow identifiers, because it can apply the appropriate marking or dropping probability to all flows of each type. A separate specification [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] requires the network to treat the ECT(1) and CE codepoints of the ECN field as this identifier. An additional process document has proved necessary to make the ECT(1) codepoint available for experimentation [RFC8311].

For policy reasons, an operator might choose to steer certain packets (e.g. from certain flows or with certain addresses) out of the L queue, even though they identify themselves as L4S by their ECN codepoints. In such cases, the L4S ECN protocol [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] says that the device "MUST NOT alter the end-to-end L4S ECN identifier", so that it is preserved end-to-end. The aim is that each operator can choose how it treats L4S traffic locally, but an individual operator does not alter the identification of L4S packets, which would prevent other operators downstream from making their own choices on how to treat L4S traffic.

In addition, an operator could use other identifiers to classify certain additional packet types into the L queue that it deems will not risk harm to the L4S service. For instance addresses of specific applications or hosts; specific Diffserv codepoints such as EF (Expedited Forwarding), Voice-Admit or the Non-Queue-Building (NQB) per-hop behaviour; or certain protocols (e.g. ARP, DNS) (see Section 5.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). Note that the mechanism only reads these identifiers. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] says it "MUST NOT alter these non-ECN identifiers". Thus, the L queue is not solely an L4S queue, it can be considered more generally as a low latency queue.

2.4. Overall DualQ Coupled AQM Structure

Figure 1 shows the overall structure that any DualQ Coupled AQM is likely to have. This schematic is intended to aid understanding of the current designs of DualQ Coupled AQMs. However, it is not intended to preclude other innovative ways of satisfying the normative requirements in Section 2.5 that minimally define a DualQ Coupled AQM. Also, the schematic only illustrates operation under normally expected circumstances; behaviour under overload or with operator-specific classifiers is deferred to Section 2.5.1.1.

The classifier on the left separates incoming traffic between the two queues (L and C). Each queue has its own AQM that determines the likelihood of marking or dropping (p_L and p_C). It has been proved [PI2] that it is preferable to control load with a linear controller, then square the output before applying it as a drop probability to Reno-friendly traffic (because Reno congestion control decreases its load proportional to the square-root of the increase in drop). So, the AQM for Classic traffic needs to be implemented in two stages: i) a base stage that outputs an internal probability p' (pronounced p-prime); and ii) a squaring stage that outputs p_C , where

$$p_C = (p')^2. \quad (2)$$

Substituting for p_C in Eqn (1) gives:

$$p' = p_{CL} / k$$

So the slow-moving input to ECN marking in the L queue (the coupled L4S probability) is:

$$p_{CL} = k * p'. \quad (3)$$

The actual ECN marking probability p_L that is applied to the L queue needs to track the immediate L queue delay under L-only congestion conditions, as well as track p_{CL} under coupled congestion conditions. So the L queue uses a native AQM that calculates a probability p'_L as a function of the instantaneous L queue delay. And, given the L queue has conditional priority over the C queue, whenever the L queue grows, the AQM ought to apply marking probability p'_L , but p_L ought not to fall below p_{CL} . This suggests:

$$p_L = \max(p'_L, p_{CL}), \quad (4)$$

which has also been found to work very well in practice.

The two transformations of p' in equations (2) and (3) implement the required coupling given in equation (1) earlier.

The constant of proportionality or coupling factor, k , in equation (1) determines the ratio between the congestion probabilities (loss or marking) experienced by L4S and Classic traffic. Thus k indirectly determines the ratio between L4S and Classic flow rates, because flows (assuming they are responsive) adjust their rate in response to congestion probability. Appendix C.2 gives guidance on the choice of k and its effect on relative flow rates.




Figure 1: DualQ Coupled AQM Schematic

Legend: ==> traffic flow; ---> control dependency.

After the AQMs have applied their dropping or marking, the scheduler forwards their packets to the link. Even though the scheduler gives priority to the L queue, it is not as strong as the coupling from the C queue. This is because, as the C queue grows, the base AQM applies more congestion signals to L traffic (as well as C). As L flows reduce their rate in response, they use less than the scheduling share for L traffic. So, because the scheduler is work preserving, it schedules any C traffic in the gaps.

Giving priority to the L queue has the benefit of very low L queue delay, because the L queue is kept empty whenever L traffic is controlled by the coupling. Also there only has to be a coupling in one direction - from Classic to L4S. Priority has to be conditional in some way to prevent the C queue being starved in the short-term (see Section 4.2.2) to give C traffic a means to push in, as explained next. With normal responsive L traffic, the coupled ECN marking gives C traffic the ability to push back against even strict priority, by congestion marking the L traffic to make it yield some space. However, if there is just a small finite set of C packets (e.g. a DNS request or an initial window of data) some Classic AQMs will not induce enough ECN marking in the L queue, no matter how long the small set of C packets waits. Then, if the L queue happens to remain busy, the C traffic would never get a scheduling opportunity from a strict priority scheduler. Ideally the Classic AQM would be designed to increase the coupled marking the longer that C packets have been waiting, but this is not always practical - hence the need for L priority to be conditional. Giving a small weight or limited waiting time for C traffic improves response times for short Classic messages, such as DNS requests, and improves Classic flow startup because immediate capacity is available.

Example DualQ Coupled AQM algorithms called DualPI2 and Curvy RED are given in Appendix A and Appendix B. Either example AQM can be used to couple packet marking and dropping across a dual Q.

DualPI2 uses a Proportional-Integral (PI) controller as the Base AQM. Indeed, this Base AQM with just the squared output and no L4S queue can be used as a drop-in replacement for PIE [RFC8033], in which case it is just called PI2 [PI2]. PI2 is a principled simplification of PIE that is both more responsive and more stable in the face of dynamically varying load.

Curvy RED is derived from RED [RFC2309], except its configuration parameters are delay-based to make them insensitive to link rate and it requires less operations per packet than RED. However, DualPI2 is more responsive and stable over a wider range of RTTs than Curvy RED. As a consequence, at the time of writing, DualPI2 has attracted more development and evaluation attention than Curvy RED, leaving the Curvy RED design not so fully evaluated.

Both AQMs regulate their queue in units of time rather than bytes. As already explained, this ensures configuration can be invariant for different drain rates. With AQMs in a dualQ structure this is particularly important because the drain rate of each queue can vary rapidly as flows for the two queues arrive and depart, even if the combined link rate is constant.

It would be possible to control the queues with other alternative AQMs, as long as the normative requirements (those expressed in capitals) in Section 2.5 are observed.

The two queues could optionally be part of a larger queuing hierarchy, such as the initial example ideas in [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv].

2.5. Normative Requirements for a DualQ Coupled AQM

The following requirements are intended to capture only the essential aspects of a DualQ Coupled AQM. They are intended to be independent of the particular AQMs used for each queue.

2.5.1. Functional Requirements

A Dual Queue Coupled AQM implementation **MUST** comply with the prerequisite L4S behaviours for any L4S network node (not just a DualQ) as specified in section 5 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. These primarily concern classification and remarking as briefly summarized in Section 2.3 earlier. But there is also a subsection (5.5) giving guidance on reducing the burstiness of the link technology underlying any L4S AQM.

A Dual Queue Coupled AQM implementation **MUST** utilize two queues, each with an AQM algorithm.

The AQM algorithm for the low latency (L) queue **MUST** be able to apply ECN marking to ECN-capable packets.

The scheduler draining the two queues **MUST** give L4S packets priority over Classic, although priority **MUST** be bounded in order not to starve Classic traffic (see Section 4.2.2). The scheduler **SHOULD** be work-conserving, or otherwise close to work-conserving. This is because Classic traffic needs to be able to efficiently fill any space left by L4S traffic even though the scheduler would otherwise allocate it to L4S.

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] defines the meaning of an ECN marking on L4S traffic, relative to drop of Classic traffic. In order to ensure coexistence of Classic and Scalable L4S traffic, it says, "The likelihood that an AQM drops a Not-ECT Classic packet (p_C) **MUST** be roughly proportional to the square of the likelihood that it would have marked it if it had been an L4S packet (p_L)." The term 'likelihood' is used to allow for marking and dropping to be either probabilistic or deterministic.

For the current specification, this translates into the following requirement. A DualQ Coupled AQM **MUST** apply ECN marking to traffic in the L queue that is no lower than that derived from the likelihood of drop (or ECN marking) in the Classic queue using Eqn. (1).

The constant of proportionality, k , in Eqn (1) determines the relative flow rates of Classic and L4S flows when the AQM concerned is the bottleneck (all other factors being equal). The L4S ECN protocol [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] says, "The constant of proportionality (k) does not have to be standardised for interoperability, but a value of 2 is RECOMMENDED."

Assuming Scalable congestion controls for the Internet will be as aggressive as DCTCP, this will ensure their congestion window will be roughly the same as that of a standards track TCP Reno congestion control (Reno) [RFC5681] and other Reno-friendly controls, such as TCP Cubic in its Reno-compatibility mode.

The choice of k is a matter of operator policy, and operators **MAY** choose a different value using the guidelines in Appendix C.2.

If multiple customers or users share capacity at a bottleneck (e.g. in the Internet access link of a campus network), the operator's choice of k will determine capacity sharing between the flows of different customers. However, on the public Internet, access network operators typically isolate customers from each other with some form of layer-2 multiplexing (OFDM(A) in DOCSIS3.1, CDMA in 3G, SC-FDMA in LTE) or L3 scheduling (WRR in DSL), rather than relying on host congestion controls to share capacity between customers [RFC0970]. In such cases, the choice of k will solely affect relative flow rates within each customer's access capacity, not between customers. Also, k will not affect relative flow rates at any times when all flows are Classic or all flows are L4S, and it will not affect the relative throughput of small flows.

2.5.1.1. Requirements in Unexpected Cases

The flexibility to allow operator-specific classifiers (Section 2.3) leads to the need to specify what the AQM in each queue ought to do with packets that do not carry the ECN field expected for that queue. It is expected that the AQM in each queue will inspect the ECN field to determine what sort of congestion notification to signal, then it will decide whether to apply congestion notification to this particular packet, as follows:

- * If a packet that does not carry an ECT(1) or CE codepoint is classified into the L queue:

- if the packet is ECT(0), the L AQM SHOULD apply CE-marking using a probability appropriate to Classic congestion control and appropriate to the target delay in the L queue
- if the packet is Not-ECT, the appropriate action depends on whether some other function is protecting the L queue from misbehaving flows (e.g. per-flow queue protection [I-D.briscoe-docsis-q-protection] or latency policing):
 - o If separate queue protection is provided, the L AQM SHOULD ignore the packet and forward it unchanged, meaning it should not calculate whether to apply congestion notification and it should neither drop nor CE-mark the packet (for instance, the operator might classify EF traffic that is unresponsive to drop into the L queue, alongside responsive L4S-ECN traffic)
 - o if separate queue protection is not provided, the L AQM SHOULD apply drop using a drop probability appropriate to Classic congestion control and appropriate to the target delay in the L queue
- * If a packet that carries an ECT(1) codepoint is classified into the C queue:
 - the C AQM SHOULD apply CE-marking using the coupled AQM probability p_{CL} ($= k \cdot p'$).

The above requirements are worded as "SHOULDs", because operator-specific classifiers are for flexibility, by definition. Therefore, alternative actions might be appropriate in the operator's specific circumstances. An example would be where the operator knows that certain legacy traffic marked with one codepoint actually has a congestion response associated with another codepoint.

If the DualQ Coupled AQM has detected overload, it MUST introduce Classic drop to both types of ECN-capable traffic until the overload episode has subsided. Introducing drop if ECN marking is persistently high is recommended by Section 7 of the ECN specification [RFC3168] and Section 4.2.1 of the AQM Recommendations [RFC7567].

2.5.2. Management Requirements

2.5.2.1. Configuration

By default, a DualQ Coupled AQM SHOULD NOT need any configuration for use at a bottleneck on the public Internet [RFC7567]. The following parameters MAY be operator-configurable, e.g. to tune for non-Internet settings:

- * Optional packet classifier(s) to use in addition to the ECN field (see Section 2.3);
- * Expected typical RTT, which can be used to determine the queuing delay of the Classic AQM at its operating point, in order to prevent typical lone flows from under-utilizing capacity. For example:
 - for the PI2 algorithm (Appendix A) the queuing delay target is dependent on the typical RTT;
 - for the Curvy RED algorithm (Appendix B) the queuing delay at the desired operating point of the curvy ramp is configured to encompass a typical RTT;
 - if another Classic AQM was used, it would be likely to need an operating point for the queue based on the typical RTT, and if so it SHOULD be expressed in units of time.

An operating point that is manually calculated might be directly configurable instead, e.g. for links with large numbers of flows where under-utilization by a single flow would be unlikely.

- * Expected maximum RTT, which can be used to set the stability parameter(s) of the Classic AQM. For example:
 - for the PI2 algorithm (Appendix A), the gain parameters of the PI algorithm depend on the maximum RTT.
 - for the Curvy RED algorithm (Appendix B) the smoothing parameter is chosen to filter out transients in the queue within a maximum RTT.

Stability parameter(s) that are manually calculated assuming a maximum RTT might be directly configurable instead.

- * Coupling factor, k (see Appendix C.2);
- * A limit to the conditional priority of L4S. This is scheduler-dependent, but it SHOULD be expressed as a relation between the max delay of a C packet and an L packet. For example:

- for a WRR scheduler a weight ratio between L and C of $w:1$ means that the maximum delay to a C packet is w times that of an L packet.
 - for a time-shifted FIFO (TS-FIFO) scheduler (see Section 4.2.2) a time-shift of $tshift$ means that the maximum delay to a C packet is $tshift$ greater than that of an L packet. $tshift$ could be expressed as a multiple of the typical RTT rather than as an absolute delay.
- * The maximum Classic ECN marking probability, p_{Cmax} , before introducing drop.

2.5.2.2. Monitoring

An experimental DualQ Coupled AQM SHOULD allow the operator to monitor each of the following operational statistics on demand, per queue and per configurable sample interval, for performance monitoring and perhaps also for accounting in some cases:

- * Bits forwarded, from which utilization can be calculated;
- * Total packets in the three categories: arrived, presented to the AQM, and forwarded. The difference between the first two will measure any non-AQM tail discard. The difference between the last two will measure proactive AQM discard;
- * ECN packets marked, non-ECN packets dropped, ECN packets dropped, which can be combined with the three total packet counts above to calculate marking and dropping probabilities;
- * Queue delay (not including serialization delay of the head packet or medium acquisition delay) - see further notes below.

Unlike the other statistics, queue delay cannot be captured in a simple accumulating counter. Therefore the type of queue delay statistics produced (mean, percentiles, etc.) will depend on implementation constraints. To facilitate comparative evaluation of different implementations and approaches, an implementation SHOULD allow mean and 99th percentile queue delay to be derived (per queue per sample interval). A relatively simple way to do this would be to store a coarse-grained histogram of queue delay. This could be done with a small number of bins with configurable edges that represent contiguous ranges of queue delay. Then, over a sample interval, each bin would accumulate a count of the number of packets that had fallen within each range. The maximum queue delay per queue per interval MAY also be recorded, to aid diagnosis of faults and anomalous events.

2.5.2.3. Anomaly Detection

An experimental DualQ Coupled AQM SHOULD asynchronously report the following data about anomalous conditions:

- * Start-time and duration of overload state.

A hysteresis mechanism SHOULD be used to prevent flapping in and out of overload causing an event storm. For instance, exit from overload state could trigger one report, but also latch a timer. Then, during that time, if the AQM enters and exits overload state any number of times, the duration in overload state is accumulated but no new report is generated until the first time the AQM is out of overload once the timer has expired.

2.5.2.4. Deployment, Coexistence and Scaling

[RFC5706] suggests that deployment, coexistence and scaling should also be covered as management requirements. The raison d'être of the DualQ Coupled AQM is to enable deployment and coexistence of Scalable congestion controls - as incremental replacements for today's Reno-friendly controls that do not scale with bandwidth-delay product. Therefore there is no need to repeat these motivating issues here given they are already explained in the Introduction and detailed in the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch].

The descriptions of specific DualQ Coupled AQM algorithms in the appendices cover scaling of their configuration parameters, e.g. with respect to RTT and sampling frequency.

3. IANA Considerations (to be removed by RFC Editor)

This specification contains no IANA considerations.

4. Security Considerations

4.1. Low Delay without Requiring Per-Flow Processing

The L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] compares the DualQ and per-flow-queuing (FQ) approaches to L4S. The privacy considerations section in that document motivates the DualQ on the grounds that users who want to encrypt application flow identifiers, e.g. in IPSec or other encrypted VPN tunnels, don't have to sacrifice low delay ([RFC8404] encourages avoidance of such privacy compromises).

The security considerations section of the L4S architecture also includes subsections on policing of relative flow-rates (section 8.1) and on policing of flows that cause excessive queuing delay (section 8.2). It explains that the interests of users do not collide in the same way for delay as they do for bandwidth. For someone to get more of the bandwidth of a shared link, someone else necessarily gets less (a 'zero-sum game'), whereas queuing delay can be reduced for everyone, without any need for someone else to lose out. It also explains that, on the current Internet, scheduling usually enforces separation between 'sites' (e.g. households, businesses or mobile users), but it is not common to need to schedule or police individual application flows.

By the above arguments, per-flow policing might not be necessary and in trusted environments it is certainly unlikely to be needed. Therefore, because it is hard to avoid complexity and unintended side-effects with per-flow policing, it needs to be separable from a basic AQM, as an option, under policy control. On this basis, the DualQ Coupled AQM provides low delay without prejudging the question of per-flow policing.

Nonetheless, the interests of users or flows might conflict, e.g. in case of accident or malice. Then per-flow control could be necessary. If flow-rate control is needed, it can be provided as a modular addition to a DualQ. And similarly, if protection against excessive queue delay is needed, a per-flow queue protection option can be added to a DualQ (e.g. [I-D.briscoe-docsis-q-protection]).

4.2. Handling Unresponsive Flows and Overload

In the absence of any per-flow control, it is important that the basic DualQ Coupled AQM gives unresponsive flows no more throughput advantage than a single-queue AQM would, and that it at least handles overload situations. Overload means that incoming load significantly or persistently exceeds output capacity, but it is not intended to be a precise term -- significant and persistent are matters of degree.

A trade-off needs to be made between complexity and the risk of either traffic class harming the other. In overloaded conditions the higher priority L4S service will have to sacrifice some aspect of its performance. Depending on the degree of overload, alternative solutions may relax a different factor: e.g. throughput, delay, drop. These choices need to be made either by the developer or by operator policy, rather than by the IETF. Subsequent subsections discuss aspects relating to handling of different degrees of overload:

- * Unresponsive flows (L and/or C) but not overloaded, i.e. the sum of unresponsive load before adding any responsive traffic is below capacity;

This case is handled by the regular Coupled DualQ (Section 2.1) but not discussed there. So below, Section 4.2.1 explains the design goal, and how it is achieved in practice;

- * Unresponsive flows (L and/or C) causing persistent overload, i.e. the sum of unresponsive load even before adding any responsive traffic persistently exceeds capacity;

This case is not covered by the regular Coupled DualQ mechanism (Section 2.1) but the last para in Section 2.5.1.1 sets out a requirement to handle the case where ECN-capable traffic could starve non-ECN-capable traffic. Section 4.2.3 below discusses the general options and gives specific examples.

- * Short-term overload that lies between the 'not overloaded' and 'persistently overloaded' cases.

For the period before overload is deemed persistent, Section 4.2.2 discusses options for more immediate mechanisms at the scheduler timescale. These prevent short-term starvation of the C queue by making the priority of the L queue conditional, as required in Section 2.5.1.

4.2.1. Unresponsive Traffic without Overload

When one or more L flows and/or C flows are unresponsive, but their total load is within the link capacity so that they do not saturate the coupled marking (below 100%), the goal of a DualQ AQM is to behave no worse than a single-queue AQM.

Tests have shown that this is indeed the case with no additional mechanism beyond the regular Coupled DualQ of Section 2.1 (see the results of 'overload experiments' in [DCttH19]). Perhaps counter-intuitively, whether the unresponsive flow classifies itself into the L or the C queue, the DualQ system behaves as if it has subtracted from the overall link capacity. Then, the coupling shares out the remaining capacity between any competing responsive flows (in either queue). See also Section 4.2.2, which discusses scheduler-specific details.

4.2.2. Avoiding Short-Term Classic Starvation: Sacrifice L4S Throughput or Delay?

Priority of L4S is required to be conditional (see Section 2.4 & Section 2.5.1) to avoid short-term starvation of Classic. Otherwise, as explained in Section 2.4, even a lone responsive L4S flow could temporarily block a small finite set of C packets (e.g. an initial window or DNS request). The blockage would only be brief, but it could be longer for certain AQM implementations that can only increase the congestion signal coupled from the C queue when C packets are actually being dequeued. There is then the question of whether to sacrifice L4S throughput or L4S delay (or some other policy) to make the priority conditional:

Sacrifice L4S throughput: By using weighted round robin as the conditional priority scheduler, the L4S service can sacrifice some throughput during overload. This can either be thought of as guaranteeing a minimum throughput service for Classic traffic, or as guaranteeing a maximum delay for a packet at the head of the Classic queue.

Cautionary note: a WRR scheduler can only guarantee Classic throughput if Classic sources are sending enough to use it -- congestion signals can undermine scheduling because they determine how much responsive traffic of each class arrives for scheduling in the first place. This is why scheduling is only relied on to handle short-term starvation; until congestion signals build up and the sources react. Even during long-term overload (discussed more fully in Section 4.2.3), it's pragmatic to discard packets from both queues, which again thins the traffic before it reaches the scheduler. This is because a scheduler cannot be relied on to handle long-term overload since the right scheduler weight cannot be known for every scenario.

The scheduling weight of the Classic queue should be small (e.g. 1/16). In most traffic scenarios the scheduler will not interfere and it will not need to, because the coupling mechanism and the end-systems will determine the share of capacity across both queues as if it were a single pool. However, if L4S traffic is over-aggressive or unresponsive, the scheduler weight for Classic traffic will at least be large enough to ensure it does not starve in the short-term.

Although WRR scheduling is only expected to address short-term overload, there are (somewhat rare) cases when WRR has an effect on capacity shares over longer time-scales. But its effect is minor, and it certainly does no harm. Specifically, in cases where the ratio of L4S to Classic flows (e.g. 19:1) is greater

than the ratio of their scheduler weights (e.g. 15:1), the L4S flows will get less than an equal share of the capacity, but only slightly. For instance, with the example numbers given, each L4S flow will get $(15/16)/19 = 4.9\%$ when ideally each would get $1/20=5\%$. In the rather specific case of an unresponsive flow taking up just less than the capacity set aside for L4S (e.g. 14/16 in the above example), using WRR could significantly reduce the capacity left for any responsive L4S flows.

The scheduling weight of the Classic queue should not be too small, otherwise a C packet at the head of the queue could be excessively delayed by a continually busy L queue. For instance if the Classic weight is 1/16, the maximum that a Classic packet at the head of the queue can be delayed by L traffic is the serialization delay of 15 MTU-sized packets.

Sacrifice L4S Delay: The operator could choose to control overload of the Classic queue by allowing some delay to 'leak' across to the L4S queue. The scheduler can be made to behave like a single First-In First-Out (FIFO) queue with different service times by implementing a very simple conditional priority scheduler that could be called a "time-shifted FIFO" (see the Modifier Earliest Deadline First (MEDF) scheduler [MEDF]). This scheduler adds t_{shift} to the queue delay of the next L4S packet, before comparing it with the queue delay of the next Classic packet, then it selects the packet with the greater adjusted queue delay.

Under regular conditions, this time-shifted FIFO scheduler behaves just like a strict priority scheduler. But under moderate or high overload it prevents starvation of the Classic queue, because the time-shift (t_{shift}) defines the maximum extra queuing delay of Classic packets relative to L4S. This would control milder overload of responsive traffic by introducing delay to defer invoking the overload mechanisms in Section 4.2.3, particularly when close to the maximum congestion signal.

The example implementations in Appendix A and Appendix B could both be implemented with either policy.

4.2.3. L4S ECN Saturation: Introduce Drop or Delay?

This section concerns persistent overload caused by unresponsive L and/or C flows. To keep the throughput of both L4S and Classic flows roughly equal over the full load range, a different control strategy needs to be defined above the point where the L4S AQM persistently saturates to an ECN marking probability of 100% leaving no room to push back the load any harder. L4S ECN marking will saturate first (assuming the coupling factor $k>1$), even though saturation could be

caused by the sum of unresponsive traffic in either or both queues exceeding the link capacity.

The term 'unresponsive' includes cases where a flow becomes temporarily unresponsive, for instance, a real-time flow that takes a while to adapt its rate in response to congestion, or a standard Reno flow that is normally responsive, but above a certain congestion level it will not be able to reduce its congestion window below the allowed minimum of 2 segments [RFC5681], effectively becoming unresponsive. (Note that L4S traffic ought to remain responsive below a window of 2 segments (see the L4S requirements [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id])).

Saturation raises the question of whether to relieve congestion by introducing some drop into the L4S queue or by allowing delay to grow in both queues (which could eventually lead to drop due to buffer exhaustion anyway):

Drop on Saturation: Persistent saturation can be defined by a maximum threshold for coupled L4S ECN marking (assuming $k > 1$) before saturation starts to make the flow rates of the different traffic types diverge. Above that, the drop probability of Classic traffic is applied to all packets of all traffic types. Then experiments have shown that queueing delay can be kept at the target in any overload situation, including with unresponsive traffic, and no further measures are required (Section 4.2.3.1).

Delay on Saturation: When L4S marking saturates, instead of introducing L4S drop, the drop and marking probabilities of both queues could be capped. Beyond that, delay will grow either solely in the queue with unresponsive traffic (if WRR is used), or in both queues (if time-shifted FIFO is used). In either case, the higher delay ought to control temporary high congestion. If the overload is more persistent, eventually the combined DualQ will overflow and tail drop will control congestion.

The example implementation in Appendix A solely applies the "drop on saturation" policy. The DOCSIS specification of a DualQ Coupled AQM [DOCSIS3.1] also implements the 'drop on saturation' policy with a very shallow L buffer. However, the addition of DOCSIS per-flow Queue Protection [I-D.briscoe-docsis-q-protection] turns this into 'delay on saturation' by redirecting some packets of the flow(s) most responsible for L queue overload into the C queue, which has a higher delay target. If overload continues, this again becomes 'drop on saturation' as the level of drop in the C queue rises to maintain the target delay of the C queue.

4.2.3.1. Protecting against Overload by Unresponsive ECN-Capable Traffic

Without a specific overload mechanism, unresponsive traffic would have a greater advantage if it were also ECN-capable. The advantage is undetectable at normal low levels of marking. However, it would become significant with the higher levels of marking typical during overload, when it could evade a significant degree of drop. This is an issue whether the ECN-capable traffic is L4S or Classic.

This raises the question of whether and when to introduce drop of ECN-capable traffic, as required by both Section 7 of the ECN spec [RFC3168] and Section 4.2.1 of the AQM recommendations [RFC7567].

As an example, experiments with the DualPI2 AQM (Appendix A) have shown that introducing 'drop on saturation' at 100% coupled L4S marking addresses this problem with unresponsive ECN as well as addressing the saturation problem. At saturation, DualPI2 switches into overload mode, where the base AQM is driven by the max delay of both queues and it introduces probabilistic drop to both queues equally. It leaves only a small range of congestion levels just below saturation where unresponsive traffic gains any advantage from using the ECN capability (relative to being unresponsive without ECN), and the advantage is hardly detectable (see [DualQ-Test] and section IV-E of [DCttH19]). Also overload with an unresponsive ECT(1) flow gets no more bandwidth advantage than with ECT(0).

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6. Contributors

The following contributed implementations and evaluations that validated and helped to improve this specification:

Olga Albisser <olga@albisser.org> of Simula Research Lab, Norway (Olga Bondarenko during early drafts) implemented the prototype DualPI2 AQM for Linux with Koen De Schepper and conducted extensive evaluations as well as implementing the live performance visualization GUI [L4Sdemo16].

Olivier Tilmans <olivier.tilmans@nokia-bell-labs.com> of Nokia Bell Labs, Belgium prepared and maintains the Linux implementation of DualPI2 for upstreaming.

Shravya K.S. wrote a model for the ns-3 simulator based on the -01 version of this Internet-Draft. Based on this initial work, Tom Henderson <tomh@tomh.org> updated that earlier model and created a model for the DualQ variant specified as part of the Low Latency DOCSIS specification, as well as conducting extensive evaluations.

Ing Jyh (Inton) Tsang of Nokia, Belgium built the End-to-End Data Centre to the Home broadband testbed on which DualQ Coupled AQM implementations were tested.

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Appendix A. Example DualQ Coupled PI2 Algorithm

As a first concrete example, the pseudocode below gives the DualPI2 algorithm. DualPI2 follows the structure of the DualQ Coupled AQM framework in Figure 1. A simple ramp function (configured in units of queuing time) with unsmoothed ECN marking is used for the Native L4S AQM. The ramp can also be configured as a step function. The PI2 algorithm [PI2] is used for the Classic AQM. PI2 is an improved variant of the PIE AQM [RFC8033].

The pseudocode will be introduced in two passes. The first pass explains the core concepts, deferring handling of edge-cases like overload to the second pass. To aid comparison, line numbers are kept in step between the two passes by using letter suffixes where the longer code needs extra lines.

All variables are assumed to be floating point in their basic units (size in bytes, time in seconds, rates in bytes/second, alpha and beta in Hz, and probabilities from 0 to 1. Constants expressed in k (kilo), M (mega), G (giga), u (micro), m (milli) , %, ... are assumed to be converted to their appropriate multiple or fraction to represent the basic units. A real implementation that wants to use integer values needs to handle appropriate scaling factors and allow accordingly appropriate resolution of its integer types (including temporary internal values during calculations).

A full open source implementation for Linux is available at: https://github.com/L4STeam/sch_dualpi2_upstream and explained in [DualPI2Linux]. The specification of the DualQ Coupled AQM for DOCSIS cable modems and CMTSS is available in [DOCSIS3.1] and explained in [LLD].

A.1. Pass #1: Core Concepts

The pseudocode manipulates three main structures of variables: the packet (pkt), the L4S queue (lq) and the Classic queue (cq). The pseudocode consists of the following six functions:

- * The initialization function `dualpi2_params_init(...)` (Figure 2) that sets parameter defaults (the API for setting non-default values is omitted for brevity)
- * The enqueue function `dualpi2_enqueue(lq, cq, pkt)` (Figure 3)
- * The dequeue function `dualpi2_dequeue(lq, cq, pkt)` (Figure 4)
- * The recurrence function `recur(q, likelihood)` for de-randomized ECN marking (shown at the end of Figure 4).
- * The L4S AQM function `laqm(qdelay)` (Figure 5) used to calculate the ECN-marking probability for the L4S queue
- * The base AQM function that implements the PI algorithm `dualpi2_update(lq, cq)` (Figure 6) used to regularly update the base probability (p'), which is squared for the Classic AQM as well as being coupled across to the L4S queue.

It also uses the following functions that are not shown in full here:

- * `scheduler()`, which selects between the head packets of the two queues; the choice of scheduler technology is discussed later;
- * `cq.bytest()` or `lq.bytest()` returns the current length (aka. backlog) of the relevant queue in bytes;
- * `cq.len()` or `lq.len()` returns the current length of the relevant queue in packets;
- * `cq.time()` or `lq.time()` returns the current queuing delay (aka. sojourn time or service time) of the relevant queue in units of time (see Note a);
- * `mark(pkt)` and `drop(pkt)` for ECN-marking and dropping a packet;

In experiments so far (building on experiments with PIE) on broadband access links ranging from 4 Mb/s to 200 Mb/s with base RTTs from 5 ms to 100 ms, DualPI2 achieves good results with the default parameters in Figure 2. The parameters are categorised by whether they relate to the Base PI2 AQM, the L4S AQM or the framework coupling them together. Constants and variables derived from these parameters are also included at the end of each category. Each parameter is explained as it is encountered in the walk-through of the pseudocode below, and the rationale for the chosen defaults are given so that sensible values can be used in scenarios other than the regular public Internet.

```

1:  dualpi2_params_init(...) {           % Set input parameter defaults
2:      % DualQ Coupled framework parameters
5:      limit = MAX_LINK_RATE * 250 ms    % Dual buffer size
3:      k = 2                             % Coupling factor
4:      % NOT SHOWN % scheduler-dependent weight or equival't parameter
6:
7:      % PI2 Classic AQM parameters
8:      target = 15 ms                     % Queue delay target
9:      RTT_max = 100 ms                   % Worst case RTT expected
10:     % PI2 constants derived from above PI2 parameters
11:     p_Cmax = min(1/k^2, 1)              % Max Classic drop/mark prob
12:     Tupdate = min(target, RTT_max/3)    % PI sampling interval
13:     alpha = 0.1 * Tupdate / RTT_max^2   % PI integral gain in Hz
14:     beta = 0.3 / RTT_max                % PI proportional gain in Hz
15:
16:     % L4S ramp AQM parameters
17:     minTh = 800 us                      % L4S min marking threshold in time units
18:     range = 400 us                      % Range of L4S ramp in time units
19:     Th_len = 1 pkt                      % Min L4S marking threshold in packets
20:     % L4S constants
21:     p_Lmax = 1                          % Max L4S marking prob
22: }
```

Figure 2: Example Header Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled PI2 AQM

The overall goal of the code is to apply the marking and dropping probabilities for L4S and Classic traffic (p_L and p_C). These are derived from the underlying base probabilities p'_L and p' driven respectively by the traffic in the L and C queues. The marking probability for the L queue (p_L) depends on both the base probability in its own queue (p'_L) and a probability called p_{CL} , which is coupled across from p' in the C queue (see Section 2.4 for the derivation of the specific equations and dependencies).

The probabilities p_{CL} and p_C are derived in lines 4 and 5 of the `dualpi2_update()` function (Figure 6) then used in the `dualpi2_dequeue()` function where p_L is also derived from p_{CL} at line 6 (Figure 4). The code walk-through below builds up to explaining that part of the code eventually, but it starts from packet arrival.

```

1: dualpi2_enqueue(lq, cq, pkt) { % Test limit and classify lq or cq
2:   if ( lq.byt() + cq.byt() + MTU > limit)
3:     drop(pkt) % drop packet if buffer is full
4:   timestamp(pkt) % attach arrival time to packet
5:   % Packet classifier
6:   if ( ecn(pkt) modulo 2 == 1 ) % ECN bits = ECT(1) or CE
7:     lq.enqueue(pkt)
8:   else % ECN bits = not-ECT or ECT(0)
9:     cq.enqueue(pkt)
10: }

```

Figure 3: Example Enqueue Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled PI2 AQM

```

1: dualpi2_dequeue(lq, cq, pkt) { % Couples L4S & Classic queues
2:   while ( lq.byt() + cq.byt() > 0 ) {
3:     if ( scheduler() == lq ) {
4:       lq.dequeue(pkt) % Scheduler chooses lq
5:       p'_L = laqm(lq.time()) % Native LAQM
6:       p_L = max(p'_L, p_CL) % Combining function
7:       if ( recur(lq, p_L) ) % Linear marking
8:         mark(pkt)
9:     } else {
10:      cq.dequeue(pkt) % Scheduler chooses cq
11:      if ( recur(cq, p_C) ) { % probability p_C = p'^2
12:        if ( ecn(pkt) == 0 ) { % if ECN field = not-ECT
13:          drop(pkt) % squared drop
14:          continue % continue to the top of the while loop
15:        }
16:        mark(pkt) % squared mark
17:      }
18:    }
19:    return(pkt) % return the packet and stop
20:  }
21:  return(NULL) % no packet to dequeue
22: }

23: recur(q, likelihood) { % Returns TRUE with a certain likelihood
24:   q.count += likelihood
25:   if (q.count > 1) {
26:     q.count -= 1
27:     return TRUE
28:   }
29:   return FALSE
30: }

```

Figure 4: Example Dequeue Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled PI2 AQM

When packets arrive, first a common queue limit is checked as shown in line 2 of the enqueueing pseudocode in Figure 3. This assumes a shared buffer for the two queues (Note b discusses the merits of separate buffers). In order to avoid any bias against larger packets, 1 MTU of space is always allowed and the limit is deliberately tested before enqueue.

If limit is not exceeded, the packet is timestamped in line 4. This assumes that queue delay is measured using the sojourn time technique (see Note a for alternatives).

At lines 5-9, the packet is classified and enqueued to the Classic or L4S queue dependent on the least significant bit of the ECN field in the IP header (line 6). Packets with a codepoint having an LSB of 0 (Not-ECT and ECT(0)) will be enqueued in the Classic queue. Otherwise, ECT(1) and CE packets will be enqueued in the L4S queue. Optional additional packet classification flexibility is omitted for brevity (see the L4S ECN protocol [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]).

The dequeue pseudocode (Figure 4) is repeatedly called whenever the lower layer is ready to forward a packet. It schedules one packet for dequeuing (or zero if the queue is empty) then returns control to the caller, so that it does not block while that packet is being forwarded. While making this dequeue decision, it also makes the necessary AQM decisions on dropping or marking. The alternative of applying the AQMs at enqueue would shift some processing from the critical time when each packet is dequeued. However, it would also add a whole queue of delay to the control signals, making the control loop sloppier (for a typical RTT it would double the Classic queue's feedback delay).

All the dequeue code is contained within a large while loop so that if it decides to drop a packet, it will continue until it selects a packet to schedule. Line 3 of the dequeue pseudocode is where the scheduler chooses between the L4S queue (lq) and the Classic queue (cq). Detailed implementation of the scheduler is not shown (see discussion later).

- * If an L4S packet is scheduled, in lines 7 and 8 the packet is ECN-marked with likelihood p_L . The `recur()` function at the end of Figure 4 is used, which is preferred over random marking because it avoids delay due to randomization when interpreting congestion signals, but it still desynchronizes the saw-teeth of the flows. Line 6 calculates p_L as the maximum of the coupled L4S probability p_{CL} and the probability from the native L4S AQM p'_L . This implements the `max()` function shown in Figure 1 to couple the outputs of the two AQMs together. Of the two probabilities input to p_L in line 6:

- p'_L is calculated per packet in line 5 by the `laqm()` function (see Figure 5),
 - Whereas p_{CL} is maintained by the `dualpi2_update()` function which runs every `Tupdate` (`Tupdate` is set in line 12 of Figure 2).
- * If a Classic packet is scheduled, lines 10 to 17 drop or mark the packet with probability p_C .

The Native L4S AQM algorithm (Figure 5) is a ramp function, similar to the RED algorithm, but simplified as follows:

- * The extent of the ramp is defined in units of queuing delay, not bytes, so that configuration remains invariant as the queue departure rate varies.
- * It uses instantaneous queueing delay, which avoids the complexity of smoothing, but also avoids embedding a worst-case RTT of smoothing delay in the network (see Section 2.1).
- * The ramp rises linearly directly from 0 to 1, not to an intermediate value of p'_L as RED would, because there is no need to keep ECN marking probability low.
- * Marking does not have to be randomized. Determinism is used instead of randomness; to reduce the delay necessary to smooth out the noise of randomness from the signal.

The ramp function requires two configuration parameters, the minimum threshold (`minTh`) and the width of the ramp (`range`), both in units of queuing time, as shown in lines 17 & 18 of the initialization function in Figure 2. The ramp function can be configured as a step (see Note c).

Although the DCTCP paper [Alizadeh-stability] recommends an ECN marking threshold of $0.17 \cdot RTT_{typ}$, it also shows that the threshold can be much shallower with hardly any worse under-utilization of the link (because the amplitude of DCTCP's sawteeth is so small). Based on extensive experiments, for the public Internet the default minimum ECN marking threshold (`target`) in Figure 2 is considered a good compromise, even though it is significantly smaller fraction of RTT_{typ} .

```

1: laqm(qdelay) {                                % Returns native L4S AQM probability
2:   if (qdelay >= maxTh)
3:     return 1
4:   else if (qdelay > minTh)
5:     return (qdelay - minTh)/range % Divide could use a bit-shift
6:   else
7:     return 0
8: }

```

Figure 5: Example Pseudocode for the Native L4S AQM

```

1: dualpi2_update(lq, cq) {                      % Update p' every Tupdate
2:   curq = cq.time() % use queuing time of first-in Classic packet
3:   p' = p' + alpha * (curq - target) + beta * (curq - prevq)
4:   p_CL = k * p' % Coupled L4S prob = base prob * coupling factor
5:   p_C = p'^2 % Classic prob = (base prob)^2
6:   prevq = curq
7: }

```

Figure 6: Example PI-Update Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled PI2 AQM

(Clamping p' within the range $[0,1]$ omitted for clarity - see text)

The coupled marking probability, p_{CL} depends on the base probability (p'), which is kept up to date by the core PI algorithm in Figure 6 executed every Tupdate.

Note that p' solely depends on the queuing time in the Classic queue. In line 2, the current queuing delay ($curq$) is evaluated from how long the head packet was in the Classic queue (cq). The function $cq.time()$ (not shown) subtracts the time stamped at enqueue from the current time (see Note a) and implicitly takes the current queuing delay as 0 if the queue is empty.

The algorithm centres on line 3, which is a classical Proportional-Integral (PI) controller that alters p' dependent on: a) the error between the current queuing delay ($curq$) and the target queuing delay, 'target'; and b) the change in queuing delay since the last sample. The name 'PI' represents the fact that the second factor (how fast the queue is growing) is $_P_roportional$ to load while the first is the $_I_ntegral$ of the load (so it removes any standing queue in excess of the target).

The target parameter can be set based on local knowledge, but the aim is for the default to be a good compromise for anywhere in the intended deployment environment -- the public Internet. According to [PI2param], the target queuing delay on line 9 of Figure 2 is related

to the typical base RTT worldwide, RTT_{typ} , by two factors: $target = RTT_{typ} * g * f$. Below we summarize the rationale behind these factors and introduce a further adjustment. The two factors ensure that, in a large proportion of cases (say 90%), the sawtooth variations in RTT of a single flow will fit within the buffer without underutilizing the link. Frankly, these factors are educated guesses, but with the emphasis closer to 'educated' than to 'guess' (see [PI2param] for full background):

- * RTT_{typ} is taken as 25 ms. This is based on an average CDN latency measured in each country weighted by the number of Internet users in that country to produce an overall weighted average for the Internet [PI2param]. Countries were ranked by number of Internet users, and once 90% of Internet users were covered, smaller countries were excluded to avoid unrepresentatively small sample sizes. Also, importantly, the data for the average CDN latency in China (with the largest number of Internet users) has been removed, because the CDN latency was a significant outlier and, on reflection, the experimental technique seemed inappropriate to the CDN market in China.
- * g is taken as 0.38. The factor g is a geometry factor that characterizes the shape of the sawteeth of prevalent Classic congestion controllers. The geometry factor is the fraction of the amplitude of the sawtooth variability in queue delay that lies below the AQM's target. For instance, at low bit rate, the geometry factor of standard Reno is 0.5, but at higher rates it tends to just under 1. According to the census of congestion controllers conducted by Mishra *et al* in Jul-Oct 2019 [CCcensus19], most Classic TCP traffic uses Cubic. And, according to the analysis in [PI2param], if running over a PI2 AQM, a large proportion of this Cubic traffic would be in its Reno-Friendly mode, which has a geometry factor of ~ 0.39 (all known implementations). The rest of the Cubic traffic would be in true Cubic mode, which has a geometry factor of ~ 0.36 . Without modelling the sawtooth profiles from all the other less prevalent congestion controllers, we estimate a 7:3 weighted average of these two, resulting in an average geometry factor of 0.38.
- * f is taken as 2. The factor f is a safety factor that increases the target queue to allow for the distribution of RTT_{typ} around its mean. Otherwise the target queue would only avoid underutilization for those users below the mean. It also provides a safety margin for the proportion of paths in use that span beyond the distance between a user and their local CDN. Currently no data is available on the variance of queue delay around the mean in each region, so there is plenty of room for this guess to become more educated.

- * [PI2param] recommends $\text{target} = \text{RTT_typ} * g * f = 25\text{ms} * 0.38 * 2 = 19\text{ ms}$. However a further adjustment is warranted, because target is moving year on year. The paper is based on data collected in 2019, and it mentions evidence from speedtest.net that suggests RTT_typ reduced by 17% (fixed) or 12% (mobile) between 2020 and 2021. Therefore we recommend a default of $\text{target} = 15\text{ ms}$ at the time of writing (2021).

Operators can always use the data and discussion in [PI2param] to configure a more appropriate target for their environment. For instance, an operator might wish to question the assumptions called out in that paper, such as the goal of no underutilization for a large majority of single flow transfers (given many large transfers use multiple flows to avoid the scaling limitations of Classic flows).

The two 'gain factors' in line 3 of Figure 6, alpha and beta, respectively weight how strongly each of the two elements (Integral and Proportional) alters p' . They are in units of 'per second of delay' or Hz, because they transform differences in queueing delay into changes in probability (assuming probability has a value from 0 to 1).

Alpha and beta determine how much p' ought to change after each update interval (Tupdate). For smaller Tupdate, p' should change by the same amount per second, but in finer more frequent steps. So alpha depends on Tupdate (see line 13 of the initialization function in Figure 2). It is best to update p' as frequently as possible, but Tupdate will probably be constrained by hardware performance. As shown in line 13, the update interval should be frequent enough to update at least once in the time taken for the target queue to drain ('target') as long as it updates at least three times per maximum RTT. Tupdate defaults to 16 ms in the reference Linux implementation because it has to be rounded to a multiple of 4 ms. For link rates from 4 to 200 Mb/s and a maximum RTT of 100ms, it has been verified through extensive testing that Tupdate=16ms (as also recommended in the PIE spec [RFC8033]) is sufficient.

The choice of alpha and beta also determines the AQM's stable operating range. The AQM ought to change p' as fast as possible in response to changes in load without over-compensating and therefore causing oscillations in the queue. Therefore, the values of alpha and beta also depend on the RTT of the expected worst-case flow (RTT_max).

The maximum RTT of a PI controller (RTT_max in line 10 of Figure 2) is not an absolute maximum, but more instability (more queue variability) sets in for long-running flows with an RTT above this

value. The propagation delay half way round the planet and back in glass fibre is 200 ms. However, hardly any traffic traverses such extreme paths and, since the significant consolidation of Internet traffic between 2007 and 2009 [Labovitz10], a high and growing proportion of all Internet traffic (roughly two-thirds at the time of writing) has been served from content distribution networks (CDNs) or 'cloud' services distributed close to end-users. The Internet might change again, but for now, designing for a maximum RTT of 100ms is a good compromise between faster queue control at low RTT and some instability on the occasions when a longer path is necessary.

Recommended derivations of the gain constants alpha and beta can be approximated for Reno over a PI2 AQM as: $\alpha = 0.1 * \text{Tupdate} / \text{RTT_max}^2$; $\beta = 0.3 / \text{RTT_max}$, as shown in lines 14 & 15 of Figure 2. These are derived from the stability analysis in [PI2]. For the default values of Tupdate=16 ms and RTT_max = 100 ms, they result in $\alpha = 0.16$; $\beta = 3.2$ (discrepancies are due to rounding). These defaults have been verified with a wide range of link rates, target delays and a range of traffic models with mixed and similar RTTs, short and long flows, etc.

In corner cases, p' can overflow the range [0,1] so the resulting value of p' has to be bounded (omitted from the pseudocode). Then, as already explained, the coupled and Classic probabilities are derived from the new p' in lines 4 and 5 of Figure 6 as $p_{\text{CL}} = k * p'$ and $p_{\text{C}} = p'^2$.

Because the coupled L4S marking probability (p_{CL}) is factored up by k , the dynamic gain parameters alpha and beta are also inherently factored up by k for the L4S queue. So, the effective gain factor for the L4S queue is $k * \alpha$ (with defaults $\alpha = 0.16 \text{ Hz}$ and $k=2$, effective L4S $\alpha = 0.32 \text{ Hz}$).

Unlike in PIE [RFC8033], alpha and beta do not need to be tuned every Tupdate dependent on p' . Instead, in PI2, alpha and beta are independent of p' because the squaring applied to Classic traffic tunes them inherently. This is explained in [PI2], which also explains why this more principled approach removes the need for most of the heuristics that had to be added to PIE.

Nonetheless, an implementer might wish to add selected details to either AQM. For instance the Linux reference DualPI2 implementation includes the following (not shown in the pseudocode above):

- * Classic and coupled marking or dropping (i.e. based on p_C and p_CL from the PI controller) is not applied to a packet if the aggregate queue length in bytes is < 2 MTU (prior to enqueueing the packet or dequeuing it, depending on whether the AQM is configured to be applied at enqueue or dequeue);
- * In the WRR scheduler, the 'credit' indicating which queue should transmit is only changed if there are packets in both queues (i.e. if there is actual resource contention). This means that a properly paced L flow might never be delayed by the WRR. The WRR credit is reset in favour of the L queue when the link is idle.

An implementer might also wish to add other heuristics, e.g. burst protection [RFC8033] or enhanced burst protection [RFC8034].

Notes:

- a. The drain rate of the queue can vary if it is scheduled relative to other queues, or to cater for fluctuations in a wireless medium. To auto-adjust to changes in drain rate, the queue needs to be measured in time, not bytes or packets [AQMetrics], [CoDel]. Queuing delay could be measured directly by storing a per-packet time-stamp as each packet is enqueued, and subtracting this from the system time when the packet is dequeued. If time-stamping is not easy to introduce with certain hardware, queuing delay could be predicted indirectly by dividing the size of the queue by the predicted departure rate, which might be known precisely for some link technologies (see for example in DOCSIS PIE [RFC8034]).
- b. Line 2 of the dualpi2_enqueue() function (Figure 3) assumes an implementation where lq and cq share common buffer memory. An alternative implementation could use separate buffers for each queue, in which case the arriving packet would have to be classified first to determine which buffer to check for available space. The choice is a trade off; a shared buffer can use less memory whereas separate buffers isolate the L4S queue from tail-drop due to large bursts of Classic traffic (e.g. a Classic Reno TCP during slow-start over a long RTT).
- c. There has been some concern that using the step function of DCTCP for the Native L4S AQM requires end-systems to smooth the signal for an unnecessarily large number of round trips to ensure sufficient fidelity. A ramp is no worse than a step in initial experiments with existing DCTCP. Therefore, it is recommended that a ramp is configured in place of a step, which will allow congestion control algorithms to investigate faster smoothing algorithms.

A ramp is more general than a step, because an operator can effectively turn the ramp into a step function, as used by DCTCP, by setting the range to zero. There will not be a divide by zero problem at line 5 of Figure 5 because, if minTh is equal to maxTh, the condition for this ramp calculation cannot arise.

A.2. Pass #2: Edge-Case Details

This section takes a second pass through the pseudocode adding details of two edge-cases: low link rate and overload. Figure 7 repeats the dequeue function of Figure 4, but with details of both edge-cases added. Similarly Figure 8 repeats the core PI algorithm of Figure 6, but with overload details added. The initialization, enqueue, L4S AQM and recur functions are unchanged.

The link rate can be so low that it takes a single packet queue longer to serialize than the threshold delay at which ECN marking starts to be applied in the L queue. Therefore, a minimum marking threshold parameter in units of packets rather than time is necessary (Th_len, default 1 packet in line 19 of Figure 2) to ensure that the ramp does not trigger excessive marking on slow links. Where an implementation knows the link rate, it can set up this minimum at the time it is configured. For instance, it would divide 1 MTU by the link rate to convert it into a serialization time, then if the lower threshold of the Native L AQM ramp was lower than this serialization time, it could increase the thresholds to shift the bottom of the ramp to 2 MTU. This is the approach used in DOCSIS [DOCSIS3.1], because the configured link rate is dedicated to the DualQ.

The pseudocode given here applies where the link rate is unknown, which is more common for software implementations that might be deployed in scenarios where the link is shared with other queues. In lines 5a to 5d in Figure 7 the native L4S marking probability, p'_L , is zeroed if the queue is only 1 packet (in the default configuration).

Linux implementation note:

- * In Linux, the check that the queue exceeds Th_len before marking with the native L4S AQM is actually at enqueue, not dequeue, otherwise it would exempt the last packet of a burst from being marked. The result of the check is conveyed from enqueue to the dequeue function via a boolean in the packet metadata.

Persistent overload is deemed to have occurred when Classic drop/marking probability reaches p_{Cmax} . Above this point, the Classic drop probability is applied to both L and C queues, irrespective of whether any packet is ECN-capable. ECT packets that are not dropped can still be ECN-marked.

In line 10 of the initialization function (Figure 2), the maximum Classic drop probability $p_{Cmax} = \min(1/k^2, 1)$ or $1/4$ for the default coupling factor $k=2$. In practice, 25% has been found to be a good threshold to preserve fairness between ECN capable and non ECN capable traffic. This protects the queues against both temporary overload from responsive flows and more persistent overload from any unresponsive traffic that falsely claims to be responsive to ECN.

When the Classic ECN marking probability reaches the p_{Cmax} threshold ($1/k^2$), the marking probability coupled to the L4S queue, p_{CL} will always be 100% for any k (by equation (1) in Section 2). So, for readability, the constant p_{Lmax} is defined as 1 in line 22 of the initialization function (Figure 2). This is intended to ensure that the L4S queue starts to introduce dropping once ECN-marking saturates at 100% and can rise no further. The 'Prague L4S' requirements [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] state that, when an L4S congestion control detects a drop, it falls back to a response that coexists with 'Classic' Reno congestion control. So it is correct that, when the L4S queue drops packets, it drops them proportional to p'^2 , as if they are Classic packets.

The two queues each test for overload in lines 4b and 12b of the dequeue function (Figure 7). Lines 8c to 8g drop L4S packets with probability p'^2 . Lines 8h to 8i mark the remaining packets with probability p_{CL} . Given $p_{Lmax} = 1$, all remaining packets will be marked because, to have reached the else block at line 8b, $p_{CL} \geq 1$.

Line 2a in the core PI algorithm (Figure 8) deals with overload of the L4S queue when there is little or no Classic traffic. This is necessary, because the core PI algorithm maintains the appropriate drop probability to regulate overload, but it depends on the length of the Classic queue. If there is little or no Classic queue the naive PI update function in Figure 6 would drop nothing, even if the L4S queue were overloaded - so tail drop would have to take over (lines 2 and 3 of Figure 3).

Instead, line 2a of the full PI update function in Figure 8 ensures that the base PI AQM in line 3 is driven by whichever of the two queue delays is greater, but line 3 still always uses the same Classic target (default 15 ms). If L queue delay is greater just because there is little or no Classic traffic, normally it will still be well below the base AQM target. This is because L4S traffic is

also governed by the shallow threshold of its own native AQM (lines 5 and 6 of the dequeue algorithm in Figure 7). So the base AQM will be driven to zero and not contribute. However, if the L queue is overloaded by traffic that is unresponsive to its marking, the max() in line 2 enables the L queue to smoothly take over driving the base AQM into overload mode even if there is little or no Classic traffic. Then the base AQM will keep the L queue to the Classic target (default 15 ms) by shedding L packets.

```

1:  dualpi2_dequeue(lq, cq, pkt) {      % Couples L4S & Classic queues
2:    while ( lq.by() + cq.by() > 0 ) {
3:      if ( scheduler() == lq ) {
4a:        lq.dequeue(pkt)                % L4S scheduled
4b:        if ( p_CL < p_Lmax ) {          % Check for overload saturation
5a:          if (lq.len()>Th_len)           % >1 packet queued
5b:            p'_L = laqm(lq.time())       % Native LAQM
5c:          else
5d:            p'_L = 0                    % Suppress marking 1 pkt queue
6:            p_L = max(p'_L, p_CL)         % Combining function
7:            if ( recur(lq, p_L)           % Linear marking
8a:              mark(pkt)
8b:            } else {                    % overload saturation
8c:              if ( recur(lq, p_C) ) {    % probability p_C = p'^2
8e:                drop(pkt)               % revert to Classic drop due to overload
8f:                continue                % continue to the top of the while loop
8g:              }
8h:              if ( recur(lq, p_CL) )    % probability p_CL = k * p'
8i:                mark(pkt)               % linear marking of remaining packets
8j:            }
9:          } else {
10:           cq.dequeue(pkt)                % Classic scheduled
11:           if ( recur(cq, p_C) ) {        % probability p_C = p'^2
12a:            if ( (ecn(pkt) == 0)         % ECN field = not-ECT
12b:              OR (p_C >= p_Cmax) ) {    % Overload disables ECN
13:              drop(pkt)                  % squared drop, redo loop
14:              continue                    % continue to the top of the while loop
15:            }
16:            mark(pkt)                     % squared mark
17:          }
18:        }
19:      return(pkt)                         % return the packet and stop
20:    }
21:    return(NULL)                          % no packet to dequeue
22:  }

```

Figure 7: Example Dequeue Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled PI2 AQM
(Including Code for Edge-Cases)

```

1:  dualpi2_update(lq, cq) {                                % Update p' every Tupdate
2a:    curq = max(cq.time(), lq.time())                    % use greatest queuing time
3:    p' = p' + alpha * (curq - target) + beta * (curq - prevq)
4:    p_CL = p' * k    % Coupled L4S prob = base prob * coupling factor
5:    p_C = p'^2        % Classic prob = (base prob)^2
6:    prevq = curq
7:  }

```

Figure 8: Example PI-Update Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled PI2 AQM
(Including Overload Code)

The choice of scheduler technology is critical to overload protection (see Section 4.2.2).

- * A well-understood weighted scheduler such as weighted round robin (WRR) is recommended. As long as the scheduler weight for Classic is small (e.g. 1/16), its exact value is unimportant because it does not normally determine capacity shares. The weight is only important to prevent unresponsive L4S traffic starving Classic traffic in the short term (see Section 4.2.2). This is because capacity sharing between the queues is normally determined by the coupled congestion signal, which overrides the scheduler, by making L4S sources leave roughly equal per-flow capacity available for Classic flows.
- * Alternatively, a time-shifted FIFO (TS-FIFO) could be used. It works by selecting the head packet that has waited the longest, biased against the Classic traffic by a time-shift of *tshift*. To implement time-shifted FIFO, the scheduler() function in line 3 of the dequeue code would simply be implemented as the scheduler() function at the bottom of Figure 10 in Appendix B. For the public Internet a good value for *tshift* is 50ms. For private networks with smaller diameter, about 4*target would be reasonable. TS-FIFO is a very simple scheduler, but complexity might need to be added to address some deficiencies (which is why it is not recommended over WRR):
 - TS-FIFO does not fully isolate latency in the L4S queue from uncontrolled bursts in the Classic queue;
 - TS-FIFO is only appropriate if time-stamping of packets is feasible;
 - Even if time-stamping is supported, the sojourn time of the head packet is always stale. For instance, if a burst arrives at an empty queue, the sojourn time only fully measures the burst's delay when its last packet is dequeued, even though the

queue knew about the burst from the start - so it could have signalled congestion earlier. To remedy this, each head packet can be marked when it is dequeued based on the expected delay of the tail packet behind it, as explained below, rather than based on the head packet's own delay due to the packets in front of it. [Heist21] identifies a specific scenario where bursty traffic significantly hits utilization of the L queue. If this effect proves to be more widely applicable, it is believed that using the delay behind the head would improve performance.

The delay behind the head can be implemented by dividing the backlog at dequeue by the link rate or equivalently multiplying the backlog by the delay per unit of backlog. The implementation details will depend on whether the link rate is known; if it is not, a moving average of the delay per unit backlog can be maintained. This delay consists of serialization as well as media acquisition for shared media. So the details will depend strongly on the specific link technology. This approach should be less sensitive to timing errors and cost less in operations and memory than the otherwise equivalent 'scaled sojourn time' metric, which is the sojourn time of a packet scaled by the ratio of the queue sizes when the packet departed and arrived [SigQ-Dyn].

- * A strict priority scheduler would be inappropriate as discussed in Section 4.2.2.

Appendix B. Example DualQ Coupled Curvy RED Algorithm

As another example of a DualQ Coupled AQM algorithm, the pseudocode below gives the Curvy RED based algorithm. Although the AQM was designed to be efficient in integer arithmetic, to aid understanding it is first given using floating point arithmetic (Figure 10). Then, one possible optimization for integer arithmetic is given, also in pseudocode (Figure 11). To aid comparison, the line numbers are kept in step between the two by using letter suffixes where the longer code needs extra lines.

B.1. Curvy RED in Pseudocode

The pseudocode manipulates three main structures of variables: the packet (pkt), the L4S queue (lq) and the Classic queue (cq) and consists of the following five functions:

- * The initialization function `cred_params_init(...)` (Figure 2) that sets parameter defaults (the API for setting non-default values is omitted for brevity);

- * The dequeue function `cred_dequeue(lq, cq, pkt)` (Figure 4);
- * The scheduling function `scheduler()`, which selects between the head packets of the two queues.

It also uses the following functions that are either shown elsewhere, or not shown in full here:

- * The enqueue function, which is identical to that used for DualPI2, `dualpi2_enqueue(lq, cq, pkt)` in Figure 3;
- * `mark(pkt)` and `drop(pkt)` for ECN-marking and dropping a packet;
- * `cq.bytest()` or `lq.bytest()` returns the current length (aka. backlog) of the relevant queue in bytes;
- * `cq.time()` or `lq.time()` returns the current queuing delay (aka. sojourn time or service time) of the relevant queue in units of time (see Note a in Appendix A.1).

Because Curvy RED was evaluated before DualPI2, certain improvements introduced for DualPI2 were not evaluated for Curvy RED. In the pseudocode below, the straightforward improvements have been added on the assumption they will provide similar benefits, but that has not been proven experimentally. They are: i) a conditional priority scheduler instead of strict priority ii) a time-based threshold for the native L4S AQM; iii) ECN support for the Classic AQM. A recent evaluation has proved that a minimum ECN-marking threshold (`minTh`) greatly improves performance, so this is also included in the pseudocode.

Overload protection has not been added to the Curvy RED pseudocode below so as not to detract from the main features. It would be added in exactly the same way as in Appendix A.2 for the DualPI2 pseudocode. The native L4S AQM uses a step threshold, but a ramp like that described for DualPI2 could be used instead. The scheduler uses the simple TS-FIFO algorithm, but it could be replaced with WRR.

The Curvy RED algorithm has not been maintained or evaluated to the same degree as the DualPI2 algorithm. In initial experiments on broadband access links ranging from 4 Mb/s to 200 Mb/s with base RTTs from 5 ms to 100 ms, Curvy RED achieved good results with the default parameters in Figure 9.

The parameters are categorised by whether they relate to the Classic AQM, the L4S AQM or the framework coupling them together. Constants and variables derived from these parameters are also included at the end of each category. These are the raw input parameters for the

algorithm. A configuration front-end could accept more meaningful parameters (e.g. `RTT_max` and `RTT_typ`) and convert them into these raw parameters, as has been done for DualPI2 in Appendix A. Where necessary, parameters are explained further in the walk-through of the pseudocode below.

```

1: cred_params_init(...) {           % Set input parameter defaults
2:   % DualQ Coupled framework parameters
3:   limit = MAX_LINK_RATE * 250 ms   % Dual buffer size
4:   k' = 1                           % Coupling factor as a power of 2
5:   tshift = 50 ms                   % Time shift of TS-FIFO scheduler
6:   % Constants derived from Classic AQM parameters
7:   k = 2^k'                         % Coupling factor from Equation (1)
6:
7:   % Classic AQM parameters
8:   g_C = 5                          % EWMA smoothing parameter as a power of 1/2
9:   S_C = -1                         % Classic ramp scaling factor as a power of 2
10:  minTh = 500 ms                   % No Classic drop/mark below this queue delay
11:  % Constants derived from Classic AQM parameters
12:  gamma = 2^(-g_C)                 % EWMA smoothing parameter
13:  range_C = 2^S_C                  % Range of Classic ramp
14:
15:  % L4S AQM parameters
16:  T = 1 ms                         % Queue delay threshold for native L4S AQM
17:  % Constants derived from above parameters
18:  S_L = S_C - k'                   % L4S ramp scaling factor as a power of 2
19:  range_L = 2^S_L                  % Range of L4S ramp
20: }
```

Figure 9: Example Header Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled Curvy RED AQM

```

1: cred_dequeue(lq, cq, pkt) {           % Couples L4S & Classic queues
2:   while ( lq.bytt() + cq.bytt() > 0 ) {
3:     if ( scheduler() == lq ) {
4:       lq.dequeue(pkt)                  % L4S scheduled
5a:      p_CL = (Q_C - minTh) / range_L
5b:      if ( ( lq.time() > T )
5c:          OR ( p_CL > maxrand(U) ) )
6:        mark(pkt)
7:      } else {
8:        cq.dequeue(pkt)                  % Classic scheduled
9a:        Q_C = gamma * cq.time() + (1-gamma) * Q_C % Classic Q EWMA
10a:       sqrt_p_C = (Q_C - minTh) / range_C
10b:       if ( sqrt_p_C > maxrand(2*U) ) {
11:         if ( (ecn(pkt) == 0) ) {        % ECN field = not-ECT
12:           drop(pkt)                    % Squared drop, redo loop
13:           continue                    % continue to the top of the while loop
14:         }
15:         mark(pkt)
16:       }
17:     }
18:     return(pkt)                        % return the packet and stop here
19:   }
20:   return(NULL)                         % no packet to dequeue
21: }

22: maxrand(u) {                          % return the max of u random numbers
23:   maxr=0
24:   while (u-- > 0)
25:     maxr = max(maxr, rand())            % 0 <= rand() < 1
26:   return(maxr)
27: }

28: scheduler() {
29:   if ( lq.time() + tshift >= cq.time() )
30:     return lq;
31:   else
32:     return cq;
33: }

```

Figure 10: Example Dequeue Pseudocode for DualQ Coupled Curvy RED AQM

The dequeue pseudocode (Figure 10) is repeatedly called whenever the lower layer is ready to forward a packet. It schedules one packet for dequeuing (or zero if the queue is empty) then returns control to the caller, so that it does not block while that packet is being forwarded. While making this dequeue decision, it also makes the necessary AQM decisions on dropping or marking. The alternative of applying the AQMs at enqueue would shift some processing from the

critical time when each packet is dequeued. However, it would also add a whole queue of delay to the control signals, making the control loop very sloppy.

The code is written assuming the AQMs are applied on dequeue (Note 1). All the dequeue code is contained within a large while loop so that if it decides to drop a packet, it will continue until it selects a packet to schedule. If both queues are empty, the routine returns NULL at line 20. Line 3 of the dequeue pseudocode is where the conditional priority scheduler chooses between the L4S queue (lq) and the Classic queue (cq). The time-shifted FIFO scheduler is shown at lines 28-33, which would be suitable if simplicity is paramount (see Note 2).

Within each queue, the decision whether to forward, drop or mark is taken as follows (to simplify the explanation, it is assumed that $U=1$):

L4S: If the test at line 3 determines there is an L4S packet to dequeue, the tests at lines 5b and 5c determine whether to mark it. The first is a simple test of whether the L4S queue delay (lq.time()) is greater than a step threshold T (Note 3). The second test is similar to the random ECN marking in RED, but with the following differences: i) marking depends on queuing time, not bytes, in order to scale for any link rate without being reconfigured; ii) marking of the L4S queue depends on a logical OR of two tests; one against its own queuing time and one against the queuing time of the `_other_` (Classic) queue; iii) the tests are against the instantaneous queuing time of the L4S queue, but a smoothed average of the other (Classic) queue; iv) the queue is compared with the maximum of U random numbers (but if $U=1$, this is the same as the single random number used in RED).

Specifically, in line 5a the coupled marking probability p_{CL} is set to the amount by which the averaged Classic queueing delay Q_C exceeds the minimum queuing delay threshold (minTh) all divided by the L4S scaling parameter $range_L$. $range_L$ represents the queuing delay (in seconds) added to minTh at which marking probability would hit 100%. Then in line 5c (if $U=1$) the result is compared with a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and 1, which ensures that, over $range_L$, marking probability will linearly increase with queueing time.

Classic: If the scheduler at line 3 chooses to dequeue a Classic packet and jumps to line 7, the test at line 10b determines whether to drop or mark it. But before that, line 9a updates Q_C , which is an exponentially weighted moving average (Note 4) of the queuing time of the Classic queue, where $cq.time()$ is the current

instantaneous queueing time of the packet at the head of the Classic queue (zero if empty) and gamma is the EWMA constant (default 1/32, see line 12 of the initialization function).

Lines 10a and 10b implement the Classic AQM. In line 10a the averaged queueing time Q_C is divided by the Classic scaling parameter $range_C$, in the same way that queueing time was scaled for L4S marking. This scaled queueing time will be squared to compute Classic drop probability so, before it is squared, it is effectively the square root of the drop probability, hence it is given the variable name $sqrt_p_C$. The squaring is done by comparing it with the maximum out of two random numbers (assuming $U=1$). Comparing it with the maximum out of two is the same as the logical 'AND' of two tests, which ensures drop probability rises with the square of queueing time.

The AQM functions in each queue (lines 5c & 10b) are two cases of a new generalization of RED called Curvy RED, motivated as follows. When the performance of this AQM was compared with FQ-CoDel and PIE, their goal of holding queueing delay to a fixed target seemed misguided [CRED_Insights]. As the number of flows increases, if the AQM does not allow host congestion controllers to increase queueing delay, it has to introduce abnormally high levels of loss. Then loss rather than queueing becomes the dominant cause of delay for short flows, due to timeouts and tail losses.

Curvy RED constrains delay with a softened target that allows some increase in delay as load increases. This is achieved by increasing drop probability on a convex curve relative to queue growth (the square curve in the Classic queue, if $U=1$). Like RED, the curve hugs the zero axis while the queue is shallow. Then, as load increases, it introduces a growing barrier to higher delay. But, unlike RED, it requires only two parameters, not three. The disadvantage of Curvy RED (compared to a PI controller for example) is that it is not adapted to a wide range of RTTs. Curvy RED can be used as is when the RTT range to be supported is limited, otherwise an adaptation mechanism is needed.

From our limited experiments with Curvy RED so far, recommended values of these parameters are: $S_C = -1$; $g_C = 5$; $T = 5 * MTU$ at the link rate (about 1ms at 60Mb/s) for the range of base RTTs typical on the public Internet. [CRED_Insights] explains why these parameters are applicable whatever rate link this AQM implementation is deployed on and how the parameters would need to be adjusted for a scenario with a different range of RTTs (e.g. a data centre). The setting of k depends on policy (see Section 2.5 and Appendix C.2 respectively for its recommended setting and guidance on alternatives).

There is also a cUrviness parameter, U , which is a small positive integer. It is likely to take the same hard-coded value for all implementations, once experiments have determined a good value. Only $U=1$ has been used in experiments so far, but results might be even better with $U=2$ or higher.

Notes:

1. The alternative of applying the AQMs at enqueue would shift some processing from the critical time when each packet is dequeued. However, it would also add a whole queue of delay to the control signals, making the control loop sloppier (for a typical RTT it would double the Classic queue's feedback delay). On a platform where packet timestamping is feasible, e.g. Linux, it is also easiest to apply the AQMs at dequeue because that is where queuing time is also measured.
2. WRR better isolates the L4S queue from large delay bursts in the Classic queue, but it is slightly less simple than TS-FIFO. If WRR were used, a low default Classic weight (e.g. 1/16) would need to be configured in place of the time shift in line 5 of the initialization function (Figure 9).
3. A step function is shown for simplicity. A ramp function (see Figure 5 and the discussion around it in Appendix A.1) is recommended, because it is more general than a step and has the potential to enable L4S congestion controls to converge more rapidly.
4. An EWMA is only one possible way to filter bursts; other more adaptive smoothing methods could be valid and it might be appropriate to decrease the EWMA faster than it increases, e.g. by using the minimum of the smoothed and instantaneous queue delays, `min(Q_C, qc.time())`.

B.2. Efficient Implementation of Curvy RED

Although code optimization depends on the platform, the following notes explain where the design of Curvy RED was particularly motivated by efficient implementation.

The Classic AQM at line 10b calls `maxrand(2*U)`, which gives twice as much curviness as the call to `maxrand(U)` in the marking function at line 5c. This is the trick that implements the square rule in equation (1) (Section 2.1). This is based on the fact that, given a number X from 1 to 6, the probability that two dice throws will both be less than X is the square of the probability that one throw will be less than X . So, when $U=1$, the L4S marking function is linear and the Classic dropping function is squared. If $U=2$, L4S would be a square function and Classic would be quartic. And so on.

The `maxrand(u)` function in lines 16-21 simply generates u random numbers and returns the maximum. Typically, `maxrand(u)` could be run in parallel out of band. For instance, if $U=1$, the Classic queue would require the maximum of two random numbers. So, instead of calling `maxrand(2*U)` in-band, the maximum of every pair of values from a pseudorandom number generator could be generated out-of-band, and held in a buffer ready for the Classic queue to consume.

```

1: cred_dequeue(lq, cq, pkt) {           % Couples L4S & Classic queues
2:   while ( lq.bytt() + cq.bytt() > 0 ) {
3:     if ( scheduler() == lq ) {
4:       lq.dequeue(pkt)                  % L4S scheduled
5:       if ((lq.time() > T) OR (Q_C >> (S_L-2) > maxrand(U)))
6:         mark(pkt)
7:     } else {
8:       cq.dequeue(pkt)                  % Classic scheduled
9:       Q_C += (qc.ns() - Q_C) >> g_C    % Classic Q EWMA
10:      if ( (Q_C >> (S_C-2) ) > maxrand(2*U) ) {
11:        if ( (ecn(pkt) == 0) ) {        % ECN field = not-ECT
12:          drop(pkt)                    % Squared drop, redo loop
13:          continue                    % continue to the top of the while loop
14:        }
15:        mark(pkt)
16:      }
17:    }
18:    return(pkt)                        % return the packet and stop here
19:  }
20:  return(NULL)                        % no packet to dequeue
21: }
```

Figure 11: Optimised Example Dequeue Pseudocode for Coupled DualQ AQM using Integer Arithmetic

The two ranges, `range_L` and `range_C` are expressed as powers of 2 so that division can be implemented as a right bit-shift (`>>`) in lines 5 and 10 of the integer variant of the pseudocode (Figure 11).

For the integer variant of the pseudocode, an integer version of the `rand()` function used at line 25 of the `maxrand(function)` in Figure 10 would be arranged to return an integer in the range $0 \leq \text{maxrand}() < 2^{32}$ (not shown). This would scale up all the floating point probabilities in the range $[0,1]$ by 2^{32} .

Queuing delays are also scaled up by 2^{32} , but in two stages: i) In line 9 queuing time `qc.ns()` is returned in integer nanoseconds, making the value about 2^{30} times larger than when the units were seconds, ii) then in lines 5 and 10 an adjustment of -2 to the right bit-shift multiplies the result by 2^2 , to complete the scaling by 2^{32} .

In line 8 of the initialization function, the EWMA constant `gamma` is represented as an integer power of 2, `g_C`, so that in line 9 of the integer code the division needed to weight the moving average can be implemented by a right bit-shift (`>> g_C`).

Appendix C. Choice of Coupling Factor, k

C.1. RTT-Dependence

Where Classic flows compete for the same capacity, their relative flow rates depend not only on the congestion probability, but also on their end-to-end RTT (= base RTT + queue delay). The rates of Reno [RFC5681] flows competing over an AQM are roughly inversely proportional to their RTTs. Cubic exhibits similar RTT-dependence when in Reno-compatibility mode, but it is less RTT-dependent otherwise.

Until the early experiments with the DualQ Coupled AQM, the importance of the reasonably large Classic queue in mitigating RTT-dependence when the base RTT is low had not been appreciated. Appendix A.1.6 of the L4S ECN protocol [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] uses numerical examples to explain why bloated buffers had concealed the RTT-dependence of Classic congestion controls before that time. Then it explains why, the more that queuing delays have reduced, the more that RTT-dependence has surfaced as a potential starvation problem for long RTT flows, when competing against very short RTT flows.

Given that congestion control on end-systems is voluntary, there is no reason why it has to be voluntarily RTT-dependent. The RTT-dependence of existing Classic traffic cannot be 'undeployed'. Therefore, [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] requires L4S congestion controls to be significantly less RTT-dependent than the standard Reno congestion control [RFC5681], at least at low RTT. Then RTT-

dependence ought to be no worse than it is with appropriately sized Classic buffers. Following this approach means there is no need for network devices to address RTT-dependence, although there would be no harm if they did, which per-flow queuing inherently does.

C.2. Guidance on Controlling Throughput Equivalence

The coupling factor, k , determines the balance between L4S and Classic flow rates (see Section 2.5.2.1 and equation (1)).

For the public Internet, a coupling factor of $k=2$ is recommended, and justified below. For scenarios other than the public Internet, a good coupling factor can be derived by plugging the appropriate numbers into the same working.

To summarize the maths below, from equation (7) it can be seen that choosing $k=1.64$ would theoretically make L4S throughput roughly the same as Classic, if their actual end-to-end RTTs were the same. However, even if the base RTTs are the same, the actual RTTs are unlikely to be the same, because Classic traffic needs a fairly large queue to avoid under-utilization and excess drop. Whereas L4S does not.

Therefore, to determine the appropriate coupling factor policy, the operator needs to decide at what base RTT it wants L4S and Classic flows to have roughly equal throughput, once the effect of the additional Classic queue on Classic throughput has been taken into account. With this approach, a network operator can determine a good coupling factor without knowing the precise L4S algorithm for reducing RTT-dependence - or even in the absence of any algorithm.

The following additional terminology will be used, with appropriate subscripts:

r : Packet rate [pkt/s]

R : RTT [s/round]

p : ECN marking probability []

On the Classic side, we consider Reno as the most sensitive and therefore worst-case Classic congestion control. We will also consider Cubic in its Reno-friendly mode ('CReno'), as the most prevalent congestion control, according to the references and analysis in [PI2param]. In either case, the Classic packet rate in steady state is given by the well-known square root formula for Reno congestion control:

$$r_C = 1.22 / (R_C * p_C^{0.5}) \quad (5)$$

On the L4S side, we consider the Prague congestion control [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control] as the reference for steady-state dependence on congestion. Prague conforms to the same equation as DCTCP, but we do not use the equation derived in the DCTCP paper, which is only appropriate for step marking. The coupled marking, p_{CL} , is the appropriate one when considering throughput equivalence with Classic flows. Unlike step marking, coupled markings are inherently spaced out, so we use the formula for DCTCP packet rate with probabilistic marking derived in Appendix A of [PI2]. We use the equation without RTT-independence enabled, which will be explained later.

$$r_L = 2 / (R_L * p_{CL}) \quad (6)$$

For packet rate equivalence, we equate the two packet rates and rearrange into the same form as Equation (1), so the two can be equated and simplified to produce a formula for a theoretical coupling factor, which we shall call k^* :

$$\begin{aligned} r_C &= r_L \\ \Rightarrow p_C &= (p_{CL}/1.64 * R_L/R_C)^2 \\ p_C &= (p_{CL} / k)^2 \quad (1) \\ k^* &= 1.64 * (R_C / R_L) \quad (7) \end{aligned}$$

We say that this coupling factor is theoretical, because it is in terms of two RTTs, which raises two practical questions: i) for multiple flows with different RTTs, the RTT for each traffic class would have to be derived from the RTTs of all the flows in that class (actually the harmonic mean would be needed); ii) a network node cannot easily know the RTT of any of the flows anyway.

RTT-dependence is caused by window-based congestion control, so it ought to be reversed there, not in the network. Therefore, we use a fixed coupling factor in the network, and reduce RTT-dependence in L4S senders. We cannot expect Classic senders to all be updated to reduce their RTT-dependence. But solely addressing the problem in L4S senders at least makes RTT-dependence no worse – not just between L4S senders, but also between L4S and Classic senders.

Traditionally, throughput equivalence has been defined for flows under comparable conditions, including with the same base RTT [RFC2914]. So if we assume the same base RTT, R_b , for comparable flows, we can put both R_C and R_L in terms of R_b .

We can approximate the L4S RTT to be hardly greater than the base RTT, i.e. $R_L \approx R_b$. And we can replace R_C with $(R_b + q_C)$, where the Classic queue, q_C , depends on the target queue delay that the operator has configured for the Classic AQM.

Taking PI2 as an example Classic AQM, it seems that we could just take $R_C = R_b + \text{target}$ (recommended 15 ms by default in Appendix A.1). However, target is roughly the queue depth reached by the tips of the sawteeth of a congestion control, not the average [PI2param]. That is $R_{\text{max}} = R_b + \text{target}$.

The position of the average in relation to the max depends on the amplitude and geometry of the sawteeth. We consider two examples: Reno [RFC5681], as the most sensitive worst-case, and Cubic [RFC8312] in its Reno-friendly mode ('Creno') as the most prevalent congestion control algorithm on the Internet according to the references in [PI2param]. Both are AIMD, so we will generalize using b as the multiplicative decrease factor ($b_r = 0.5$ for Reno, $b_c = 0.7$ for Creno). Then:

$$\begin{aligned} R_C &= (R_{\text{max}} + b \cdot R_{\text{max}}) / 2 \\ &= R_{\text{max}} * (1+b)/2 \end{aligned}$$

$$R_{\text{reno}} = 0.75 * (R_b + \text{target}); \quad R_{\text{creno}} = 0.85 * (R_b + \text{target}). \quad (8)$$

Plugging all this into equation (7) we get a fixed coupling factor for each:

$$\begin{aligned} k_{\text{reno}} &= 1.64 * 0.75 * (R_b + \text{target}) / R_b \\ &= 1.23 * (1 + \text{target} / R_b); \quad k_{\text{creno}} = 1.39 * (1 + \text{target} / R_b) \end{aligned}$$

An operator can then choose the base RTT at which it wants throughput to be equivalent. For instance, if we recommend that the operator chooses $R_b = 25$ ms, as a typical base RTT between Internet users and CDNs [PI2param], then these coupling factors become:

$$\begin{aligned} k_{\text{reno}} &= 1.23 * (1 + 15/25) & k_{\text{creno}} &= 1.39 * (1 + 15/25) \\ &= 1.97 & &= 2.22 \\ &\approx 2 & &\approx 2 \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

The approximation is relevant to any of the above example DualQ Coupled algorithms, which use a coupling factor that is an integer power of 2 to aid efficient implementation. It also fits best to the worst case (Reno).

To check the outcome of this coupling factor, we can express the ratio of L4S to Classic throughput by substituting from their rate equations (5) and (6), then also substituting for p_C in terms of p_{CL} , using equation (1) with $k=2$ as just determined for the Internet:

$$\begin{aligned} r_L / r_C &= 2 (R_C * p_C^{0.5}) / 1.22 (R_L * p_{CL}) \\ &= (R_C * p_{CL}) / (1.22 * R_L * p_{CL}) \\ &= R_C / (1.22 * R_L) \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

As an example, we can then consider single competing CReNO and Prague flows, by expressing both their RTTs in (10) in terms of their base RTTs, R_{bC} and R_{bL} . So R_C is replaced by equation (8) for CReNO. And R_L is replaced by the $\max()$ function below, which represents the effective RTT of the current Prague congestion control [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control] in its (default) RTT-independent mode, because it sets a floor to the effective RTT that it uses for additive increase:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{R} &= 0.85 * (R_{bC} + \text{target}) / (1.22 * \max(R_{bL}, R_{\text{typ}})) \\ \tilde{R} &= (R_{bC} + \text{target}) / (1.4 * \max(R_{bL}, R_{\text{typ}})) \end{aligned}$$

It can be seen that, for base RTTs below target (15 ms), both the numerator and the denominator plateau, which has the desired effect of limiting RTT-dependence.

At the start of the above derivations, an explanation was promised for why the L4S throughput equation in equation (6) did not need to model RTT-independence. This is because we only use one point - at the the typical base RTT where the operator chooses to calculate the coupling factor. Then, throughput equivalence will at least hold at that chosen point. Nonetheless, assuming Prague senders implement RTT-independence over a range of RTTs below this, the throughput equivalence will then extend over that range as well.

Congestion control designers can choose different ways to reduce RTT-dependence. And each operator can make a policy choice to decide on a different base RTT, and therefore a different k , at which it wants throughput equivalence. Nonetheless, for the Internet, it makes sense to choose what is believed to be the typical RTT most users experience, because a Classic AQM's target queuing delay is also derived from a typical RTT for the Internet.

As a non-Internet example, for localized traffic from a particular ISP's data centre, using the measured RTTs, it was calculated that a value of $k = 8$ would achieve throughput equivalence, and experiments verified the formula very closely.

But, for a typical mix of RTTs across the general Internet, a value of $k=2$ is recommended as a good workable compromise.

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Considerations for Assigning a new Recommended DiffServ Codepoint (DSCP)
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Abstract

This document discusses considerations for assigning a new recommended DiffServ Code Point (DSCP). It considers the common remarking pathologies that the DiffServ field might be subjected to along an Internet path. It also notes some implications of using a specific DSCP.

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1. Introduction

The Differentiated Services (DiffServ) architecture has been deployed in many networks. It provides differentiated traffic forwarding based on the DiffServ Code Point (DSCP) [RFC2474] carried in the DiffServ field [RFC2474] of the IP packet header.

Internet traffic can be associated with a service class, and categorised into Behavior Aggregates [RFC4594]. In IP networks, these are associated with a DSCP. Each DSCP is mapped to a Per Hop Behaviour (PHB). A treatment aggregate is concerned only with the forwarding treatment of the aggregated traffic, which could be mapped from a set of DSCP values [RFC5127]. Treatment differentiation can be realised using a variety of schedulers and queues, and also by algorithms that implement access to the physical media.




Figure showing the role of DSCPs in classifying IP traffic for differential network treatment.

This document discusses considerations for assigning a new DSCP. It considers some commonly observed DSCP remarking pathologies that might be experienced along an Internet path. It also describes some packet forwarding treatments that a packet with a specific DSCP can expect to receive when forwarded across a link or subnetwork.

The document is motivated by new opportunities to use DiffServ end-to-end across multiple domains, such as [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-nqb], proposals to build mechanisms using DSCPs in other standards-setting organisations, and the desire to use a common set of DSCPs across a range of infrastructure (e.g., [RFC8622], [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-nqb], [I-D.learmonth-rfc1226-bis]).

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

DSCPs are specified in the IANA registry [DSCP-registry] where a variety of different formats are described. A DSCP can sometimes be referred to by name, such as "CS1", and sometimes by a decimal, hex, or binary value. Hex values will be represented in text using prefix 0x. Binary values will use prefix 0b.

3. Current usage of DSCPs

This section describes current usage of DSCPs.

3.1. IP-Layer Semantics

The DiffServ architecture specifies use of the DiffServ field in the IPv4 and IPv6 packet headers to carry one of 64 distinct DSCP values. Within a given administrative boundary, each DSCP value can be mapped to a distinct PHB [RFC2474]. When a new PHB is standardized, a recommended DSCP value among those 64 values is normally reserved for that PHB, and is assigned by IANA.

The DSCP space is divided into three pools for the purpose of assignment and management [DSCP-registry]. This use of the pools can be summarised in a table (where 'x' refers to either a bit position with value '0' or '1').

DSCP Pool 1: A pool of 32 codepoints with a format 0bxxxxx0, to be assigned by IANA Standards Action [RFC8126].

DSCP Pool 2: A pool of 16 codepoints with a format 0bxxxx11, reserved for experimental or local (private) use by network operators (see sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [RFC8126]).

DSCP Pool 3: A pool of 16 codepoints with a 0bxxxx01. This was initially available for experimental or local use, but which was originally specified to be preferentially utilised for standardized assignments if Pool 1 is ever exhausted. Pool 3 codepoints are now utilised for standardized assignments and are no longer available for experimental or local use [RFC8436].

The DSCP space is shown in the following Figure.

56/CS7	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
48/CS6	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
40/CS5	41	42	43	44/VA	45	46/EF	47
32/CS4	33	34/AF41	35	36/AF42	37	38/AF43	39
24/CS3	25	26/AF31	27	28/AF32	29	30/AF33	31
16/CS2	17	18/AF21	19	20/AF22	21	22/AF23	23
8/CS1	9	10/AF11	11	12/AF12	13	14/AF13	15
0/CS0	1/LE	2	3	4	5	6	7

Figure showing the current list of assigned DSCPs and their assigned PHBs.

The DiffServ architecture allows forwarding treatments to be associated with each DSCP, and the RFC series describes some of these as PHBs. Although DSCPs are intended to identify specific treatment requirements, multiple DSCPs might also be mapped (aggregated) to the same forwarding treatment. Several IP standards map treatment aggregates to DSCPs, that might result in remarking: RFC5160 [RFC5160] suggests Meta-QoS-Classes to help enable deployment of standardized end-to-end QoS classes.

3.2. Network Control Traffic

Network Control Traffic is defined as packet flows that are essential for stable operation of the administered network (see [RFC4594], Section 3). This traffic is marked with a value from a set of Class Selector (CS) DSCPs. This traffic is often a special case within a provider network, and ingress traffic with these DSCP markings can be remarked.

DSCP CS2 is recommended for the OAM (Operations, Administration, and Maintenance) service class (see [RFC4594], Section 3.3).

DSCP CS6 is recommended for local network control traffic. This includes routing protocols and OAM traffic that are essential to network operation administration, control and management. Section 3.2 of RFC4594 [RFC4594] recommends that "CS6 marked packet flows from untrusted sources (for example, end user devices) SHOULD be dropped or remarked at ingress to the DiffServ network".

DSCP CS7 is reserved for future use by network control traffic. "CS7 marked packets SHOULD NOT be sent across peering points" [RFC4594].

At the time of writing, there is evidence to suggest CS6 is actively used by network operators for control traffic. A study of traffic at a large Internet Exchange showed around 40% of ICMP traffic carried this mark [IETF113DSCP]. Similarly, another study found many routers remark all traffic except those packets with a DSCP that sets the higher order bits to 0b11 (see Section 4 of this document).

4. Remarking the DSCP

It is a feature of the DiffServ architecture that the DiffServ field of packets can be remarked at domain boundaries (see section 2.3.4.2 of RFC2475 [RFC2475]). A DSCP can be remarked at the ingress of a DiffServ domain. This remarking can change the DSCP value used on the remainder of an IP path, or the network can restore the initial DSCP marking at the egress of the domain. The DiffServ field can also be remarked based upon common semantics and agreements between providers at an exchange point. Furthermore, RFC 2475 states that remarking must occur when there is a possibility of theft/denial-of-service attack.

If packets are received that are marked with an unknown or an unexpected DSCP, RFC2474 [RFC2474] recommends forwarding the packet using a default (best effort) treatment, but without changing the DSCP. This seeks to support incremental DiffServ deployment in existing networks as well as preserve DSCP markings by routers that have not been configured to support DiffServ. (See also Section 4.3). RFC3260 [RFC3260] clarifies that this remarking specified by RFC2474 is intended for interior nodes within a DiffServ domain. For DiffServ ingress nodes the traffic conditioning required by RFC 2475 applies first.

Reports measuring existing deployments have categorised DSCP remarking [Custura] [Barik] into the following seven remarking pathologies:

Bleach: bleaches all traffic (sets the DSCP to zero);

Bleach-ToS-Precedence: set the first three bits of the DSCP field to 0b000 (reset the 3 bits of the former ToS Precedence field) ;

Bleach-some-ToS: set the first three bits of the DSCP field to 0b000 (reset the 3 bits of the former ToS Precedence field), unless the first two bits of the DSCP field are 0b11;

Remark-ToS: set the first three bits of the DSCP field to any value

different than 0b000 (replace the 3 bits of the former ToS Precedence field);

Bleach-low: set the last three bits of the DSCP field to 0b000;

Bleach-some-low: set the last three bits of the DSCP field to 0b000, unless the first two bits of the DSCP field are 0b11;

Remark: remarks all traffic to one or more particular (non-zero) DSCP values.

4.1. Bleaching the DSCP Field

A specific form of remarking occurs when the DiffServ field is re-assigned to the default treatment, CS0 (0x00). This results in traffic being forwarded using the BE PHB. For example, AF31 (0x1a) would be bleached to CS0.

A survey reported that resetting all the bits of the DiffServ field to 0 was seen to be more prevalent at the edge of the network, and rather less common in core networks [Custura].

4.2. IP Type of Service manipulations

The IETF first defined ToS precedence for IP packets [RFC0791], updated by specification as a part of the ToS Field RFC1349 [RFC1349]. Since 1998, this practice has been deprecated by RFC2474 [RFC2474]. RFC 2474 defines DSCPs 0bxxx000 as the Class Selector codepoints, where PHBs selected by these codepoints MUST meet the Class Selector PHB Requirements" described in Sec. 4.2.2.2 of that RFC.

However, a recent survey reports practices based on ToS semantics have not yet been eliminated from Internet, and need to still be considered when making new DSCP assignments [Custura].

4.2.1. Impact of ToS Precedence Bleaching

ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) is a practice that resets the first three bits of the DSCP field to zero (the former ToS Precedence field), leaving the last three bits unchanged (see section 4.2.1 of RFC2474 [RFC2474]). This remarking is distinctive of non-DiffServ aware routers and a common manipulation of the DiffServ field. The following Figure provides details.

```

+-+--+--+--+
| 0 0 0 | x x x |
+-+--+--+--+

```

Figure showing the ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) pathology, based on Section 3 of RFC1349 [RFC1349].

56/CS7	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
48/CS6	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
40/CS5	41	42	43	44/VA	45	46/EF	47
32/CS4	33	34/AF41	35	36/AF42	37	38/AF43	39
24/CS3	25	26/AF31	27	28/AF32	29	30/AF33	31
16/CS2	17	18/AF21	19	20/AF22	21	22/AF23	23
8/CS1	9	10/AF11	11	12/AF12	13	14/AF13	15
0/CS0	1/LE	2	3	4	5	6	7

As a result of ToS Precedence Bleaching, all the DSCPs in each column are remarked to the smallest DSCP in that column. The DSCPs in the bottom row therefore have a higher survivability across an end-to-end Internet path.

0/CS0	1/LE	2	3	4	5	6	7
Assigned	ToS Prec Bl. of AF11..41		EXP/ LU	Used by SSH	Future NQB	ToS Prec Bl. of AF13..EF	Exp/ LU

Figure showing 0b000xxx DSCPs, highlighting any current assignments and whether they are affected by any known pathologies. For example, ToS Precedence Bleaching of popular DSCPs AF11,21,31,41 would result in traffic being remarked with DSCP 2 in the Internet core. DSCP 4 has been historically used by the SSH application, following semantics which precede DiffServ[DSCP4].

If ToS Precedence Bleaching occurs, packets with a DSCP 'x' would be remarked to 'x' & 0x07 and then would be treated according to the corresponding PHB.

A variation of this pathology clears the top three bits of a DSCP, unless these have values 0b110 or 0b111 (corresponding to the CS6 and CS7 DSCPs). As a result, a DSCP value greater than 48 decimal (0x30) is less likely to be impacted by ToS Precedence Bleaching.

4.2.2. Impact of ToS Precedence Remarking

Practices based on ToS Precedence Remarking (/Remark-ToS/) RFC1349 [RFC1349] were deprecated by RFC2474 [RFC2474]. These practices based on ToS semantics have not yet been eliminated from deployed networks.

```

+--+--+--+--+
|0 0 1|x x x|
+--+--+--+--+

```

Figure showing ToS Precedence Remarking (/Remark-ToS/) pathology, based on Section 3 of RFC1349 [RFC1349].

A less common remarking, ToS Precedence Remarking sets the first three bits of the DSCP to a non-zero value corresponding to a CS PHB. This remarking is distinctive of non-DiffServ aware routers.

If remarking occurs, packets are forwarded using the PHB specified for the resulting DSCP. For example, the AF31 DSCP (0x1a) could be remarked to either AF11 or AF21.

4.3. Remarking to a Particular DSCP

A network device might remark the DiffServ field of an IP packet based on a local policy with a specific (set of) DSCPs, /Remark/. This is sometimes performed using a Multi-Field (MF) classifier [RFC2475] [RFC3290] [RFC4594]. For example, a common remarking is to remark all traffic to a single DSCP, thus removing any traffic differentiation (see Section 4.1). Bleaching (/Bleach/) is a specific example of this pathology that remarks to CS0 (0x00).

In another example, some networks do not follow the recommendation in RFC2475 [RFC2475], and instead remark packets with an unknown or unexpected DSCP to the default class, CS0 (0x00) to ensure that appropriate DSCPs are used within a DiffServ domain. (e.g., see [RFC8100]).

5. Interpretation of the IP DSCP at Lower Layers

Transmission systems and subnetworks can, and do, utilise the DiffServ field in an IP packet to select a lower layer forwarding treatment. In many cases, this use is constrained by designs that utilise fewer than 6 bits to express the service class, and therefore infer mapping to a smaller L2 QoS field, for example, WiFi or Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS).

5.1. Mapping Specified for IEEE 802

The IEEE specifies standards that include mappings for DSCPs to lower layer elements.

5.1.1. Mapping Specified for IEEE 802.1

A 3-bit Priority Code Point (PCP) is specified in the IEEE 802.1Q tag to mark Ethernet frames to one of eight priority values [IEEE-802-1Q]. The value zero indicates the default best effort treatment, and the value one indicates a background traffic class. The remaining values indicate increasing priority. Internet control traffic can be marked as six, and network control is marked as seven.

The mapping specified in [IEEE-802-1Q] revises a previous standard [IEEE-802-1D], in an effort to align with DiffServ practice: the traffic types are specified to match the first three bits of a suitable DSCP (e.g., the first three bits of the EF DSCP is mapped to a PCP of 5). However, [IEEE-802-1D] maps both PCP1 (Background) and PCP2 (Spare) to indicate lower priority than PCP0, RFC8622. Therefore, different remarking pathologies are expected depending on the age of deployed devices.

5.1.2. Mapping Specified for IEEE 802.11

Section 6 of RFC 8325 [RFC8325] provides a brief overview of IEEE 802.11 QoS. The IEEE 802.11 standards [IEEE-802-11] provide MAC functions to support QoS in WLANs using Access Classes (AC). The upstream User Priority (UP) in the 802.11 header has a 3-bit QoS value. A DSCP can be mapped to the UP.

Most existing WiFi implementations [RFC8325] use a default mapping that maps the first three bits of the DSCP to the 802.11 UP value. This is then in turn mapped to the four WiFi Multimedia (WMM) Access Categories. The Wi-Fi Alliance has also specified a more flexible mapping that follows RFC8325 and provides functions at an AP to remark packets as well as a QoS Map that maps each DSCP to an AC [WIFI-ALLIANCE].


```

+--+--+--+--+
|x x x|. . .|
+--+--+--+--+

```

Figure showing the DSCP bits commonly mapped to the UP in 802.11.

RFC8325 [RFC8325] notes inconsistencies that can result from such remarking, and recommends how to perform this remarking. It proposes several recommendations for mapping a DSCP to an IEEE 802.11 UP for wired-to-wireless interconnection. The recommendation includes mapping network control traffic CS6 and CS7, as well unassigned DSCPs, to UP 0.

In the upstream direction (wireless-to-wired interconnections, this mapping can result in a specific DSCP remarking pathology. Some Access Points (APs) currently use a default UP-to-DSCP mapping RFC8325 [RFC8325], wherein "DSCP values are derived from the layer 2 UP values by multiplying the UP values by eight (i.e., shifting the three UP bits to the left and adding three additional zeros to generate a 6-bit DSCP value). This derived DSCP value is used for QoS treatment between the wireless AP and the nearest classification and marking policy enforcement point (which may be the centralized wireless LAN controller, relatively deep within the network). Alternatively, in the case where there is no other classification and marking policy enforcement point, then this derived DSCP value will be used on the remainder of the Internet path." This can result in remarking /Reset-low/.

```

+--+--+--+--+
|x x x|0 0 0|
+--+--+--+--+

```

Figure showing the pathology resulting from deriving from UP-to-DSCP mapping in some 802.11 networks.

An alternative to UP-to-DSCP remapping uses the DSCP value of a downstream IP packet (e.g., the Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) protocol, RFC5415, maps an IP packet DiffServ field to the DiffServ field of outer IP header in a CAPWAP tunnel).

Some current constraints of WiFi mapping are discussed in section 2 of [RFC8325]. A QoS profile can be used to limit the maximum DSCP value used for the upstream and downstream traffic.

5.2. DiffServ and MPLS

Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) specified eight MPLS Traffic Classes (TCs), which restricts the number of different treatments [RFC5129]. RFC 5127 describes aggregation of DiffServ TCs [RFC5127], and introduces four DiffServ Treatment Aggregates. Traffic marked with multiple DSCPs can be forwarded in a single MPLS TC.

There are three Label-Switched Router (LSR) behaviors: the Pipe, the Short Pipe and the Uniform Model [RFC3270]. These only differ when a LSP performs a push or a pop.

5.2.1. Mapping Specified for MPLS

RFC3270 [RFC3270] defines a flexible solution for support of DiffServ over MPLS networks. This allows an MPLS network administrator to select how BAs (marked by DSCPs) are mapped onto Label Switched Paths (LSPs) to best match the DiffServ, Traffic Engineering and protection objectives within their particular network.

Mapping from the IP DSCP to the MPLS header are defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC3270].

The Pipe Model conveys the "LSP Diff-Serv Information" to the LSP Egress so that its forwarding treatment can be based on the IP DSCP.

When Penultimate Hop Popping (PHP) is used, the Penultimate LSR needs to be aware of the encapsulation mapping for a PHB to the label corresponding to the exposed header to perform DiffServ Information Encoding (Section 2.5.2 of RFC3270 [RFC3270]).

5.2.2. Mapping Specified for MPLS Short Pipe

The Short Pipe Model is an optional variation of the Pipe Model [RFC3270].

ITU-T Y.1566 [ITU-T-Y-1566] further defined a set of four common QoS classes and four auxiliary classes to which a DSCP can be mapped when interconnecting Ethernet, IP and MPLS networks. RFC8100 [RFC8100] proposes four treatment aggregates for interconnection with four defined DSCPs. This was motivated by the requirements of MPLS network operators that use Short-Pipe tunnels, but can be applicable to other networks, both MPLS and non-MPLS.

RFC8100 recommends preserving the notion of end-to-end service classes, and recommends that the original DSCP marking is not changed when treatment aggregates are used. The key requirement is that the DSCP at the network ingress is restored at the network egress. This

is only feasible in general for a small number of DSCPs. In this design, packets marked with other DSCPs can be remarked (a /Remark/pathology) or dealt with via an additional agreement(s) among the operators of the interconnected networks. Use of the MPLS Short Pipe Model favours remarking unexpected DSCP values to zero in the absence of an additional agreement(s), as explained in RFC8100 [RFC8100]. This can result in bleaching (/Bleach/).

RFC8100 Agg. Class	DSCP
Telephony Service Treatment Aggregate	EF VA
Bulk Real-Time Treatment Aggregate May be added May be added	AF41 (AF42) (AF43)
Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate Reserved for the extension of PHBs	AF31 AF32 (AF33)
Default / Elastic Treatment Aggregate	BE/CS0
Network Control: Local Use	CS6

The short-pipe MPLS mapping from RFC 8100.

5.3. Mapping Specified for Mobile Networks

Mobile LTE and 5G standards have evolved from older UMTS standards, and are DiffServ aware. LTE (4G) and 5G standards [SA-5G] identify traffic classes at the interface between User Equipment (UE) and the mobile Packet Core network by QCI (QoS Class Identifiers) and 5QI (5G QoS Identifier). The 3GPP standards do not define or recommend any specific mapping between each QCI or 5QI and DiffServ (and mobile QCIs are based on several criteria service class definitions). The way packets are mapped at the Packet Gateway (P-GW) boundary is determined by operators. However, TS 23.107 (version 16.0.0, applies to LTE and below) mandates that Differentiated Services, defined by IETF, shall be used to interoperate with IP backbone networks.

The GSM Association (GSMA) has defined four aggregated classes and seven associated PHBs in their guidelines for IPX Provider networks GSMA IR.34 [GSMA-IR-34]. This was previously specified as the Inter-

Service Provider IP Backbone Guidelines, and provides a mobile ISP to ISP QoS mapping mechanism, and interconnection with other IP networks in the general Internet. This describes the case where the DSCP marking from a Service Provider cannot be trusted (depending on the agreement between the Service Provider and its IPX Provider), allowing the IPX Provider to remark the DSCP value to a static default value.

GSMA IR.34 Agg. Class	PHB
Conversational	EF
Streaming	AF41
Interactive	AF31
(ordered by priority, AF3 highest)	AF32
	AF21
	AF11
Background	CS0

Figure showing the PHB mapping recommended in the guidelines proposed in GSMA IR.34 [GSMA-IR-34].

5.4. Mapping Specified for Carrier Ethernet

Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) provides a mapping of DSCPs at the IP layer to quality of service markings in the Ethernet frame headers MEF 23.1 [MEF23.1].

5.5. Remarking as a Side-effect of Another Policy

The result of applying a QoS policy (such as matching the IP address, or traffic reaching a rate limit) could also result in a packet being remarked to a different DSCP (/Remark/) when it is not admitted to a service. Traffic marked with an EF and VA DSCP are often policed by such policies.

Policies and L2 procedures can also result in remarking traffic as a side-effect of other functions (e.g., in response to DDos).

5.6. Summary

This section has discussed the various ways in which DSCP remarking pathologies can arise from interactions with lower layers.

6. Considerations for DSCP Selection

This section provides advice for the assignment of a new DSCP value. It identifies known issues that might influence the finally assigned DSCP, followed by a summary of considerations for assignment of a new DSCP.

6.1. Effect of Bleaching

New DSCP assignments should consider the impact of bleaching, which can limit the ability to provide the expected treatment end-to-end. This is particularly important for cases where the codepoint is intended to result in lower than best effort treatment, as was the case when defining the LE PHB [RFC8622]. In this case, bleaching, or remarking to "CS0" would result in elevating the lower effort traffic to the default class. This is an example of priority inversion.

6.2. Where the proposed DSCP > 0x07 (7)

Although the IETF specifications require systems to use DSCP marking semantics in place of methods based on the former ToS field, the current recommendation is that any new assignment where the DSCP is greater than 0x07 should consider the semantics associated with the resulting DSCP when ToS Precedence Bleaching is experienced. For example, it can be desirable to avoid choosing a DSCP that could be remarked to LE, Lower Effort [RFC8622], which could otherwise potentially result in a priority inversion in the treatment.

6.3. Where the proposed DSCP < 0x07 (7)

ToS Precedence Bleaching can unintentionally result in extra traffic aggregated to the same DSCP. For example, after experiencing ToS Precedence Bleaching, all traffic marked AF11, AF21, AF31 and AF41 would be aggregated with traffic marked with DSCP 2 (0x02), increasing the volume of traffic which receives the treatment associated with DSCP 2. New DiffServ Codepoint assignments should consider unexpected consequences arising from this pathology.

6.3.1. Where the proposed DSCP & 0x07 = 0x01

As a consequence of assigning the LE PHB [RFC8622], the IETF allocated the DSCP 0b000001 from Pool 3.

When making assignments where the DSCP has a format: 0bxxx001, the case of ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) of a DSCP to a value of 0x01 needs to be considered. ToS Precedence Bleaching will result in demoting the traffic to the lower effort traffic class. Care should be taken to consider the implications of remarking when shooing to assign a DSCP with tyhis format.

6.4. Impact on deployed infrastructure

Behaviour of deployed PHBs and conditioning treatments also needs to be considered when assigning a new DSCP. Network operators have choices when it comes to configuring DiffServ support within their domains, and the pathologies described in the previous section can result from different configurations and approaches:

Networks not remarking DiffServ: A network that implements one or more PHBs, and does not remark DSCPs. Operators in this category pass all DSCPs transparently.

Networks that condition the DSCP: A network that implements more than one PHB and enforces SLAs with its peers. Operators in this category use conditioning to ensure that only traffic that matches a policy is permitted to use a specific DSCP (see RFC8100 [RFC8100]). This requires operators to choose to support or remark a new DSCP assignment.

Networks that remark in some other way , which includes:

1. Networks containing misconfigured devices that do not comply with the relevent RFCs.
2. Networks containing devices that implement an obsolete specification or contain software bugs.
3. Networks containing devices that remark the DSCP as a result of lower layer interactions.

For example, the ToS Precedence Bleaching (/Bleach-ToS-Precedence/) pathology cannot arise in the case of networks not remarking DiffServ, but can arise as a result of traffic conditioning at operator boundaries. It can also arise in the case of misconfiguration or in netwroks using old equipment which precedes DiffServ.

6.5. Questions to guide discussion of a proposed new DSCP

A series of questions emerge that need to be answered when considering a proposal to the IETF that requests a new assignment. These questions include:

- * Is the request for local use within a DiffServ domain that does not require interconnection with other DiffServ domains? This can use DSCPs in Pool 2 for local or experimental use, without any IETF specification for the DSCP or associated PHB.
- * How is the proposed service class characterised? What are the characteristics of the traffic to be carried? What are the expectations for treatment?
- * Service Classes that can utilise existing PHBs should use assigned DSCPs to mark their traffic: Could the request be met by using an existing IETF DSCP? The proposed new treatment be used to map traffic to a new or existing PHB.
- * Does the service class request assigning new DSCP? Specification of a new recommended DSCP requires Standards Action. RFC2474 states: "Each standardized PHB MUST have an associated RECOMMENDED codepoint". If approved, new IETF assignments are normally made by IANA in Pool 1, but the IETF can request assignments to be made from Pool 3 [RFC8436].
- * Many What are the effects of treatment aggregation on the proposed method? Section 5.2 describes examples of treatment aggregation.
- * What are the implications of using the proposed DSCP on the expected lower layers over which the traffic may be forwarded? Section 5 describes some observed treatments by layers below IP.
- * If a new DSCP is needed for an end-to-end service, then what is the expected effect of currently-deployed remarking on the end-to-end service? Section 4 describes some observed remarking pathologies, and Section 6.4 identifies root causes for why these remarking pathologies are observed.

7. Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the helpful discussions and analysis by Greg White and Thomas Fossati in a draft concerning NQB. Ruediger Geib, and Brian Carpenter contributed comments, along with other members of the TSVWG.

8. IANA Considerations

This memo provides information to assist in considering new assignments to the IANA DSCP registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xhtml>).

This memo includes no request to IANA, or update to the IANA procedures.

9. Security Considerations

The security considerations are discussed in the security considerations of each cited RFC.

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Appendix A. Revision Notes

Note to RFC-Editor: please remove this entire section prior to publication.

- * Individual draft -00, initial document.
- * Individual draft -01, address comments from Martin Duke; Brian Carpenter; Ruediger Geib, and revisions to improve language consistency.
- * Individual draft -02, revise to improve language consistency.
- * Working Group -00, replace individual draft.
- * Working Group -01, address feedback in preparation for IETF 113 Vienna.
- * Working Group -02:

Consolidate terminology after IETF 113 Vienna.

Add clarification to RFC2474 and RFC2475 addressed in RFC3260 (Comments from Ruediger Geib).

Include figures to show the full list of codepoints, their assigned PHBs & impact of ToS Precedence Bleaching.

Add network categories that differentiate between network operator approaches to DiffServ.

Add Terminology section to clarify representations of DSCPs.

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Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification to Protocols that
Encapsulate IP
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Abstract

The purpose of this document is to guide the design of congestion notification in any lower layer or tunnelling protocol that encapsulates IP. The aim is for explicit congestion signals to propagate consistently from lower layer protocols into IP. Then the IP internetwork layer can act as a portability layer to carry congestion notification from non-IP-aware congested nodes up to the transport layer (L4). Following these guidelines should assure interworking among IP layer and lower layer congestion notification mechanisms, whether specified by the IETF or other standards bodies. This document updates the advice to subnetwork designers about ECN in RFC 3819.

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1. Introduction

The benefits of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) described in [RFC8087] and summarized below can only be fully realized if support for ECN is added to the relevant subnetwork technology, as well as to IP. When a lower layer buffer drops a packet obviously it does not just drop at that layer; the packet disappears from all layers. In contrast, when active queue management (AQM) at a lower layer marks a packet with ECN, the marking needs to be explicitly propagated up the layers. The same is true if AQM marks the outer header of a packet that encapsulates inner tunnelled headers. Forwarding ECN is not as straightforward as other headers because it has to be assumed ECN may be only partially deployed. If a lower layer header that contains ECN congestion indications is stripped off by a subnet egress that is not ECN-aware, or if the ultimate receiver or sender is not ECN-aware, congestion needs to be indicated by dropping a packet, not marking it.

The purpose of this document is to guide the addition of congestion notification to any subnet technology or tunnelling protocol, so that lower layer AQM algorithms can signal congestion explicitly and it will propagate consistently into encapsulated (higher layer) headers, otherwise the signals will not reach their ultimate destination.

ECN is defined in the IP header (v4 and v6) [RFC3168] to allow a resource to notify the onset of queue build-up without having to drop packets, by explicitly marking a proportion of packets with the congestion experienced (CE) codepoint.

Given a suitable marking scheme, ECN removes nearly all congestion loss and it cuts delays for two main reasons:

- o It avoids the delay when recovering from congestion losses, which particularly benefits small flows or real-time flows, making their delivery time predictably short [RFC2884];
- o As ECN is used more widely by end-systems, it will gradually remove the need to configure a degree of delay into buffers before they start to notify congestion (the cause of bufferbloat). This is because drop involves a trade-off between sending a timely signal and trying to avoid impairment, whereas ECN is solely a signal not an impairment, so there is no harm triggering it earlier.

Some lower layer technologies (e.g. MPLS, Ethernet) are used to form subnetworks with IP-aware nodes only at the edges. These networks are often sized so that it is rare for interior queues to overflow. However, until recently this was more due to the inability of TCP to

saturate the links. For many years, fixes such as window scaling [RFC7323] proved hard to deploy. And the Reno variant of TCP has remained in widespread use despite its inability to scale to high flow rates. However, now that modern operating systems are finally capable of saturating interior links, even the buffers of well-provisioned interior switches will need to signal episodes of queuing.

Propagation of ECN is defined for MPLS [RFC5129], and is being defined for TRILL [RFC7780], [I-D.ietf-trill-ecn-support], but it remains to be defined for a number of other subnetwork technologies.

Similarly, ECN propagation is yet to be defined for many tunnelling protocols. [RFC6040] defines how ECN should be propagated for IP-in-IPv4 [RFC2003], IP-in-IPv6 [RFC2473] and IPsec [RFC4301] tunnels, but there are numerous other tunnelling protocols with a shim and/or a layer 2 header between two IP headers (v4 or v6). Some address ECN propagation between the IP headers, but many do not. This document gives guidance on how to address ECN propagation for future tunnelling protocols, and a companion standards track specification [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] updates those existing IP-shim-(L2)-IP protocols that are under IETF change control and still widely used.

Incremental deployment is the most delicate aspect when adding support for ECN. The original ECN protocol in IP [RFC3168] was carefully designed so that a congested buffer would not mark a packet (rather than drop it) unless both source and destination hosts were ECN-capable. Otherwise its congestion markings would never be detected and congestion would just build up further. However, to support congestion marking below the IP layer or within tunnels, it is not sufficient to only check that the two layer 4 transport endpoints support ECN; correct operation also depends on the decapsulator at each subnet or tunnel egress faithfully propagating congestion notifications to the higher layer. Otherwise, a legacy decapsulator might silently fail to propagate any ECN signals from the outer to the forwarded header. Then the lost signals would never be detected and again congestion would build up further. The guidelines given later require protocol designers to carefully consider incremental deployment, and suggest various safe approaches for different circumstances.

Of course, the IETF does not have standards authority over every link layer protocol. So this document gives guidelines for designing propagation of congestion notification across the interface between IP and protocols that may encapsulate IP (i.e. that can be layered beneath IP). Each lower layer technology will exhibit different issues and compromises, so the IETF or the relevant standards body

must be free to define the specifics of each lower layer congestion notification scheme. Nonetheless, if the guidelines are followed, congestion notification should interwork between different technologies, using IP in its role as a 'portability layer'.

Therefore, the capitalized terms 'SHOULD' or 'SHOULD NOT' are often used in preference to 'MUST' or 'MUST NOT', because it is difficult to know the compromises that will be necessary in each protocol design. If a particular protocol design chooses not to follow a 'SHOULD (NOT)' given in the advice below, it MUST include a sound justification.

It has not been possible to give common guidelines for all lower layer technologies, because they do not all fit a common pattern. Instead they have been divided into a few distinct modes of operation: feed-forward-and-upward; feed-upward-and-forward; feed-backward; and null mode. These modes are described in Section 3, then in the subsequent sections separate guidelines are given for each mode.

1.1. Update to RFC 3819

This document updates the brief advice to subnetwork designers about ECN in [RFC3819], by replacing the last two paragraphs of Section 13 with the following sentence:

By following the guidelines in [this document], subnetwork designers can enable a layer-2 protocol to participate in congestion control without dropping packets via propagation of explicit congestion notification (ECN [RFC3168]) to receivers.

and adding [this document] as an informative reference. {RFC Editor: Please replace both instances of [this document] above with the number of the present RFC when published.}

1.2. Scope

This document only concerns wire protocol processing of explicit notification of congestion. It makes no changes or recommendations concerning algorithms for congestion marking or for congestion response, because algorithm issues should be independent of the layer the algorithm operates in.

The default ECN semantics are described in [RFC3168] and updated by [RFC8311]. Also the guidelines for AQM designers [RFC7567] clarify the semantics of both drop and ECN signals from AQM algorithms. [RFC4774] is the appropriate best current practice specification of how algorithms with alternative semantics for the ECN field can be

partitioned from Internet traffic that uses the default ECN semantics. There are two main examples for how alternative ECN semantics have been defined in practice:

- o RFC 4774 suggests using the ECN field in combination with a Diffserv codepoint such as in PCN [RFC6660], Voice over 3G [UTRAN] or Voice over LTE (VoLTE) [LTE-RA];
- o RFC 8311 suggests using the ECT(1) codepoint of the ECN field to indicate alternative semantics such as for the experimental Low Latency Low Loss Scalable throughput (L4S) service [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]).

The aim is that the default rules for encapsulating and decapsulating the ECN field are sufficiently generic that tunnels and subnets will encapsulate and decapsulate packets without regard to how algorithms elsewhere are setting or interpreting the semantics of the ECN field. [RFC6040] updates RFC 4774 to allow alternative encapsulation and decapsulation behaviours to be defined for alternative ECN semantics. However it reinforces the same point - that it is far preferable to try to fit within the common ECN encapsulation and decapsulation behaviours, because expecting all lower layer technologies and tunnels to be updated is likely to be completely impractical.

Alternative semantics for the ECN field can be defined to depend on the traffic class indicated by the DSCP. Therefore correct propagation of congestion signals could depend on correct propagation of the DSCP between the layers and along the path. For instance, if the meaning of the ECN field depends on the DSCP (as in PCN or VoLTE) and if the outer DSCP is stripped on decapsulation, as in the pipe model of [RFC2983], the special semantics of the ECN field would be lost. Similarly, if the DSCP is changed at the boundary between Diffserv domains, the special ECN semantics would also be lost. This is an important implication of the localized scope of most Diffserv arrangements. In this document, correct propagation of traffic class information is assumed, while what 'correct' means and how it is achieved is covered elsewhere (e.g. RFC 2983) and is outside the scope of the present document.

The guidelines in this document do ensure that common encapsulation and decapsulation rules are sufficiently generic to cover cases where ECT(1) is used instead of ECT(0) to identify alternative ECN semantics (as in L4S [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]) and where ECN marking algorithms use ECT(1) to encode 3 severity levels into the ECN field (e.g. PCN [RFC6660]) rather than the default of 2. All these different semantics for the ECN field work because it has been possible to define common default decapsulation rules that allow for all cases.

Note that the guidelines in this document do not necessarily require the subnet wire protocol to be changed to add support for congestion notification. For instance, the Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode (Section 3.2) and the Null Mode (Section 3.4) do not. Another way to add congestion notification without consuming header space in the subnet protocol might be to use a parallel control plane protocol.

This document focuses on the congestion notification interface between IP and lower layer or tunnel protocols that can encapsulate IP, where the term 'IP' includes v4 or v6, unicast, multicast or anycast. However, it is likely that the guidelines will also be useful when a lower layer protocol or tunnel encapsulates itself, e.g. Ethernet MAC in MAC ([IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1ah) or when it encapsulates other protocols. In the feed-backward mode, propagation of congestion signals for multicast and anycast packets is out-of-scope (because the complexity would make it unlikely to be attempted).

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Further terminology used within this document:

Protocol data unit (PDU): Information that is delivered as a unit among peer entities of a layered network consisting of protocol control information (typically a header) and possibly user data (payload) of that layer. The scope of this document includes layer 2 and layer 3 networks, where the PDU is respectively termed a frame or a packet (or a cell in ATM). PDU is a general term for any of these. This definition also includes a payload with a shim header lying somewhere between layer 2 and 3.

Transport: The end-to-end transmission control function, conventionally considered at layer-4 in the OSI reference model. Given the audience for this document will often use the word transport to mean low level bit carriage, whenever the term is used it will be qualified, e.g. 'L4 transport'.

Encapsulator: The link or tunnel endpoint function that adds an outer header to a PDU (also termed the 'link ingress', the 'subnet ingress', the 'ingress tunnel endpoint' or just the 'ingress' where the context is clear).

Decapsulator: The link or tunnel endpoint function that removes an outer header from a PDU (also termed the 'link egress', the 'subnet egress', the 'egress tunnel endpoint' or just the 'egress' where the context is clear).

Incoming header: The header of an arriving PDU before encapsulation.

Outer header: The header added to encapsulate a PDU.

Inner header: The header encapsulated by the outer header.

Outgoing header: The header forwarded by the decapsulator.

CE: Congestion Experienced [RFC3168]

ECT: ECN-Capable (L4) Transport [RFC3168]

Not-ECT: Not ECN-Capable (L4) Transport [RFC3168]

Load Regulator: For each flow of PDUs, the transport function that is capable of controlling the data rate. Typically located at the data source, but in-path nodes can regulate load in some congestion control arrangements (e.g. admission control, policing nodes or transport circuit-breakers [RFC8084]). Note the term "a function capable of controlling the load" deliberately includes a transport that does not actually control the load responsively but ideally it ought to (e.g. a sending application without congestion control that uses UDP).

ECN-PDU: A PDU at the IP layer or below with a capacity to signal congestion that is part of a congestion control feedback loop within which all the nodes necessary to propagate the signal back to the Load Regulator are capable of doing that propagation. An IP packet with a non-zero ECN field implies that the endpoints are ECN-capable, so this would be an ECN-PDU. However, ECN-PDU is intended to be a general term for a PDU at lower layers, as well as at the IP layer.

Not-ECN-PDU: A PDU at the IP layer or below that is part of a congestion control feedback-loop within which at least one node necessary to propagate any explicit congestion notification signals back to the Load Regulator is not capable of doing that propagation.

3. Modes of Operation

This section sets down the different modes by which congestion information is passed between the lower layer and the higher one. It acts as a reference framework for the following sections, which give normative guidelines for designers of explicit congestion notification protocols, taking each mode in turn:

Feed-Forward-and-Up: Nodes feed forward congestion notification towards the egress within the lower layer then up and along the layers towards the end-to-end destination at the transport layer. The following local optimisation is possible:

Feed-Up-and-Forward: A lower layer switch feeds-up congestion notification directly into the higher layer (e.g. into the ECN field in the IP header), irrespective of whether the node is at the egress of a subnet.

Feed-Backward: Nodes feed back congestion signals towards the ingress of the lower layer and (optionally) attempt to control congestion within their own layer.

Null: Nodes cannot experience congestion at the lower layer except at ingress nodes (which are IP-aware or equivalently higher-layer-aware).

3.1. Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode

Like IP and MPLS, many subnet technologies are based on self-contained protocol data units (PDUs) or frames sent unreliably. They provide no feedback channel at the subnetwork layer, instead relying on higher layers (e.g. TCP) to feed back loss signals.

In these cases, ECN may best be supported by standardising explicit notification of congestion into the lower layer protocol that carries the data forwards. Then a specification is needed for how the egress of the lower layer subnet propagates this explicit signal into the forwarded upper layer (IP) header. This signal continues forwards until it finally reaches the destination transport (at L4). Then typically the destination will feed this congestion notification back to the source transport using an end-to-end protocol (e.g. TCP). This is the arrangement that has already been used to add ECN to IP-in-IP tunnels [RFC6040], IP-in-MPLS and MPLS-in-MPLS [RFC5129].

This mode is illustrated in Figure 1. Along the middle of the figure, layers 2, 3 and 4 of the protocol stack are shown, and one packet is shown along the bottom as it progresses across the network from source to destination, crossing two subnets connected by a

router, and crossing two switches on the path across each subnet. Congestion at the output of the first switch (shown as *) leads to a congestion marking in the L2 header (shown as C in the illustration of the packet). The chevrons show the progress of the resulting congestion indication. It is propagated from link to link across the subnet in the L2 header, then when the router removes the marked L2 header, it propagates the marking up into the L3 (IP) header. The router forwards the marked L3 header into subnet 2, and when it adds a new L2 header it copies the L3 marking into the L2 header as well, as shown by the 'C's in both layers (assuming the technology of subnet 2 also supports explicit congestion marking).

Note that there is no implication that each 'C' marking is encoded the same; a different encoding might be used for the 'C' marking in each protocol.

Finally, for completeness, we show the L3 marking arriving at the destination, where the host transport protocol (e.g. TCP) feeds it back to the source in the L4 acknowledgement (the 'C' at L4 in the packet at the top of the diagram).




Figure 1: Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode

Of course, modern networks are rarely as simple as this text-book example, often involving multiple nested layers. For example, a 3GPP mobile network may have two IP-in-IP (GTP [GTPv1]) tunnels in series and an MPLS backhaul between the base station and the first router. Nonetheless, the example illustrates the general idea of feeding congestion notification forward then upward whenever a header is removed at the egress of a subnet.

Note that the FECN (forward ECN) bit in Frame Relay [Buck00] and the explicit forward congestion indication (EFCI [ITU-T.I.371]) bit in ATM user data cells follow a feed-forward pattern. However, in ATM, this arrangement is only part of a feed-forward-and-backward pattern at the lower layer, not feed-forward-and-up out of the lower layer--the intention was never to interface to IP ECN at the subnet egress. To our knowledge, Frame Relay FECN is solely used to detect where more capacity should be provisioned.

3.2. Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode

Ethernet is particularly difficult to extend incrementally to support explicit congestion notification. One way to support ECN in such cases has been to use so called 'layer-3 switches'. These are Ethernet switches that dig into the Ethernet payload to find an IP header and manipulate or act on certain IP fields (specifically Diffserv & ECN). For instance, in Data Center TCP [RFC8257], layer-3 switches are configured to mark the ECN field of the IP header within the Ethernet payload when their output buffer becomes congested. With respect to switching, a layer-3 switch acts solely on the addresses in the Ethernet header; it does not use IP addresses, and it does not decrement the TTL field in the IP header.




Figure 2: Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode

By comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, it can be seen that subnet E (perhaps a subnet of layer-3 Ethernet switches) works in feed-up-and-forward mode by notifying congestion directly into L3 at the point of congestion, even though the congested switch does not otherwise act at L3. In this example, the technology in subnet F (e.g. MPLS) does

support ECN natively, so when the router adds the layer-2 header it copies the ECN marking from L3 to L2 as well.

3.3. Feed-Backward Mode

In some layer 2 technologies, explicit congestion notification has been defined for use internally within the subnet with its own feedback and load regulation, but typically the interface with IP for ECN has not been defined.

For instance, for the available bit-rate (ABR) service in ATM, the relative rate mechanism was one of the more popular mechanisms for managing traffic, tending to supersede earlier designs. In this approach ATM switches send special resource management (RM) cells in both the forward and backward directions to control the ingress rate of user data into a virtual circuit. If a switch buffer is approaching congestion or is congested it sends an RM cell back towards the ingress with respectively the No Increase (NI) or Congestion Indication (CI) bit set in its message type field [ATM-TM-ABR]. The ingress then holds or decreases its sending bit-rate accordingly.




Figure 3: Feed-Backward Mode

ATM's feed-backward approach does not fit well when layered beneath IP's feed-forward approach--unless the initial data source is the same node as the ATM ingress. Figure 3 shows the feed-backward approach being used in subnet H. If the final switch on the path is congested (*), it does not feed-forward any congestion indications on packet (U). Instead it sends a control cell (V) back to the router at the ATM ingress.

However, the backward feedback does not reach the original data source directly because IP does not support backward feedback (and subnet G is independent of subnet H). Instead, the router in the middle throttles down its sending rate but the original data sources don't reduce their rates. The resulting rate mismatch causes the middle router's buffer at layer 3 to back up until it becomes congested, which it signals forwards on later data packets at layer 3 (e.g. packet W). Note that the forward signal from the middle router is not triggered directly by the backward signal. Rather, it is triggered by congestion resulting from the middle router's mismatched rate response to the backward signal.

In response to this later forward signalling, end-to-end feedback at layer-4 finally completes the tortuous path of congestion indications back to the origin data source, as before.

Quantized congestion notification (QCN [IEEE802.1Q]) would suffer from similar problems if extended to multiple subnets. However, from the start QCN was clearly characterized as solely applicable to a single subnet (see Section 6).

3.4. Null Mode

Often link and physical layer resources are 'non-blocking' by design. In these cases congestion notification may be implemented but it does not need to be deployed at the lower layer; ECN in IP would be sufficient.

A degenerate example is a point-to-point Ethernet link. Excess loading of the link merely causes the queue from the higher layer to back up, while the lower layer remains immune to congestion. Even a whole meshed subnetwork can be made immune to interior congestion by limiting ingress capacity and sufficient sizing of interior links, e.g. a non-blocking fat-tree network [Leiserson85]. An alternative to fat links near the root is numerous thin links with multi-path routing to ensure even worst-case patterns of load cannot congest any link, e.g. a Clos network [Clos53].

4. Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

Feed-forward-and-up is the mode already used for signalling ECN up the layers through MPLS into IP [RFC5129] and through IP-in-IP tunnels [RFC6040], whether encapsulating with IPv4 [RFC2003], IPv6 [RFC2473] or IPsec [RFC4301]. These RFCs take a consistent approach and the following guidelines are designed to ensure this consistency continues as ECN support is added to other protocols that encapsulate IP. The guidelines are also designed to ensure compliance with the more general best current practice for the design of alternate ECN schemes given in [RFC4774] and extended by [RFC8311].

The rest of this section is structured as follows:

- o Section 4.1 addresses the most straightforward cases, where [RFC6040] can be applied directly to add ECN to tunnels that are effectively IP-in-IP tunnels, but with shim header(s) between the IP headers.
- o The subsequent sections give guidelines for adding ECN to a subnet technology that uses feed-forward-and-up mode like IP, but it is

not so similar to IP that [RFC6040] rules can be applied directly. Specifically:

- * Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively address how to add ECN support to the wire protocol and to the encapsulators and decapsulators at the ingress and egress of the subnet.
- * Section 4.5 deals with the special, but common, case of sequences of tunnels or subnets that all use the same technology
- * Section 4.6 deals with the question of reframing when IP packets do not map 1:1 into lower layer frames.

4.1. IP-in-IP Tunnels with Shim Headers

A common pattern for many tunnelling protocols is to encapsulate an inner IP header with shim header(s) then an outer IP header. A shim header is defined as one that is not sufficient alone to forward the packet as an outer header. Another common pattern is for a shim to encapsulate a layer 2 (L2) header, which in turn encapsulates (or might encapsulate) an IP header. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] clarifies that RFC 6040 is just as applicable when there are shim(s) and possibly a L2 header between two IP headers.

However, it is not always feasible or necessary to propagate ECN between IP headers when separated by a shim. For instance, it might be too costly to dig to arbitrary depths to find an inner IP header, there may be little or no congestion within the tunnel by design (see null mode in Section 3.4 above), or a legacy implementation might not support ECN. In cases where a tunnel does not support ECN, it is important that the ingress does not copy the ECN field from an inner IP header to an outer. Therefore section 4 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] requires network operators to configure the ingress of a tunnel that does not support ECN so that it zeros the ECN field in the outer IP header.

Nonetheless, in many cases it is feasible to propagate the ECN field between IP headers separated by shim header(s) and/or a L2 header. Particularly in the typical case when the outer IP header and the shim(s) are added (or removed) as part of the same procedure. Even if the shim(s) encapsulate a L2 header, it is often possible to find an inner IP header within the L2 PDU and propagate ECN between that and the outer IP header. This can be thought of as a special case of the feed-up-and-forward mode (Section 3.2), so the guidelines for this mode apply (Section 5).

Numerous shim protocols have been defined for IP tunnelling. More recent ones e.g. Geneve [RFC8926] and Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) [I-D.ietf-intarea-gue] cite and follow RFC 6040. And some earlier ones, e.g. CAPWAP [RFC5415] and LISP [RFC6830], cite RFC 3168, which is compatible with RFC 6040.

However, as Section 9.3 of RFC 3168 pointed out, ECN support needs to be defined for many earlier shim-based tunnelling protocols, e.g. L2TPv2 [RFC2661], L2TPv3 [RFC3931], GRE [RFC2784], PPTP [RFC2637], GTP [GTPv1], [GTPv1-U], [GTPv2-C] and Teredo [RFC4380] as well as some recent ones, e.g. VXLAN [RFC7348], NVGRE [RFC7637] and NSH [RFC8300].

All these IP-based encapsulations can be updated in one shot by simple reference to RFC 6040. However, it would not be appropriate to update all these protocols from within the present guidance document. Instead a companion specification [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] has been prepared that has the appropriate standards track status to update standards track protocols. For those that are not under IETF change control [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] can only recommend that the relevant body updates them.

4.2. Wire Protocol Design: Indication of ECN Support

This section is intended to guide the redesign of any lower layer protocol that encapsulate IP to add native ECN support at the lower layer. It reflects the approaches used in [RFC6040] and in [RFC5129]. Therefore IP-in-IP tunnels or IP-in-MPLS or MPLS-in-MPLS encapsulations that already comply with [RFC6040] or [RFC5129] will already satisfy this guidance.

A lower layer (or subnet) congestion notification system:

1. SHOULD NOT apply explicit congestion notifications to PDUs that are destined for legacy layer-4 transport implementations that will not understand ECN, and
2. SHOULD NOT apply explicit congestion notifications to PDUs if the egress of the subnet might not propagate congestion notifications onward into the higher layer.

We use the term ECN-PDUs for a PDU on a feedback loop that will propagate congestion notification properly because it meets both the above criteria. And a Not-ECN-PDU is a PDU on a feedback loop that does not meet at least one of the criteria, and will therefore not propagate congestion notification properly. A

corollary of the above is that a lower layer congestion notification protocol:

3. SHOULD be able to distinguish ECN-PDUs from Not-ECN-PDUs.

Note that there is no need for all interior nodes within a subnet to be able to mark congestion explicitly. A mix of ECN and drop signals from different nodes is fine. However, if any interior nodes might generate ECN markings, guideline 2 above says that all relevant egress node(s) SHOULD be able to propagate those markings up to the higher layer.

In IP, if the ECN field in each PDU is cleared to the Not-ECT (not ECN-capable transport) codepoint, it indicates that the L4 transport will not understand congestion markings. A congested buffer must not mark these Not-ECT PDUs, and therefore drops them instead.

The mechanism a lower layer uses to distinguish the ECN-capability of PDUs need not mimic that of IP. The above guidelines merely say that the lower layer system, as a whole, should achieve the same outcome. For instance, ECN-capable feedback loops might use PDUs that are identified by a particular set of labels or tags. Alternatively, logical link protocols that use flow state might determine whether a PDU can be congestion marked by checking for ECN-support in the flow state. Other protocols might depend on out-of-band control signals.

The per-domain checking of ECN support in MPLS [RFC5129] is a good example of a way to avoid sending congestion markings to L4 transports that will not understand them, without using any header space in the subnet protocol.

In MPLS, header space is extremely limited, therefore RFC5129 does not provide a field in the MPLS header to indicate whether the PDU is an ECN-PDU or a Not-ECN-PDU. Instead, interior nodes in a domain are allowed to set explicit congestion indications without checking whether the PDU is destined for a L4 transport that will understand them. Nonetheless, this is made safe by requiring that the network operator upgrades all decapsulating edges of a whole domain at once, as soon as even one switch within the domain is configured to mark rather than drop during congestion. Therefore, any edge node that might decapsulate a packet will be capable of checking whether the higher layer transport is ECN-capable. When decapsulating a CE-marked packet, if the decapsulator discovers that the higher layer (inner header) indicates the transport is not ECN-capable, it drops the packet--effectively on behalf of the earlier congested node (see Decapsulation Guideline 1 in Section 4.4).

It was only appropriate to define such an incremental deployment strategy because MPLS is targeted solely at professional operators, who can be expected to ensure that a whole subnetwork is consistently configured. This strategy might not be appropriate for other link technologies targeted at zero-configuration deployment or deployment by the general public (e.g. Ethernet). For such 'plug-and-play' environments it will be necessary to invent a failsafe approach that ensures congestion markings will never fall into black holes, no matter how inconsistently a system is put together. Alternatively, congestion notification relying on correct system configuration could be confined to flavours of Ethernet intended only for professional network operators, such as Provider Backbone Bridges (PBB [IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1ah).

ECN support in TRILL [I-D.ietf-trill-ecn-support] provides a good example of how to add ECN to a lower layer protocol without relying on careful and consistent operator configuration. TRILL provides an extension header word with space for flags of different categories depending on whether logic to understand the extension is critical. The congestion experienced marking has been defined as a 'critical ingress-to-egress' flag. So if a transit RBridge sets this flag and an egress RBridge does not have any logic to process it, it will drop it; which is the desired default action anyway. Therefore TRILL RBridges can be updated with support for ECN in no particular order and, at the egress of the TRILL campus, congestion notification will be propagated to IP as ECN whenever ECN logic has been implemented, or as drop otherwise.

QCN [IEEE802.1Q] is not intended to extend beyond a single subnet, or to interoperate with ECN. Nonetheless, the way QCN indicates to lower layer devices that the end-points will not understand QCN provides another example that a lower layer protocol designer might be able to mimic for their scenario. An operator can define certain Priority Code Points (PCPs [IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1p) to indicate non-QCN frames and an ingress bridge is required to map arriving not-QCN-capable IP packets to one of these non-QCN PCPs.

4.3. Encapsulation Guidelines

This section is intended to guide the redesign of any node that encapsulates IP with a lower layer header when adding native ECN support to the lower layer protocol. It reflects the approaches used in [RFC6040] and in [RFC5129]. Therefore IP-in-IP tunnels or IP-in-MPLS or MPLS-in-MPLS encapsulations that already comply with [RFC6040] or [RFC5129] will already satisfy this guidance.

1. Egress Capability Check: A subnet ingress needs to be sure that the corresponding egress of a subnet will propagate any

congestion notification added to the outer header across the subnet. This is necessary in addition to checking that an incoming PDU indicates an ECN-capable (L4) transport. Examples of how this guarantee might be provided include:

- * by configuration (e.g. if any label switches in a domain support ECN marking, [RFC5129] requires all egress nodes to have been configured to propagate ECN)
 - * by the ingress explicitly checking that the egress propagates ECN (e.g. an early attempt to add ECN support to TRILL used IS-IS to check path capabilities before adding ECN extension flags to each frame [RFC7780]).
 - * by inherent design of the protocol (e.g. by encoding ECN marking on the outer header in such a way that a legacy egress that does not understand ECN will consider the PDU corrupt or invalid and discard it, thus at least propagating a form of congestion signal).
2. Egress Fails Capability Check: If the ingress cannot guarantee that the egress will propagate congestion notification, the ingress SHOULD disable ECN at the lower layer when it forwards the PDU. An example of how the ingress might disable ECN at the lower layer would be by setting the outer header of the PDU to identify it as a Not-ECN-PDU, assuming the subnet technology supports such a concept.
 3. Standard Congestion Monitoring Baseline: Once the ingress to a subnet has established that the egress will correctly propagate ECN, on encapsulation it SHOULD encode the same level of congestion in outer headers as is arriving in incoming headers. For example it might copy any incoming congestion notification into the outer header of the lower layer protocol.

This ensures that bulk congestion monitoring of outer headers (e.g. by a network management node monitoring ECN in passing frames) will measure congestion accumulated along the whole upstream path - since the Load Regulator not just since the ingress of the subnet. A node that is not the Load Regulator SHOULD NOT re-initialize the level of CE markings in the outer to zero.

It would still also be possible to measure congestion introduced across one subnet (or tunnel) by subtracting the level of CE markings on inner headers from that on outer headers (see Appendix C of [RFC6040]). For example:

- * If this guideline has been followed and if the level of CE markings is 0.4% on the outer and 0.1% on the inner, 0.4% congestion has been introduced across all the networks since the load regulator, and 0.3% ($= 0.4\% - 0.1\%$) has been introduced since the ingress to the current subnet (or tunnel);
- * Without this guideline, if the subnet ingress had re-initialized the outer congestion level to zero, the outer and inner would measure 0.1% and 0.3%. It would still be possible to infer that the congestion introduced since the Load Regulator was 0.4% ($= 0.1\% + 0.3\%$). But only if the monitoring system somehow knows whether the subnet ingress re-initialized the congestion level.

As long as subnet and tunnel technologies use the standard congestion monitoring baseline in this guideline, monitoring systems will know to use the former approach, rather than having to "somehow know" which approach to use.

4.4. Decapsulation Guidelines

This section is intended to guide the redesign of any node that decapsulates IP from within a lower layer header when adding native ECN support to the lower layer protocol. It reflects the approaches used in [RFC6040] and in [RFC5129]. Therefore IP-in-IP tunnels or IP-in-MPLS or MPLS-in-MPLS encapsulations that already comply with [RFC6040] or [RFC5129] will already satisfy this guidance.

A subnet egress SHOULD NOT simply copy congestion notification from outer headers to the forwarded header. It SHOULD calculate the outgoing congestion notification field from the inner and outer headers using the following guidelines. If there is any conflict, rules earlier in the list take precedence over rules later in the list:

1. If the arriving inner header is a Not-ECN-PDU it implies the L4 transport will not understand explicit congestion markings.
Then:
 - * If the outer header carries an explicit congestion marking, drop is the only indication of congestion that the L4 transport will understand. If the congestion marking is the most severe possible, the packet MUST be dropped. However, if congestion can be marked with multiple levels of severity and the packet's marking is not the most severe, this requirement can be relaxed to: the packet SHOULD be dropped.

- * If the outer is an ECN-PDU that carries no indication of congestion or a Not-ECN-PDU the PDU SHOULD be forwarded, but still as a Not-ECN-PDU.
- 2. If the outer header does not support explicit congestion notification (a Not-ECN-PDU), but the inner header does (an ECN-PDU), the inner header SHOULD be forwarded unchanged.
- 3. In some lower layer protocols congestion may be signalled as a numerical level, such as in the control frames of quantized congestion notification (QCN [IEEE802.1Q]). If such a multi-bit encoding encapsulates an ECN-capable IP data packet, a function will be needed to convert the quantized congestion level into the frequency of congestion markings in outgoing IP packets.
- 4. Congestion indications might be encoded by a severity level. For instance increasing levels of congestion might be encoded by numerically increasing indications, e.g. pre-congestion notification (PCN) can be encoded in each PDU at three severity levels in IP or MPLS [RFC6660] and the default encapsulation and decapsulation rules [RFC6040] are compatible with this interpretation of the ECN field.

If the arriving inner header is an ECN-PDU, where the inner and outer headers carry indications of congestion of different severity, the more severe indication SHOULD be forwarded in preference to the less severe.

- 5. The inner and outer headers might carry a combination of congestion notification fields that should not be possible given any currently used protocol transitions. For instance, if Encapsulation Guideline 3 in Section 4.3 had been followed, it should not be possible to have a less severe indication of congestion in the outer than in the inner. It MAY be appropriate to log unexpected combinations of headers and possibly raise an alarm.

If a safe outgoing codepoint can be defined for such a PDU, the PDU SHOULD be forwarded rather than dropped. Some implementers discard PDUs with currently unused combinations of headers just in case they represent an attack. However, an approach using alarms and policy-mediated drop is preferable to hard-coded drop, so that operators can keep track of possible attacks but currently unused combinations are not precluded from future use through new standards actions.

4.5. Sequences of Similar Tunnels or Subnets

In some deployments, particularly in 3GPP networks, an IP packet may traverse two or more IP-in-IP tunnels in sequence that all use identical technology (e.g. GTP).

In such cases, it would be sufficient for every encapsulation and decapsulation in the chain to comply with RFC 6040. Alternatively, as an optimisation, a node that decapsulates a packet and immediately re-encapsulates it for the next tunnel MAY copy the incoming outer ECN field directly to the outgoing outer and the incoming inner ECN field directly to the outgoing inner. Then the overall behavior across the sequence of tunnel segments would still be consistent with RFC 6040.

Appendix C of RFC6040 describes how a tunnel egress can monitor how much congestion has been introduced within a tunnel. A network operator might want to monitor how much congestion had been introduced within a whole sequence of tunnels. Using the technique in Appendix C of RFC6040 at the final egress, the operator could monitor the whole sequence of tunnels, but only if the above optimisation were used consistently along the sequence of tunnels, in order to make it appear as a single tunnel. Therefore, tunnel endpoint implementations SHOULD allow the operator to configure whether this optimisation is enabled.

When ECN support is added to a subnet technology, consideration SHOULD be given to a similar optimisation between subnets in sequence if they all use the same technology.

4.6. Reframing and Congestion Markings

The guidance in this section is worded in terms of framing boundaries, but it applies equally whether the protocol data units are frames, cells or packets.

Where an AQM marks the ECN field of IP packets as they queue into a layer-2 link, there will be no problem with framing boundaries, because the ECN markings would be applied directly to IP packets. The guidance in this section is only applicable where an ECN capability is being added to a layer-2 protocol so that layer-2 frames can be ECN-marked by an AQM at layer-2. This would only be necessary where AQM will be applied at pure layer-2 nodes (without IP-awareness).

When layer-2 frame headers are stripped off and IP PDUs with different boundaries are forwarded, the provisions in RFC7141 for handling congestion indications when splitting or merging packets

apply (see Section 2.4 of [RFC7141]). Those provisions include: "The general rule to follow is that the number of octets in packets with congestion indications SHOULD be equivalent before and after merging or splitting." See RFC 7141 for the complete provisions and related discussion, including an exception to that general rule.

As also recommended in RFC 7141, the mechanism for propagating congestion indications SHOULD ensure that any new incoming congestion indication is propagated immediately, and not held awaiting possible arrival of further congestion indications sufficient to indicate congestion for all of the octets of an outgoing IP PDU.

5. Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

The guidance in this section is applicable, for example, when IP packets:

- o are encapsulated in Ethernet headers, which have no support for ECN;
- o are forwarded by the eNode-B (base station) of a 3GPP radio access network, which is required to apply ECN marking during congestion, [LTE-RA], [UTRAN], but the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) that encapsulates the IP header over the radio access has no support for ECN.

This guidance also generalizes to encapsulation by other subnet technologies with no native support for explicit congestion notification at the lower layer, but with support for finding and processing an IP header. It is unlikely to be applicable or necessary for IP-in-IP encapsulation, where feed-forward-and-up mode based on [RFC6040] would be more appropriate.

Marking the IP header while switching at layer-2 (by using a layer-3 switch) or while forwarding in a radio access network seems to represent a layering violation. However, it can be considered as a benign optimisation if the guidelines below are followed. Feed-up-and-forward is certainly not a general alternative to implementing feed-forward congestion notification in the lower layer, because:

- o IPv4 and IPv6 are not the only layer-3 protocols that might be encapsulated by lower layer protocols
- o Link-layer encryption might be in use, making the layer-2 payload inaccessible

- o Many Ethernet switches do not have 'layer-3 switch' capabilities so they cannot read or modify an IP payload
- o It might be costly to find an IP header (v4 or v6) when it may be encapsulated by more than one lower layer header, e.g. Ethernet MAC in MAC ([IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1ah).

Nonetheless, configuring lower layer equipment to look for an ECN field in an encapsulated IP header is a useful optimisation. If the implementation follows the guidelines below, this optimisation does not have to be confined to a controlled environment such as within a data centre; it could usefully be applied on any network--even if the operator is not sure whether the above issues will never apply:

1. If a native lower-layer congestion notification mechanism exists for a subnet technology, it is safe to mix feed-up-and-forward with feed-forward-and-up on other switches in the same subnet. However, it will generally be more efficient to use the native mechanism.
 2. The depth of the search for an IP header SHOULD be limited. If an IP header is not found soon enough, or an unrecognized or unreadable header is encountered, the switch SHOULD resort to an alternative means of signalling congestion (e.g. drop, or the native lower layer mechanism if available).
 3. It is sufficient to use the first IP header found in the stack; the egress of the relevant tunnel can propagate congestion notification upwards to any more deeply encapsulated IP headers later.
6. Feed-Backward Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

It can be seen from Section 3.3 that congestion notification in a subnet using feed-backward mode has generally not been designed to be directly coupled with IP layer congestion notification. The subnet attempts to minimize congestion internally, and if the incoming load at the ingress exceeds the capacity somewhere through the subnet, the layer 3 buffer into the ingress backs up. Thus, a feed-backward mode subnet is in some sense similar to a null mode subnet, in that there is no need for any direct interaction between the subnet and higher layer congestion notification. Therefore no detailed protocol design guidelines are appropriate. Nonetheless, a more general guideline is appropriate:

A subnetwork technology intended to eventually interface to IP SHOULD NOT be designed using only the feed-backward mode, which is certainly best for a stand-alone subnet, but would need to be

modified to work efficiently as part of the wider Internet, because IP uses feed-forward-and-up mode.

The feed-backward approach at least works beneath IP, where the term 'works' is used only in a narrow functional sense because feed-backward can result in very inefficient and sluggish congestion control--except if it is confined to the subnet directly connected to the original data source, when it is faster than feed-forward. It would be valid to design a protocol that could work in feed-backward mode for paths that only cross one subnet, and in feed-forward-and-up mode for paths that cross subnets.

In the early days of TCP/IP, a similar feed-backward approach was tried for explicit congestion signalling, using source-quench (SQ) ICMP control packets. However, SQ fell out of favour and is now formally deprecated [RFC6633]. The main problem was that it is hard for a data source to tell the difference between a spoofed SQ message and a quench request from a genuine buffer on the path. It is also hard for a lower layer buffer to address an SQ message to the original source port number, which may be buried within many layers of headers, and possibly encrypted.

QCN (also known as backward congestion notification, BCN; see Sections 30--33 of [IEEE802.1Q]; previously known as 802.1Qau) uses a feed-backward mode structurally similar to ATM's relative rate mechanism. However, QCN confines its applicability to scenarios such as some data centres where all endpoints are directly attached by the same Ethernet technology. If a QCN subnet were later connected into a wider IP-based internetwork (e.g. when attempting to interconnect multiple data centres) it would suffer the inefficiency shown in Figure 3.

7. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

8. Security Considerations

If a lower layer wire protocol is redesigned to include explicit congestion signalling in-band in the protocol header, care SHOULD be taken to ensure that the field used is specified as mutable during transit. Otherwise interior nodes signalling congestion would invalidate any authentication protocol applied to the lower layer header--by altering a header field that had been assumed as immutable.

The redesign of protocols that encapsulate IP in order to propagate congestion signals between layers raises potential signal integrity

concerns. Experimental or proposed approaches exist for assuring the end-to-end integrity of in-band congestion signals, e.g.:

- o Congestion exposure (ConEx) for networks to audit that their congestion signals are not being suppressed by other networks or by receivers, and for networks to police that senders are responding sufficiently to the signals, irrespective of the L4 transport protocol used [RFC7713].
- o A test for a sender to detect whether a network or the receiver is suppressing congestion signals (for example see 2nd para of Section 20.2 of [RFC3168]).

Given these end-to-end approaches are already being specified, it would make little sense to attempt to design hop-by-hop congestion signal integrity into a new lower layer protocol, because end-to-end integrity inherently achieves hop-by-hop integrity.

Section 6 gives vulnerability to spoofing as one of the reasons for deprecating feed-backward mode.

9. Conclusions

Following the guidance in this document enables ECN support to be extended to numerous protocols that encapsulate IP (v4 & v6) in a consistent way, so that IP continues to fulfil its role as an end-to-end interoperability layer. This includes:

- o A wide range of tunnelling protocols including those with various forms of shim header between two IP headers, possibly also separated by a L2 header;
- o A wide range of subnet technologies, particularly those that work in the same 'feed-forward-and-up' mode that is used to support ECN in IP and MPLS.

Guidelines have been defined for supporting propagation of ECN between Ethernet and IP on so-called Layer-3 Ethernet switches, using a 'feed-up-and-forward' mode. This approach could enable other subnet technologies to pass ECN signals into the IP layer, even if they do not support ECN natively.

Finally, attempting to add ECN to a subnet technology in feed-backward mode is deprecated except in special cases, due to its likely sluggish response to congestion.

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12. Comments Solicited

Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

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Appendix A. Changes in This Version (to be removed by RFC Editor)

From ietf-12 to ietf-13

* Following 3rd tsvwg WGLC:

- + Formalized update to RFC 3819 in its own subsection (1.1) and referred to it in the abstract
- + Scope: Clarified that the specification of alternative ECN semantics using ECT(1) was not in RFC 4774, but rather in RFC 8311, and that the problem with using a DSCP to indicate alternative semantics has issues at domain boundaries as well as tunnels.
- + Terminology: tightened up definitions of ECN-PDU and Not-ECN-PDU, and removed definition of Congestion Baseline, given it was only used once.
- + Mentioned QCN where feed-backward is first introduced (S.3), referring forward to where it is discussed more deeply (S.4).
- + Clarified that IS-IS solution to adding ECN support to TRILL was not pursued
- + Completely rewrote the rationale for the guideline about a Standard Congestion Monitoring Baseline, to focus on standardization of the otherwise unknown scenario used, rather than the relative usefulness of the info in each approach
- + Explained the re-framing problem better and added fragmentation as another possible cause of the problem
- + Acknowledged new reviewers
- + Updated references, replaced citations of 802.1Qau and 802.1ah with rolled up 802.1Q, and added citations of Fat trees and Clos Networks
- + Numerous other editorial improvements

From ietf-11 to ietf-12

- * Updated references

From ietf-10 to ietf-11

- * Removed short section (was 3) 'Guidelines for All Cases' because it was out of scope, being covered by RFC 4774. Expanded the Scope section (1.2) to explain all this. Explained that the default encap/decap rules already support certain alternative semantics, particularly all three of the alternative semantics for ECT(1): equivalent to ECT(0) , higher severity than ECT(0), and unmarked but implying different marking semantics from ECT(0).
- * Clarified why the QCN example was being given even though not about increment deployment of ECN
- * Pointed to the spoofing issue with feed-backward mode from the Security Considerations section, to aid security review.
- * Removed any ambiguity in the word 'transport' throughout

From ietf-09 to ietf-10

- * Updated section 5.1 on "IP-in-IP tunnels with Shim Headers" to be consistent with updates to draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim.
- * Removed reference to the ECN nonce, which has been made historic by RFC 8311
- * Removed "Open Issues" Appendix, given all have been addressed.

From ietf-08 to ietf-09

- * Updated para in Intro that listed all the IP-in-IP tunnelling protocols, to instead refer to draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim
- * Updated section 5.1 on "IP-in-IP tunnels with Shim Headers" to summarize guidance that has evolved as rfc6040update-shim has developed.

From ietf-07 to ietf-08: Refreshed to avoid expiry. Updated references.

From ietf-06 to ietf-07:

- * Added the people involved in liaisons to the acknowledgements.

From ietf-05 to ietf-06:

- * Introduction: Added GUE and Geneve as examples of tightly coupled shims between IP headers that cite RFC 6040. And added VXLAN to list of those that do not.
- * Replaced normative text about tightly coupled shims between IP headers, with reference to new draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim
- * Wire Protocol Design: Indication of ECN Support: Added TRILL as an example of a well-design protocol that does not need an indication of ECN support in the wire protocol.
- * Encapsulation Guidelines: In the case of a Not-ECN-PDU with a CE outer, replaced SHOULD be dropped, with explanations of when SHOULD or MUST are appropriate.
- * Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode: Explained examples more carefully, referred to PDCP and cited UTRAN spec as well as E-UTRAN.
- * Updated references.
- * Marked open issues as resolved, but did not delete Open Issues Appendix (yet).

From ietf-04 to ietf-05:

- * Explained why tightly coupled shim headers only "SHOULD" comply with RFC 6040, not "MUST".
- * Updated references

From ietf-03 to ietf-04:

- * Addressed Richard Scheffenegger's review comments: primarily editorial corrections, and addition of examples for clarity.

From ietf-02 to ietf-03:

- * Updated references, ad cited RFC4774.

From ietf-01 to ietf-02:

- * Added Section for guidelines that are applicable in all cases.
- * Updated references.

From ietf-00 to ietf-01: Updated references.

From briscoe-04 to ietf-00: Changed filename following tsvwg adoption.

From briscoe-03 to 04:

- * Re-arranged the introduction to describe the purpose of the document first before introducing ECN in more depth. And clarified the introduction throughout.
- * Added applicability to 3GPP TS 36.300.

From briscoe-02 to 03:

- * Scope section:
 - + Added dependence on correct propagation of traffic class information
 - + For the feed-backward mode, deemed multicast and anycast out of scope
- * Ensured all guidelines referring to subnet technologies also refer to tunnels and vice versa by adding applicability sentences at the start of sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6 and 5.
- * Added Security Considerations on ensuring congestion signal fields are classed as immutable and on using end-to-end congestion signal integrity technologies rather than hop-by-hop.

From briscoe-01 to 02:

- * Added authors: JK & PT
- * Added
 - + Section 4.1 "IP-in-IP Tunnels with Tightly Coupled Shim Headers"
 - + Section 4.5 "Sequences of Similar Tunnels or Subnets"
 - + roadmap at the start of Section 4, given the subsections have become quite fragmented.
 - + Section 9 "Conclusions"

- * Clarified why transports are starting to be able to saturate interior links
- * Under Section 1.1, addressed the question of alternative signal semantics and included multicast & anycast.
- * Under Section 3.1, included a 3GPP example.
- * Section 4.2. "Wire Protocol Design":
 - + Altered guideline 2. to make it clear that it only applies to the immediate subnet egress, not later ones
 - + Added a reminder that it is only necessary to check that ECN propagates at the egress, not whether interior nodes mark ECN
 - + Added example of how QCN uses 802.1p to indicate support for QCN.
- * Added references to Appendix C of RFC6040, about monitoring the amount of congestion signals introduced within a tunnel
- * Appendix A: Added more issues to be addressed, including plan to produce a standards track update to IP-in-IP tunnel protocols.
- * Updated acks and references

From briscoe-00 to 01:

- * Intended status: BCP (was Informational) & updates 3819 added.
- * Briefer Introduction: Introductory para justifying benefits of ECN. Moved all but a brief enumeration of modes of operation to their own new section (from both Intro & Scope). Introduced incr. deployment as most tricky part.
- * Tightened & added to terminology section
- * Structured with Modes of Operation, then Guidelines section for each mode.
- * Tightened up guideline text to remove vagueness / passive voice / ambiguity and highlight main guidelines as numbered items.
- * Added Outstanding Document Issues Appendix

* Updated references

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Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) Protocol for Very Low Queuing
Delay (L4S)
draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id-25

Abstract

This specification defines the protocol to be used for a new network service called low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S). L4S uses an Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) scheme at the IP layer that is similar to the original (or 'Classic') ECN approach, except as specified within. L4S uses 'scalable' congestion control, which induces much more frequent control signals from the network and it responds to them with much more fine-grained adjustments, so that very low (typically sub-millisecond on average) and consistently low queuing delay becomes possible for L4S traffic without compromising link utilization. Thus even capacity-seeking (TCP-like) traffic can have high bandwidth and very low delay at the same time, even during periods of high traffic load.

The L4S identifier defined in this document distinguishes L4S from 'Classic' (e.g. TCP-Reno-friendly) traffic. It gives an incremental migration path so that suitably modified network bottlenecks can distinguish and isolate existing traffic that still follows the Classic behaviour, to prevent it degrading the low queuing delay and low loss of L4S traffic. This specification defines the rules that L4S transports and network elements need to follow with the intention that L4S flows neither harm each other's performance nor that of Classic traffic. Examples of new active queue management (AQM) marking algorithms and examples of new transports (whether TCP-like or real-time) are specified separately.

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1. Introduction

This specification defines the protocol to be used for a new network service called low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S). L4S uses an Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) scheme at the IP layer with the same set of codepoint transitions as the original (or 'Classic') Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN [RFC3168]). RFC 3168 required an ECN mark to be equivalent to a drop, both when applied in the network and when responded to by a transport. Unlike Classic ECN marking, the network applies L4S marking more immediately and more aggressively than drop, and the transport response to each mark is reduced and smoothed relative to that for drop. The two changes counterbalance each other so that the throughput of an L4S flow will be roughly the same as a comparable non-L4S flow under the same conditions. Nonetheless, the much more frequent ECN control signals and the finer responses to these signals result in very low queuing delay without compromising link utilization, and this low delay can be maintained during high load. For instance, queuing delay under heavy and highly varying load with the example DCTCP/DualQ solution cited below on a DSL or Ethernet link is sub-millisecond on average and roughly 1 to 2 milliseconds at the 99th percentile without losing link utilization [DualPI2Linux], [DCTH19]. Note that the inherent queuing delay while waiting to acquire a discontinuous medium such as WiFi has to be minimized in its own right, so it would be additional to the above (see section 6.3 of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]).

L4S relies on 'scalable' congestion controls for these delay properties and for preserving low delay as flow rate scales, hence the name. The congestion control used in Data Center TCP (DCTCP) is an example of a scalable congestion control, but DCTCP is applicable solely to controlled environments like data centres [RFC8257], because it is too aggressive to co-exist with existing TCP-Reno-friendly traffic. The DualQ Coupled AQM, which is defined in a complementary experimental specification [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled], is an AQM framework that enables scalable congestion controls derived from DCTCP to co-exist with existing traffic, each getting roughly the same flow rate when they compete under similar conditions. Note that a scalable congestion control is still not safe to deploy on the Internet unless it satisfies the requirements listed in Section 4.

L4S is not only for elastic (TCP-like) traffic - there are scalable congestion controls for real-time media, such as the L4S variant of the SCReAM [RFC8298] real-time media congestion avoidance technique (RMCAT). The factor that distinguishes L4S from Classic traffic is its behaviour in response to congestion. The transport wire protocol, e.g. TCP, QUIC, SCTP, DCCP, RTP/RTCP, is orthogonal (and therefore not suitable for distinguishing L4S from Classic packets).

The L4S identifier defined in this document is the key piece that distinguishes L4S from 'Classic' (e.g. Reno-friendly) traffic. It gives an incremental migration path so that suitably modified network bottlenecks can distinguish and isolate existing Classic traffic from L4S traffic to prevent the former from degrading the very low delay and loss of the new scalable transports, without harming Classic performance at these bottlenecks. Initial implementation of the separate parts of the system has been motivated by the performance benefits.

1.1. Latency, Loss and Scaling Problems

Latency is becoming the critical performance factor for many (most?) applications on the public Internet, e.g. interactive Web, Web services, voice, conversational video, interactive video, interactive remote presence, instant messaging, online gaming, remote desktop, cloud-based applications, and video-assisted remote control of machinery and industrial processes. In the 'developed' world, further increases in access network bit-rate offer diminishing returns, whereas latency is still a multi-faceted problem. In the last decade or so, much has been done to reduce propagation time by placing caches or servers closer to users. However, queuing remains a major intermittent component of latency.

The Diffserv architecture provides Expedited Forwarding [RFC3246], so that low latency traffic can jump the queue of other traffic. If growth in high-throughput latency-sensitive applications continues, periods with solely latency-sensitive traffic will become increasingly common on links where traffic aggregation is low. For instance, on the access links dedicated to individual sites (homes, small enterprises or mobile devices). These links also tend to become the path bottleneck under load. During these periods, if all the traffic were marked for the same treatment, at these bottlenecks Diffserv would make no difference. Instead, it becomes imperative to remove the underlying causes of any unnecessary delay.

The bufferbloat project has shown that excessively-large buffering ('bufferbloat') has been introducing significantly more delay than the underlying propagation time. These delays appear only intermittently -- only when a capacity-seeking (e.g. TCP) flow is long enough for the queue to fill the buffer, making every packet in other flows sharing the buffer sit through the queue.

Active queue management (AQM) was originally developed to solve this problem (and others). Unlike Diffserv, which gives low latency to some traffic at the expense of others, AQM controls latency for all traffic in a class. In general, AQM methods introduce an increasing level of discard from the buffer the longer the queue persists above a shallow threshold. This gives sufficient signals to capacity-seeking (aka. greedy) flows to keep the buffer empty for its intended purpose: absorbing bursts. However, RED [RFC2309] and other algorithms from the 1990s were sensitive to their configuration and hard to set correctly. So, this form of AQM was not widely deployed.

More recent state-of-the-art AQM methods, e.g. FQ-CoDel [RFC8290], PIE [RFC8033], Adaptive RED [ARED01], are easier to configure, because they define the queuing threshold in time not bytes, so it is invariant for different link rates. However, no matter how good the AQM, the sawtooth sending window of a Classic congestion control will either cause queuing delay to vary or cause the link to be underutilized. Even with a perfectly tuned AQM, the additional queuing delay will be of the same order as the underlying speed-of-light delay across the network, thereby roughly doubling the total round-trip time.

If a sender's own behaviour is introducing queuing delay variation, no AQM in the network can 'un-vary' the delay without significantly compromising link utilization. Even flow-queuing (e.g. [RFC8290]), which isolates one flow from another, cannot isolate a flow from the delay variations it inflicts on itself. Therefore those applications that need to seek out high bandwidth but also need low latency will have to migrate to scalable congestion control.

Altering host behaviour is not enough on its own though. Even if hosts adopt low latency behaviour (scalable congestion controls), they need to be isolated from the behaviour of existing Classic congestion controls that induce large queue variations. L4S enables that migration by providing latency isolation in the network and distinguishing the two types of packets that need to be isolated: L4S and Classic. L4S isolation can be achieved with a queue per flow (e.g. [RFC8290]) but a DualQ [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] is sufficient, and actually gives better tail latency. Both approaches are addressed in this document.

The DualQ solution was developed to make very low latency available without requiring per-flow queues at every bottleneck. This was because per-flow-queuing (FQ) has well-known downsides - not least the need to inspect transport layer headers in the network, which makes it incompatible with privacy approaches such as IPsec VPN tunnels, and incompatible with link layer queue management, where transport layer headers can be hidden, e.g. 5G.

Latency is not the only concern addressed by L4S: It was known when TCP congestion avoidance was first developed that it would not scale to high bandwidth-delay products (footnote 6 of Jacobson and Karels [TCP-CA]). Given regular broadband bit-rates over WAN distances are already [RFC3649] beyond the scaling range of Reno congestion control, 'less unscalable' Cubic [RFC8312] and Compound [I-D.sridharan-tcpm-ctcp] variants of TCP have been successfully deployed. However, these are now approaching their scaling limits. Unfortunately, fully scalable congestion controls such as DCTCP [RFC8257] outcompete Classic ECN congestion controls sharing the same queue, which is why they have been confined to private data centres or research testbeds.

It turns out that these scalable congestion control algorithms that solve the latency problem can also solve the scalability problem of Classic congestion controls. The finer sawteeth in the congestion window have low amplitude, so they cause very little queuing delay variation and the average time to recover from one congestion signal to the next (the average duration of each sawtooth) remains invariant, which maintains constant tight control as flow-rate scales. A background paper [DCttH19] gives the full explanation of why the design solves both the latency and the scaling problems, both in plain English and in more precise mathematical form. The explanation is summarised without the maths in Section 4 of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

Note: The L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] repeats the following definitions, but if there are accidental differences those below take precedence.

Classic Congestion Control: A congestion control behaviour that can

co-exist with standard Reno [RFC5681] without causing significantly negative impact on its flow rate [RFC5033]. With Classic congestion controls, such as Reno or Cubic, because flow rate has scaled since TCP congestion control was first designed in 1988, it now takes hundreds of round trips (and growing) to recover after a congestion signal (whether a loss or an ECN mark) as shown in the examples in section 5.1 of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] and in [RFC3649]. Therefore control of queuing and utilization becomes very slack, and the slightest disturbances (e.g. from new flows starting) prevent a high rate from being attained.

Scalable Congestion Control: A congestion control where the average time from one congestion signal to the next (the recovery time) remains invariant as the flow rate scales, all other factors being equal. This maintains the same degree of control over queueing and utilization whatever the flow rate, as well as ensuring that high throughput is robust to disturbances. For instance, DCTCP averages 2 congestion signals per round-trip whatever the flow rate, as do other recently developed scalable congestion controls, e.g. Relentless TCP [Mathis09], TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], [PragueLinux], BBRv2 [BBRv2], [I-D.cardwell-iccrp-bbr-congestion-control] and the L4S variant of SCREAM for real-time media [SCReAM], [RFC8298]). See Section 4.3 for more explanation.

Classic service: The Classic service is intended for all the congestion control behaviours that co-exist with Reno [RFC5681] (e.g. Reno itself, Cubic [RFC8312], Compound [I-D.sridharan-tcpm-ctcp], TFRC [RFC5348]). The term 'Classic queue' means a queue providing the Classic service.

Low-Latency, Low-Loss Scalable throughput (L4S) service: The 'L4S' service is intended for traffic from scalable congestion control algorithms, such as TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], which was derived from DCTCP [RFC8257]. The L4S service is for more general traffic than just TCP Prague -- it allows the set of congestion controls with similar scaling properties to Prague to evolve, such as the examples listed above (Relentless, SCReAM). The term 'L4S queue' means a queue providing the L4S service.

The terms Classic or L4S can also qualify other nouns, such as 'queue', 'codepoint', 'identifier', 'classification', 'packet', 'flow'. For example: an L4S packet means a packet with an L4S identifier sent from an L4S congestion control.

Both Classic and L4S services can cope with a proportion of unresponsive or less-responsive traffic as well, but in the L4S case its rate has to be smooth enough or low enough not to build a queue (e.g. DNS, VoIP, game sync datagrams, etc).

Reno-friendly: The subset of Classic traffic that is friendly to the standard Reno congestion control defined for TCP in [RFC5681]. The TFRC spec. [RFC5348] indirectly implies that 'friendly' is defined as "generally within a factor of two of the sending rate of a TCP flow under the same conditions". Reno-friendly is used here in place of 'TCP-friendly', given the latter has become imprecise, because the TCP protocol is now used with so many different congestion control behaviours, and Reno is used in non-TCP transports such as QUIC [RFC9000].

Classic ECN: The original Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) protocol [RFC3168], which requires ECN signals to be treated the same as drops, both when generated in the network and when responded to by the sender. For L4S, the names used for the four codepoints of the 2-bit IP-ECN field are unchanged from those defined in [RFC3168]: Not ECT, ECT(0), ECT(1) and CE, where ECT stands for ECN-Capable Transport and CE stands for Congestion Experienced. A packet marked with the CE codepoint is termed 'ECN-marked' or sometimes just 'marked' where the context makes ECN obvious.

Site: A home, mobile device, small enterprise or campus, where the network bottleneck is typically the access link to the site. Not all network arrangements fit this model but it is a useful, widely applicable generalization.

1.3. Scope

The new L4S identifier defined in this specification is applicable for IPv4 and IPv6 packets (as for Classic ECN [RFC3168]). It is applicable for the unicast, multicast and anycast forwarding modes.

The L4S identifier is an orthogonal packet classification to the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) [RFC2474]. Section 5.4 explains what this means in practice.

This document is intended for experimental status, so it does not update any standards track RFCs. Therefore it depends on [RFC8311], which is a standards track specification that:

- * updates the ECN proposed standard [RFC3168] to allow experimental track RFCs to relax the requirement that an ECN mark must be equivalent to a drop (when the network applies markings and/or

when the sender responds to them). For instance, in the ABE experiment [RFC8511] this permits a sender to respond less to ECN marks than to drops;

- * changes the status of the experimental ECN nonce [RFC3540] to historic;
- * makes consequent updates to the following additional proposed standard RFCs to reflect the above two bullets:
 - ECN for RTP [RFC6679];
 - the congestion control specifications of various DCCP congestion control identifier (CCID) profiles [RFC4341], [RFC4342], [RFC5622].

This document is about identifiers that are used for interoperation between hosts and networks. So the audience is broad, covering developers of host transports and network AQMs, as well as covering how operators might wish to combine various identifiers, which would require flexibility from equipment developers.

2. Choice of L4S Packet Identifier: Requirements

This subsection briefly records the process that led to the chosen L4S identifier.

The identifier for packets using the Low Latency, Low Loss, Scalable throughput (L4S) service needs to meet the following requirements:

- * it SHOULD survive end-to-end between source and destination end-points: across the boundary between host and network, between interconnected networks, and through middleboxes;
- * it SHOULD be visible at the IP layer;
- * it SHOULD be common to IPv4 and IPv6 and transport-agnostic;
- * it SHOULD be incrementally deployable;
- * it SHOULD enable an AQM to classify packets encapsulated by outer IP or lower-layer headers;
- * it SHOULD consume minimal extra codepoints;
- * it SHOULD be consistent on all the packets of a transport layer flow, so that some packets of a flow are not served by a different queue to others.

Whether the identifier would be recoverable if the experiment failed is a factor that could be taken into account. However, this has not been made a requirement, because that would favour schemes that would be easier to fail, rather than those more likely to succeed.

It is recognised that any choice of identifier is unlikely to satisfy all these requirements, particularly given the limited space left in the IP header. Therefore a compromise will always be necessary, which is why all the above requirements are expressed with the word 'SHOULD' not 'MUST'.

After extensive assessment of alternative schemes, "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" was chosen as the best compromise. Therefore this scheme is defined in detail in the following sections, while Appendix B records its pros and cons against the above requirements.

3. L4S Packet Identification

The L4S treatment is an experimental track alternative packet marking treatment to the Classic ECN treatment in [RFC3168], which has been updated by [RFC8311] to allow experiments such as the one defined in the present specification. [RFC4774] discusses some of the issues and evaluation criteria when defining alternative ECN semantics. Like Classic ECN, L4S ECN identifies both network and host behaviour: it identifies the marking treatment that network nodes are expected to apply to L4S packets, and it identifies packets that have been sent from hosts that are expected to comply with a broad type of sending behaviour.

For a packet to receive L4S treatment as it is forwarded, the sender sets the ECN field in the IP header to the ECT(1) codepoint. See Section 4 for full transport layer behaviour requirements, including feedback and congestion response.

A network node that implements the L4S service always classifies arriving ECT(1) packets for L4S treatment and by default classifies CE packets for L4S treatment unless the heuristics described in Section 5.3 are employed. See Section 5 for full network element behaviour requirements, including classification, ECN-marking and interaction of the L4S identifier with other identifiers and per-hop behaviours.

4. Transport Layer Behaviour (the 'Prague Requirements')

4.1. Codepoint Setting

A sender that wishes a packet to receive L4S treatment as it is forwarded, MUST set the ECN field in the IP header (v4 or v6) to the ECT(1) codepoint.

4.2. Prerequisite Transport Feedback

For a transport protocol to provide scalable congestion control (Section 4.3) it MUST provide feedback of the extent of CE marking on the forward path. When ECN was added to TCP [RFC3168], the feedback method reported no more than one CE mark per round trip. Some transport protocols derived from TCP mimic this behaviour while others report the accurate extent of ECN marking. This means that some transport protocols will need to be updated as a prerequisite for scalable congestion control. The position for a few well-known transport protocols is given below.

TCP: Support for the accurate ECN feedback requirements [RFC7560] (such as that provided by AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]) by both ends is a prerequisite for scalable congestion control in TCP. Therefore, the presence of ECT(1) in the IP headers even in one direction of a TCP connection will imply that both ends support accurate ECN feedback. However, the converse does not apply. So even if both ends support AccECN, either of the two ends can choose not to use a scalable congestion control, whatever the other end's choice.

SCTP: A suitable ECN feedback mechanism for SCTP could add a chunk to report the number of received CE marks (e.g. [I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn]), and update the ECN feedback protocol sketched out in Appendix A of the original standards track specification of SCTP [RFC4960].

RTP over UDP: A prerequisite for scalable congestion control is for both (all) ends of one media-level hop to signal ECN support [RFC6679] and use the new generic RTCP feedback format of [RFC8888]. The presence of ECT(1) implies that both (all) ends of that media-level hop support ECN. However, the converse does not apply. So each end of a media-level hop can independently choose not to use a scalable congestion control, even if both ends support ECN.

QUIC: Support for sufficiently fine-grained ECN feedback is provided by the v1 IETF QUIC transport [RFC9000].

DCCP: The ACK vector in DCCP [RFC4340] is already sufficient to

report the extent of CE marking as needed by a scalable congestion control.

4.3. Prerequisite Congestion Response

As a condition for a host to send packets with the L4S identifier (ECT(1)), it SHOULD implement a congestion control behaviour that ensures that, in steady state, the average duration between induced ECN marks does not increase as flow rate scales up, all other factors being equal. This is termed a scalable congestion control. This invariant duration ensures that, as flow rate scales, the average period with no feedback information about capacity does not become excessive. It also ensures that queue variations remain small, without having to sacrifice utilization.

With a congestion control that sawtooths to probe capacity, this duration is called the recovery time, because each time the sawtooth yields, on average it takes this time to recover to its previous high point. A scalable congestion control does not have to sawtooth, but it has to coexist with scalable congestion controls that do.

For instance, for DCTCP [RFC8257], TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], [PragueLinux] and the L4S variant of SCReAM [RFC8298], the average recovery time is always half a round trip (or half a reference round trip), whatever the flow rate.

As with all transport behaviours, a detailed specification (probably an experimental RFC) is expected for each congestion control, following the guidelines for specifying new congestion control algorithms in [RFC5033]. In addition it is expected to document these L4S-specific matters, specifically the timescale over which the proportionality is averaged, and control of burstiness. The recovery time requirement above is worded as a 'SHOULD' rather than a 'MUST' to allow reasonable flexibility for such implementations.

The condition 'all other factors being equal', allows the recovery time to be different for different round trip times, as long as it does not increase with flow rate for any particular RTT.

Saying that the recovery time remains roughly invariant is equivalent to saying that the number of ECN CE marks per round trip remains invariant as flow rate scales, all other factors being equal. For instance, an average recovery time of half of 1 RTT is equivalent to 2 ECN marks per round trip. For those familiar with steady-state congestion response functions, it is also equivalent to say that the congestion window is inversely proportional to the proportion of bytes in packets marked with the CE codepoint (see section 2 of [PI2]).

In order to coexist safely with other Internet traffic, a scalable congestion control MUST NOT tag its packets with the ECT(1) codepoint unless it complies with the following bulleted requirements:

1. A scalable congestion control MUST be capable of being replaced by a Classic congestion control (by application and/or by administrative control). If a Classic congestion control is activated, it will not tag its packets with the ECT(1) codepoint (see Appendix A.1.3 for rationale).
2. As well as responding to ECN markings, a scalable congestion control MUST react to packet loss in a way that will coexist safely with Classic congestion controls such as standard Reno [RFC5681], as required by [RFC5033] (see Appendix A.1.4 for rationale).
3. In uncontrolled environments, monitoring MUST be implemented to support detection of problems with an ECN-capable AQM at the path bottleneck that appears not to support L4S and might be in a shared queue. Such monitoring SHOULD be applied to live traffic that is using Scalable congestion control. Alternatively, monitoring need not be applied to live traffic, if monitoring has been arranged to cover the paths that live traffic takes through uncontrolled environments.

A function to detect the above problems with an ECN-capable AQM MUST also be implemented and used. The detection function SHOULD be capable of making the congestion control adapt its ECN-marking response in real-time to coexist safely with Classic congestion controls such as standard Reno [RFC5681], as required by [RFC5033]. This could be complemented by more detailed offline detection of potential problems. If only offline detection is used and potential problems with such an AQM are detected on certain paths, the scalable congestion control MUST be replaced by a Classic congestion control, at least for the problem paths.

See Section 4.3.1, Appendix A.1.5 and the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops] for rationale.

Note that a scalable congestion control is not expected to change to setting ECT(0) while it transiently adapts to coexist with Classic congestion controls, whereas a replacement congestion control that solely behaves in the Classic way will set ECT(0).

4. In the range between the minimum likely RTT and typical RTTs expected in the intended deployment scenario, a scalable congestion control MUST converge towards a rate that is as independent of RTT as is possible without compromising stability or efficiency (see Appendix A.1.6 for rationale).
5. A scalable congestion control SHOULD remain responsive to congestion when typical RTTs over the public Internet are significantly smaller because they are no longer inflated by queuing delay. It would be preferable for the minimum window of a scalable congestion control to be lower than 1 segment rather than use the timeout approach described for TCP in S.6.1.2 of the ECN spec [RFC3168] (or an equivalent for other transports). However, a lower minimum is not set as a formal requirement for L4S experiments (see Appendix A.1.7 for rationale).
6. A scalable congestion control's loss detection SHOULD be resilient to reordering over an adaptive time interval that scales with throughput and adapts to reordering (as in RACK [RFC8985]), as opposed to counting only in fixed units of packets (as in the 3 DupACK rule of New Reno [RFC5681] and [RFC6675], which is not scalable). As data rates increase (e.g., due to new and/or improved technology), congestion controls that detect loss by counting in units of packets become more likely to incorrectly treat reordering events as congestion-caused loss events (see Appendix A.1.8 for further rationale). This requirement does not apply to congestion controls that are solely used in controlled environments where the network introduces hardly any reordering.
7. A scalable congestion control is expected to limit the queue caused by bursts of packets. It would not seem necessary to set the limit any lower than 10% of the minimum RTT expected in a typical deployment (e.g. additional queuing of roughly 250 us for the public Internet). This would be converted to a number of packets under the worst-case assumption that the bottleneck link capacity equals the current flow rate. No normative requirement to limit bursts is given here and, until there is more industry experience from the L4S experiment, it is not even known whether one is needed - it seems to be in an L4S sender's self-interest to limit bursts.

Each sender in a session can use a scalable congestion control independently of the congestion control used by the receiver(s) when they send data. Therefore there might be ECT(1) packets in one direction and ECT(0) or Not-ECT in the other.

Later (Section 5.4.1.1) this document discusses the conditions for mixing other "'Safe' Unresponsive Traffic" (e.g. DNS, LDAP, NTP, voice, game sync packets) with L4S traffic. To be clear, although such traffic can share the same queue as L4S traffic, it is not appropriate for the sender to tag it as ECT(1), except in the (unlikely) case that it satisfies the above conditions.

4.3.1. Guidance on Congestion Response in the RFC Series

RFC 3168 requires the congestion responses to a CE-marked packet and a dropped packet to be the same. RFC 8311 is a standards-track update to RFC 3168 intended to enable experimentation with ECN, including the L4S experiment. RFC 8311 allows an experimental congestion control's response to a CE-marked packet to differ from the response to a dropped packet, provided that the differences are documented in an experimental RFC, such as the present document.

BCP 124 [RFC4774] gives guidance to protocol designers, when specifying alternative semantics for the ECN field. RFC 8311 explained that it did not need to update the best current practice in BCP 124 in order to relax the 'equivalence with drop' requirement because, although BCP 124 quotes the same requirement from RFC 3168, the BCP does not impose requirements based on it. BCP 124 describes three options for incremental deployment, with Option 3 (in Section 4.3 of BCP 124) best matching the L4S case. Option 3's requirement for end-nodes is that they respond to CE marks "in a way that is friendly to flows using IETF-conformant congestion control." This echoes other general congestion control requirements in the RFC series, for example [RFC5033], which says "...congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect", or [RFC8085] concerning UDP congestion control says "Bulk-transfer applications that choose not to implement TFRC or TCP-like windowing SHOULD implement a congestion control scheme that results in bandwidth (capacity) use that competes fairly with TCP within an order of magnitude."

The third normative bullet in Section 4.3 above (which concerns L4S response to congestion from a Classic ECN AQM) aims to ensure that these 'coexistence' requirements are satisfied, but it makes some compromises. This subsection highlights and justifies those compromises and Appendix A.1.5 and the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops] give detailed analysis, examples and references (the normative text in that bullet takes precedence if any

informative elaboration leads to ambiguity). The approach is based on an assessment of the risk of harm, which is a combination of the prevalence of the conditions necessary for harm to occur, and the potential severity of the harm if they do.

Prevalence: There are three cases:

- * Drop Tail: Coexistence between L4S and Classic flows is not in doubt where the bottleneck does not support any form of ECN, which has remained by far the most prevalent case since the ECN RFC was published in 2001.
- * L4S: Coexistence is not in doubt if the bottleneck supports L4S.
- * Classic ECN [RFC3168]: The compromises centre around cases where the bottleneck supports Classic ECN but not L4S. But it depends on which sub-case:
 - Shared Queue with Classic ECN: The members of the Transport Working group are not aware of any current deployments of single-queue Classic ECN bottlenecks in the Internet. Nonetheless, at the scale of the Internet, rarity need not imply small numbers, nor that there will be rarity in future.
 - Per-Flow-queues with Classic ECN: Most AQMs with per-flow-queuing (FQ) deployed from 2012 onwards had Classic ECN enabled by default, specifically FQ-CoDel [RFC8290] and COBALT [COBALT]. But the compromises only apply to the second of two further sub-cases:
 - o With per-flow-queuing, co-existence between Classic and L4S flows is not normally a problem, because different flows are not meant to be in the same queue (BCP 124 [RFC4774] did not foresee the introduction of per-flow-queuing, which appeared as a potential isolation technique some eight years after the BCP was published).
 - o However, the isolation between L4S and Classic flows is not perfect in cases where the hashes of flow IDs collide or where multiple flows within a layer-3 VPN are encapsulated within one flow ID.

To summarize, the coexistence problem is confined to cases of imperfect flow isolation in an FQ, or in potential cases where a Classic ECN AQM has been deployed in a shared queue (see the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops] for further details

including recent surveys attempting to quantify prevalence). Further, if one of these cases does occur, the coexistence problem does not arise unless sources of Classic and L4S flows are simultaneously sharing the same bottleneck queue (e.g. different applications in the same household) and flows of each type have to be large enough to coincide for long enough for any throughput imbalance to have developed.

Severity: Where long-running L4S and Classic flows coincide in a shared queue, testing of one L4S congestion control (TCP Prague) has found that the imbalance in average throughput between an L4S and a Classic flow can reach 25:1 in favour of L4S in the worst case [ecn-fallback]. However, when capacity is most scarce, the Classic flow gets a higher proportion of the link, for instance over a 4 Mb/s link the throughput ratio is below ~10:1 over paths with a base RTT below 100 ms, and falls below ~5:1 for base RTTs below 20ms.

These throughput ratios can clearly fall well outside current RFC guidance on coexistence. However, the tendency towards leaving a greater share for Classic flows at lower link rate and the very limited prevalence of the conditions necessary for harm to occur led to the possibility of allowing the RFC requirements to be compromised, albeit briefly:

- * The recommended approach is still to detect and adapt to a Classic ECN AQM in real-time, which is fully consistent with all the RFCs on coexistence. In other words, the "SHOULD"s in the third bullet of Section 4.3 above expect the sender to implement something similar to the proof of concept code that detects the presence of a Classic ECN AQM and falls back to a Classic congestion response within a few round trips [ecn-fallback]. However, although this code reliably detects a Classic ECN AQM, the current code can also wrongly categorize an L4S AQM as Classic, most often in cases when link rate is low or RTT is high. Although this is the safe way round, and although implementers are expected to be able to improve on this proof of concept, concerns have been raised that implementers might lose faith in such detection and disable it.
- * Therefore the third bullet in Section 4.3 above allows a compromise where coexistence could diverge from the requirements in the RFC Series briefly, but mandatory monitoring is required, in order to detect such cases and trigger remedial action. This approach tolerates a brief divergence from the RFCs given the likely low prevalence and given harm here means a flow progresses more slowly than otherwise, but it does progress. The L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops] outlines a range of example remedial actions that include alterations either to the

sender or to the network. However, the final normative requirement in the third bullet of Section 4.3 above places ultimate responsibility for remedial action on the sender. If coexistence problems with a Classic ECN AQM are detected (implying they have not been resolved by the network), it says the sender "MUST" revert to a Classic congestion control."

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops] also gives example ways in which L4S congestion controls can be rolled out initially in lower risk scenarios.

4.4. Filtering or Smoothing of ECN Feedback

Section 5.2 below specifies that an L4S AQM is expected to signal L4S ECN immediately, to avoid introducing delay due to filtering or smoothing. This contrasts with a Classic AQM, which filters out variations in the queue before signalling ECN marking or drop. In the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch], responsibility for smoothing out these variations shifts to the sender's congestion control.

This shift of responsibility has the advantage that each sender can smooth variations over a timescale proportionate to its own RTT. Whereas, in the Classic approach, the network doesn't know the RTTs of any of the flows, so it has to smooth out variations for a worst-case RTT to ensure stability. For all the typical flows with shorter RTT than the worst-case, this makes congestion control unnecessarily sluggish.

This also gives an L4S sender the choice not to smooth, depending on its context (start-up, congestion avoidance, etc). Therefore, this document places no requirement on an L4S congestion control to smooth out variations in any particular way. Implementers are encouraged to openly publish the approach they take to smoothing, and the results and experience they gain during the L4S experiment.

5. Network Node Behaviour

5.1. Classification and Re-Marking Behaviour

A network node that implements the L4S service:

- * MUST classify arriving ECT(1) packets for L4S treatment, unless overridden by another classifier (e.g., see Section 5.4.1.2);

- * MUST classify arriving CE packets for L4S treatment as well, unless overridden by a another classifier or unless the exception referred to next applies;

CE packets might have originated as ECT(1) or ECT(0), but the above rule to classify them as if they originated as ECT(1) is the safe choice (see Appendix B for rationale). The exception is where some flow-aware in-network mechanism happens to be available for distinguishing CE packets that originated as ECT(0), as described in Section 5.3, but there is no implication that such a mechanism is necessary.

An L4S AQM treatment follows similar codepoint transition rules to those in RFC 3168. Specifically, the ECT(1) codepoint MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint than CE, and CE MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint. An ECT(1) packet is classified as ECN-capable and, if congestion increases, an L4S AQM algorithm will increasingly mark the ECN field as CE, otherwise forwarding packets unchanged as ECT(1). Necessary conditions for an L4S marking treatment are defined in Section 5.2.

Under persistent overload an L4S marking treatment MUST begin applying drop to L4S traffic until the overload episode has subsided, as recommended for all AQM methods in [RFC7567] (Section 4.2.1), which follows the similar advice in RFC 3168 (Section 7). During overload, it MUST apply the same drop probability to L4S traffic as it would to Classic traffic.

Where an L4S AQM is transport-aware, this requirement could be satisfied by using drop in only the most overloaded individual per-flow AQMs. In a DualQ with flow-aware queue protection (e.g. [I-D.briscoe-docsis-q-protection]), this could be achieved by redirecting packets in those flows contributing most to the overload out of the L4S queue so that they are subjected to drop in the Classic queue.

For backward compatibility in uncontrolled environments, a network node that implements the L4S treatment MUST also implement an AQM treatment for the Classic service as defined in Section 1.2. This Classic AQM treatment need not mark ECT(0) packets, but if it does, see Section 5.2 for the strengths of the markings relative to drop. It MUST classify arriving ECT(0) and Not-ECT packets for treatment by this Classic AQM (for the DualQ Coupled AQM, see the extensive discussion on classification in Sections 2.3 and 2.5.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]).

In case unforeseen problems arise with the L4S experiment, it MUST be possible to configure an L4S implementation to disable the L4S treatment. Once disabled, all packets of all ECN codepoints will receive Classic treatment and ECT(1) packets MUST be treated as if they were Not-ECT.

5.2. The Strength of L4S CE Marking Relative to Drop

The relative strengths of L4S CE and drop are irrelevant where AQMs are implemented in separate queues per-application-flow, which are then explicitly scheduled (e.g. with an FQ scheduler as in FQ-CoDel [RFC8290]). Nonetheless, the relationship between them needs to be defined for the coupling between L4S and Classic congestion signals in a DualQ Coupled AQM [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled], as below.

Unless an AQM node schedules application flows explicitly, the likelihood that the AQM drops a Not-ECT Classic packet (p_C) MUST be roughly proportional to the square of the likelihood that it would have marked it if it had been an L4S packet (p_L). That is

$$p_C \sim (p_L / k)^2$$

The constant of proportionality (k) does not have to be standardised for interoperability, but a value of 2 is RECOMMENDED. The term 'likelihood' is used above to allow for marking and dropping to be either probabilistic or deterministic.

This formula ensures that Scalable and Classic flows will converge to roughly equal congestion windows, for the worst case of Reno congestion control. This is because the congestion windows of Scalable and Classic congestion controls are inversely proportional to p_L and $\sqrt{p_C}$ respectively. So squaring p_C in the above formula counterbalances the square root that characterizes Reno-friendly flows.

Note that, contrary to RFC 3168, an AQM implementing the L4S and Classic treatments does not mark an ECT(1) packet under the same conditions that it would have dropped a Not-ECT packet, as allowed by [RFC8311], which updates RFC 3168. However, if it marks ECT(0) packets, it does so under the same conditions that it would have dropped a Not-ECT packet [RFC3168].

Also, In the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch], the sender, not the network, is responsible for smoothing out variations in the queue. So, an L4S AQM MUST signal congestion as soon as possible. Then, an L4S sender generally interprets CE marking as an unsmoothed signal.

This requirement does not prevent an L4S AQM from mixing in additional congestion signals that are smoothed, such as the signals from a Classic smoothed AQM that are coupled with unsmoothed L4S signals in the coupled DualQ [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]. But only as long as the onset of congestion can be signalled immediately, and can be interpreted by the sender as if it has been signalled immediately, which is important for interoperability

5.3. Exception for L4S Packet Identification by Network Nodes with Transport-Layer Awareness

To implement L4S packet classification, a network node does not need to identify transport-layer flows. Nonetheless, if an L4S network node classifies packets by their transport-layer flow ID and their ECN field, and if all the ECT packets in a flow have been ECT(0), the node MAY classify any CE packets in the same flow as if they were Classic ECT(0) packets. In all other cases, a network node MUST classify all CE packets as if they were ECT(1) packets. Examples of such other cases are: i) if no ECT packets have yet been identified in a flow; ii) if it is not desirable for a network node to identify transport-layer flows; or iii) if some ECT packets in a flow have been ECT(1) (this advice will need to be verified as part of L4S experiments).

5.4. Interaction of the L4S Identifier with other Identifiers

The examples in this section concern how additional identifiers might complement the L4S identifier to classify packets between class-based queues. Firstly Section 5.4.1 considers two queues, L4S and Classic, as in the Coupled DualQ AQM [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled], either alone (Section 5.4.1.1) or within a larger queuing hierarchy (Section 5.4.1.2). Then Section 5.4.2 considers schemes that might combine per-flow 5-tuples with other identifiers.

5.4.1. DualQ Examples of Other Identifiers Complementing L4S Identifiers

5.4.1.1. Inclusion of Additional Traffic with L4S

In a typical case for the public Internet a network element that implements L4S in a shared queue might want to classify some low-rate but unresponsive traffic (e.g. DNS, LDAP, NTP, voice, game sync packets) into the low latency queue to mix with L4S traffic. In this case it would not be appropriate to call the queue an L4S queue, because it is shared by L4S and non-L4S traffic. Instead it will be called the low latency or L queue. The L queue then offers two different treatments:

- * The L4S treatment, which is a combination of the L4S AQM treatment and a priority scheduling treatment;
- * The low latency treatment, which is solely the priority scheduling treatment, without ECN-marking by the AQM.

To identify packets for just the scheduling treatment, it would be inappropriate to use the L4S ECT(1) identifier, because such traffic is unresponsive to ECN marking. Examples of relevant non-ECN identifiers are:

- * address ranges of specific applications or hosts configured to be, or known to be, safe, e.g. hard-coded IoT devices sending low intensity traffic;
- * certain low data-volume applications or protocols (e.g. ARP, DNS);
- * specific Diffserv codepoints that indicate traffic with limited burstiness such as the EF (Expedited Forwarding [RFC3246]), Voice-Admit [RFC5865] or proposed NQB (Non-Queue-Building [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-nqb]) service classes or equivalent local-use DSCPs (see [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv]).

In summary, a network element that implements L4S in a shared queue MAY classify additional types of packets into the L queue based on identifiers other than the ECN field, but the types SHOULD be 'safe' to mix with L4S traffic, where 'safe' is explained in Section 5.4.1.1.1.

A packet that carries one of these non-ECN identifiers to classify it into the L queue would not be subject to the L4S ECN marking treatment, unless it also carried an ECT(1) or CE codepoint. The specification of an L4S AQM MUST define the behaviour for packets with unexpected combinations of codepoints, e.g. a non-ECN-based classifier for the L queue, but ECT(0) in the ECN field (for examples see section 2.5.1.1 of the DualQ spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]).

For clarity, non-ECN identifiers, such as the examples itemized above, might be used by some network operators who believe they identify non-L4S traffic that would be safe to mix with L4S traffic. They are not alternative ways for a host to indicate that it is sending L4S packets. Only the ECT(1) ECN codepoint indicates to a network element that a host is sending L4S packets (and CE indicates that it could have originated as ECT(1)). Specifically ECT(1) indicates that the host claims its behaviour satisfies the prerequisite transport requirements in Section 4.

In order to include non-L4S packets in the L queue, a network node MUST NOT alter Not-ECT or ECT(0) in the IP-ECN field to an L4S identifier. This ensures that these codepoints survive for any potential use later on the network path.

5.4.1.1.1. 'Safe' Unresponsive Traffic

The above section requires unresponsive traffic to be 'safe' to mix with L4S traffic. Ideally this means that the sender never sends any sequence of packets at a rate that exceeds the available capacity of the bottleneck link. However, typically an unresponsive transport does not even know the bottleneck capacity of the path, let alone its available capacity. Nonetheless, an application can be considered safe enough if it paces packets out (not necessarily completely regularly) such that its maximum instantaneous rate from packet to packet stays well below a typical broadband access rate.

This is a vague but useful definition, because many low latency applications of interest, such as DNS, voice, game sync packets, RPC, ACKs, keep-alives, could match this description.

Low rate streams such as voice and game sync packets, might not use continuously adapting ECN-based congestion control, but they ought to at least use a 'circuit-breaker' style of congestion response [RFC8083]. If the volume of traffic from unresponsive applications is high enough to overload the link, this will at least protect the capacity available to responsive applications. However, queuing delay in the L queue will probably rise to that controlled by the Classic (drop-based) AQM. If a network operator considers that such self-restraint is not enough, it might want to police the L queue (see Section 8.2 of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]).

5.4.1.2. Exclusion of Traffic From L4S Treatment

To extend the above example, an operator might want to exclude some traffic from the L4S treatment for a policy reason, e.g. security (traffic from malicious sources) or commercial (e.g. initially the operator may wish to confine the benefits of L4S to business customers).

In this exclusion case, the classifier MUST classify on the relevant locally-used identifiers (e.g. source addresses) before classifying the non-matching traffic on the end-to-end L4S ECN identifier.

A network node MUST NOT alter the end-to-end L4S ECN identifier from L4S to Classic, because an operator decision to exclude certain traffic from L4S treatment is local-only. The end-to-end L4S

identifier then survives for other operators to use, or indeed, they can apply their own policy, independently based on their own choice of locally-used identifiers. This approach also allows any operator to remove its locally-applied exclusions in future, e.g. if it wishes to widen the benefit of the L4S treatment to all its customers.

A network node that supports L4S but excludes certain packets carrying the L4S identifier from L4S treatment **MUST** still apply marking or dropping that is compatible with an L4S congestion response. For instance, it could either drop such packets with the same likelihood as Classic packets or it could ECN-mark them with a likelihood appropriate to L4S traffic (e.g. the coupled probability in a DualQ coupled AQM) but aiming for the Classic delay target. It **MUST NOT** ECN-mark such packets with a Classic marking probability, which could confuse the sender.

5.4.1.3. Generalized Combination of L4S and Other Identifiers

L4S concerns low latency, which it can provide for all traffic without differentiation and without necessarily affecting bandwidth allocation. Diffserv provides for differentiation of both bandwidth and low latency, but its control of latency depends on its control of bandwidth. The two can be combined if a network operator wants to control bandwidth allocation but it also wants to provide low latency - for any amount of traffic within one of these allocations of bandwidth (rather than only providing low latency by limiting bandwidth) [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv].

The DualQ examples so far have been framed in the context of providing the default Best Efforts Per-Hop Behaviour (PHB) using two queues - a Low Latency (L) queue and a Classic (C) Queue. This single DualQ structure is expected to be the most common and useful arrangement. But, more generally, an operator might choose to control bandwidth allocation through a hierarchy of Diffserv PHBs at a node, and to offer one (or more) of these PHBs using a pair of queues for a low latency and a Classic variant of the PHB.

In the first case, if we assume that a network element provides no PHBs except the DualQ, if a packet carries ECT(1) or CE, the network element would classify it for the L4S treatment irrespective of its DSCP. And, if a packet carried (say) the EF DSCP, the network element could classify it into the L queue irrespective of its ECN codepoint. However, where the DualQ is in a hierarchy of other PHBs, the classifier would classify some traffic into other PHBs based on DSCP before classifying between the low latency and Classic queues (based on ECT(1), CE and perhaps also the EF DSCP or other identifiers as in the above example).

[I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv] gives a number of examples of such arrangements to address various requirements.

[I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv] describes how an operator might use L4S to offer low latency as well as using Diffserv for bandwidth differentiation. It identifies two main types of approach, which can be combined: the operator might split certain Diffserv PHBs between L4S and a corresponding Classic service. Or it might split the L4S and/or the Classic service into multiple Diffserv PHBs. In either of these cases, a packet would have to be classified on its Diffserv and ECN codepoints.

In summary, there are numerous ways in which the L4S ECN identifier (ECT(1) and CE) could be combined with other identifiers to achieve particular objectives. The following categorization articulates those that are valid, but it is not necessarily exhaustive. Those tagged 'Recommended-standard-use' could be set by the sending host or a network. Those tagged 'Local-use' would only be set by a network:

1. Identifiers Complementing the L4S Identifier
 - a. Including More Traffic in the L Queue
(Could use Recommended-standard-use or Local-use identifiers)
 - b. Excluding Certain Traffic from the L Queue
(Local-use only)
2. Identifiers to place L4S classification in a PHB Hierarchy
(Could use Recommended-standard-use or Local-use identifiers)
 - a. PHBs Before L4S ECN Classification
 - b. PHBs After L4S ECN Classification

5.4.2. Per-Flow Queuing Examples of Other Identifiers Complementing L4S Identifiers

At a node with per-flow queueing (e.g. FQ-CoDel [RFC8290]), the L4S identifier could complement the Layer-4 flow ID as a further level of flow granularity (i.e. Not-ECT and ECT(0) queued separately from ECT(1) and CE packets). "Risk of reordering Classic CE packets" in Appendix B discusses the resulting ambiguity if packets originally marked ECT(0) are marked CE by an upstream AQM before they arrive at a node that classifies CE as L4S. It argues that the risk of reordering is vanishingly small and the consequence of such a low level of reordering is minimal.

Alternatively, it could be assumed that it is not in a flow's own interest to mix Classic and L4S identifiers. Then the AQM could use the ECN field to switch itself between a Classic and an L4S AQM behaviour within one per-flow queue. For instance, for ECN-capable packets, the AQM might consist of a simple marking threshold and an L4S ECN identifier might simply select a shallower threshold than a Classic ECN identifier would.

5.5. Limiting Packet Bursts from Links

As well as senders needing to limit packet bursts (Section 4.3), links need to limit the degree of burstiness they introduce. In both cases (senders and links) this is a tradeoff, because batch-handling of packets is done for good reason, e.g. processing efficiency or to make efficient use of medium acquisition delay. Some take the attitude that there is no point reducing burst delay at the sender below that introduced by links (or vice versa). However, delay reduction proceeds by cutting down 'the longest pole in the tent', which turns the spotlight on the next longest, and so on.

This document does not set any quantified requirements for links to limit burst delay, primarily because link technologies are outside the remit of L4S specifications. Nonetheless, the following two subsections outline opportunities for addressing bursty links in the process of L4S implementation and deployment.

5.5.1. Limiting Packet Bursts from Links Fed by an L4S AQM

It would not make sense to implement an L4S AQM that feeds into a particular link technology without also reviewing opportunities to reduce any form of burst delay introduced by that link technology. This would at least limit the bursts that the link would otherwise introduce into the onward traffic, which would cause jumpy feedback to the sender as well as potential extra queuing delay downstream. This document does not presume to even give guidance on an

appropriate target for such burst delay until there is more industry experience of L4S. However, as suggested in Section 4.3 it would not seem necessary to limit bursts lower than roughly 10% of the minimum base RTT expected in the typical deployment scenario (e.g. 250 us burst duration for links within the public Internet).

5.5.2. Limiting Packet Bursts from Links Upstream of an L4S AQM

The initial scope of the L4S experiment is to deploy L4S AQMs at bottlenecks and L4S congestion controls at senders. This is expected to highlight interactions with the most bursty upstream links and lead operators to tune down the burstiness of those links in their network that are configurable, or failing that, to have to compromise on the delay target of some L4S AQMs. It might also require specific redesign work relevant to the most problematic link types. Such knock-on effects of initial L4S deployment would all be part of the learning from the L4S experiment.

The details of such link changes are beyond the scope of the present document. Nonetheless, where L4S technology is being implemented on an outgoing interface of a device, it would make sense to consider opportunities for reducing bursts arriving at other incoming interface(s). For instance, where an L4S AQM is implemented to feed into the upstream WAN interface of a home gateway, there would be opportunities to alter the WiFi profiles sent out of any WiFi interfaces from the same device, in order to mitigate incoming bursts of aggregated WiFi frames from other WiFi stations.

6. Behaviour of Tunnels and Encapsulations

6.1. No Change to ECN Tunnels and Encapsulations in General

The L4S identifier is expected to work through and within any tunnel without modification, as long as the tunnel propagates the ECN field in any of the ways that have been defined since the first variant in the year 2001 [RFC3168]. L4S will also work with (but does not rely on) any of the more recent updates to ECN propagation in [RFC4301], [RFC6040] or [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim]. However, it is likely that some tunnels still do not implement ECN propagation at all. In these cases, L4S will work through such tunnels, but within them the outer header of L4S traffic will appear as Classic.

AQMs are typically implemented where an IP-layer buffer feeds into a lower layer, so they are agnostic to link layer encapsulations. Where a bottleneck link is not IP-aware, the L4S identifier is still expected to work within any lower layer encapsulation without modification, as long as it propagates the ECN field as defined for the link technology, for example for MPLS [RFC5129] or

TRILL [I-D.ietf-trill-ecn-support]. In some of these cases, e.g. layer-3 Ethernet switches, the AQM accesses the IP layer header within the outer encapsulation, so again the L4S identifier is expected to work without modification. Nonetheless, the programme to define ECN for other lower layers is still in progress [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines].

6.2. VPN Behaviour to Avoid Limitations of Anti-Replay

If a mix of L4S and Classic packets is sent into the same security association (SA) of a virtual private network (VPN), and if the VPN egress is employing the optional anti-replay feature, it could inappropriately discard Classic packets (or discard the records in Classic packets) by mistaking their greater queuing delay for a replay attack (see "Dropped Packets for Tunnels with Replay Protection Enabled" in [Heist21] for the potential performance impact). This known problem is common to both IPsec [RFC4301] and DTLS [RFC6347] VPNs, given they use similar anti-replay window mechanisms. The mechanism used can only check for replay within its window, so if the window is smaller than the degree of reordering, it can only assume there might be a replay attack and discard all the packets behind the trailing edge of the window. The specifications of IPsec AH [RFC4302] and ESP [RFC4303] suggest that an implementer scales the size of the anti-replay window with interface speed, and DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] says "The receiver SHOULD pick a window large enough to handle any plausible reordering, which depends on the data rate." However, in practice, the size of a VPN's anti-replay window is not always scaled appropriately.

If a VPN carrying traffic participating in the L4S experiment experiences inappropriate replay detection, the foremost remedy would be to ensure that the egress is configured to comply with the above window-sizing requirements.

If an implementation of a VPN egress does not support a sufficiently large anti-replay window, e.g. due to hardware limitations, one of the temporary alternatives listed in order of preference below might be feasible instead:

- * If the VPN can be configured to classify packets into different SAs indexed by DSCP, apply the appropriate locally defined DSCPs to Classic and L4S packets. The DSCPs could be applied by the network (based on the least significant bit of the ECN field), or by the sending host. Such DSCPs would only need to survive as far as the VPN ingress.
- * If the above is not possible and it is necessary to use L4S, either of the following might be appropriate as a last resort:

- disable anti-replay protection at the VPN egress, after considering the security implications (optional anti-replay is mandatory in both IPsec and DTLS);
- configure the tunnel ingress not to propagate ECN to the outer, which would lose the benefits of L4S and Classic ECN over the VPN.

Modification to VPN implementations is outside the present scope, which is why this section has so far focused on reconfiguration. Although this document does not define any requirements for VPN implementations, determining whether there is a need for such requirements could be one aspect of L4S experimentation.

7. L4S Experiments

This section describes open questions that L4S Experiments ought to focus on. This section also documents outstanding open issues that will need to be investigated as part of L4S experimentation, given they could not be fully resolved during the WG phase. It also lists metrics that will need to be monitored during experiments (summarizing text elsewhere in L4S documents) and finally lists some potential future directions that researchers might wish to investigate.

In addition to this section, the DualQ spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] sets operational and management requirements for experiments with DualQ Coupled AQMs; and General operational and management requirements for experiments with L4S congestion controls are given in Section 4 and Section 5 above, e.g. co-existence and scaling requirements, incremental deployment arrangements.

The specification of each scalable congestion control will need to include protocol-specific requirements for configuration and monitoring performance during experiments. Appendix A of the guidelines in [RFC5706] provides a helpful checklist.

7.1. Open Questions

L4S experiments would be expected to answer the following questions:

- * Have all the parts of L4S been deployed, and if so, what proportion of paths support it?
 - What types of L4S AQMs were deployed, e.g. FQ, coupled DualQ, uncoupled DualQ, other? And how prevalent was each?

- Are the signalling patterns emitted by the deployed AQMs in any way different from those expected when the Prague requirements for endpoints were written?
- * Does use of L4S over the Internet result in significantly improved user experience?
- * Has L4S enabled novel interactive applications?
- * Did use of L4S over the Internet result in improvements to the following metrics:
 - queue delay (mean and 99th percentile) under various loads;
 - utilization;
 - starvation / fairness;
 - scaling range of flow rates and RTTs?
- * How dependent was the performance of L4S service on the bottleneck bandwidth or the path RTT?
- * How much do bursty links in the Internet affect L4S performance (see "Underutilization with Bursty Links" in [Heist21]) and how prevalent are they? How much limitation of burstiness from upstream links was needed and/or was realized - both at senders and at links, especially radio links or how much did L4S target delay have to be increased to accommodate the bursts (see bullet #7 in Section 4.3 and Section 5.5.2)?
- * Is the initial experiment with mis-marked bursty traffic at high RTT (see "Underutilization with Bursty Traffic" in [Heist21]) indicative of similar problems at lower RTTs and, if so, how effective is the suggested remedy in Appendix A.1 of the DualQ spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] (or possible other remedies)?
- * Was per-flow queue protection typically (un)necessary?
 - How well did overload protection or queue protection work?
- * How well did L4S flows coexist with Classic flows when sharing a bottleneck?
 - How frequently did problems arise?

- What caused any coexistence problems, and were any problems due to single-queue Classic ECN AQMs (this assumes single-queue Classic ECN AQMs can be distinguished from FQ ones)?
- * How prevalent were problems with the L4S service due to tunnels / encapsulations that do not support ECN decapsulation?
- * How easy was it to implement a fully compliant L4S congestion control, over various different transport protocols (TCP, QUIC, RMCAT, etc)?

Monitoring for harm to other traffic, specifically bandwidth starvation or excess queuing delay, will need to be conducted alongside all early L4S experiments. It is hard, if not impossible, for an individual flow to measure its impact on other traffic. So such monitoring will need to be conducted using bespoke monitoring across flows and/or across classes of traffic.

7.2. Open Issues

- * What is the best way forward to deal with L4S over single-queue Classic ECN AQM bottlenecks, given current problems with misdetecting L4S AQMs as Classic ECN AQMs? See the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops].
- * Fixing the poor Interaction between current L4S congestion controls and CoDel with only Classic ECN support during flow startup. Originally, this was due to a bug in the initialization of the congestion EWMA in the Linux implementation of TCP Prague. That was quickly fixed, which removed the main performance impact, but further improvement would be useful (either by modifying CoDel, Scalable congestion controls, or both).

7.3. Future Potential

Researchers might find that L4S opens up the following interesting areas for investigation:

- * Potential for faster convergence time and tracking of available capacity;
- * Potential for improvements to particular link technologies, and cross-layer interactions with them;
- * Potential for using virtual queues, e.g. to further reduce latency jitter, or to leave headroom for capacity variation in radio networks;

- * Development and specification of reverse path congestion control using L4S building blocks (e.g. AccECN, QUIC);
- * Once queuing delay is cut down, what becomes the 'second longest pole in the tent' (other than the speed of light)?
- * Novel alternatives to the existing set of L4S AQMs;
- * Novel applications enabled by L4S.

8. IANA Considerations

The 01 codepoint of the ECN Field of the IP header is specified by the present Experimental RFC. The process for an experimental RFC to assign this codepoint in the IP header (v4 and v6) is documented in Proposed Standard [RFC8311], which updates the Proposed Standard [RFC3168].

When the present document is published as an RFC, IANA is asked to update the 01 entry in the registry, "ECN Field (Bits 6-7)" to the following (see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xhtml#ecn-field>):

Binary	Keyword	References
01	ECT(1) (ECN-Capable Transport (1)) [1]	[RFC8311] [RFC Errata 5399] [RFCXXXX]

Table 1

[XXXX is the number that the RFC Editor assigns to the present document (this sentence to be removed by the RFC Editor)].

9. Security Considerations

Approaches to assure the integrity of signals using the new identifier are introduced in Appendix C.1. See the security considerations in the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] for further discussion of mis-use of the identifier, as well as extensive discussion of policing rate and latency in regard to L4S.

If the anti-replay window of a VPN egress is too small, it will mistake deliberate delay differences as a replay attack, and discard higher delay packets (e.g. Classic) carried within the same security association (SA) as low delay packets (e.g. L4S). Section 6.2 recommends that VPNs used in L4S experiments are configured with a sufficiently large anti-replay window, as required by the relevant specifications. It also discusses other alternatives.

If a user taking part in the L4S experiment sets up a VPN without being aware of the above advice, and if the user allows anyone to send traffic into their VPN, they would open up a DoS vulnerability in which an attacker could induce the VPN's anti-replay mechanism to discard enough of the user's Classic (C) traffic (if they are receiving any) to cause a significant rate reduction. While the user is actively downloading C traffic, the attacker sends C traffic into the VPN to fill the remainder of the bottleneck link, then sends intermittent L4S packets to maximize the chance of exceeding the VPN's replay window. The user can prevent this attack by following the recommendations in Section 6.2.

The recommendation to detect loss in time units prevents the ACK-splitting attacks described in [Savage-TCP].

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Appendix A. Rationale for the 'Prague L4S Requirements'

This appendix is informative, not normative. It gives a list of modifications to current scalable congestion controls so that they can be deployed over the public Internet and coexist safely with existing traffic. The list complements the normative requirements in Section 4 that a sender has to comply with before it can set the L4S identifier in packets it sends into the Internet. As well as rationale for safety improvements (the requirements in Section 4) this appendix also includes preferable performance improvements (optimizations).

The requirements and recommendations in Section 4) have become known as the Prague L4S Requirements, because they were originally identified at an ad hoc meeting during IETF-94 in Prague [TCPPrague]. They were originally called the 'TCP Prague Requirements', but they are not solely applicable to TCP, so the name and wording has been generalized for all transport protocols, and the name 'TCP Prague' is now used for a specific implementation of the requirements.

At the time of writing, DCTCP [RFC8257] is the most widely used scalable transport protocol. In its current form, DCTCP is specified to be deployable only in controlled environments. Deploying it in the public Internet would lead to a number of issues, both from the safety and the performance perspective. The modifications and additional mechanisms listed in this section will be necessary for its deployment over the global Internet. Where an example is needed, DCTCP is used as a base, but the requirements in Section 4 apply equally to other scalable congestion controls, covering adaptive real-time media, etc., not just capacity-seeking behaviours.

A.1. Rationale for the Requirements for Scalable Transport Protocols

A.1.1. Use of L4S Packet Identifier

Description: A scalable congestion control needs to distinguish the packets it sends from those sent by Classic congestion controls (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.1).

Motivation: It needs to be possible for a network node to classify L4S packets without flow state into a queue that applies an L4S ECN marking behaviour and isolates L4S packets from the queuing delay of Classic packets.

A.1.2. Accurate ECN Feedback

Description: The transport protocol for a scalable congestion control needs to provide timely, accurate feedback about the extent of ECN marking experienced by all packets (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.2).

Motivation: Classic congestion controls only need feedback about the existence of a congestion episode within a round trip, not precisely how many packets were marked with ECN or dropped. Therefore, in 2001, when ECN feedback was added to TCP [RFC3168], it could not inform the sender of more than one ECN mark per RTT. Since then, requirements for more accurate ECN feedback in TCP have been defined in [RFC7560] and [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] specifies a change to the TCP protocol to satisfy these requirements. Most other transport protocols already satisfy this requirement (see Section 4.2).

A.1.3. Capable of Replacement by Classic Congestion Control

Description: It needs to be possible to replace the implementation of a scalable congestion control with a Classic control (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.3).

Motivation: L4S is an experimental protocol, therefore it seems prudent to be able to disable it at source in case of insurmountable problems, perhaps due to some unexpected interaction on a particular sender; over a particular path or network; with a particular receiver or even ultimately an insurmountable problem with the experiment as a whole.

A.1.4. Fall back to Classic Congestion Control on Packet Loss

Description: As well as responding to ECN markings in a scalable way, a scalable congestion control needs to react to packet loss in a way that will coexist safely with a Reno congestion control [RFC5681] (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.3).

Motivation: Part of the safety conditions for deploying a scalable congestion control on the public Internet is to make sure that it behaves properly when it builds a queue at a network bottleneck that has not been upgraded to support L4S. Packet loss can have many causes, but it usually has to be conservatively assumed that it is a sign of congestion. Therefore, on detecting packet loss, a scalable congestion control will need to fall back to Classic congestion control behaviour. If it does not comply, it could starve Classic traffic.

A scalable congestion control can be used for different types of transport, e.g. for real-time media or for reliable transport like TCP. Therefore, the particular Classic congestion control behaviour to fall back on will need to be dependent on the specific congestion control implementation. In the particular case of DCTCP, the DCTCP specification [RFC8257] states that "It is RECOMMENDED that an implementation deal with loss episodes in the same way as conventional TCP." For safe deployment, Section 4.3 requires any specification of a scalable congestion control for the public Internet to define the above requirement as a "MUST".

Even though a bottleneck is L4S capable, it might still become overloaded and have to drop packets. In this case, the sender may receive a high proportion of packets marked with the CE bit set and also experience loss. Current DCTCP implementations each react differently to this situation. At least one implementation reacts only to the drop signal (e.g. by halving the CWND) and at least another DCTCP implementation reacts to both signals (e.g. by halving the CWND due to the drop and also further reducing the CWND based on the proportion of marked packet). A third approach for the public Internet has been proposed that adjusts the loss response to result in a halving when combined with the ECN response. We believe that further experimentation is needed to understand what is the best behaviour for the public Internet, which may or not be one of these existing approaches.

A.1.5. Coexistence with Classic Congestion Control at Classic ECN bottlenecks

Description: Monitoring has to be in place so that a non-L4S but ECN-capable AQM can be detected at path bottlenecks. This is in case such an AQM has been implemented in a shared queue, in which case any long-running scalable flow would predominate over any simultaneous long-running Classic flow sharing the queue. The precise requirement wording in Section 4.3 is written so that such a problem could either be resolved in real-time, or via administrative intervention.

Motivation: Similarly to the discussion in Appendix A.1.4, this requirement in Section 4.3 is a safety condition to ensure an L4S congestion control coexists well with Classic flows when it builds a queue at a shared network bottleneck that has not been upgraded to support L4S. Nonetheless, if necessary, it is considered reasonable to resolve such problems over management timescales (possibly involving human intervention) because:

- * although a Classic flow can considerably reduce its throughput in the face of a competing scalable flow, it still makes progress and does not starve;
- * implementations of a Classic ECN AQM in a queue that is intended to be shared are believed to be rare;
- * detection of such AQMs is not always clear-cut; so focused out-of-band testing (or even contacting the relevant network operator) would improve certainty.

Therefore, the relevant normative requirement (Section 4.3) is divided into three stages: monitoring, detection and action:

Monitoring: Monitoring involves collection of the measurement data to be analysed. Monitoring is expressed as a 'MUST' for uncontrolled environments, although the placement of the monitoring function is left open. Whether monitoring has to be applied in real-time is expressed as a 'SHOULD'. This allows for the possibility that the operator of an L4S sender (e.g. a CDN) might prefer to test out-of-band for signs of Classic ECN AQMs, perhaps to avoid continually consuming resources to monitor live traffic.

Detection: Detection involves analysis of the monitored data to detect the likelihood of a Classic ECN AQM. Detection can either directly detect actual coexistence problems between flows, or it can aim to identify AQM technologies that are likely to present coexistence problems, based on knowledge of AQMs deployed at the

time. The requirements recommend that detection occurs live in real-time. However, detection is allowed to be deferred (e.g. it might involve further testing targeted at candidate AQMs);

Action: This involves the act of switching the sender to a Classic congestion control. This might occur in real-time within the congestion control for the subsequent duration of a flow, or it might involve administrative action to switch to Classic congestion control for a specific interface or for a certain set of destination addresses.

Instead of the sender taking action itself, the operator of the sender (e.g. a CDN) might prefer to ask the network operator to modify the Classic AQM's treatment of L4S packets; or to ensure L4S packets bypass the AQM; or to upgrade the AQM to support L4S (see the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops]). Once L4S flows no longer shared the Classic ECN AQM they would obviously no longer detect it, and the requirement to act on it would no longer apply.

The whole set of normative requirements concerning Classic ECN AQMs in Section 4.3 is worded so that it does not apply in controlled environments, such as private networks or data centre networks. CDN servers placed within an access ISP's network can be considered as a single controlled environment, but any onward networks served by the access network, including all the attached customer networks, would be unlikely to fall under the same degree of coordinated control. Monitoring is expressed as a 'MUST' for these uncontrolled segments of paths (e.g. beyond the access ISP in a home network), because there is a possibility that there might be a shared queue Classic ECN AQM in that segment. Nonetheless, the intent of the wording is to only require occasional monitoring of these uncontrolled regions, and not to burden CDN operators if monitoring never uncovers any potential problems.

More detailed discussion of all the above options and alternatives can be found in the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops].

Having said all the above, the approach recommended in Section 4.3 is to monitor, detect and act in real-time on live traffic. A passive monitoring algorithm to detect a Classic ECN AQM at the bottleneck and fall back to Classic congestion control is described in an extensive technical report [ecn-fallback], which also provides a link to Linux source code, and a large online visualization of its evaluation results. Very briefly, the algorithm primarily monitors RTT variation using the same algorithm that maintains the mean deviation of TCP's smoothed RTT, but it smooths over a duration of the order of a Classic sawtooth. The outcome is also conditioned on

other metrics such as the presence of CE marking and congestion avoidance phase having stabilized. The report also identifies further work to improve the approach, for instance improvements with low capacity links and combining the measurements with a cache of what had been learned about a path in previous connections. The report also suggests alternative approaches.

Although using passive measurements within live traffic (as above) can detect a Classic ECN AQM, it is much harder (perhaps impossible) to determine whether or not the AQM is in a shared queue. Nonetheless, this is much easier using active test traffic out-of-band, because two flows can be used. Section 4 of the same report [ecn-fallback] describes a simple technique to detect a Classic ECN AQM and determine whether it is in a shared queue, summarized here.

An L4S-enabled test server could be set up so that, when a test client accesses it, it serves a script that gets the client to open two parallel long-running flows. It could serve one with a Classic congestion control (C, that sets ECT(0)) and one with a scalable CC (L, that sets ECT(1)). If neither flow induces any ECN marks, it can be presumed the path does not contain a Classic ECN AQM. If either flow induces some ECN marks, the server could measure the relative flow rates and round trip times of the two flows. Table 2 shows the AQM that can be inferred for various cases (presuming the AQM behaviours known at the time of writing).

Rate	RTT	Inferred AQM
L > C	L = C	Classic ECN AQM (FIFO)
L = C	L = C	Classic ECN AQM (FQ)
L = C	L < C	FQ-L4S AQM
L ~ C	L < C	Coupled DualQ AQM

Table 2: Out-of-band testing with two parallel flows. L:=L4S, C:=Classic.

Finally, we motivate the recommendation in Section 4.3 that a scalable congestion control is not expected to change to setting ECT(0) while it adapts its behaviour to coexist with Classic flows. This is because the sender needs to continue to check whether it made the right decision – and switch back if it was wrong, or if a different link becomes the bottleneck:

- * If, as recommended, the sender changes only its behaviour but not its codepoint to Classic, its codepoint will still be compatible with either an L4S or a Classic AQM. If the bottleneck does actually support both, it will still classify ECT(1) into the same L4S queue, where the sender can measure that switching to Classic behaviour was wrong, so that it can switch back.
- * In contrast, if the sender changes both its behaviour and its codepoint to Classic, even if the bottleneck supports both, it will classify ECT(0) into the Classic queue, reinforcing the sender's incorrect decision so that it never switches back.
- * Also, not changing codepoint avoids the risk of being flipped to a different path by a load balancer or multipath routing that hashes on the whole of the ex-ToS byte (unfortunately still a common pathology).

Note that if a flow is configured to only use a Classic congestion control, it is then entirely appropriate not to use ECT(1).

A.1.6. Reduce RTT dependence

Description: A scalable congestion control needs to reduce RTT bias as much as possible at least over the low to typical range of RTTs that will interact in the intended deployment scenario (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.3).

Motivation: The throughput of Classic congestion controls is known to be inversely proportional to RTT, so one would expect flows over very low RTT paths to nearly starve flows over larger RTTs. However, Classic congestion controls have never allowed a very low RTT path to exist because they induce a large queue. For instance, consider two paths with base RTT 1 ms and 100 ms. If a Classic congestion control induces a 100 ms queue, it turns these RTTs into 101 ms and 200 ms leading to a throughput ratio of about 2:1. Whereas if a scalable congestion control induces only a 1 ms queue, the ratio is 2:101, leading to a throughput ratio of about 50:1.

Therefore, with very small queues, long RTT flows will essentially starve, unless scalable congestion controls comply with this requirement in Section 4.3.

The RTT bias in current Classic congestion controls works satisfactorily when the RTT is higher than typical, and L4S does not change that. So, there is no additional requirement in Section 4.3 for high RTT L4S flows to remove RTT bias - they can but they don't have to.

A.1.7. Scaling down to fractional congestion windows

Description: A scalable congestion control needs to remain responsive to congestion when typical RTTs over the public Internet are significantly smaller because they are no longer inflated by queuing delay (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.3).

Motivation: As currently specified, the minimum congestion window of ECN-capable TCP (and its derivatives) is expected to be 2 sender maximum segment sizes (SMSS), or 1 SMSS after a retransmission timeout. Once the congestion window reaches this minimum, if there is further ECN-marking, TCP is meant to wait for a retransmission timeout before sending another segment (see section 6.1.2 of the ECN spec [RFC3168]). In practice, most known window-based congestion control algorithms become unresponsive to ECN congestion signals at this point. No matter how much ECN marking, the congestion window no longer reduces. Instead, the sender's lack of any further congestion response forces the queue to grow, overriding any AQM and increasing queuing delay (making the window large enough to become responsive again). This can result in a stable but deeper queue, or it might drive the queue to loss, then the retransmission timeout mechanism acts as a backstop.

Most window-based congestion controls for other transport protocols have a similar minimum window, albeit when measured in bytes for those that use smaller packets.

L4S mechanisms significantly reduce queuing delay so, over the same path, the RTT becomes lower. Then this problem becomes surprisingly common [sub-mss-prob]. This is because, for the same link capacity, smaller RTT implies a smaller window. For instance, consider a residential setting with an upstream broadband Internet access of 8 Mb/s, assuming a max segment size of 1500 B. Two upstream flows will each have the minimum window of 2 SMSS if the RTT is 6 ms or less, which is quite common when accessing a nearby data centre. So, any more than two such parallel TCP flows will become unresponsive to ECN and increase queuing delay.

Unless scalable congestion controls address the requirement in Section 4.3 from the start, they will frequently become unresponsive to ECN, negating the low latency benefit of L4S, for themselves and for others.

That would seem to imply that scalable congestion controllers ought to be required to be able work with a congestion window less than 1 SMSS. For instance, if an ECN-capable TCP gets an ECN-mark when it is already sitting at a window of 1 SMSS, RFC 3168 requires it to defer sending for a retransmission timeout. A less drastic but more

complex mechanism can maintain a congestion window less than 1 SMSS (significantly less if necessary), as described in [Ahmed19]. Other approaches are likely to be feasible.

However, the requirement in Section 4.3 is worded as a "SHOULD" because it is believed that the existence of a minimum window is not all bad. When competing with an unresponsive flow, a minimum window naturally protects the flow from starvation by at least keeping some data flowing.

By stating the requirement to go lower than 1 SMSS as a "SHOULD", while the requirement in RFC 3168 still stands as well, we shall be able to watch the choices of minimum window evolve in different scalable congestion controllers.

A.1.1.8. Measuring Reordering Tolerance in Time Units

Description: When detecting loss, a scalable congestion control needs to be tolerant to reordering over an adaptive time interval, which scales with throughput, rather than counting only in fixed units of packets, which does not scale (see the precise normative requirement wording in Section 4.3).

Motivation: A primary purpose of L4S is scalable throughput (it's in the name). Scalability in all dimensions is, of course, also a goal of all IETF technology. The inverse linear congestion response in Section 4.3 is necessary, but not sufficient, to solve the congestion control scalability problem identified in [RFC3649]. As well as maintaining frequent ECN signals as rate scales, it is also important to ensure that a potentially false perception of loss does not limit throughput scaling.

End-systems cannot know whether a missing packet is due to loss or reordering, except in hindsight - if it appears later. So they can only deem that there has been a loss if a gap in the sequence space has not been filled, either after a certain number of subsequent packets has arrived (e.g. the 3 DupACK rule of standard TCP congestion control [RFC5681]) or after a certain amount of time (e.g. the RACK approach [RFC8985]).

As we attempt to scale packet rate over the years:

- * Even if only some sending hosts still deem that loss has occurred by counting reordered packets, all networks will have to keep reducing the time over which they keep packets in order. If some link technologies keep the time within which reordering occurs roughly unchanged, then loss over these links, as perceived by these hosts, will appear to continually rise over the years.

- * In contrast, if all senders detect loss in units of time, the time over which the network has to keep packets in order stays roughly invariant.

Therefore hosts have an incentive to detect loss in time units (so as not to fool themselves too often into detecting losses when there are none). And for hosts that are changing their congestion control implementation to L4S, there is no downside to including time-based loss detection code in the change (loss recovery implemented in hardware is an exception, covered later). Therefore requiring L4S hosts to detect loss in time-based units would not be a burden.

If the requirement in Section 4.3 were not placed on L4S hosts, even though it would be no burden on hosts to comply, all networks would face unnecessary uncertainty over whether some L4S hosts might be detecting loss by counting packets. Then all link technologies will have to unnecessarily keep reducing the time within which reordering occurs. That is not a problem for some link technologies, but it becomes increasingly challenging for other link technologies to continue to scale, particularly those relying on channel bonding for scaling, such as LTE, 5G and DOCSIS.

Given Internet paths traverse many link technologies, any scaling limit for these more challenging access link technologies would become a scaling limit for the Internet as a whole.

It might be asked how it helps to place this loss detection requirement only on L4S hosts, because networks will still face uncertainty over whether non-L4S flows are detecting loss by counting DupACKs. The answer is that those link technologies for which it is challenging to keep squeezing the reordering time will only need to do so for non-L4S traffic (which they can do because the L4S identifier is visible at the IP layer). Therefore, they can focus their processing and memory resources into scaling non-L4S (Classic) traffic. Then, the higher the proportion of L4S traffic, the less of a scaling challenge they will have.

To summarize, there is no reason for L4S hosts not to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem.

Requirement ("MUST") or recommendation ("SHOULD")? As explained above, this is a subtle interoperability issue between hosts and networks, which seems to need a "MUST". Unless networks can be certain that all L4S hosts follow the time-based approach, they still have to cater for the worst case - continually squeeze reordering into a smaller and smaller duration - just for hosts that might be using the counting approach. However, it was decided to express this as a recommendation, using "SHOULD". The main justification was that networks can still be fairly certain that L4S hosts will follow this recommendation, because following it offers only gain and no pain.

Details:

The speed of loss recovery is much more significant for short flows than long, therefore a good compromise is to adapt the reordering window; from a small fraction of the RTT at the start of a flow, to a larger fraction of the RTT for flows that continue for many round trips.

This is broadly the approach adopted by TCP RACK (Recent ACKnowledgements) [RFC8985]. However, RACK starts with the 3 DupACK approach, because the RTT estimate is not necessarily stable. As long as the initial window is paced, such initial use of 3 DupACK counting would amount to time-based loss detection and therefore would satisfy the time-based loss detection recommendation of Section 4.3. This is because pacing of the initial window would ensure that 3 DupACKs early in the connection would be spread over a small fraction of the round trip.

As mentioned above, hardware implementations of loss recovery using DupACK counting exist (e.g. some implementations of RoCEv2 for RDMA). For low latency, these implementations can change their congestion control to implement L4S, because the congestion control (as distinct from loss recovery) is implemented in software. But they cannot easily satisfy this loss recovery requirement. However, it is believed they do not need to, because such implementations are believed to solely exist in controlled environments, where the network technology keeps reordering extremely low anyway. This is why controlled environments with hardly any reordering are excluded from the scope of the normative recommendation in Section 4.3.

Detecting loss in time units also prevents the ACK-splitting attacks described in [Savage-TCP].

A.2. Scalable Transport Protocol Optimizations

A.2.1. Setting ECT in Control Packets and Retransmissions

Description: This item concerns TCP and its derivatives (e.g. SCTP) as well as RTP/RTCP [RFC6679]. The original specification of ECN for TCP precluded the use of ECN on control packets and retransmissions. Similarly RFC 6679 precludes the use of ECT on RTCP datagrams, in case the path changes after it has been checked for ECN traversal. To improve performance, scalable transport protocols ought to enable ECN at the IP layer in TCP control packets (SYN, SYN-ACK, pure ACKs, etc.) and in retransmitted packets. The same is true for other transports, e.g. SCTP, RTCP.

Motivation (TCP): RFC 3168 prohibits the use of ECN on these types of TCP packet, based on a number of arguments. This means these packets are not protected from congestion loss by ECN, which considerably harms performance, particularly for short flows. ECN++ [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn] proposes experimental use of ECN on all types of TCP packet as long as AccECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] is available (which itself satisfies the accurate feedback requirement in Section 4.2 for using a scalable congestion control).

Motivation (RTCP): L4S experiments in general will need to observe the rule in the RTP ECN spec [RFC6679] that precludes ECT on RTCP datagrams. Nonetheless, as ECN usage becomes more widespread, it would be useful to conduct specific experiments with ECN-capable RTCP to gather data on whether such caution is necessary.

A.2.2. Faster than Additive Increase

Description: It would improve performance if scalable congestion controls did not limit their congestion window increase to the standard additive increase of 1 SMSS per round trip [RFC5681] during congestion avoidance. The same is true for derivatives of TCP congestion control, including similar approaches used for real-time media.

Motivation: As currently defined [RFC8257], DCTCP uses the traditional Reno additive increase in congestion avoidance phase. When the available capacity suddenly increases (e.g. when another flow finishes, or if radio capacity increases) it can take very many round trips to take advantage of the new capacity. TCP Cubic [RFC8312] was designed to solve this problem, but as flow rates have continued to increase, the delay accelerating into available capacity has become prohibitive. See, for instance, the examples in

Section 5.1 of the L4S architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]. Even when out of its Reno-compatibility mode, every 8x scaling of Cubic's flow rate leads to 2x more acceleration delay.

In the steady state, DCTCP induces about 2 ECN marks per round trip, so it is possible to quickly detect when these signals have disappeared and seek available capacity more rapidly, while minimizing the impact on other flows (Classic and scalable) [LinuxPacedChirping]. Alternatively, approaches such as Adaptive Acceleration (A2DTCP [A2DTCP]) have been proposed to address this problem in data centres, which might be deployable over the public Internet.

A.2.3. Faster Convergence at Flow Start

Description: It would improve performance if scalable congestion controls converged (reached their steady-state share of the capacity) faster than Classic congestion controls or at least no slower. This affects the flow start behaviour of any L4S congestion control derived from a Classic transport that uses TCP slow start, including those for real-time media.

Motivation: As an example, a new DCTCP flow takes longer than a Classic congestion control to obtain its share of the capacity of the bottleneck when there are already ongoing flows using the bottleneck capacity. In a data centre environment DCTCP takes about a factor of 1.5 to 2 longer to converge due to the much higher typical level of ECN marking that DCTCP background traffic induces, which causes new flows to exit slow start early [Alizadeh-stability]. In testing for use over the public Internet the convergence time of DCTCP relative to a regular loss-based TCP slow start is even less favourable [Paced-Chirping] due to the shallow ECN marking threshold needed for L4S. It is exacerbated by the typically greater mismatch between the link rate of the sending host and typical Internet access bottlenecks. This problem is detrimental in general, but would particularly harm the performance of short flows relative to Classic congestion controls.

Appendix B. Compromises in the Choice of L4S Identifier

This appendix is informative, not normative. As explained in Section 2, there is insufficient space in the IP header (v4 or v6) to fully accommodate every requirement. So the choice of L4S identifier involves tradeoffs. This appendix records the pros and cons of the choice that was made.

Non-normative recap of the chosen codepoint scheme:

Packets with ECT(1) and conditionally packets with CE signify L4S semantics as an alternative to the semantics of Classic ECN [RFC3168], specifically:

- The ECT(1) codepoint signifies that the packet was sent by an L4S-capable sender.
- Given shortage of codepoints, both L4S and Classic ECN sides of an AQM have to use the same CE codepoint to indicate that a packet has experienced congestion. If a packet that had already been marked CE in an upstream buffer arrived at a subsequent AQM, this AQM would then have to guess whether to classify CE packets as L4S or Classic ECN. Choosing the L4S treatment is a safer choice, because then a few Classic packets might arrive early, rather than a few L4S packets arriving late.
- Additional information might be available if the classifier were transport-aware. Then it could classify a CE packet for Classic ECN treatment if the most recent ECT packet in the same flow had been marked ECT(0). However, the L4S service ought not to need transport-layer awareness.

Cons:

Consumes the last ECN codepoint: The L4S service could potentially supersede the service provided by Classic ECN, therefore using ECT(1) to identify L4S packets could ultimately mean that the ECT(0) codepoint was 'wasted' purely to distinguish one form of ECN from its successor.

ECN hard in some lower layers: It is not always possible to support the equivalent of an IP-ECN field in an AQM acting in a buffer below the IP layer [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines]. Then, depending on the lower layer scheme, the L4S service might have to drop rather than mark frames even though they might encapsulate an ECN-capable packet.

Risk of reordering Classic CE packets within a flow: Classifying all CE packets into the L4S queue risks any CE packets that were originally ECT(0) being incorrectly classified as L4S. If there were delay in the Classic queue, these incorrectly classified CE packets would arrive early, which is a form of reordering. Reordering within a microflow can cause TCP senders (and senders of similar transports) to retransmit spuriously. However, the risk of spurious retransmissions would be extremely low for the following reasons:

1. It is quite unusual to experience queuing at more than one bottleneck on the same path (the available capacities have to be identical).
2. In only a subset of these unusual cases would the first bottleneck support Classic ECN marking while the second supported L4S ECN marking, which would be the only scenario where some ECT(0) packets could be CE marked by an AQM supporting Classic ECN then the remainder experienced further delay through the Classic side of a subsequent L4S DualQ AQM.
3. Even then, when a few packets are delivered early, it takes very unusual conditions to cause a spurious retransmission, in contrast to when some packets are delivered late. The first bottleneck has to apply CE-marks to at least N contiguous packets and the second bottleneck has to inject an uninterrupted sequence of at least N of these packets between two packets earlier in the stream (where N is the reordering window that the transport protocol allows before it considers a packet is lost).

For example consider $N=3$, and consider the sequence of packets 100, 101, 102, 103,... and imagine that packets 150,151,152 from later in the flow are injected as follows: 100, 150, 151, 101, 152, 102, 103... If this were late reordering, even one packet arriving out of sequence would trigger a spurious retransmission, but there is no spurious retransmission here with early reordering, because packet 101 moves the cumulative ACK counter forward before 3 packets have arrived out of order. Later, when packets 148, 149, 153... arrive, even though there is a 3-packet hole, there will be no problem, because the packets to fill the hole are already in the receive buffer.

4. Even with the current TCP recommendation of $N=3$ [RFC5681] spurious retransmissions will be unlikely for all the above reasons. As RACK [RFC8985] is becoming widely deployed, it tends to adapt its reordering window to a larger value of N, which will make the chance of a contiguous sequence of N early arrivals vanishingly small.
5. Even a run of 2 CE marks within a Classic ECN flow is unlikely, given FQ-CoDel is the only known widely deployed AQM that supports Classic ECN marking and it takes great care to separate out flows and to space any markings evenly along each flow.

It is extremely unlikely that the above set of 5 eventualities that are each unusual in themselves would all happen simultaneously. But, even if they did, the consequences would hardly be dire: the odd spurious fast retransmission. Whenever the traffic source (a Classic congestion control) mistakes the reordering of a string of CE marks for a loss, one might think that it will reduce its congestion window as well as emitting a spurious retransmission. However, it would have already reduced its congestion window when the CE markings arrived early. If it is using ABE [RFC8511], it might reduce cwnd a little more for a loss than for a CE mark. But it will revert that reduction once it detects that the retransmission was spurious.

In conclusion, the impact of early reordering on spurious retransmissions due to CE being ambiguous will generally be vanishingly small.

Insufficient anti-replay window in some pre-existing VPNs: If delay is reduced for a subset of the flows within a VPN, the anti-replay feature of some VPNs is known to potentially mistake the difference in delay for a replay attack. Section 6.2 recommends that the anti-replay window at the VPN egress is sufficiently sized, as required by the relevant specifications. However, in some VPN implementations the maximum anti-replay window is insufficient to cater for a large delay difference at prevailing packet rates. Section 6.2 suggests alternative work-rounds for such cases, but end-users using L4S over a VPN will need to be able to recognize the symptoms of this problem, in order to seek out these work-rounds.

Hard to distinguish Classic ECN AQM: With this scheme, when a source receives ECN feedback, it is not explicitly clear which type of AQM generated the CE markings. This is not a problem for Classic ECN sources that send ECT(0) packets, because an L4S AQM will recognize the ECT(0) packets as Classic and apply the appropriate Classic ECN marking behaviour.

However, in the absence of explicit disambiguation of the CE markings, an L4S source needs to use heuristic techniques to work out which type of congestion response to apply (see Appendix A.1.5). Otherwise, if long-running Classic flow(s) are sharing a Classic ECN AQM bottleneck with long-running L4S flow(s), which then apply an L4S response to Classic CE signals, the L4S flows would outcompete the Classic flow(s). Experiments have shown that L4S flows can take about 20 times more capacity share than equivalent Classic flows. Nonetheless, as link capacity reduces (e.g. to 4 Mb/s), the inequality reduces. So Classic flows always make progress and are not starved.

When L4S was first proposed (in 2015, 14 years after the Classic ECN spec [RFC3168] was published), it was believed that Classic ECN AQMs had failed to be deployed, because research measurements had found little or no evidence of CE marking. In subsequent years Classic ECN was included in per-flow-queuing (FQ) deployments, however an FQ scheduler stops an L4S flow outcompeting Classic, because it enforces equality between flow rates. It is not known whether there have been any non-FQ deployments of Classic ECN AQMs in the subsequent years, or whether there will be in future.

An algorithm for detecting a Classic ECN AQM as soon as a flow stabilizes after start-up has been proposed [ecn-fallback] (see Appendix A.1.5 for a brief summary). Testbed evaluations of v2 of the algorithm have shown detection is reasonably good for Classic ECN AQMs, in a wide range of circumstances. However, although it can correctly detect an L4S ECN AQM in many circumstances, it is often incorrect at low link capacities and/or high RTTs. Although this is the safe way round, there is a danger that it will discourage use of the algorithm.

Non-L4S service for control packets: Solely for the case of TCP, the Classic ECN RFCs [RFC3168] and [RFC5562] require a sender to clear the ECN field to Not-ECT on retransmissions and on certain control packets specifically pure ACKs, window probes and SYNs. When L4S packets are classified by the ECN field, these TCP control packets would not be classified into an L4S queue, and could therefore be delayed relative to the other packets in the flow. This would not cause reordering (because retransmissions are already out of order, and these control packets typically carry no data). However, it would make critical TCP control packets more vulnerable to loss and delay. To address this problem, ECN++ [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn] proposes an experiment in which all TCP control packets and retransmissions are ECN-capable as long as appropriate ECN feedback is available in each case.

Pros:

Should work e2e: The ECN field generally propagates end-to-end across the Internet without being wiped or mangled, at least over fixed networks. Unlike the DSCP, the setting of the ECN field is at least meant to be forwarded unchanged by networks that do not support ECN.

Should work in tunnels: The L4S identifiers work across and within

any tunnel that propagates the ECN field in any of the variant ways it has been defined since ECN-tunneling was first specified in the year 2001 [RFC3168]. However, it is likely that some tunnels still do not implement ECN propagation at all.

Should work for many link technologies: At most, but not all, path bottlenecks there is IP-awareness, so that L4S AQMs can be located where the IP-ECN field can be manipulated. Bottlenecks at lower layer nodes without IP-awareness either have to use drop to signal congestion or a specific congestion notification facility has to be defined for that link technology, including propagation to and from IP-ECN. The programme to define these is progressing and in each case so far the scheme already defined for ECN inherently supports L4S as well (see Section 6.1).

Could migrate to one codepoint: If all Classic ECN senders eventually evolve to use the L4S service, the ECT(0) codepoint could be reused for some future purpose, but only once use of ECT(0) packets had reduced to zero, or near-zero, which might never happen.

L4 not required: Being based on the ECN field, this scheme does not need the network to access transport layer flow identifiers. Nonetheless, it does not preclude solutions that do.

Appendix C. Potential Competing Uses for the ECT(1) Codepoint

The ECT(1) codepoint of the ECN field has already been assigned once for the ECN nonce [RFC3540], which has now been categorized as historic [RFC8311]. ECN is probably the only remaining field in the Internet Protocol that is common to IPv4 and IPv6 and still has potential to work end-to-end, with tunnels and with lower layers. Therefore, ECT(1) should not be reassigned to a different experimental use (L4S) without carefully assessing competing potential uses. These fall into the following categories:

C.1. Integrity of Congestion Feedback

Receiving hosts can fool a sender into downloading faster by suppressing feedback of ECN marks (or of losses if retransmissions are not necessary or available otherwise).

The historic ECN nonce protocol [RFC3540] proposed that a TCP sender could set either of ECT(0) or ECT(1) in each packet of a flow and remember the sequence it had set. If any packet was lost or congestion marked, the receiver would miss that bit of the sequence. An ECN Nonce receiver had to feed back the least significant bit of the sum, so it could not suppress feedback of a loss or mark without a 50-50 chance of guessing the sum incorrectly.

It is highly unlikely that ECT(1) will be needed for integrity protection in future. The ECN Nonce RFC [RFC3540] has been reclassified as historic, partly because other ways have been developed to protect feedback integrity of TCP and other transports [RFC8311] that do not consume a codepoint in the IP header. For instance:

- * the sender can test the integrity of the receiver's feedback by occasionally setting the IP-ECN field to a value normally only set by the network. Then it can test whether the receiver's feedback faithfully reports what it expects (see para 2 of Section 20.2 of the ECN spec [RFC3168]). This works for loss and it will work for the accurate ECN feedback [RFC7560] intended for L4S.
- * A network can enforce a congestion response to its ECN markings (or packet losses) by auditing congestion exposure (ConEx) [RFC7713]. Whether the receiver or a downstream network is suppressing congestion feedback or the sender is unresponsive to the feedback, or both, ConEx audit can neutralise any advantage that any of these three parties would otherwise gain.
- * The TCP authentication option (TCP-AO [RFC5925]) can be used to detect any tampering with TCP congestion feedback (whether malicious or accidental). TCP's congestion feedback fields are immutable end-to-end, so they are amenable to TCP-AO protection, which covers the main TCP header and TCP options by default. However, TCP-AO is often too brittle to use on many end-to-end paths, where middleboxes can make verification fail in their attempts to improve performance or security, e.g. by resegmentation or shifting the sequence space.

C.2. Notification of Less Severe Congestion than CE

Various researchers have proposed to use ECT(1) as a less severe congestion notification than CE, particularly to enable flows to fill available capacity more quickly after an idle period, when another flow departs or when a flow starts, e.g. VCP [VCP], Queue View (QV) [QV].

Before assigning ECT(1) as an identifier for L4S, we must carefully consider whether it might be better to hold ECT(1) in reserve for future standardisation of rapid flow acceleration, which is an important and enduring problem [RFC6077].

Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) is another scheme that assigns alternative semantics to the ECN field. It uses ECT(1) to signify a less severe level of pre-congestion notification than CE [RFC6660]. However, the ECN field only takes on the PCN semantics if packets carry a Diffserv codepoint defined to indicate PCN marking within a controlled environment. PCN is required to be applied solely to the outer header of a tunnel across the controlled region in order not to interfere with any end-to-end use of the ECN field. Therefore a PCN region on the path would not interfere with the L4S service identifier defined in Section 3.

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Low Latency, Low Loss, Scalable Throughput (L4S) Internet Service:
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Abstract

This document describes the L4S architecture, which enables Internet applications to achieve Low queuing Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable throughput (L4S). The insight on which L4S is based is that the root cause of queuing delay is in the congestion controllers of senders, not in the queue itself. With the L4S architecture all Internet applications could (but do not have to) transition away from congestion control algorithms that cause substantial queuing delay, to a new class of congestion controls that induce very little queuing, aided by explicit congestion signalling from the network. This new class of congestion controls can provide low latency for capacity-seeking flows, so applications can achieve both high bandwidth and low latency.

The architecture primarily concerns incremental deployment. It defines mechanisms that allow the new class of L4S congestion controls to coexist with 'Classic' congestion controls in a shared network. These mechanisms aim to ensure that the latency and throughput performance using an L4S-compliant congestion controller is usually much better (and rarely worse) than performance would have been using a 'Classic' congestion controller, and that competing flows continuing to use 'Classic' controllers are typically not impacted by the presence of L4S. These characteristics are important to encourage adoption of L4S congestion control algorithms and L4S compliant network elements.

The L4S architecture consists of three components: network support to isolate L4S traffic from classic traffic; protocol features that allow network elements to identify L4S traffic; and host support for L4S congestion controls.

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1. Introduction

At any one time, it is increasingly common for all of the traffic in a bottleneck link (e.g. a household's Internet access) to come from applications that prefer low delay: interactive Web, Web services, voice, conversational video, interactive video, interactive remote presence, instant messaging, online gaming, remote desktop, cloud-based applications and video-assisted remote control of machinery and industrial processes. In the last decade or so, much has been done to reduce propagation delay by placing caches or servers closer to users. However, queuing remains a major, albeit intermittent, component of latency. For instance spikes of hundreds of milliseconds are not uncommon, even with state-of-the-art active queue management (AQM) [COBALT], [DOCSIS3AQM]. Queuing in access network bottlenecks is typically configured to cause overall network delay to roughly double during a long-running flow, relative to expected base (unloaded) path delay [BufferSize]. Low loss is also important because, for interactive applications, losses translate into even longer retransmission delays.

It has been demonstrated that, once access network bit rates reach levels now common in the developed world, increasing capacity offers diminishing returns if latency (delay) is not addressed [Dukkipati06], [Rajiullah15]. Therefore, the goal is an Internet service with very Low queueing Latency, very Low Loss and Scalable throughput (L4S). Very low queueing latency means less than 1 millisecond (ms) on average and less than about 2 ms at the 99th percentile. This document describes the L4S architecture for achieving these goals.

Differentiated services (Diffserv) offers Expedited Forwarding (EF [RFC3246]) for some packets at the expense of others, but this makes no difference when all (or most) of the traffic at a bottleneck at any one time requires low latency. In contrast, L4S still works well when all traffic is L4S - a service that gives without taking needs none of the configuration or management baggage (traffic policing, traffic contracts) associated with favouring some traffic flows over others.

Queuing delay degrades performance intermittently [Hohlfeld14]. It occurs when a large enough capacity-seeking (e.g. TCP) flow is running alongside the user's traffic in the bottleneck link, which is typically in the access network. Or when the low latency application is itself a large capacity-seeking or adaptive rate (e.g. interactive video) flow. At these times, the performance improvement from L4S must be sufficient that network operators will be motivated to deploy it.

Active Queue Management (AQM) is part of the solution to queuing under load. AQM improves performance for all traffic, but there is a limit to how much queuing delay can be reduced by solely changing the network; without addressing the root of the problem.

The root of the problem is the presence of standard TCP congestion control (Reno [RFC5681]) or compatible variants (e.g. TCP Cubic [RFC8312]). We shall use the term 'Classic' for these Reno-friendly congestion controls. Classic congestion controls induce relatively large saw-tooth-shaped excursions up the queue and down again, which have been growing as flow rate scales [RFC3649]. So if a network operator naively attempts to reduce queuing delay by configuring an AQM to operate at a shallower queue, a Classic congestion control will significantly underutilize the link at the bottom of every saw-tooth.

It has been demonstrated that if the sending host replaces a Classic congestion control with a 'Scalable' alternative, when a suitable AQM is deployed in the network the performance under load of all the above interactive applications can be significantly improved. For instance, queuing delay under heavy load with the example DCTCP/DualQ solution cited below on a DSL or Ethernet link is roughly 1 to 2 milliseconds at the 99th percentile without losing link utilization [DualPI2Linux], [DCTtH19] (for other link types, see Section 6.3). This compares with 5-20 ms on average with a Classic congestion control and current state-of-the-art AQMs such as FQ-CoDel [RFC8290], PIE [RFC8033] or DOCSIS PIE [RFC8034] and about 20-30 ms at the 99th percentile [DualPI2Linux].

L4S is designed for incremental deployment. It is possible to deploy the L4S service at a bottleneck link alongside the existing best efforts service [DualPI2Linux] so that unmodified applications can start using it as soon as the sender's stack is updated. Access networks are typically designed with one link as the bottleneck for each site (which might be a home, small enterprise or mobile device), so deployment at either or both ends of this link should give nearly all the benefit in the respective direction. With some transport protocols, namely TCP and SCTP, the sender has to check for suitably updated receiver feedback, whereas with more recent transport protocols such as QUIC and DCCP, all receivers have always been suitable.

This document presents the L4S architecture, by describing and justifying the component parts and how they interact to provide the scalable, low latency, low loss Internet service. It also details the approach to incremental deployment, as briefly summarized above.

1.1. Document Roadmap

This document describes the L4S architecture in three passes. First this brief overview gives the very high level idea and states the main components with minimal rationale. This is only intended to give some context for the terminology definitions that follow in Section 3, and to explain the structure of the rest of the document. Then Section 4 goes into more detail on each component with some rationale, but still mostly stating what the architecture is, rather than why. Finally Section 5 justifies why each element of the solution was chosen (Section 5.1) and why these choices were different from other solutions (Section 5.2).

Having described the architecture, Section 6 clarifies its applicability; that is, the applications and use-cases that motivated the design, the challenges applying the architecture to various link technologies, and various incremental deployment models: including the two main deployment topologies, different sequences for incremental deployment and various interactions with pre-existing approaches. The document ends with the usual tail pieces, including extensive discussion of traffic policing and other security considerations Section 8.

2. L4S Architecture Overview

Below we outline the three main components to the L4S architecture; 1) the scalable congestion control on the sending host; 2) the AQM at the network bottleneck; and 3) the protocol between them.

But first, the main point to grasp is that low latency is not provided by the network - low latency results from the careful behaviour of the scalable congestion controllers used by L4S senders. The network does have a role - primarily to isolate the low latency of the carefully behaving L4S traffic from the higher queuing delay needed by traffic with pre-existing Classic behaviour. The network also alters the way it signals queue growth to the transport - It uses the Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) protocol, but it signals the very start of queue growth - immediately without the smoothing delay typical of Classic AQMs. Because ECN support is essential for L4S, senders use the ECN field as the protocol to identify to the network which packets are L4S and which are Classic.

- 1) Host: Scalable congestion controls already exist. They solve the scaling problem with Classic congestion controls, such as Reno or Cubic. Because flow rate has scaled since TCP congestion control was first designed in 1988, assuming the flow lasts long enough, it now takes hundreds of round trips (and growing) to recover after a congestion signal (whether a loss or an ECN mark) as shown in the examples in Section 5.1 and [RFC3649]. Therefore control of queuing and utilization becomes very slack, and the slightest disturbances (e.g. from new flows starting) prevent a high rate from being attained.

With a scalable congestion control, the average time from one congestion signal to the next (the recovery time) remains invariant as the flow rate scales, all other factors being equal. This maintains the same degree of control over queuing and utilization whatever the flow rate, as well as ensuring that high throughput is more robust to disturbances. The scalable control used most widely (in controlled environments) is Data Center TCP (DCTCP [RFC8257]), which has been implemented and deployed in Windows Server Editions (since 2012), in Linux and in FreeBSD. Although DCTCP as-is functions well over wide-area round trip times, most implementations lack certain safety features that would be necessary for use outside controlled environments like data centres (see Section 6.4.3). So scalable congestion control needs to be implemented in TCP and other transport protocols (QUIC, SCTP, RTP/RTCP, RMCAT, etc.). Indeed, between the present document being drafted and published, the following scalable congestion controls were implemented: TCP Prague [PragueLinux], QUIC Prague, an L4S variant of the RMCAT SCReAM controller [SCReAM] and the L4S ECN part of BBRv2 [BBRv2] intended for TCP and QUIC transports.

- 2) Network: L4S traffic needs to be isolated from the queuing

latency of Classic traffic. One queue per application flow (FQ) is one way to achieve this, e.g. FQ-CoDel [RFC8290]. However, just two queues is sufficient and does not require inspection of transport layer headers in the network, which is not always possible (see Section 5.2). With just two queues, it might seem impossible to know how much capacity to schedule for each queue without inspecting how many flows at any one time are using each. And it would be undesirable to arbitrarily divide access network capacity into two partitions. The Dual Queue Coupled AQM was developed as a minimal complexity solution to this problem. It acts like a 'semi-permeable' membrane that partitions latency but not bandwidth. As such, the two queues are for transition from Classic to L4S behaviour, not bandwidth prioritization.

Section 4 gives a high level explanation of how the per-flow-queue (FQ) and DualQ variants of L4S work, and [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] gives a full explanation of the DualQ Coupled AQM framework. A specific marking algorithm is not mandated for L4S AQMs. Appendices of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] give non-normative examples that have been implemented and evaluated, and give recommended default parameter settings. It is expected that L4S experiments will improve knowledge of parameter settings and whether the set of marking algorithms needs to be limited.

- 3) Protocol: A host needs to distinguish L4S and Classic packets with an identifier so that the network can classify them into their separate treatments. The L4S identifier spec. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] concludes that all alternatives involve compromises, but the ECT(1) and CE codepoints of the ECN field represent a workable solution. As already explained, the network also uses ECN to immediately signal the very start of queue growth to the transport.

3. Terminology

Note: The following definitions are copied from the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] for convenience. If there are accidental differences, those in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] take precedence.

Classic Congestion Control: A congestion control behaviour that can co-exist with standard Reno [RFC5681] without causing significantly negative impact on its flow rate [RFC5033]. The scaling problem with Classic congestion control is explained, with examples, in Section 5.1 and in [RFC3649].

Scalable Congestion Control: A congestion control where the average

time from one congestion signal to the next (the recovery time) remains invariant as the flow rate scales, all other factors being equal. For instance, DCTCP averages 2 congestion signals per round-trip whatever the flow rate, as do other recently developed scalable congestion controls, e.g. Relentless TCP [Mathis09], TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], [PragueLinux], BBRv2 [BBRv2], [I-D.cardwell-iccrp-bbr-congestion-control] and the L4S variant of SCReAM for real-time media [SCReAM], [RFC8298]). See Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] for more explanation.

Classic service: The Classic service is intended for all the congestion control behaviours that co-exist with Reno [RFC5681] (e.g. Reno itself, Cubic [RFC8312], Compound [I-D.sridharan-tcpm-ctcp], TFRC [RFC5348]). The term 'Classic queue' means a queue providing the Classic service.

Low-Latency, Low-Loss Scalable throughput (L4S) service: The 'L4S' service is intended for traffic from scalable congestion control algorithms, such as the Prague congestion control [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control], which was derived from DCTCP [RFC8257]. The L4S service is for more general traffic than just TCP Prague -- it allows the set of congestion controls with similar scaling properties to Prague to evolve, such as the examples listed above (Relentless, SCReAM). The term 'L4S queue' means a queue providing the L4S service.

The terms Classic or L4S can also qualify other nouns, such as 'queue', 'codepoint', 'identifier', 'classification', 'packet', 'flow'. For example: an L4S packet means a packet with an L4S identifier sent from an L4S congestion control.

Both Classic and L4S services can cope with a proportion of unresponsive or less-responsive traffic as well, but in the L4S case its rate has to be smooth enough or low enough not build a queue (e.g. DNS, VoIP, game sync datagrams, etc).

Reno-friendly: The subset of Classic traffic that is friendly to the standard Reno congestion control defined for TCP in [RFC5681]. The TFRC spec. [RFC5348] indirectly implies that 'friendly' is defined as "generally within a factor of two of the sending rate of a TCP flow under the same conditions". Reno-friendly is used here in place of 'TCP-friendly', given the latter has become imprecise, because the TCP protocol is now used with so many different congestion control behaviours, and Reno is used in non-TCP transports such as QUIC [RFC9000].

Classic ECN: The original Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)

protocol [RFC3168], which requires ECN signals to be treated as equivalent to drops, both when generated in the network and when responded to by the sender.

L4S uses the ECN field as an identifier [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] with the names for the four codepoints of the 2-bit IP-ECN field unchanged from those defined in the ECN spec [RFC3168]: Not ECT, ECT(0), ECT(1) and CE, where ECT stands for ECN-Capable Transport and CE stands for Congestion Experienced. A packet marked with the CE codepoint is termed 'ECN-marked' or sometimes just 'marked' where the context makes ECN obvious.

Site: A home, mobile device, small enterprise or campus, where the network bottleneck is typically the access link to the site. Not all network arrangements fit this model but it is a useful, widely applicable generalization.

4. L4S Architecture Components

The L4S architecture is composed of the elements in the following three subsections.

4.1. Protocol Mechanisms

The L4S architecture involves: a) unassignment of an identifier; b) reassignment of the same identifier; and c) optional further identifiers:

- a. An essential aspect of a scalable congestion control is the use of explicit congestion signals. 'Classic' ECN [RFC3168] requires an ECN signal to be treated as equivalent to drop, both when it is generated in the network and when it is responded to by hosts. L4S needs networks and hosts to support a more fine-grained meaning for each ECN signal that is less severe than a drop, so that the L4S signals:

- * can be much more frequent;
- * can be signalled immediately, without the significant delay required to smooth out fluctuations in the queue.

To enable L4S, the standards track Classic ECN spec. [RFC3168] has had to be updated to allow L4S packets to depart from the 'equivalent to drop' constraint. [RFC8311] is a standards track update to relax specific requirements in RFC 3168 (and certain other standards track RFCs), which clears the way for the experimental changes proposed for L4S. [RFC8311] also reclassifies the original experimental assignment of the ECT(1) codepoint as an ECN nonce [RFC3540] as historic.

- b. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] specifies that ECT(1) is used as the identifier to classify L4S packets into a separate treatment from Classic packets. This satisfies the requirement for identifying an alternative ECN treatment in [RFC4774].

The CE codepoint is used to indicate Congestion Experienced by both L4S and Classic treatments. This raises the concern that a Classic AQM earlier on the path might have marked some ECT(0) packets as CE. Then these packets will be erroneously classified into the L4S queue. Appendix B of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] explains why five unlikely eventualities all have to coincide for this to have any detrimental effect, which even then would only involve a vanishingly small likelihood of a spurious retransmission.

- c. A network operator might wish to include certain unresponsive, non-L4S traffic in the L4S queue if it is deemed to be smoothly enough paced and low enough rate not to build a queue. For instance, VoIP, low rate datagrams to sync online games, relatively low rate application-limited traffic, DNS, LDAP, etc. This traffic would need to be tagged with specific identifiers, e.g. a low latency Diffserv Codepoint such as Expedited Forwarding (EF [RFC3246]), Non-Queue-Building (NQB [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-nqb]), or operator-specific identifiers.

4.2. Network Components

The L4S architecture aims to provide low latency without the need for per-flow operations in network components. Nonetheless, the architecture does not preclude per-flow solutions. The following bullets describe the known arrangements: a) the DualQ Coupled AQM with an L4S AQM in one queue coupled from a Classic AQM in the other; b) Per-Flow Queues with an instance of a Classic and an L4S AQM in each queue; c) Dual queues with per-flow AQMs, but no per-flow queues:

- a. The Dual Queue Coupled AQM (illustrated in Figure 1) achieves the 'semi-permeable' membrane property mentioned earlier as follows:

- * Latency isolation: Two separate queues are used to isolate L4S queuing delay from the larger queue that Classic traffic needs to maintain full utilization.
- * Bandwidth pooling: The two queues act as if they are a single pool of bandwidth in which flows of either type get roughly equal throughput without the scheduler needing to identify any flows. This is achieved by having an AQM in each queue, but the Classic AQM provides a congestion signal to both queues in a manner that ensures a consistent response from the two classes of congestion control. Specifically, the Classic AQM generates a drop/mark probability based on congestion in its own queue, which it uses both to drop/mark packets in its own queue and to affect the marking probability in the L4S queue. The strength of the coupling of the congestion signalling between the two queues is enough to make the L4S flows slow down to leave the right amount of capacity for the Classic flows (as they would if they were the same type of traffic sharing the same queue).

Then the scheduler can serve the L4S queue with priority (denoted by the '1' on the higher priority input), because the L4S traffic isn't offering up enough traffic to use all the priority that it is given. Therefore:

- * for latency isolation on short time-scales (sub-round-trip) the prioritization of the L4S queue protects its low latency by allowing bursts to dissipate quickly;
- * but for bandwidth pooling on longer time-scales (round-trip and longer) the Classic queue creates an equal and opposite pressure against the L4S traffic to ensure that neither has priority when it comes to bandwidth - the tension between prioritizing L4S and coupling the marking from the Classic AQM results in approximate per-flow fairness.

To protect against unresponsive traffic taking advantage of the prioritization of the L4S queue and starving the Classic queue, it is advisable for the priority to be conditional, not strict (see Appendix A of the DualQ spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]).

When there is no Classic traffic, the L4S queue's own AQM comes into play. It starts congestion marking with a very shallow queue, so L4S traffic maintains very low queuing delay.

If either queue becomes persistently overloaded, drop of ECN-capable packets is introduced, as recommended in Section 7 of the ECN spec [RFC3168] and Section 4.2.1 of the AQM recommendations [RFC7567]. Then both queues introduce the same level of drop (not shown in the figure).

The Dual Queue Coupled AQM has been specified as generically as possible [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] without specifying the particular AQMs to use in the two queues so that designers are free to implement diverse ideas. Informational appendices in that draft give pseudocode examples of two different specific AQM approaches: one called DualPI2 (pronounced Dual PI Squared) [DualPI2Linux] that uses the PI2 variant of PIE, and a zero-config variant of RED called Curvy RED. A DualQ Coupled AQM based on PIE has also been specified and implemented for Low Latency DOCSIS [DOCSIS3.1].




Figure 1: Components of an L4S DualQ Coupled AQM Solution: 1) Scalable Sending Host; 2) Isolation in separate network queues; and 3) Packet Identification Protocol

- b. Per-Flow Queues and AQMs: A scheduler with per-flow queues such as FQ-CoDel or FQ-PIE can be used for L4S. For instance within each queue of an FQ-CoDel system, as well as a CoDel AQM, there is typically also the option of ECN marking at an immediate (unsmoothed) shallow threshold to support use in data centres (see Sec.5.2.7 of the FQ-CoDel spec [RFC8290]). In Linux, this has been modified so that the shallow threshold can be solely applied to ECT(1) packets [FQ_CoDel_Thresh]. Then if there is a flow of non-ECN or ECT(0) packets in the per-flow-queue, the Classic AQM (e.g. CoDel) is applied; while if there is a flow of ECT(1) packets in the queue, the shallower (typically sub-millisecond) threshold is applied. In addition, ECT(0) and not-ECT packets could potentially be classified into a separate flow-queue from ECT(1) and CE packets to avoid them mixing if they share a common flow-identifier (e.g. in a VPN).
- c. Dual-queues, but per-flow AQMs: It should also be possible to use dual queues for isolation, but with per-flow marking to control flow-rates (instead of the coupled per-queue marking of the Dual Queue Coupled AQM). One of the two queues would be for isolating L4S packets, which would be classified by the ECN codepoint. Flow rates could be controlled by flow-specific marking. The policy goal of the marking could be to differentiate flow rates (e.g. [Nadas20], which requires additional signalling of a per-flow 'value'), or to equalize flow-rates (perhaps in a similar way to Approx Fair CoDel [AFCD], [I-D.morton-tsvwg-codel-approx-fair], but with two queues not one).

Note that whenever the term 'DualQ' is used loosely without saying whether marking is per-queue or per-flow, it means a dual queue AQM with per-queue marking.

4.3. Host Mechanisms

The L4S architecture includes two main mechanisms in the end host that we enumerate next:

- a. Scalable Congestion Control at the sender: Section 2 defines a scalable congestion control as one where the average time from one congestion signal to the next (the recovery time) remains invariant as the flow rate scales, all other factors being equal. Data Center TCP is the most widely used example. It has been documented as an informational record of the protocol currently in use in controlled environments [RFC8257]. A draft list of safety and performance improvements for a scalable congestion control to be usable on the public Internet has been drawn up (the so-called 'Prague L4S requirements' in Appendix A of

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). The subset that involve risk of harm to others have been captured as normative requirements in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control] has been implemented in Linux as a reference implementation to address these requirements [PragueLinux].

Transport protocols other than TCP use various congestion controls that are designed to be friendly with Reno. Before they can use the L4S service, they will need to be updated to implement a scalable congestion response, which they will have to indicate by using the ECT(1) codepoint. Scalable variants are under consideration for more recent transport protocols, e.g. QUIC, and the L4S ECN part of BBRv2 [BBRv2], [I-D.cardwell-iccrp-bbr-congestion-control] is a scalable congestion control intended for the TCP and QUIC transports, amongst others. Also an L4S variant of the RMCAT SCReAM controller [RFC8298] has been implemented [SCReAM] for media transported over RTP.

Section 4.3 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] defines scalable congestion control in more detail, and specifies that requirements that an L4S scalable congestion control has to comply with.

- b. The ECN feedback in some transport protocols is already sufficiently fine-grained for L4S (specifically DCCP [RFC4340] and QUIC [RFC9000]). But others either require update or are in the process of being updated:
 - * For the case of TCP, the feedback protocol for ECN embeds the assumption from Classic ECN [RFC3168] that an ECN mark is equivalent to a drop, making it unusable for a scalable TCP. Therefore, the implementation of TCP receivers will have to be upgraded [RFC7560]. Work to standardize and implement more accurate ECN feedback for TCP (AccECN) is in progress [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn], [PragueLinux].
 - * ECN feedback is only roughly sketched in an appendix of the SCTP specification [RFC4960]. A fuller specification has been proposed in a long-expired draft [I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn], which would need to be implemented and deployed before SCTCP could support L4S.
 - * For RTP, sufficient ECN feedback was defined in [RFC6679], but [RFC8888] defines the latest standards track improvements.

5. Rationale

5.1. Why These Primary Components?

Explicit congestion signalling (protocol): Explicit congestion signalling is a key part of the L4S approach. In contrast, use of drop as a congestion signal creates a tension because drop is both an impairment (less would be better) and a useful signal (more would be better):

- * Explicit congestion signals can be used many times per round trip, to keep tight control, without any impairment. Under heavy load, even more explicit signals can be applied so the queue can be kept short whatever the load. In contrast, Classic AQMs have to introduce very high packet drop at high load to keep the queue short. By using ECN, an L4S congestion control's sawtooth reduction can be smaller and therefore return to the operating point more often, without worrying that more sawteeth will cause more signals. The consequent smaller amplitude sawteeth fit between an empty queue and a very shallow marking threshold (~1 ms in the public Internet), so queue delay variation can be very low, without risk of under-utilization.
- * Explicit congestion signals can be emitted immediately to track fluctuations of the queue. L4S shifts smoothing from the network to the host. The network doesn't know the round trip times of any of the flows. So if the network is responsible for smoothing (as in the Classic approach), it has to assume a worst case RTT, otherwise long RTT flows would become unstable. This delays Classic congestion signals by 100-200 ms. In contrast, each host knows its own round trip time. So, in the L4S approach, the host can smooth each flow over its own RTT, introducing no more soothing delay than strictly necessary (usually only a few milliseconds). A host can also choose not to introduce any smoothing delay if appropriate, e.g. during flow start-up.

Neither of the above are feasible if explicit congestion signalling has to be considered 'equivalent to drop' (as was required with Classic ECN [RFC3168]), because drop is an impairment as well as a signal. So drop cannot be excessively frequent, and drop cannot be immediate, otherwise too many drops would turn out to have been due to only a transient fluctuation in the queue that would not have warranted dropping a packet in hindsight. Therefore, in an L4S AQM, the L4S queue uses a new L4S variant of ECN that is not equivalent to drop (see section 5.2 of

the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]), while the Classic queue uses either Classic ECN [RFC3168] or drop, which are equivalent to each other.

Before Classic ECN was standardized, there were various proposals to give an ECN mark a different meaning from drop. However, there was no particular reason to agree on any one of the alternative meanings, so 'equivalent to drop' was the only compromise that could be reached. RFC 3168 contains a statement that:

"An environment where all end nodes were ECN-Capable could allow new criteria to be developed for setting the CE codepoint, and new congestion control mechanisms for end-node reaction to CE packets. However, this is a research issue, and as such is not addressed in this document."

Latency isolation (network): L4S congestion controls keep queue delay low whereas Classic congestion controls need a queue of the order of the RTT to avoid under-utilization. One queue cannot have two lengths, therefore L4S traffic needs to be isolated in a separate queue (e.g. DualQ) or queues (e.g. FQ).

Coupled congestion notification: Coupling the congestion notification between two queues as in the DualQ Coupled AQM is not necessarily essential, but it is a simple way to allow senders to determine their rate, packet by packet, rather than be overridden by a network scheduler. An alternative is for a network scheduler to control the rate of each application flow (see discussion in Section 5.2).

L4S packet identifier (protocol): Once there are at least two treatments in the network, hosts need an identifier at the IP layer to distinguish which treatment they intend to use.

Scalable congestion notification: A scalable congestion control in the host keeps the signalling frequency from the network high whatever the flow rate, so that queue delay variations can be small when conditions are stable, and rate can track variations in available capacity as rapidly as possible otherwise.

Low loss: Latency is not the only concern of L4S. The 'Low Loss' part of the name denotes that L4S generally achieves zero congestion loss due to its use of ECN. Otherwise, loss would itself cause delay, particularly for short flows, due to retransmission delay [RFC2884].

Scalable throughput: The "Scalable throughput" part of the name

denotes that the per-flow throughput of scalable congestion controls should scale indefinitely, avoiding the imminent scaling problems with Reno-friendly congestion control algorithms [RFC3649]. It was known when TCP congestion avoidance was first developed in 1988 that it would not scale to high bandwidth-delay products (see footnote 6 in [TCP-CA]). Today, regular broadband flow rates over WAN distances are already beyond the scaling range of Classic Reno congestion control. So 'less unscalable' Cubic [RFC8312] and Compound [I-D.sridharan-tcpm-ctcp] variants of TCP have been successfully deployed. However, these are now approaching their scaling limits.

For instance, we will consider a scenario with a maximum RTT of 30 ms at the peak of each sawtooth. As Reno packet rate scales 8x from 1,250 to 10,000 packet/s (from 15 to 120 Mb/s with 1500 B packets), the time to recover from a congestion event rises proportionately by 8x as well, from 422 ms to 3.38 s. It is clearly problematic for a congestion control to take multiple seconds to recover from each congestion event. Cubic [RFC8312] was developed to be less unscalable, but it is approaching its scaling limit; with the same max RTT of 30 ms, at 120 Mb/s Cubic is still fully in its Reno-friendly mode, so it takes about 4.3 s to recover. However, once the flow rate scales by 8x again to 960 Mb/s it enters true Cubic mode, with a recovery time of 12.2 s. From then on, each further scaling by 8x doubles Cubic's recovery time (because the cube root of 8 is 2), e.g. at 7.68 Gb/s the recovery time is 24.3 s. In contrast a scalable congestion control like DCTCP or TCP Prague induces 2 congestion signals per round trip on average, which remains invariant for any flow rate, keeping dynamic control very tight.

For a feel of where the global average lone-flow download sits on this scale at the time of writing (2021), according to [BDPdata] globally averaged fixed access capacity was 103 Mb/s in 2020 and averaged base RTT to a CDN was 25-34ms in 2019. Averaging of per-country data was weighted by Internet user population (data collected globally is necessarily of variable quality, but the paper does double-check that the outcome compares well against a second source). So a lone CUBIC flow would at best take about 200 round trips (5 s) to recover from each of its sawtooth reductions, if the flow even lasted that long. This is described as 'at best' because it assume everyone uses an AQM, whereas in reality most users still have a (probably bloated) tail-drop buffer. In the tail-drop case, likely average recovery time would be at least 4x 5 s, if not more, because RTT under load would be at least double that of an AQM, and recovery time depends on the square of RTT.

Although work on scaling congestion controls tends to start with TCP as the transport, the above is not intended to exclude other transports (e.g. SCTP, QUIC) or less elastic algorithms (e.g. RMCAT), which all tend to adopt the same or similar developments.

5.2. What L4S adds to Existing Approaches

All the following approaches address some part of the same problem space as L4S. In each case, it is shown that L4S complements them or improves on them, rather than being a mutually exclusive alternative:

Diffserv: Diffserv addresses the problem of bandwidth apportionment for important traffic as well as queuing latency for delay-sensitive traffic. Of these, L4S solely addresses the problem of queuing latency. Diffserv will still be necessary where important traffic requires priority (e.g. for commercial reasons, or for protection of critical infrastructure traffic) - see [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv]. Nonetheless, the L4S approach can provide low latency for all traffic within each Diffserv class (including the case where there is only the one default Diffserv class).

Also, Diffserv can only provide a latency benefit if a small subset of the traffic on a bottleneck link requests low latency. As already explained, it has no effect when all the applications in use at one time at a single site (home, small business or mobile device) require low latency. In contrast, because L4S works for all traffic, it needs none of the management baggage (traffic policing, traffic contracts) associated with favouring some packets over others. This lack of management baggage ought to give L4S a better chance of end-to-end deployment.

In particular, because networks tend not to trust end systems to identify which packets should be favoured over others, where networks assign packets to Diffserv classes they tend to use packet inspection of application flow identifiers or deeper inspection of application signatures. Thus, nowadays, Diffserv doesn't always sit well with encryption of the layers above IP [RFC8404]. So users have to choose between privacy and QoS.

As with Diffserv, the L4S identifier is in the IP header. But, in contrast to Diffserv, the L4S identifier does not convey a want or a need for a certain level of quality. Rather, it promises a certain behaviour (scalable congestion response), which networks can objectively verify if they need to. This is because low delay depends on collective host behaviour, whereas bandwidth priority depends on network behaviour.

State-of-the-art AQMs: AQMs such as PIE and FQ-CoDel give a significant reduction in queuing delay relative to no AQM at all. L4S is intended to complement these AQMs, and should not distract from the need to deploy them as widely as possible. Nonetheless, AQMs alone cannot reduce queuing delay too far without significantly reducing link utilization, because the root cause of the problem is on the host - where Classic congestion controls use large saw-toothed rate variations. The L4S approach resolves this tension between delay and utilization by enabling hosts to minimize the amplitude of their sawteeth. A single-queue Classic AQM is not sufficient to allow hosts to use small sawteeth for two reasons: i) smaller sawteeth would not get lower delay in an AQM designed for larger amplitude Classic sawteeth, because a queue can only have one length at a time; and ii) much smaller sawteeth implies much more frequent sawteeth, so L4S flows would drive a Classic AQM into a high level of ECN-marking, which would appear as heavy congestion to Classic flows, which in turn would greatly reduce their rate as a result (see Section 6.4.4).

Per-flow queuing or marking: Similarly, per-flow approaches such as FQ-CoDel or Approx Fair CoDel [AFCD] are not incompatible with the L4S approach. However, per-flow queuing alone is not enough - it only isolates the queuing of one flow from others; not from itself. Per-flow implementations need to have support for scalable congestion control added, which has already been done for FQ-CoDel in Linux (see Sec.5.2.7 of [RFC8290] and [FQ-CoDel_Thresh]). Without this simple modification, per-flow AQMs like FQ-CoDel would still not be able to support applications that need both very low delay and high bandwidth, e.g. video-based control of remote procedures, or interactive cloud-based video (see Note 1 below).

Although per-flow techniques are not incompatible with L4S, it is important to have the DualQ alternative. This is because handling end-to-end (layer 4) flows in the network (layer 3 or 2) precludes some important end-to-end functions. For instance:

- a. Per-flow forms of L4S like FQ-CoDel are incompatible with full end-to-end encryption of transport layer identifiers for privacy and confidentiality (e.g. IPSec or encrypted VPN tunnels, as opposed to TLS over UDP), because they require packet inspection to access the end-to-end transport flow identifiers.

In contrast, the DualQ form of L4S requires no deeper inspection than the IP layer. So, as long as operators take the DualQ approach, their users can have both very low queuing delay and full end-to-end encryption [RFC8404].

- b. With per-flow forms of L4S, the network takes over control of the relative rates of each application flow. Some see it as an advantage that the network will prevent some flows running faster than others. Others consider it an inherent part of the Internet's appeal that applications can control their rate while taking account of the needs of others via congestion signals. They maintain that this has allowed applications with interesting rate behaviours to evolve, for instance, variable bit-rate video that varies around an equal share rather than being forced to remain equal at every instant, or e2e scavenger behaviours [RFC6817] that use less than an equal share of capacity [LEDBAT_AQM].

The L4S architecture does not require the IETF to commit to one approach over the other, because it supports both, so that the 'market' can decide. Nonetheless, in the spirit of 'Do one thing and do it well' [McIlroy78], the DualQ option provides low delay without prejudging the issue of flow-rate control. Then, flow rate policing can be added separately if desired. This allows application control up to a point, but the network can still choose to set the point at which it intervenes to prevent one flow completely starving another.

Note:

1. It might seem that self-inflicted queuing delay within a per-flow queue should not be counted, because if the delay wasn't in the network it would just shift to the sender. However, modern adaptive applications, e.g. HTTP/2 [RFC7540] or some interactive media applications (see Section 6.1), can keep low latency objects at the front of their local send queue by shuffling priorities of other objects dependent on the progress of other transfers (for example see [lowat]). They cannot shuffle objects once they have released them into the network.

Alternative Back-off ECN (ABE): Here again, L4S is not an alternative to ABE but a complement that introduces much lower queuing delay. ABE [RFC8511] alters the host behaviour in response to ECN marking to utilize a link better and give ECN flows faster throughput. It uses ECT(0) and assumes the network still treats ECN and drop the same. Therefore ABE exploits any lower queuing delay that AQMs can provide. But as explained above, AQMs still cannot reduce queuing delay too far without losing link utilization (to allow for other, non-ABE, flows).

BBR: Bottleneck Bandwidth and Round-trip propagation time

(BBR [I-D.cardwell-iccr-g-bbr-congestion-control]) controls queuing delay end-to-end without needing any special logic in the network, such as an AQM. So it works pretty-much on any path. BBR keeps queuing delay reasonably low, but perhaps not quite as low as with state-of-the-art AQMs such as PIE or FQ-CoDel, and certainly nowhere near as low as with L4S. Queuing delay is also not consistently low, due to BBR's regular bandwidth probing spikes and its aggressive flow start-up phase.

L4S complements BBR. Indeed BBRv2 can use L4S ECN where available and a scalable L4S congestion control behaviour in response to any ECN signalling from the path [BBRv2]. The L4S ECN signal complements the delay based congestion control aspects of BBR with an explicit indication that hosts can use, both to converge on a fair rate and to keep below a shallow queue target set by the network. Without L4S ECN, both these aspects need to be assumed or estimated.

6. Applicability

6.1. Applications

A transport layer that solves the current latency issues will provide new service, product and application opportunities.

With the L4S approach, the following existing applications also experience significantly better quality of experience under load:

- * Gaming, including cloud based gaming;
- * VoIP;
- * Video conferencing;
- * Web browsing;
- * (Adaptive) video streaming;
- * Instant messaging.

The significantly lower queuing latency also enables some interactive application functions to be offloaded to the cloud that would hardly even be usable today:

- * Cloud based interactive video;
- * Cloud based virtual and augmented reality.

The above two applications have been successfully demonstrated with L4S, both running together over a 40 Mb/s broadband access link loaded up with the numerous other latency sensitive applications in the previous list as well as numerous downloads - all sharing the same bottleneck queue simultaneously [L4Sdemo16]. For the former, a panoramic video of a football stadium could be swiped and pinched so that, on the fly, a proxy in the cloud could generate a sub-window of the match video under the finger-gesture control of each user. For the latter, a virtual reality headset displayed a viewport taken from a 360 degree camera in a racing car. The user's head movements controlled the viewport extracted by a cloud-based proxy. In both cases, with 7 ms end-to-end base delay, the additional queuing delay of roughly 1 ms was so low that it seemed the video was generated locally.

Using a swiping finger gesture or head movement to pan a video are extremely latency-demanding actions -- far more demanding than VoIP. Because human vision can detect extremely low delays of the order of single milliseconds when delay is translated into a visual lag between a video and a reference point (the finger or the orientation of the head sensed by the balance system in the inner ear -- the vestibular system).

Without the low queuing delay of L4S, cloud-based applications like these would not be credible without significantly more access bandwidth (to deliver all possible video that might be viewed) and more local processing, which would increase the weight and power consumption of head-mounted displays. When all interactive processing can be done in the cloud, only the data to be rendered for the end user needs to be sent.

Other low latency high bandwidth applications such as:

- * Interactive remote presence;
- * Video-assisted remote control of machinery or industrial processes.

are not credible at all without very low queuing delay. No amount of extra access bandwidth or local processing can make up for lost time.

6.2. Use Cases

The following use-cases for L4S are being considered by various interested parties:

- * Where the bottleneck is one of various types of access network:
e.g. DSL, Passive Optical Networks (PON), DOCSIS cable, mobile, satellite (see Section 6.3 for some technology-specific details)
- * Private networks of heterogeneous data centres, where there is no single administrator that can arrange for all the simultaneous changes to senders, receivers and network needed to deploy DCTCP:
 - a set of private data centres interconnected over a wide area with separate administrations, but within the same company
 - a set of data centres operated by separate companies interconnected by a community of interest network (e.g. for the finance sector)
 - multi-tenant (cloud) data centres where tenants choose their operating system stack (Infrastructure as a Service - IaaS)
- * Different types of transport (or application) congestion control:
 - elastic (TCP/SCTP);
 - real-time (RTP, RMCAT);
 - query (DNS/LDAP).
- * Where low delay quality of service is required, but without inspecting or intervening above the IP layer [RFC8404]:
 - mobile and other networks have tended to inspect higher layers in order to guess application QoS requirements. However, with growing demand for support of privacy and encryption, L4S offers an alternative. There is no need to select which traffic to favour for queuing, when L4S can give favourable queuing to all traffic.
- * If queuing delay is minimized, applications with a fixed delay budget can communicate over longer distances, or via a longer chain of service functions [RFC7665] or onion routers.
- * If delay jitter is minimized, it is possible to reduce the dejitter buffers on the receive end of video streaming, which should improve the interactive experience

6.3. Applicability with Specific Link Technologies

Certain link technologies aggregate data from multiple packets into bursts, and buffer incoming packets while building each burst. WiFi, PON and cable all involve such packet aggregation, whereas fixed Ethernet and DSL do not. No sender, whether L4S or not, can do anything to reduce the buffering needed for packet aggregation. So an AQM should not count this buffering as part of the queue that it controls, given no amount of congestion signals will reduce it.

Certain link technologies also add buffering for other reasons, specifically:

- * Radio links (cellular, WiFi, satellite) that are distant from the source are particularly challenging. The radio link capacity can vary rapidly by orders of magnitude, so it is considered desirable to hold a standing queue that can utilize sudden increases of capacity;
- * Cellular networks are further complicated by a perceived need to buffer in order to make hand-overs imperceptible;

L4S cannot remove the need for all these different forms of buffering. However, by removing 'the longest pole in the tent' (buffering for the large sawteeth of Classic congestion controls), L4S exposes all these 'shorter poles' to greater scrutiny.

Until now, the buffering needed for these additional reasons tended to be over-specified - with the excuse that none were 'the longest pole in the tent'. But having removed the 'longest pole', it becomes worthwhile to minimize them, for instance reducing packet aggregation burst sizes and MAC scheduling intervals.

6.4. Deployment Considerations

L4S AQMs, whether DualQ [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] or FQ, e.g. [RFC8290] are, in themselves, an incremental deployment mechanism for L4S - so that L4S traffic can coexist with existing Classic (Reno-friendly) traffic. Section 6.4.1 explains why only deploying an L4S AQM in one node at each end of the access link will realize nearly all the benefit of L4S.

L4S involves both end systems and the network, so Section 6.4.2 suggests some typical sequences to deploy each part, and why there will be an immediate and significant benefit after deploying just one part.

Section 6.4.3 and Section 6.4.4 describe the converse incremental deployment case where there is no L4S AQM at the network bottleneck, so any L4S flow traversing this bottleneck has to take care in case it is competing with Classic traffic.

6.4.1. Deployment Topology

L4S AQMs will not have to be deployed throughout the Internet before L4S can benefit anyone. Operators of public Internet access networks typically design their networks so that the bottleneck will nearly always occur at one known (logical) link. This confines the cost of queue management technology to one place.

The case of mesh networks is different and will be discussed later in this section. But the known bottleneck case is generally true for Internet access to all sorts of different 'sites', where the word 'site' includes home networks, small- to medium-sized campus or enterprise networks and even cellular devices (Figure 2). Also, this known-bottleneck case tends to be applicable whatever the access link technology; whether xDSL, cable, PON, cellular, line of sight wireless or satellite.

Therefore, the full benefit of the L4S service should be available in the downstream direction when an L4S AQM is deployed at the ingress to this bottleneck link. And similarly, the full upstream service will be available once an L4S AQM is deployed at the ingress into the upstream link. (Of course, multi-homed sites would only see the full benefit once all their access links were covered.)




Figure 2: Likely location of DualQ (DQ) Deployments in common access topologies

Deployment in mesh topologies depends on how overbooked the core is. If the core is non-blocking, or at least generously provisioned so that the edges are nearly always the bottlenecks, it would only be necessary to deploy an L4S AQM at the edge bottlenecks. For example, some data-centre networks are designed with the bottleneck in the hypervisor or host NICs, while others bottleneck at the top-of-rack switch (both the output ports facing hosts and those facing the core).

An L4S AQM would often next be needed where the WiFi links in a home sometimes become the bottleneck. And an L4S AQM would eventually also need to be deployed at any other persistent bottlenecks such as network interconnections, e.g. some public Internet exchange points and the ingress and egress to WAN links interconnecting data-centres.

6.4.2. Deployment Sequences

For any one L4S flow to provide benefit, it requires three (or sometimes two) parts to have been deployed: i) the congestion control at the sender; ii) the AQM at the bottleneck; and iii) older transports (namely TCP) need upgraded receiver feedback too. This was the same deployment problem that ECN faced [RFC8170] so we have learned from that experience.

Firstly, L4S deployment exploits the fact that DCTCP already exists on many Internet hosts (Windows, FreeBSD and Linux); both servers and clients. Therefore, an L4S AQM can be deployed at a network bottleneck to immediately give a working deployment of all the L4S parts for testing, as long as the ECT(0) codepoint is switched to ECT(1). DCTCP needs some safety concerns to be fixed for general use over the public Internet (see Section 4.3 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]), but DCTCP is not on by default, so these issues can be managed within controlled deployments or controlled trials.

Secondly, the performance improvement with L4S is so significant that it enables new interactive services and products that were not previously possible. It is much easier for companies to initiate new work on deployment if there is budget for a new product trial. If, in contrast, there were only an incremental performance improvement (as with Classic ECN), spending on deployment tends to be much harder to justify.

Thirdly, the L4S identifier is defined so that initially network operators can enable L4S exclusively for certain customers or certain applications. But this is carefully defined so that it does not compromise future evolution towards L4S as an Internet-wide service. This is because the L4S identifier is defined not only as the end-to-

end ECN field, but it can also optionally be combined with any other packet header or some status of a customer or their access link (see section 5.4 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). Operators could do this anyway, even if it were not blessed by the IETF. However, it is best for the IETF to specify that, if they use their own local identifier, it must be in combination with the IETF's identifier. Then, if an operator has opted for an exclusive local-use approach, later they only have to remove this extra rule to make the service work Internet-wide - it will already traverse middleboxes, peerings, etc.

	Servers or proxies	Access link	Clients
0	DCTCP (existing)		DCTCP (existing)
1	Add L4S AQM downstream WORKS DOWNSTREAM FOR CONTROLLED DEPLOYMENTS/TRIALS		
2	Upgrade DCTCP to TCP Prague	FULLY WORKS DOWNSTREAM	Replace DCTCP feedb'k with AccECN
3		Add L4S AQM upstream	Upgrade DCTCP to TCP Prague
	FULLY WORKS UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM		

Figure 3: Example L4S Deployment Sequence

Figure 3 illustrates some example sequences in which the parts of L4S might be deployed. It consists of the following stages:

1. Here, the immediate benefit of a single AQM deployment can be seen, but limited to a controlled trial or controlled deployment. In this example downstream deployment is first, but in other scenarios the upstream might be deployed first. If no AQM at all was previously deployed for the downstream access, an L4S AQM greatly improves the Classic service (as well as adding the L4S service). If an AQM was already deployed, the Classic service will be unchanged (and L4S will add an improvement on top).
2. In this stage, the name 'TCP Prague' [I-D.briscoe-iccrp-prague-congestion-control] is used to represent a variant of DCTCP that is designed to be used in a production Internet environment (assuming it complies with the requirements in Section 4 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). If the application is

primarily unidirectional, 'TCP Prague' at one end will provide all the benefit needed. For TCP transports, Accurate ECN feedback (AccECN) [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] is needed at the other end, but it is a generic ECN feedback facility that is already planned to be deployed for other purposes, e.g. DCTCP, BBR. The two ends can be deployed in either order, because, in TCP, an L4S congestion control only enables itself if it has negotiated the use of AccECN feedback with the other end during the connection handshake. Thus, deployment of TCP Prague on a server enables L4S trials to move to a production service in one direction, wherever AccECN is deployed at the other end. This stage might be further motivated by the performance improvements of TCP Prague relative to DCTCP (see Appendix A.2 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]).

Unlike TCP, from the outset, QUIC ECN feedback [RFC9000] has supported L4S. Therefore, if the transport is QUIC, one-ended deployment of a Prague congestion control at this stage is simple and sufficient.

3. This is a two-move stage to enable L4S upstream. An L4S AQM or TCP Prague can be deployed in either order as already explained. To motivate the first of two independent moves, the deferred benefit of enabling new services after the second move has to be worth it to cover the first mover's investment risk. As explained already, the potential for new interactive services provides this motivation. An L4S AQM also improves the upstream Classic service - significantly if no other AQM has already been deployed.

Note that other deployment sequences might occur. For instance: the upstream might be deployed first; a non-TCP protocol might be used end-to-end, e.g. QUIC, RTP; a body such as the 3GPP might require L4S to be implemented in 5G user equipment, or other random acts of kindness.

6.4.3. L4S Flow but Non-ECN Bottleneck

If L4S is enabled between two hosts, the L4S sender is required to coexist safely with Reno in response to any drop (see Section 4.3 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]).

Unfortunately, as well as protecting Classic traffic, this rule degrades the L4S service whenever there is any loss, even if the cause is not persistent congestion at a bottleneck, e.g.:

- * congestion loss at other transient bottlenecks, e.g. due to bursts in shallower queues;

- * transmission errors, e.g. due to electrical interference;
- * rate policing.

Three complementary approaches are in progress to address this issue, but they are all currently research:

- * In Prague congestion control, ignore certain losses deemed unlikely to be due to congestion (using some ideas from BBR [I-D.cardwell-iccr-g-bbr-congestion-control] regarding isolated losses). This could mask any of the above types of loss while still coexisting with drop-based congestion controls.
- * A combination of RACK, L4S and link retransmission without resequencing could repair transmission errors without the head of line blocking delay usually associated with link-layer retransmission [UnorderedLTE], [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id];
- * Hybrid ECN/drop rate policers (see Section 8.3).

L4S deployment scenarios that minimize these issues (e.g. over wireline networks) can proceed in parallel to this research, in the expectation that research success could continually widen L4S applicability.

6.4.4. L4S Flow but Classic ECN Bottleneck

Classic ECN support is starting to materialize on the Internet as an increased level of CE marking. It is hard to detect whether this is all due to the addition of support for ECN in implementations of FQ-CoDel and/or FQ-COBALT, which is not generally problematic, because flow-queue (FQ) scheduling inherently prevents a flow from exceeding the 'fair' rate irrespective of its aggressiveness. However, some of this Classic ECN marking might be due to single-queue ECN deployment. This case is discussed in Section 4.3 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id].

6.4.5. L4S AQM Deployment within Tunnels

An L4S AQM uses the ECN field to signal congestion. So, in common with Classic ECN, if the AQM is within a tunnel or at a lower layer, correct functioning of ECN signalling requires correct propagation of the ECN field up the layers [RFC6040], [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim], [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines].

7. IANA Considerations (to be removed by RFC Editor)

This specification contains no IANA considerations.

8. Security Considerations

8.1. Traffic Rate (Non-)Policing

In the current Internet, scheduling usually enforces separation between 'sites' (e.g. households, businesses or mobile users [RFC0970]) and various techniques like redirection to traffic scrubbing facilities deal with flooding attacks. However, there has never been a universal need to police the rate of individual application flows - the Internet has generally always relied on self-restraint of congestion controls at senders for sharing intra-'site' capacity.

As explained in Section 5.2, the DualQ variant of L4S provides low delay without prejudging the issue of flow-rate control. Then, if flow-rate control is needed, per-flow-queuing (FQ) can be used instead, or flow rate policing can be added as a modular addition to a DualQ.

Because the L4S service reduces delay without increasing the delay of Classic traffic, it should not be necessary to rate-police access to the L4S service. In contrast, Section 5.2 explains how Diffserv only makes a difference if some packets get less favourable treatment than others, which typically requires traffic rate policing, which can, in turn, lead to further complexity such as traffic contracts at trust boundaries. Because L4S avoids this management complexity, it is more likely to work end-to-end.

During early deployment (and perhaps always), some networks will not offer the L4S service. In general, these networks should not need to police L4S traffic. They are required (by both the ECN spec [RFC3168] and the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]) not to change the L4S identifier, which would interfere with end-to-end congestion control. Instead they can merely treat L4S traffic as Not-ECT, as they might already treat all ECN traffic today. At a bottleneck, such networks will introduce some queuing and dropping. When a scalable congestion control detects a drop it will have to respond safely with respect to Classic congestion controls (as required in Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). This will degrade the L4S service to be no better (but never worse) than Classic best efforts, whenever a non-ECN bottleneck is encountered on a path (see Section 6.4.3).

In cases that are expected to be rare, networks that solely support Classic ECN [RFC3168] in a single queue bottleneck might opt to police L4S traffic so as to protect competing Classic ECN traffic (for instance, see Section 6.1.3 of the L4S operational guidance [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4sops]). However, Section 4.3 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] recommends that the sender adapts its congestion response to properly coexist with Classic ECN flows, i.e. reverting to the self-restraint approach.

Certain network operators might choose to restrict access to the L4S class, perhaps only to selected premium customers as a value-added service. Their packet classifier (item 2 in Figure 1) could identify such customers against some other field (e.g. source address range) as well as classifying on the ECN field. If only the ECN L4S identifier matched, but not the source address (say), the classifier could direct these packets (from non-premium customers) into the Classic queue. Explaining clearly how operators can use an additional local classifiers (see section 5.4 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]) is intended to remove any motivation to clear the L4S identifier. Then at least the L4S ECN identifier will be more likely to survive end-to-end even though the service may not be supported at every hop. Such local arrangements would only require simple registered/not-registered packet classification, rather than the managed, application-specific traffic policing against customer-specific traffic contracts that Diffserv uses.

8.2. 'Latency Friendliness'

Like the Classic service, the L4S service relies on self-restraint - limiting rate in response to congestion. In addition, the L4S service requires self-restraint in terms of limiting latency (burstiness). It is hoped that self-interest and guidance on dynamic behaviour (especially flow start-up, which might need to be standardized) will be sufficient to prevent transports from sending excessive bursts of L4S traffic, given the application's own latency will suffer most from such behaviour.

Whether burst policing becomes necessary remains to be seen. Without it, there will be potential for attacks on the low latency of the L4S service.

If needed, various arrangements could be used to address this concern:

Local bottleneck queue protection: A per-flow (5-tuple) queue

protection function [I-D.briscoe-docsis-q-protection] has been developed for the low latency queue in DOCSIS, which has adopted the DualQ L4S architecture. It protects the low latency service from any queue-building flows that accidentally or maliciously classify themselves into the low latency queue. It is designed to score flows based solely on their contribution to queuing (not flow rate in itself). Then, if the shared low latency queue is at risk of exceeding a threshold, the function redirects enough packets of the highest scoring flow(s) into the Classic queue to preserve low latency.

Distributed traffic scrubbing: Rather than policing locally at each bottleneck, it may only be necessary to address problems reactively, e.g. punitively target any deployments of new bursty malware, in a similar way to how traffic from flooding attack sources is rerouted via scrubbing facilities.

Local bottleneck per-flow scheduling: Per-flow scheduling should inherently isolate non-bursty flows from bursty (see Section 5.2 for discussion of the merits of per-flow scheduling relative to per-flow policing).

Distributed access subnet queue protection: Per-flow queue protection could be arranged for a queue structure distributed across a subnet inter-communicating using lower layer control messages (see Section 2.1.4 of [QDyn]). For instance, in a radio access network, user equipment already sends regular buffer status reports to a radio network controller, which could use this information to remotely police individual flows.

Distributed Congestion Exposure to Ingress Policers: The Congestion Exposure (ConEx) architecture [RFC7713] which uses egress audit to motivate senders to truthfully signal path congestion in-band where it can be used by ingress policers. An edge-to-edge variant of this architecture is also possible.

Distributed Domain-edge traffic conditioning: An architecture similar to Diffserv [RFC2475] may be preferred, where traffic is proactively conditioned on entry to a domain, rather than reactively policed only if it leads to queuing once combined with other traffic at a bottleneck.

Distributed core network queue protection: The policing function

could be divided between per-flow mechanisms at the network ingress that characterize the burstiness of each flow into a signal carried with the traffic, and per-class mechanisms at bottlenecks that act on these signals if queuing actually occurs once the traffic converges. This would be somewhat similar to [Nadas20], which is in turn similar to the idea behind core stateless fair queuing.

None of these possible queue protection capabilities are considered a necessary part of the L4S architecture, which works without them (in a similar way to how the Internet works without per-flow rate policing). Indeed, even where latency policers are deployed, under normal circumstances they would not intervene, and if operators found they were not necessary they could disable them. Part of the L4S experiment will be to see whether such a function is necessary, and which arrangements are most appropriate to the size of the problem.

8.3. Interaction between Rate Policing and L4S

As mentioned in Section 5.2, L4S should remove the need for low latency Diffserv classes. However, those Diffserv classes that give certain applications or users priority over capacity, would still be applicable in certain scenarios (e.g. corporate networks). Then, within such Diffserv classes, L4S would often be applicable to give traffic low latency and low loss as well. Within such a Diffserv class, the bandwidth available to a user or application is often limited by a rate policer. Similarly, in the default Diffserv class, rate policers are used to partition shared capacity.

A classic rate policer drops any packets exceeding a set rate, usually also giving a burst allowance (variants exist where the policer re-marks non-compliant traffic to a discard-eligible Diffserv codepoint, so they can be dropped elsewhere during contention). Whenever L4S traffic encounters one of these rate policers, it will experience drops and the source will have to fall back to a Classic congestion control, thus losing the benefits of L4S (Section 6.4.3). So, in networks that already use rate policers and plan to deploy L4S, it will be preferable to redesign these rate policers to be more friendly to the L4S service.

L4S-friendly rate policing is currently a research area (note that this is not the same as latency policing). It might be achieved by setting a threshold where ECN marking is introduced, such that it is just under the policed rate or just under the burst allowance where drop is introduced. For instance the two-rate three-colour marker [RFC2698] or a PCN threshold and excess-rate marker [RFC5670] could mark ECN at the lower rate and drop at the higher. Or an existing rate policer could have congestion-rate policing added,

e.g. using the 'local' (non-ConEx) variant of the ConEx aggregate congestion policer [I-D.briscoe-conex-policing]. It might also be possible to design scalable congestion controls to respond less catastrophically to loss that has not been preceded by a period of increasing delay.

The design of L4S-friendly rate policers will require a separate dedicated document. For further discussion of the interaction between L4S and Diffserv, see [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-diffserv].

8.4. ECN Integrity

Receiving hosts can fool a sender into downloading faster by suppressing feedback of ECN marks (or of losses if retransmissions are not necessary or available otherwise). Various ways to protect transport feedback integrity have been developed. For instance:

- * The sender can test the integrity of the receiver's feedback by occasionally setting the IP-ECN field to the congestion experienced (CE) codepoint, which is normally only set by a congested link. Then the sender can test whether the receiver's feedback faithfully reports what it expects (see 2nd para of Section 20.2 of the Classic ECN spec [RFC3168]).
- * A network can enforce a congestion response to its ECN markings (or packet losses) by auditing congestion exposure (ConEx) [RFC7713].
- * Transport layer authentication such as the TCP authentication option (TCP-AO [RFC5925]) or QUIC's use of TLS [RFC9001] can detect any tampering with congestion feedback.
- * The ECN Nonce [RFC3540] was proposed to detect tampering with congestion feedback, but it has been reclassified as historic [RFC8311].

Appendix C.1 of the L4S ECN spec [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] gives more details of these techniques including their applicability and pros and cons.

8.5. Privacy Considerations

As discussed in Section 5.2, the L4S architecture does not preclude approaches that inspect end-to-end transport layer identifiers. For instance, L4S support has been added to FQ-CoDel, which classifies by application flow ID in the network. However, the main innovation of L4S is the DualQ AQM framework that does not need to inspect any deeper than the outermost IP header, because the L4S identifier is in

the IP-ECN field.

Thus, the L4S architecture enables very low queuing delay without requiring inspection of information above the IP layer. This means that users who want to encrypt application flow identifiers, e.g. in IPSec or other encrypted VPN tunnels, don't have to sacrifice low delay [RFC8404].

Because L4S can provide low delay for a broad set of applications that choose to use it, there is no need for individual applications or classes within that broad set to be distinguishable in any way while traversing networks. This removes much of the ability to correlate between the delay requirements of traffic and other identifying features [RFC6973]. There may be some types of traffic that prefer not to use L4S, but the coarse binary categorization of traffic reveals very little that could be exploited to compromise privacy.

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Operational Guidance for Deployment of L4S in the Internet
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Abstract

This document is intended to provide guidance in order to ensure successful deployment of Low Latency Low Loss Scalable throughput (L4S) in the Internet. Other L4S documents provide guidance for running an L4S experiment, but this document is focused solely on potential interactions between L4S flows and flows using the original ('Classic') ECN over a Classic ECN bottleneck link. The document discusses the potential outcomes of these interactions, describes mechanisms to detect the presence of Classic ECN bottlenecks, and identifies opportunities to prevent and/or detect and resolve fairness problems in such networks. This guidance is aimed at operators of end-systems, operators of networks, and researchers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Low-latency, low-loss, scalable throughput (L4S)

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] traffic is designed to provide lower queuing delay than conventional traffic via a new network service based on a modified Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) response from the network. L4S traffic is identified by the ECT(1) codepoint, and network bottlenecks that support L4S should congestion-mark ECT(1) packets to enable L4S congestion feedback. However, L4S traffic is also expected to coexist well with classic congestion controlled traffic even if the bottleneck queue does not support L4S. This includes paths where the bottleneck link utilizes packet drops in response to congestion (either due to buffer overrun or active queue management), as well as paths that implement a 'flow-queuing' scheduler such as fq_codel [RFC8290]. A potential area of poor interoperability lies in network bottlenecks employing a shared queue that implements an Active Queue Management (AQM) algorithm that provides Explicit Congestion Notification signaling according to [RFC3168]. RFC3168 has been updated (via [RFC8311]) to reserve ECT(1) for experimental use only (also see [IANA-ECN]), and its use for L4S has been specified in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. However, any deployed RFC3168 AQMs might not be updated, and RFC8311 still prefers that routers not involved in L4S experimentation treat ECT(1) and ECT(0) as equivalent. It has been demonstrated [Briscoe] that when a set of long-running flows comprising both classic congestion controlled flows and L4S-compliant congestion controlled flows compete for bandwidth in such a legacy shared RFC3168 queue, the classic congestion controlled flows may achieve lower throughput than they would have if all of the flows had been classic congestion controlled flows. This 'unfairness' between the two classes is more pronounced on longer RTT paths (e.g. 50ms and above) and/or at higher link rates (e.g. 50 Mbps and above). The lower the capacity per flow, the less pronounced the problem becomes. Thus the imbalance is most significant when the slowest flow rate is still high in absolute terms.

The root cause of the unfairness is that the L4S architecture redefines the congestion signal (CE mark) and congestion response in the case of packets marked ECT(1) (used by L4S senders), whereas a RFC3168 queue does not differentiate between packets marked ECT(0) (used by classic senders) and those marked ECT(1), and provides CE marks identically to both types. The classic senders expect that CE marks are sent very rarely (e.g. approximately 1 CE mark every 200 round trips on a 50 Mbps x 50ms path) while the L4S senders expect very frequent CE marking (e.g. approximately 2 CE marks per round trip). The result is that the classic senders respond to the CE marks provided by the bottleneck by yielding capacity to the L4S flows. The resulting rate imbalance can be demonstrated, and could be a cause of concern in some cases.

This concern primarily relates to single-queue (FIFO) bottleneck links that implement RFC3168 ECN, but the situation can also potentially occur with per-flow queuing, e.g. fq_codel [RFC8290], when flow isolation is imperfect due to hash collisions or VPN tunnels.

While the above mentioned unfairness has been demonstrated in laboratory testing, it has not been observed in operational networks, in part because members of the Transport Working group are not aware of any deployments of single-queue Classic ECN bottlenecks in the Internet.

This issue was considered in November 2015 (and reaffirmed in April 2020) when the WG decided on the identifier to use for L4S, as recorded in Appendix B.1 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. It was recognized that compromises would have to be made because IP header space is extremely limited. A number of alternative codepoint schemes were compared for their ability to traverse most Internet paths, to work over tunnels, to work at lower layers, to work with TCP, etc. It was decided to progress on the basis that robust performance in presence of these single-queue RFC3168 bottlenecks is not the most critical issue, since it was believed that they are rare.

Nonetheless, there is the possibility that such deployments exist, and there is the possibility that they could be deployed/enabled in the future. Since any negative impact of this coexistence issue would not be directly experienced by the party experimenting with L4S endpoints, but rather by the other users of the bottleneck, there is an interest in providing guidance to ensure that measures can be taken to address the potential issues, should they arise in practice.

2. Per-Flow Fairness

There are a number of factors that influence the relative rates achieved by a set of users or a set of applications sharing a queue in a bottleneck link. Notably the response that each application has to congestion signals (whether loss or explicit signaling) can play a large role in determining whether the applications share the bandwidth in an equitable manner. In the Internet, ISPs typically control capacity sharing between their customers using a scheduler at the access bottleneck rather than relying on the congestion responses of end-systems. So in that context this question primarily concerns capacity sharing between the applications used by one customer site. Nonetheless, there are many networks on the Internet where capacity sharing relies, at least to some extent, on congestion control in the end-systems. The traditional norm for congestion response has been that it is handled on a per-connection basis, and that (all else being equal) it results in each connection in the bottleneck achieving a data rate inversely proportional to the average RTT of the connection. The end result (in the case of steady-state behavior of a set of like connections) is that each user or application achieves a data rate proportional to N/RTT , where N is the number of simultaneous connections that the user or application creates, and RTT is the harmonic mean of the average round-trip-times for those connections. Thus, users or applications that create a larger number of connections and/or that have a lower RTT achieve a larger share of the bottleneck link rate than others.

While this may not be considered fair by many, it nonetheless has been the typical starting point for discussions around fairness. In fact it has been common when evaluating new congestion responses to actually set aside N & RTT as variables in the equation, and just compare per-flow rates between flows with the same RTT. For example [RFC5348] defines the congestion response for a flow to be 'reasonably fair' if its sending rate is generally within a factor of two of the sending rate of a [Reno] TCP flow under the same conditions.' Given that RTTs can vary by roughly two orders of magnitude and flow counts can vary by at least an order of magnitude between applications, it seems that the accepted definition of reasonable fairness leaves quite a bit of room for different levels of performance between users or applications, and so perhaps isn't the gold standard, but is rather a metric that is used because of its convenience.

In practice, the effect of this RTT dependence has historically been muted by the fact that many networks were deployed with very large ("bloated") drop-tail buffers that would introduce queuing delays well in excess of the base RTT of the flows utilizing the link, thus equalizing (to some degree) the effective RTTs of those flows.

Recently, as network equipment suppliers and operators have worked to improve the latency performance of the network by the use of smaller buffers and/or AQM algorithms, this has had the side-effect of uncovering the inherent RTT bias in classic congestion control algorithms.

The L4S architecture aims to significantly improve this situation, by requiring senders to adopt a congestion response that eliminates RTT bias as much as possible (see [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). As a result, L4S promotes a level of per-flow fairness beyond what is ordinarily considered for classic senders, the RFC3168 issue notwithstanding.

It is also worth noting that the congestion control algorithms deployed currently on the internet tend toward (RTT-weighted) fairness only over long timescales. For example, the cubic algorithm can take minutes to converge to fairness when a new flow joins an existing flow on a link [Ha]. Since the vast majority of TCP connections don't last for minutes, it is unclear to what degree per-flow, same-RTT fairness, even when demonstrated in the lab, translates to the real world.

So, in real networks, where per-application, per-end-host or per-customer fairness may be more important than long-term, same-RTT, per-flow fairness, it may not be that instructive to focus on the latter as being a necessary end goal.

Nonetheless, situations in which the presence of an L4S flow has the potential to cause harm [Ware] to classic flows need to be understood. Most importantly, if there are situations in which the introduction of L4S traffic would degrade both the absolute and relative performance of classic traffic significantly, i.e. to the point that it would be considered starvation while L4S was not starved, these situations need to be understood and either remedied or avoided.

Aligned with this context, the guidance provided in this document is aimed not at monitoring the relative performance of L4S senders compared against classic senders on a per-flow basis, but rather at identifying instances where RFC3168 bottlenecks are deployed so that operators of L4S senders can have the opportunity to assess whether any actions need to be taken. Additionally this document provides guidance for network operators around configuring any RFC3168 bottlenecks to minimize the potential for negative interactions between L4S and classic senders.

3. Flow Queuing Systems

As noted above, the concern around RFC3168 coexistence mainly concerns single-queue systems where classic and L4S traffic are mixed. In a flow-queuing system, when flow isolation is successful, the FQ scheduling of such queues isolates classic congestion control traffic from L4S traffic, and thus eliminates the potential for unfairness. But, these systems are known to sometimes result in imperfect isolation, either due to hash collisions (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8290]), because of VPN tunneling (see Section 6.2 of [RFC8290]), or due to deliberate configuration (see Section 7, Paragraph 5).

It is believed that the majority of FQ deployments in bottleneck links today (e.g. Cake [Hoiland-Jorgensen]) employ hashing algorithms that virtually eliminate the possibility of collisions, making this a non-issue for those deployments. But, VPN tunnels remain an issue for FQ deployments, and the introduction of L4S traffic raises the possibility that tunnels containing mixed classic and L4S traffic would exist, in which case FQ implementations that have not been updated to be L4S-aware could exhibit similar unfairness properties as single queue AQMs. Section 7 discusses some remedies that can be implemented by operators of FQ equipment in order to minimize this risk. Additionally, end-host mitigations such as separating L4S and Classic traffic into distinct VPN tunnels could be employed.

4. Detection of Classic ECN Bottlenecks

The IETF encourages researchers, end system deployers and network operators to conduct experiments to identify to what degree RFC3168 bottlenecks exist in networks. These types of measurement campaigns, even if each is conducted over a limited set of paths, could be useful to further understand the scope of any potential issues, to guide end system deployers on where to examine performance more closely (or possibly delay L4S deployment), and to help network operators identify nodes where remediation may be necessary to provide the best performance.

4.1. Recent Studies

A small number of recent studies have attempted to gauge the level of RFC3168 AQM deployment in the internet.

In 2020, Akamai conducted a study (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tsvwg/2tbRHphJ8K_CE6is9n7iQy-VAZM/) of "downstream" (server to client) CE marking broken out by ASN on two separate days, one in late March, the other in mid July

[Holland]. They concluded that prevalence of CE-marking was low across the ~800 ASNs observed (0.19% - 0.30% of ECT client IPs ever saw a CE mark), but it was growing, and that they could not determine whether the CE marking was due to a single queue or FQ. They also observed that RFC3168 AQMs are not uniformly distributed. There were three small ISPs where prevalence of CE-marking was above ~70%, indicating a likely deployment by the ISP. There were another four small ASNs where the prevalence was between 10% and 20%, which may also indicate deployment by the ISP. There were also roughly six larger ASNs (and perhaps 20 small ASNs) where the prevalence was between 3% and 8%.

In 2017, Apple reported on their observations of ECN marking by networks, broken out by country [Bhooma]. They reported four countries that exceeded the global baseline seen by Akamai, but one of these (Argentine Republic) was later discovered to be due to a bug (<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/106/materials/slides-106-tsvwg-sessa-72-l4s-drafts-00#page=15>), leaving three countries: China 1% of paths, Mexico 3.2% of paths, France 6% of paths. The percentage in France appears consistent with reports (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tsvwg/UyvpwUiNw0obd_EylBBV7kDRIHs/) that fq_codel has been implemented in DSL home routers deployed by Free.fr.

In December 2020 - January 2021, Pete Heist worked with a small cooperative WISP in the Czech Republic to collect data on CE-marking [I-D.heist-tsvwg-ecn-deployment-observations]. Overall, 18.6% of paths saw possible RFC3168 AQM activity, which appears to place this ISP in the small group with moderately high RFC3168 prevalence reported by Akamai. This ISP was known to have deployed RFC3168 fq_codel equipment in some of their subnets, and in other subnets there were 33 IPs where possible AQM activity was observed via CE-marks and/or ECE flags, corresponding to approximately 10% of paths. It was agreed (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tsvwg/Rj7GylByZuFa3_LTCMvEfb-CYpw/) that these were likely to be due to fq_codel implementations in home routers deployed by members of the cooperative.

The interpretation of these studies seems to be that there are no known deployments of FIFO RFC3168, all of the known RFC3168 deployments are fq_codel, the majority of the currently unknown deployments are likely to be fq_codel, and there may be a small number of networks where CE-marking is prevalent (and thus likely ISP-managed) where it is currently unknown as to whether the source is a FIFO or an FQ system.

Other studies (e.g. [Trammel], [Bauer], [Mandalari]) have examined ECN traversal, but have not reported data on prevalence of CE-marking by networks. Another [Roddav] examined traces from a Tier 1 ISP link in 2018 and observed that 94% of the non-zero ECN marked packets were CE, which appears to reflect a misconfiguration of equipment using that link, as opposed to providing evidence of RFC3168 AQM deployment.

4.2. Future Experiments

The design of future experiments should consider not only the detection of RFC3168 ECN marking, but also the determination whether the bottleneck AQM is a single queue (FIFO) or a flow-queuing (FQ) system. It is believed that the vast majority, if not all, of the RFC3168 AQMs in use at bottleneck links are flow-queuing systems (e.g. fq_codel [RFC8290] or COBALT [Palmei]).

[Briscoe] contains recommendations on some of the mechanisms that can be used to detect RFC3168 bottlenecks. In particular, Section 4 of [Briscoe] outlines an approach for out-band-detection of RFC3168 bottlenecks.

5. Operator of an L4S host

From a host's perspective, support for L4S only involves the sender via ECT(1) marking & L4S-compatible congestion control. The receiver is involved in ECN feedback but can generally be agnostic to whether ECN is being used for L4S [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]. Between these two entities, it is primarily incumbent upon the sender to evaluate the potential for presence of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks and make decisions whether or not to use L4S congestion control. While it is possible for a receiver to disable L4S functionality by not negotiating ECN, a general purpose receiver is not expected to perform any testing or monitoring for RFC3168, and is also not expected to invoke any active response in the case that such a bottleneck exists.

Prior to deployment of any new technology, it is commonplace for the parties involved in the deployment to validate the performance of the new technology via lab testing, limited field testing, large scale field testing, etc., usually in a progressive manner. The same is expected for deployers of L4S technology. As part of that validation, it is recommended that deployers consider the issue of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks and conduct experiments as described in the previous section, or otherwise assess the impact that the L4S technology will have in the networks in which it is to be deployed, and take action as is described further in this section. This sort of progressive (incremental) deployment helps to ensure that any issues are discovered when the scale of those issues is relatively small.

Some of the recommendations in this section involve the sender determining (through various means) the likelihood of a particular path having a bottleneck that implements single queue RFC3168 AQM. Since this determination can be imprecise, there exists some risk that a path is incorrectly classified. In the case of false-positives (where a path is erroneously believed to contain RFC3168), discontinuing the use of L4S on that path would result in a lost opportunity for low-latency low-loss service, and thus likely an unnecessary degradation in the quality of experience for the user. In the case of false-negatives, the use of L4S has the potential to result in a reduction in the throughput of non-L4S flows while the L4S flow is active. In environments where the risk of false-negatives is significant, it is recommended that hosts limit the use of L4S congestion control to application-limited flows that are especially sensitive to latency, latency variation and loss.

5.1. Server Type

If pre-deployment testing raises concerns about issues with RFC3168 bottlenecks, the actions taken may depend on the server type.

5.1.1. General purpose servers (e.g. web servers)

- * Out-of-band active testing could be performed by the server. For example, a JavaScript application could run simultaneous downloads (i.e. with and without L4S) during page reading time in order to survey for presence of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks on paths to users (e.g. as described in Section 4 of [Briscoe]).
- * In-band testing could be built in to the transport protocol implementation at the sender in order to perform detection (see Section 5 of [Briscoe], though note that this mechanism does not differentiate between FIFO and FQ).

- * Depending on the details of the L4S congestion control implementation, taking action based on the detection of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks may not be needed for short transactional transfers that are unlikely to achieve the steady-state conditions where unfairness is likely to occur.
- * For longer file transfers, it may be possible to fall-back to Classic behavior in real-time (i.e. when doing in-band testing), or to cache those destinations where RFC3168 has been detected, and disable L4S for subsequent long file transfers to those destinations.

5.1.2. Specialized servers handling long-running sessions (e.g. cloud gaming)

- * Out-of-band active testing could be performed at each session startup
- * Out-of-band active testing could be integrated into a "pre-validation" of the service, done when the user signs up, and periodically thereafter
- * In-band detection as described in [Briscoe] could be performed during the session

5.2. Server deployment environment

The responsibilities of and actions taken by a sender may additionally depend on the environment in which it is deployed. The following sub-sections discuss two scenarios: senders serving a limited, known target audience and those that serve an unknown target audience.

5.2.1. Edge Servers

Some hosts (such as CDN leaf nodes and servers internal to an ISP) are deployed in environments in which they serve content to a constrained set of networks or clients. The operator of such hosts may be able to determine whether there is the possibility of [RFC3168] FIFO bottlenecks being present, and utilize this information to make decisions on selectively deploying L4S and/or disabling it (e.g. bleaching ECN). Furthermore, such an operator may be able to determine the likelihood of an L4S bottleneck being present, and use this information as well.

It is recommended that L4S experimental deployments begin with such servers.

For example, if a particular network is known to have deployed legacy [RFC3168] FIFO bottlenecks, usage of L4S for long capacity-seeking file transfers on that network could be delayed until those bottlenecks can be upgraded to mitigate any potential issues as discussed in the next section.

Prior to deploying L4S on edge servers a server operator should:

- * Consult with network operators on presence of legacy [RFC3168] FIFO bottlenecks
- * Consult with network operators on presence of L4S bottlenecks
- * Perform pre-deployment testing per network

If a particular network offers connectivity to other networks (e.g. in the case of an ISP offering service to their customer's networks), the lack of RFC3168 FIFO bottleneck deployment in the ISP network can't be taken as evidence that RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks don't exist end-to-end (because one may have been deployed by the end-user network). In these cases, deployment of L4S will need to take appropriate steps to detect the presence of such bottlenecks. At present, it is believed that the vast majority of RFC3168 bottlenecks in end-user networks are implementations that utilize fq_codel or Cake, where the unfairness problem is less likely to be a concern. While this doesn't completely eliminate the possibility that a legacy [RFC3168] FIFO bottleneck could exist, it nonetheless provides useful information that can be utilized in the decision making around the potential risk for any unfairness to be experienced by end users.

5.2.2. Other hosts

Hosts that are deployed in locations that serve a wide variety of networks face a more difficult prospect in terms of handling the potential presence of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks. Nonetheless, the steps listed in the earlier section (based on server type) can be taken to minimize the risk of unfairness.

It is recommended that operators of such hosts consider carefully whether these hosts are appropriate for early experimentation with L4S.

The interpretation of studies on ECN usage and their deployment context (see Section 4.1) has so far concluded that RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks are likely to be rare, and so detections using these techniques may also prove to be rare. Additionally, the most recent large scale study [Holland] indicated that there were a small number of networks in which RFC3168 bottlenecks are more prevalent than the

global average. Therefore, it may be possible for a host to maintain a list of networks where L4S should not be enabled, and, for other networks, to cache a list of end host ip addresses where a RFC3168 bottleneck has been detected. Entries in such a cache would need to age-out after a period of time to account for IP address changes, path changes, equipment upgrades, etc. [TODO: more info on ways to cache/maintain such a list]

It has been suggested that a public block-list of domains that implement RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks could be maintained. There are a number of significant issues that would seem to make this idea infeasible, not the least of which is the fact that presence of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks or L4S bottlenecks is not a property of a domain, it is the property of a link, and therefore of the particular current path between two endpoints.

It has also been suggested that a public allow-list of domains that are participating in the L4S experiment could be maintained. This approach would not be useful, given the presence of an L4S domain on the path does not imply the absence of RFC3168 AQMs upstream or downstream of that domain. Also, the approach cannot cater for domains with a mix of L4S and RFC3168 AQMs.

6. Operator of a Network Employing RFC3168 FIFO Bottlenecks

While it is more preferable for L4S senders to detect problems themselves, a network operator who has deployed equipment in a likely bottleneck link location (i.e. a link that is expected to frequently be fully saturated) that is configured with a legacy [RFC3168] FIFO AQM can take certain steps in order to improve rate fairness between classic traffic and L4S traffic, and thus enable L4S to be deployed in a greater number of paths.

Some of the options listed in this section may not be feasible in all networking equipment.

6.1. Preferred Options

The options in this section preserve the ability of the bottleneck to CE-mark ECT(1) packets as well as ECT(0) packets. The result of these options is that hosts utilizing classic (RFC3168) ECN and hosts utilizing L4S ECN receive the benefit of ECN. Further with these options, the hosts that choose to use L4S ECN see the benefit of reduced latency and latency-variation compared to hosts that choose instead to use classic ECN.

6.1.1. Upgrade AQMs to an L4S-aware AQM

If the RFC3168 AQM implementation can be upgraded to enable support for L4S, either via [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] or via an L4S-aware FQ implementation, this is the preferred approach to addressing potential unfairness, because it additionally enables all of the benefits of L4S.

Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] contains a description of the options available, including a discussion about L4S-aware FQ implementations.

6.1.2. Configure Non-Coupled Dual Queue with Shallow Target

Equipment supporting [RFC3168] may be configurable to enable two parallel queues for the same traffic class, with classification done based on the ECN field.

- * Configure 2 queues, both with ECN; 50:50 WRR scheduler
 - Queue #1: ECT(1) & CE packets - Shallow immediate AQM target
 - Queue #2: ECT(0) & NotECT packets - Classic AQM target
- * Outcome in the case of n L4S flows and m long-running Classic flows
 - if m & n are non-zero, flows get $1/2n$ and $1/2m$ of the capacity, otherwise $1/n$ or $1/m$
 - never $< 1/2$ each flow's rate if all had been Classic

This option would allow L4S flows to achieve low latency, low loss and scalable throughput, but would sacrifice the more precise flow balance offered by [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]. This option would be expected to result in some reordering of previously CE marked packets sent by Classic ECN senders, which is a trait shared with [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]. As is discussed in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id], this reordering would be either zero risk or very low risk.

If classification based on the ECN field isn't possible in the bottleneck, this option may still be useful if an external system can be configured to reflect the ECN codepoint to another field that could then be used as an alternative identifier to classify traffic into Queue #1. For example, if at network ingress an edge router can apply a local-use DSCP to ECT(1) & CE packets, the bottleneck can then utilize a DSCP classifier. Similarly, in MPLS networks, ECT(1)

& CE packets could use a different EXP value [RFC5129] than classic packets. More generally, any tunneling protocol can be used to proxy the ECN value of the encapsulated packet to its outer header, enabling bottlenecks to classify packets based on their input virtual interface.

6.1.3. Approximate Fair Dropping

The Approximate Fair Dropping ([AFD]) algorithm tracks individual flow rates and introduces either packet drops or CE-marks to each flow in proportion to the amount by which the flow rate exceeds a computed per-flow fair-share rate. Where an implementation of AFD or an equivalent algorithm is available, it could be enabled on an interface with a single-queue RFC3168 AQM as a fairly lightweight way to inject additional ECN marks into any significantly higher rate flows. See also [Cisco-N9000].

6.1.4. Replace RFC3168 FIFO with RFC3168 FQ

As discussed in Section XREF, implementations of RFC3168 with an FQ scheduler (e.g. fq_codel or Cake) significantly reduce the likelihood of experiencing any unfairness between Classic and L4S traffic.

6.1.5. Do Nothing

If it is infeasible to implement any of the above options, it may be preferable for an operator of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks to leave them unchanged. In many deployment situations the risk of fairness issues may be very low, and the impact if they occur may not be particularly troublesome. This could, for instance, be true in bottlenecks where there is a high degree of flow aggregation or in high-speed bottlenecks (e.g. greater than 100 Mbps).

6.2. Non-Preferred Options

The options in this section come with a downside that they treat ECT(1) packets as NotECT, and thus don't provide the latency/loss benefit to flows marked ECT(1) (i.e. L4S flows). In the case that there is a strong concern about per-flow fairness between L4S flows and Classic flows in an RFC3168 FIFO bottleneck, and none of the remedies in the previous section can be implemented, the options listed in this section could be considered. These options are non-preferred because bottlenecks that implement them create a dilemma for operators of hosts, in that the application could see better performance if it uses classic (RFC3168) ECN rather than L4S ECN.

6.2.1. Configure Non-Coupled Dual Queue Treating ECT(1) as NotECT

- * Configure 2 queues, both with AQM; 50:50 WRR scheduler
 - Queue #1: ECT(1) & NotECT packets - ECN disabled
 - Queue #2: ECT(0) & CE packets - ECN enabled
- * Outcome
 - ECT(1) treated as NotECT
 - Flow balance for the 2 queues is the same as in Section 6.1.2

This option could potentially be implemented using an identifier other than the ECN field, as discussed in Section 6.1.2.

6.2.2. WRED with ECT(1) Differentiation

This configuration is similar to the option described in Section 6.2.1, but uses a single queue with WRED functionality.

- * Configure the queue with two WRED classes
 - Class #1: ECT(1) & NotECT packets - ECN disabled
 - Class #2: ECT(0) & CE packets - ECN enabled

This option could potentially be implemented using an identifier other than the ECN field, as discussed in Section 6.1.2.

6.2.3. Configure AQM to treat ECT(1) as NotECT

If equipment is configurable in such a way as to only supply CE marks to ECT(0) packets, and treat ECT(1) packets identically to NotECT, or is upgradable to support this capability, doing so will eliminate the risk of unfairness.

6.2.4. ECT(1) Tunnel Bypass

Tunnel ECT(1) traffic through the RFC3168 bottleneck with the outer header indicating Not-ECT, by using either an ECN tunnel ingress in Compatibility Mode [RFC6040] or a Limited Functionality ECN tunnel [RFC3168].

Two variants exist for this approach

1. per-domain: tunnel ECT(1) pkts to domain edge towards dst

2. per-dst: tunnel ECT(1) pkts to dst

6.3. Last Resort Options

If serious issues are detected, where the presence of L4S flows is determined to be the likely cause, and none of the above options are implementable, the options in this section can be considered as a last resort. These options are not recommended.

6.3.1. Disable RFC3168 Support

Disabling an [RFC3168] AQM from CE marking both ECT(0) traffic and ECT(1) traffic eliminates the unfairness issue. A downside to this approach is that classic senders will no longer get the benefits of Explicit Congestion Notification at this bottleneck link either. This alternative is only mentioned in case there is no other way to reconfigure an RFC3168 AQM.

6.3.2. Re-mark ECT(1) to NotECT Prior to AQM

Remarking ECT(1) packets as NotECT (i.e. bleaching ECT(1)) ensures that they are treated identically to classic NotECT senders. However, this action is not recommended because a) it would also prevent downstream L4S bottlenecks from providing high fidelity congestion signals; b) it could lead to problems with future experiments that use ECT(1) in alternative ways to L4S; and c) it would violate requirements in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. This alternative is mentioned as an absolute last resort in case there is no other way to reconfigure an RFC3168 AQM.

Note that the CE codepoint must never be bleached, otherwise it would black-hole congestion indications.

7. Operator of a Network Employing RFC3168 FQ Bottlenecks

A network operator who has deployed flow-queuing systems that implement RFC3168 (e.g. fq_codel or CAKE using default hashing) at network bottlenecks will likely see fewer potential issues when L4S traffic is present on their network as compared to operators of RFC3168 FIFOs. As discussed in Section 3, the flow queuing mechanism will typically isolate L4S flows and Classic flows into separate queues, and the scheduler will then enforce per-flow fairness. As a result, the potential fairness issues between Classic and L4S traffic that can occur in FIFOs will typically not occur in FQ systems. That said, FQ systems commonly treat a tunneled traffic aggregate as a single flow, and thus a tunneled traffic aggregate that contains a mix of Classic and L4S traffic will utilize a single queue, and the traffic within the tunnel could experience the same fairness issue as

has been described for RFC3168 FIFOs. This unfairness is compounded by the fact that the FQ scheduler will already be causing unfairness to flows within the tunnel relative to flows that are not tunneled (each of which gets the same bandwidth share as does the tunnel). Additionally, many of the deployed RFC3168 FQ systems currently implement an AQM algorithm (either CoDel or COBALT) that is designed for Classic traffic and reacts sluggishly to L4S (or unresponsive) traffic, with the result being that L4S senders could in some cases see worse latency performance than Classic senders.

While the potential unfairness result is arguably less impactful in the case of RFC3168 FQ bottlenecks, it is believed that RFC3168 FQ bottlenecks are currently more common than RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks. The most common deployments of RFC3168 FQ bottlenecks are in home routers running OpenWRT firmware where the user has turned the feature on.

As is the case with RFC3168 FIFOs, the preferred remedy for a network operator that wishes to enable the best performance possible with regard to L4S, is for the network operator to update RFC3168 FQ bottlenecks to be L4S-aware. In cases where that is infeasible, several of the remedies described in the previous section can be used to reduce or eliminate these issues.

- * Configure AQM to treat ECT(1) as NotECT
- * Disable RFC3168 Support
- * Re-mark ECT(1) to NotECT Prior to AQM

Note that some FQ schedulers can be configured to intentionally aggregate multiple flows into each queue. This might be used, for instance, to implement per-user or per-host fairness rather than per-flow fairness. In this case, if the flow aggregates contain a mix of Classic and L4S traffic, one would expect to see the same potential unfairness as is seen in the FIFO case. The same remedies mentioned above would apply in this case as well.

8. Conclusion of the L4S experiment

This section gives guidance on how L4S-deploying networks and endpoints should respond to either of the two possible outcomes of the IETF-supported L4S experiment.

8.1. Termination of a successful L4S experiment

If the L4S experiment is deemed successful, the IETF would be expected to move the L4S specifications to standards track. Networks would then be encouraged to continue/begin deploying L4S-aware nodes and to replace all non-L4S-aware RFC3168 AQMs already deployed as far as feasible, or at least restrict RFC3168 AQM to interpret ECT(1) equal to NotECT. Networks that participated in the experiment would be expected to track the evolution of the L4S standards and adapt their implementations accordingly (e.g. if as part of switching from experimental to standards track, changes in the L4S RFCs become necessary).

8.2. Termination of an unsuccessful L4S experiment

If the L4S experiment is deemed unsuccessful due to lack of deployment of compliant end-systems or AQMs, it might need to be terminated: any L4S network nodes should then be un-deployed and the ECT(1) codepoint usage should be released/recycled as quickly as possible, recognizing that this process may take some time. To facilitate this potential outcome, [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] requires L4S hosts to be configurable to revert to non-L4S congestion control, and networks to be configurable to treat ECT(1) the same as ECT(0).

9. Contributors

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10. IANA Considerations

None.

11. Security Considerations

For further study.

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Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Network Address Translation
Support
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Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) provides a reliable communications channel between two end-hosts in many ways similar to the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). With the widespread deployment of Network Address Translators (NAT), specialized code has been added to NAT functions for TCP that allows multiple hosts to reside behind a NAT function and yet share a single IPv4 address, even when two hosts (behind a NAT function) choose the same port numbers for their connection. This additional code is sometimes classified as Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT).

This document describes the protocol extensions needed for the SCTP endpoints and the mechanisms for NAT functions necessary to provide similar features of NAPT in the single point and multipoint traversal scenario.

Finally, a YANG module for SCTP NAT is defined.

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1. Introduction

Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960] provides a reliable communications channel between two end-hosts in many ways similar to TCP [RFC0793]. With the widespread deployment of Network Address Translators (NAT), specialized code has been added to NAT functions for TCP that allows multiple hosts to reside behind a NAT function using private-use addresses (see [RFC6890]) and yet share a single IPv4 address, even when two hosts (behind a NAT function) choose the same port numbers for their connection. This additional code is sometimes classified as Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT). Please note that this document focuses on the case where the NAT function maps a single or multiple internal addresses to a single external address and vice versa.

To date, specialized code for SCTP has not yet been added to most NAT functions so that only a translation of IP addresses is supported. The end result of this is that only one SCTP-capable host can successfully operate behind such a NAT function and this host can only be single-homed. The only alternative for supporting legacy NAT functions is to use UDP encapsulation as specified in [RFC6951].

The NAT function in the document refers to NAPT functions described in Section 2.2 of [RFC3022], NAT64 [RFC6146], or DS-Lite AFTR [RFC6333].

This document specifies procedures allowing a NAT function to support SCTP by providing similar features to those provided by a NAPT for TCP (see [RFC5382] and [RFC7857]), UDP (see [RFC4787] and [RFC7857]), and ICMP (see [RFC5508] and [RFC7857]). This document also specifies a set of data formats for SCTP packets and a set of SCTP endpoint procedures to support NAT traversal. An SCTP implementation supporting these procedures can assure that in both single-homed and multi-homed cases a NAT function will maintain the appropriate state without the NAT function needing to change port numbers.

It is possible and desirable to make these changes for a number of reasons:

- * It is desirable for SCTP internal end-hosts on multiple platforms to be able to share a NAT function's external IP address in the same way that a TCP session can use a NAT function.
- * If a NAT function does not need to change any data within an SCTP packet, it will reduce the processing burden of NAT'ing SCTP by not needing to execute the CRC32c checksum used by SCTP.
- * Not having to touch the IP payload makes the processing of ICMP messages by NAT functions easier.

An SCTP-aware NAT function will need to follow these procedures for generating appropriate SCTP packet formats.

When considering SCTP-aware NAT it is possible to have multiple levels of support. At each level, the Internal Host, Remote Host, and NAT function does or does not support the procedures described in this document. The following table illustrates the results of the various combinations of support and if communications can occur between two endpoints.

Internal Host	NAT Function	Remote Host	Communication
Support	Support	Support	Yes
Support	Support	No Support	Limited
Support	No Support	Support	None
Support	No Support	No Support	None
No Support	Support	Support	Limited
No Support	Support	No Support	Limited
No Support	No Support	Support	None
No Support	No Support	No Support	None

Table 1: Communication possibilities

From the table it can be seen that no communication can occur when a NAT function does not support SCTP-aware NAT. This assumes that the NAT function does not handle SCTP packets at all and all SCTP packets sent from behind a NAT function are discarded by the NAT function. In some cases, where the NAT function supports SCTP-aware NAT, but one of the two hosts does not support the feature, communication can possibly occur in a limited way. For example, only one host can have a connection when a collision case occurs.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terms, which are depicted in Figure 1. Familiarity with the terminology used in [RFC4960] and [RFC5061] is assumed.

Internal-Address (Int-Addr)

An internal address that is known to the internal host.

Internal-Port (Int-Port)

The port number that is in use by the host holding the Internal-Address.

Internal-VTag (Int-VTag)

The SCTP Verification Tag (VTag) (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4960]) that the internal host has chosen for an association. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that accompanies any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the Internal-Address.

Remote-Address (Rem-Addr)

The address that an internal host is attempting to contact.

Remote-Port (Rem-Port)

The port number used by the host holding the Remote-Address.

Remote-VTag (Rem-VTag)

The Verification Tag (VTag) (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4960]) that the host holding the Remote-Address has chosen for an association. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that accompanies any outgoing SCTP packet for this association to the Remote-Address.

External-Address (Ext-Addr)

An external address assigned to the NAT function, that it uses as a source address when sending packets towards a Remote-Address.




Figure 1: Basic Network Setup

4. Motivation and Overview

4.1. SCTP NAT Traversal Scenarios

This section defines the notion of single and multipoint NAT traversal.

4.1.1. Single Point Traversal

In this case, all packets in the SCTP association go through a single NAT function, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Single NAT Function Scenario

A variation of this case is shown in Figure 3, i.e., multiple NAT functions in the forwarding path between two endpoints.




Figure 3: Serial NAT Functions Scenario

Although one of the main benefits of SCTP multi-homing is redundant paths, in the single point traversal scenario the NAT function represents a single point of failure in the path of the SCTP multi-homed association. However, the rest of the path can still benefit from path diversity provided by SCTP multi-homing.

The two SCTP endpoints in this case can be either single-homed or multi-homed. However, the important thing is that the NAT function in this case sees all the packets of the SCTP association.

4.1.2. Multipoint Traversal

This case involves multiple NAT functions and each NAT function only sees some of the packets in the SCTP association. An example is shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Parallel NAT Functions Scenario

This case does not apply to a single-homed SCTP association (i.e., both endpoints in the association use only one IP address). The advantage here is that the existence of multiple NAT traversal points can preserve the path diversity of a multi-homed association for the entire path. This in turn can improve the robustness of the communication.

4.2. Limitations of Classical NAPT for SCTP

Using classical NAPT possibly results in changing one of the SCTP port numbers during the processing, which requires the recomputation of the transport layer checksum by the NAPT function. Whereas for UDP and TCP this can be done very efficiently, for SCTP the checksum (CRC32c) over the entire packet needs to be recomputed (see Appendix B of [RFC4960] for details of the CRC32c computation). This would considerably add to the NAT computational burden, however hardware support can mitigate this in some implementations.

An SCTP endpoint can have multiple addresses but only has a single port number to use. To make multipoint traversal work, all the NAT functions involved need to recognize the packets they see as belonging to the same SCTP association and perform port number translation in a consistent way. One possible way of doing this is to use a pre-defined table of port numbers and addresses configured within each NAT function. Other mechanisms could make use of NAT to NAT communication. Such mechanisms have not been deployed on a wide scale base and thus are not a preferred solution. Therefore an SCTP variant of NAT function has been developed (see Section 4.3).

4.3. The SCTP-Specific Variant of NAT

In this section it is allowed that there are multiple SCTP capable hosts behind a NAT function that share one External-Address. Furthermore, this section focuses on the single point traversal scenario (see Section 4.1.1).


The modification of outgoing SCTP packets sent from an internal host is simple: the source address of the packets has to be replaced with the External-Address. It might also be necessary to establish some state in the NAT function to later handle incoming packets.

Typically, the NAT function has to maintain a NAT binding table of Internal-VTag, Internal-Port, Remote-VTag, Remote-Port, Internal-Address, and whether the restart procedure is disabled or not. An entry in that NAT binding table is called a NAT-State control block. The function Create() obtains the just mentioned parameters and returns a NAT-State control block. A NAT function MAY allow creating NAT-State control blocks via a management interface.

For SCTP packets coming from the external realm of the NAT function the destination address of the packets has to be replaced with the Internal-Address of the host to which the packet has to be delivered, if a NAT state entry is found. The lookup of the Internal-Address is based on the Remote-VTag, Remote-Port, Internal-VTag and the Internal-Port.

The entries in the NAT binding table need to fulfill some uniqueness conditions. There can not be more than one entry NAT binding table with the same pair of Internal-Port and Remote-Port. This rule can be relaxed, if all NAT binding table entries with the same Internal-Port and Remote-Port have the support for the restart procedure disabled (see Section 5.3.1). In this case there can not be no more than one entry with the same Internal-Port, Remote-Port and Remote-VTag and no more than one NAT binding table entry with the same Internal-Port, Remote-Port, and Int-VTag.

The processing of outgoing SCTP packets containing an INIT chunk is illustrated in the following figure. This scenario is valid for all message flows in this section.



```

      INIT[Initiate-Tag]
Int-Addr:Int-Port -----> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
                        Rem-VTag=0

      Create(Initiate-Tag, Int-Port, 0, Rem-Port, Int-Addr,
              IsRestartDisabled)
      Returns(NAT-State control block)
  
```

Translate To:

```

      INIT[Initiate-Tag]
Ext-Addr:Int-Port -----> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
                        Rem-VTag=0
  
```


Normally a NAT binding table entry will be created.

However, it is possible that there is already a NAT binding table entry with the same Remote-Port, Internal-Port, and Internal-VTag but different Internal-Address and the restart procedure is disabled. In this case the packet containing the INIT chunk MUST be dropped by the NAT and a packet containing an ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent to the SCTP host that originated the packet with the M bit set and 'VTag and Port Number Collision' error cause (see Section 5.1.1 for the format). The source address of the packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be the destination address of the packet containing the INIT chunk.

If an outgoing SCTP packet contains an INIT or ASCONF chunk and a matching NAT binding table entry is found, the packet is processed as a normal outgoing packet.

It is also possible that a NAT binding table entry with the same Remote-Port and Internal-Port exists without an Internal-VTag conflict but there exists a NAT binding table entry with the same port numbers but a different Internal-Address and the restart procedure is not disabled. In such a case the packet containing the INIT chunk MUST be dropped by the NAT function and a packet containing an ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent to the SCTP host that originated the packet with the M bit set and 'Port Number Collision' error cause (see Section 5.1.1 for the format).

The processing of outgoing SCTP packets containing no INIT chunks is described in the following figure.




Int-Addr:Int-Port -----> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
 Rem-VTag

Translate To:

Ext-Addr:Int-Port -----> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
 Rem-VTag

The processing of incoming SCTP packets containing an INIT ACK chunk is illustrated in the following figure. The Lookup() function has as input the Internal-VTag, Internal-Port, Remote-VTag, and Remote-Port. It returns the corresponding entry of the NAT binding table and updates the Remote-VTag by substituting it with the value of the Initiate-Tag of the INIT ACK chunk. The wildcard character signifies that the parameter's value is not considered in the Lookup() function or changed in the Update() function, respectively.



INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag]
 Ext-Addr:Int-Port <---- Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
 Int-VTag


Lookup(Int-VTag, Int-Port, *, Rem-Port)
 Update(*, *, Initiate-Tag, *)

Returns(NAT-State control block containing Int-Addr)

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag]
 Int-Addr:Int-Port <----- Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
 Int-VTag

In the case where the Lookup function fails because it does not find an entry, the SCTP packet is dropped. If it succeeds, the Update routine inserts the Remote-VTag (the Initiate-Tag of the INIT ACK chunk) in the NAT-State control block.

The processing of incoming SCTP packets containing an ABORT or SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk with the T bit set is illustrated in the following figure.



Ext-Addr:Int-Port <----- Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Rem-VTag


Lookup(*, Int-Port, Rem-VTag, Rem-Port)

Returns (NAT-State control block containing Int-Addr)

Int-Addr:Int-Port <----- Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Rem-VTag

For an incoming packet containing an INIT chunk a table lookup is made only based on the addresses and port numbers. If an entry with a Remote-VTag of zero is found, it is considered a match and the Remote-VTag is updated. If an entry with a non-matching Remote-VTag is found or no entry is found, the incoming packet is silently dropped. If an entry with a matching Remote-VTag is found, the incoming packet is forwarded. This allows the handling of INIT collision through NAT functions.

The processing of other incoming SCTP packets is described in the following figure.



Ext-Addr: Int-Port <----- Rem-Addr: Rem-Port
Int-VTag

Lookup(Int-VTag, Int-Port, *, Rem-Port)

Returns(NAT-State control block containing Internal-Address)

Int-Addr: Int-Port <----- Rem-Addr: Rem-Port
Int-VTag


5. Data Formats

This section defines the formats used to support NAT traversal. Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 describe chunks and error causes sent by NAT functions and received by SCTP endpoints. Section 5.3 describes parameters sent by SCTP endpoints and used by NAT functions and SCTP endpoints.

5.1. Modified Chunks

This section presents existing chunks defined in [RFC4960] for which additional flags are specified by this document.


5.1.1. Extended ABORT Chunk



The ABORT chunk is extended to add the new 'M bit'. The M bit indicates to the receiver of the ABORT chunk that the chunk was not generated by the peer SCTP endpoint, but instead by a middle box (e.g., NAT).

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of M bit to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.1.2. Extended ERROR Chunk




The ERROR chunk defined in [RFC4960] is extended to add the new 'M bit'. The M bit indicates to the receiver of the ERROR chunk that the chunk was not generated by the peer SCTP endpoint, but instead by a middle box.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of M bit to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.2. New Error Causes

This section defines the new error causes added by this document.

5.2.1. VTag and Port Number Collision Error Cause



Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the 'VTag and Port Number Collision' Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B0 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Chunk: variable length

The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the chunk that caused this error. This can be an INIT, INIT ACK, or ASCONF chunk. Note that if the entire chunk will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of cause code to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.2.2. Missing State Error Cause

0										1										2										3									
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1								
Cause Code = 0x00B1										Cause Length = Variable																													
Original Packet																																							

Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the 'Missing State' Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B1 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)


This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Original Packet: variable length

The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the IPv4 or IPv6 packet that caused this error. The IPv4 or IPv6 header MUST be included. Note that if the packet will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of cause code to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.2.3. Port Number Collision Error Cause



Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the 'Port Number Collision' Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B2 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Chunk: variable length

The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the chunk that caused this error. This can be an INIT, INIT ACK, or ASCONF chunk. Note that if the entire chunk will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.


[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of cause code to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.3. New Parameters

This section defines new parameters and their valid appearance defined by this document.

5.3.1. Disable Restart Parameter

This parameter is used to indicate that the restart procedure is requested to be disabled. Both endpoints of an association MUST include this parameter in the INIT chunk and INIT ACK chunk when establishing an association and MUST include it in the ASCONF chunk when adding an address to successfully disable the restart procedure.



Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the Disable Restart Parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 0xC007 for this parameter type.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)


This field holds the length in bytes of the parameter. The value MUST be 4.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of parameter type to be confirmed by IANA.]

The Disable Restart Parameter MAY appear in INIT, INIT ACK and ASCONF chunks and MUST NOT appear in any other chunk.

5.3.2. VTags Parameter

This parameter is used to help a NAT function to recover from state loss.



Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the VTags Parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 0xC008 for this parameter type.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)

This field holds the length in bytes of the parameter. The value MUST be 16.

ASCONF-Request Correlation ID: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)

This is an opaque integer assigned by the sender to identify each request parameter. The receiver of the ASCONF Chunk will copy this 32-bit value into the ASCONF Response Correlation ID field of the ASCONF ACK response parameter. The sender of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk can use this same value in the ASCONF ACK chunk to find which request the response is for. The receiver MUST NOT change the value of the ASCONF-Request Correlation ID.

Internal Verification Tag: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)

The Verification Tag that the internal host has chosen for the association. The Verification Tag is a unique 32-bit tag that accompanies any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the Internal-Address.

Remote Verification Tag: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)

The Verification Tag that the host holding the Remote-Address has chosen for the association. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that accompanies any outgoing SCTP packet for this association to the Remote-Address.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of parameter type to be confirmed by IANA.]

The VTags Parameter MAY appear in ASCONF chunks and MUST NOT appear in any other chunk.

6. Procedures for SCTP Endpoints and NAT Functions

If an SCTP endpoint is behind an SCTP-aware NAT, a number of problems can arise as it tries to communicate with its peers:

- * IP addresses can not be included in the SCTP packet. This is discussed in Section 6.1.
- * More than one host behind a NAT function could select the same VTag and source port number when communicating with the same peer server. This creates a situation where the NAT function will not be able to tell the two associations apart. This situation is discussed in Section 6.2.
- * If an SCTP endpoint is a server communicating with multiple peers and the peers are behind the same NAT function, then these peers cannot be distinguished by the server. This case is discussed in Section 6.3.
- * A restart of a NAT function during a conversation could cause a loss of its state. This problem and its solution is discussed in Section 6.4.
- * NAT functions need to deal with SCTP packets being fragmented at the IP layer. This is discussed in Section 6.5.
- * An SCTP endpoint can be behind two NAT functions in parallel providing redundancy. The method to set up this scenario is discussed in Section 6.6.

The mechanisms to solve these problems require additional chunks and parameters, defined in this document, and modified handling procedures from those specified in [RFC4960] as described below.

6.1. Association Setup Considerations for Endpoints

The association setup procedure defined in [RFC4960] allows multi-homed SCTP endpoints to exchange its IP-addresses by using IPv4 or IPv6 address parameters in the INIT and INIT ACK chunks. However, this does not work when NAT functions are present.

Every association setup from a host behind a NAT function MUST NOT use multiple internal addresses. The INIT chunk MUST NOT contain an IPv4 Address parameter, IPv6 Address parameter, or Supported Address Types parameter. The INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any IPv4 Address parameter or IPv6 Address parameter using non-global addresses. The INIT chunk and the INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any Host Name parameters.

If the association is intended to be finally multi-homed, the procedure in Section 6.6 MUST be used.

The INIT and INIT ACK chunk SHOULD contain the Disable Restart parameter defined in Section 5.3.1.

6.2. Handling of Internal Port Number and Verification Tag Collisions

Consider the case where two hosts in the Internal-Address space want to set up an SCTP association with the same service provided by some remote hosts. This means that the Remote-Port is the same. If they both choose the same Internal-Port and Internal-VTag, the NAT function cannot distinguish between incoming packets anymore. However, this is unlikely. The Internal-VTags are chosen at random and if the Internal-Ports are also chosen from the ephemeral port range at random (see [RFC6056]) this gives a 46-bit random number that has to match.

The same can happen with the Remote-VTag when a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk or an ASCONF chunk is processed by the NAT function.

6.2.1. NAT Function Considerations

If the NAT function detects a collision of internal port numbers and verification tags, it SHOULD send a packet containing an ABORT chunk with the M bit set if the collision is triggered by a packet containing an INIT or INIT ACK chunk. If such a collision is triggered by a packet containing an ASCONF chunk, it SHOULD send a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the M bit. The M bit is a new

bit defined by this document to express to SCTP that the source of this packet is a "middle" box, not the peer SCTP endpoint (see Section 5.1.1). If a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk triggers the collision, the corresponding packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST contain the same source and destination address and port numbers as the packet containing the INIT ACK chunk. If a packet containing an INIT chunk or an ASCONF chunk, the source and destination address and port numbers MUST be swapped.

The sender of the packet containing an ERROR or ABORT chunk MUST include the error cause with cause code 'VTag and Port Number Collision' (see Section 5.2.1).

6.2.2. Endpoint Considerations

The sender of the packet containing the INIT chunk or the receiver of a packet containing the INIT ACK chunk, upon reception of a packet containing an ABORT chunk with M bit set and the appropriate error cause code for colliding NAT binding table state is included, SHOULD reinitiate the association setup procedure after choosing a new initiate tag, if the association is in COOKIE-WAIT state. In any other state, the SCTP endpoint MUST NOT respond.

The sender of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, upon reception of a packet containing an ERROR chunk with M bit set, MUST stop adding the path to the association.

6.3. Handling of Internal Port Number Collisions

When two SCTP hosts are behind an SCTP-aware NAT it is possible that two SCTP hosts in the Internal-Address space will want to set up an SCTP association with the same server running on the same remote host. If the two hosts choose the same internal port, this is considered an internal port number collision.

For the NAT function, appropriate tracking can be performed by assuring that the VTags are unique between the two hosts.

6.3.1. NAT Function Considerations

The NAT function, when processing the packet containing the INIT ACK chunk, SHOULD note in its NAT binding table if the association supports the disable restart extension. This note is used when establishing future associations (i.e. when processing a packet containing an INIT chunk from an internal host) to decide if the connection can be allowed. The NAT function does the following when processing a packet containing an INIT chunk:

- * If the packet containing the INIT chunk is originating from an internal port to a remote port for which the NAT function has no matching NAT binding table entry, it MUST allow the packet containing the INIT chunk creating an NAT binding table entry.
- * If the packet containing the INIT chunk matches an existing NAT binding table entry, it MUST validate that the disable restart feature is supported and, if it does, allow the packet containing the INIT chunk to be forwarded.
- * If the disable restart feature is not supported, the NAT function SHOULD send a packet containing an ABORT chunk with the M bit set.

The 'Port Number Collision' error cause (see Section 5.2.3) MUST be included in the ABORT chunk sent in response to the packet containing an INIT chunk.

If the collision is triggered by a packet containing an ASCONF chunk, a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the 'Port Number Collision' error cause SHOULD be sent in response to the packet containing the ASCONF chunk.

6.3.2. Endpoint Considerations

For the remote SCTP server this means that the Remote-Port and the Remote-Address are the same. If they both have chosen the same Internal-Port the server cannot distinguish between both associations based on the address and port numbers. For the server it looks like the association is being restarted. To overcome this limitation the client sends a Disable Restart parameter in the INIT chunk.

When the server receives this parameter it does the following:

- * It MUST include a Disable Restart parameter in the INIT ACK to inform the client that it will support the feature.
- * It MUST disable the restart procedures defined in [RFC4960] for this association.

Servers that support this feature will need to be capable of maintaining multiple connections to what appears to be the same peer (behind the NAT function) differentiated only by the VTags.

6.4. Handling of Missing State

6.4.1. NAT Function Considerations

If the NAT function receives a packet from the internal network for which the lookup procedure does not find an entry in the NAT binding table, a packet containing an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent back with the M bit set. The source address of the packet containing the ERROR chunk MUST be the destination address of the packet received from the internal network. The verification tag is reflected and the T bit is set. Such a packet containing an ERROR chunk SHOULD NOT be sent if the received packet contains an ASCONF chunk with the VTags parameter or an ABORT, SHUTDOWN COMPLETE or INIT ACK chunk. A packet containing an ERROR chunk MUST NOT be sent if the received packet contains an ERROR chunk with the M bit set. In any case, the packet SHOULD NOT be forwarded to the remote address.

If the NAT function receives a packet from the internal network for which it has no NAT binding table entry and the packet contains an ASCONF chunk with the VTags parameter, the NAT function MUST update its NAT binding table according to the verification tags in the VTags parameter and, if present, the Disable Restart parameter.

When sending a packet containing an ERROR chunk, the error cause 'Missing State' (see Section 5.2.2) MUST be included and the M bit of the ERROR chunk MUST be set (see Section 5.1.2).

6.4.2. Endpoint Considerations

Upon reception of this packet containing the ERROR chunk by an SCTP endpoint the receiver takes the following actions:

- * It SHOULD validate that the verification tag is reflected by looking at the VTag that would have been included in an outgoing packet. If the validation fails, discard the received packet containing the ERROR chunk.
- * It SHOULD validate that the peer of the SCTP association supports the dynamic address extension. If the validation fails, discard the received packet containing the ERROR chunk.
- * It SHOULD generate a packet containing a new ASCONF chunk containing the VTags parameter (see Section 5.3.2) and the Disable Restart parameter (see Section 5.3.1) if the association is using the disable restart feature. By processing this packet the NAT function can recover the appropriate state. The procedures for generating an ASCONF chunk can be found in [RFC5061].

The peer SCTP endpoint receiving such a packet containing an ASCONF chunk SHOULD add the address and respond with an acknowledgment if the address is new to the association (following all procedures defined in [RFC5061]). If the address is already part of the association, the SCTP endpoint MUST NOT respond with an error, but instead SHOULD respond with a packet containing an ASCONF ACK chunk acknowledging the address and take no action (since the address is already in the association).

Note that it is possible that upon receiving a packet containing an ASCONF chunk containing the VTags parameter the NAT function will realize that it has an 'Internal Port Number and Verification Tag collision'. In such a case the NAT function SHOULD send a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the error cause code set to 'VTag and Port Number Collision' (see Section 5.2.1).

If an SCTP endpoint receives a packet containing an ERROR chunk with 'Internal Port Number and Verification Tag collision' as the error cause and the packet in the Error Chunk contains an ASCONF with the VTags parameter, careful examination of the association is necessary. The endpoint does the following:

- * It MUST validate that the verification tag is reflected by looking at the VTag that would have been included in the outgoing packet. If the validation fails, it MUST discard the packet.
- * It MUST validate that the peer of the SCTP association supports the dynamic address extension. If the peer does not support this extension, it MUST discard the received packet containing the ERROR chunk.
- * If the association is attempting to add an address (i.e. following the procedures in Section 6.6) then the endpoint MUST NOT consider the address part of the association and SHOULD make no further attempt to add the address (i.e. cancel any ASCONF timers and remove any record of the path), since the NAT function has a VTag collision and the association cannot easily create a new VTag (as it would if the error occurred when sending a packet containing an INIT chunk).
- * If the endpoint has no other path, i.e. the procedure was executed due to missing a state in the NAT function, then the endpoint MUST abort the association. This would occur only if the local NAT function restarted and accepted a new association before attempting to repair the missing state (Note that this is no different than what happens to all TCP connections when a NAT function loses its state).

6.5. Handling of Fragmented SCTP Packets by NAT Functions

SCTP minimizes the use of IP-level fragmentation. However, it can happen that using IP-level fragmentation is needed to continue an SCTP association. For example, if the path MTU is reduced and there are still some DATA chunk in flight, which require packets larger than the new path MTU. If IP-level fragmentation can not be used, the SCTP association will be terminated in a non-graceful way. See [RFC8900] for more information about IP fragmentation.

Therefore, a NAT function MUST be able to handle IP-level fragmented SCTP packets. The fragments MAY arrive in any order.

When an SCTP packet can not be forwarded by the NAT function due to MTU issues and the IP header forbids fragmentation, the NAT MUST send back a "Fragmentation needed and DF set" ICMPv4 or PTB ICMPv6 message to the internal host. This allows for a faster recovery from this packet drop.

6.6. Multi Point Traversal Considerations for Endpoints

If a multi-homed SCTP endpoint behind a NAT function connects to a peer, it MUST first set up the association single-homed with only one address causing the first NAT function to populate its state. Then it SHOULD add each IP address using packets containing ASCONF chunks sent via their respective NAT functions. The address used in the Add IP address parameter is the wildcard address (0.0.0.0 or ::0) and the address parameter in the ASCONF chunk SHOULD also contain the VTags parameter and optionally the Disable Restart parameter.

7. SCTP NAT YANG Module

This section defines a YANG module for SCTP NAT.

The terminology for describing YANG data models is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

7.1. Tree Structure

This module augments NAT YANG module [RFC8512] with SCTP specifics. The module supports both classical SCTP NAT (that is, rewrite port numbers) and SCTP-specific variant where the ports numbers are not altered. The YANG "feature" is used to indicate whether SCTP-specific variant is supported.

The tree structure of the SCTP NAT YANG module is provided below:

```

module: ietf-nat-sctp
  augment /nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance
    /nat:policy/nat:timers:
      +--rw sctp-timeout?  uint32
  augment /nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance
    /nat:mapping-table/nat:mapping-entry:
      +--rw int-VTag?      uint32 {sctp-nat}?
      +--rw rem-VTag?      uint32 {sctp-nat}?

```

Concretely, the SCTP NAT YANG module augments the NAT YANG module (policy, in particular) with the following:

- * The sctp-timeout is used to control the SCTP inactivity timeout. That is, the time an SCTP mapping will stay active without SCTP packets traversing the NAT. This timeout can be set only for SCTP. Hence, `"/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance/nat:policy/nat:transport-protocols/nat:protocol-id"` MUST be set to `'132'` (SCTP).

In addition, the SCTP NAT YANG module augments the mapping entry with the following parameters defined in Section 3. These parameters apply only for SCTP NAT mapping entries (i.e., `"/nat/instances/instance/mapping-table/mapping-entry/transport-protocol"` MUST be set to `'132'`);

- * The Internal Verification Tag (Int-VTag)
- * The Remote Verification Tag (Rem-VTag)

7.2. YANG Module

```

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-nat-sctp@2020-11-02.yang"
module ietf-nat-sctp {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-nat-sctp";
  prefix nat-sctp;

  import ietf-nat {
    prefix nat;
    reference
      "RFC 8512: A YANG Module for Network Address Translation
       (NAT) and Network Prefix Translation (NPT)";
  }

  organization
    "IETF TSVWG Working Group";
  contact
    "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tsvwg/>

```

WG List: <mailto:tsvwg@ietf.org>

Author: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>;

description

"This module augments NAT YANG module with Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) specifics. The extension supports both a classical SCTP NAT (that is, rewrite port numbers) and a, SCTP-specific variant where the ports numbers are not altered.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

revision 2019-11-18 {

description

"Initial revision.";

reference

"RFC XXXX: Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Network Address Translation Support";

}

feature sctp-nat {

description

"This feature means that SCTP-specific variant of NAT is supported. That is, avoid rewriting port numbers.";

reference

"Section 4.3 of RFC XXXX.";

}

augment "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance"

+ "/nat:policy/nat:timers" {

when "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance"

+ "/nat:policy/nat:transport-protocols"

+ "/nat:protocol-id = 132";

description

"Extends NAT policy with a timeout for SCTP mapping entries.";

```
    leaf sctp-timeout {
      type uint32;
      units "seconds";
      description
        "SCTP inactivity timeout. That is, the time an SCTP
        mapping entry will stay active without packets
        traversing the NAT.";
    }
  }

  augment "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance"
    + "/nat:mapping-table/nat:mapping-entry" {
    when "nat:transport-protocol = 132";
    if-feature "sctp-nat";
    description
      "Extends the mapping entry with SCTP specifics.";

    leaf int-VTag {
      type uint32;
      description
        "The Internal Verification Tag that the internal
        host has chosen for this communication.";
    }
    leaf rem-VTag {
      type uint32;
      description
        "The Remote Verification Tag that the remote
        peer has chosen for this communication.";
    }
  }
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

8. Various Examples of NAT Traversals


Please note that this section is informational only.

The addresses being used in the following examples are IPv4 addresses for private-use networks and for documentation as specified in [RFC6890]. However, the method described here is not limited to this NAT44 case.

The NAT binding table entries shown in the following examples do not include the flag indicating whether the restart procedure is supported or not. This flag is not relevant for these examples.

8.1. Single-homed Client to Single-homed Server

The internal client starts the association with the remote server via a four-way-handshake. Host A starts by sending a packet containing an INIT chunk.



```
INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
    Rem-VTtag = 0
```


A NAT binding tabled entry is created, the source address is substituted and the packet is sent on:

NAT function creates entry:

NAT	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	0	2	10.0.0.1

```
INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
    Rem-VTtag = 0
```

Host B receives the packet containing an INIT chunk and sends a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk with the NAT's Remote-address as destination address.




INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
 192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

NAT function updates entry:

NAT	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	5678	2	10.0.0.1

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
 10.0.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE ACK.



COOKIE ECHO
 10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678


COOKIE ECHO
 192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ACK
 192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ACK
 10.0.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

8.2. Single-homed Client to Multi-homed Server

The internal client is single-homed whereas the remote server is multi-homed. The client (Host A) sends a packet containing an INIT chunk like in the single-homed case.



NAT	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
-----	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------

```

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 ---> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0
  
```


NAT function creates entry:

NAT	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	0	2	10.0.0.1

```

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0
  
```

The server (Host B) includes its two addresses in the INIT ACK chunk.




```
INIT ACK[Initiate-tag = 5678, IP-Addr = 203.0.113.129]
192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234
```

The NAT function does not need to change the NAT binding table for the second address:

NAT	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	5678	2	10.0.0.1

```
INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <--- 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234
```

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE ACK.



COOKIE ECHO
 10.0.0.1:1 ---> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678


COOKIE ECHO
 192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ACK
 192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ACK
 10.0.0.1:1 <--- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

8.3. Multihomed Client and Server

The client (Host A) sends a packet containing an INIT chunk to the server (Host B), but does not include the second address.



NAT 1	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
 10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 0

NAT function 1 creates entry:


NAT 1	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	0	2	10.0.0.1

```

                                INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
                                Rem-VTag = 0

```

Host B includes its second address in the INIT ACK.



```

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678, IP-Addr = 203.0.113.129]
192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
                                Int-VTag = 1234

```

NAT function 1 does not need to update the NAT binding table for the second address:


NAT 1	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	5678	2	10.0.0.1

```

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
                                Int-VTag = 1234

```

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE ACK.




COOKIE ECHO
 10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ECHO
 192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ACK
 192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ACK
 10.0.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

Host A announces its second address in an ASCONF chunk. The address parameter contains a wildcard address (0.0.0.0 or ::0) to indicate that the source address has to be added. The address parameter within the ASCONF chunk will also contain the pair of VTags (remote and internal) so that the NAT function can populate its NAT binding table entry completely with this single packet.



ASCONF [ADD-IP=0.0.0.0, INT-VTag=1234, Rem-VTag = 5678]
 10.1.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.129:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

NAT function 2 creates a complete entry:

NAT 2	+-----+				
	Int	Int	Rem	Rem	Int
	VTag	Port	VTag	Port	Addr
	1234	1	5678	2	10.1.0.1
	+-----+				

```

ASCONF [ADD-IP, Int-VTag=1234, Rem-VTag = 5678]
192.0.2.129:1 -----> 203.0.113.129:2
                        Rem-VTag = 5678

```

```

                        ASCONF ACK
192.0.2.129:1 <----- 203.0.113.129:2
                        Int-VTag = 1234

```


```

                        ASCONF ACK
10.1.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.129:2
                        Int-VTag = 1234

```

8.4. NAT Function Loses Its State

Association is already established between Host A and Host B, when the NAT function loses its state and obtains a new external address. Host A sends a DATA chunk to Host B.




NAT	+-----+				
	Int	Int	Rem	Rem	Int
	VTag	Port	VTag	Port	Addr
	+-----+				

```

                        DATA
10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
                        Rem-VTag = 5678

```


The NAT function cannot find an entry in the NAT binding table for the association. It sends a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the M bit set and the cause "NAT state missing".



```

ERROR [M bit, NAT state missing]
10.0.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
      Rem-VTag = 5678
  
```

On reception of the packet containing the ERROR chunk, Host A sends a packet containing an ASCONF chunk indicating that the former information has to be deleted and the source address of the actual packet added.



```


ASCONF [ADD-IP, DELETE-IP, Int-VTag=1234, Rem-VTag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.129:2
      Rem-VTag = 5678
  
```

NAT	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	5678	2	10.0.0.1

```

ASCONF [ADD-IP, DELETE-IP, Int-VTag=1234, Rem-VTag = 5678]
      192.0.2.2:1 -----> 203.0.113.129:2
      Rem-VTag = 5678
  
```

Host B adds the new source address to this association and deletes all other addresses from this association.



ASCONF ACK
 192.0.2.2:1 <----- 203.0.113.129:2
 Int-VTag = 1234


ASCONF ACK
 10.1.0.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.129:2
 Int-VTag = 1234

DATA
 10.0.0.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

DATA
 192.0.2.2:1 -----> 203.0.113.129:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

8.5. Peer-to-Peer Communications

If two hosts, each of them behind a NAT function, want to communicate with each other, they have to get knowledge of the peer's external address. This can be achieved with a so-called rendezvous server. Afterwards the destination addresses are external, and the association is set up with the help of the INIT collision. The NAT functions create their entries according to their internal peer's point of view. Therefore, NAT function A's Internal-VTag and Internal-Port are NAT function B's Remote-VTag and Remote-Port, respectively. The naming (internal/remote) of the verification tag in the packet flow is done from the sending host's point of view.



NAT Binding Tables

NAT A	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
-------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------

NAT B	Int v-tag	Int port	Rem v-tag	Rem port	Int Addr
-------	--------------	-------------	--------------	-------------	-------------

```

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 --> 203.0.113.1:2
    Rem-VTag = 0
  
```

NAT function A creates entry:

NAT A	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	0	2	10.0.0.1


```

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
    Rem-VTag = 0
  
```

NAT function B processes the packet containing the INIT chunk, but cannot find an entry. The SCTP packet is silently discarded and leaves the NAT binding table of NAT function B unchanged.

NAT B	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
-------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------


Now Host B sends a packet containing an INIT chunk, which is processed by NAT function B. Its parameters are used to create an entry.



NAT B	Int	Int	Rem	Rem	Int
	VTag	Port	VTag	Port	Addr
	5678	2	0	1	10.1.0.1

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

NAT function A processes the packet containing the INIT chunk. As the outgoing packet containing an INIT chunk of Host A has already created an entry, the entry is found and updated:




VTag != Int-VTag, but Rem-VTag == 0, find entry.

NAT A	Int VTag	Int Port	Rem VTag	Rem Port	Int Addr
	1234	1	5678	2	10.0.0.1

```
INIT[Initiate-tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <-- 203.0.113.1:2
    Rem-VTag = 0
```

Host A sends a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk, which can pass through NAT function B:



```

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 --> 203.0.113.1:2
    Rem-VTag = 5678

```

```

                INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
                Rem-VTag = 5678

```

NAT function B updates entry:


NAT B	Int	Int	Rem	Rem	Int
	VTag	Port	VTag	Port	Addr
	5678	2	1234	1	10.1.0.1

```

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 --> 10.1.0.1:2
                Rem-VTag = 5678

```

The lookup for COOKIE ECHO and COOKIE ACK is successful.



COOKIE ECHO
 192.0.2.1:1 <-- 10.1.0.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ECHO
 192.0.2.1:1 <----- 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ECHO
 10.0.0.1:1 <-- 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ACK
 10.0.0.1:1 --> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ACK
 192.0.2.1:1 -----> 203.0.113.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ACK
 192.0.2.1:1 --> 10.1.0.1:2
 Rem-VTag = 5678

9. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to provide a way for the application to control NAT friendliness.

Please note that this section is informational only.

A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is extended by supporting one new read/write socket option.

9.1. Get or Set the NAT Friendliness (SCTP_NAT_FRIENDLY)

This socket option uses the option_level IPPROTO_SCTP and the option_name SCTP_NAT_FRIENDLY. It can be used to enable/disable the NAT friendliness for future associations and retrieve the value for future and specific ones.

```
struct sctp_assoc_value {  
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;  
    uint32_t assoc_value;  
};
```

assoc_id

This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application can fill in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC for this query. It is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in assoc_id.

assoc_value

A non-zero value indicates a NAT-friendly mode.

10. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: "RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.]

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: The requested values for the chunk type and the chunk parameter types are tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.]

This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for all registrations described in this section. The requested changes are described below.

10.1. New Chunk Flags for Two Existing Chunk Types

As defined in [RFC6096] two chunk flags have to be assigned by IANA for the ERROR chunk. The requested value for the T bit is 0x01 and for the M bit is 0x02.

This requires an update of the "ERROR Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:

ERROR Chunk Flags

Chunk Flag Value	Chunk Flag Name	Reference
0x01	T bit	[RFCXXXX]
0x02	M bit	[RFCXXXX]
0x04	Unassigned	
0x08	Unassigned	
0x10	Unassigned	
0x20	Unassigned	
0x40	Unassigned	
0x80	Unassigned	

Table 2

As defined in [RFC6096] one chunk flag has to be assigned by IANA for the ABORT chunk. The requested value of the M bit is 0x02.

This requires an update of the "ABORT Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:

ABORT Chunk Flags

Chunk Flag Value	Chunk Flag Name	Reference
0x01	T bit	[RFC4960]
0x02	M bit	[RFCXXXX]
0x04	Unassigned	
0x08	Unassigned	
0x10	Unassigned	
0x20	Unassigned	
0x40	Unassigned	
0x80	Unassigned	

Table 3

10.2. Three New Error Causes

Three error causes have to be assigned by IANA. It is requested to use the values given below.

This requires three additional lines in the "Error Cause Codes" registry for SCTP:

Error Cause Codes

Value	Cause Code	Reference
176	VTag and Port Number Collision	[RFCXXXX]
177	Missing State	[RFCXXXX]
178	Port Number Collision	[RFCXXXX]

Table 4

10.3. Two New Chunk Parameter Types

Two chunk parameter types have to be assigned by IANA. IANA is requested to assign these values from the pool of parameters with the upper two bits set to '11' and to use the values given below.

This requires two additional lines in the "Chunk Parameter Types" registry for SCTP:

Chunk Parameter Types

ID Value	Chunk Parameter Type	Reference
49159	Disable Restart (0xC007)	[RFCXXXX]
49160	VTags (0xC008)	[RFCXXXX]

Table 5

10.4. One New URI

An URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML" registry has to be assigned by IANA ([RFC3688]):

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-nat-sctp
 Registrant Contact: The IESG.
 XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

10.5. One New YANG Module

An YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry within the "YANG Parameters" registry has to be assigned by IANA ([RFC6020]):

Name: ietf-nat-sctp
 Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-nat-sctp
 Maintained by IANA: N
 Prefix: nat-sctp
 Reference: RFCXXXX

11. Security Considerations

State maintenance within a NAT function is always a subject of possible Denial Of Service attacks. This document recommends that at a minimum a NAT function runs a timer on any SCTP state so that old association state can be cleaned up.

Generic issues related to address sharing are discussed in [RFC6269] and apply to SCTP as well.

For SCTP endpoints not disabling the restart procedure, this document does not add any additional security considerations to the ones given in [RFC4960], [RFC4895], and [RFC5061].

SCTP endpoints disabling the restart procedure, need to monitor the status of all associations to mitigate resource exhaustion attacks by establishing a lot of associations sharing the same IP addresses and port numbers.

In any case, SCTP is protected by the verification tags and the usage of [RFC4895] against off-path attackers.

For IP-level fragmentation and reassembly related issues see [RFC4963].

The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].

The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.

All data nodes defined in the YANG module that can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) applied to these data nodes without proper protection can negatively affect network operations. An attacker who is able to access the SCTP NAT function can undertake various attacks, such as:

- * Setting a low timeout for SCTP mapping entries to cause failures to deliver incoming SCTP packets.
- * Instantiating mapping entries to cause NAT collision.

12. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>>.
- [RFC4895] Tuexen, M., Stewart, R., Lei, P., and E. Rescorla, "Authenticated Chunks for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 4895, DOI 10.17487/RFC4895, August 2007, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4895>>.
- [RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>>.
- [RFC5061] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., Maruyama, S., and M. Kozuka, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Dynamic Address Reconfiguration", RFC 5061, DOI 10.17487/RFC5061, September 2007, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5061>>.
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A Non-Queue-Building Per-Hop Behavior (NQB PHB) for Differentiated
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Abstract

This document specifies properties and characteristics of a Non-Queue-Building Per-Hop Behavior (NQB PHB). The purpose of this NQB PHB is to provide a separate queue that enables smooth, low-data-rate, application-limited traffic flows, which would ordinarily share a queue with bursty and capacity-seeking traffic, to avoid the latency, latency variation and loss caused by such traffic. This PHB is implemented without prioritization and without rate policing, making it suitable for environments where the use of either these features may be restricted. The NQB PHB has been developed primarily for use by access network segments, where queuing delays and queuing loss caused by Queue-Building protocols are manifested, but its use is not limited to such segments. In particular, applications to cable broadband links, Wi-Fi links, and mobile network radio and core segments are discussed. This document recommends a specific Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) to identify Non-Queue-Building flows.

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1. Introduction

This document defines a Differentiated Services per-hop behavior (PHB) called "Non-Queue-Building Per-Hop Behavior" (NQB PHB), which isolates traffic flows that are relatively low data rate and that do not themselves materially contribute to queueing delay and loss, allowing them to avoid the queueing delays and losses caused by other traffic. Such Non-Queue-Building flows (for example: interactive voice, gaming, machine-to-machine applications) are application limited flows that are distinguished from traffic flows managed by an end-to-end congestion control algorithm.

The vast majority of packets that are carried by broadband access networks are managed by an end-to-end congestion control algorithm, such as Reno, Cubic or BBR. These congestion control algorithms attempt to seek the available capacity of the end-to-end path (which can frequently be the access network link capacity), and in doing so generally overshoot the available capacity, causing a queue to build-up at the bottleneck link. This queue build up results in queueing delay (variable latency) and possibly packet loss that can affect all of the applications that are sharing the bottleneck link.

In contrast to traditional congestion-controlled applications, there are a variety of relatively low data rate applications that do not materially contribute to queueing delay and loss, but are nonetheless subjected to it by sharing the same bottleneck link in the access network. Many of these applications may be sensitive to latency or latency variation, as well as packet loss, and thus produce a poor quality of experience in such conditions.

Active Queue Management (AQM) mechanisms (such as PIE [RFC8033], DOCSIS-PIE [RFC8034], or CoDel [RFC8289]) can improve the quality of experience for latency sensitive applications, but there are practical limits to the amount of improvement that can be achieved without impacting the throughput of capacity-seeking applications. For example, AQMs generally allow a significant amount of queue depth variation in order to accommodate the behaviors of congestion control algorithms such as Reno and Cubic. If the AQM attempted to control the queue much more tightly, applications using those algorithms would not perform well. Alternatively, flow queueing systems, such as fq_codel [RFC8290] can be employed to isolate flows from one another, but these are not appropriate for all bottleneck links, due to complexity or other reasons.

The NQB PHB supports differentiating between these two classes of traffic in bottleneck links and queueing them separately in order that both classes can deliver satisfactory quality of experience for their applications.

To be clear, a network implementing the NQB PHB solely provides isolation for traffic classified as behaving in conformance with the NQB DSCP (and optionally enforces that behavior). It is the NQB senders' behavior itself which results in low latency and low loss.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Context

3.1. Non-Queue-Building Behavior

There are many applications that send traffic at relatively low data rates and/or in a fairly smooth and consistent manner such that they are highly unlikely to exceed the available capacity of the network path between source and sink. These applications may themselves only cause very small, transient queues to form in network buffers, but nonetheless they can be subjected to packet delay and delay variation as a result of sharing a network buffer with applications that tend to cause large and/or standing queues to form. Many of these applications are negatively affected by excessive packet delay and delay variation. Such applications are ideal candidates to be queued separately from the applications that are the cause of queue buildup, latency and loss.

In contrast, Queue-building (QB) flows include those that use TCP or QUIC, with Cubic, Reno or other TCP congestion control algorithms that probe for the link capacity and induce latency and loss as a result. Other types of QB flows include those that frequently send at a high burst rate (e.g. several consecutive packets sent well in excess of 1 Mbps) even if the long-term average data rate is much lower.

3.2. Relationship to the Diffserv Architecture

The IETF has defined the Differentiated Services architecture [RFC2475] with the intention that it allows traffic to be marked in a manner that conveys the performance requirements of that traffic either quantitatively or in a relative sense (i.e. priority). The architecture defines the use of the Diffserv field [RFC2474] for this purpose, and numerous RFCs have been written that describe recommended interpretations of the values (Diffserv Code Points) of the field, and standardized treatments (traffic conditioning and per-

hop-behaviors) that can be implemented to satisfy the performance requirements of traffic so marked.

While this architecture is powerful, and can be configured to meet the performance requirements of a variety of applications and traffic categories, or to achieve differentiated service offerings, it has proven problematic to enable its use for these purposes end-to-end across the Internet.

This difficulty is in part due to the fact that meeting (in an end-to-end context) the performance requirements of an application involves all of the networks in the path agreeing on what those requirements are, and sharing an interest in meeting them. In many cases this is made more difficult due to the fact that the performance "requirements" are not strict ones (e.g. applications will degrade in some manner as loss/latency/jitter increase), so the importance of meeting them for any particular application in some cases involves a judgment as to the value of avoiding some amount of degradation in quality for that application in exchange for an increase in the degradation of another application.

Further, in many cases the implementation of Diffserv PHBs has historically involved prioritization of service classes with respect to one another, which sets up the zero-sum game alluded to in the previous paragraph, and results in the need to limit access to higher priority classes via mechanisms such as access control, admission control, traffic conditioning and rate policing, and/or to meter and bill for carriage of such traffic. These mechanisms can be difficult or impossible to implement in an end-to-end context.

Finally, some jurisdictions impose regulations that limit the ability of networks to provide differentiation of services, in large part based on the belief that doing so necessarily involves prioritization or privileged access to bandwidth, and thus a benefit to one class of traffic always comes at the expense of another.

In contrast, the NQB PHB has been designed with the goal that it avoids many of these issues, and thus could conceivably be deployed end-to-end across the Internet. The intent of the NQB DSCP is that it signals verifiable behavior that permits the sender to request differentiated treatment. Also, the NQB traffic is to be given a separate queue with priority equal to default traffic, and given no reserved bandwidth other than the bandwidth that it shares with default traffic. As a result, the NQB PHB does not aim to meet specific application performance requirements. Instead the goal of the NQB PHB is to provide statistically better loss, latency, and jitter performance for traffic that is itself only an insignificant contributor to those degradations. The PHB is also designed to

minimize any incentives for a sender to mismark its traffic, since neither higher priority nor reserved bandwidth are being offered. These attributes eliminate many of the tradeoffs that underlie the handling of differentiated service classes in the Diffserv architecture as it has traditionally been defined. They also significantly simplify access control and admission control functions, reducing them to simple verification of behavior.

3.3. Relationship to L4S

The NQB DSCP and PHB described in this draft have been defined to operate independently of the experimental L4S Architecture [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]. Nonetheless, the NQB traffic flows are intended to be compatible with [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch], with the result being that NQB traffic and L4S traffic can share the low-latency queue in an L4S DualQ node [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]. Compliance with the DualQ Coupled AQM requirements (Section 2.5 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]) is considered sufficient to support the NQB PHB requirement of fair allocation of bandwidth between the QB and NQB queues (Section 5).

4. DSCP Marking of NQB Traffic

4.1. Non-Queue-Building Sender Requirements

Non-queue-building (NQB) flows are typically UDP flows that don't seek the maximum capacity of the link (examples: online games, voice chat, DNS lookups, real-time IoT analytics data). Here the data rate is limited by the application itself rather than by network capacity - these applications send, at most, the equivalent of a few well-spaced packets per RTT, even if the packets are not actually RTT-clocked. In today's network this corresponds to an instantaneous data rate (packet size divided by packet inter-arrival time) of no more than about 1 Mbps (e.g. no more than one 1250 B packet every 10 ms), but there is no precise bound since it depends on the conditions in which the application is operating.

Note that, while such flows ordinarily don't implement a traditional congestion control mechanism, they nonetheless are expected to comply with existing guidance for safe deployment on the Internet, for example the requirements in [RFC8085] and Section 2 of [RFC3551] (also see the circuit breaker limits in Section 4.3 of [RFC8083] and the description of inelastic pseudowires in Section 4 of [RFC7893]). To be clear, the description of NQB flows in this document should not be interpreted as suggesting that such flows are in any way exempt from this responsibility.

Applications that align with the description of NQB behavior in the preceding paragraphs SHOULD identify themselves to the network using a Diffserv Code Point (DSCP) of 45 (decimal) so that their packets can be queued separately from QB flows. The choice of the value 45 is motivated in part by the desire to achieve separate queuing in existing WiFi networks (see Section 8.3) and by the desire to make implementation of the PHB simpler in network gear that has the ability to classify traffic based on ranges of DSCP value (see Section 4.2 for further discussion). In networks where another (e.g. a local-use) codepoint is designated for NQB traffic, or where specialized PHBs are available that can meet specific application requirements (e.g. a guaranteed-latency path for voice traffic), it may be preferred to use another DSCP. In end systems where the choice of using DSCP 45 is not available to the application, the CS5 DSCP (40 decimal) could be used as a fallback. See Section 4.2 for rationale as to why this choice could be fruitful.

If the application's traffic exceeds more than a few packets per RTT, or exceeds a fairly small fraction of the expected path capacity on an instantaneous (e.g. inter-packet or a suitably short time interval) basis, the application SHOULD NOT mark its traffic with the NQB DSCP. In such a case, the application could instead consider implementing a low latency congestion control mechanism as described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. At the time of writing, it is believed that 1 Mbps is a reasonable upper bound on instantaneous traffic rate for an NQB-marked application, but this value is of course subject to the context in which the application is expected to be deployed.

An application that marks its traffic as NQB but happens to exceed the available path capacity (even on an instantaneous basis) runs the risk of being subjected to a Traffic Protection algorithm (see Section 5.2), which could result in the excess traffic being discarded or queued separately as default traffic (and thus potentially delivered out of order). As a result, applications that aren't clearly beneath the threshold described above would need to weigh the risk of additional loss or out-of-order delivery against the expected latency benefits of NQB treatment in determining whether or not to mark their packets as NQB.

4.2. Aggregation of the NQB DSCP with other Diffserv PHBs

It is RECOMMENDED that networks and nodes that do not support the NQB PHB be configured to treat NQB marked traffic the same as traffic marked "Default". It is additionally RECOMMENDED that such networks and nodes simply classify the NQB DSCP into the same treatment aggregate as Default traffic, or encapsulate the NQB marked packet, rather than re-marking NQB traffic as Default. This preservation of

the NQB marking enables hops further along the path to provide the NQB PHB successfully. Section 4.3 discusses re-marking of NQB traffic to an alternate DSCP value of 5 within core networks as a means to facilitate this for networks where this behavior can be more readily implemented for such a value.

In backbone and core network switches (particularly if shallow-buffered), and nodes that do not typically experience congestion, treating NQB marked traffic the same as Default may be sufficient to preserve loss/latency/jitter performance for NQB traffic. In other nodes, treating NQB marked traffic as Default could result in degradation of loss/latency/jitter performance but is recommended nonetheless in order to preserve the incentives described in Section 5. An alternative, in controlled environments where there is no risk of mismarking of traffic, would be to aggregate NQB marked traffic with real-time, latency sensitive traffic. Similarly, networks and nodes that aggregate service classes as discussed in [RFC5127] and [RFC8100] may not be able to provide a PDB/PHB that meets the requirements of this document. In these cases it is RECOMMENDED that NQB-marked traffic be aggregated into the Elastic Treatment Aggregate (for [RFC5127] networks) or the Default / Elastic Treatment Aggregate (for [RFC8100] networks), although in some cases a network operator may instead choose to aggregate NQB traffic into the (Bulk) Real-Time Treatment Aggregate. Either approach comes with trade-offs: when the aggregated traffic encounters a bottleneck, aggregating with Default/Elastic traffic could result in a degradation of loss/latency/jitter performance for NQB traffic, while aggregating with Real-Time (assuming such traffic is provided a prioritized PHB) risks creating an incentive for mismarking of non-compliant traffic as NQB (except in controlled environments). In either case, the NQB DSCP SHOULD be preserved (possibly via encapsulation) in order to limit the negative impact that such networks would have on end-to-end performance for NQB traffic. This aligns with recommendations in [RFC5127].

Nodes that support the NQB PHB may choose to aggregate other service classes into the NQB queue. This is particularly useful in cases where specialized PHBs for these other service classes are not provided. Candidate service classes for this aggregation would include those that carry inelastic traffic that has low to very-low tolerance for loss, latency and/or jitter as discussed in [RFC4594]. These could include Telephony (EF/VA), Signaling (CS5), Real-Time Interactive (CS4) and Broadcast Video (CS3). Or, in some networks, equipment limitations may necessitate aggregating all traffic marked with DSCPs 40-47 (i.e., whose three MSBs are 0b101). As noted in Section 4.1, the choice of the value 45 is motivated in part by the desire to make this aggregation simpler in network equipment that can classify packets via comparing the DSCP value to a range of configured values.

4.3. End-to-end usage and DSCP Re-marking

In contrast to some existing standard PHBs, many of which are typically only meaningful within a Diffserv Domain (e.g. an AS or an enterprise network), this PHB is expected to be used end-to-end across the Internet, wherever suitable operator agreements apply. Under the [RFC2474] model, this requires that the corresponding DSCP is recognized by all operators and mapped across their boundaries accordingly.

To support NQB, networks MUST preserve a DSCP marking distinction between NQB traffic and Default traffic when forwarding via an interconnect from or to another network. To facilitate the default treatment of NQB traffic in backbones and core networks discussed in the previous section (where IP Precedence may be deployed), networks that support NQB SHOULD NOT use the value 45 for NQB at network interconnects unless that usage is explicitly documented in the TCA (Traffic Conditioning Agreement, see [RFC2475]) for that interconnection. Rather, networks SHOULD remap NQB traffic to DSCP 5 prior to interconnection, unless agreed otherwise between the interconnecting partners. To be clear, interconnecting networks are not precluded from negotiating (via an SLA, TCA, or some other agreement) a different DSCP to use to signal NQB across an interconnect. Additionally, the fact that this PHB is intended for end-to-end usage does not preclude networks from mapping the NQB DSCP to a value other than 45 or 5 for internal usage, as long as the appropriate NQB DSCP is restored when forwarding to another network.

Furthermore, in other network environments where IP Precedence ([RFC0791]) is deployed, it is RECOMMENDED that the network operator re-mark NQB traffic to DSCP 5 in order to ensure that it is aggregated with Default traffic.

In order to enable interoperability with WiFi equipment as described in Section 8.3.1, networks SHOULD re-mark NQB traffic (e.g. DSCP 5) to DSCP 45 prior to a customer access link, subject to the safeguards described below and in that section.

Thus, this document recommends two DSCPs to designate NQB, the value 45 for use by hosts and in WiFi networks, and the value 5 for use across network interconnections.

4.3.1. Unmanaged Networks

In cases where a network operator is delivering traffic into an unmanaged network outside of their control (e.g. a residential ISP delivering traffic to a customer's home network), the network operator should presume that the existing network equipment in the user network supports the WiFi default DSCP mapping (see Section 8.3) and/or IP Precedence, and does not support the safeguards that are provided by the NQB PHB requirements. As a result, the network operator should take precautions to prevent issues. When the data rate of the access network segment is less than the expected data rate of the user network, this is unlikely to be an issue. However, if the access network rate exceeds the expected rate of the user network, the operator SHOULD deploy a policing function on NQB marked traffic that minimizes the potential for negative impacts on traffic marked Default, for example by limiting the rate of such traffic to a set fraction of the customer's service rate, with excess traffic either dropped or re-marked as Default.

As an additional safeguard, and to prevent the inadvertent introduction of problematic traffic into unmanaged user networks, network equipment that is intended to deliver traffic into unmanaged user networks (e.g. an access network gateway for a residential ISP) MUST by default ensure that NQB traffic is marked with a DSCP that selects the WiFi "Best Effort" Access Category and the "Routine" IP Precedence level (i.e. DSCP 0-7). Such equipment MUST support the ability to configure the remapping, so that (when appropriate safeguards are in place) traffic can be delivered as NQB-marked.

4.4. The NQB DSCP and Tunnels

[RFC2983] discusses tunnel models that support Diffserv. It describes a "uniform model" in which the inner DSCP is copied to the outer header at encapsulation, and the outer DSCP is copied to the inner header at decapsulation. It also describes a "pipe model" in which the outer DSCP is not copied to the inner header at decapsulation. Both models can be used in conjunction with the NQB PHB. In the case of the pipe model, any DSCP manipulation (re-marking) of the outer header by intermediate nodes would be discarded

at tunnel egress, potentially improving the possibility of achieving NQB treatment in subsequent nodes.

As is discussed in [RFC2983], tunnel protocols that are sensitive to reordering can result in undesirable interactions if multiple DSCP PHBs are signaled for traffic within a tunnel instance. This is true for NQB marked traffic as well. If a tunnel contains a mix of QB and NQB traffic, and this is reflected in the outer DSCP in a network that supports the NQB PHB, it would be necessary to avoid a reordering-sensitive tunnel protocol.

5. Non-Queue-Building PHB Requirements

It is worthwhile to note again that the NQB designation and marking is intended to convey verifiable traffic behavior, as opposed to simply a desire for differentiated treatment. Also, it is important that incentives are aligned correctly, i.e. that there is a benefit to the application in marking its packets correctly, and a disadvantage (or at least no benefit) to an application in intentionally mismarking its traffic. Thus, a useful property of nodes (i.e. network switches and routers) that support separate queues for NQB and QB flows is that for NQB flows, the NQB queue provides better performance than the QB queue; and for QB flows, the QB queue provides better performance than the NQB queue (this is discussed further in this section and Section 11). By adhering to these principles, there is no incentive for senders to mismark their traffic as NQB, and further, any mismarking can be identified by the network.

5.1. Primary Requirements

A node supporting the NQB PHB makes no guarantees on latency or data rate for NQB marked flows, but instead aims to provide a bound on queuing delay for as many such marked flows as it can, and shed load when needed.

A node supporting the NQB PHB **MUST** provide a queue for non-queue-building traffic separate from any queue used for queue-building traffic.

NQB traffic, in aggregate, **SHOULD NOT** be rate limited or rate policed separately from queue-building traffic of equivalent importance.

The NQB queue **SHOULD** be given equivalent forwarding preference compared to queue-building traffic of equivalent importance. The node **SHOULD** provide a scheduler that allows QB and NQB traffic of equivalent importance to share the link in a fair manner, e.g. a deficit round-robin scheduler with equal weights. Compliance with

these recommendations helps to ensure that there are no incentives for QB traffic to be mismarked as NQB. In environments where mismarking is not a potential issue (e.g. a network where a marking policy is enforced by other means), these requirements may not be necessary.

A node supporting the NQB PHB SHOULD treat traffic marked as Default (DSCP=0) as QB traffic having equivalent importance to the NQB marked traffic. A node supporting the NQB DSCP MUST support the ability to configure the classification criteria that are used to identify QB and NQB traffic of equivalent importance.

The NQB queue SHOULD have a buffer size that is significantly smaller than the buffer provided for QB traffic (e.g. single-digit milliseconds). It is expected that most QB traffic is engineered to work well when the network provides a relatively deep buffer (e.g. on the order of tens or hundreds of ms) in nodes where support for the NQB PHB is advantageous (i.e. bottleneck nodes). Providing a similarly deep buffer for the NQB queue would be at cross purposes to providing very low queueing delay, and would erode the incentives for QB traffic to be marked correctly.

5.2. Traffic Protection

It is possible that due to an implementation error or misconfiguration, a QB flow would end up getting mismarked as NQB, or vice versa. In the case of an NQB flow that isn't marked as NQB and ends up in the QB queue, it would only impact its own quality of service, and so it seems to be of lesser concern. However, a QB flow that is mismarked as NQB would cause queueing delays and/or loss for all of the other flows that are sharing the NQB queue.

To prevent this situation from harming the performance of the real NQB flows, network elements that support differentiating NQB traffic SHOULD support a "traffic protection" function that can identify QB flows that are mismarked as NQB, and either reclassify those flows/packets to the QB queue or discard the offending traffic. Such a function SHOULD be implemented in an objective and verifiable manner, basing its decisions upon the behavior of the flow rather than on application-layer constructs. It is RECOMMENDED that traffic protection algorithms base their decisions on the detection of actual queueing, as opposed to simply packet arrival rates. It may be advantageous for a traffic protection function to employ hysteresis to prevent borderline flows from being reclassified capriciously.

One example traffic protection algorithm can be found in [I-D.briscoe-docsis-q-protection].

There are some situations where such function may not be necessary. For example, a network element designed for use in controlled environments (e.g. enterprise LAN) may not require a traffic protection function. Additionally, some networks may prefer to police the application of the NQB DSCP at the ingress edge, so that in-network traffic protection is not needed.

5.3. Guidance for Very Low Rate Links

The NQB sender requirements in Section 4.1 place responsibility in the hands of the application developer to determine the likelihood that the application's sending behavior could result in a queue forming along the path. These requirements rely on application developers having a reasonable sense for the network context in which their application is to be deployed. Even so, there will undoubtedly be networks that contain links having a data rate that is below the lower end of what is considered "typical", and some of these links may even be below the instantaneous sending rate of some NQB-marked applications.

To limit the consequences of this scenario, operators of such networks SHOULD utilize a traffic protection function that is more tolerant of burstiness (i.e. a temporary queue). Alternatively, operators of such networks MAY choose to disable NQB support on these low speed links. In particular, for links that are far below "typical" path rates, it is RECOMMENDED that NQB support be disabled.

6. Impact on Higher Layer Protocols

Network elements that support the NQB PHB and that support traffic protection as discussed in the previous section introduce the possibility that flows classified into the NQB queue could experience out of order delivery or packet loss if their behavior is not consistent with NQB. This is particularly true if the traffic protection algorithm makes decisions on a packet-by-packet basis. In this scenario, a flow that is (mis)marked as NQB and that causes a queue to form in this bottleneck link could see some of its packets forwarded by the NQB queue, and some of them either discarded or redirected to the QB queue. In the case of redirection, depending on the queueing latency and scheduling within the network element, this could result in packets being delivered out of order. As a result, the use of the NQB DSCP by a higher layer protocol carries some risk that an increased amount of out of order delivery or packet loss will be experienced. This characteristic provides one disincentive for mis-marking of traffic.

7. Configuration and Management

As required above, nodes supporting the NQB PHB provide for the configuration of classifiers that can be used to differentiate between QB and NQB traffic of equivalent importance. The default for such classifiers is recommended to be the assigned NQB DSCP (to identify NQB traffic) and the Default (0) DSCP (to identify QB traffic).

8. Example Use Cases

8.1. DOCSIS Access Networks

Residential cable broadband Internet services are commonly configured with a single bottleneck link (the access network link) upon which the service definition is applied. The service definition, typically an upstream/downstream data rate tuple, is implemented as a configured pair of rate shapers that are applied to the user's traffic. In such networks, the quality of service that each application receives, and as a result, the quality of experience that it generates for the user is influenced by the characteristics of the access network link.

To support the NQB PHB, cable broadband services **MUST** be configured to provide a separate queue for NQB marked traffic. The NQB queue **MUST** be configured to share the service's rate shaped bandwidth with the queue for QB traffic.

8.2. Mobile Networks

Historically, 3GPP mobile networks have utilised "bearers" to encapsulate each user's user plane traffic through the radio and core networks. A "dedicated bearer" may be allocated a Quality of Service (QoS) to apply any prioritisation to its flows at queues and radio schedulers. Typically an LTE operator provides a dedicated bearer for IMS VoLTE (Voice over LTE) traffic, which is prioritised in order to meet regulatory obligations for call completion rates; and a "best effort" default bearer, for Internet traffic. The "best effort" bearer provides no guarantees, and hence its buffering characteristics are not compatible with low-latency traffic. The 5G radio and core systems offer more flexibility over bearer allocation, meaning bearers can be allocated per traffic type (e.g. loss-tolerant, low-latency etc.) and hence support more suitable treatment of Internet real-time flows.

To support the NQB PHB, the mobile network SHOULD be configured to give UEs a dedicated, low-latency, non-GBR, EPS bearer, e.g. one with QCI 7, in addition to the default EPS bearer; or a Data Radio Bearer with 5QI 7 in a 5G system (see Table 5.7.4-1: Standardized 5QI to QoS characteristics mapping in [SA-5G]).

A packet carrying the NQB DSCP SHOULD be routed through the dedicated low-latency EPS bearer. A packet that has no associated NQB marking SHOULD NOT be routed through the dedicated low-latency EPS bearer.

8.3. WiFi Networks

WiFi networking equipment compliant with 802.11e/n/ac/ax [IEEE802-11] generally supports either four or eight transmit queues and four sets of associated Enhanced Multimedia Distributed Control Access (EDCA) parameters (corresponding to the four WiFi Multimedia (WMM) Access Categories) that are used to enable differentiated media access characteristics. As discussed in [RFC8325], most existing WiFi implementations use a default DSCP to User Priority mapping that utilizes the most significant three bits of the Diffserv Field to select "User Priority" which is then mapped to the four WMM Access Categories. [RFC8325] also provides an alternative mapping that more closely aligns with the DSCP recommendations provided by the IETF.

In addition to the requirements provided in other sections of this document, to support the NQB PHB, WiFi equipment (including equipment compliant with [RFC8325]) SHOULD map the NQB codepoint 45 into a separate queue in the same Access Category as the queue that carries default traffic (i.e. the Best Effort Access Category).

8.3.1. Interoperability with Existing WiFi Networks

While some existing WiFi equipment may be capable (in some cases via firmware update) of supporting the NQB PHB requirements, many currently deployed devices cannot be configured in this way. As a result the remainder of this section discusses interoperability with these existing WiFi networks, as opposed to PHB compliance.

In order to increase the likelihood that NQB traffic is provided a separate queue from QB traffic in existing WiFi equipment that uses the default mapping, the 45 code point is recommended for NQB. This maps NQB to UP_5 which is in the "Video" Access Category. While this DSCP to User Priority mapping enables these WiFi systems to support the NQB PHB requirement for segregated queuing, it does not support the remaining NQB PHB requirements in Section 5. The ramifications of, and remedies for this are discussed further below.

Existing WiFi devices are unlikely to support a traffic protection algorithm, so traffic mismarked as NQB is not likely to be detected and remedied by such devices.

Furthermore, in their default configuration, existing WiFi devices utilize EDCA parameters that result in statistical prioritization of the "Video" Access Category above the "Best Effort" Access Category. If left unchanged, this would violate the NQB PHB requirement for equal prioritization, and could erode the principle of alignment of incentives. In order to preserve the incentives principle for NQB, WiFi systems SHOULD be configured such that the EDCA parameters for the Video Access Category match those of the Best Effort Access Category. This recommendation is primarily applicable to WiFi systems deployed in a managed environment or those deployed by an ISP, and is intended for situations when the vast majority of traffic that would use AC_VI is NQB. In other situations (e.g. consumer-grade WiFi gear deployed by an ISP's customer) this configuration may not be possible, and the requirements and recommendations in Section 4.3.1 would apply.

Similarly, systems that utilize [RFC8325] but that are unable to fully support the PHB requirements, SHOULD map the recommended NQB code point 45 (or the locally determined alternative) to UP_5 in the "Video" Access Category.

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10. IANA Considerations

This document requests that IANA assign the Differentiated Services Field Codepoint (DSCP) 45 ('0b101101', 0x2D) from the "Differentiated Services Field Codepoints (DSCP)" registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/>) ("DSCP Pool 3 Codepoints", Codepoint Space xxxx01, Standards Action) as the RECOMMENDED codepoint for Non-Queue-Building behavior for end-systems and in edge networks.

IANA should update this registry as follows:

* Name: NQB-EDGE

- * Value (Binary): 101101
- * Value (Decimal): 45
- * Reference: this document

This document requests that IANA assign the Differentiated Services Field Codepoint (DSCP) 5 ('0b000101', 0x05) from the "Differentiated Services Field Codepoints (DSCP)" registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/>) ("DSCP Pool 3 Codepoints", Codepoint Space xxxx01, Standards Action) as the RECOMMENDED codepoint for Non-Queue-Building behavior in core networks and interconnections.

IANA should update this registry as follows:

- * Name: NQB-CORE
- * Value (Binary): 000101
- * Value (Decimal): 5
- * Reference: this document

11. Security Considerations

When the NQB PHB is fully supported in bottleneck links, there is no incentive for a queue-building application to mismark its packets as NQB (or vice versa). If a queue-building flow were to mark its packets as NQB, it would be unlikely to receive a benefit by doing so, and it could experience excessive packet loss, excessive latency variation and/or excessive out-of-order delivery (depending on the nature of the traffic protection function). If a non-queue-building flow were to fail to mark its packets as NQB, it could suffer the latency and loss typical of sharing a queue with capacity seeking traffic.

In order to preserve low latency performance for NQB traffic, networks that support the NQB PHB will need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to prevent malicious NQB-marked traffic from causing excessive queue delays. This document recommends the implementation of a traffic protection mechanism to achieve this goal, but recognizes that other options may be more desirable in certain situations.

Notwithstanding the above, the choice of DSCP for NQB does allow existing WiFi networks to readily (and by default) support some of the PHB requirements, but without a traffic protection function, and

(when left in the default state) by giving NQB traffic higher priority than QB traffic. This does open up the NQB marking to potential abuse on these WiFi links, but since these existing WiFi networks already give one quarter of the DSCP space this same treatment, and further they give another quarter of the DSCP space even higher priority, the NQB DSCP does not seem to be of any greater risk for abuse than these others.

The NQB signal is not integrity protected and could be flipped by an on-path attacker. This might negatively affect the QoS of the tampered flow.

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Appendix A. DSCP Remarking Pathologies

Some network operators typically bleach (zero out) the Diffserv field on ingress into their network

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-dscp-considerations][Custura][Barik], and in some cases apply their own DSCP for internal usage. Bleaching the NQB DSCP is not expected to cause harm to default traffic, but it will severely limit the ability to provide NQB treatment end-to-end. Reports on existing deployments of DSCP manipulation [Custura][Barik] categorize the re-marking behaviors into the following six policies: bleach all traffic (set DSCP to zero), set the top three bits (the former Precedence bits) on all traffic to 0b000, 0b001, or 0b010, set the low three bits on all traffic to 0b000, or remark all traffic to a particular (non-zero) DSCP value.

Regarding the DSCP values of 5 & 45, there were no observations of DSCP manipulation reported in which traffic was marked 5 or 45 by any of these policies. Thus it appears that these re-marking policies would be unlikely to result in QB traffic being marked as NQB (45). In terms of the fate of NQB-marked traffic that is subjected to one of these policies, the result would be that NQB marked traffic would be indistinguishable from some subset (possibly all) of other traffic. In the policies where all traffic is remarked using the same (zero or non-zero) DSCP, the ability for a subsequent network hop to differentiate NQB traffic via DSCP would clearly be lost entirely.

In the policies where the top three bits are overwritten, both NQB values (5 & 45) would receive the same marking as would the currently unassigned Pool 3 DSCPs 13,21,29,37,53,61, with all of these code points getting mapped to DSCP=5, 13 or 21 (depending on the overwrite value used). Since none of the DSCPs in the preceding lists are currently assigned by IANA, and they all are set aside for Standards Action, it is believed that they are not widely used currently, but this may vary based on local-usage.

For the policy in which the low three bits are set to 0b000, the NQB (45) value would be mapped to CS5 and would be indistinguishable from CS5, VA, EF (and the unassigned DSCPs 41, 42, 43). Traffic marked using the existing standardized DSCPs in this list are likely to share the same general properties as NQB traffic (non capacity-seeking, very low data rate or relatively low and consistent data rate). Similarly, any future recommended usage for DSCPs 41, 42, 43 would likely be somewhat compatible with NQB treatment, assuming that IP Precedence compatibility (see Section 1.5.4 of [RFC4594]) is maintained in the future. Here there may be an opportunity for a node to provide the NQB PHB or the CS5 PHB to CS5-marked traffic and retain some of the benefits of NQB marking. This could be another motivation to (as discussed in Section 4.2) classify CS5-marked traffic into NQB queue. For this same re-marking policy, the NQB (5) value would be mapped to CS0/default and would be indistinguishable from CS0, LE (and the unassigned DSCPs 2,3,4,6,7). In this case, NQB traffic is likely to be given default treatment in all subsequent nodes, which would eliminate the ability to provide NQB treatment in those nodes, but would be relatively harmless otherwise.

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Stream Control Transmission Protocol
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Abstract

This document obsoletes RFC 4960, if approved. It describes the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and incorporates the specification of the chunk flags registry from RFC 6096 and the specification of the I bit of DATA chunks from RFC 7053. Therefore, RFC 6096 and RFC 7053 are also obsoleted by this document, if approved. In addition to that, the Errata documents RFC 4460 and RFC 8540 are also obsoleted by this document, if approved.

SCTP was originally designed to transport Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) signaling messages over IP networks. It is also suited to be used for other applications, for example WebRTC.

SCTP is a reliable transport protocol operating on top of a connectionless packet network such as IP. It offers the following services to its users:

- * acknowledged error-free non-duplicated transfer of user data,
- * data fragmentation to conform to discovered path maximum transmission unit (PMTU) size,
- * sequenced delivery of user messages within multiple streams, with an option for order-of-arrival delivery of individual user messages,
- * optional bundling of multiple user messages into a single SCTP packet, and
- * network-level fault tolerance through supporting of multi-homing at either or both ends of an association.

The design of SCTP includes appropriate congestion avoidance behavior and resistance to flooding and masquerade attacks.

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1. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Introduction

This section explains the reasoning behind the development of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), the services it offers, and the basic concepts needed to understand the detailed description of the protocol.

This document obsoletes [RFC4960], if approved. In addition to that, it incorporates the specification of the chunk flags registry from [RFC6096] and the specification of the I bit of DATA chunks from [RFC7053]. Therefore, [RFC6096] and [RFC7053] are also obsoleted by this document, if approved.

2.1. Motivation

TCP [RFC0793] has performed immense service as the primary means of reliable data transfer in IP networks. However, an increasing number of recent applications have found TCP too limiting, and have incorporated their own reliable data transfer protocol on top of UDP [RFC0768]. The limitations that users have wished to bypass include the following:

- * TCP provides both reliable data transfer and strict order-of-transmission delivery of data. Some applications need reliable transfer without sequence maintenance, while others would be satisfied with partial ordering of the data. In both of these cases, the head-of-line blocking offered by TCP causes unnecessary delay.
- * The stream-oriented nature of TCP is often an inconvenience. Applications add their own record marking to delineate their messages, and make explicit use of the push facility to ensure that a complete message is transferred in a reasonable time.
- * The limited scope of TCP sockets complicates the task of providing highly-available data transfer capability using multi-homed hosts.
- * TCP is relatively vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, such as SYN attacks.

Transport of PSTN signaling across the IP network is an application for which all of these limitations of TCP are relevant. While this application directly motivated the development of SCTP, other applications might find SCTP a good match to their requirements. One example of this is the use of datachannels in the WebRTC infrastructure.

2.2. Architectural View of SCTP

SCTP is viewed as a layer between the SCTP user application ("SCTP user" for short) and a connectionless packet network service such as IP. The remainder of this document assumes SCTP runs on top of IP. The basic service offered by SCTP is the reliable transfer of user messages between peer SCTP users. It performs this service within the context of an association between two SCTP endpoints. Section 11 of this document sketches the API that exists at the boundary between the SCTP and the SCTP upper layers.

SCTP is connection-oriented in nature, but the SCTP association is a broader concept than the TCP connection. SCTP provides the means for each SCTP endpoint (Section 2.3) to provide the other endpoint

(during association startup) with a list of transport addresses (i.e., multiple IP addresses in combination with an SCTP port) through which that endpoint can be reached and from which it will originate SCTP packets. The association spans transfers over all of the possible source/destination combinations that can be generated from each endpoint's lists.




Figure 1: An SCTP Association

In addition to encapsulating SCTP packets in IPv4 or IPv6, it is also possible to encapsulate SCTP packets in UDP as specified in [RFC6951] or encapsulate them in DTLS as specified in [RFC8261].

2.3. Key Terms

Some of the language used to describe SCTP has been introduced in the previous sections. This section provides a consolidated list of the key terms and their definitions.

Active Destination Transport Address: A transport address on a peer endpoint that a transmitting endpoint considers available for receiving user messages.

Association Maximum DATA Chunk Size (AMDCS): The smallest Path Maximum DATA Chunk Size (PMDCS) of all destination addresses.

Bundling Of Chunks: An optional multiplexing operation, whereby more than one chunk can be carried in the same SCTP packet.

Bundling Of User Messages: An optional multiplexing operation, whereby more than one user message can be carried in the same SCTP packet. Each user message occupies its own DATA chunk.

Chunk: A unit of information within an SCTP packet, consisting of a chunk header and chunk-specific content.

Congestion Window (cwnd): An SCTP variable that limits outstanding data, in number of bytes, that a sender can send to a particular destination transport address before receiving an acknowledgement.

Control Chunk: A chunk not being used for transmitting user data, i.e. every chunk which is not a DATA chunk.

Cumulative TSN Ack Point: The Transmission Sequence Number (TSN) of the last DATA chunk acknowledged via the Cumulative TSN Ack field of a SACK chunk.

Flightsize: The number of bytes of outstanding data to a particular destination transport address at any given time.

Idle Destination Address: An address that has not had user messages sent to it within some length of time, normally the 'HB.interval' or greater.

Inactive Destination Transport Address: An address that is considered inactive due to errors and unavailable to transport user messages.

Message (or User Message): Data submitted to SCTP by the Upper Layer Protocol (ULP).

Network Byte Order: Most significant byte first, a.k.a., big endian.

Ordered Message: A user message that is delivered in order with respect to all previous user messages sent within the stream on which the message was sent.

Outstanding Data (or Data Outstanding or Data In Flight): The total size of the DATA chunks associated with outstanding TSNs. A retransmitted DATA chunk is counted once in outstanding data. A DATA chunk that is classified as lost but that has not yet been retransmitted is not in outstanding data.

Outstanding TSN (at an SCTP Endpoint): A TSN (and the associated DATA chunk) that has been sent by the endpoint but for which it has not yet received an acknowledgement.

Out Of The Blue (OOTB) Packet: A correctly formed packet, for which the receiver can not identify the association it belongs to. See Section 8.4.

Path: The route taken by the SCTP packets sent by one SCTP endpoint to a specific destination transport address of its peer SCTP endpoint. Sending to different destination transport addresses does not necessarily guarantee getting separate paths. Within this specification, a path is identified by the destination transport address, since the routing is assumed to be stable. This includes in particular the source address being selected when sending packets to the destination address.

Path Maximum DATA Chunk Size (PMDCS): The maximum size (including the DATA chunk header) of a DATA chunk which fits into an SCTP packet not exceeding the PMTU of a particular destination address.

Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU): The maximum size (including the SCTP common header and all chunks including their paddings) of an SCTP packet which can be sent to a particular destination address without using IP level fragmentation.

Primary Path: The primary path is the destination and source address that will be put into a packet outbound to the peer endpoint by default. The definition includes the source address since an implementation MAY wish to specify both destination and source address to better control the return path taken by reply chunks and on which interface the packet is transmitted when the data sender is multi-homed.

Receiver Window (rwnd): An SCTP variable a data sender uses to store the most recently calculated receiver window of its peer, in number of bytes. This gives the sender an indication of the space available in the receiver's inbound buffer.

SCTP Association: A protocol relationship between SCTP endpoints, composed of the two SCTP endpoints and protocol state information including Verification Tags and the currently active set of Transmission Sequence Numbers (TSNs), etc. An association can be uniquely identified by the transport addresses used by the endpoints in the association. Two SCTP endpoints MUST NOT have more than one SCTP association between them at any given time.

SCTP Endpoint: The logical sender/receiver of SCTP packets. On a

multi-homed host, an SCTP endpoint is represented to its peers as a combination of a set of eligible destination transport addresses to which SCTP packets can be sent and a set of eligible source transport addresses from which SCTP packets can be received. All transport addresses used by an SCTP endpoint MUST use the same port number, but can use multiple IP addresses. A transport address used by an SCTP endpoint MUST NOT be used by another SCTP endpoint. In other words, a transport address is unique to an SCTP endpoint.

SCTP Packet (or Packet): The unit of data delivery across the interface between SCTP and the connectionless packet network (e.g., IP). An SCTP packet includes the common SCTP header, possible SCTP control chunks, and user data encapsulated within SCTP DATA chunks.

SCTP User Application (or SCTP User): The logical higher-layer application entity which uses the services of SCTP, also called the Upper-Layer Protocol (ULP).

Slow-Start Threshold (ssthresh): An SCTP variable. This is the threshold that the endpoint will use to determine whether to perform slow start or congestion avoidance on a particular destination transport address. Ssthresh is in number of bytes.

State Cookie: A container of all information needed to establish an association.

Stream: A unidirectional logical channel established from one to another associated SCTP endpoint, within which all user messages are delivered in sequence except for those submitted to the unordered delivery service.

Note: The relationship between stream numbers in opposite directions is strictly a matter of how the applications use them. It is the responsibility of the SCTP user to create and manage these correlations if they are so desired.

Stream Sequence Number: A 16-bit sequence number used internally by SCTP to ensure sequenced delivery of the user messages within a given stream. One Stream Sequence Number is attached to each ordered user message.

Tie-Tags: Two 32-bit random numbers that together make a 64-bit nonce. These tags are used within a State Cookie and TCB so that a newly restarting association can be linked to the original association within the endpoint that did not restart and yet not reveal the true Verification Tags of an existing association.

Transmission Control Block (TCB): An internal data structure created by an SCTP endpoint for each of its existing SCTP associations to other SCTP endpoints. TCB contains all the status and operational information for the endpoint to maintain and manage the corresponding association.

Transmission Sequence Number (TSN): A 32-bit sequence number used internally by SCTP. One TSN is attached to each chunk containing user data to permit the receiving SCTP endpoint to acknowledge its receipt and detect duplicate deliveries.

Transport Address: A transport address is traditionally defined by a network-layer address, a transport-layer protocol, and a transport-layer port number. In the case of SCTP running over IP, a transport address is defined by the combination of an IP address and an SCTP port number (where SCTP is the transport protocol).

Unordered Message: Unordered messages are "unordered" with respect to any other message; this includes both other unordered messages as well as other ordered messages. An unordered message might be delivered prior to or later than ordered messages sent on the same stream.

User Message: The unit of data delivery across the interface between SCTP and its user.

Verification Tag: A 32-bit unsigned integer that is randomly generated. The Verification Tag provides a key that allows a receiver to verify that the SCTP packet belongs to the current association and is not an old or stale packet from a previous association.

2.4. Abbreviations

MAC Message Authentication Code [RFC2104]
RTO Retransmission Timeout
RTT Round-Trip Time
RTTVAR Round-Trip Time Variation
SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol
SRTT Smoothed RTT
TCB Transmission Control Block
TLV Type-Length-Value coding format
TSN Transmission Sequence Number
ULP Upper-Layer Protocol

2.5. Functional View of SCTP

The SCTP transport service can be decomposed into a number of functions. These are depicted in Figure 2 and explained in the remainder of this section.




Figure 2: Functional View of the SCTP Transport Service

2.5.1. Association Startup and Takedown

An association is initiated by a request from the SCTP user (see the description of the ASSOCIATE (or SEND) primitive in Section 11).

A cookie mechanism, similar to one described by Karn and Simpson in [RFC2522], is employed during the initialization to provide protection against synchronization attacks. The cookie mechanism uses a four-way handshake, the last two legs of which are allowed to carry user data for fast setup. The startup sequence is described in Section 5 of this document.

SCTP provides for graceful close (i.e., shutdown) of an active association on request from the SCTP user. See the description of the SHUTDOWN primitive in Section 11. SCTP also allows ungraceful close (i.e., abort), either on request from the user (ABORT primitive) or as a result of an error condition detected within the SCTP layer. Section 9 describes both the graceful and the ungraceful close procedures.

SCTP does not support a half-open state (like TCP) wherein one side continues sending data while the other end is closed. When either endpoint performs a shutdown, the association on each peer will stop accepting new data from its user and only deliver data in queue at the time of the graceful close (see Section 9).

2.5.2. Sequenced Delivery within Streams

The term "stream" is used in SCTP to refer to a sequence of user messages that are to be delivered to the upper-layer protocol in order with respect to other messages within the same stream. This is in contrast to its usage in TCP, where it refers to a sequence of bytes (in this document, a byte is assumed to be 8 bits).

The SCTP user can specify at association startup time the number of streams to be supported by the association. This number is negotiated with the remote end (see Section 5.1.1). User messages are associated with stream numbers (SEND, RECEIVE primitives, Section 11). Internally, SCTP assigns a Stream Sequence Number to each message passed to it by the SCTP user. On the receiving side, SCTP ensures that messages are delivered to the SCTP user in sequence within a given stream. However, while one stream might be blocked waiting for the next in-sequence user message, delivery from other streams might proceed.

SCTP provides a mechanism for bypassing the sequenced delivery service. User messages sent using this mechanism are delivered to the SCTP user as soon as they are received.

2.5.3. User Data Fragmentation

When needed, SCTP fragments user messages to ensure that the size of the SCTP packet passed to the lower layer does not exceed the PMTU. Once a user message has been fragmented, this fragmentation cannot be changed anymore. On receipt, fragments are reassembled into complete messages before being passed to the SCTP user.

2.5.4. Acknowledgement and Congestion Avoidance

SCTP assigns a Transmission Sequence Number (TSN) to each user data fragment or unfragmented message. The TSN is independent of any Stream Sequence Number assigned at the stream level. The receiving end acknowledges all TSNs received, even if there are gaps in the sequence. If a user data fragment or unfragmented message needs to be retransmitted, the TSN assigned to it is used. In this way, reliable delivery is kept functionally separate from sequenced stream delivery.

The acknowledgement and congestion avoidance function is responsible for packet retransmission when timely acknowledgement has not been received. Packet retransmission is conditioned by congestion avoidance procedures similar to those used for TCP. See Section 6 and Section 7 for a detailed description of the protocol procedures associated with this function.

2.5.5. Chunk Bundling

As described in Section 3, the SCTP packet as delivered to the lower layer consists of a common header followed by one or more chunks. Each chunk contains either user data or SCTP control information. An SCTP implementation supporting bundling on the sender side might delay the sending of user messages to allow the corresponding DATA chunks to be bundled.

The SCTP user has the option to request that an SCTP implementation does not delay the sending of a user message just for this purpose. However, even if the SCTP user has chosen this option, the SCTP implementation might delay the sending due to other reasons, for example due to congestion control or flow control, and might also bundle multiple DATA chunks, if possible.

2.5.6. Packet Validation

A mandatory Verification Tag field and a 32-bit checksum field (see Appendix A for a description of the CRC32c checksum) are included in the SCTP common header. The Verification Tag value is chosen by each end of the association during association startup. Packets received without the expected Verification Tag value are discarded, as a protection against blind masquerade attacks and against stale SCTP packets from a previous association. The CRC32c checksum is set by the sender of each SCTP packet to provide additional protection against data corruption in the network. The receiver of an SCTP packet with an invalid CRC32c checksum silently discards the packet.

2.5.7. Path Management

The sending SCTP user is able to manipulate the set of transport addresses used as destinations for SCTP packets through the primitives described in Section 11. The SCTP path management function monitors reachability through heartbeats when other packet traffic is inadequate to provide this information and advises the SCTP user when reachability of any transport address of the peer endpoint changes. The path management function chooses the destination transport address for each outgoing SCTP packet based on the SCTP user's instructions and the currently perceived reachability status of the eligible destination set. The path management function is also responsible for reporting the eligible set of local transport addresses to the peer endpoint during association startup, and for reporting the transport addresses returned from the peer endpoint to the SCTP user.

At association startup, a primary path is defined for each SCTP endpoint, and is used for normal sending of SCTP packets.

On the receiving end, the path management is responsible for verifying the existence of a valid SCTP association to which the inbound SCTP packet belongs before passing it for further processing.

Note: Path Management and Packet Validation are done at the same time, so although described separately above, in reality they cannot be performed as separate items.

2.6. Serial Number Arithmetic

It is essential to remember that the actual Transmission Sequence Number space is finite, though very large. This space ranges from 0 to $2^{32} - 1$. Since the space is finite, all arithmetic dealing with Transmission Sequence Numbers MUST be performed modulo 2^{32} . This unsigned arithmetic preserves the relationship of sequence numbers as they cycle from $2^{32} - 1$ to 0 again. There are some subtleties to computer modulo arithmetic, so great care has to be taken in programming the comparison of such values. When referring to TSNs, the symbol " \leq " means "less than or equal" (modulo 2^{32}).

Comparisons and arithmetic on TSNs in this document SHOULD use Serial Number Arithmetic as defined in [RFC1982] where SERIAL_BITS = 32.

An endpoint SHOULD NOT transmit a DATA chunk with a TSN that is more than $2^{31} - 1$ above the beginning TSN of its current send window. Doing so will cause problems in comparing TSNs.

Transmission Sequence Numbers wrap around when they reach $2^{32} - 1$. That is, the next TSN a DATA chunk MUST use after transmitting TSN = $2^{32} - 1$ is TSN = 0.

Any arithmetic done on Stream Sequence Numbers SHOULD use Serial Number Arithmetic as defined in [RFC1982] where SERIAL_BITS = 16. All other arithmetic and comparisons in this document use normal arithmetic.

2.7. Changes from RFC 4960

SCTP was originally defined in [RFC4960], which this document obsoletes, if approved. Readers interested in the details of the various changes that this document incorporates are asked to consult [RFC8540].

In addition to these and further editorial changes, the following changes have been incorporated in this document:


- * Update references.
- * Improve the language related to requirements levels.
- * Allow the ASSOCIATE primitive to take multiple remote addresses; also refer to the Socket API specification.
- * Refer to the PLPMTUD specification for path MTU discovery.

- * Move the description of ICMP handling from an Appendix to the main text.
- * Remove the Appendix describing ECN handling from the document.
- * Describe the packet size handling more precisely by introducing PMTU, PMDCS and AMDCS.
- * Add the definition of control chunk.
- * Improve the description of the handling of INIT and INIT ACK chunks with invalid mandatory parameters.
- * Allow using $L > 1$ for Appropriate Byte Counting (ABC) during slow start.
- * Explicitly describe the reinitialization of the congestion controller on route changes.
- * Improve the terminology to make clear that this specification does not describe a full mesh architecture.
- * Improve the description of sequence number generation (Transmission Sequence Number and Stream Sequence Number).
- * Improve the description of reneging.
- * Don't require the change of the cumulative TSN ACK anymore for increasing the congestion window. This improves the consistency with the handling in congestion avoidance.
- * Improve the description of the State Cookie.
- * Fix the API for retrieving messages in case of association failures.

3. SCTP Packet Format

An SCTP packet is composed of a common header and chunks. A chunk contains either control information or user data.

The SCTP packet format is shown below:




INIT, INIT ACK and SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunks MUST NOT be bundled with any other chunk into an SCTP packet. All other chunks MAY be bundled to form an SCTP packet that does not exceed the PMTU. See Section 6.10 for more details on chunk bundling.

If a user data message does not fit into one SCTP packet it can be fragmented into multiple chunks using the procedure defined in Section 6.9.

All integer fields in an SCTP packet MUST be transmitted in network byte order, unless otherwise stated.

3.1. SCTP Common Header Field Descriptions



Source Port Number: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

This is the SCTP sender's port number. It can be used by the receiver in combination with the source IP address, the SCTP destination port, and possibly the destination IP address to identify the association to which this packet belongs. The source port number 0 MUST NOT be used.

Destination Port Number: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

This is the SCTP port number to which this packet is destined. The receiving host will use this port number to de-multiplex the SCTP packet to the correct receiving endpoint/application. The destination port number 0 MUST NOT be used.

Verification Tag: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

The receiver of an SCTP packet uses the Verification Tag to validate the sender of this packet. On transmit, the value of the Verification Tag MUST be set to the value of the Initiate Tag received from the peer endpoint during the association initialization, with the following exceptions:


- * A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification Tag.
- * A packet containing a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk with the T bit set MUST have the Verification Tag copied from the packet with the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk.
- * A packet containing an ABORT chunk MAY have the verification tag copied from the packet that caused the ABORT chunk to be sent. For details see Section 8.4 and Section 8.5.

Checksum: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This field contains the checksum of the SCTP packet. Its calculation is discussed in Section 6.8. SCTP uses the CRC32c algorithm as described in Appendix A for calculating the checksum.

3.2. Chunk Field Descriptions

The figure below illustrates the field format for the chunks to be transmitted in the SCTP packet. Each chunk is formatted with a Chunk Type field, a chunk-specific Flag field, a Chunk Length field, and a Value field.



Chunk Type: 8 bits (unsigned integer)

This field identifies the type of information contained in the Chunk Value field. It takes a value from 0 to 254. The value of 255 is reserved for future use as an extension field.

The values of Chunk Types are defined as follows:

ID Value	Chunk Type
0	Payload Data (DATA)
1	Initiation (INIT)
2	Initiation Acknowledgement (INIT ACK)
3	Selective Acknowledgement (SACK)
4	Heartbeat Request (HEARTBEAT)
5	Heartbeat Acknowledgement (HEARTBEAT ACK)
6	Abort (ABORT)
7	Shutdown (SHUTDOWN)
8	Shutdown Acknowledgement (SHUTDOWN ACK)
9	Operation Error (ERROR)
10	State Cookie (COOKIE ECHO)
11	Cookie Acknowledgement (COOKIE ACK)
12	Reserved for Explicit Congestion Notification Echo (ECNE)
13	Reserved for Congestion Window Reduced (CWR)
14	Shutdown Complete (SHUTDOWN COMPLETE)
15 to 62	available
63	reserved for IETF-defined Chunk Extensions
64 to 126	available
127	reserved for IETF-defined Chunk Extensions
128 to 190	available

191	reserved for IETF-defined Chunk Extensions
192 to 254	available
255	reserved for IETF-defined Chunk Extensions

Table 1: Chunk Types

Note: The ECNE and CWR chunk types are reserved for future use of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN).

Chunk Types are encoded such that the highest-order 2 bits specify the action that is taken if the processing endpoint does not recognize the Chunk Type.

00	Stop processing this SCTP packet; discard the unrecognized chunk and all further chunks.
01	Stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and all further chunks, and report the unrecognized chunk in an ERROR chunk using the 'Unrecognized Chunk Type' error cause.
10	Skip this chunk and continue processing.
11	Skip this chunk and continue processing, but report it in an ERROR chunk using the 'Unrecognized Chunk Type' error cause.

Table 2: Processing of Unknown Chunks

Chunk Flags: 8 bits

The usage of these bits depends on the Chunk type as given by the Chunk Type field. Unless otherwise specified, they are set to 0 on transmit and are ignored on receipt.

Chunk Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

This value represents the size of the chunk in bytes, including the Chunk Type, Chunk Flags, Chunk Length, and Chunk Value fields. Therefore, if the Chunk Value field is zero-length, the Length field will be set to 4. The Chunk Length field does not count any chunk padding. However, it does include any padding of variable-length parameters other than the last parameter in the chunk.

Note: A robust implementation is expected to accept the chunk whether or not the final padding has been included in the Chunk Length.

Chunk Value: variable length


The Chunk Value field contains the actual information to be transferred in the chunk. The usage and format of this field is dependent on the Chunk Type.

The total length of a chunk (including Type, Length, and Value fields) MUST be a multiple of 4 bytes. If the length of the chunk is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes, and this padding is not included in the Chunk Length field. The sender MUST NOT pad with more than 3 bytes. The receiver MUST ignore the padding bytes.

SCTP-defined chunks are described in detail in Section 3.3. The guidelines for IETF-defined chunk extensions can be found in Section 15.1 of this document.

3.2.1. Optional/Variable-Length Parameter Format

Chunk values of SCTP control chunks consist of a chunk-type-specific header of required fields, followed by zero or more parameters. The optional and variable-length parameters contained in a chunk are defined in a Type-Length-Value format as shown below.



Parameter Type: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

The Type field is a 16-bit identifier of the type of parameter. It takes a value of 0 to 65534.

The value of 65535 is reserved for IETF-defined extensions. Values other than those defined in specific SCTP chunk descriptions are reserved for use by IETF.

Parameter Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

The Parameter Length field contains the size of the parameter in bytes, including the Parameter Type, Parameter Length, and Parameter Value fields. Thus, a parameter with a zero-length Parameter Value field would have a Parameter Length field of 4. The Parameter Length does not include any padding bytes.

Parameter Value: variable length

The Parameter Value field contains the actual information to be transferred in the parameter.

The total length of a parameter (including Parameter Type, Parameter Length, and Parameter Value fields) MUST be a multiple of 4 bytes. If the length of the parameter is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the parameter at the end (i.e., after the Parameter Value field) with all zero bytes. The length of the padding is not included in the Parameter Length field. A sender MUST NOT pad with more than 3 bytes. The receiver MUST ignore the padding bytes.

The Parameter Types are encoded such that the highest-order 2 bits specify the action that is taken if the processing endpoint does not recognize the Parameter Type.

00	Stop processing this parameter; do not process any further parameters within this chunk.
01	Stop processing this parameter, do not process any further parameters within this chunk, and report the unrecognized parameter as described in Section 3.2.2.
10	Skip this parameter and continue processing.
11	Skip this parameter and continue processing but report the unrecognized parameter as described in Section 3.2.2.

Table 3: Processing of Unknown Parameters

Please note that, when an INIT or INIT ACK chunk is received, in all four cases, an INIT ACK or COOKIE ECHO chunk is sent in response, respectively. In the 00 or 01 case, the processing of the parameters after the unknown parameter is canceled, but no processing already done is rolled back.

The actual SCTP parameters are defined in the specific SCTP chunk sections. The rules for IETF-defined parameter extensions are defined in Section 15.3. Parameter types MUST be unique across all chunks. For example, the parameter type '5' is used to represent an IPv4 address (see Section 3.3.2.1). The value '5' then is reserved across all chunks to represent an IPv4 address and MUST NOT be reused with a different meaning in any other chunk.

3.2.2. Reporting of Unrecognized Parameters

If the receiver of an INIT chunk detects unrecognized parameters and has to report them according to Section 3.2.1, it MUST put the "Unrecognized Parameter" parameter(s) in the INIT ACK chunk sent in response to the INIT chunk. Note that if the receiver of the INIT chunk is not going to establish an association (e.g., due to lack of resources), an "Unrecognized Parameter" error cause would not be included with any ABORT chunk being sent to the sender of the INIT chunk.

If the receiver of any other chunk (e.g., INIT ACK) detects unrecognized parameters and has to report them according to Section 3.2.1, it SHOULD bundle the ERROR chunk containing the "Unrecognized Parameters" error cause with the chunk sent in response (e.g., COOKIE ECHO). If the receiver of an INIT ACK chunk cannot bundle the COOKIE ECHO chunk with the ERROR chunk, the ERROR chunk MAY be sent separately but not before the COOKIE ACK chunk has been received.


Any time a COOKIE ECHO chunk is sent in a packet, it MUST be the first chunk.

3.3. SCTP Chunk Definitions

This section defines the format of the different SCTP chunk types.

3.3.1. Payload Data (DATA) (0)

The following format MUST be used for the DATA chunk:



Res: 4 bits

All set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

I bit: 1 bit

The (I)mmEDIATE bit MAY be set by the sender whenever the sender of a DATA chunk can benefit from the corresponding SACK chunk being sent back without delay. See Section 4 of [RFC7053] for a discussion of the benefits.

U bit: 1 bit

The (U)NORDERED bit, if set to 1, indicates that this is an unordered DATA chunk, and there is no Stream Sequence Number assigned to this DATA chunk. Therefore, the receiver MUST ignore the Stream Sequence Number field.

After reassembly (if necessary), unordered DATA chunks MUST be dispatched to the upper layer by the receiver without any attempt to reorder.

If an unordered user message is fragmented, each fragment of the message MUST have its U bit set to 1.

B bit: 1 bit

The (B)EGINNING fragment bit, if set, indicates the first fragment of a user message.

E bit: 1 bit

The (E)NDING fragment bit, if set, indicates the last fragment of a user message.

Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

This field indicates the length of the DATA chunk in bytes from the beginning of the type field to the end of the User Data field excluding any padding. A DATA chunk with one byte of user data will have Length set to 17 (indicating 17 bytes).

A DATA chunk with a User Data field of length L will have the Length field set to $(16 + L)$ (indicating $16 + L$ bytes) where L MUST be greater than 0.

TSN: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This value represents the TSN for this DATA chunk. The valid range of TSN is from 0 to 4294967295 ($2^{32} - 1$). TSN wraps back to 0 after reaching 4294967295.

Stream Identifier S: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Identifies the stream to which the following user data belongs.

Stream Sequence Number n: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

This value represents the Stream Sequence Number of the following user data within the stream S. Valid range is 0 to 65535.

When a user message is fragmented by SCTP for transport, the same Stream Sequence Number MUST be carried in each of the fragments of the message.

Payload Protocol Identifier: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This value represents an application (or upper layer) specified protocol identifier. This value is passed to SCTP by its upper layer and sent to its peer. This identifier is not used by SCTP but can be used by certain network entities, as well as by the peer application, to identify the type of information being carried in this DATA chunk. This field MUST be sent even in fragmented DATA chunks (to make sure it is available for agents in the middle of the network). Note that this field is not touched by an SCTP implementation; The upper layer is responsible for the host to network byte order conversion of this field.

The value 0 indicates that no application identifier is specified by the upper layer for this payload data.

User Data: variable length

This is the payload user data. The implementation MUST pad the end of the data to a 4-byte boundary with all-zero bytes. Any padding MUST NOT be included in the Length field. A sender MUST never add more than 3 bytes of padding.

An unfragmented user message **MUST** have both the B and E bits set to 1. Setting both B and E bits to 0 indicates a middle fragment of a multi-fragment user message, as summarized in the following table:

B	E	Description
1	0	First piece of a fragmented user message
0	0	Middle piece of a fragmented user message
0	1	Last piece of a fragmented user message
1	1	Unfragmented message

Table 4: Fragment Description Flags


When a user message is fragmented into multiple chunks, the TSNs are used by the receiver to reassemble the message. This means that the TSNs for each fragment of a fragmented user message **MUST** be strictly sequential.

The TSNs of DATA chunks sent **SHOULD** be strictly sequential.

Note: The extension described in [RFC8260] can be used to mitigate the head of line blocking when transferring large user messages.

3.3.2. Initiation (INIT) (1)

This chunk is used to initiate an SCTP association between two endpoints. The format of the INIT chunk is shown below:



The following parameters are specified for the INIT chunk. Unless otherwise noted, each parameter MUST only be included once in the INIT chunk.

Fixed Length Parameter	Status
Initiate Tag	Mandatory
Advertised Receiver Window Credit	Mandatory
Number of Outbound Streams	Mandatory
Number of Inbound Streams	Mandatory
Initial TSN	Mandatory

Table 5: Fixed Length Parameters of INIT Chunks

Variable Length Parameter	Status	Type Value
IPv4 Address (Note 1)	Optional	5
IPv6 Address (Note 1)	Optional	6
Cookie Preservative	Optional	9
Reserved for ECN Capable (Note 2)	Optional	32768 (0x8000)
Host Name Address (Note 3)	Deprecated	11
Supported Address Types (Note 4)	Optional	12

Table 6: Variable Length Parameters of INIT Chunks

Note 1: The INIT chunks can contain multiple addresses that can be IPv4 and/or IPv6 in any combination.

Note 2: The ECN Capable field is reserved for future use of Explicit Congestion Notification.

Note 3: An INIT chunk MUST NOT contain the Host Name Address parameter. The receiver of an INIT chunk containing a Host Name Address parameter MUST send an ABORT chunk and MAY include an "Unresolvable Address" error cause.

Note 4: This parameter, when present, specifies all the address types the sending endpoint can support. The absence of this parameter indicates that the sending endpoint can support any address type.

If an INIT chunk is received with all mandatory parameters that are specified for the INIT chunk, then the receiver SHOULD process the INIT chunk and send back an INIT ACK. The receiver of the INIT chunk MAY bundle an ERROR chunk with the COOKIE ACK chunk later. However, restrictive implementations MAY send back an ABORT chunk in response to the INIT chunk.

The Chunk Flags field in INIT chunks is reserved, and all bits in it SHOULD be set to 0 by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

Initiate Tag: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

The receiver of the INIT chunk (the responding end) records the value of the Initiate Tag parameter. This value MUST be placed into the Verification Tag field of every SCTP packet that the receiver of the INIT chunk transmits within this association.

The Initiate Tag is allowed to have any value except 0. See Section 5.3.1 for more on the selection of the tag value.

If the value of the Initiate Tag in a received INIT chunk is found to be 0, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet.

Advertised Receiver Window Credit (a_rwnd): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This value represents the dedicated buffer space, in number of bytes, the sender of the INIT chunk has reserved in association with this window.

The Advertised Receiver Window Credit MUST NOT be smaller than 1500.

A receiver of an INIT chunk with the a_rwnd value set to a value smaller than 1500 MUST discard the packet, SHOULD send a packet in response containing an ABORT chunk and using the Initiate Tag as the Verification Tag, and MUST NOT change the state of any existing association.

During the life of the association, this buffer space SHOULD NOT be reduced (i.e., dedicated buffers ought not to be taken away from this association); however, an endpoint MAY change the value of a_rwnd it sends in SACK chunks.

Number of Outbound Streams (OS): 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the number of outbound streams the sender of this INIT chunk wishes to create in this association. The value of 0 MUST NOT be used.

A receiver of an INIT chunk with the OS value set to 0 MUST discard the packet, SHOULD send a packet in response containing an ABORT chunk and using the Initiate Tag as the Verification Tag, and MUST NOT change the state of any existing association.

Number of Inbound Streams (MIS): 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the maximum number of streams the sender of this INIT chunk allows the peer end to create in this association. The value 0 MUST NOT be used.

Note: There is no negotiation of the actual number of streams but instead the two endpoints will use the min(requested, offered). See Section 5.1.1 for details.

A receiver of an INIT chunk with the MIS value set to 0 MUST discard the packet, SHOULD send a packet in response containing an ABORT chunk and using the Initiate Tag as the Verification Tag, and MUST NOT change the state of any existing association.


Initial TSN (I-TSN): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the initial TSN that the sender of the INIT chunk will use. The valid range is from 0 to 4294967295 and the Initial TSN SHOULD be set to a random value in that range. The methods described in [RFC4086] can be used for the Initial TSN randomization.

3.3.2.1. Optional or Variable-Length Parameters in INIT chunks

The following parameters follow the Type-Length-Value format as defined in Section 3.2.1. Any Type-Length-Value fields MUST be placed after the fixed-length fields. (The fixed-length fields are defined in the previous section.)


3.3.2.1.1. IPv4 Address (5)



IPv4 Address: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

Contains an IPv4 address of the sending endpoint. It is binary encoded.

3.3.2.1.2. IPv6 Address (6)



IPv6 Address: 128 bits (unsigned integer)

Contains an IPv6 [RFC8200] address of the sending endpoint. It is binary encoded.

A sender **MUST NOT** use an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address [RFC4291], but **SHOULD** instead use an IPv4 Address parameter for an IPv4 address.

Combined with the Source Port Number in the SCTP common header, the value passed in an IPv4 or IPv6 Address parameter indicates a transport address the sender of the INIT chunk will support for the association being initiated. That is, during the life time of this association, this IP address can appear in the source address field of an IP datagram sent from the sender of the INIT chunk, and can be used as a destination address of an IP datagram sent from the receiver of the INIT chunk.


More than one IP Address parameter can be included in an INIT chunk when the sender of the INIT chunk is multi-homed. Moreover, a multi-homed endpoint might have access to different types of network; thus, more than one address type can be present in one INIT chunk, i.e., IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are allowed in the same INIT chunk.

If the INIT chunk contains at least one IP Address parameter, then the source address of the IP datagram containing the INIT chunk and any additional address(es) provided within the INIT can be used as destinations by the endpoint receiving the INIT chunk. If the INIT chunk does not contain any IP Address parameters, the endpoint receiving the INIT chunk **MUST** use the source address associated with the received IP datagram as its sole destination address for the association.

Note that not using any IP Address parameters in the INIT and INIT ACK chunk is a way to make an association more likely to work in combination with Network Address Translation (NAT).

3.3.2.1.3. Cookie Preservative (9)

The sender of the INIT chunk uses this parameter to suggest to the receiver of the INIT chunk a longer life-span for the State Cookie.




Suggested Cookie Life-Span Increment: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This parameter indicates to the receiver how much increment in milliseconds the sender wishes the receiver to add to its default cookie life-span.

This optional parameter MAY be added to the INIT chunk by the sender when it reattempts establishing an association with a peer to which its previous attempt of establishing the association failed due to a stale cookie operation error. The receiver MAY choose to ignore the suggested cookie life-span increase for its own security reasons.

3.3.2.1.4. Host Name Address (11)

The sender of an INIT chunk or INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT include this parameter. The usage of the Host Name Address parameter is deprecated. The receiver of an INIT chunk or an INIT ACK containing a Host Name Address parameter MUST send an ABORT chunk and MAY include an "Unresolvable Address" error cause.




Host Name: variable length

This field contains a host name in "host name syntax" per Section 2.1 of [RFC1123]. The method for resolving the host name is out of scope of SCTP.

At least one null terminator is included in the Host Name string and MUST be included in the length.

3.3.2.1.5. Supported Address Types (12)

The sender of INIT chunk uses this parameter to list all the address types it can support.




Address Type: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

This is filled with the type value of the corresponding address TLV (e.g., 5 for indicating IPv4, 6 for indicating IPv6). The value indicating the Host Name Address parameter MUST NOT be used when sending this parameter and MUST be ignored when receiving this parameter.

3.3.3. Initiation Acknowledgement (INIT ACK) (2)

The INIT ACK chunk is used to acknowledge the initiation of an SCTP association. The format of the INIT ACK chunk is shown below:



The parameter part of INIT ACK is formatted similarly to the INIT chunk. The following parameters are specified for the INIT ACK chunk:

Fixed Length Parameter	Status
Initiate Tag	Mandatory
Advertised Receiver Window Credit	Mandatory
Number of Outbound Streams	Mandatory
Number of Inbound Streams	Mandatory
Initial TSN	Mandatory

Table 7: Fixed Length Parameters of INIT ACK Chunks

It uses two extra variable parameters: The State Cookie and the Unrecognized Parameter:

Variable Length Parameter	Status	Type Value
State Cookie	Mandatory	7
IPv4 Address (Note 1)	Optional	5
IPv6 Address (Note 1)	Optional	6
Unrecognized Parameter	Optional	8
Reserved for ECN Capable (Note 2)	Optional	32768 (0x8000)
Host Name Address (Note 3)	Deprecated	11

Table 8: Variable Length Parameters of INIT ACK Chunks

Note 1: The INIT ACK chunks can contain any number of IP address parameters that can be IPv4 and/or IPv6 in any combination.

Note 2: The ECN Capable field is reserved for future use of Explicit Congestion Notification.

Note 3: An INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT contain the Host Name Address parameter. The receiver of INIT ACK chunks containing a Host Name Address parameter MUST send an ABORT chunk and MAY include an "Unresolvable Address" error cause.

The Chunk Flags field in INIT ACK chunks is reserved, and all bits in it SHOULD be set to 0 by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

Initiate Tag: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

The receiver of the INIT ACK chunk records the value of the Initiate Tag parameter. This value MUST be placed into the Verification Tag field of every SCTP packet that the receiver of the INIT ACK chunk transmits within this association.

The Initiate Tag MUST NOT take the value 0. See Section 5.3.1 for more on the selection of the Initiate Tag value.

If an endpoint in the COOKIE-WAIT state receives an INIT ACK chunk with the Initiate Tag set to 0, it MUST destroy the TCB and SHOULD send an ABORT chunk with the T bit set. If such an INIT-ACK chunk is received in any state other than CLOSED or COOKIE-WAIT, it SHOULD be discarded silently (see Section 5.2.3).

Advertised Receiver Window Credit (a_rwnd): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This value represents the dedicated buffer space, in number of bytes, the sender of the INIT ACK chunk has reserved in association with this window.

The Advertised Receiver Window Credit MUST NOT be smaller than 1500.

A receiver of an INIT ACK chunk with the a_rwnd value set to a value smaller than 1500 MUST discard the packet, SHOULD send a packet in response containing an ABORT chunk and using the Initiate Tag as the Verification Tag, and MUST NOT change the state of any existing association.

During the life of the association, this buffer space SHOULD NOT be reduced (i.e., dedicated buffers ought not to be taken away from this association); however, an endpoint MAY change the value of a_rwnd it sends in SACK chunks.

Number of Outbound Streams (OS): 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the number of outbound streams the sender of this INIT ACK chunk wishes to create in this association. The value of 0 MUST NOT be used, and the value MUST NOT be greater than the MIS value sent in the INIT chunk.

If an endpoint in the COOKIE-WAIT state receives an INIT ACK chunk with the OS value set to 0, it MUST destroy the TCB and SHOULD send an ABORT chunk. If such an INIT-ACK chunk is received in any state other than CLOSED or COOKIE-WAIT, it SHOULD be discarded silently (see Section 5.2.3).

Number of Inbound Streams (MIS): 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the maximum number of streams the sender of this INIT ACK chunk allows the peer end to create in this association. The value 0 MUST NOT be used.

Note: There is no negotiation of the actual number of streams but instead the two endpoints will use the min(requested, offered). See Section 5.1.1 for details.

If an endpoint in the COOKIE-WAIT state receives an INIT ACK chunk with the MIS value set to 0, it MUST destroy the TCB and SHOULD send an ABORT chunk. If such an INIT-ACK chunk is received in any state other than CLOSED or COOKIE-WAIT, it SHOULD be discarded silently (see Section 5.2.3).

Initial TSN (I-TSN): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the initial TSN that the sender of the INIT ACK chunk will use. The valid range is from 0 to 4294967295 and the Initial TSN SHOULD be set to a random value in that range. The methods described in [RFC4086] can be used for the Initial TSN randomization.

Implementation Note: An implementation MUST be prepared to receive an INIT ACK chunk that is quite large (more than 1500 bytes) due to the variable size of the State Cookie and the variable address list. For example if a responder to the INIT chunk has 1000 IPv4 addresses it wishes to send, it would need at least 8,000 bytes to encode this in the INIT ACK chunk.

If an INIT ACK chunk is received with all mandatory parameters that are specified for the INIT ACK chunk, then the receiver SHOULD process the INIT ACK chunk and send back a COOKIE ECHO chunk. The receiver of the INIT ACK chunk MAY bundle an ERROR chunk with the COOKIE ECHO chunk. However, restrictive implementations MAY send back an ABORT chunk in response to the INIT ACK chunk.

In combination with the Source Port carried in the SCTP common header, each IP Address parameter in the INIT ACK chunk indicates to the receiver of the INIT ACK chunk a valid transport address supported by the sender of the INIT ACK chunk for the life time of the association being initiated.


If the INIT ACK chunk contains at least one IP Address parameter, then the source address of the IP datagram containing the INIT ACK chunk and any additional address(es) provided within the INIT ACK chunk MAY be used as destinations by the receiver of the INIT ACK chunk. If the INIT ACK chunk does not contain any IP Address parameters, the receiver of the INIT ACK chunk MUST use the source address associated with the received IP datagram as its sole destination address for the association.

The State Cookie and Unrecognized Parameters use the Type-Length-Value format as defined in Section 3.2.1 and are described below. The other fields are defined the same as their counterparts in the INIT chunk.

3.3.3.1. Optional or Variable-Length Parameters in INIT ACK chunks

The State Cookie and Unrecognized Parameters use the Type-Length-Value format as defined in Section 3.2.1 and are described below. The IPv4 Address Parameter is described in Section 3.3.2.1.1, and the IPv6 Address Parameter is described in Section 3.3.2.1.2. The Host Name Address Parameter is described in Section 3.3.2.1.4 and MUST NOT be included in an INIT ACK chunk. Any Type-Length-Value fields MUST be placed after the fixed-length fields. (The fixed-length fields are defined in the previous section.)

3.3.3.1.1. State Cookie (7)




Cookie: variable length

This parameter value MUST contain all the necessary state and parameter information required for the sender of this INIT ACK chunk to create the association, along with a Message Authentication Code (MAC). See Section 5.1.3 for details on State Cookie definition.

3.3.3.1.2. Unrecognized Parameter (8)

This parameter is returned to the originator of the INIT chunk when the INIT chunk contains an unrecognized parameter that has a type that indicates it SHOULD be reported to the sender.



Unrecognized Parameter: variable length

The parameter value field will contain an unrecognized parameter copied from the INIT chunk complete with Parameter Type, Length, and Value fields.

3.3.4. Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) (3)


This chunk is sent to the peer endpoint to acknowledge received DATA chunks and to inform the peer endpoint of gaps in the received subsequences of DATA chunks as represented by their TSNs.

The SACK chunk MUST contain the Cumulative TSN Ack, Advertised Receiver Window Credit (*a_rwnd*), Number of Gap Ack Blocks, and Number of Duplicate TSNs fields.

By definition, the value of the Cumulative TSN Ack parameter is the last TSN received before a break in the sequence of received TSNs occurs; the next TSN value following this one has not yet been received at the endpoint sending the SACK chunk. This parameter therefore acknowledges receipt of all TSNs less than or equal to its value.

The handling of *a_rwnd* by the receiver of the SACK chunk is discussed in detail in Section 6.2.1.

The SACK chunk also contains zero or more Gap Ack Blocks. Each Gap Ack Block acknowledges a subsequence of TSNs received following a break in the sequence of received TSNs. The Gap Ack Blocks SHOULD be isolated. This means that the TSN just before each Gap Ack Block and the TSN just after each Gap Ack Block have not been received. By definition, all TSNs acknowledged by Gap Ack Blocks are greater than the value of the Cumulative TSN Ack.



Chunk Flags: 8 bits

All set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Cumulative TSN Ack: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

The largest TSN, such that all TSNs smaller than or equal to it have been received and the next one has not been received. In the case where no DATA chunk has been received, this value is set to the peer's Initial TSN minus one.

Advertised Receiver Window Credit (a_rwnd): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This field indicates the updated receive buffer space in bytes of the sender of this SACK chunk; see Section 6.2.1 for details.

Number of Gap Ack Blocks: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Indicates the number of Gap Ack Blocks included in this SACK chunk.

Number of Duplicate TSNs: 16 bit

This field contains the number of duplicate TSNs the endpoint has received. Each duplicate TSN is listed following the Gap Ack Block list.

Gap Ack Blocks:

These fields contain the Gap Ack Blocks. They are repeated for each Gap Ack Block up to the number of Gap Ack Blocks defined in the Number of Gap Ack Blocks field. All DATA chunks with TSNs greater than or equal to (Cumulative TSN Ack + Gap Ack Block Start) and less than or equal to (Cumulative TSN Ack + Gap Ack Block End) of each Gap Ack Block are assumed to have been received correctly.

Gap Ack Block Start: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Indicates the Start offset TSN for this Gap Ack Block. To calculate the actual TSN number the Cumulative TSN Ack is added to this offset number. This calculated TSN identifies the lowest TSN in this Gap Ack Block that has been received.

Gap Ack Block End: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Indicates the End offset TSN for this Gap Ack Block. To calculate the actual TSN number, the Cumulative TSN Ack is added to this offset number. This calculated TSN identifies the highest TSN in this Gap Ack Block that has been received.

For example, assume that the receiver has the following DATA chunks newly arrived at the time when it decides to send a Selective ACK,

```

-----
| TSN = 17 |
-----
|           | <- still missing
-----
| TSN = 15 |
-----
| TSN = 14 |
-----
|           | <- still missing
-----
| TSN = 12 |
-----
| TSN = 11 |
-----
| TSN = 10 |
-----

```

then the parameter part of the SACK chunk MUST be constructed as follows (assuming the new a_rwnd is set to 4660 by the sender):

Cumulative TSN Ack = 12															
a_rwnd = 4660															
num of block = 2								num of dup = 0							
block #1 start = 2								block #1 end = 3							
block #2 start = 5								block #2 end = 5							

Duplicate TSN: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

Indicates the number of times a TSN was received in duplicate since the last SACK chunk was sent. Every time a receiver gets a duplicate TSN (before sending the SACK chunk), it adds it to the list of duplicates. The duplicate count is reinitialized to zero after sending each SACK chunk.

For example, if a receiver were to get the TSN 19 three times it would list 19 twice in the outbound SACK chunk. After sending the SACK chunk, if it received yet one more TSN 19 it would list 19 as a duplicate once in the next outgoing SACK chunk.

3.3.5. Heartbeat Request (HEARTBEAT) (4)

An endpoint SHOULD send a HEARTBEAT (HB) chunk to its peer endpoint to probe the reachability of a particular destination transport address defined in the present association.

The parameter field contains the Heartbeat Information, which is a variable-length opaque data structure understood only by the sender.

0																1																2																3															
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1																																
Type = 4																Chunk Flags																Heartbeat Length																															
Heartbeat Information TLV (Variable-Length)																																																															

Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Heartbeat Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Set to the size of the chunk in bytes, including the chunk header and the Heartbeat Information field.

Heartbeat Information: variable length

Defined as a variable-length parameter using the format described in Section 3.2.1, i.e.:

Variable Parameters	Status	Type Value
Heartbeat Info	Mandatory	1

Table 9: Variable Length Parameters of
HEARTBEAT Chunks


0										1										2										3									
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1								
+-----																																							

The Sender-Specific Heartbeat Info field SHOULD include information about the sender's current time when this HEARTBEAT chunk is sent and the destination transport address to which this HEARTBEAT chunk is sent (see Section 8.3). This information is simply reflected back by the receiver in the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk (see Section 3.3.6). Note also that the HEARTBEAT chunk is both for reachability checking and for path verification (see Section 5.4). When a HEARTBEAT chunk is being used for path verification purposes, it MUST include a random nonce of length 64-bit or longer ([RFC4086] provides some information on randomness guidelines).

3.3.6. Heartbeat Acknowledgement (HEARTBEAT ACK) (5)

An endpoint MUST send this chunk to its peer endpoint as a response to a HEARTBEAT chunk (see Section 8.3). A packet containing the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk is always sent to the source IP address of the IP datagram containing the HEARTBEAT chunk to which this HEARTBEAT ACK chunk is responding.

The parameter field contains a variable-length opaque data structure.



Chunk Flags: 8 bits
Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Heartbeat Ack Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
Set to the size of the chunk in bytes, including the chunk header and the Heartbeat Information field.

Heartbeat Information: variable length
This field MUST contain the Heartbeat Info parameter (as defined in Section 3.3.5) of the Heartbeat Request to which this Heartbeat Acknowledgement is responding.


Variable Parameters	Status	Type Value
Heartbeat Info	Mandatory	1

Table 10: Variable Length Parameters of
HEARTBEAT ACK Chunks

3.3.7. Abort Association (ABORT) (6)

The ABORT chunk is sent to the peer of an association to close the association. The ABORT chunk MAY contain Cause Parameters to inform the receiver about the reason of the abort. DATA chunks MUST NOT be bundled with ABORT chunks. Control chunks (except for INIT, INIT ACK, and SHUTDOWN COMPLETE) MAY be bundled with an ABORT chunk, but they MUST be placed before the ABORT chunk in the SCTP packet, otherwise they will be ignored by the receiver.

If an endpoint receives an ABORT chunk with a format error or no TCB is found, it MUST silently discard it. Moreover, under any circumstances, an endpoint that receives an ABORT chunk MUST NOT respond to that ABORT chunk by sending an ABORT chunk of its own.



Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Reserved: 7 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

T bit: 1 bit

The T bit is set to 0 if the sender filled in the Verification Tag expected by the peer. If the Verification Tag is reflected, the T bit MUST be set to 1. Reflecting means that the sent Verification Tag is the same as the received one.

Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)


Set to the size of the chunk in bytes, including the chunk header and all the Error Cause fields present.

See Section 3.3.10 for Error Cause definitions.

Note: Special rules apply to this chunk for verification; please see Section 8.5.1 for details.

3.3.8. Shutdown Association (SHUTDOWN) (7)

An endpoint in an association MUST use this chunk to initiate a graceful close of the association with its peer. This chunk has the following format.




Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Indicates the length of the parameter. Set to 8.




Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Set to the size of the chunk in bytes, including the chunk header and all the Error Cause fields present.

Error causes are defined as variable-length parameters using the format described in Section 3.2.1, that is:



Cause Code: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Defines the type of error conditions being reported.

Value	Cause Code
1	Invalid Stream Identifier
2	Missing Mandatory Parameter
3	Stale Cookie Error
4	Out of Resource
5	Unresolvable Address
6	Unrecognized Chunk Type
7	Invalid Mandatory Parameter
8	Unrecognized Parameters
9	No User Data
10	Cookie Received While Shutting Down
11	Restart of an Association with New Addresses
12	User Initiated Abort
13	Protocol Violation

Table 11: Cause Code

Cause Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Set to the size of the parameter in bytes, including the Cause Code, Cause Length, and Cause-Specific Information fields.


Cause-Specific Information: variable length

This field carries the details of the error condition.

Section 3.3.10.1 – Section 3.3.10.13 define error causes for SCTP. Guidelines for the IETF to define new error cause values are discussed in Section 15.4.

3.3.10.1. Invalid Stream Identifier (1)

Indicates that the endpoint received a DATA chunk sent using a nonexistent stream.



Stream Identifier: 16 bits (unsigned integer)


Contains the Stream Identifier of the DATA chunk received in error.

Reserved: 16 bits

This field is reserved. It is set to all 0's on transmit and ignored on receipt.

3.3.10.2. Missing Mandatory Parameter (2)

Indicates that one or more mandatory TLV parameters are missing in a received INIT or INIT ACK chunk.



Number of Missing params: 32 bits (unsigned integer)


This field contains the number of parameters contained in the Cause-Specific Information field.

Missing Param Type: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Each field will contain the missing mandatory parameter number.

3.3.10.3. Stale Cookie Error (3)

Indicates the receipt of a valid State Cookie that has expired.




Measure of Staleness: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This field contains the difference, rounded up in microseconds, between the current time and the time the State Cookie expired.

The sender of this error cause MAY choose to report how long past expiration the State Cookie is by including a non-zero value in the Measure of Staleness field. If the sender does not wish to provide the Measure of Staleness, it SHOULD set this field to the value of zero.


3.3.10.4. Out of Resource (4)

Indicates that the sender is out of resource. This is usually sent in combination with or within an ABORT chunk.



3.3.10.5. Unresolvable Address (5)

Indicates that the sender is not able to resolve the specified address parameter (e.g., type of address is not supported by the sender). This is usually sent in combination with or within an ABORT chunk.




Unresolvable Address: variable length

The Unresolvable Address field contains the complete Type, Length, and Value of the address parameter (or Host Name parameter) that contains the unresolvable address or host name.

3.3.10.6. Unrecognized Chunk Type (6)

This error cause is returned to the originator of the chunk if the receiver does not understand the chunk and the upper bits of the 'Chunk Type' are set to 01 or 11.




Unrecognized Chunk: variable length

The Unrecognized Chunk field contains the unrecognized chunk from the SCTP packet complete with Chunk Type, Chunk Flags, and Chunk Length.


3.3.10.7. Invalid Mandatory Parameter (7)

This error cause is returned to the originator of an INIT or INIT ACK chunk when one of the mandatory parameters is set to an invalid value.



3.3.10.8. Unrecognized Parameters (8)

This error cause is returned to the originator of the INIT ACK chunk if the receiver does not recognize one or more Optional TLV parameters in the INIT ACK chunk.




Unrecognized Parameters: variable length

The Unrecognized Parameters field contains the unrecognized parameters copied from the INIT ACK chunk complete with TLV. This error cause is normally contained in an ERROR chunk bundled with the COOKIE ECHO chunk when responding to the INIT ACK chunk, when the sender of the COOKIE ECHO chunk wishes to report unrecognized parameters.

3.3.10.9. No User Data (9)

This error cause is returned to the originator of a DATA chunk if a received DATA chunk has no user data.




TSN: 32 bits (unsigned integer)

This parameter contains the TSN of the DATA chunk received with no user data field.

This cause code is normally returned in an ABORT chunk (see Section 6.2).

3.3.10.10. Cookie Received While Shutting Down (10)

A COOKIE ECHO chunk was received while the endpoint was in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state. This error is usually returned in an ERROR chunk bundled with the retransmitted SHUTDOWN ACK chunk.



3.3.10.11. Restart of an Association with New Addresses (11)

An INIT chunk was received on an existing association. But the INIT chunk added addresses to the association that were previously not part of the association. The new addresses are listed in the error cause. This error cause is normally sent as part of an ABORT chunk refusing the INIT chunk (see Section 5.2).

```

      0               1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|               Cause Code = 11               | Cause Length |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/                               New Address TLVs                               /
\                                                                                     \
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Note: Each New Address TLV is an exact copy of the TLV that was found in the INIT chunk that was new, including the Parameter Type and the Parameter Length.

3.3.10.12. User-Initiated Abort (12)

This error cause MAY be included in ABORT chunks that are sent because of an upper-layer request. The upper layer can specify an Upper Layer Abort Reason that is transported by SCTP transparently and MAY be delivered to the upper-layer protocol at the peer.


```

      0               1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|               Cause Code = 12               | Cause Length |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/                               Upper Layer Abort Reason                               /
\                                                                                     \
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```


3.3.10.13. Protocol Violation (13)

This error cause MAY be included in ABORT chunks that are sent because an SCTP endpoint detects a protocol violation of the peer that is not covered by the error causes described in Section 3.3.10.1 to Section 3.3.10.12. An implementation MAY provide additional information specifying what kind of protocol violation has been detected.



3.3.11. Cookie Echo (COOKIE ECHO) (10)

This chunk is used only during the initialization of an association. It is sent by the initiator of an association to its peer to complete the initialization process. This chunk **MUST** precede any DATA chunk sent within the association, but **MAY** be bundled with one or more DATA chunks in the same packet.



Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)

Set to the size of the chunk in bytes, including the 4 bytes of the chunk header and the size of the cookie.

Cookie: variable size

This field **MUST** contain the exact cookie received in the State Cookie parameter from the previous INIT ACK chunk.

An implementation **SHOULD** make the cookie as small as possible to ensure interoperability.

Note: A Cookie Echo does not contain a State Cookie parameter; instead, the data within the State Cookie's Parameter Value becomes the data within the Cookie Echo's Chunk Value. This allows an implementation to change only the first 2 bytes of the State Cookie parameter to become a COOKIE ECHO chunk.

3.3.12. Cookie Acknowledgement (COOKIE ACK) (11)

This chunk is used only during the initialization of an association. It is used to acknowledge the receipt of a COOKIE ECHO chunk. This chunk MUST precede any DATA or SACK chunk sent within the association, but MAY be bundled with one or more DATA chunks or SACK chunk's in the same SCTP packet.

```

      0               1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|  Type = 11  |  Chunk Flags  |                Length = 4          |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

3.3.13. Shutdown Complete (SHUTDOWN COMPLETE) (14)

This chunk MUST be used to acknowledge the receipt of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk at the completion of the shutdown process; see Section 9.2 for details.

The SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk has no parameters.

```

      0               1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|  Type = 14  |  Reserved  |T|                Length = 4          |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

Chunk Flags: 8 bits

Reserved: 7 bits

Set to 0 on transmit and ignored on receipt.

T bit: 1 bit

The T bit is set to 0 if the sender filled in the Verification Tag expected by the peer. If the Verification Tag is reflected, the T bit MUST be set to 1. Reflecting means that the sent Verification Tag is the same as the received one.

Note: Special rules apply to this chunk for verification, please see Section 8.5.1 for details.


4. SCTP Association State Diagram


During the life time of an SCTP association, the SCTP endpoint's association progresses from one state to another in response to various events. The events that might potentially advance an association's state include:

- * SCTP user primitive calls, e.g., [ASSOCIATE], [SHUTDOWN], [ABORT],
- * Reception of INIT, COOKIE ECHO, ABORT, SHUTDOWN, etc., control chunks, or
- * Some timeout events.

The state diagram in the figures below illustrates state changes, together with the causing events and resulting actions. Note that some of the error conditions are not shown in the state diagram. Full descriptions of all special cases are found in the text.

Note: Chunk names are given in all capital letters, while parameter names have the first letter capitalized, e.g., COOKIE ECHO chunk type vs. State Cookie parameter. If more than one event/message can occur that causes a state transition, it is labeled (A), (B).








Figure 3: State Transition Diagram of SCTP

The following applies:

- 1) If the State Cookie in the received COOKIE ECHO chunk is invalid (i.e., failed to pass the integrity check), the receiver MUST silently discard the packet. Or, if the received State Cookie is expired (see Section 5.1.5), the receiver MUST send back an ERROR chunk. In either case, the receiver stays in the CLOSED state.
- 2) If the T1-init timer expires, the endpoint MUST retransmit the INIT chunk and restart the T1-init timer without changing state. This MUST be repeated up to 'Max.Init.Retransmits' times. After that, the endpoint MUST abort the initialization process and report the error to the SCTP user.
- 3) If the T1-cookie timer expires, the endpoint MUST retransmit COOKIE ECHO chunk and restart the T1-cookie timer without changing state. This MUST be repeated up to 'Max.Init.Retransmits' times. After that, the endpoint MUST abort the initialization process and report the error to the SCTP user.
- 4) In the SHUTDOWN-SENT state, the endpoint MUST acknowledge any received DATA chunks without delay.
- 5) In the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state, the endpoint MUST NOT accept any new send requests from its SCTP user.

- 6) In the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state, the endpoint MUST transmit or retransmit data and leave this state when all data in queue is transmitted.
- 7) In the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state, the endpoint MUST NOT accept any new send requests from its SCTP user.

The CLOSED state is used to indicate that an association is not created (i.e., does not exist).

5. Association Initialization

Before the first data transmission can take place from one SCTP endpoint ("A") to another SCTP endpoint ("Z"), the two endpoints MUST complete an initialization process in order to set up an SCTP association between them.

The SCTP user at an endpoint can use the ASSOCIATE primitive to initialize an SCTP association to another SCTP endpoint.

Implementation Note: From an SCTP user's point of view, an association might be implicitly opened, without an ASSOCIATE primitive (see Section 11.1.2) being invoked, by the initiating endpoint's sending of the first user data to the destination endpoint. The initiating SCTP will assume default values for all mandatory and optional parameters for the INIT/INIT ACK chunk.

Once the association is established, unidirectional streams are open for data transfer on both ends (see Section 5.1.1).

5.1. Normal Establishment of an Association

The initialization process consists of the following steps (assuming that SCTP endpoint "A" tries to set up an association with SCTP endpoint "Z" and "Z" accepts the new association):

- A) "A" first builds a TCB and sends an INIT chunk to "Z". In the INIT chunk, "A" MUST provide its Verification Tag (Tag_A) in the Initiate Tag field. Tag_A SHOULD be a random number in the range of 1 to 4294967295 (see Section 5.3.1 for Tag value selection). After sending the INIT chunk, "A" starts the T1-init timer and enters the COOKIE-WAIT state.

- B) "Z" responds immediately with an INIT ACK chunk. The destination IP address of the INIT ACK chunk MUST be set to the source IP address of the INIT chunk to which this INIT ACK chunk is responding. In the response, besides filling in other parameters, "Z" MUST set the Verification Tag field to Tag_A, and also provide its own Verification Tag (Tag_Z) in the Initiate Tag field.

Moreover, "Z" MUST generate and send along with the INIT ACK chunk a State Cookie. See Section 5.1.3 for State Cookie generation.

After sending an INIT ACK chunk with the State Cookie parameter, "Z" MUST NOT allocate any resources or keep any states for the new association. Otherwise, "Z" will be vulnerable to resource attacks.

- C) Upon reception of the INIT ACK chunk from "Z", "A" stops the Tl-init timer and leaves the COOKIE-WAIT state. "A" then sends the State Cookie received in the INIT ACK chunk in a COOKIE ECHO chunk, starts the Tl-cookie timer, and enters the COOKIE-ECHOED state.

The COOKIE ECHO chunk MAY be bundled with any pending outbound DATA chunks, but it MUST be the first chunk in the packet and until the COOKIE ACK chunk is returned the sender MUST NOT send any other packets to the peer.

- D) Upon reception of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, endpoint "Z" replies with a COOKIE ACK chunk after building a TCB and moving to the ESTABLISHED state. A COOKIE ACK chunk MAY be bundled with any pending DATA chunks (and/or SACK chunks), but the COOKIE ACK chunk MUST be the first chunk in the packet.

Implementation Note: An implementation can choose to send the Communication Up notification to the SCTP user upon reception of a valid COOKIE ECHO chunk.

- E) Upon reception of the COOKIE ACK chunk, endpoint "A" moves from the COOKIE-ECHOED state to the ESTABLISHED state, stopping the Tl-cookie timer. It can also notify its ULP about the successful establishment of the association with a Communication Up notification (see Section 11).

An INIT or INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT be bundled with any other chunk. They MUST be the only chunks present in the SCTP packets that carry them.

An endpoint MUST send the INIT ACK chunk to the IP address from which it received the INIT chunk.

Tl-init timer and Tl-cookie timer SHOULD follow the same rules given in Section 6.3. If the application provided multiple IP addresses of the peer, there SHOULD be a Tl-init and Tl-cookie timer for each address of the peer. Retransmissions of INIT chunks and COOKIE ECHO chunks SHOULD use all addresses of the peer similar to retransmissions of DATA chunks.

If an endpoint receives an INIT, INIT ACK, or COOKIE ECHO chunk but decides not to establish the new association due to missing mandatory parameters in the received INIT or INIT ACK chunk, invalid parameter values, or lack of local resources, it SHOULD respond with an ABORT chunk. It SHOULD also specify the cause of abort, such as the type of the missing mandatory parameters, etc., by including the error cause parameters with the ABORT chunk. The Verification Tag field in the common header of the outbound SCTP packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be set to the Initiate Tag value of the received INIT or INIT ACK chunk this ABORT chunk is responding to.

Note that a COOKIE ECHO chunk that does not pass the integrity check is not considered an 'invalid mandatory parameter' and requires special handling; see Section 5.1.5.

After the reception of the first DATA chunk in an association the endpoint MUST immediately respond with a SACK chunk to acknowledge the DATA chunk. Subsequent acknowledgements SHOULD be done as described in Section 6.2.

When the TCB is created, each endpoint MUST set its internal Cumulative TSN Ack Point to the value of its transmitted Initial TSN minus one.

Implementation Note: The IP addresses and SCTP port are generally used as the key to find the TCB within an SCTP instance.

5.1.1. Handle Stream Parameters

In the INIT and INIT ACK chunks, the sender of the chunk MUST indicate the number of outbound streams (OSs) it wishes to have in the association, as well as the maximum inbound streams (MISs) it will accept from the other endpoint.

After receiving the stream configuration information from the other side, each endpoint MUST perform the following check: If the peer's MIS is less than the endpoint's OS, meaning that the peer is incapable of supporting all the outbound streams the endpoint wants

to configure, the endpoint MUST use MIS outbound streams and MAY report any shortage to the upper layer. The upper layer can then choose to abort the association if the resource shortage is unacceptable.

After the association is initialized, the valid outbound stream identifier range for either endpoint MUST be 0 to min(local OS, remote MIS) - 1.

5.1.2. Handle Address Parameters

During the association initialization, an endpoint uses the following rules to discover and collect the destination transport address(es) of its peer.

- A) If there are no address parameters present in the received INIT or INIT ACK chunk, the endpoint MUST take the source IP address from which the chunk arrives and record it, in combination with the SCTP source port number, as the only destination transport address for this peer.
- B) If there is a Host Name Address parameter present in the received INIT or INIT ACK chunk, the endpoint MUST immediately send an ABORT chunk and MAY include an "Unresolvable Address" error cause to its peer. The ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent to the source IP address from which the last peer packet was received.
- C) If there are only IPv4/IPv6 addresses present in the received INIT or INIT ACK chunk, the receiver MUST derive and record all the transport addresses from the received chunk AND the source IP address that sent the INIT or INIT ACK chunk. The transport addresses are derived by the combination of SCTP source port (from the common header) and the IP Address parameter(s) carried in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk and the source IP address of the IP datagram. The receiver SHOULD use only these transport addresses as destination transport addresses when sending subsequent packets to its peer.
- D) An INIT or INIT ACK chunk MUST be treated as belonging to an already established association (or one in the process of being established) if the use of any of the valid address parameters contained within the chunk would identify an existing TCB.

Implementation Note: In some cases (e.g., when the implementation does not control the source IP address that is used for transmitting), an endpoint might need to include in its INIT or INIT ACK chunk all possible IP addresses from which packets to the peer could be transmitted.

After all transport addresses are derived from the INIT or INIT ACK chunk using the above rules, the endpoint selects one of the transport addresses as the initial primary path.

The packet containing the INIT ACK chunk MUST be sent to the source address of the packet containing the INIT chunk.

The sender of INIT chunks MAY include a 'Supported Address Types' parameter in the INIT chunk to indicate what types of addresses are acceptable.

Implementation Note: In the case that the receiver of an INIT ACK chunk fails to resolve the address parameter due to an unsupported type, it can abort the initiation process and then attempt a reinitiation by using a 'Supported Address Types' parameter in the new INIT chunk to indicate what types of address it prefers.

If an SCTP endpoint that only supports either IPv4 or IPv6 receives IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in an INIT or INIT ACK chunk from its peer, it MUST use all the addresses belonging to the supported address family. The other addresses MAY be ignored. The endpoint SHOULD NOT respond with any kind of error indication.

If an SCTP endpoint lists in the 'Supported Address Types' parameter either IPv4 or IPv6, but uses the other family for sending the packet containing the INIT chunk, or if it also lists addresses of the other family in the INIT chunk, then the address family that is not listed in the 'Supported Address Types' parameter SHOULD also be considered as supported by the receiver of the INIT chunk. The receiver of the INIT chunk SHOULD NOT respond with any kind of error indication.

5.1.3. Generating State Cookie

When sending an INIT ACK chunk as a response to an INIT chunk, the sender of INIT ACK chunk creates a State Cookie and sends it in the State Cookie parameter of the INIT ACK chunk. Inside this State Cookie, the sender MUST include a MAC (see [RFC2104] for an example) to provide integrity protection on the State Cookie. The State Cookie SHOULD also contain a timestamp on when the State Cookie is created, and the lifespan of the State Cookie, along with all the information necessary for it to establish the association including the port numbers and the verification tags.

The method used to generate the MAC is strictly a private matter for the receiver of the INIT chunk. The use of a MAC is mandatory to prevent denial-of-service attacks. MAC algorithms can have different performance depending on the platform. Choosing a high performance MAC algorithm increases the resistance against cookie flooding

attacks. A MAC with acceptable security properties SHOULD be used. The secret key SHOULD be random ([RFC4086] provides some information on randomness guidelines). The secret keys need to have an appropriate size. The secret key SHOULD be changed reasonably frequently (e.g., hourly), and the timestamp in the State Cookie MAY be used to determine which key is used to verify the MAC.

If the State Cookie is not encrypted, it MUST NOT contain information which is not being envisioned to be shared.

An implementation SHOULD make the cookie as small as possible to ensure interoperability.

5.1.4. State Cookie Processing

When an endpoint (in the COOKIE-WAIT state) receives an INIT ACK chunk with a State Cookie parameter, it MUST immediately send a COOKIE ECHO chunk to its peer with the received State Cookie. The sender MAY also add any pending DATA chunks to the packet after the COOKIE ECHO chunk.

The endpoint MUST also start the Tl-cookie timer after sending the COOKIE ECHO chunk. If the timer expires, the endpoint MUST retransmit the COOKIE ECHO chunk and restart the Tl-cookie timer. This is repeated until either a COOKIE ACK chunk is received or 'Max.Init.Retransmits' (see Section 16) is reached causing the peer endpoint to be marked unreachable (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

5.1.5. State Cookie Authentication

When an endpoint receives a COOKIE ECHO chunk from another endpoint with which it has no association, it takes the following actions:

- 1) Compute a MAC using the information carried in the State Cookie and the secret key. The timestamp in the State Cookie MAY be used to determine which secret key to use. If secrets are kept only for a limited amount of time and the secret key to use is not available anymore, the packet containing the COOKIE ECHO chunk MUST be silently discarded. [RFC2104] can be used as a guideline for generating the MAC,
- 2) Authenticate the State Cookie as one that it previously generated by comparing the computed MAC against the one carried in the State Cookie. If this comparison fails, the SCTP packet, including the COOKIE ECHO chunk and any DATA chunks, MUST be silently discarded,

- 3) Compare the port numbers and the Verification Tag contained within the COOKIE ECHO chunk to the actual port numbers and the Verification Tag within the SCTP common header of the received packet. If these values do not match, the packet MUST be silently discarded.
- 4) Compare the creation timestamp in the State Cookie to the current local time. If the elapsed time is longer than the lifespan carried in the State Cookie, then the packet, including the COOKIE ECHO chunk and any attached DATA chunks, SHOULD be discarded, and the endpoint MUST transmit an ERROR chunk with a "Stale Cookie" error cause to the peer endpoint.
- 5) If the State Cookie is valid, create an association to the sender of the COOKIE ECHO chunk with the information in the State Cookie carried in the COOKIE ECHO chunk and enter the ESTABLISHED state.
- 6) Send a COOKIE ACK chunk to the peer acknowledging receipt of the COOKIE ECHO chunk. The COOKIE ACK chunk MAY be bundled with an outbound DATA chunk or SACK chunk; however, the COOKIE ACK chunk MUST be the first chunk in the SCTP packet.
- 7) Immediately acknowledge any DATA chunk bundled with the COOKIE ECHO chunk with a SACK chunk (subsequent DATA chunk acknowledgement SHOULD follow the rules defined in Section 6.2). As mentioned in step 6, if the SACK chunk is bundled with the COOKIE ACK chunk, the COOKIE ACK chunk MUST appear first in the SCTP packet.

If a COOKIE ECHO chunk is received from an endpoint with which the receiver of the COOKIE ECHO chunk has an existing association, the procedures in Section 5.2 SHOULD be followed.

5.1.6. An Example of Normal Association Establishment

In the following example, "A" initiates the association and then sends a user message to "Z", then "Z" sends two user messages to "A" later (assuming no bundling or fragmentation occurs):




Figure 4: A Setup Example

If the Tl-init timer expires at "A" after the INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunks are sent, the same INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk with the same Initiate Tag (i.e., Tag_A) or State Cookie is retransmitted and the timer restarted. This is repeated 'Max.Init.Retransmits' times before "A" considers "Z" unreachable and reports the failure to its upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

When retransmitting the INIT chunk, the endpoint MUST follow the rules defined in Section 6.3 to determine the proper timer value.

5.2. Handle Duplicate or Unexpected INIT, INIT ACK, COOKIE ECHO, and COOKIE ACK Chunks

During the life time of an association (in one of the possible states), an endpoint can receive from its peer endpoint one of the setup chunks (INIT, INIT ACK, COOKIE ECHO, and COOKIE ACK). The receiver treats such a setup chunk as a duplicate and process it as described in this section.

Note: An endpoint will not receive the chunk unless the chunk was sent to an SCTP transport address and is from an SCTP transport address associated with this endpoint. Therefore, the endpoint processes such a chunk as part of its current association.

The following scenarios can cause duplicated or unexpected chunks:

- A) The peer has crashed without being detected, restarted itself, and sent a new INIT chunk trying to restore the association,
- B) Both sides are trying to initialize the association at about the same time,
- C) The chunk is from a stale packet that was used to establish the present association or a past association that is no longer in existence,
- D) The chunk is a false packet generated by an attacker, or
- E) The peer never received the COOKIE ACK chunk and is retransmitting its COOKIE ECHO chunk.

The rules in the following sections are applied in order to identify and correctly handle these cases.

5.2.1. INIT Chunk Received in COOKIE-WAIT or COOKIE-ECHOED State (Item B)

This usually indicates an initialization collision, i.e., each endpoint is attempting, at about the same time, to establish an association with the other endpoint.

Upon receipt of an INIT chunk in the COOKIE-WAIT state, an endpoint MUST respond with an INIT ACK chunk using the same parameters it sent in its original INIT chunk (including its Initiate Tag, unchanged). When responding, the following rules MUST be applied:

- 1) The packet containing the INIT ACK chunk MUST only be sent to an address passed by the upper layer in the request to initialize the association.
- 2) The packet containing the INIT ACK chunk MUST only be sent to an address reported in the incoming INIT chunk.
- 3) The packet containing the INIT ACK chunk SHOULD be sent to the source address of the received packet containing the INIT chunk.

Upon receipt of an INIT chunk in the COOKIE-ECHOED state, an endpoint MUST respond with an INIT ACK chunk using the same parameters it sent in its original INIT chunk (including its Initiate Tag, unchanged), provided that no NEW address has been added to the forming association. If the INIT chunk indicates that a new address has been added to the association, then the entire INIT chunk MUST be discarded, and the state of the existing association SHOULD NOT be changed. An ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent in response that MAY include the error 'Restart of an association with new addresses'. The error SHOULD list the addresses that were added to the restarting association.

When responding in either state (COOKIE-WAIT or COOKIE-ECHOED) with an INIT ACK chunk, the original parameters are combined with those from the newly received INIT chunk. The endpoint MUST also generate a State Cookie with the INIT ACK chunk. The endpoint uses the parameters sent in its INIT chunk to calculate the State Cookie.

After that, the endpoint MUST NOT change its state, the Tl-init timer MUST be left running, and the corresponding TCB MUST NOT be destroyed. The normal procedures for handling State Cookies when a TCB exists will resolve the duplicate INIT chunks to a single association.

For an endpoint that is in the COOKIE-ECHOED state, it MUST populate its Tie-Tags within both the association TCB and inside the State Cookie (see Section 5.2.2 for a description of the Tie-Tags).

5.2.2. Unexpected INIT Chunk in States Other than CLOSED, COOKIE-ECHOED, COOKIE-WAIT, and SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT

Unless otherwise stated, upon receipt of an unexpected INIT chunk for this association, the endpoint MUST generate an INIT ACK chunk with a State Cookie. Before responding, the endpoint MUST check to see if the unexpected INIT chunk adds new addresses to the association. If new addresses are added to the association, the endpoint MUST respond with an ABORT chunk, copying the 'Initiate Tag' of the unexpected INIT chunk into the 'Verification Tag' of the outbound packet

carrying the ABORT chunk. In the ABORT chunk, the error cause MAY be set to 'restart of an association with new addresses'. The error SHOULD list the addresses that were added to the restarting association. If no new addresses are added, when responding to the INIT chunk in the outbound INIT ACK chunk, the endpoint MUST copy its current Tie-Tags to a reserved place within the State Cookie and the association's TCB. We refer to these locations inside the cookie as the Peer's-Tie-Tag and the Local-Tie-Tag. We will refer to the copy within an association's TCB as the Local Tag and Peer's Tag. The outbound SCTP packet containing this INIT ACK chunk MUST carry a Verification Tag value equal to the Initiate Tag found in the unexpected INIT chunk. And the INIT ACK chunk MUST contain a new Initiate Tag (randomly generated; see Section 5.3.1). Other parameters for the endpoint SHOULD be copied from the existing parameters of the association (e.g., number of outbound streams) into the INIT ACK chunk and cookie.

After sending the INIT ACK or ABORT chunk, the endpoint MUST take no further actions; i.e., the existing association, including its current state, and the corresponding TCB MUST NOT be changed.

Only when a TCB exists and the association is not in a COOKIE-WAIT or SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state are the Tie-Tags populated with a random value other than 0. For a normal association INIT chunk (i.e., the endpoint is in the CLOSED state), the Tie-Tags MUST be set to 0 (indicating that no previous TCB existed).

5.2.3. Unexpected INIT ACK Chunk

If an INIT ACK chunk is received by an endpoint in any state other than the COOKIE-WAIT or CLOSED state, the endpoint SHOULD discard the INIT ACK chunk. An unexpected INIT ACK chunk usually indicates the processing of an old or duplicated INIT chunk.

5.2.4. Handle a COOKIE ECHO Chunk when a TCB Exists

When a COOKIE ECHO chunk is received by an endpoint in any state for an existing association (i.e., not in the CLOSED state) the following rules are applied:

- 1) Compute a MAC as described in step 1 of Section 5.1.5,
- 2) Authenticate the State Cookie as described in step 2 of Section 5.1.5 (this is case C or D above).
- 3) Compare the timestamp in the State Cookie to the current time. If the State Cookie is older than the lifespan carried in the State Cookie and the Verification Tags contained in the State

Cookie do not match the current association's Verification Tags, the packet, including the COOKIE ECHO chunk and any DATA chunks, SHOULD be discarded. The endpoint also MUST transmit an ERROR chunk with a "Stale Cookie" error cause to the peer endpoint (this is case C or D in Section 5.2).

If both Verification Tags in the State Cookie match the Verification Tags of the current association, consider the State Cookie valid (this is case E in Section 5.2) even if the lifespan is exceeded.

- 4) If the State Cookie proves to be valid, unpack the TCB into a temporary TCB.
- 5) Refer to Table 12 to determine the correct action to be taken.

Local Tag	Peer's Tag	Local-Tie-Tag	Peer's-Tie-Tag	Action
X	X	M	M	(A)
M	X	A	A	(B)
M	0	A	A	(B)
X	M	0	0	(C)
M	M	A	A	(D)

Table 12: Handling of a COOKIE ECHO Chunk when a TCB Exists

Legend:

- X - Tag does not match the existing TCB.
- M - Tag matches the existing TCB.
- 0 - Tag unknown (Peer's Tag not known yet / No tie-tag in cookie).
- A - All cases, i.e., M, X, or 0.

For any case not shown in Table 12, the cookie SHOULD be silently discarded.

Action

- A) In this case, the peer might have restarted. When the endpoint recognizes this potential 'restart', the existing session is treated the same as if it received an ABORT chunk followed by a new COOKIE ECHO chunk with the following exceptions:

- * Any SCTP DATA chunks MAY be retained (this is an implementation-specific option).
- * A notification of RESTART SHOULD be sent to the ULP instead of a "COMMUNICATION LOST" notification.

All the congestion control parameters (e.g., cwnd, ssthresh) related to this peer MUST be reset to their initial values (see Section 6.2.1).

After this, the endpoint enters the ESTABLISHED state.

If the endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and recognizes that the peer has restarted (Action A), it MUST NOT set up a new association but instead resend the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk and send an ERROR chunk with a "Cookie Received While Shutting Down" error cause to its peer.

- B) In this case, both sides might be attempting to start an association at about the same time, but the peer endpoint sent its INIT chunk after responding to the local endpoint's INIT chunk. Thus, it might have picked a new Verification Tag, not being aware of the previous tag it had sent this endpoint. The endpoint SHOULD stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED state, but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from the State Cookie, stop any T1-init or T1-cookie timers that might be running, and send a COOKIE ACK chunk.
- C) In this case, the local endpoint's cookie has arrived late. Before it arrived, the local endpoint sent an INIT chunk and received an INIT ACK chunk and finally sent a COOKIE ECHO chunk with the peer's same tag but a new tag of its own. The cookie SHOULD be silently discarded. The endpoint SHOULD NOT change states and SHOULD leave any timers running.
- D) When both local and remote tags match, the endpoint SHOULD enter the ESTABLISHED state, if it is in the COOKIE-ECHOED state. It SHOULD stop any T1-cookie timer that is running and send a COOKIE ACK chunk.

Note: The "peer's Verification Tag" is the tag received in the Initiate Tag field of the INIT or INIT ACK chunk.

5.2.4.1. An Example of a Association Restart

In the following example, "A" initiates the association after a restart has occurred. Endpoint "Z" had no knowledge of the restart until the exchange (i.e., Heartbeats had not yet detected the failure of "A") (assuming no bundling or fragmentation occurs):

```

Endpoint A                                     Endpoint Z
<----- Association is established----->
Tag=Tag_A                                     Tag=Tag_Z
<----->
{A crashes and restarts}
{app sets up a association with Z}
{build TCB}
INIT [I-Tag=Tag_A'
      & other info] -----\
(Start T1-init timer)       \
(Enter COOKIE-WAIT state)   \----> (find an existing TCB,
                                   populate TieTags if needed,
                                   compose Cookie_Z with Tie-Tags
                                   and other info)
                                   /--- INIT ACK [Veri Tag=Tag_A',
                                   I-Tag=Tag_Z',
                                   Cookie_Z]
                                   (leave original TCB in place)
(Cancel T1-init timer) <-----/
COOKIE ECHO [Veri=Tag_Z',
             Cookie_Z]-----\
(Start T1-init timer)       \
(Enter COOKIE-ECHOED state)  \----> (Find existing association,
                                   Tie-Tags in Cookie_Z match
                                   Tie-Tags in TCB,
                                   Tags do not match, i.e.,
                                   case X X M M above,
                                   Announce Restart to ULP
                                   and reset association).
                                   /----- COOKIE ACK
(Cancel T1-init timer, <-----/
  Enter ESTABLISHED state)
{app sends 1st user data; strm 0}
DATA [TSN=initial TSN_A
      Strm=0,Seq=0 & user data]--\
(Start T3-rtx timer)           \
                                   \->
                                   /--- SACK [TSN Ack=init TSN_A,Block=0]
(Cancel T3-rtx timer) <-----/

```

Figure 5: A Restart Example

5.2.5. Handle Duplicate COOKIE ACK Chunk

At any state other than COOKIE-ECHOED, an endpoint SHOULD silently discard a received COOKIE ACK chunk.

5.2.6. Handle Stale Cookie Error

Receipt of an ERROR chunk with a "Stale Cookie" error cause indicates one of a number of possible events:

- A) The association failed to completely setup before the State Cookie issued by the sender was processed.
- B) An old State Cookie was processed after setup completed.
- C) An old State Cookie is received from someone that the receiver is not interested in having an association with and the ABORT chunk was lost.

When processing an ERROR chunk with a "Stale Cookie" error cause an endpoint SHOULD first examine if an association is in the process of being set up, i.e., the association is in the COOKIE-ECHOED state. In all cases, if the association is not in the COOKIE-ECHOED state, the ERROR chunk SHOULD be silently discarded.

If the association is in the COOKIE-ECHOED state, the endpoint MAY elect one of the following three alternatives.

- 1) Send a new INIT chunk to the endpoint to generate a new State Cookie and reattempt the setup procedure.
- 2) Discard the TCB and report to the upper layer the inability to set up the association.
- 3) Send a new INIT chunk to the endpoint, adding a Cookie Preservative parameter requesting an extension to the life time of the State Cookie. When calculating the time extension, an implementation SHOULD use the RTT information measured based on the previous COOKIE ECHO / ERROR chunk exchange, and SHOULD add no more than 1 second beyond the measured RTT, due to long State Cookie life times making the endpoint more subject to a replay attack.

5.3. Other Initialization Issues

5.3.1. Selection of Tag Value

Initiate Tag values SHOULD be selected from the range of 1 to $2^{32} - 1$. It is very important that the Initiate Tag value be randomized to help protect against "man in the middle" and "sequence number" attacks. The methods described in [RFC4086] can be used for the Initiate Tag randomization. Careful selection of Initiate Tags is also necessary to prevent old duplicate packets from previous associations being mistakenly processed as belonging to the current association.

Moreover, the Verification Tag value used by either endpoint in a given association MUST NOT change during the life time of an association. A new Verification Tag value MUST be used each time the endpoint tears down and then reestablishes an association to the same peer.

5.4. Path Verification

During association establishment, the two peers exchange a list of addresses. In the predominant case, these lists accurately represent the addresses owned by each peer. However, a misbehaving peer might supply addresses that it does not own. To prevent this, the following rules are applied to all addresses of the new association:

- 1) Any addresses passed to the sender of the INIT chunk by its upper layer in the request to initialize an association are automatically considered to be CONFIRMED.
- 2) For the receiver of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, the only CONFIRMED address is the address to which the packet containing the INIT ACK chunk was sent.
- 3) All other addresses not covered by rules 1 and 2 are considered UNCONFIRMED and are subject to probing for verification.

To probe an address for verification, an endpoint will send HEARTBEAT chunks including a 64-bit random nonce and a path indicator (to identify the address that the HEARTBEAT chunk is sent to) within the Heartbeat Info parameter.

Upon receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk, a verification is made that the nonce included in the Heartbeat Info parameter is the one sent to the address indicated inside the Heartbeat Info parameter. When this match occurs, the address that the original HEARTBEAT was sent to is now considered CONFIRMED and available for normal data transfer.

These probing procedures are started when an association moves to the ESTABLISHED state and are ended when all paths are confirmed.

In each RTO, a probe MAY be sent on an active UNCONFIRMED path in an attempt to move it to the CONFIRMED state. If during this probing the path becomes inactive, this rate is lowered to the normal HEARTBEAT rate. At the expiration of the RTO timer, the error counter of any path that was probed but not CONFIRMED is incremented by one and subjected to path failure detection, as defined in Section 8.2. When probing UNCONFIRMED addresses, however, the association overall error count is not incremented.

The number of packets containing HEARTBEAT chunks sent at each RTO SHOULD be limited by the 'HB.Max.Burst' parameter. It is an implementation decision as to how to distribute packets containing HEARTBEAT chunks to the peer's addresses for path verification.

Whenever a path is confirmed, an indication MAY be given to the upper layer.

An endpoint MUST NOT send any chunks to an UNCONFIRMED address, with the following exceptions:

- * A HEARTBEAT chunk including a nonce MAY be sent to an UNCONFIRMED address.
- * A HEARTBEAT ACK chunk MAY be sent to an UNCONFIRMED address.
- * A COOKIE ACK chunk MAY be sent to an UNCONFIRMED address, but it MUST be bundled with a HEARTBEAT chunk including a nonce. An implementation that does not support bundling MUST NOT send a COOKIE ACK chunk to an UNCONFIRMED address.
- * A COOKIE ECHO chunk MAY be sent to an UNCONFIRMED address, but it MUST be bundled with a HEARTBEAT chunk including a nonce, and the size of the SCTP packet MUST NOT exceed the PMTU. If the implementation does not support bundling or if the bundled COOKIE ECHO chunk plus HEARTBEAT chunk (including nonce) would result in an SCTP packet larger than the PMTU, then the implementation MUST NOT send a COOKIE ECHO chunk to an UNCONFIRMED address.

6. User Data Transfer

Data transmission MUST only happen in the ESTABLISHED, SHUTDOWN-PENDING, and SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED states. The only exception to this is that DATA chunks are allowed to be bundled with an outbound COOKIE ECHO chunk when in the COOKIE-WAIT state.

DATA chunks MUST only be received according to the rules below in ESTABLISHED, SHUTDOWN-PENDING, and SHUTDOWN-SENT states. A DATA chunk received in CLOSED is out of the blue and SHOULD be handled per Section 8.4. A DATA chunk received in any other state SHOULD be discarded.

A SACK chunk MUST be processed in ESTABLISHED, SHUTDOWN-PENDING, and SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED states. An incoming SACK chunk MAY be processed in COOKIE-ECHOED. A SACK chunk in the CLOSED state is out of the blue and SHOULD be processed according to the rules in Section 8.4. A SACK chunk received in any other state SHOULD be discarded.

For transmission efficiency, SCTP defines mechanisms for bundling of small user messages and fragmentation of large user messages. The following diagram depicts the flow of user messages through SCTP.

In this section, the term "data sender" refers to the endpoint that transmits a DATA chunk and the term "data receiver" refers to the endpoint that receives a DATA chunk. A data receiver will transmit SACK chunks.




Figure 6: Illustration of User Data Transfer

The following applies:

- 1) When converting user messages into DATA chunks, an endpoint **MUST** fragment large user messages into multiple DATA chunks. The size of each DATA chunk **SHOULD** be smaller than or equal to the Association Maximum DATA Chunk Size (AMDCS). The data receiver will normally reassemble the fragmented message from DATA chunks before delivery to the user (see Section 6.9 for details).
- 2) Multiple DATA and control chunks **MAY** be bundled by the sender into a single SCTP packet for transmission, as long as the final size of the SCTP packet does not exceed the current PMTU. The receiver will unbundle the packet back into the original chunks. Control chunks **MUST** come before DATA chunks in the packet.

The fragmentation and bundling mechanisms, as detailed in Section 6.9 and Section 6.10, are **OPTIONAL** to implement by the data sender, but they **MUST** be implemented by the data receiver, i.e., an endpoint **MUST** properly receive and process bundled or fragmented data.

6.1. Transmission of DATA Chunks

This section specifies the rules for sending DATA chunks. In particular, it defines zero window probing, which is required to avoid the indefinite stalling of an association in case of a loss of packets containing SACK chunks performing window updates.

This document is specified as if there is a single retransmission timer per destination transport address, but implementations **MAY** have a retransmission timer for each DATA chunk.

The following general rules **MUST** be applied by the data sender for transmission and/or retransmission of outbound DATA chunks:

- A) At any given time, the data sender **MUST NOT** transmit new data to any destination transport address if its peer's `rwnd` indicates that the peer has no buffer space (i.e., `rwnd` is smaller than the size of the next DATA chunk; see Section 6.2.1), except for zero window probes.

A zero window probe is a DATA chunk sent when the receiver has no buffer space. This rule allows the sender to probe for a change in `rwnd` that the sender missed due to the SACK chunks having been lost in transit from the data receiver to the data sender. A zero window probe **MUST** only be sent when the `cwnd` allows (see Rule B below). A zero window probe **SHOULD** only be sent when all outstanding DATA chunks have been cumulatively acknowledged and no DATA chunks are in flight. Senders **MUST** support zero window probing.

If the sender continues to receive SACK chunks from the peer while doing zero window probing, the unacknowledged window probes SHOULD NOT increment the error counter for the association or any destination transport address. This is because the receiver could keep its window closed for an indefinite time. Section 6.2 describes the receiver behavior when it advertises a zero window. The sender SHOULD send the first zero window probe after 1 RTO when it detects that the receiver has closed its window and SHOULD increase the probe interval exponentially afterwards. Also note that the cwnd SHOULD be adjusted according to Section 7.2.1. Zero window probing does not affect the calculation of cwnd.

The sender MUST also have an algorithm for sending new DATA chunks to avoid silly window syndrome (SWS) as described in [RFC1122]. The algorithm can be similar to the one described in Section 4.2.3.4 of [RFC1122].

- B) At any given time, the sender MUST NOT transmit new data to a given transport address if it has $cwnd + (PMDCS - 1)$ or more bytes of data outstanding to that transport address. If data is available, the sender SHOULD exceed cwnd by up to $(PMDCS - 1)$ bytes on a new data transmission if the flightsize does not currently reach cwnd. The breach of cwnd MUST constitute one packet only.
- C) When the time comes for the sender to transmit, before sending new DATA chunks, the sender MUST first transmit any DATA chunks that are marked for retransmission (limited by the current cwnd).
- D) When the time comes for the sender to transmit new DATA chunks, the protocol parameter 'Max.Burst' SHOULD be used to limit the number of packets sent. The limit MAY be applied by adjusting cwnd temporarily, as follows:

```
if ((flightsize + Max.Burst * PMDCS) < cwnd)
    cwnd = flightsize + Max.Burst * PMDCS;
```

Or, it MAY be applied by strictly limiting the number of packets emitted by the output routine. When calculating the number of packets to transmit, and particularly when using the formula above, cwnd SHOULD NOT be changed permanently.

- E) Then, the sender can send as many new DATA chunks as rule A and rule B allow.

Multiple DATA chunks committed for transmission MAY be bundled in a single packet. Furthermore, DATA chunks being retransmitted MAY be bundled with new DATA chunks, as long as the resulting SCTP packet size does not exceed the PMTU. A ULP can request that no bundling is performed, but this only turns off any delays that an SCTP implementation might be using to increase bundling efficiency. It does not in itself stop all bundling from occurring (i.e., in case of congestion or retransmission).

Before an endpoint transmits a DATA chunk, if any received DATA chunks have not been acknowledged (e.g., due to delayed ack), the sender SHOULD create a SACK chunk and bundle it with the outbound DATA chunk, as long as the size of the final SCTP packet does not exceed the current PMTU. See Section 6.2.

When the window is full (i.e., transmission is disallowed by rule A and/or rule B), the sender MAY still accept send requests from its upper layer, but MUST transmit no more DATA chunks until some or all of the outstanding DATA chunks are acknowledged and transmission is allowed by rule A and rule B again.

Whenever a transmission or retransmission is made to any address, if the T3-rtx timer of that address is not currently running, the sender MUST start that timer. If the timer for that address is already running, the sender MUST restart the timer if the earliest (i.e., lowest TSN) outstanding DATA chunk sent to that address is being retransmitted. Otherwise, the data sender MUST NOT restart the timer.

When starting or restarting the T3-rtx timer, the timer value SHOULD be adjusted according to the timer rules defined in Section 6.3.2 and Section 6.3.3.

The data sender MUST NOT use a TSN that is more than $2^{31} - 1$ above the beginning TSN of the current send window.

For each stream, the data sender MUST NOT have more than $2^{16} - 1$ ordered user messages in the current send window.

Whenever the sender of a DATA chunk can benefit from the corresponding SACK chunk being sent back without delay, the sender MAY set the I bit in the DATA chunk header. Please note that why the sender has set the I bit is irrelevant to the receiver.

Reasons for setting the I bit include, but are not limited to, the following (see Section 4 of [RFC7053] for a discussion of the benefits):

- * The application requests that the I bit of the last DATA chunk of a user message be set when providing the user message to the SCTP implementation (see Section 11.1).
- * The sender is in the SHUTDOWN-PENDING state.
- * The sending of a DATA chunk fills the congestion or receiver window.

6.2. Acknowledgement on Reception of DATA Chunks

The SCTP endpoint MUST always acknowledge the reception of each valid DATA chunk when the DATA chunk received is inside its receive window.

When the receiver's advertised window is 0, the receiver MUST drop any new incoming DATA chunk with a TSN larger than the largest TSN received so far. Also, if the new incoming DATA chunk holds a TSN value less than the largest TSN received so far, then the receiver SHOULD drop the largest TSN held for reordering and accept the new incoming DATA chunk. In either case, if such a DATA chunk is dropped, the receiver MUST immediately send back a SACK chunk with the current receive window showing only DATA chunks received and accepted so far. The dropped DATA chunk(s) MUST NOT be included in the SACK chunk, as they were not accepted. The receiver MUST also have an algorithm for advertising its receive window to avoid receiver silly window syndrome (SWS), as described in [RFC1122]. The algorithm can be similar to the one described in Section 4.2.3.3 of [RFC1122].

The guidelines on delayed acknowledgement algorithm specified in Section 4.2 of [RFC5681] SHOULD be followed. Specifically, an acknowledgement SHOULD be generated for at least every second packet (not every second DATA chunk) received, and SHOULD be generated within 200 ms of the arrival of any unacknowledged DATA chunk. In some situations, it might be beneficial for an SCTP transmitter to be more conservative than the algorithms detailed in this document allow. However, an SCTP transmitter MUST NOT be more aggressive in sending SACK chunks than the following algorithms allow.

An SCTP receiver MUST NOT generate more than one SACK chunk for every incoming packet, other than to update the offered window as the receiving application consumes new data. When the window opens up, an SCTP receiver SHOULD send additional SACK chunks to update the window even if no new data is received. The receiver MUST avoid sending a large number of window updates -- in particular, large bursts of them. One way to achieve this is to send a window update only if the window can be increased by at least a quarter of the receive buffer size of the association.

Implementation Note: The maximum delay for generating an acknowledgement MAY be configured by the SCTP administrator, either statically or dynamically, in order to meet the specific timing requirement of the protocol being carried.

An implementation MUST NOT allow the maximum delay (protocol parameter 'SACK.Delay') to be configured to be more than 500 ms. In other words, an implementation MAY lower the value of 'SACK.Delay' below 500 ms but MUST NOT raise it above 500 ms.

Acknowledgements MUST be sent in SACK chunks unless shutdown was requested by the ULP, in which case an endpoint MAY send an acknowledgement in the SHUTDOWN chunk. A SACK chunk can acknowledge the reception of multiple DATA chunks. See Section 3.3.4 for SACK chunk format. In particular, the SCTP endpoint MUST fill in the Cumulative TSN Ack field to indicate the latest sequential TSN (of a valid DATA chunk) it has received. Any received DATA chunks with TSN greater than the value in the Cumulative TSN Ack field are reported in the Gap Ack Block fields. The SCTP endpoint MUST report as many Gap Ack Blocks as can fit in a single SACK chunk such that the size of the SCTP packet does not exceed the current PMTU.

The SHUTDOWN chunk does not contain Gap Ack Block fields. Therefore, the endpoint SHOULD use a SACK chunk instead of the SHUTDOWN chunk to acknowledge DATA chunks received out of order.

Upon receipt of an SCTP packet containing a DATA chunk with the I bit set, the receiver SHOULD NOT delay the sending of the corresponding SACK chunk, i.e., the receiver SHOULD immediately respond with the corresponding SACK chunk.

When a packet arrives with duplicate DATA chunk(s) and with no new DATA chunk(s), the endpoint MUST immediately send a SACK chunk with no delay. If a packet arrives with duplicate DATA chunk(s) bundled with new DATA chunks, the endpoint MAY immediately send a SACK chunk. Normally, receipt of duplicate DATA chunks will occur when the original SACK chunk was lost and the peer's RTO has expired. The duplicate TSN number(s) SHOULD be reported in the SACK chunk as duplicate.

When an endpoint receives a SACK chunk, it MAY use the duplicate TSN information to determine if SACK chunk loss is occurring. Further use of this data is for future study.

The data receiver is responsible for maintaining its receive buffers. The data receiver SHOULD notify the data sender in a timely manner of changes in its ability to receive data. How an implementation manages its receive buffers is dependent on many factors (e.g.,

operating system, memory management system, amount of memory, etc.). However, the data sender strategy defined in Section 6.2.1 is based on the assumption of receiver operation similar to the following:

- A) At initialization of the association, the endpoint tells the peer how much receive buffer space it has allocated to the association in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk. The endpoint sets `a_rwnd` to this value.
- B) As DATA chunks are received and buffered, decrement `a_rwnd` by the number of bytes received and buffered. This is, in effect, closing `rwnd` at the data sender and restricting the amount of data it can transmit.
- C) As DATA chunks are delivered to the ULP and released from the receive buffers, increment `a_rwnd` by the number of bytes delivered to the upper layer. This is, in effect, opening up `rwnd` on the data sender and allowing it to send more data. The data receiver SHOULD NOT increment `a_rwnd` unless it has released bytes from its receive buffer. For example, if the receiver is holding fragmented DATA chunks in a reassembly queue, it SHOULD NOT increment `a_rwnd`.
- D) When sending a SACK chunk, the data receiver SHOULD place the current value of `a_rwnd` into the `a_rwnd` field. The data receiver SHOULD take into account that the data sender will not retransmit DATA chunks that are acked via the Cumulative TSN Ack (i.e., will drop from its retransmit queue).

Under certain circumstances, the data receiver MAY drop DATA chunks that it has received but has not released from its receive buffers (i.e., delivered to the ULP). These DATA chunks might have been acked in Gap Ack Blocks. For example, the data receiver might be holding data in its receive buffers while reassembling a fragmented user message from its peer when it runs out of receive buffer space. It MAY drop these DATA chunks even though it has acknowledged them in Gap Ack Blocks. If a data receiver drops DATA chunks, it MUST NOT include them in Gap Ack Blocks in subsequent SACK chunks until they are received again via retransmission. In addition, the endpoint SHOULD take into account the dropped data when calculating its `a_rwnd`.

An endpoint SHOULD NOT revoke a SACK chunk and discard data. Only in extreme circumstances might an endpoint use this procedure (such as out of buffer space). The data receiver SHOULD take into account that dropping data that has been acked in Gap Ack Blocks can result in suboptimal retransmission strategies in the data sender and thus in suboptimal performance.

The following example illustrates the use of delayed acknowledgements:

Endpoint A	Endpoint Z
{App sends 3 messages; strm 0}	
DATA [TSN=7,Strm=0,Seq=3] ----->	(ack delayed)
(Start T3-rtx timer)	
DATA [TSN=8,Strm=0,Seq=4] ----->	(send ack)
	/----- SACK [TSN Ack=8,block=0]
(cancel T3-rtx timer) <-----/	
DATA [TSN=9,Strm=0,Seq=5] ----->	(ack delayed)
(Start T3-rtx timer)	
	...
	{App sends 1 message; strm 1}
	(bundle SACK with DATA)
	/----- SACK [TSN Ack=9,block=0] \
	DATA [TSN=6,Strm=1,Seq=2]
(cancel T3-rtx timer) <-----/	(Start T3-rtx timer)
(ack delayed)	
(send ack)	
SACK [TSN Ack=6,block=0] ----->	(cancel T3-rtx timer)

Figure 7: Delayed Acknowledgement Example

If an endpoint receives a DATA chunk with no user data (i.e., the Length field is set to 16), it SHOULD send an ABORT chunk with a "No User Data" error cause.

An endpoint SHOULD NOT send a DATA chunk with no user data part. This avoids the need to be able to return a zero-length user message in the API, especially in the socket API as specified in [RFC6458] for details.

6.2.1. Processing a Received SACK Chunk

Each SACK chunk an endpoint receives contains an `a_rwnd` value. This value represents the amount of buffer space the data receiver, at the time of transmitting the SACK chunk, has left of its total receive buffer space (as specified in the INIT/INIT ACK chunk). Using `a_rwnd`, Cumulative TSN Ack, and Gap Ack Blocks, the data sender can develop a representation of the peer's receive buffer space.

One of the problems the data sender takes into account when processing a SACK chunk is that a SACK chunk can be received out of order. That is, a SACK chunk sent by the data receiver can pass an earlier SACK chunk and be received first by the data sender. If a SACK chunk is received out of order, the data sender can develop an incorrect view of the peer's receive buffer space.

Since there is no explicit identifier that can be used to detect out-of-order SACK chunks, the data sender uses heuristics to determine if a SACK chunk is new.

An endpoint SHOULD use the following rules to calculate the `rwnd`, using the `a_rwnd` value, the Cumulative TSN Ack, and Gap Ack Blocks in a received SACK chunk.

- A) At the establishment of the association, the endpoint initializes the `rwnd` to the Advertised Receiver Window Credit (`a_rwnd`) the peer specified in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk.
- B) Any time a DATA chunk is transmitted (or retransmitted) to a peer, the endpoint subtracts the data size of the chunk from the `rwnd` of that peer.
- C) Any time a DATA chunk is marked for retransmission, either via T3-rtx timer expiration (Section 6.3.3) or via Fast Retransmit (Section 7.2.4), add the data size of those chunks to the `rwnd`.
- D) Any time a SACK chunk arrives, the endpoint performs the following:
 - i) If Cumulative TSN Ack is less than the Cumulative TSN Ack Point, then drop the SACK chunk. Since Cumulative TSN Ack is monotonically increasing, a SACK chunk whose Cumulative TSN Ack is less than the Cumulative TSN Ack Point indicates an out-of-order SACK chunk.
 - ii) Set `rwnd` equal to the newly received `a_rwnd` minus the number of bytes still outstanding after processing the Cumulative TSN Ack and the Gap Ack Blocks.
 - iii) If the SACK chunk is missing a TSN that was previously acknowledged via a Gap Ack Block (e.g., the data receiver reneged on the data), then consider the corresponding DATA that might be possibly missing: Count one miss indication towards Fast Retransmit as described in Section 7.2.4, and if no retransmit timer is running for the destination address to which the DATA chunk was originally transmitted, then T3-rtx is started for that destination address.

- iv) If the Cumulative TSN Ack matches or exceeds the Fast Recovery exitpoint (Section 7.2.4), Fast Recovery is exited.

6.3. Management of Retransmission Timer

An SCTP endpoint uses a retransmission timer T3-rtx to ensure data delivery in the absence of any feedback from its peer. The duration of this timer is referred to as RTO (retransmission timeout).

When an endpoint's peer is multi-homed, the endpoint will calculate a separate RTO for each different destination transport address of its peer endpoint.

The computation and management of RTO in SCTP follow closely how TCP manages its retransmission timer. To compute the current RTO, an endpoint maintains two state variables per destination transport address: SRTT (smoothed round-trip time) and RTTVAR (round-trip time variation).

6.3.1. RTO Calculation

The rules governing the computation of SRTT, RTTVAR, and RTO are as follows:

- C1) Until an RTT measurement has been made for a packet sent to the given destination transport address, set RTO to the protocol parameter 'RTO.Initial'.

- C2) When the first RTT measurement R is made, perform

```
SRTT = R;  
RTTVAR = R/2;  
RTO = SRTT + 4 * RTTVAR;
```

- C3) When a new RTT measurement R' is made, perform:

```
RTTVAR = (1 - RTO.Beta) * RTTVAR + RTO.Beta * |SRTT - R'|;  
SRTT = (1 - RTO.Alpha) * SRTT + RTO.Alpha * R';
```

Note: The value of SRTT used in the update to RTTVAR is its value before updating SRTT itself using the second assignment.

After the computation, update

```
RTO = SRTT + 4 * RTTVAR;
```

C4) When data is in flight and when allowed by rule C5 below, a new RTT measurement MUST be made each round trip. Furthermore, new RTT measurements SHOULD be made no more than once per round trip for a given destination transport address. There are two reasons for this recommendation: First, it appears that measuring more frequently often does not in practice yield any significant benefit [ALLMAN99]; second, if measurements are made more often, then the values of 'RTO.Alpha' and 'RTO.Beta' in rule C3 above SHOULD be adjusted so that SRTT and RTTVAR still adjust to changes at roughly the same rate (in terms of how many round trips it takes them to reflect new values) as they would if making only one measurement per round-trip and using 'RTO.Alpha' and 'RTO.Beta' as given in rule C3. However, the exact nature of these adjustments remains a research issue.

C5) Karn's algorithm: RTT measurements MUST NOT be made using chunks that were retransmitted (and thus for which it is ambiguous whether the reply was for the first instance of the chunk or for a later instance).

RTT measurements SHOULD only be made using a DATA chunk with TSN r , if no DATA chunk with TSN less than or equal to r was retransmitted since the DATA chunk with TSN r was sent first.

C6) Whenever RTO is computed, if it is less than 'RTO.Min' seconds then it is rounded up to 'RTO.Min' seconds. The reason for this rule is that RTOs that do not have a high minimum value are susceptible to unnecessary timeouts [ALLMAN99].

C7) A maximum value MAY be placed on RTO provided it is at least 'RTO.max' seconds.

There is no requirement for the clock granularity G used for computing RTT measurements and the different state variables, other than:

G1) Whenever RTTVAR is computed, if $RTTVAR == 0$, then adjust $RTTVAR = G$.

Experience [ALLMAN99] has shown that finer clock granularities (less than 100 msec) perform somewhat better than more coarse granularities.

See Section 16 for suggested parameter values.

6.3.2. Retransmission Timer Rules

The rules for managing the retransmission timer are as follows:

- R1) Every time a DATA chunk is sent to any address (including a retransmission), if the T3-rtx timer of that address is not running, start it running so that it will expire after the RTO of that address. The RTO used here is that obtained after any doubling due to previous T3-rtx timer expirations on the corresponding destination address as discussed in rule E2 below.
- R2) Whenever all outstanding data sent to an address have been acknowledged, turn off the T3-rtx timer of that address.
- R3) Whenever a SACK chunk is received that acknowledges the DATA chunk with the earliest outstanding TSN for that address, restart the T3-rtx timer for that address with its current RTO (if there is still outstanding data on that address).
- R4) Whenever a SACK chunk is received missing a TSN that was previously acknowledged via a Gap Ack Block, start the T3-rtx for the destination address to which the DATA chunk was originally transmitted if it is not already running.

The following example shows the use of various timer rules (assuming that the receiver uses delayed acks).




Figure 8: Timer Rule Examples

6.3.3. Handle T3-rtx Expiration

Whenever the retransmission timer T3-rtx expires for a destination address, do the following:

- E1) For the destination address for which the timer expires, adjust its ssthresh with rules defined in Section 7.2.3 and set the cwnd = PMDCS.
- E2) For the destination address for which the timer expires, set $RTO = RTO * 2$ ("back off the timer"). The maximum value discussed in rule C7 above ('RTO.max') MAY be used to provide an upper bound to this doubling operation.
- E3) Determine how many of the earliest (i.e., lowest TSN) outstanding DATA chunks for the address for which the T3-rtx has expired will fit into a single SCTP packet, subject to the PMTU corresponding to the destination transport address to which the retransmission is being sent (this might be different from the address for which the timer expires; see Section 6.4). Call this value K. Bundle and retransmit those K DATA chunks in a single packet to the destination endpoint.
- E4) Start the retransmission timer T3-rtx on the destination address to which the retransmission is sent, if rule R1 above indicates to do so. The RTO to be used for starting T3-rtx SHOULD be the one for the destination address to which the retransmission is sent, which, when the receiver is multi-homed, might be different from the destination address for which the timer expired (see Section 6.4 below).

After retransmitting, once a new RTT measurement is obtained (which can happen only when new data has been sent and acknowledged, per rule C5, or for a measurement made from a HEARTBEAT chunk; see Section 8.3), the computation in rule C3 is performed, including the computation of RTO, which might result in "collapsing" RTO back down after it has been subject to doubling (rule E2).

Any DATA chunks that were sent to the address for which the T3-rtx timer expired but did not fit in an SCTP packet of size smaller than or equal to the PMTU (rule E3 above) SHOULD be marked for retransmission and sent as soon as cwnd allows (normally, when a SACK chunk arrives).

The final rule for managing the retransmission timer concerns failover (see Section 6.4.1):

F1) Whenever an endpoint switches from the current destination transport address to a different one, the current retransmission timers are left running. As soon as the endpoint transmits a packet containing DATA chunk(s) to the new transport address, start the timer on that transport address, using the RTO value of the destination address to which the data is being sent, if rule R1 indicates to do so.

6.4. Multi-Homed SCTP Endpoints

An SCTP endpoint is considered multi-homed if there is more than one transport address that can be used as a destination address to reach that endpoint.

Moreover, the ULP of an endpoint selects one of the multiple destination addresses of a multi-homed peer endpoint as the primary path (see Section 5.1.2 and Section 11.1 for details).

By default, an endpoint SHOULD always transmit to the primary path, unless the SCTP user explicitly specifies the destination transport address (and possibly source transport address) to use.

An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., INIT ACK, COOKIE ACK, HEARTBEAT ACK) in response to control chunks to the same destination transport address from which it received the control chunk to which it is replying.

The selection of the destination transport address for packets containing SACK chunks is implementation dependent. However, an endpoint SHOULD NOT vary the destination transport address of a SACK chunk when it receives DATA chunks coming from the same source address.

When acknowledging multiple DATA chunks received in packets from different source addresses in a single SACK chunk, the SACK chunk MAY be transmitted to one of the destination transport addresses from which the DATA or control chunks being acknowledged were received.

When a receiver of a duplicate DATA chunk sends a SACK chunk to a multi-homed endpoint, it MAY be beneficial to vary the destination address and not use the source address of the DATA chunk. The reason is that receiving a duplicate from a multi-homed endpoint might indicate that the return path (as specified in the source address of the DATA chunk) for the SACK chunk is broken.

Furthermore, when its peer is multi-homed, an endpoint SHOULD try to retransmit a chunk that timed out to an active destination transport address that is different from the last destination address to which the chunk was sent.

When its peer is multi-homed, an endpoint SHOULD send fast retransmissions to the same destination transport address to which the original data was sent. If the primary path has been changed and the original data was sent to the old primary path before the Fast Retransmit, the implementation MAY send it to the new primary path.

Retransmissions do not affect the total outstanding data count. However, if the DATA chunk is retransmitted onto a different destination address, both the outstanding data counts on the new destination address and the old destination address to which the data chunk was last sent is adjusted accordingly.

6.4.1. Failover from an Inactive Destination Address

Some of the transport addresses of a multi-homed SCTP endpoint might become inactive due to either the occurrence of certain error conditions (see Section 8.2) or adjustments from the SCTP user.

When there is outbound data to send and the primary path becomes inactive (e.g., due to failures), or where the SCTP user explicitly requests to send data to an inactive destination transport address, before reporting an error to its ULP, the SCTP endpoint SHOULD try to send the data to an alternate active destination transport address if one exists.

When retransmitting data that timed out, if the endpoint is multi-homed, it needs to consider each source-destination address pair in its retransmission selection policy. When retransmitting timed-out data, the endpoint SHOULD attempt to pick the most divergent source-destination pair from the original source-destination pair to which the packet was transmitted.

Note: Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation decision and are not specified within this document.

6.5. Stream Identifier and Stream Sequence Number

Every DATA chunk MUST carry a valid stream identifier. If an endpoint receives a DATA chunk with an invalid stream identifier, it SHOULD acknowledge the reception of the DATA chunk following the normal procedure, immediately send an ERROR chunk with cause set to "Invalid Stream Identifier" (see Section 3.3.10), and discard the DATA chunk. The endpoint MAY bundle the ERROR chunk and the SACK chunk in the same packet.

The Stream Sequence Number in all the outgoing streams MUST start from 0 when the association is established. The Stream Sequence Number of an outgoing stream MUST be incremented by 1 for each ordered user message sent on that outgoing stream. In particular, when the Stream Sequence Number reaches the value 65535 the next Stream Sequence Number MUST be set to 0. For unordered user messages the Stream Sequence Number MUST NOT be changed.

6.6. Ordered and Unordered Delivery

Within a stream, an endpoint MUST deliver DATA chunks received with the U flag set to 0 to the upper layer according to the order of their Stream Sequence Number. If DATA chunks arrive out of order of their Stream Sequence Number, the endpoint MUST hold the received DATA chunks from delivery to the ULP until they are reordered.

However, an SCTP endpoint can indicate that no ordered delivery is required for a particular DATA chunk transmitted within the stream by setting the U flag of the DATA chunk to 1.

When an endpoint receives a DATA chunk with the U flag set to 1, it bypasses the ordering mechanism and immediately deliver the data to the upper layer (after reassembly if the user data is fragmented by the data sender).

This provides an effective way of transmitting "out-of-band" data in a given stream. Also, a stream can be used as an "unordered" stream by simply setting the U flag to 1 in all DATA chunks sent through that stream.

Implementation Note: When sending an unordered DATA chunk, an implementation MAY choose to place the DATA chunk in an outbound packet that is at the head of the outbound transmission queue if possible.

The 'Stream Sequence Number' field in a DATA chunk with U flag set to 1 has no significance. The sender can fill the 'Stream Sequence Number' with arbitrary value, but the receiver MUST ignore the field.

Note: When transmitting ordered and unordered data, an endpoint does not increment its Stream Sequence Number when transmitting a DATA chunk with U flag set to 1.

6.7. Report Gaps in Received DATA TSNs

Upon the reception of a new DATA chunk, an endpoint examines the continuity of the TSNs received. If the endpoint detects a gap in the received DATA chunk sequence, it SHOULD send a SACK chunk with Gap Ack Blocks immediately. The data receiver continues sending a SACK chunk after receipt of each SCTP packet that does not fill the gap.

Based on the Gap Ack Block from the received SACK chunk, the endpoint can calculate the missing DATA chunks and make decisions on whether to retransmit them (see Section 6.2.1 for details).

Multiple gaps can be reported in one single SACK chunk (see Section 3.3.4).

When its peer is multi-homed, the SCTP endpoint SHOULD always try to send the SACK chunk to the same destination address from which the last DATA chunk was received.

Upon the reception of a SACK chunk, the endpoint MUST remove all DATA chunks that have been acknowledged by the SACK chunk's Cumulative TSN Ack from its transmit queue. All DATA chunks with TSNs not included in the Gap Ack Blocks that are smaller than the highest acknowledged TSN reported in the SACK chunk MUST be treated as "missing" by the sending endpoint. The number of "missing" reports for each outstanding DATA chunk MUST be recorded by the data sender to make retransmission decisions. See Section 7.2.4 for details.

The following example shows the use of SACK chunk to report a gap.

```

Endpoint A                                Endpoint Z
{App sends 3 messages; strm 0}
DATA [TSN=6,Strm=0,Seq=2] -----> (ack delayed)
(Start T3-rtx timer)

DATA [TSN=7,Strm=0,Seq=3] -----> X (lost)

DATA [TSN=8,Strm=0,Seq=4] -----> (gap detected,
                                   immediately send ack)
                                   /----- SACK [TSN Ack=6,Block=1,
                                   /          Start=2,End=2]
                                   <-----/
(remove 6 from out-queue,
 and mark 7 as "1" missing report)

```

Figure 9: Reporting a Gap using SACK Chunk

The maximum number of Gap Ack Blocks that can be reported within a single SACK chunk is limited by the current PMTU. When a single SACK chunk cannot cover all the Gap Ack Blocks needed to be reported due to the PMTU limitation, the endpoint **MUST** send only one SACK chunk. This single SACK chunk **MUST** report the Gap Ack Blocks from the lowest to highest TSNs, within the size limit set by the PMTU, and leave the remaining highest TSN numbers unacknowledged.

6.8. CRC32c Checksum Calculation

When sending an SCTP packet, the endpoint **MUST** strengthen the data integrity of the transmission by including the CRC32c checksum value calculated on the packet, as described below.

After the packet is constructed (containing the SCTP common header and one or more control or DATA chunks), the transmitter **MUST**

- 1) fill in the proper Verification Tag in the SCTP common header and initialize the checksum field to 0,
- 2) calculate the CRC32c checksum of the whole packet, including the SCTP common header and all the chunks (refer to Appendix A for details of the CRC32c algorithm); and
- 3) put the resultant value into the checksum field in the common header, and leave the rest of the bits unchanged.

When an SCTP packet is received, the receiver **MUST** first check the CRC32c checksum as follows:

- 1) Store the received CRC32c checksum value aside.

- 2) Replace the 32 bits of the checksum field in the received SCTP packet with 0 and calculate a CRC32c checksum value of the whole received packet.
- 3) Verify that the calculated CRC32c checksum is the same as the received CRC32c checksum. If it is not, the receiver MUST treat the packet as an invalid SCTP packet.

The default procedure for handling invalid SCTP packets is to silently discard them.

Any hardware implementation SHOULD permit alternative verification of the CRC in software.

6.9. Fragmentation and Reassembly

An endpoint MAY support fragmentation when sending DATA chunks, but it MUST support reassembly when receiving DATA chunks. If an endpoint supports fragmentation, it MUST fragment a user message if the size of the user message to be sent causes the outbound SCTP packet size to exceed the current PMTU. An endpoint that does not support fragmentation and is requested to send a user message such that the outbound SCTP packet size would exceed the current PMTU MUST return an error to its upper layer and MUST NOT attempt to send the user message.

An SCTP implementation MAY provide a mechanism to the upper layer that disables fragmentation when sending DATA chunks. When fragmentation of DATA chunks is disabled, the SCTP implementation MUST behave in the same way an implementation that does not support fragmentation, i.e., it rejects calls that would result in sending SCTP packets that exceed the current PMTU.

Implementation Note: In this error case, the SEND primitive discussed in Section 11.1 would need to return an error to the upper layer.

If its peer is multi-homed, the endpoint SHOULD choose a DATA chunk size smaller than or equal to the AMDCS.

Once a user message is fragmented, it cannot be re-fragmented. Instead, if the PMTU has been reduced, then IP fragmentation MUST be used. Therefore, an SCTP association can fail if IP fragmentation is not working on any path. Please see Section 7.3 for details of PMTU discovery.

When determining when to fragment, the SCTP implementation MUST take into account the SCTP packet header as well as the DATA chunk header(s). The implementation MUST also take into account the space required for a SACK chunk if bundling a SACK chunk with the DATA chunk.

Fragmentation takes the following steps:

- 1) The data sender MUST break the user message into a series of DATA chunks. The sender SHOULD choose a size of DATA chunks that is smaller than or equal to the AMDCS.
- 2) The transmitter MUST then assign, in sequence, a separate TSN to each of the DATA chunks in the series. The transmitter assigns the same Stream Sequence Number to each of the DATA chunks. If the user indicates that the user message is to be delivered using unordered delivery, then the U flag of each DATA chunk of the user message MUST be set to 1.
- 3) The transmitter MUST also set the B/E bits of the first DATA chunk in the series to '10', the B/E bits of the last DATA chunk in the series to '01', and the B/E bits of all other DATA chunks in the series to '00'.

An endpoint MUST recognize fragmented DATA chunks by examining the B/E bits in each of the received DATA chunks, and queue the fragmented DATA chunks for reassembly. Once the user message is reassembled, SCTP passes the reassembled user message to the specific stream for possible reordering and final dispatching.

If the data receiver runs out of buffer space while still waiting for more fragments to complete the reassembly of the message, it SHOULD dispatch part of its inbound message through a partial delivery API (see Section 11), freeing some of its receive buffer space so that the rest of the message can be received.

6.10. Bundling

An endpoint bundles chunks by simply including multiple chunks in one outbound SCTP packet. The total size of the resultant SCTP packet MUST be less than or equal to the current PMTU.

If its peer endpoint is multi-homed, the sending endpoint SHOULD choose a size no larger than the PMTU of the current primary path.

When bundling control chunks with DATA chunks, an endpoint MUST place control chunks first in the outbound SCTP packet. The transmitter MUST transmit DATA chunks within an SCTP packet in increasing order of TSN.

Note: Since control chunks are placed first in a packet and since DATA chunks are transmitted before SHUTDOWN or SHUTDOWN ACK chunks, DATA chunks cannot be bundled with SHUTDOWN or SHUTDOWN ACK chunks.

Partial chunks MUST NOT be placed in an SCTP packet. A partial chunk is a chunk that is not completely contained in the SCTP packet; i.e., the SCTP packet is too short to contain all the bytes of the chunk as indicated by the chunk length.

An endpoint MUST process received chunks in their order in the packet. The receiver uses the Chunk Length field to determine the end of a chunk and beginning of the next chunk taking account of the fact that all chunks end on a 4-byte boundary. If the receiver detects a partial chunk, it MUST drop the chunk.

An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK, or SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunks with any other chunks.

7. Congestion Control

Congestion control is one of the basic functions in SCTP. To manage congestion, the mechanisms and algorithms in this section are to be employed.

Implementation Note: As far as its specific performance requirements are met, an implementation is always allowed to adopt a more conservative congestion control algorithm than the one defined below.

The congestion control algorithms used by SCTP are based on [RFC5681]. This section describes how the algorithms defined in [RFC5681] are adapted for use in SCTP. We first list differences in protocol designs between TCP and SCTP, and then describe SCTP's congestion control scheme. The description will use the same terminology as in TCP congestion control whenever appropriate.

SCTP congestion control is always applied to the entire association, and not to individual streams.

7.1. SCTP Differences from TCP Congestion Control

Gap Ack Blocks in the SCTP SACK chunk carry the same semantic meaning as the TCP SACK. TCP considers the information carried in the SACK as advisory information only. SCTP considers the information carried in the Gap Ack Blocks in the SACK chunk as advisory. In SCTP, any DATA chunk that has been acknowledged by a SACK chunk, including DATA that arrived at the receiving end out of order, is not considered fully delivered until the Cumulative TSN Ack Point passes the TSN of the DATA chunk (i.e., the DATA chunk has been acknowledged by the Cumulative TSN Ack field in the SACK chunk). Consequently, the value of cwnd controls the amount of outstanding data, rather than (as in the case of non-SACK TCP) the upper bound between the highest acknowledged sequence number and the latest DATA chunk that can be sent within the congestion window. SCTP SACK leads to different implementations of Fast Retransmit and Fast Recovery than non-SACK TCP. As an example, see [FALL96].

The biggest difference between SCTP and TCP, however, is multi-homing. SCTP is designed to establish robust communication associations between two endpoints each of which might be reachable by more than one transport address. Potentially different addresses might lead to different data paths between the two endpoints; thus, ideally one needs a separate set of congestion control parameters for each of the paths. The treatment here of congestion control for multi-homed receivers is new with SCTP and might require refinement in the future. The current algorithms make the following assumptions:

- * The sender usually uses the same destination address until being instructed by the upper layer to do otherwise; however, SCTP MAY change to an alternate destination in the event an address is marked inactive (see Section 8.2). Also, SCTP MAY retransmit to a different transport address than the original transmission.
- * The sender keeps a separate congestion control parameter set for each of the destination addresses it can send to (not each source-destination pair but for each destination). The parameters SHOULD decay if the address is not used for a long enough time period. [RFC5681] specifies this period of time as a retransmission timeout.
- * For each of the destination addresses, an endpoint does slow start upon the first transmission to that address.

Note: TCP guarantees in-sequence delivery of data to its upper-layer protocol within a single TCP session. This means that when TCP notices a gap in the received sequence number, it waits until the gap

is filled before delivering the data that was received with sequence numbers higher than that of the missing data. On the other hand, SCTP can deliver data to its upper-layer protocol even if there is a gap in TSN if the Stream Sequence Numbers are in sequence for a particular stream (i.e., the missing DATA chunks are for a different stream) or if unordered delivery is indicated. Although this does not affect cwnd, it might affect rwnd calculation.

7.2. SCTP Slow-Start and Congestion Avoidance

The slow-start and congestion avoidance algorithms **MUST** be used by an endpoint to control the amount of data being injected into the network. The congestion control in SCTP is employed in regard to the association, not to an individual stream. In some situations, it might be beneficial for an SCTP sender to be more conservative than the algorithms allow; however, an SCTP sender **MUST NOT** be more aggressive than the following algorithms allow.

Like TCP, an SCTP endpoint uses the following three control variables to regulate its transmission rate.

- * Receiver advertised window size (rwnd, in bytes), which is set by the receiver based on its available buffer space for incoming packets.

Note: This variable is kept on the entire association.

- * Congestion control window (cwnd, in bytes), which is adjusted by the sender based on observed network conditions.

Note: This variable is maintained on a per-destination-address basis.

- * Slow-start threshold (ssthresh, in bytes), which is used by the sender to distinguish slow-start and congestion avoidance phases.

Note: This variable is maintained on a per-destination-address basis.

SCTP also requires one additional control variable, `partial_bytes_acked`, which is used during congestion avoidance phase to facilitate cwnd adjustment.

Unlike TCP, an SCTP sender **MUST** keep a set of these control variables cwnd, ssthresh, and `partial_bytes_acked` for **EACH** destination address of its peer (when its peer is multi-homed). When calculating one of these variables, the length of the DATA chunk including the padding **SHOULD** be used.

Only one `rwnd` is kept for the whole association (no matter if the peer is multi-homed or has a single address).

7.2.1. Slow-Start

Beginning data transmission into a network with unknown conditions or after a sufficiently long idle period requires SCTP to probe the network to determine the available capacity. The slow-start algorithm is used for this purpose at the beginning of a transfer, or after repairing loss detected by the retransmission timer.

- * The initial `cwnd` before data transmission MUST be set to $\min(4 * PMDCS, \max(2 * PMDCS, 4404))$ bytes if the peer address is an IPv4 address and to $\min(4 * PMDCS, \max(2 * PMDCS, 4344))$ bytes if the peer address is an IPv6 address.
- * The initial `cwnd` after a retransmission timeout MUST be no more than `PMDCS`, and only one packet is allowed to be in flight until successful acknowledgement.
- * The initial value of `ssthresh` SHOULD be arbitrarily high (e.g., the size of the largest possible advertised window).
- * Whenever `cwnd` is greater than zero, the endpoint is allowed to have `cwnd` bytes of data outstanding on that transport address. A limited overbooking as described in Section 6.1 B) SHOULD be supported.
- * When `cwnd` is less than or equal to `ssthresh`, an SCTP endpoint MUST use the slow-start algorithm to increase `cwnd` only if the current congestion window is being fully utilized, and the data sender is not in Fast Recovery. Only when these two conditions are met can the `cwnd` be increased; otherwise, the `cwnd` MUST NOT be increased. If these conditions are met, then `cwnd` MUST be increased by, at most, the lesser of
 1. the total size of the previously outstanding DATA chunk(s) acknowledged, and
 2. L times the destination's `PMDCS`.

The first upper bound protects against the ACK-Splitting attack outlined in [SAVAGE99]. The positive integer L SHOULD be 1, and MAY be larger than 1. See [RFC3465] for details of choosing L .

In instances where its peer endpoint is multi-homed, if an endpoint receives a SACK chunk that results in updating the cwnd, then it SHOULD update its cwnd (or cwnds) apportioned to the destination addresses to which it transmitted the acknowledged data.

- * While the endpoint does not transmit data on a given transport address, the cwnd of the transport address SHOULD be adjusted to $\max(\text{cwnd} / 2, 4 * \text{PMDCS})$ once per RTT. Before the first cwnd adjustment, the ssthresh of the transport address SHOULD be set to the cwnd.

7.2.2. Congestion Avoidance

When cwnd is greater than ssthresh, cwnd SHOULD be incremented by PMDCS per RTT if the sender has cwnd or more bytes of data outstanding for the corresponding transport address. The basic recommendations for incrementing cwnd during congestion avoidance are as follows:

- * SCTP MAY increment cwnd by PMDCS.
- * SCTP SHOULD increment cwnd by PMDCS once per RTT when the sender has cwnd or more bytes of data outstanding for the corresponding transport address.
- * SCTP MUST NOT increment cwnd by more than PMDCS per RTT.

In practice, an implementation can achieve this goal in the following way:

- * `partial_bytes_acked` is initialized to 0.
- * Whenever cwnd is greater than ssthresh, upon each SACK chunk arrival, increase `partial_bytes_acked` by the total number of bytes (including the chunk header and the padding) of all new DATA chunks acknowledged in that SACK chunk, including chunks acknowledged by the new Cumulative TSN Ack, by Gap Ack Blocks, and by the number of bytes of duplicated chunks reported in Duplicate TSNs.
- * When (1) `partial_bytes_acked` is greater than cwnd and (2) before the arrival of the SACK chunk the sender had less than cwnd bytes of data outstanding (i.e., before the arrival of the SACK chunk, `flightsize` was less than cwnd), reset `partial_bytes_acked` to cwnd.

- * When (1) `partial_bytes_acked` is equal to or greater than `cwnd` and (2) before the arrival of the SACK chunk the sender had `cwnd` or more bytes of data outstanding (i.e., before the arrival of the SACK chunk, `flightsize` was greater than or equal to `cwnd`), `partial_bytes_acked` is reset to `(partial_bytes_acked - cwnd)`. Next, `cwnd` is increased by `PMDCS`.
- * Same as in the slow start, when the sender does not transmit DATA chunks on a given transport address, the `cwnd` of the transport address SHOULD be adjusted to `max(cwnd / 2, 4 * PMDCS)` per RTO.
- * When all of the data transmitted by the sender has been acknowledged by the receiver, `partial_bytes_acked` is initialized to 0.

7.2.3. Congestion Control

Upon detection of packet losses from SACK chunks (see Section 7.2.4), an endpoint SHOULD do the following:

```
ssthresh = max(cwnd / 2, 4 * PMDCS)
cwnd = ssthresh
partial_bytes_acked = 0
```

Basically, a packet loss causes `cwnd` to be cut in half.

When the T3-rtx timer expires on an address, SCTP SHOULD perform slow start by:

```
ssthresh = max(cwnd / 2, 4 * PMDCS)
cwnd = PMDCS
partial_bytes_acked = 0
```

and ensure that no more than one SCTP packet will be in flight for that address until the endpoint receives acknowledgement for successful delivery of data to that address.

7.2.4. Fast Retransmit on Gap Reports

In the absence of data loss, an endpoint performs delayed acknowledgement. However, whenever an endpoint notices a hole in the arriving TSN sequence, it SHOULD start sending a SACK chunk back every time a packet arrives carrying data until the hole is filled.

Whenever an endpoint receives a SACK chunk that indicates that some TSNs are missing, it SHOULD wait for two further miss indications (via subsequent SACK chunks for a total of three missing reports) on the same TSNs before taking action with regard to Fast Retransmit.

Miss indications SHOULD follow the HTNA (Highest TSN Newly Acknowledged) algorithm. For each incoming SACK chunk, miss indications are incremented only for missing TSNs prior to the highest TSN newly acknowledged in the SACK chunk. A newly acknowledged DATA chunk is one not previously acknowledged in a SACK chunk. If an endpoint is in Fast Recovery and a SACK chunk arrives that advances the Cumulative TSN Ack Point, the miss indications are incremented for all TSNs reported missing in the SACK chunk.

When the third consecutive miss indication is received for a TSN(s), the data sender does the following:

- 1) Mark the DATA chunk(s) with three miss indications for retransmission.
- 2) If not in Fast Recovery, adjust the ssthresh and cwnd of the destination address(es) to which the missing DATA chunks were last sent, according to the formula described in Section 7.2.3.
- 3) If not in Fast Recovery, determine how many of the earliest (i.e., lowest TSN) DATA chunks marked for retransmission will fit into a single packet, subject to constraint of the PMTU of the destination transport address to which the packet is being sent. Call this value K. Retransmit those K DATA chunks in a single packet. When a Fast Retransmit is being performed, the sender SHOULD ignore the value of cwnd and SHOULD NOT delay retransmission for this single packet.
- 4) Restart the T3-rtx timer only if the last SACK chunk acknowledged the lowest outstanding TSN number sent to that address, or the endpoint is retransmitting the first outstanding DATA chunk sent to that address.
- 5) Mark the DATA chunk(s) as being fast retransmitted and thus ineligible for a subsequent Fast Retransmit. Those TSNs marked for retransmission due to the Fast-Retransmit algorithm that did not fit in the sent datagram carrying K other TSNs are also marked as ineligible for a subsequent Fast Retransmit. However, as they are marked for retransmission they will be retransmitted later on as soon as cwnd allows.
- 6) If not in Fast Recovery, enter Fast Recovery and mark the highest outstanding TSN as the Fast Recovery exit point. When a SACK chunk acknowledges all TSNs up to and including this exit point, Fast Recovery is exited. While in Fast Recovery, the ssthresh and cwnd SHOULD NOT change for any destinations due to a subsequent Fast Recovery event (i.e., one SHOULD NOT reduce the cwnd further due to a subsequent Fast Retransmit).

Note: Before the above adjustments, if the received SACK chunk also acknowledges new DATA chunks and advances the Cumulative TSN Ack Point, the cwnd adjustment rules defined in Section 7.2.1 and Section 7.2.2 MUST be applied first.

7.2.5. Reinitialization

During the lifetime of an SCTP association events can happen, which result in using the network under unknown new conditions. When detected by an SCTP implementation, the congestion control MUST be reinitialized.

7.2.5.1. Change of Differentiated Services Code Points

SCTP implementations MAY allow an application to configure the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) used for sending packets. If a DSCP change might result in outgoing packets being queued in different queues, the congestion control parameters for all affected destination addresses MUST be reset to their initial values.

7.2.5.2. Change of Routes

SCTP implementations MAY be aware of routing changes affecting packets sent to a destination address. In particular, this includes the selection of a different source address used for sending packets to a destination address. If such a routing change happens, the congestion control parameters for the affected destination addresses MUST be reset to their initial values.

7.3. PMTU Discovery

[RFC8899], [RFC8201], and [RFC1191] specify "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery", whereby an endpoint maintains an estimate of PMTU along a given Internet path and refrains from sending packets along that path that exceed the PMTU, other than occasional attempts to probe for a change in the PMTU. [RFC8899] is thorough in its discussion of the PMTU discovery mechanism and strategies for determining the current end-to-end PMTU setting as well as detecting changes in this value.

An endpoint SHOULD apply these techniques, and SHOULD do so on a per-destination-address basis.

There are two important SCTP-specific points regarding PMTU discovery:

- 1) SCTP associations can span multiple addresses. An endpoint **MUST** maintain separate PMTU estimates for each destination address of its peer.
- 2) The sender **SHOULD** track an AMDCS that will be the smallest PMDCS discovered for all of the peer's destination addresses. When fragmenting messages into multiple parts this AMDCS **SHOULD** be used to calculate the size of each DATA chunk. This will allow retransmissions to be seamlessly sent to an alternate address without encountering IP fragmentation.

8. Fault Management

8.1. Endpoint Failure Detection

An endpoint **SHOULD** keep a counter on the total number of consecutive retransmissions to its peer (this includes data retransmissions to all the destination transport addresses of the peer if it is multi-homed), including the number of unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks observed on the path that is currently used for data transfer. Unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks observed on paths different from the path currently used for data transfer **SHOULD NOT** increment the association error counter, as this could lead to association closure even if the path that is currently used for data transfer is available (but idle). If the value of this counter exceeds the limit indicated in the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans', the endpoint **SHOULD** consider the peer endpoint unreachable and **SHALL** stop transmitting any more data to it (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state). In addition, the endpoint **SHOULD** report the failure to the upper layer and optionally report back all outstanding user data remaining in its outbound queue. The association is automatically closed when the peer endpoint becomes unreachable.

The counter used for endpoint failure detection **MUST** be reset each time a DATA chunk sent to that peer endpoint is acknowledged (by the reception of a SACK chunk). When a HEARTBEAT ACK chunk is received from the peer endpoint, the counter **SHOULD** also be reset. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk **MAY** choose not to clear the counter if there is outstanding data on the association. This allows for handling the possible difference in reachability based on DATA chunks and HEARTBEAT chunks.

8.2. Path Failure Detection

When its peer endpoint is multi-homed, an endpoint **SHOULD** keep an error counter for each of the destination transport addresses of the peer endpoint.

Each time the T3-rtx timer expires on any address, or when a HEARTBEAT chunk sent to an idle address is not acknowledged within an RTO, the error counter of that destination address will be incremented. When the value in the error counter exceeds the protocol parameter 'Path.Max.Retrans' of that destination address, the endpoint SHOULD mark the destination transport address as inactive, and a notification SHOULD be sent to the upper layer.

When an outstanding TSN is acknowledged or a HEARTBEAT chunk sent to that address is acknowledged with a HEARTBEAT ACK chunk, the endpoint SHOULD clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the DATA chunk was last sent (or HEARTBEAT chunk was sent) and SHOULD also report to the upper layer when an inactive destination address is marked as active. When the peer endpoint is multi-homed and the last chunk sent to it was a retransmission to an alternate address, there exists an ambiguity as to whether or not the acknowledgement could be credited to the address of the last chunk sent. However, this ambiguity does not seem to have significant consequences for SCTP behavior. If this ambiguity is undesirable, the transmitter MAY choose not to clear the error counter if the last chunk sent was a retransmission.

Note: When configuring the SCTP endpoint, the user ought to avoid having the value of 'Association.Max.Retrans' larger than the summation of the 'Path.Max.Retrans' of all the destination addresses for the remote endpoint. Otherwise, all the destination addresses might become inactive while the endpoint still considers the peer endpoint reachable. When this condition occurs, how SCTP chooses to function is implementation specific.

When the primary path is marked inactive (due to excessive retransmissions, for instance), the sender MAY automatically transmit new packets to an alternate destination address if one exists and is active. If more than one alternate address is active when the primary path is marked inactive, only ONE transport address SHOULD be chosen and used as the new destination transport address.

8.3. Path Heartbeat

By default, an SCTP endpoint SHOULD monitor the reachability of the idle destination transport address(es) of its peer by sending a HEARTBEAT chunk periodically to the destination transport address(es). The sending of HEARTBEAT chunks MAY begin upon reaching the ESTABLISHED state and is discontinued after sending either a SHUTDOWN chunk or SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. A receiver of a HEARTBEAT chunks MUST respond to a HEARTBEAT chunk with a HEARTBEAT ACK chunk after entering the COOKIE-ECHOED state (sender of the INIT chunk) or the ESTABLISHED state (receiver of the INIT chunk), up until reaching

the SHUTDOWN-SENT state (sender of the SHUTDOWN chunk) or the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state (receiver of the SHUTDOWN chunk).

A destination transport address is considered "idle" if no new chunk that can be used for updating path RTT (usually including first transmission DATA, INIT, COOKIE ECHO, or HEARTBEAT chunks, etc.) and no HEARTBEAT chunk has been sent to it within the current heartbeat period of that address. This applies to both active and inactive destination addresses.

The upper layer can optionally initiate the following functions:

- A) Disable heartbeat on a specific destination transport address of a given association,
- B) Change the 'HB.interval',
- C) Re-enable heartbeat on a specific destination transport address of a given association, and
- D) Request the sending of an on-demand HEARTBEAT chunk on a specific destination transport address of a given association.

The endpoint SHOULD increment the respective error counter of the destination transport address each time a HEARTBEAT chunk is sent to that address and not acknowledged within one RTO.

When the value of this counter exceeds the protocol parameter 'Path.Max.Retrans', the endpoint SHOULD mark the corresponding destination address as inactive if it is not so marked and SHOULD also report to the upper layer the change in reachability of this destination address. After this, the endpoint SHOULD continue sending HEARTBEAT chunks on this destination address but SHOULD stop increasing the counter.

The sender of the HEARTBEAT chunk SHOULD include in the Heartbeat Information field of the chunk the current time when the packet is sent and the destination address to which the packet is sent.

Implementation Note: An alternative implementation of the heartbeat mechanism that can be used is to increment the error counter variable every time a HEARTBEAT chunk is sent to a destination. Whenever a HEARTBEAT ACK chunk arrives, the sender SHOULD clear the error counter of the destination that the HEARTBEAT chunk was sent to. This in effect would clear the previously stroked error (and any other error counts as well).

The receiver of the HEARTBEAT chunk SHOULD immediately respond with a HEARTBEAT ACK chunk that contains the Heartbeat Information TLV, together with any other received TLVs, copied unchanged from the received HEARTBEAT chunk.

Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk, the sender of the HEARTBEAT chunk SHOULD clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT chunk was sent and mark the destination transport address as active if it is not so marked. The endpoint SHOULD report to the upper layer when an inactive destination address is marked as active due to the reception of the latest HEARTBEAT ACK chunk. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk SHOULD also clear the association overall error count (as defined in Section 8.1).

The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk SHOULD also perform an RTT measurement for that destination transport address using the time value carried in the HEARTBEAT ACK chunk.

On an idle destination address that is allowed to heartbeat, it is RECOMMENDED that a HEARTBEAT chunk is sent once per RTO of that destination address plus the protocol parameter 'HB.interval', with jittering of +/- 50% of the RTO value, and exponential backoff of the RTO if the previous HEARTBEAT chunk is unanswered.

A primitive is provided for the SCTP user to change the 'HB.interval' and turn on or off the heartbeat on a given destination address. The 'HB.interval' set by the SCTP user is added to the RTO of that destination (including any exponential backoff). Only one heartbeat SHOULD be sent each time the heartbeat timer expires (if multiple destinations are idle). It is an implementation decision on how to choose which of the candidate idle destinations to heartbeat to (if more than one destination is idle).

When tuning the 'HB.interval', there is a side effect that SHOULD be taken into account. When this value is increased, i.e., the time between the sending of HEARTBEAT chunks is longer, the detection of lost ABORT chunks takes longer as well. If a peer endpoint sends an ABORT chunk for any reason and the ABORT chunk is lost, the local endpoint will only discover the lost ABORT chunk by sending a DATA chunk or HEARTBEAT chunk (thus causing the peer to send another ABORT chunk). This is to be considered when tuning the heartbeat timer. If the sending of HEARTBEAT chunks is disabled, only sending DATA chunks to the association will discover a lost ABORT chunk from the peer.

8.4. Handle "Out of the Blue" Packets

An SCTP packet is called an "out of the blue" (OOTB) packet if it is correctly formed (i.e., passed the receiver's CRC32c check; see Section 6.8), but the receiver is not able to identify the association to which this packet belongs.

The receiver of an OOTB packet does the following:

- 1) If the OOTB packet is to or from a non-unicast address, a receiver SHOULD silently discard the packet. Otherwise,
- 2) If the OOTB packet contains an ABORT chunk, the receiver MUST silently discard the OOTB packet and take no further action. Otherwise,
- 3) If the packet contains an INIT chunk with a Verification Tag set to 0, it SHOULD be processed as described in Section 5.1. If, for whatever reason, the INIT chunk cannot be processed normally and an ABORT chunk has to be sent in response, the Verification Tag of the packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be the Initiate Tag of the received INIT chunk, and the T bit of the ABORT chunk has to be set to 0, indicating that the Verification Tag is not reflected. Otherwise,
- 4) If the packet contains a COOKIE ECHO chunk as the first chunk, it MUST be processed as described in Section 5.1. Otherwise,
- 5) If the packet contains a SHUTDOWN ACK chunk, the receiver SHOULD respond to the sender of the OOTB packet with a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk. When sending the SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk, the receiver of the OOTB packet MUST fill in the Verification Tag field of the outbound packet with the Verification Tag received in the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk and set the T bit in the Chunk Flags to indicate that the Verification Tag is reflected. Otherwise,
- 6) If the packet contains a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk, the receiver SHOULD silently discard the packet and take no further action. Otherwise,
- 7) If the packet contains a ERROR chunk with the "Stale Cookie" error cause or a COOKIE ACK chunk, the SCTP packet SHOULD be silently discarded. Otherwise,
- 8) The receiver SHOULD respond to the sender of the OOTB packet with an ABORT chunk. When sending the ABORT chunk, the receiver of the OOTB packet MUST fill in the Verification Tag field of the outbound packet with the value found in the Verification Tag

field of the OOTB packet and set the T bit in the Chunk Flags to indicate that the Verification Tag is reflected. After sending this ABORT chunk, the receiver of the OOTB packet MUST discard the OOTB packet and MUST NOT take any further action.

8.5. Verification Tag

The Verification Tag rules defined in this section apply when sending or receiving SCTP packets that do not contain an INIT, SHUTDOWN COMPLETE, COOKIE ECHO (see Section 5.1), ABORT, or SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. The rules for sending and receiving SCTP packets containing one of these chunk types are discussed separately in Section 8.5.1.

When sending an SCTP packet, the endpoint MUST fill in the Verification Tag field of the outbound packet with the tag value in the Initiate Tag parameter of the INIT or INIT ACK chunk received from its peer.

When receiving an SCTP packet, the endpoint MUST ensure that the value in the Verification Tag field of the received SCTP packet matches its own tag. If the received Verification Tag value does not match the receiver's own tag value, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet and MUST NOT process it any further except for those cases listed in Section 8.5.1 below.

8.5.1. Exceptions in Verification Tag Rules

A) Rules for packets carrying an INIT chunk:

- * The sender MUST set the Verification Tag of the packet to 0.
- * When an endpoint receives an SCTP packet with the Verification Tag set to 0, it SHOULD verify that the packet contains only an INIT chunk. Otherwise, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet.

B) Rules for packets carrying an ABORT chunk:

- * The endpoint MUST always fill in the Verification Tag field of the outbound packet with the destination endpoint's tag value, if it is known.
- * If the ABORT chunk is sent in response to an OOTB packet, the endpoint MUST follow the procedure described in Section 8.4.
- * The receiver of an ABORT chunk MUST accept the packet if the Verification Tag field of the packet matches its own tag and the T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's tag and the T bit is set in the Chunk Flags. Otherwise, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet and take no further action.

C) Rules for packets carrying a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk:

- * When sending a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk, if the receiver of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk has a TCB, then the destination endpoint's tag MUST be used, and the T bit MUST NOT be set. Only where no TCB exists SHOULD the sender use the Verification Tag from the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk, and MUST set the T bit.
- * The receiver of a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk accepts the packet if the Verification Tag field of the packet matches its own tag and the T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's tag and the T bit is set in the Chunk Flags. Otherwise, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet and take no further action. An endpoint MUST ignore the SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk if it is not in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state.

D) Rules for packets carrying a COOKIE ECHO chunk:

- * When sending a COOKIE ECHO chunk, the endpoint MUST use the value of the Initiate Tag received in the INIT ACK chunk.
- * The receiver of a COOKIE ECHO chunk follows the procedures in Section 5.

E) Rules for packets carrying a SHUTDOWN ACK chunk:

- * If the receiver is in COOKIE-ECHOED or COOKIE-WAIT state the procedures in Section 8.4 SHOULD be followed; in other words, it is treated as an OOTB packet.

9. Termination of Association

An endpoint SHOULD terminate its association when it exits from service. An association can be terminated by either abort or shutdown. An abort of an association is abortive by definition in that any data pending on either end of the association is discarded and not delivered to the peer. A shutdown of an association is considered a graceful close where all data in queue by either endpoint is delivered to the respective peers. However, in the case of a shutdown, SCTP does not support a half-open state (like TCP) wherein one side might continue sending data while the other end is closed. When either endpoint performs a shutdown, the association on each peer will stop accepting new data from its user and only deliver data in queue at the time of sending or receiving the SHUTDOWN chunk.

9.1. Abort of an Association

When an endpoint decides to abort an existing association, it MUST send an ABORT chunk to its peer endpoint. The sender MUST fill in the peer's Verification Tag in the outbound packet and MUST NOT bundle any DATA chunk with the ABORT chunk. If the association is aborted on request of the upper layer, a "User-Initiated Abort" error cause (see Section 3.3.10.12) SHOULD be present in the ABORT chunk.

An endpoint MUST NOT respond to any received packet that contains an ABORT chunk (also see Section 8.4).

An endpoint receiving an ABORT chunk MUST apply the special Verification Tag check rules described in Section 8.5.1.

After checking the Verification Tag, the receiving endpoint MUST remove the association from its record and SHOULD report the termination to its upper layer. If a "User-Initiated Abort" error cause is present in the ABORT chunk, the Upper Layer Abort Reason SHOULD be made available to the upper layer.

9.2. Shutdown of an Association

Using the SHUTDOWN primitive (see Section 11.1), the upper layer of an endpoint in an association can gracefully close the association. This will allow all outstanding DATA chunks from the peer of the shutdown initiator to be delivered before the association terminates.

Upon receipt of the SHUTDOWN primitive from its upper layer, the endpoint enters the SHUTDOWN-PENDING state and remains there until all outstanding data has been acknowledged by its peer. The endpoint accepts no new data from its upper layer, but retransmits data to the peer endpoint if necessary to fill gaps.

Once all its outstanding data has been acknowledged, the endpoint sends a SHUTDOWN chunk to its peer including in the Cumulative TSN Ack field the last sequential TSN it has received from the peer. It SHOULD then start the T2-shutdown timer and enter the SHUTDOWN-SENT state. If the timer expires, the endpoint MUST resend the SHUTDOWN chunk with the updated last sequential TSN received from its peer.

The rules in Section 6.3 MUST be followed to determine the proper timer value for T2-shutdown. To indicate any gaps in TSN, the endpoint MAY also bundle a SACK chunk with the SHUTDOWN chunk in the same SCTP packet.

An endpoint SHOULD limit the number of retransmissions of the SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans'. If this threshold is exceeded, the endpoint SHOULD destroy the TCB and SHOULD report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state). The reception of any packet from its peer (i.e., as the peer sends all of its queued DATA chunks) SHOULD clear the endpoint's retransmission count and restart the T2-shutdown timer, giving its peer ample opportunity to transmit all of its queued DATA chunks that have not yet been sent.

Upon reception of the SHUTDOWN chunk, the peer endpoint does the following:

- * enter the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state,
- * stop accepting new data from its SCTP user, and
- * verify, by checking the Cumulative TSN Ack field of the chunk, that all its outstanding DATA chunks have been received by the SHUTDOWN chunk sender.

Once an endpoint has reached the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state, it MUST ignore ULP shutdown requests but MUST continue responding to SHUTDOWN chunks from its peer.

If there are still outstanding DATA chunks left, the SHUTDOWN chunk receiver MUST continue to follow normal data transmission procedures defined in Section 6, until all outstanding DATA chunks are acknowledged; however, the SHUTDOWN chunk receiver MUST NOT accept new data from its SCTP user.

While in the SHUTDOWN-SENT state, the SHUTDOWN chunk sender MUST immediately respond to each received packet containing one or more DATA chunks with a SHUTDOWN chunk and restart the T2-shutdown timer. If a SHUTDOWN chunk by itself cannot acknowledge all of the received DATA chunks (i.e., there are TSNs that can be acknowledged that are larger than the cumulative TSN, and thus gaps exist in the TSN sequence), or if duplicate TSNs have been received, then a SACK chunk MUST also be sent.

The sender of the SHUTDOWN chunk MAY also start an overall guard timer T5-shutdown-guard to bound the overall time for the shutdown sequence. At the expiration of this timer, the sender SHOULD abort the association by sending an ABORT chunk. If the T5-shutdown-guard timer is used, it SHOULD be set to the RECOMMENDED value of 5 times 'RTO.Max'.

If the receiver of the SHUTDOWN chunk has no more outstanding DATA chunks, the SHUTDOWN chunk receiver MUST send a SHUTDOWN ACK chunk and start a T2-shutdown timer of its own, entering the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state. If the timer expires, the endpoint MUST resend the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk.

The sender of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk SHOULD limit the number of retransmissions of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk to the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans'. If this threshold is exceeded, the endpoint SHOULD destroy the TCB and SHOULD report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

Upon the receipt of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk, the sender of the SHUTDOWN chunk MUST stop the T2-shutdown timer, send a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk to its peer, and remove all record of the association.

Upon reception of the SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk, the endpoint verifies that it is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state; if it is not, the chunk SHOULD be discarded. If the endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state, the endpoint SHOULD stop the T2-shutdown timer and remove all knowledge of the association (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

An endpoint SHOULD ensure that all its outstanding DATA chunks have been acknowledged before initiating the shutdown procedure.

An endpoint SHOULD reject any new data request from its upper layer if it is in the SHUTDOWN-PENDING, SHUTDOWN-SENT, SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED, or SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state.

If an endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and receives an INIT chunk (e.g., if the SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk was lost) with source and destination transport addresses (either in the IP addresses or in the INIT chunk) that belong to this association, it SHOULD discard the INIT chunk and retransmit the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk.

Note: Receipt of a packet containing an INIT chunk with the same source and destination IP addresses as used in transport addresses assigned to an endpoint but with a different port number indicates the initialization of a separate association.

The sender of the INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk SHOULD respond to the receipt of a SHUTDOWN ACK chunk with a stand-alone SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk in an SCTP packet with the Verification Tag field of its common header set to the same tag that was received in the packet containing the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. This is considered an OOTB packet as defined in Section 8.4. The sender of the INIT chunk lets T1-init continue

running and remains in the COOKIE-WAIT or COOKIE-ECHOED state. Normal T1-init timer expiration will cause the INIT or COOKIE chunk to be retransmitted and thus start a new association.

If a SHUTDOWN chunk is received in the COOKIE-WAIT or COOKIE ECHOED state, the SHUTDOWN chunk SHOULD be silently discarded.

If an endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-SENT state and receives a SHUTDOWN chunk from its peer, the endpoint SHOULD respond immediately with a SHUTDOWN ACK chunk to its peer, and move into the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state restarting its T2-shutdown timer.

If an endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and receives a SHUTDOWN ACK, it MUST stop the T2-shutdown timer, send a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk to its peer, and remove all record of the association.

10. ICMP Handling

Whenever an ICMP message is received by an SCTP endpoint, the following procedures MUST be followed to ensure proper utilization of the information being provided by layer 3.

- ICMP1) An implementation MAY ignore all ICMPv4 messages where the type field is not set to "Destination Unreachable".
- ICMP2) An implementation MAY ignore all ICMPv6 messages where the type field is not "Destination Unreachable", "Parameter Problem", or "Packet Too Big".
- ICMP3) An implementation SHOULD ignore any ICMP messages where the code indicates "Port Unreachable".
- ICMP4) An implementation MAY ignore all ICMPv6 messages of type "Parameter Problem" if the code is not "Unrecognized Next Header Type Encountered".
- ICMP5) An implementation MUST use the payload of the ICMP message (v4 or v6) to locate the association that sent the message to which ICMP is responding. If the association cannot be found, an implementation SHOULD ignore the ICMP message.

- ICMP6) An implementation MUST validate that the Verification Tag contained in the ICMP message matches the Verification Tag of the peer. If the Verification Tag is not 0 and does not match, discard the ICMP message. If it is 0 and the ICMP message contains enough bytes to verify that the chunk type is an INIT chunk and that the Initiate Tag matches the tag of the peer, continue with ICMP7. If the ICMP message is too short or the chunk type or the Initiate Tag does not match, silently discard the packet.
- ICMP7) If the ICMP message is either an ICMPv6 message of type "Packet Too Big" or an ICMPv4 message of type "Destination Unreachable" and code "Fragmentation Needed", an implementation SHOULD process this information as defined for PMTU discovery.
- ICMP8) If the ICMP code is an "Unrecognized Next Header Type Encountered" or a "Protocol Unreachable", an implementation MUST treat this message as an abort with the T bit set if it does not contain an INIT chunk. If it does contain an INIT chunk and the association is in the COOKIE-WAIT state, handle the ICMP message like an ABORT chunk.
- ICMP9) If the ICMP type is "Destination Unreachable", the implementation MAY move the destination to the unreachable state or, alternatively, increment the path error counter. SCTP MAY provide information to the upper layer indicating the reception of ICMP messages when reporting a network status change.

These procedures differ from [RFC1122] and from its requirements for processing of port-unreachable messages and the requirements that an implementation MUST abort associations in response to a "protocol unreachable" message. Port-unreachable messages are not processed, since an implementation will send an ABORT chunk, not a port unreachable. The stricter handling of the "protocol unreachable" message is due to security concerns for hosts that do not support SCTP.

11. Interface with Upper Layer

The Upper Layer Protocols (ULPs) request services by passing primitives to SCTP and receive notifications from SCTP for various events.

The primitives and notifications described in this section can be used as a guideline for implementing SCTP. The following functional description of ULP interface primitives is shown for illustrative

purposes. Different SCTP implementations can have different ULP interfaces. However, all SCTP implementations are expected to provide a certain minimum set of services to guarantee that all SCTP implementations can support the same protocol hierarchy.

Please note that this section is informational only.

[RFC6458] and the Socket API Considerations section of [RFC7053] define an extension of the socket API for SCTP as described in this document.

11.1. ULP-to-SCTP

The following sections functionally characterize a ULP/SCTP interface. The notation used is similar to most procedure or function calls in high-level languages.

The ULP primitives described below specify the basic functions that SCTP performs to support inter-process communication. Individual implementations define their own exact format, and provide combinations or subsets of the basic functions in single calls.

11.1.1. Initialize

```
INITIALIZE ([local port],[local eligible address list])  
-> local SCTP instance name
```

This primitive allows SCTP to initialize its internal data structures and allocate necessary resources for setting up its operation environment. Once SCTP is initialized, ULP can communicate directly with other endpoints without re-invoking this primitive.

SCTP will return a local SCTP instance name to the ULP.

Mandatory attributes:
None.

Optional attributes:
local port: SCTP port number, if ULP wants it to be specified.
local eligible address list: an address list that the local SCTP endpoint binds. By default, if an address list is not included, all IP addresses assigned to the host are used by the local endpoint.

Implementation Note: If this optional attribute is supported by an implementation, it will be the responsibility of the implementation to enforce that the IP source address field of any SCTP packets sent by this endpoint contains one of the IP addresses indicated in the local eligible address list.

11.1.2. Associate

```
ASSOCIATE(local SCTP instance name,  
initial destination transport addr list, outbound stream count)  
-> association id [,destination transport addr list]  
[,outbound stream count]
```

This primitive allows the upper layer to initiate an association to a specific peer endpoint.

The peer endpoint is specified by one or more of the transport addresses that defines the endpoint (see Section 2.3). If the local SCTP instance has not been initialized, the ASSOCIATE is considered an error.

An association id, which is a local handle to the SCTP association, will be returned on successful establishment of the association. If SCTP is not able to open an SCTP association with the peer endpoint, an error is returned.

Other association parameters can be returned, including the complete destination transport addresses of the peer as well as the outbound stream count of the local endpoint. One of the transport addresses from the returned destination addresses will be selected by the local endpoint as default primary path for sending SCTP packets to this peer. The returned "destination transport addr list" can be used by the ULP to change the default primary path or to force sending a packet to a specific transport address.

Implementation Note: If ASSOCIATE primitive is implemented as a blocking function call, the ASSOCIATE primitive can return association parameters in addition to the association id upon successful establishment. If ASSOCIATE primitive is implemented as a non-blocking call, only the association id is returned and association parameters are passed using the COMMUNICATION UP notification.

Mandatory attributes:

local SCTP instance name: obtained from the INITIALIZE operation.

initial destination transport addr list: a non-empty list of

transport addresses of the peer endpoint with which the association is to be established.

outbound stream count: the number of outbound streams the ULP would like to open towards this peer endpoint.

Optional attributes:
None.

11.1.3. Shutdown

SHUTDOWN(association id) -> result

Gracefully closes an association. Any locally queued user data will be delivered to the peer. The association will be terminated only after the peer acknowledges all the SCTP packets sent. A success code will be returned on successful termination of the association. If attempting to terminate the association results in a failure, an error code is returned.

Mandatory attributes:
association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

Optional attributes:
None.

11.1.4. Abort

ABORT(association id [, Upper Layer Abort Reason]) -> result

Ungracefully closes an association. Any locally queued user data will be discarded, and an ABORT chunk is sent to the peer. A success code will be returned on successful abort of the association. If attempting to abort the association results in a failure, an error code is returned.

Mandatory attributes:
association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

Optional attributes:
Upper Layer Abort Reason: reason of the abort to be passed to the peer.

11.1.5. Send

```
SEND(association id, buffer address, byte count [,context]  
[,stream id] [,life time] [,destination transport address]  
[,unordered flag] [,no-bundle flag] [,payload protocol-id]  
[,sack-immediately flag]) -> result
```

This is the main method to send user data via SCTP.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

buffer address: the location where the user message to be transmitted is stored.

byte count: the size of the user data in number of bytes.

Optional attributes:

context: an optional information provided that will be carried in the sending failure notification to the ULP if the transportation of this user message fails.

stream id: to indicate which stream to send the data on. If not specified, stream 0 will be used.

life time: specifies the life time of the user data. The user data will not be sent by SCTP after the life time expires. This parameter can be used to avoid efforts to transmit stale user messages. SCTP notifies the ULP if the data cannot be initiated to transport (i.e., sent to the destination via SCTP's SEND primitive) within the life time variable. However, the user data will be transmitted if SCTP has attempted to transmit a chunk before the life time expired.

Implementation Note: In order to better support the data life time option, the transmitter can hold back the assigning of the TSN number to an outbound DATA chunk to the last moment. And, for implementation simplicity, once a TSN number has been assigned the sender considers the send of this DATA chunk as committed, overriding any life time option attached to the DATA chunk.

destination transport address: specified as one of the destination transport addresses of the peer endpoint to which this packet is sent. Whenever possible, SCTP uses this destination transport address for sending the packets, instead of the current primary path.

unordered flag: this flag, if present, indicates that the user

would like the data delivered in an unordered fashion to the peer (i.e., the U flag is set to 1 on all DATA chunks carrying this message).

no-bundle flag: instructs SCTP not to delay the sending of DATA chunks for this user data just to allow it to be bundled with other outbound DATA chunks. When faced with network congestion, SCTP might still bundle the data, even when this flag is present.

payload protocol-id: a 32-bit unsigned integer that is to be passed to the peer indicating the type of payload protocol data being transmitted. Note that the upper layer is responsible for the host to network byte order conversion of this field, which is passed by SCTP as 4 bytes of opaque data.

sack-immediately flag: set the I bit on the last DATA chunk used for the user message to be transmitted.

11.1.6. Set Primary

SETPRIMARY(association id, destination transport address,
[source transport address]) -> result

Instructs the local SCTP to use the specified destination transport address as the primary path for sending packets.

The result of attempting this operation is returned. If the specified destination transport address is not present in the "destination transport address list" returned earlier in an associate command or communication up notification, an error is returned.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

destination transport address: specified as one of the transport addresses of the peer endpoint, which is used as the primary address for sending packets. This overrides the current primary address information maintained by the local SCTP endpoint.

Optional attributes:

source transport address: optionally, some implementations can allow you to set the default source address placed in all outgoing IP datagrams.

11.1.7. Receive


```
RECEIVE(association id, buffer address, buffer size [,stream id])  
-> byte count [,transport address] [,stream id]  
[,stream sequence number] [,partial flag] [,payload protocol-id]
```

This primitive reads the first user message in the SCTP in-queue into the buffer specified by ULP, if there is one available. The size of the message read, in bytes, will be returned. It might, depending on the specific implementation, also return other information such as the sender's address, the stream id on which it is received, whether there are more messages available for retrieval, etc. For ordered messages, their Stream Sequence Number might also be returned.

Depending upon the implementation, if this primitive is invoked when no message is available the implementation returns an indication of this condition or blocks the invoking process until data does become available.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association

buffer address: the memory location indicated by the ULP to store the received message.

buffer size: the maximum size of data to be received, in bytes.

Optional attributes:

stream id: to indicate which stream to receive the data on.

stream sequence number: the Stream Sequence Number assigned by the sending SCTP peer.

partial flag: if this returned flag is set to 1, then this primitive contains a partial delivery of the whole message. When this flag is set, the stream id and stream sequence number accompanies this primitive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates that no more deliveries will be received for this stream sequence number.

payload protocol-id: a 32-bit unsigned integer that is received from the peer indicating the type of payload protocol of the received data. Note that the upper layer is responsible for the host to network byte order conversion of this field, which is passed by SCTP as 4 bytes of opaque data.

11.1.8. Status

```
STATUS(association id) -> status data
```

This primitive returns a data block containing the following information:

- * association connection state,
- * destination transport address list,
- * destination transport address reachability states,
- * current receiver window size,
- * current congestion window sizes,
- * number of unacknowledged DATA chunks,
- * number of DATA chunks pending receipt,
- * primary path,
- * most recent SRTT on primary path,
- * RTO on primary path,
- * SRTT and RTO on other destination addresses, etc.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

Optional attributes:

None.

11.1.9. Change Heartbeat

CHANGE HEARTBEAT(association id, destination transport address, new state [,interval]) -> result

Instructs the local endpoint to enable or disable heartbeat on the specified destination transport address.

The result of attempting this operation is returned.

Note: Even when enabled, heartbeat will not take place if the destination transport address is not idle.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

destination transport address: specified as one of the transport

addresses of the peer endpoint.

new state: the new state of heartbeat for this destination transport address (either enabled or disabled).

Optional attributes:

interval: if present, indicates the frequency of the heartbeat if this is to enable heartbeat on a destination transport address. This value is added to the RTO of the destination transport address. This value, if present, affects all destinations.

11.1.10. Request Heartbeat

REQUESTHEARTBEAT(association id, destination transport address)
-> result

Instructs the local endpoint to perform a heartbeat on the specified destination transport address of the given association. The returned result indicates whether the transmission of the HEARTBEAT chunk to the destination address is successful.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

destination transport address: the transport address of the association on which a heartbeat is issued.

Optional attributes:

None.

11.1.11. Get SRTT Report

GETSRTTREPORT(association id, destination transport address)
-> srtt result

Instructs the local SCTP to report the current SRTT measurement on the specified destination transport address of the given association. The returned result can be an integer containing the most recent SRTT in milliseconds.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

destination transport address: the transport address of the association on which the SRTT measurement is to be reported.

Optional attributes:

None.

11.1.12. Set Failure Threshold

```
SETFAILURETHRESHOLD(association id, destination transport address,  
failure threshold) -> result
```

This primitive allows the local SCTP to customize the reachability failure detection threshold 'Path.Max.Retrans' for the specified destination address. Note that this can also be done using the SETPROTOCOLPARAMETERS primitive (Section 11.1.13).

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

destination transport address: the transport address of the association on which the failure detection threshold is to be set.

failure threshold: the new value of 'Path.Max.Retrans' for the destination address.

Optional attributes:

None.

11.1.13. Set Protocol Parameters

```
SETPROTOCOLPARAMETERS(association id,  
[destination transport address,] protocol parameter list)  
-> result
```

This primitive allows the local SCTP to customize the protocol parameters.

Mandatory attributes:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

protocol parameter list: the specific names and values of the protocol parameters (e.g., 'Association.Max.Retrans' (see Section 16), or other parameters like the DSCP) that the SCTP user wishes to customize.

Optional attributes:

destination transport address: some of the protocol parameters might be set on a per destination transport address basis.

11.1.14. Receive Unsent Message

```
RECEIVE_UNSENT(data retrieval id, buffer address, buffer size  
[,stream id] [, stream sequence number] [,partial flag]  
[,payload protocol-id])
```

This primitive reads a user message, which has never been sent, into the buffer specified by ULP.

Mandatory attributes:

data retrieval id: the identification passed to the ULP in the failure notification.

buffer address: the memory location indicated by the ULP to store the received message.

buffer size: the maximum size of data to be received, in bytes.

Optional attributes:

stream id: this is a return value that is set to indicate which stream the data was sent to.

stream sequence number: this value is returned indicating the Stream Sequence Number that was associated with the message.

partial flag: if this returned flag is set to 1, then this message is a partial delivery of the whole message. When this flag is set, the stream id and stream sequence number accompanies this primitive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates that no more deliveries will be received for this stream sequence number.

payload protocol-id: The 32 bit unsigned integer that was set to be sent to the peer indicating the type of payload protocol of the received data.

11.1.15. Receive Unacknowledged Message

```
RECEIVE_UNACKED(data retrieval id, buffer address, buffer size,  
[,stream id] [,stream sequence number] [,partial flag]  
[,payload protocol-id])
```

This primitive reads a user message, which has been sent and has not been acknowledged by the peer, into the buffer specified by ULP.

Mandatory attributes:

data retrieval id: the identification passed to the ULP in the failure notification.

buffer address: the memory location indicated by the ULP to store

the received message.

buffer size: the maximum size of data to be received, in bytes.

Optional attributes:

stream id: this is a return value that is set to indicate which stream the data was sent to.

stream sequence number: this value is returned indicating the Stream Sequence Number that was associated with the message.

partial flag: if this returned flag is set to 1, then this message is a partial delivery of the whole message. When this flag is set, the stream id and stream sequence number accompanies this primitive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates that no more deliveries will be received for this stream sequence number.

payload protocol-id: the 32-bit unsigned integer that was sent to the peer indicating the type of payload protocol of the received data.

11.1.16. Destroy SCTP Instance

DESTROY(local SCTP instance name)

Mandatory attributes:

local SCTP instance name: this is the value that was passed to the application in the initialize primitive and it indicates which SCTP instance is to be destroyed.

Optional attributes:

None.

11.2. SCTP-to-ULP

It is assumed that the operating system or application environment provides a means for the SCTP to asynchronously signal the ULP process. When SCTP does signal a ULP process, certain information is passed to the ULP.

Implementation Note: In some cases, this might be done through a separate socket or error channel.

11.2.1. DATA ARRIVE Notification

SCTP invokes this notification on the ULP when a user message is successfully received and ready for retrieval.

The following might optionally be passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

stream id: to indicate which stream the data is received on.

11.2.2. SEND FAILURE Notification

If a message cannot be delivered, SCTP invokes this notification on the ULP.

The following might optionally be passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

data retrieval id: an identification used to retrieve unsent and unacknowledged data.

mode: Indicate whether no part of the message never has been sent or if at least part of it has been sent but it is not completely acknowledged.

cause code: indicating the reason of the failure, e.g., size too large, message life time expiration, etc.

context: optional information associated with this message (see Section 11.1.5).

11.2.3. NETWORK STATUS CHANGE Notification

When a destination transport address is marked inactive (e.g., when SCTP detects a failure) or marked active (e.g., when SCTP detects a recovery), SCTP invokes this notification on the ULP.

The following is passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

destination transport address: this indicates the destination transport address of the peer endpoint affected by the change.

new-status: this indicates the new status.

11.2.4. COMMUNICATION UP Notification

This notification is used when SCTP becomes ready to send or receive user messages, or when a lost communication to an endpoint is restored.

Implementation Note: If the ASSOCIATE primitive is implemented as a blocking function call, the association parameters are returned as a result of the ASSOCIATE primitive itself. In that case, COMMUNICATION UP notification is optional at the association initiator's side.

The following is passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

status: This indicates what type of event has occurred.

destination transport address list: the complete set of transport addresses of the peer.

outbound stream count: the maximum number of streams allowed to be used in this association by the ULP.

inbound stream count: the number of streams the peer endpoint has requested with this association (this might not be the same number as 'outbound stream count').

11.2.5. COMMUNICATION LOST Notification

When SCTP loses communication to an endpoint completely (e.g., via Heartbeats) or detects that the endpoint has performed an abort operation, it invokes this notification on the ULP.

The following is passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

status: this indicates what type of event has occurred; the status might indicate that a failure OR a normal termination event occurred in response to a shutdown or abort request.

The following might be passed with the notification:

last-acked: the TSN last acked by that peer endpoint.

last-sent: the TSN last sent to that peer endpoint.

Upper Layer Abort Reason: the abort reason specified in case of a user-initiated abort.

11.2.6. COMMUNICATION ERROR Notification

When SCTP receives an ERROR chunk from its peer and decides to notify its ULP, it can invoke this notification on the ULP.

The following can be passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

error info: this indicates the type of error and optionally some additional information received through the ERROR chunk.

11.2.7. RESTART Notification

When SCTP detects that the peer has restarted, it might send this notification to its ULP.

The following can be passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

11.2.8. SHUTDOWN COMPLETE Notification

When SCTP completes the shutdown procedures (Section 9.2), this notification is passed to the upper layer.

The following can be passed with the notification:

association id: local handle to the SCTP association.

12. Security Considerations

12.1. Security Objectives

As a common transport protocol designed to reliably carry time-sensitive user messages, such as billing or signaling messages for telephony services, between two networked endpoints, SCTP has the following security objectives.

- * availability of reliable and timely data transport services
- * integrity of the user-to-user information carried by SCTP

12.2. SCTP Responses to Potential Threats

SCTP could potentially be used in a wide variety of risk situations. It is important for operators of systems running SCTP to analyze their particular situations and decide on the appropriate counter-measures.

Operators of systems running SCTP might consult [RFC2196] for guidance in securing their site.

12.2.1. Countering Insider Attacks

The principles of [RFC2196] might be applied to minimize the risk of theft of information or sabotage by insiders. Such procedures include publication of security policies, control of access at the physical, software, and network levels, and separation of services.

12.2.2. Protecting against Data Corruption in the Network

Where the risk of undetected errors in datagrams delivered by the lower-layer transport services is considered to be too great, additional integrity protection is required. If this additional protection were provided in the application layer, the SCTP header would remain vulnerable to deliberate integrity attacks. While the existing SCTP mechanisms for detection of packet replays are considered sufficient for normal operation, stronger protections are needed to protect SCTP when the operating environment contains significant risk of deliberate attacks from a sophisticated adversary.

The SCTP Authentication extension SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895] MAY be used when the threat environment requires stronger integrity protections, but does not require confidentiality.

12.2.3. Protecting Confidentiality

In most cases, the risk of breach of confidentiality applies to the signaling data payload, not to the SCTP or lower-layer protocol overheads. If that is true, encryption of the SCTP user data only might be considered. As with the supplementary checksum service, user data encryption MAY be performed by the SCTP user application. [RFC6083] MAY be used for this. Alternately, the user application MAY use an implementation-specific API to request that the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] be used to provide confidentiality and integrity.

Particularly for mobile users, the requirement for confidentiality might include the masking of IP addresses and ports. In this case, ESP SHOULD be used instead of application-level confidentiality. If ESP is used to protect confidentiality of SCTP traffic, an ESP cryptographic transform that includes cryptographic integrity protection MUST be used, because if there is a confidentiality threat there will also be a strong integrity threat.

Regardless of where confidentiality is provided, the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296] SHOULD be used for key management of ESP.

Operators might consult [RFC4301] for more information on the security services available at and immediately above the Internet Protocol layer.

12.2.4. Protecting against Blind Denial-of-Service Attacks

A blind attack is one where the attacker is unable to intercept or otherwise see the content of data flows passing to and from the target SCTP node. Blind denial-of-service attacks can take the form of flooding, masquerade, or improper monopolization of services.

12.2.4.1. Flooding

The objective of flooding is to cause loss of service and incorrect behavior at target systems through resource exhaustion, interference with legitimate transactions, and exploitation of buffer-related software bugs. Flooding can be directed either at the SCTP node or at resources in the intervening IP Access Links or the Internet. Where the latter entities are the target, flooding will manifest itself as loss of network services, including potentially the breach of any firewalls in place.

In general, protection against flooding begins at the equipment design level, where it includes measures such as:

- * avoiding commitment of limited resources before determining that the request for service is legitimate.
- * giving priority to completion of processing in progress over the acceptance of new work.
- * identification and removal of duplicate or stale queued requests for service.
- * not responding to unexpected packets sent to non-unicast addresses.

Network equipment is expected to be capable of generating an alarm and log if a suspicious increase in traffic occurs. The log provides information such as the identity of the incoming link and source address(es) used, which will help the network or SCTP system operator to take protective measures. Procedures are expected to be in place for the operator to act on such alarms if a clear pattern of abuse emerges.

The design of SCTP is resistant to flooding attacks, particularly in its use of a four-way startup handshake, its use of a cookie to defer commitment of resources at the responding SCTP node until the handshake is completed, and its use of a Verification Tag to prevent insertion of extraneous packets into the flow of an established association.

ESP might be useful in reducing the risk of certain kinds of denial-of-service attacks.

Support for the Host Name Address parameter has been removed from the protocol. Endpoints receiving INIT or INIT ACK chunks containing the Host Name Address parameter MUST send an ABORT chunk in response and MAY include an "Unresolvable Address" error cause.

12.2.4.2. Blind Masquerade

Masquerade can be used to deny service in several ways:

- * by tying up resources at the target SCTP node to which the impersonated node has limited access. For example, the target node can by policy permit a maximum of one SCTP association with the impersonated SCTP node. The masquerading attacker can attempt to establish an association purporting to come from the impersonated node so that the latter cannot do so when it requires it.
- * by deliberately allowing the impersonation to be detected, thereby provoking counter-measures that cause the impersonated node to be locked out of the target SCTP node.
- * by interfering with an established association by inserting extraneous content such as a SHUTDOWN chunk.

SCTP reduces the risk of blind masquerade attacks through IP spoofing by use of the four-way startup handshake. Because the initial exchange is memory-less, no lockout mechanism is triggered by blind masquerade attacks. In addition, the packet containing the INIT ACK chunk with the State Cookie is transmitted back to the IP address from which it received the packet containing the INIT chunk. Thus,

the attacker would not receive the INIT ACK chunk containing the State Cookie. SCTP protects against insertion of extraneous packets into the flow of an established association by use of the Verification Tag.

Logging of received INIT chunks and abnormalities such as unexpected INIT ACK chunks might be considered as a way to detect patterns of hostile activity. However, the potential usefulness of such logging has to be weighed against the increased SCTP startup processing it implies, rendering the SCTP node more vulnerable to flooding attacks. Logging is pointless without the establishment of operating procedures to review and analyze the logs on a routine basis.

12.2.4.3. Improper Monopolization of Services

Attacks under this heading are performed openly and legitimately by the attacker. They are directed against fellow users of the target SCTP node or of the shared resources between the attacker and the target node. Possible attacks include the opening of a large number of associations between the attacker's node and the target, or transfer of large volumes of information within a legitimately established association.

Policy limits are expected to be placed on the number of associations per adjoining SCTP node. SCTP user applications are expected to be capable of detecting large volumes of illegitimate or "no-op" messages within a given association and either logging or terminating the association as a result, based on local policy.

12.3. SCTP Interactions with Firewalls

It is helpful for some firewalls if they can inspect just the first fragment of a fragmented SCTP packet and unambiguously determine whether it corresponds to an INIT chunk (for further information, please refer to [RFC1858]). Accordingly, we stress the requirements, as stated in Section 3.1, that (1) an INIT chunk MUST NOT be bundled with any other chunk in a packet and (2) a packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification Tag. The receiver of an INIT chunk MUST silently discard the INIT chunk and all further chunks if the INIT chunk is bundled with other chunks or the packet has a non-zero Verification Tag.

12.4. Protection of Non-SCTP-Capable Hosts

To provide a non-SCTP-capable host with the same level of protection against attacks as for SCTP-capable ones, all SCTP implementations MUST implement the ICMP handling described in Section 10.

When an SCTP implementation receives a packet containing multiple control or DATA chunks and the processing of the packet would result in sending multiple chunks in response, the sender of the response chunk(s) MUST NOT send more than one packet containing chunks other than DATA chunks. This requirement protects the network for triggering a packet burst in response to a single packet. If bundling is supported, multiple response chunks that fit into a single packet MAY be bundled together into one single response packet. If bundling is not supported, then the sender MUST NOT send more than one response chunk and MUST discard all other responses. Note that this rule does not apply to a SACK chunk, since a SACK chunk is, in itself, a response to DATA chunks and a SACK chunk does not require a response of more DATA chunks.

An SCTP implementation MUST abort the association if it receives a SACK chunk acknowledging a TSN that has not been sent.

An SCTP implementation that receives an INIT chunk that would require a large packet in response, due to the inclusion of multiple "Unrecognized Parameter" parameters, MAY (at its discretion) elect to omit some or all of the "Unrecognized Parameter" parameters to reduce the size of the INIT ACK chunk. Due to a combination of the size of the State Cookie parameter and the number of addresses a receiver of an INIT chunk indicates to a peer, it is always possible that the INIT ACK chunk will be larger than the original INIT chunk. An SCTP implementation SHOULD attempt to make the INIT ACK chunk as small as possible to reduce the possibility of byte amplification attacks.

13. Network Management Considerations

The MIB module for SCTP defined in [RFC3873] applies for the version of the protocol specified in this document.

14. Recommended Transmission Control Block (TCB) Parameters

This section details a set of parameters that are expected to be contained within the TCB for an implementation. This section is for illustrative purposes and is not considered to be requirements on an implementation or as an exhaustive list of all parameters inside an SCTP TCB. Each implementation might need its own additional parameters for optimization.

14.1. Parameters Necessary for the SCTP Instance

Associations: A list of current associations and mappings to the

data consumers for each association. This might be in the form of a hash table or other implementation-dependent structure. The data consumers might be process identification information such as file descriptors, named pipe pointer, or table pointers dependent on how SCTP is implemented.

Secret Key: A secret key used by this endpoint to compute the MAC. This SHOULD be a cryptographic quality random number with a sufficient length. Discussion in [RFC4086] can be helpful in selection of the key.

Address List: The list of IP addresses that this instance has bound. This information is passed to one's peer(s) in INIT and INIT ACK chunks.

SCTP Port: The local SCTP port number to which the endpoint is bound.

14.2. Parameters Necessary per Association (i.e., the TCB)

Peer Verification Tag: Tag value to be sent in every packet and is received in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk.

My Verification Tag: Tag expected in every inbound packet and sent in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk.

State: COOKIE-WAIT, COOKIE-ECHOED, ESTABLISHED, SHUTDOWN-PENDING, SHUTDOWN-SENT, SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED, SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT.

Note: No "CLOSED" state is illustrated since if a association is "CLOSED" its TCB SHOULD be removed.

Peer Transport Address List: A list of SCTP transport addresses to which the peer is bound. This information is derived from the INIT or INIT ACK chunk and is used to associate an inbound packet with a given association. Normally, this information is hashed or keyed for quick lookup and access of the TCB.

Primary Path: This is the current primary destination transport address of the peer endpoint. It might also specify a source transport address on this endpoint.

Overall Error Count: The overall association error count.

Overall Error Threshold: The threshold for this association that if the Overall Error Count reaches will cause this association to be torn down.

Peer Rwnd: Current calculated value of the peer's rwnd.

Next TSN: The next TSN number to be assigned to a new DATA chunk. This is sent in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk to the peer and incremented each time a DATA chunk is assigned a TSN (normally just prior to transmit or during fragmentation).

Last Rcvd TSN: This is the last TSN received in sequence. This value is set initially by taking the peer's initial TSN, received in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk, and subtracting one from it.

Mapping Array: An array of bits or bytes indicating which out-of-order TSNs have been received (relative to the Last Rcvd TSN). If no gaps exist, i.e., no out-of-order packets have been received, this array will be set to all zero. This structure might be in the form of a circular buffer or bit array.

Ack State: This flag indicates if the next received packet is to be responded to with a SACK chunk. This is initialized to 0. When a packet is received it is incremented. If this value reaches 2 or more, a SACK chunk is sent and the value is reset to 0. Note: This is used only when no DATA chunks are received out of order. When DATA chunks are out of order, SACK chunks are not delayed (see Section 6).

Inbound Streams: An array of structures to track the inbound streams, normally including the next sequence number expected and possibly the stream number.

Outbound Streams: An array of structures to track the outbound streams, normally including the next sequence number to be sent on the stream.

Reasm Queue: A reassembly queue.

Receive Buffer: A buffer to store received user data which has not been delivered to the upper layer.

Local Transport Address List: The list of local IP addresses bound in to this association.

Association Maximum DATA Chunk Size: The smallest Path Maximum DATA Chunk Size of all destination addresses.

14.3. Per Transport Address Data

For each destination transport address in the peer's address list derived from the INIT or INIT ACK chunk, a number of data elements need to be maintained including:

Error Count: The current error count for this destination.

Error Threshold: Current error threshold for this destination, i.e., what value marks the destination down if error count reaches this value.

cwnd: The current congestion window.

ssthresh: The current ssthresh value.

RTO: The current retransmission timeout value.

SRTT: The current smoothed round-trip time.

RTTVAR: The current RTT variation.

partial bytes acked: The tracking method for increase of cwnd when in congestion avoidance mode (see Section 7.2.2).

state: The current state of this destination, i.e., DOWN, UP, ALLOW-HEARTBEAT, NO-HEARTBEAT, etc.

PMTU: The current known PMTU.

PMDCS: The current known PMDCS.

Per Destination Timer: A timer used by each destination.

RTO-Pending: A flag used to track if one of the DATA chunks sent to this address is currently being used to compute an RTT. If this flag is 0, the next DATA chunk sent to this destination is expected to be used to compute an RTT and this flag is expected to be set. Every time the RTT calculation completes (i.e., the DATA chunk is acknowledged), clear this flag.

last-time: The time to which this destination was last sent. This can be used to determine if the sending of a HEARTBEAT chunk is needed.

14.4. General Parameters Needed

Out Queue: A queue of outbound DATA chunks.

In Queue: A queue of inbound DATA chunks.

15. IANA Considerations

This document defines five registries that IANA maintains:

- * through definition of additional chunk types,
- * through definition of additional chunk flags,
- * through definition of additional parameter types,
- * through definition of additional cause codes within ERROR chunks,
or
- * through definition of additional payload protocol identifiers.

IANA is requested to perform the following updates for the above five registries:

- * In the Chunk Types Registry replace in the Reference section the reference to [RFC4960] and [RFC6096] by a reference to this document.

Replace in the Notes section the reference to Section 3.2 of [RFC6096] by a reference to Section 15.2 of this document.

Finally replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following chunk types:

- Payload Data (DATA)
- Initiation (INIT)
- Initiation Acknowledgement (INIT ACK)
- Selective Acknowledgement (SACK)
- Heartbeat Request (HEARTBEAT)
- Heartbeat Acknowledgement (HEARTBEAT ACK)
- Abort (ABORT)

- Shutdown (SHUTDOWN)
- Shutdown Acknowledgement (SHUTDOWN ACK)
- Operation Error (ERROR)
- State Cookie (COOKIE ECHO)
- Cookie Acknowledgement (COOKIE ACK)
- Reserved for Explicit Congestion Notification Echo (ECNE)
- Reserved for Congestion Window Reduced (CWR)
- Shutdown Complete (SHUTDOWN COMPLETE)
- Reserved for IETF-defined Chunk Extensions

- * In the Chunk Parameter Types Registry replace in the Reference section the reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document.

Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following chunk parameter types:

- Heartbeat Info
- IPv4 Address
- IPv6 Address
- State Cookie
- Unrecognized Parameters
- Cookie Preservative
- Host Name Address
- Supported Address Types

Add a reference to this document for the following chunk parameter type:

- Reserved for ECN Capable (0x8000)

- * In the Chunk Flags Registry replace in the Reference section the reference to [RFC6096] by a reference to this document.

Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following DATA chunk flags:

- E bit
- B bit
- U bit

Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following ABORT chunk flags:

- T bit

Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk flags:

- T bit

- * In the Error Cause Codes Registry replace in the Reference section the reference to [RFC6096] by a reference to this document.

Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following cause codes:

- Invalid Stream Identifier
- Missing Mandatory Parameter
- Stale Cookie Error
- Out of Resource
- Unresolvable Address
- Unrecognized Chunk Type
- Invalid Mandatory Parameter
- Unrecognized Parameters
- No User Data
- Cookie Received While Shutting Down
- Restart of an Association with New Addressess

Replace each reference to [RFC4460] by a reference to this document for the following cause codes:

- User Initiated Abort
- Protocol Violation
- * In the SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers Registry replace in the Reference section the reference to [RFC6096] by a reference to this document.

Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following SCTP payload protocol identifiers:

- Reserved by SCTP

SCTP requires that the IANA Port Numbers registry be opened for SCTP port registrations, Section 15.6 describes how. An IESG-appointed Expert Reviewer supports IANA in evaluating SCTP port allocation requests.

IANA is requested to perform the following update for the Port Number registry. Replace each reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following SCTP port numbers:

- * 9 (discard)
- * 20 (ftp-data)
- * 21 (ftp)
- * 22 (ssh)
- * 80 (http)
- * 179 (bgp)
- * 443 (https)

Furthermore, IANA is requested to replace in the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values registry the reference to Appendix B of [RFC4960] to Appendix A of this document.

IANA is also requested to replace in the ONC RPC Netids registry, each of the reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following netids:

- * sctp

- * sctp6

IANA is finally requested to replace in the IPFIX Information Elements registry, each of the reference to [RFC4960] by a reference to this document for the following elements with the name:

- * sourceTransportPort
- * destinationTransportPort
- * collectorTransportPort
- * exporterTransportPort
- * postNAPTSourceTransportPort
- * postNAPTDestinationTransportPort

15.1. IETF-Defined Chunk Extension

The assignment of new chunk type codes is done through an IETF Review action, as defined in [RFC8126]. Documentation for a new chunk MUST contain the following information:

- a) A long and short name for the new chunk type.
- b) A detailed description of the structure of the chunk, which MUST conform to the basic structure defined in Section 3.2.
- c) A detailed definition and description of intended use of each field within the chunk, including the chunk flags if any. Defined chunk flags will be used as initial entries in the chunk flags table for the new chunk type.
- d) A detailed procedural description of the use of the new chunk type within the operation of the protocol.

The last chunk type (255) is reserved for future extension if necessary.

For each new chunk type, IANA creates a registration table for the chunk flags of that type. The procedure for registering particular chunk flags is described in Section 15.2.

15.2. IETF Chunk Flags Registration

The assignment of new chunk flags is done through an RFC Required action, as defined in [RFC8126]. Documentation for the chunk flags MUST contain the following information:

- a) A name for the new chunk flag.
- b) A detailed procedural description of the use of the new chunk flag within the operation of the protocol. It MUST be considered that implementations not supporting the flag will send 0 on transmit and just ignore it on receipt.

IANA selects a chunk flags value. This MUST be one of 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, or 0x80, which MUST be unique within the chunk flag values for the specific chunk type.

15.3. IETF-Defined Chunk Parameter Extension

The assignment of new chunk parameter type codes is done through an IETF Review action as defined in [RFC8126]. Documentation of the chunk parameter MUST contain the following information:

- a) Name of the parameter type.
- b) Detailed description of the structure of the parameter field. This structure MUST conform to the general Type-Length-Value format described in Section 3.2.1.
- c) Detailed definition of each component of the parameter value.
- d) Detailed description of the intended use of this parameter type, and an indication of whether and under what circumstances multiple instances of this parameter type can be found within the same chunk.
- e) Each parameter type MUST be unique across all chunks.

15.4. IETF-Defined Additional Error Causes

Additional cause codes can be allocated in the range 11 to 65535 through a Specification Required action as defined in [RFC8126]. Provided documentation MUST include the following information:

- a) Name of the error condition.
- b) Detailed description of the conditions under which an SCTP endpoint issues an ERROR (or ABORT) chunk with this cause code.

- c) Expected action by the SCTP endpoint that receives an ERROR (or ABORT) chunk containing this cause code.
- d) Detailed description of the structure and content of data fields that accompany this cause code.

The initial word (32 bits) of a cause code parameter MUST conform to the format shown in Section 3.3.10, i.e.:

- * first 2 bytes contain the cause code value
- * last 2 bytes contain the length of the cause parameter.

15.5. Payload Protocol Identifiers

The assignment of payload protocol identifier is done using the First Come First Served policy as defined in [RFC8126].

Except for value 0, which is reserved to indicate an unspecified payload protocol identifier in a DATA chunk, an SCTP implementation will not be responsible for standardizing or verifying any payload protocol identifiers; An SCTP implementation simply receives the identifier from the upper layer and carries it with the corresponding payload data.

The upper layer, i.e., the SCTP user, SHOULD standardize any specific protocol identifier with IANA if it is so desired. The use of any specific payload protocol identifier is out of the scope of this specification.

15.6. Port Numbers Registry

SCTP services can use contact port numbers to provide service to unknown callers, as in TCP and UDP. An IESG-appointed expert reviewer supports IANA in evaluating SCTP port allocation requests, according to the procedure defined in [RFC8126]. The details of this process are defined in [RFC6335].

16. Suggested SCTP Protocol Parameter Values

The following protocol parameters are RECOMMENDED:

RTO.Initial: 1 second

RTO.Min: 1 second

RTO.Max: 60 seconds

Max.Burst: 4

RTO.Alpha: 1/8

RTO.Beta: 1/4

Valid.Cookie.Life: 60 seconds

Association.Max.Retrans: 10 attempts

Path.Max.Retrans: 5 attempts (per destination address)

Max.Init.Retransmits: 8 attempts

HB.interval: 30 seconds

HB.Max.Burst: 1

SACK.Delay: 200 milliseconds

Implementation Note: The SCTP implementation can allow ULP to customize some of these protocol parameters (see Section 11).

'RTO.Min' SHOULD be set as described above in this section.

17. Acknowledgements

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18. Normative References

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Appendix A. CRC32c Checksum Calculation

We define a 'reflected value' as one that is the opposite of the normal bit order of the machine. The 32-bit CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) is calculated as described for CRC32c and uses the polynomial code 0x11EDC6F41 (Castagnoli93) or $x^{32}+x^{28}+x^{27}+x^{26}+x^{25}+x^{23}+x^{22}+x^{20}+x^{19}+x^{18}+x^{14}+x^{13}+x^{11}+x^{10}+x^9+x^8+x^6+x^0$. The CRC is computed using a procedure similar to ETHERNET CRC [ITU.V42.1994], modified to reflect transport-level usage.

CRC computation uses polynomial division. A message bit-string M is transformed to a polynomial, $M(X)$, and the CRC is calculated from $M(X)$ using polynomial arithmetic.

When CRCs are used at the link layer, the polynomial is derived from on-the-wire bit ordering: the first bit 'on the wire' is the high-order coefficient. Since SCTP is a transport-level protocol, it cannot know the actual serial-media bit ordering. Moreover, different links in the path between SCTP endpoints can use different link-level bit orders.

A convention therefore is established for mapping SCTP transport messages to polynomials for purposes of CRC computation. The bit-ordering for mapping SCTP messages to polynomials is that bytes are taken most-significant first, but within each byte, bits are taken least-significant first. The first byte of the message provides the eight highest coefficients. Within each byte, the least-significant SCTP bit gives the most-significant polynomial coefficient within that byte, and the most-significant SCTP bit is the least-significant polynomial coefficient in that byte. (This bit ordering is sometimes called 'mirrored' or 'reflected' [WILLIAMS93].) CRC polynomials are to be transformed back into SCTP transport-level byte values, using a consistent mapping.

The SCTP transport-level CRC value can be calculated as follows:

- * CRC input data are assigned to a byte stream, numbered from 0 to N-1.
- * The transport-level byte stream is mapped to a polynomial value. An N-byte PDU with j bytes numbered 0 to N-1 is considered as coefficients of a polynomial $M(x)$ of order $8*N-1$, with bit 0 of byte j being coefficient $x^{(8*(N-j)-8)}$, and bit 7 of byte j being coefficient $x^{(8*(N-j)-1)}$.
- * The CRC remainder register is initialized with all 1s and the CRC is computed with an algorithm that simultaneously multiplies by x^{32} and divides by the CRC polynomial.
- * The polynomial is multiplied by x^{32} and divided by $G(x)$, the generator polynomial, producing a remainder $R(x)$ of degree less than or equal to 31.
- * The coefficients of $R(x)$ are considered a 32-bit sequence.
- * The bit sequence is complemented. The result is the CRC polynomial.
- * The CRC polynomial is mapped back into SCTP transport-level bytes. The coefficient of x^{31} gives the value of bit 7 of SCTP byte 0, and the coefficient of x^{24} gives the value of bit 0 of byte 0. The coefficient of x^7 gives bit 7 of byte 3, and the coefficient of x^0 gives bit 0 of byte 3. The resulting 4-byte transport-level sequence is the 32-bit SCTP checksum value.

Implementation Note: Standards documents, textbooks, and vendor literature on CRCs often follow an alternative formulation, in which the register used to hold the remainder of the long-division algorithm is initialized to zero rather than all ones, and instead

the first 32 bits of the message are complemented. The long-division algorithm used in our formulation is specified such that the initial multiplication by 2^{32} and the long-division are combined into one simultaneous operation. For such algorithms, and for messages longer than 64 bits, the two specifications are precisely equivalent. That equivalence is the intent of this document.

Implementors of SCTP are warned that both specifications are to be found in the literature, sometimes with no restriction on the long-division algorithm. The choice of formulation in this document is to permit non-SCTP usage, where the same CRC algorithm can be used to protect messages shorter than 64 bits.

There can be a computational advantage in validating the association against the Verification Tag, prior to performing a checksum, as invalid tags will result in the same action as a bad checksum in most cases. The exceptions for this technique would be packets containing INIT chunks and some SHUTDOWN-COMplete chunks, as well as a stale COOKIE ECHO chunks. These special-case exchanges represent small packets and will minimize the effect of the checksum calculation.

The following non-normative sample code is taken from an open-source CRC generator [WILLIAMS93], using the "mirroring" technique and yielding a lookup table for SCTP CRC32c with 256 entries, each 32 bits wide. While neither especially slow nor especially fast, as software table-lookup CRCs go, it has the advantage of working on both big-endian and little-endian CPUs, using the same (host-order) lookup tables, and using only the predefined `ntohl()` and `htonl()` operations. The code is somewhat modified from [WILLIAMS93], to ensure portability between big-endian and little-endian architectures, use fixed sized types to allow portability between 32-bit and 64-bit platforms, and general C code improvements. (Note that if the byte endian-ness of the target architecture is known to be little-endian, the final bit-reversal and byte-reversal steps can be folded into a single operation.)

```
<CODE BEGINS>
/*****
/* Note: The definitions for Ross Williams's table generator */
/* would be TB_WIDTH=4, TB_POLY=0x1EDC6F41, TB_REVER=TRUE. */
/* For Mr. Williams's direct calculation code, use the settings */
/* cm_width=32, cm_poly=0x1EDC6F41, cm_init=0xFFFFFFFF, */
/* cm_refin=TRUE, cm_refot=TRUE, cm_xorot=0x00000000. */
*****/

/* Example of the crc table file */
#ifndef __crc32cr_h__
#define __crc32cr_h__
```

```

#define CRC32C_POLY 0x1EDC6F41UL
#define CRC32C(c,d) (c=(c>>8)^crc_c[(c^(d))&0xFF])

uint32_t crc_c[256] = {
    0x00000000UL, 0xF26B8303UL, 0xE13B70F7UL, 0x1350F3F4UL,
    0xC79A971FUL, 0x35F1141CUL, 0x26A1E7E8UL, 0xD4CA64EBUL,
    0x8AD958CFUL, 0x78B2DBCCUL, 0x6BE22838UL, 0x9989AB3BUL,
    0x4D43CFD0UL, 0xBF284CD3UL, 0xAC78BF27UL, 0x5E133C24UL,
    0x105EC76FUL, 0xE235446CUL, 0xF165B798UL, 0x030E349BUL,
    0xD7C45070UL, 0x25AFD373UL, 0x36FF2087UL, 0xC494A384UL,
    0x9A879FA0UL, 0x68EC1CA3UL, 0x7BBCEF57UL, 0x89D76C54UL,
    0x5D1D08BFUL, 0xAF768BBCUL, 0xBC267848UL, 0x4E4DFB4BUL,
    0x20BD8EDEUL, 0xD2D60DDFUL, 0xC186FE29UL, 0x33ED7D2AUL,
    0xE72719C1UL, 0x154C9AC2UL, 0x061C6936UL, 0xF477EA35UL,
    0xAA64D611UL, 0x580F5512UL, 0x4B5FA6E6UL, 0xB93425E5UL,
    0x6DFE410EUL, 0x9F95C20DUL, 0x8CC531F9UL, 0x7EAE2FAUL,
    0x30E349B1UL, 0xC288CAB2UL, 0xD1D83946UL, 0x23B3BA45UL,
    0xF779DEAEUL, 0x05125DADUL, 0x1642AE59UL, 0xE4292D5AUL,
    0xBA3A117EUL, 0x4851927DUL, 0x5B016189UL, 0xA96AE28AUL,
    0x7DA08661UL, 0x8FCB0562UL, 0x9C9BF696UL, 0x6EF07595UL,
    0x417B1DBCUL, 0xB3109EBFUL, 0xA0406D4BUL, 0x522BEE48UL,
    0x86E18AA3UL, 0x748A09A0UL, 0x67DAFA54UL, 0x95B17957UL,
    0xCBA24573UL, 0x39C9C670UL, 0x2A993584UL, 0xD8F2B687UL,
    0x0C38D26CUL, 0xFE53516FUL, 0xED03A29BUL, 0x1F682198UL,
    0x5125DAD3UL, 0xA34E59D0UL, 0xB01EAA24UL, 0x42752927UL,
    0x96BF4DCCUL, 0x64D4CECFUL, 0x77843D3BUL, 0x85EFBE38UL,
    0xDBFC821CUL, 0x2997011FUL, 0x3AC7F2EBUL, 0xC8AC71E8UL,
    0x1C661503UL, 0xEE0D9600UL, 0xFD5D65F4UL, 0x0F36E6F7UL,
    0x61C69362UL, 0x93AD1061UL, 0x80FDE395UL, 0x72966096UL,
    0xA65C047DUL, 0x5437877EUL, 0x4767748AUL, 0xB50CF789UL,
    0xEB1FCBADUL, 0x197448AEUL, 0x0A24BB5AUL, 0xF84F3859UL,
    0x2C855CB2UL, 0xDEEEDFB1UL, 0xCDBE2C45UL, 0x3FD5AF46UL,
    0x7198540DUL, 0x83F3D70EUL, 0x90A324FAUL, 0x62C8A7F9UL,
    0xB602C312UL, 0x44694011UL, 0x5739B3E5UL, 0xA55230E6UL,
    0xFB410CC2UL, 0x092A8FC1UL, 0x1A7A7C35UL, 0xE811FF36UL,
    0x3CDB9BDDUL, 0xCEB018DEUL, 0xDDE0EB2AUL, 0x2F8B6829UL,
    0x82F63B78UL, 0x709DB87BUL, 0x63CD4B8FUL, 0x91A6C88CUL,
    0x456CAC67UL, 0xB7072F64UL, 0xA457DC90UL, 0x563C5F93UL,
    0x082F63B7UL, 0xFA44E0B4UL, 0xE9141340UL, 0x1B7F9043UL,
    0xCFB5F4A8UL, 0x3DDE77ABUL, 0x2E8E845FUL, 0xDCE5075CUL,
    0x92A8FC17UL, 0x60C37F14UL, 0x73938CE0UL, 0x81F80FE3UL,
    0x55326B08UL, 0xA759E80BUL, 0xB4091BFFUL, 0x466298FCUL,
    0x1871A4D8UL, 0xEA1A27DBUL, 0xF94AD42FUL, 0x0B21572CUL,
    0xDFEB33C7UL, 0x2D80B0C4UL, 0x3ED04330UL, 0xCCBBC033UL,
    0xA24BB5A6UL, 0x502036A5UL, 0x4370C551UL, 0xB11B4652UL,
    0x65D122B9UL, 0x97BAA1BAUL, 0x84EA524EUL, 0x7681D14DUL,
    0x2892ED69UL, 0xDAF96E6AUL, 0xC9A99D9EUL, 0x3BC21E9DUL,
    0xEF087A76UL, 0x1D63F975UL, 0x0E330A81UL, 0xFC588982UL,

```

```

0xB21572C9UL, 0x407EF1CAUL, 0x532E023EUL, 0xA145813DUL,
0x758FE5D6UL, 0x87E466D5UL, 0x94B49521UL, 0x66DF1622UL,
0x38CC2A06UL, 0xCA7A905UL, 0xD9F75AF1UL, 0x2B9CD9F2UL,
0xFF56BD19UL, 0x0D3D3E1AUL, 0x1E6DCDEEUL, 0xEC064EEDUL,
0xC38D26C4UL, 0x31E6A5C7UL, 0x22B65633UL, 0xD0DDD530UL,
0x0417B1DBUL, 0xF67C32D8UL, 0xE52CC12CUL, 0x1747422FUL,
0x49547E0BUL, 0xBB3FFD08UL, 0xA86F0EFCUL, 0x5A048DFFUL,
0x8ECEE914UL, 0x7CA56A17UL, 0x6FF599E3UL, 0x9D9E1AE0UL,
0xD3D3E1ABUL, 0x21B862A8UL, 0x32E8915CUL, 0xC083125FUL,
0x144976B4UL, 0xE622F5B7UL, 0xF5720643UL, 0x07198540UL,
0x590AB964UL, 0xAB613A67UL, 0xB831C993UL, 0x4A5A4A90UL,
0x9E902E7BUL, 0x6CFBAD78UL, 0x7FAB5E8CUL, 0x8DC0DD8FUL,
0xE330A81AUL, 0x115B2B19UL, 0x020BD8EDUL, 0xF0605BEEUL,
0x24AA3F05UL, 0xD6C1BC06UL, 0xC5914FF2UL, 0x37FACCF1UL,
0x69E9F0D5UL, 0x9B8273D6UL, 0x88D28022UL, 0x7AB90321UL,
0xAE7367CAUL, 0x5C18E4C9UL, 0x4F48173DUL, 0xBD23943EUL,
0xF36E6F75UL, 0x0105EC76UL, 0x12551F82UL, 0xE03E9C81UL,
0x34F4F86AUL, 0xC69F7B69UL, 0xD5CF889DUL, 0x27A40B9EUL,
0x79B737BAUL, 0x8BDCB4B9UL, 0x988C474DUL, 0x6AE7C44EUL,
0xBE2DA0A5UL, 0x4C4623A6UL, 0x5F16D052UL, 0xAD7D5351UL,
};

```

```

#endif

```

```

/* Example of table build routine */

```

```

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#define OUTPUT_FILE    "crc32cr.h"
#define CRC32C_POLY    0x1EDC6F41UL

static FILE *tf;

static uint32_t
reflect_32(uint32_t b)
{
    int i;
    uint32_t rw = 0UL;

    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
        if (b & 1)
            rw |= 1UL << (31 - i);
        b >>= 1;
    }
    return (rw);
}

```

```
static uint32_t
build_crc_table (int index)
{
    int i;
    uint32_t rb;

    rb = reflect_32(index);

    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
        if (rb & 0x80000000UL)
            rb = (rb << 1) ^ (uint32_t)CRC32C_POLY;
        else
            rb <<= 1;
    }
    return (reflect_32(rb));
}

int
main (void)
{
    int i;

    printf("\nGenerating CRC32c table file <%s>.\n",
        OUTPUT_FILE);
    if ((tf = fopen(OUTPUT_FILE, "w")) == NULL) {
        printf("Unable to open %s.\n", OUTPUT_FILE);
        exit (1);
    }
    fprintf(tf, "#ifndef __crc32cr_h__\n");
    fprintf(tf, "#define __crc32cr_h__\n\n");
    fprintf(tf, "#define CRC32C_POLY 0x%08XUL\n",
        (uint32_t)CRC32C_POLY);
    fprintf(tf,
        "#define CRC32C(c,d) (c=(c>>8)^crc_c[(c^(d))&0xFF])\n");
    fprintf(tf, "\nuint32_t crc_c[256] =\n{\n");
    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
        fprintf(tf, "0x%08XUL, ", build_crc_table (i));
        if ((i & 3) == 3)
            fprintf(tf, "\n");
        else
            fprintf(tf, " ");
    }
    fprintf(tf, "};\n\n#endif\n");

    if (fclose(tf) != 0)
        printf("Unable to close <%s>.\n", OUTPUT_FILE);
    else
        printf("\nThe CRC32c table has been written to <%s>.\n",
```

```
        OUTPUT_FILE);
    return (0);
}

/* Example of crc insertion */

#include "crc32cr.h"

uint32_t
generate_crc32c(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
{
    unsigned int i;
    uint32_t crc32 = 0xffffffffUL;
    uint32_t result;
    uint32_t byte0, byte1, byte2, byte3;

    for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        CRC32C(crc32, buffer[i]);
    }

    result = ~crc32;

    /* result now holds the negated polynomial remainder,
     * since the table and algorithm are "reflected" [williams95].
     * That is, result has the same value as if we mapped the message
     * to a polynomial, computed the host-bit-order polynomial
     * remainder, performed final negation, and then did an
     * end-for-end bit-reversal.
     * Note that a 32-bit bit-reversal is identical to four in-place
     * 8-bit bit-reversals followed by an end-for-end byteswap.
     * In other words, the bits of each byte are in the right order,
     * but the bytes have been byteswapped. So, we now do an explicit
     * byteswap. On a little-endian machine, this byteswap and
     * the final ntohl cancel out and could be elided.
     */

    byte0 = result & 0xff;
    byte1 = (result>>8) & 0xff;
    byte2 = (result>>16) & 0xff;
    byte3 = (result>>24) & 0xff;
    crc32 = ((byte0 << 24) |
             (byte1 << 16) |
             (byte2 << 8) |
             byte3);
    return (crc32);
}

int
```

```
insert_crc32(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
{
    SCTP_message *message;
    uint32_t crc32;

    message = (SCTP_message *)buffer;
    message->common_header.checksum = 0UL;
    crc32 = generate_crc32c(buffer, length);
    /* and insert it into the message */
    message->common_header.checksum = htonl(crc32);
    return (1);
}

int
validate_crc32(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
{
    SCTP_message *message;
    unsigned int i;
    uint32_t original_crc32;
    uint32_t crc32;

    /* save and zero checksum */
    message = (SCTP_message *)buffer;
    original_crc32 = ntohl(message->common_header.checksum);
    message->common_header.checksum = 0L;
    crc32 = generate_crc32c(buffer, length);
    return ((original_crc32 == crc32) ? 1 : -1);
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

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Propagating Explicit Congestion Notification Across IP Tunnel Headers
Separated by a Shim
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim-14

Abstract

RFC 6040 on "Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion Notification" made the rules for propagation of ECN consistent for all forms of IP in IP tunnel. This specification updates RFC 6040 to clarify that its scope includes tunnels where two IP headers are separated by at least one shim header that is not sufficient on its own for wide area packet forwarding. It surveys widely deployed IP tunnelling protocols that use such shim header(s) and updates the specifications of those that do not mention ECN propagation (L2TPv2, L2TPv3, GRE, Teredo and AMT). This specification also updates RFC 6040 with configuration requirements needed to make any legacy tunnel ingress safe.

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1. Introduction

RFC 6040 on "Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion Notification" [RFC6040] made the rules for propagation of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN [RFC3168]) consistent for all forms of IP in IP tunnel.

A common pattern for many tunnelling protocols is to encapsulate an inner IP header (v4 or v6) with shim header(s) then an outer IP header (v4 or v6). Some of these shim headers are designed as generic encapsulations, so they do not necessarily directly encapsulate an inner IP header. Instead they can encapsulate headers such as link-layer (L2) protocols that in turn often encapsulate IP.

To clear up confusion, this specification clarifies that the scope of RFC 6040 includes any IP-in-IP tunnel, including those with shim header(s) and other encapsulations between the IP headers. Where necessary, it updates the specifications of the relevant encapsulation protocols with the specific text necessary to comply with RFC 6040.

This specification also updates RFC 6040 to state how operators ought to configure a legacy tunnel ingress to avoid unsafe system configurations.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification uses the terminology defined in RFC 6040 [RFC6040].

3. Scope of RFC 6040

In section 1.1 of RFC 6040, its scope is defined as:

"...ECN field processing at encapsulation and decapsulation for any IP-in-IP tunnelling, whether IPsec or non-IPsec tunnels. It applies irrespective of whether IPv4 or IPv6 is used for either the inner or outer headers. ..."

This was intended to include cases where shim header(s) sit between the IP headers. Many tunnelling implementers have interpreted the scope of RFC 6040 as it was intended, but it is ambiguous. Therefore, this specification updates RFC 6040 by adding the following scoping text after the sentences quoted above:

It applies in cases where an outer IP header encapsulates an inner IP header either directly or indirectly by encapsulating other headers that in turn encapsulate (or might encapsulate) an inner IP header.

There is another problem with the scope of RFC 6040. Like many IETF specifications, RFC 6040 is written as a specification that implementations can choose to claim compliance with. This means it does not cover two important cases:

1. those cases where it is infeasible for an implementation to access an inner IP header when adding or removing an outer IP header;
2. those implementations that choose not to propagate ECN between IP headers.

However, the ECN field is a non-optional part of the IP header (v4 and v6). So any implementation that creates an outer IP header has to give the ECN field some value. There is only one safe value a tunnel ingress can use if it does not know whether the egress supports propagation of the ECN field; it has to clear the ECN field in any outer IP header to 0b00.

However, an RFC has no jurisdiction over implementations that choose not to comply with it or cannot comply with it, including all those implementations that pre-dated the RFC. Therefore it would have been unreasonable to add such a requirement to RFC 6040. Nonetheless, to ensure safe propagation of the ECN field over tunnels, it is reasonable to add requirements on operators, to ensure they configure their tunnels safely (where possible). Before stating these configuration requirements in Section 4, the factors that determine whether propagating ECN is feasible or desirable will be briefly introduced.

3.1. Feasibility of ECN Propagation between Tunnel Headers

In many cases shim header(s) and an outer IP header are always added to (or removed from) an inner IP packet as part of the same procedure. We call this a tightly coupled shim header. Processing the shim and outer together is often necessary because the shim(s) are not sufficient for packet forwarding in their own right; not unless complemented by an outer header. In these cases it will often be feasible for an implementation to propagate the ECN field between the IP headers.

In some cases a tunnel adds an outer IP header and a tightly coupled shim header to an inner header that is not an IP header, but that in turn encapsulates an IP header (or might encapsulate an IP header). For instance an inner Ethernet (or other link layer) header might encapsulate an inner IP header as its payload. We call this a tightly coupled shim over an encapsulating header.

Digging to arbitrary depths to find an inner IP header within an encapsulation is strictly a layering violation so it cannot be a required behaviour. Nonetheless, some tunnel endpoints already look within a L2 header for an IP header, for instance to map the Diffserv codepoint between an encapsulated IP header and an outer IP header

[RFC2983]. In such cases at least, it should be feasible to also (independently) propagate the ECN field between the same IP headers. Thus, access to the ECN field within an encapsulating header can be a useful and benign optimization. The guidelines in section 5 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines] give the conditions for this layering violation to be benign.

3.2. Desirability of ECN Propagation between Tunnel Headers

Developers and network operators are encouraged to implement and deploy tunnel endpoints compliant with RFC 6040 (as updated by the present specification) in order to provide the benefits of wider ECN deployment [RFC8087]. Nonetheless, propagation of ECN between IP headers, whether separated by shim headers or not, has to be optional to implement and to use, because:

- o Legacy implementations of tunnels without any ECN support already exist
- o A network might be designed so that there is usually no bottleneck within the tunnel
- o If the tunnel endpoints would have to search within an L2 header to find an encapsulated IP header, it might not be worth the potential performance hit

4. Making a non-ECN Tunnel Ingress Safe by Configuration

Even when no specific attempt has been made to implement propagation of the ECN field at a tunnel ingress, it ought to be possible for the operator to render a tunnel ingress safe by configuration. The main safety concern is to disable (clear to zero) the ECN capability in the outer IP header at the ingress if the egress of the tunnel does not implement ECN logic to propagate any ECN markings into the packet forwarded beyond the tunnel. Otherwise the non-ECN egress could discard any ECN marking introduced within the tunnel, which would break all the ECN-based control loops that regulate the traffic load over the tunnel.

Therefore this specification updates RFC 6040 by inserting the following text at the end of section 4.3:

"

Whether or not an ingress implementation claims compliance with RFC 6040, RFC 4301 or RFC3168, when the outer tunnel header is IP (v4 or v6), if possible, the operator MUST configure the ingress to zero the outer ECN field in any of the following cases:

- * if it is known that the tunnel egress does not support any of the RFCs that define propagation of the ECN field (RFC 6040, RFC 4301 or the full functionality mode of RFC 3168)
- * or if the behaviour of the egress is not known or an egress with unknown behaviour might be dynamically paired with the ingress.
- * or if an IP header might be encapsulated within a non-IP header that the tunnel ingress is encapsulating, but the ingress does not inspect within the encapsulation.

For the avoidance of doubt, the above only concerns the outer IP header. The ingress MUST NOT alter the ECN field of the arriving IP header that will become the inner IP header.

In order that the network operator can comply with the above safety rules, even if an implementation of a tunnel ingress does not claim to support RFC 6040, RFC 4301 or the full functionality mode of RFC 3168:

- * it MUST NOT treat the former ToS octet (IPv4) or the former Traffic Class octet (IPv6) as a single 8-bit field, as the resulting linkage of ECN and Diffserv field propagation between inner and outer is not consistent with the definition of the 6-bit Diffserv field in [RFC2474] and [RFC3260];
- * it SHOULD be able to be configured to zero the ECN field of the outer header.

"

For instance, if a tunnel ingress with no ECN-specific logic had a configuration capability to refer to the last 2 bits of the old ToS Byte of the outer (e.g. with a 0x3 mask) and set them to zero, while also being able to allow the DSCP to be re-mapped independently, that would be sufficient to satisfy both the above implementation requirements.

There might be concern that the above "MUST NOT" makes compliant implementations non-compliant at a stroke. However, by definition it solely applies to equipment that provides Diffserv configuration. Any such Diffserv equipment that is configuring treatment of the former ToS octet (IPv4) or the former Traffic Class octet (IPv6) as a single 8-bit field must have always been non-compliant with the definition of the 6-bit Diffserv field in [RFC2474] and [RFC3260]. If a tunnel ingress does not have any ECN logic, copying the ECN field as a side-effect of copying the DSCP is a seriously unsafe bug

that risks breaking the feedback loops that regulate load on a tunnel.

Zeroing the outer ECN field of all packets in all circumstances would be safe, but it would not be sufficient to claim compliance with RFC 6040 because it would not meet the aim of introducing ECN support to tunnels (see Section 4.3 of [RFC6040]).

5. ECN Propagation and Fragmentation/Reassembly

The following requirements update RFC6040, which omitted handling of the ECN field during fragmentation or reassembly. These changes might alter how many ECN-marked packets are propagated by a tunnel that fragments packets, but this would not raise any backward compatibility issues:

If a tunnel ingress fragments a packet, it MUST set the outer ECN field of all the fragments to the same value as it would have set if it had not fragmented the packet.

Section 5.3 of [RFC3168] specifies ECN requirements for reassembly of sets of outer fragments [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] into packets. The following two additional requirements apply at a tunnel egress:

- o During reassembly of outer fragments [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels], if the ECN fields of the outer headers being reassembled into a single packet consist of a mixture of Not-ECT and other ECN codepoints, the packet MUST be discarded.
- o If there is mix of ECT(0) and ECT(1) fragments, then the reassembled packet MUST be set to either ECT(0) or ECT(1). In this case, reassembly SHOULD take into account that the RFC series has so far ensured that ECT(0) and ECT(1) can either be considered equivalent, or they can provide 2 levels of congestion severity, where the ranking of severity from highest to lowest is CE, ECT(1), ECT(0) [RFC6040].

6. IP-in-IP Tunnels with Tightly Coupled Shim Headers

There follows a list of specifications of encapsulations with tightly coupled shim header(s), in rough chronological order. The list is confined to standards track or widely deployed protocols. The list is not necessarily exhaustive so, for the avoidance of doubt, the scope of RFC 6040 is defined in Section 3 and is not limited to this list.

- o PPTP (Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol) [RFC2637];

- o L2TP (Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol), specifically L2TPv2 [RFC2661] and L2TPv3 [RFC3931], which not only includes all the L2-specific specializations of L2TP, but also derivatives such as the Keyed IPv6 Tunnel [RFC8159];
- o GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) [RFC2784] and NVGRE (Network Virtualization using GRE) [RFC7637];
- o GTP (GPRS Tunneling Protocol), specifically GTPv1 [GTPv1], GTP v1 User Plane [GTPv1-U], GTP v2 Control Plane [GTPv2-C];
- o Teredo [RFC4380];
- o CAPWAP (Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points) [RFC5415];
- o LISP (Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol) [RFC6830];
- o AMT (Automatic Multicast Tunneling) [RFC7450];
- o VXLAN (Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network) [RFC7348] and VXLAN-GPE [I-D.ietf-nvo3-vxlan-gpe];
- o The Network Service Header (NSH [RFC8300]) for Service Function Chaining (SFC);
- o Geneve [RFC8926];
- o GUE (Generic UDP Encapsulation) [I-D.ietf-intarea-gue];
- o Direct tunnelling of an IP packet within a UDP/IP datagram (see Section 3.1.11 of [RFC8085]);
- o TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets (see Section 12.5 of [RFC8229]).

Some of the listed protocols enable encapsulation of a variety of network layer protocols as inner and/or outer. This specification applies in the cases where there is an inner and outer IP header as described in Section 3. Otherwise [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines] gives guidance on how to design propagation of ECN into other protocols that might encapsulate IP.

Where protocols in the above list need to be updated to specify ECN propagation and they are under IETF change control, update text is given in the following subsections. For those not under IETF control, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations of encapsulation and decapsulation comply with RFC 6040. It is also RECOMMENDED that

their specifications are updated to add a requirement to comply with RFC 6040 (as updated by the present document).

PPTP is not under the change control of the IETF, but it has been documented in an informational RFC [RFC2637]. However, there is no need for the present specification to update PPTP because L2TP has been developed as a standardized replacement.

NVGRE is not under the change control of the IETF, but it has been documented in an informational RFC [RFC7637]. NVGRE is a specific use-case of GRE (it re-purposes the key field from the initial specification of GRE [RFC1701] as a Virtual Subnet ID). Therefore the text that updates GRE in Section 6.1.2 below is also intended to update NVGRE.

Although the definition of the various GTP shim headers is under the control of the 3GPP, it is hard to determine whether the 3GPP or the IETF controls standardization of the `_process_` of adding both a GTP and an IP header to an inner IP header. Nonetheless, the present specification is provided so that the 3GPP can refer to it from any of its own specifications of GTP and IP header processing.

The specification of CAPWAP already specifies RFC 3168 ECN propagation and ECN capability negotiation. Without modification the CAPWAP specification already interworks with the backward compatible updates to RFC 3168 in RFC 6040.

LISP made the ECN propagation procedures in RFC 3168 mandatory from the start. RFC 3168 has since been updated by RFC 6040, but the changes are backwards compatible so there is still no need for LISP tunnel endpoints to negotiate their ECN capabilities.

VXLAN is not under the change control of the IETF but it has been documented in an informational RFC. In contrast, VXLAN-GPE (Generic Protocol Extension) is being documented under IETF change control. It is RECOMMENDED that VXLAN and VXLAN-GPE implementations comply with RFC 6040 when the VXLAN header is inserted between (or removed from between) IP headers. The authors of any future update to these specifications are encouraged to add a requirement to comply with RFC 6040 as updated by the present specification.

The Network Service Header (NSH [RFC8300]) has been defined as a shim-based encapsulation to identify the Service Function Path (SFP) in the Service Function Chaining (SFC) architecture [RFC7665]. A proposal has been made for the processing of ECN when handling transport encapsulation [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh-ecn-support].

The specifications of Geneve and GUE already refer to RFC 6040 for ECN encapsulation.

Section 3.1.11 of RFC 8085 already explains that a tunnel that encapsulates an IP header within a UDP/IP datagram needs to follow RFC 6040 when propagating the ECN field between inner and outer IP headers. The requirements in Section 4 update RFC 6040, and hence implicitly update the UDP usage guidelines in RFC 8085 to add the important but previously unstated requirement that, if the UDP tunnel egress does not, or might not, support ECN propagation, a UDP tunnel ingress has to clear the outer IP ECN field to 0b00, e.g. by configuration.

Section 12.5 of TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets [RFC8229] already recommends the compatibility mode of RFC 6040 in this case, because there is not a one-to-one mapping between inner and outer packets.

6.1. Specific Updates to Protocols under IETF Change Control

6.1.1. L2TP (v2 and v3) ECN Extension

The L2TP terminology used here is defined in [RFC2661] and [RFC3931].

L2TPv3 [RFC3931] is used as a shim header between any packet-switched network (PSN) header (e.g. IPv4, IPv6, MPLS) and many types of layer 2 (L2) header. The L2TPv3 shim header encapsulates an L2-specific sub-layer then an L2 header that is likely to contain an inner IP header (v4 or v6). Then this whole stack of headers can be encapsulated optionally within an outer UDP header then an outer PSN header that is typically IP (v4 or v6).

L2TPv2 is used as a shim header between any PSN header and a PPP header, which is in turn likely to encapsulate an IP header.

Even though these shims are rather fat (particularly in the case of L2TPv3), they still fit the definition of a tightly coupled shim header over an encapsulating header (Section 3.1), because all the headers encapsulating the L2 header are added (or removed) together. L2TPv2 and L2TPv3 are therefore within the scope of RFC 6040, as updated by Section 3 above.

L2TP maintainers are RECOMMENDED to implement the ECN extension to L2TPv2 and L2TPv3 defined in Section 6.1.1.2 below, in order to provide the benefits of ECN [RFC8087], whenever a node within an L2TP tunnel becomes the bottleneck for an end-to-end traffic flow.

6.1.1.1. Safe Configuration of a 'Non-ECN' Ingress LCCE

The following text is appended to both Section 5.3 of [RFC2661] and Section 4.5 of [RFC3931] as an update to the base L2TPv2 and L2TPv3 specifications:

The operator of an LCCE that does not support the ECN Extension in Section 6.1.1.2 of RFCXXXX MUST follow the configuration requirements in Section 4 of RFCXXXX to ensure it clears the outer IP ECN field to 0b00 when the outer PSN header is IP (v4 or v6). {RFCXXXX refers to the present document so it will need to be inserted by the RFC Editor}

In particular, for an LCCE implementation that does not support the ECN Extension, this means that configuration of how it propagates the ECN field between inner and outer IP headers MUST be independent of any configuration of the Diffserv extension of L2TP [RFC3308].

6.1.1.2. ECN Extension for L2TP (v2 or v3)

When the outer PSN header and the payload inside the L2 header are both IP (v4 or v6), to comply with RFC 6040, an LCCE will follow the rules for propagation of the ECN field at ingress and egress in Section 4 of RFC 6040 [RFC6040].

Before encapsulating any data packets, RFC 6040 requires an ingress LCCE to check that the egress LCCE supports ECN propagation as defined in RFC 6040 or one of its compatible predecessors ([RFC4301] or the full functionality mode of [RFC3168]). If the egress supports ECN propagation, the ingress LCCE can use the normal mode of encapsulation (copying the ECN field from inner to outer). Otherwise, the ingress LCCE has to use compatibility mode [RFC6040] (clearing the outer IP ECN field to 0b00).

An LCCE can determine the remote LCCE's support for ECN either statically (by configuration) or by dynamic discovery during setup of each control connection between the LCCEs, using the Capability AVP defined in Section 6.1.1.2.1 below.

Where the outer PSN header is some protocol other than IP that supports ECN, the appropriate ECN propagation specification will need to be followed, e.g. "Explicit Congestion Marking in MPLS" [RFC5129]. Where no specification exists for ECN propagation by a particular PSN, [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines] gives general guidance on how to design ECN propagation into a protocol that encapsulates IP.

6.1.1.2.1. LCCE Capability AVP for ECN Capability Negotiation

The LCCE Capability Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) defined here has Attribute Type ZZ. The Attribute Value field for this AVP is a bit-mask with the following 16-bit format:

```

      0                               1
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X E|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```

Figure 1: Value Field for the LCCE Capability Attribute

This AVP MAY be present in the following message types: SCCRQ and SCCRP (Start-Control-Connection-Request and Start-Control-Connection-Reply). This AVP MAY be hidden (the H-bit set to 0 or 1) and is optional (M-bit not set). The length (before hiding) of this AVP MUST be 8 octets. The Vendor ID is the IETF Vendor ID of 0.

Bit 15 of the Value field of the LCCE Capability AVP is defined as the ECN Capability flag (E). When the ECN Capability flag is set to 1, it indicates that the sender supports ECN propagation. When the ECN Capability flag is cleared to zero, or when no LCCE Capability AVP is present, it indicates that the sender does not support ECN propagation. All the other bits are reserved. They MUST be cleared to zero when sent and ignored when received or forwarded.

An LCCE initiating a control connection will send a Start-Control-Connection-Request (SCCRQ) containing an LCCE Capability AVP with the ECN Capability flag set to 1. If the tunnel terminator supports ECN, it will return a Start-Control-Connection-Reply (SCCRP) that also includes an LCCE Capability AVP with the ECN Capability flag set to 1. Then, for any sessions created by that control connection, both ends of the tunnel can use the normal mode of RFC 6040, i.e. it can copy the IP ECN field from inner to outer when encapsulating data packets.

If, on the other hand, the tunnel terminator does not support ECN it will ignore the ECN flag in the LCCE Capability AVP and send an SCCRP to the tunnel initiator without a Capability AVP (or with a Capability AVP but with the ECN Capability flag cleared to zero). The tunnel initiator interprets the absence of the ECN Capability flag in the SCCRP as an indication that the tunnel terminator is incapable of supporting ECN. When encapsulating data packets for any sessions created by that control connection, the tunnel initiator will then use the compatibility mode of RFC 6040 to clear the ECN field of the outer IP header to 0b00.

If the tunnel terminator does not support this ECN extension, the network operator is still expected to configure it to comply with the safety provisions set out in Section 6.1.1.1 above, when it acts as an ingress LCCE.

6.1.2. GRE

The GRE terminology used here is defined in [RFC2784]. GRE is often used as a tightly coupled shim header between IP headers. Sometimes the GRE shim header encapsulates an L2 header, which might in turn encapsulate an IP header. Therefore GRE is within the scope of RFC 6040 as updated by Section 3 above.

GRE tunnel endpoint maintainers are RECOMMENDED to support [RFC6040] as updated by the present specification, in order to provide the benefits of ECN [RFC8087] whenever a node within a GRE tunnel becomes the bottleneck for an end-to-end IP traffic flow tunnelled over GRE using IP as the delivery protocol (outer header).

GRE itself does not support dynamic set-up and configuration of tunnels. However, control plane protocols such as Mobile IPv4 (MIP4) [RFC5944], Mobile IPv6 (MIP6) [RFC6275], Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [RFC5845] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] are sometimes used to set up GRE tunnels dynamically.

When these control protocols set up IP-in-IP or IPSec tunnels, it is likely that they propagate the ECN field as defined in RFC 6040 or one of its compatible predecessors (RFC 4301 or the full functionality mode of RFC 3168). However, if they use a GRE encapsulation, this presumption is less sound.

Therefore, If the outer delivery protocol is IP (v4 or v6) the operator is obliged to follow the safe configuration requirements in Section 4 above. Section 6.1.2.1 below updates the base GRE specification with this requirement, to emphasize its importance.

Where the delivery protocol is some protocol other than IP that supports ECN, the appropriate ECN propagation specification will need to be followed, e.g Explicit Congestion Marking in MPLS [RFC5129]. Where no specification exists for ECN propagation by a particular PSN, [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines] gives more general guidance on how to propagate ECN to and from protocols that encapsulate IP.

6.1.2.1. Safe Configuration of a 'Non-ECN' GRE Ingress

The following text is appended to Section 3 of [RFC2784] as an update to the base GRE specification:

The operator of a GRE tunnel ingress MUST follow the configuration requirements in Section 4 of RFCXXXX when the outer delivery protocol is IP (v4 or v6). {RFCXXXX refers to the present document so it will need to be inserted by the RFC Editor}

6.1.3. Teredo

Teredo [RFC4380] provides a way to tunnel IPv6 over an IPv4 network, with a UDP-based shim header between the two.

For Teredo tunnel endpoints to provide the benefits of ECN, the Teredo specification would have to be updated to include negotiation of the ECN capability between Teredo tunnel endpoints. Otherwise it would be unsafe for a Teredo tunnel ingress to copy the ECN field to the IPv6 outer.

It is believed that current implementations do not support propagation of ECN, but that they do safely zero the ECN field in the outer IPv6 header. However the specification does not mention anything about this.

To make existing Teredo deployments safe, it would be possible to add ECN capability negotiation to those that are subject to remote OS update. However, for those implementations not subject to remote OS update, it will not be feasible to require them to be configured correctly, because Teredo tunnel endpoints are generally deployed on hosts.

Therefore, until ECN support is added to the specification of Teredo, the only feasible further safety precaution available here is to update the specification of Teredo implementations with the following text, as a new section 5.1.3:

"5.1.3 Safe 'Non-ECN' Teredo Encapsulation

A Teredo tunnel ingress implementation that does not support ECN propagation as defined in RFC 6040 or one of its compatible predecessors (RFC 4301 or the full functionality mode of RFC 3168) MUST zero the ECN field in the outer IPv6 header."

6.1.4. AMT

Automatic Multicast Tunneling (AMT [RFC7450]) is a tightly coupled shim header that encapsulates an IP packet and is itself encapsulated within a UDP/IP datagram. Therefore AMT is within the scope of RFC 6040 as updated by Section 3 above.

AMT tunnel endpoint maintainers are RECOMMENDED to support [RFC6040] as updated by the present specification, in order to provide the benefits of ECN [RFC8087] whenever a node within an AMT tunnel becomes the bottleneck for an IP traffic flow tunnelled over AMT.

To comply with RFC 6040, an AMT relay and gateway will follow the rules for propagation of the ECN field at ingress and egress respectively, as described in Section 4 of RFC 6040 [RFC6040].

Before encapsulating any data packets, RFC 6040 requires an ingress AMT relay to check that the egress AMT gateway supports ECN propagation as defined in RFC 6040 or one of its compatible predecessors (RFC 4301 or the full functionality mode of RFC 3168). If the egress gateway supports ECN, the ingress relay can use the normal mode of encapsulation (copying the IP ECN field from inner to outer). Otherwise, the ingress relay has to use compatibility mode, which means it has to clear the outer ECN field to zero [RFC6040].

An AMT tunnel is created dynamically (not manually), so the relay will need to determine the remote gateway's support for ECN using the ECN capability declaration defined in Section 6.1.4.2 below.

6.1.4.1. Safe Configuration of a 'Non-ECN' Ingress AMT Relay

The following text is appended to Section 4.2.2 of [RFC7450] as an update to the AMT specification:

The operator of an AMT relay that does not support RFC 6040 or one of its compatible predecessors (RFC 4301 or the full functionality mode of RFC 3168) MUST follow the configuration requirements in Section 4 of RFCXXXX to ensure it clears the outer IP ECN field to zero. {RFCXXXX refers to the present document so it will need to be inserted by the RFC Editor}

6.1.4.2. ECN Capability Declaration of an AMT Gateway




Figure 2: Updated AMT Request Message Format

Bit 14 of the AMT Request Message counting from 0 (or bit 7 of the Reserved field counting from 1) is defined here as the AMT Gateway ECN Capability flag (E), as shown in Figure 2. The definitions of all other fields in the AMT Request Message are unchanged from RFC 7450.

When the E flag is set to 1, it indicates that the sender of the message supports RFC 6040 ECN propagation. When it is cleared to zero, it indicates the sender of the message does not support RFC 6040 ECN propagation. An AMT gateway "that supports RFC 6040 ECN propagation" means one that propagates the ECN field to the forwarded data packet based on the combination of arriving inner and outer ECN fields, as defined in Section 4 of RFC 6040.

The other bits of the Reserved field remain reserved. They will continue to be cleared to zero when sent and ignored when either received or forwarded, as specified in Section 5.1.3.3. of RFC 7450.

An AMT gateway that does not support RFC 6040 MUST NOT set the E flag of its Request Message to 1.

An AMT gateway that supports RFC 6040 ECN propagation MUST set the E flag of its Relay Discovery Message to 1.

The action of the corresponding AMT relay that receives a Request message with the E flag set to 1 depends on whether the relay itself supports RFC 6040 ECN propagation:

- o If the relay supports RFC 6040 ECN propagation, it will store the ECN capability of the gateway along with its address. Then whenever it tunnels datagrams towards this gateway, it MUST use the normal mode of RFC 6040 to propagate the ECN field when encapsulating datagrams (i.e. it copies the IP ECN field from inner to outer).

- o If the discovered AMT relay does not support RFC 6040 ECN propagation, it will ignore the E flag in the Reserved field, as per section 5.1.3.3. of RFC 7450.

If the AMT relay does not support RFC 6040 ECN propagation, the network operator is still expected to configure it to comply with the safety provisions set out in Section 6.1.4.1 above.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign the following L2TP Control Message Attribute Value Pair:

Attribute Type	Description	Reference
ZZ	ECN Capability	RFCXXXX

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/l2tp-parameters/l2tp-parameters.xhtml>]

8. Security Considerations

The Security Considerations in [RFC6040] and [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines] apply equally to the scope defined for the present specification.

9. Comments Solicited

Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

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DSCP Packet Markings for WebRTC QoS
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Abstract

Many networks, such as service provider and enterprise networks, can provide different forwarding treatments for individual packets based on Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) values on a per-hop basis. This document provides the recommended DSCP values for web browsers to use for various classes of WebRTC traffic.

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1. Introduction

Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) [RFC2474] packet marking can help provide QoS in some environments. This specification provides default packet marking for browsers that support WebRTC applications, but does not change any advice or requirements in other IETF RFCs. The contents of this specification are intended to be a simple set of implementation recommendations based on the previous RFCs.

Networks where these DSCP markings are beneficial (likely to improve QoS for WebRTC traffic) include:

1. Private, wide-area networks. Network administrators have control over remarking packets and treatment of packets.
2. Residential Networks. If the congested link is the broadband uplink in a cable or DSL scenario, often residential routers/NAT support preferential treatment based on DSCP.
3. Wireless Networks. If the congested link is a local wireless network, marking may help.

There are cases where these DSCP markings do not help, but, aside from possible priority inversion for "less than best effort traffic"

(see Section 5), they seldom make things worse if packets are marked appropriately.

DSCP values are in principle site specific, with each site selecting its own code points for controlling per-hop-behavior to influence the QoS for transport-layer flows. However in the WebRTC use cases, the browsers need to set them to something when there is no site specific information. This document describes a subset of DSCP code point values drawn from existing RFCs and common usage for use with WebRTC applications. These code points are intended to be the default values used by a WebRTC application. While other values could be used, using a non-default value may result in unexpected per-hop behavior. It is RECOMMENDED that WebRTC applications use non-default values only in private networks that are configured to use different values.

This specification defines inputs that are provided by the WebRTC application hosted in the browser that aid the browser in determining how to set the various packet markings. The specification also defines the mapping from abstract QoS policies (flow type, priority level) to those packet markings.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The terms "browser" and "non-browser" are defined in [RFC7742] and carry the same meaning in this document.

3. Relation to Other Specifications

This document is a complement to [RFC7657], which describes the interaction between DSCP and real-time communications. That RFC covers the implications of using various DSCP values, particularly focusing on Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] streams that are multiplexed onto a single transport-layer flow.

There are a number of guidelines specified in [RFC7657] that apply to marking traffic sent by WebRTC applications, as it is common for multiple RTP streams to be multiplexed on the same transport-layer flow. Generally, the RTP streams would be marked with a value as appropriate from Table 1. A WebRTC application might also multiplex data channel [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel] traffic over the same 5-tuple as RTP streams, which would also be marked as per that table. The guidance in [RFC7657] says that all data channel traffic would be marked with a single value that is typically different than the

value(s) used for RTP streams multiplexed with the data channel traffic over the same 5-tuple, assuming RTP streams are marked with a value other than default forwarding (DF). This is expanded upon further in the next section.

This specification does not change or override the advice in any other IETF RFCs about setting packet markings. Rather, it simply selects a subset of DSCP values that is relevant in the WebRTC context.

The DSCP value set by the endpoint is not trusted by the network. In addition, the DSCP value may be remarked at any place in the network for a variety of reasons to any other DSCP value, including default forwarding (DF) value to provide basic best effort service. Even so, there is benefit in marking traffic even if it only benefits the first few hops. The implications are discussed in Section 3.2 of [RFC7657]. Further, a mitigation for such action is through an authorization mechanism. Such an authorization mechanism is outside the scope of this document.

4. Inputs

WebRTC applications send and receive two types of flows of significance to this document:

- o media flows which are RTP streams [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-rtp-usage]
- o data flows which are data channels [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]

Each of the RTP streams and distinct data channels consists of all of the packets associated with an independent media entity, so an RTP stream or distinct data channel is not always equivalent to a transport-layer flow defined by a 5-tuple (source address, destination address, source port, destination port, and protocol). There may be multiple RTP streams and data channels multiplexed over the same 5-tuple, with each having a different level of importance to the application and, therefore, potentially marked using different DSCP values than another RTP stream or data channel within the same transport-layer flow. (Note that there are restrictions with respect to marking different data channels carried within the same SCTP association as outlined in Section 5.)

The following are the inputs provided by the WebRTC application to the browser:

- o Flow Type: The application provides this input because it knows if the flow is audio, interactive video [RFC4594] [G.1010] with or without audio, or data.

- o Application Priority: Another input is the relative importance of an RTP stream or data channel. Many applications have multiple flows of the same Flow Type and often some flows are more important than others. For example, in a video conference where there are usually audio and video flows, the audio flow may be more important than the video flow. JavaScript applications can tell the browser whether a particular flow is high, medium, low or very low importance to the application.

[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports] defines in more detail what an individual flow is within the WebRTC context and priorities for media and data flows.

Currently in WebRTC, media sent over RTP is assumed to be interactive [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports] and browser APIs do not exist to allow an application to differentiate between interactive and non-interactive video.

5. DSCP Mappings

The DSCP values for each flow type of interest to WebRTC based on application priority are shown in Table 1. These values are based on the framework and recommended values in [RFC4594]. A web browser SHOULD use these values to mark the appropriate media packets. More information on EF can be found in [RFC3246]. More information on AF can be found in [RFC2597]. DF is default forwarding which provides the basic best effort service [RFC2474].

WebRTC use of multiple DSCP values may encounter network blocking of packets with certain DSCP values. See section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports] for further discussion, including how WebRTC implementations establish and maintain connectivity when such blocking is encountered.

Flow Type	Very Low	Low	Medium	High
Audio	CS1 (8)	DF (0)	EF (46)	EF (46)
Interactive Video with or without Audio	CS1 (8)	DF (0)	AF42, AF43 (36, 38)	AF41, AF42 (34, 36)
Non-Interactive Video with or without Audio	CS1 (8)	DF (0)	AF32, AF33 (28, 30)	AF31, AF32 (26, 28)
Data	CS1 (8)	DF (0)	AF11	AF21

Table 1: Recommended DSCP Values for WebRTC Applications

The application priority, indicated by the columns "very low", "low", "Medium", and "high", signifies the relative importance of the flow within the application. It is an input that the browser receives to assist in selecting the DSCP value and adjusting the network transport behavior.

The above table assumes that packets marked with CS1 are treated as "less than best effort", such as the LE behavior described in [RFC3662]. However, the treatment of CS1 is implementation dependent. If an implementation treats CS1 as other than "less than best effort", then the actual priority (or, more precisely, the per-hop-behavior) of the packets may be changed from what is intended. It is common for CS1 to be treated the same as DF, so applications and browsers using CS1 cannot assume that CS1 will be treated differently than DF [RFC7657]. However, it is also possible per [RFC2474] for CS1 traffic to be given better treatment than DF, thus caution should be exercised when electing to use CS1. This is one of the cases where marking packets using these recommendations can make things worse.

Implementers should also note that excess EF traffic is dropped. This could mean that a packet marked as EF may not get through, although the same packet marked with a different DSCP value would have gotten through. This is not a flaw, but how excess EF traffic is intended to be treated.

The browser SHOULD first select the flow type of the flow. Within the flow type, the relative importance of the flow SHOULD be used to select the appropriate DSCP value.

Currently, all WebRTC video is assumed to be interactive [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports], for which the Interactive Video DSCP values in Table 1 SHOULD be used. Browsers MUST NOT use the AF3x DSCP values (for Non-Interactive Video in Table 1) for WebRTC applications. Non-browser implementations of WebRTC MAY use the AF3x DSCP values for video that is known not to be interactive, e.g., all video in a WebRTC video playback application that is not implemented in a browser.

The combination of flow type and application priority provides specificity and helps in selecting the right DSCP value for the flow. All packets within a flow SHOULD have the same application priority. In some cases, the selected application priority cell may have multiple DSCP values, such as AF41 and AF42. These offer different drop precedences. The different drop precedence values provides additional granularity in classifying packets within a flow. For example, in a video conference the video flow may have medium application priority, thus either AF42 or AF43 may be selected. More important video packets (e.g., a video picture or frame encoded without any dependency on any prior pictures or frames) might be marked with AF42 and less important packets (e.g., a video picture or frame encoded based on the content of one or more prior pictures or frames) might be marked with AF43 (e.g., receipt of the more important packets enables a video renderer to continue after one or more packets are lost).

It is worth noting that the application priority is utilized by the coupled congestion control mechanism for media flows per [I-D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc] and the SCTP scheduler for data channel traffic per [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel].

For reasons discussed in Section 6 of [RFC7657], if multiple flows are multiplexed using a reliable transport (e.g., TCP) then all of the packets for all flows multiplexed over that transport-layer flow MUST be marked using the same DSCP value. Likewise, all WebRTC data channel packets transmitted over an SCTP association MUST be marked using the same DSCP value, regardless of how many data channels (streams) exist or what kind of traffic is carried over the various SCTP streams. In the event that the browser wishes to change the DSCP value in use for an SCTP association, it MUST reset the SCTP congestion controller after changing values. Frequent changes in the DSCP value used for an SCTP association are discouraged, though, as this would defeat any attempts at effectively managing congestion. It should also be noted that any change in DSCP value that results in a reset of the congestion controller puts the SCTP association back into slow start, which may have undesirable effects on application performance.

For the data channel traffic multiplexed over an SCTP association, it is RECOMMENDED that the DSCP value selected be the one associated with the highest priority requested for all data channels multiplexed over the SCTP association. Likewise, when multiplexing multiple flows over a TCP connection, the DSCP value selected should be the one associated with the highest priority requested for all multiplexed flows.

If a packet enters a network that has no support for a flow type-application priority combination specified in Table 1, then the network node at the edge will remark the DSCP value based on policies. This could result in the flow not getting the network treatment it expects based on the original DSCP value in the packet. Subsequently, if the packet enters a network that supports a larger number of these combinations, there may not be sufficient information in the packet to restore the original markings. Mechanisms for restoring such original DSCP is outside the scope of this document.

In summary, DSCP marking provides neither guarantees nor promised levels of service. However, DSCP marking is expected to provide a statistical improvement in real-time service as a whole. The service provided to a packet is dependent upon the network design along the path, as well as the network conditions at every hop.

6. Security Considerations

Since the JavaScript application specifies the flow type and application priority that determine the media flow DSCP values used by the browser, the browser could consider application use of a large number of higher priority flows to be suspicious. If the server hosting the JavaScript application is compromised, many browsers within the network might simultaneously transmit flows with the same DSCP marking. The DiffServ architecture requires ingress traffic conditioning for reasons that include protecting the network from this sort of attack.

Otherwise, this specification does not add any additional security implications beyond those addressed in the following DSCP-related specifications. For security implications on use of DSCP, please refer to Section 7 of [RFC7657] and Section 6 of [RFC4594]. Please also see [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security] as an additional reference.

7. IANA Considerations

This specification does not require any actions from IANA.

8. Downward References

This specification contains a downwards reference to [RFC4594] and [RFC7657]. However, the parts of the former RFC used by this specification are sufficiently stable for this downward reference. The guidance in the latter RFC is necessary to understand the Diffserv technology used in this document and the motivation for the recommended DSCP values and procedures.

9. Acknowledgements

Thanks to David Black, Magnus Westerlund, Paolo Severini, Jim Hasselbrook, Joe Marcus, Erik Nordmark, Michael Tuexen, and Brian Carpenter for their invaluable input.

10. Dedication

This document is dedicated to the memory of James Polk, a long-time friend and colleague. James made important contributions to this specification, including serving initially as one of the primary authors. The IETF global community mourns his loss and he will be missed dearly.

11. Document History

Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section.

This document was originally an individual submission in RTCWeb WG. The RTCWeb working group selected it to become a WG document. Later the transport ADs requested that this be moved to the TSVWG WG as that seemed to be a better match.

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Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network
Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols
draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-21

Abstract

To protect user data and privacy, Internet transport protocols have supported payload encryption and authentication for some time. Such encryption and authentication is now also starting to be applied to the transport protocol headers. This helps avoid transport protocol ossification by middleboxes, mitigate attacks against the transport protocol, and protect metadata about the communication. Current operational practice in some networks inspect transport header information within the network, but this is no longer possible when those transport headers are encrypted.

This document discusses the possible impact when network traffic uses a protocol with an encrypted transport header. It suggests issues to consider when designing new transport protocols or features.

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1. Introduction

The transport layer supports the end-to-end flow of data across a network path, providing features such as connection establishment, reliability, framing, ordering, congestion control, flow control, etc., as needed to support applications. One of the core functions of an Internet transport is to discover and adapt to the characteristics of the network path that is currently being used.

For some years, it has been common for the transport layer payload to be protected by encryption and authentication, but for the transport layer headers to be sent unprotected. Examples of protocols that behave in this manner include Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP [RFC8446], Datagram TLS [RFC6347] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol [RFC3711], and tcpcrypt [RFC8548]. The use of unencrypted transport headers has led some network operators, researchers, and others to develop tools and processes that rely on observations of transport headers both in aggregate and at the flow level to infer details of the network's behaviour and inform operational practice.

Transport protocols are now being developed that encrypt some or all of the transport headers, in addition to the transport payload data. The QUIC transport protocol [I-D.ietf-quic-transport] is an example of such a protocol. Such transport header encryption makes it difficult to observe transport protocol behaviour from the vantage point of the network. This document discusses some implications of transport header encryption for network operators and researchers that have previously observed transport headers, and highlights some issues to consider for transport protocol designers.

As discussed in [RFC7258], the IETF has concluded that Pervasive Monitoring (PM) is a technical attack that needs to be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols. This document supports that conclusion. It also recognises that RFC7258 states "Making networks unmanageable to mitigate PM is not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring PM would go against the consensus documented here. An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are considered". This document is written to provide input to the discussion around what is an appropriate balance, by highlighting some implications of transport header encryption.

Current uses of transport header information by network devices on the Internet path are explained. These uses can be beneficial or malicious. This is written to provide input to the discussion around what is an appropriate balance, by highlighting some implications of transport header encryption.

2. Current uses of Transport Headers within the Network

In response to pervasive monitoring [RFC7624] revelations and the IETF consensus that "Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack" [RFC7258], efforts are underway to increase encryption of Internet traffic. Applying confidentiality to transport header fields can improve privacy, and can help to mitigate certain attacks or manipulation of packets by devices on the network path, but it can also affect network operations and measurement [RFC8404].

When considering what parts of the transport headers should be encrypted to provide confidentiality, and what parts should be visible to network devices (including non-encrypted but authenticated headers), it is necessary to consider both the impact on network operations and management, and the implications for ossification and user privacy [Measurement]. Different parties will view the relative importance of these concerns differently. For some, the benefits of encrypting all the transport headers outweigh the impact of doing so; others might analyse the security, privacy, and ossification impacts and arrive at a different trade-off.

This section reviews examples of the observation of transport layer headers within the network by devices on the network path, or using information exported by an on-path device. Unencrypted transport headers provide information that can support network operations and management, and this section notes some ways in which this has been done. Unencrypted transport header information also contributes metadata that can be exploited for purposes unrelated to network transport measurement, diagnostics or troubleshooting (e.g., to block or to throttle traffic from a specific content provider), and this section also notes some threats relating to unencrypted transport headers.

Exposed transport information also provides a source of information that contributes to linked data sets, which could be exploited to deduce private information, e.g., user patterns, user location, tracking behaviour, etc. This might reveal information the parties did not intend to be revealed. [RFC6973] aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy-related design choices in IETF protocols.

This section does not consider intentional modification of transport headers by middleboxes, such as devices performing Network Address Translation (NAT) or Firewalls.

2.1. To Separate Flows in Network Devices

Some network layer mechanisms separate network traffic by flow, without resorting to identifying the type of traffic. Hash-based load-sharing sharing across paths (e.g., equal cost multi path, ECMP), sharing across a group of links (e.g., using a link aggregation group, LAG), ensuring equal access to link capacity (e.g., fair queuing, FQ), or distributing traffic to servers (e.g., load balancing). To prevent packet reordering, forwarding engines can consistently forward the same transport flows along the same forwarding path, often achieved by calculating a hash using an n-tuple gleaned from a combination of link header information through to transport header information. This n-tuple can use the MAC address, IP addresses, and can include observable transport header information.

When transport header information cannot be observed, there can be less information to separate flows at equipment along the path. Flow separation might not be possible when, a transport that forms traffic into an encrypted aggregate. For IPv6, the Flow Label [RFC6437] can be used even when all transport information is encrypted, enabling Flow Label-based ECMP [RFC6438] and Load-Sharing [RFC7098].

2.2. To Identify Transport Protocols and Flows

Information in exposed transport layer headers can be used by the network to identify transport protocols and flows [RFC8558]. The ability to identify transport protocols, flows, and sessions is a common function performed, for example, by measurement activities, Quality of Service (QoS) classifiers, and firewalls. These functions can be beneficial, and performed with the consent of, and in support of, the end user. Alternatively, the same mechanisms could be used to support practises that might be adversarial to the end user, including blocking, de-prioritising, and monitoring traffic without consent.

Observable transport header information, together with information in the network header, has been used to identify flows and their connection state, together with the set of protocol options being used. Transport protocols, such as TCP [RFC7414] and the Stream Control Transport Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], specify a standard base header that includes sequence number information and other data. They also have the possibility to negotiate additional headers at connection setup, identified by an option number in the transport header.

In some uses, an assigned transport port (e.g., 0..49151) can identify the upper-layer protocol or service [RFC7605]. However,

port information alone is not sufficient to guarantee identification. Applications can use arbitrary ports and do not need to use assigned port numbers. The use of an assigned port number is also not limited to the protocol for which the port is intended. Multiple sessions can also be multiplexed on a single port, and ports can be re-used by subsequent sessions.

Some flows can be identified by observing signalling data (e.g., [RFC3261], [RFC8837]) or through the use of magic numbers placed in the first byte(s) of a datagram payload [RFC7983].

When transport header information cannot be observed, this removes information that could have been used to classify flows by passive observers along the path. More ambitious ways could be used to collect, estimate, or infer flow information, including heuristics based on the analysis of traffic patterns, such as classification of flows relying on timing, volumes of information, and correlation between multiple flows. For example, an operator that cannot access the Session Description Protocol (SDP) session descriptions [RFC4566] to classify a flow as audio traffic, might instead use (possibly less-reliable) heuristics to infer that short UDP packets with regular spacing carry audio traffic. Operational practises aimed at inferring transport parameters are out of scope for this document, and are only mentioned here to recognise that encryption does not prevent operators from attempting to apply practises that were used with unencrypted transport headers.

The IAB [RFC8546] have provided a summary of expected implications of increased encryption on network functions that use the observable headers and describe the expected benefits of designs that explicitly declare protocol invariant header information that can be used for this purpose.

2.3. To Understand Transport Protocol Performance

This subsection describes use by the network of exposed transport layer headers to understand transport protocol performance and behaviour.

2.3.1. Using Information Derived from Transport Layer Headers

Observable transport headers enable explicit measurement and analysis of protocol performance, and detection of network anomalies at any point along the Internet path. Some operators use passive monitoring to manage their portion of the Internet by characterising the performance of link/network segments. Inferences from transport headers are used to derive performance metrics:

Traffic Rate and Volume: Per-application traffic rate and volume measures can be used to characterise the traffic that uses a network segment or the pattern of network usage. Observing the protocol sequence number and packet size offers one way to measure this (e.g., measurements observing counters in periodic reports such as RTCP; or measurements observing protocol sequence numbers in statistical samples of packet flows, or specific control packets, such as those observed at the start and end of a flow).

Measurements can be per endpoint, or for an endpoint aggregate. These could be used to assess usage or for subscriber billing.

Such measurements can be used to trigger traffic shaping, and to associate QoS support within the network and lower layers. This can be done with consent and in support of an end user, to improve quality of service; or could be used by the network to de-prioritise certain flows without user consent.

The traffic rate and volume can be determined providing that the packets belonging to individual flows can be identified, but there might be no additional information about a flow when the transport headers cannot be observed.

Loss Rate and Loss Pattern: Flow loss rate can be derived (e.g., from transport sequence numbers or inferred from observing transport protocol interactions) and has been used as a metric for performance assessment and to characterise transport behaviour. Network operators have used the variation in patterns to detect changes in the offered service. Understanding the location and root cause of loss can help an operator determine whether this requires corrective action.

There are various causes of loss, including: corruption of link frames (e.g., due to interference on a radio link), buffering loss (e.g., overflow due to congestion, Active Queue Management, AQM [RFC7567], or inadequate provision following traffic pre-emption), and policing (traffic management [RFC2475]). Understanding flow loss rates requires maintaining per-flow state (flow identification often requires transport layer information) and either observing the increase in sequence numbers in the network or transport headers, or comparing a per-flow packet counter with the number of packets that the flow actually sent. Per-hop loss can also sometimes be monitored at the interface level by devices on the network path, or using in-situ methods operating over a network segment (see Section 3.3).

The pattern of loss can provide insight into the cause of loss. Losses can often occur as bursts, randomly-timed events, etc. It

can also be valuable to understand the conditions under which loss occurs. This usually requires relating loss to the traffic flowing at a network node or segment at the time of loss. Transport header information can help identify cases where loss could have been wrongly identified, or where the transport did not require retransmission of a lost packet.

Throughput and Goodput: Throughput is the amount of payload data sent by a flow per time interval. Goodput (the subset of throughput consisting of useful traffic) (see Section 2.5 of [RFC7928] and [RFC5166]) is a measure of useful data exchanged. The throughput of a flow can be determined in the absence of transport header information, providing that the individual flow can be identified, and the overhead known. Goodput requires ability to differentiate loss and retransmission of packets, for example by observing packet sequence numbers in the TCP or RTP headers [RFC3550].

Latency: Latency is a key performance metric that impacts application and user-perceived response times. It often indirectly impacts throughput and flow completion time. This determines the reaction time of the transport protocol itself, impacting flow setup, congestion control, loss recovery, and other transport mechanisms. The observed latency can have many components [Latency]. Of these, unnecessary/unwanted queueing in buffers of the network devices on the path has often been observed as a significant factor [bufferbloat]. Once the cause of unwanted latency has been identified, this can often be eliminated.

To measure latency across a part of a path, an observation point [RFC7799] can measure the experienced round trip time (RTT) using packet sequence numbers and acknowledgements, or by observing header timestamp information. Such information allows an observation point on the network path to determine not only the path RTT, but also allows measurement of the upstream and downstream contribution to the RTT. This could be used to locate a source of latency, e.g., by observing cases where the median RTT is much greater than the minimum RTT for a part of a path.

The service offered by network operators can benefit from latency information to understand the impact of configuration changes and to tune deployed services. Latency metrics are key to evaluating and deploying AQM [RFC7567], DiffServ [RFC2474], and Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] [RFC8087]. Measurements could identify excessively large buffers, indicating where to deploy or configure AQM. An AQM method is often deployed in combination with other techniques, such as scheduling [RFC7567] [RFC8290] and although parameter-less methods are desired

[RFC7567], current methods often require tuning [RFC8290] [RFC8289] [RFC8033] because they cannot scale across all possible deployment scenarios.

Latency and round-trip time information can potentially expose some information useful for approximate geolocation, as discussed in [PAM-RTT].

Variation in delay: Some network applications are sensitive to (small) changes in packet timing (jitter). Short and long-term delay variation can impact on the latency of a flow and hence the perceived quality of applications using a network path. For example, jitter metrics are often cited when characterising paths supporting real-time traffic. The expected performance of such applications, can be inferred from a measure of the variation in delay observed along a portion of the path [RFC3393] [RFC5481]. The requirements resemble those for the measurement of latency.

Flow Reordering: Significant packet reordering within a flow can impact time-critical applications and can be interpreted as loss by reliable transports. Many transport protocol techniques are impacted by reordering (e.g., triggering TCP retransmission or re-buffering of real-time applications). Packet reordering can occur for many reasons, from equipment design to misconfiguration of forwarding rules. Flow identification is often required to avoid significant packet mis-ordering (e.g., when using ECMP, or LAG). Network tools can detect and measure unwanted/excessive reordering, and the impact on transport performance.

There have been initiatives in the IETF transport area to reduce the impact of reordering within a transport flow, possibly leading to a reduction in the requirements for preserving ordering. These have potential to simplify network equipment design as well as the potential to improve robustness of the transport service. Measurements of reordering can help understand the present level of reordering, and inform decisions about how to progress new mechanisms.

Techniques for measuring reordering typically observe packet sequence numbers. Metrics have been defined that evaluate whether a network path has maintained packet order on a packet-by-packet basis [RFC4737] [RFC5236]. Some protocols provide in-built monitoring and reporting functions. Transport fields in the RTP header [RFC3550] [RFC4585] can be observed to derive traffic volume measurements and provide information on the progress and quality of a session using RTP. Metadata assists in understanding the context under which the data was collected, including the time, observation point [RFC7799], and way in which metrics were

accumulated. The RTCP protocol directly reports some of this information in a form that can be directly visible by devices on the network path.

In some cases, measurements could involve active injection of test traffic to perform a measurement (see Section 3.4 of [RFC7799]). However, most operators do not have access to user equipment, therefore the point of test is normally different from the transport endpoint. Injection of test traffic can incur an additional cost in running such tests (e.g., the implications of capacity tests in a mobile network segment are obvious). Some active measurements [RFC7799] (e.g., response under load or particular workloads) perturb other traffic, and could require dedicated access to the network segment.

Passive measurements (see Section 3.6 of [RFC7799]) can have advantages in terms of eliminating unproductive test traffic, reducing the influence of test traffic on the overall traffic mix, and the ability to choose the point of observation (see Section 2.4.1). Measurements can rely on observing packet headers, which is not possible if those headers are encrypted, but could utilise information about traffic volumes or patterns of interaction to deduce metrics.

Passive packet sampling techniques are also often used to scale the processing involved in observing packets on high rate links. This exports only the packet header information of (randomly) selected packets. Interpretation of the exported information relies on understanding of the header information. The utility of these measurements depends on the type of network segment/link and number of mechanisms used by the network devices. Simple routers are relatively easy to manage, but a device with more complexity demands understanding of the choice of many system parameters.

2.3.2. Using Information Derived from Network Layer Header Fields

Information from the transport header can be used by a multi-field (MF) classifier as a part of policy framework. Policies are commonly used for management of the QoS or Quality of Experience (QoE) in resource-constrained networks, or by firewalls to implement access rules (see also Section 2.2.2 of [RFC8404]). Policies can support user applications/services or protect against unwanted, or lower priority traffic (Section 2.4.4).

Transport layer information can also be explicitly carried in network-layer header fields that are not encrypted, serving as a replacement/addition to the exposed transport header information [RFC8558]. This information can enable a different forwarding

treatment by the devices forming the network path, even when a transport employs encryption to protect other header information.

On the one hand, the user of a transport that multiplexes multiple sub-flows might want to obscure the presence and characteristics of these sub-flows. On the other hand, an encrypted transport could set the network-layer information to indicate the presence of sub-flows, and to reflect the service requirements of individual sub-flows. There are several ways this could be done:

IP Address: Applications normally expose the endpoint addresses used in the forwarding decisions in network devices. Address and other protocol information can be used by a MF-classifier to determine how traffic is treated [RFC2475], and hence affect the quality of experience for a flow. Common issues concerning IP address sharing are described in [RFC6269].

Using the IPv6 Network-Layer Flow Label: A number of Standards Track and Best Current Practice RFCs (e.g., [RFC8085], [RFC6437], [RFC6438]) encourage endpoints to set the IPv6 flow label field of the network-layer header. IPv6 "source nodes SHOULD assign each unrelated transport connection and application data stream to a new flow" [RFC6437]. A multiplexing transport could choose to use multiple flow labels to allow the network to independently forward sub-flows. RFC6437 provides further guidance on choosing a flow label value, stating these "should be chosen such that their bits exhibit a high degree of variability", and chosen so that "third parties should be unlikely to be able to guess the next value that a source of flow labels will choose".

Once set, a flow label can provide information that can help inform network-layer queueing and forwarding, including use with IPsec, [RFC6294] and use with Equal Cost Multi-Path routing and Link Aggregation [RFC6438].

The choice of how to assign a flow label needs to avoid introducing linkages between flows that a network device could not otherwise observe. Inappropriate use by the transport can have privacy implications (e.g., assigning the same label to two independent flows that ought not to be classified the same).

Using the Network-Layer Differentiated Services Code Point: Applications can expose their delivery expectations to network devices by setting the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) field of IPv4 and IPv6 packets [RFC2474]. For example, WebRTC applications identify different forwarding treatments for individual sub-flows (audio vs. video) based on the value of the DSCP field [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]). This provides explicit

information to inform network-layer queueing and forwarding, rather than an operator inferring traffic requirements from transport and application headers via a multi-field classifier. Inappropriate use by the transport can have privacy implications (e.g., assigning a different DSCP to a subflow could assist in a network device discovering the traffic pattern used by an application). The field is mutable, i.e., some network devices can be expected to change this field. Since the DSCP value can impact the quality of experience for a flow, observations of service performance have to consider this field when a network path supports differentiated service treatment.

Using Explicit Congestion Marking: ECN [RFC3168] is a transport mechanism that uses the ECN field in the network-layer header. Use of ECN explicitly informs the network-layer that a transport is ECN-capable, and requests ECN treatment of the flow. An ECN-capable transport can offer benefits when used over a path with equipment that implements an AQM method with CE marking of IP packets [RFC8087], since it can react to congestion without also having to recover from lost packets.

ECN exposes the presence of congestion. The reception of CE-marked packets can be used to estimate the level of incipient congestion on the upstream portion of the path from the point of observation (Section 2.5 of [RFC8087]). Interpreting the marking behaviour (i.e., assessing congestion and diagnosing faults) requires context from the transport layer, such as path RTT.

AQM and ECN offer a range of algorithms and configuration options. Tools therefore have to be available to network operators and researchers to understand the implication of configuration choices and transport behaviour as the use of ECN increases and new methods emerge [RFC7567].

Network-Layer Options Network protocols can carry optional headers (see Section 5.1). These can explicitly expose transport header information to on-path devices operating at the network layer (as discussed further in Section 6).

IPv4 [RFC0791] has provision for optional header fields. IP routers can examine these headers and are required to ignore IPv4 options that they do not recognise. Many current paths include network devices that forward packets that carry options on a slower processing path. Some network devices (e.g., firewalls) can be (and are) configured to drop these packets [RFC7126]. BCP 186 [RFC7126] provides Best Current Practice guidance on how operators should treat IPv4 packets that specify options.

IPv6 can encode optional network-layer information in separate headers that may be placed between the IPv6 header and the upper-layer header [RFC8200]. (e.g., the IPv6 Alternate Marking Method [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-alt-mark], which can be used to measure packet loss and delay metrics). The Hop-by-Hop options header, when present, immediately follows the IPv6 header. IPv6 permits this header to be examined by any node along the path if explicitly configured [RFC8200].

Careful use of the network layer features (e.g., Extension Headers can Section 5) help provide similar information in the case where the network is unable to inspect transport protocol headers.

2.4. To Support Network Operations

Some network operators make use of on-path observations of transport headers to analyse the service offered to the users of a network segment, and to inform operational practice, and can help detect and locate network problems. [RFC8517] gives an operator's perspective about such use.

When observable transport header information is not available, those seeking an understanding of transport behaviour and dynamics might learn to work without that information. Alternatively, they might use more limited measurements combined with pattern inference and other heuristics to infer network behaviour (see Section 2.1.1 of [RFC8404]). Operational practises aimed at inferring transport parameters are out of scope for this document, and are only mentioned here to recognise that encryption does not necessarily stop operators from attempting to apply practises that have been used with unencrypted transport headers.

This section discusses topics concerning observation of transport flows, with a focus on transport measurement.

2.4.1. Problem Location

Observations of transport header information can be used to locate the source of problems or to assess the performance of a network segment. Often issues can only be understood in the context of the other flows that share a particular path, particular device configuration, interface port, etc. A simple example is monitoring of a network device that uses a scheduler or active queue management technique [RFC7567], where it could be desirable to understand whether the algorithms are correctly controlling latency, or if overload protection is working. This implies knowledge of how traffic is assigned to any sub-queues used for flow scheduling, but can require information about how the traffic dynamics impact active

queue management, starvation prevention mechanisms, and circuit-breakers.

Sometimes correlating observations of headers at multiple points along the path (e.g., at the ingress and egress of a network segment), allows an observer to determine the contribution of a portion of the path to an observed metric. e.g., to locate a source of delay, jitter, loss, reordering, or congestion marking.

2.4.2. Network Planning and Provisioning

Traffic rate and volume measurements are used to help plan deployment of new equipment and configuration in networks. Data is also valuable to equipment vendors who want to understand traffic trends and patterns of usage as inputs to decisions about planning products and provisioning for new deployments.

Trends in aggregate traffic can be observed and can be related to the endpoint addresses being used, but when transport header information is not observable, it might be impossible to correlate patterns in measurements with changes in transport protocols. This increases the dependency on other indirect sources of information to inform planning and provisioning.

2.4.3. Compliance with Congestion Control

The traffic that can be observed by on-path network devices (the "wire image") is a function of transport protocol design/options, network use, applications, and user characteristics. In general, when only a small proportion of the traffic has a specific (different) characteristic, such traffic seldom leads to operational concern, although the ability to measure and monitor it is lower. The desire to understand the traffic and protocol interactions typically grows as the proportion of traffic increases. The challenges increase when multiple instances of an evolving protocol contribute to the traffic that share network capacity.

Operators can manage traffic load (e.g., when the network is severely overloaded) by deploying rate-limiters, traffic shaping, or network transport circuit breakers [RFC8084]. The information provided by observing transport headers is a source of data that can help to inform such mechanisms.

Congestion Control Compliance of Traffic: Congestion control is a key transport function [RFC2914]. Many network operators implicitly accept that TCP traffic complies with a behaviour that is acceptable for the shared Internet. TCP algorithms have been continuously improved over decades, and have reached a level of

efficiency and correctness that is difficult to match in custom application-layer mechanisms [RFC8085].

A standards-compliant TCP stack provides congestion control that is judged safe for use across the Internet. Applications developed on top of well-designed transports can be expected to appropriately control their network usage, reacting when the network experiences congestion, by back-off and reduce the load placed on the network. This is the normal expected behaviour for IETF-specified transports (e.g., TCP and SCTP).

Congestion Control Compliance for UDP traffic: UDP provides a minimal message-passing datagram transport that has no inherent congestion control mechanisms. Because congestion control is critical to the stable operation of the Internet, applications and other protocols that choose to use UDP as a transport have to employ mechanisms to prevent collapse, avoid unacceptable contributions to jitter/latency, and to establish an acceptable share of capacity with concurrent traffic [RFC8085].

UDP flows that expose a well-known header can be observed to gain understanding of the dynamics of a flow and its congestion control behaviour. For example, tools exist to monitor various aspects of RTP header information and RTCP reports for real-time flows (see Section 2.3). The Secure RTP and RTCP extensions [RFC3711] were explicitly designed to expose some header information to enable such observation, while protecting the payload data.

A network operator can observe the headers of transport protocols layered above UDP to understand if the datagram flows comply with congestion control expectations. This can help inform a decision on whether it might be appropriate to deploy methods such as rate-limiters to enforce acceptable usage. The available information determines the level of precision with which flows can be classified and the design space for conditioning mechanisms (e.g., rate limiting, circuit breaker techniques [RFC8084], or blocking of uncharacterised traffic) [RFC5218].

When anomalies are detected, tools can interpret the transport header information to help understand the impact of specific transport protocols (or protocol mechanisms) on the other traffic that shares a network. An observer on the network path can gain an understanding of the dynamics of a flow and its congestion control behaviour. Analysing observed flows can help to build confidence that an application flow backs-off its share of the network load under persistent congestion, and hence to understand whether the behaviour is appropriate for sharing limited network capacity. For example, it is common to visualise plots of TCP sequence numbers versus time for

a flow to understand how a flow shares available capacity, deduce its dynamics in response to congestion, etc.

The ability to identify sources and flows that contribute to persistent congestion is important to the safe operation of network infrastructure, and can inform configuration of network devices to complement the endpoint congestion avoidance mechanisms [RFC7567] [RFC8084] to avoid a portion of the network being driven into congestion collapse [RFC2914].

2.4.4. To Characterise "Unknown" Network Traffic

The patterns and types of traffic that share Internet capacity change over time as networked applications, usage patterns and protocols continue to evolve.

Encryption can increase the volume of "unknown" or "uncharacterised" traffic seen by the network. If these traffic patterns form a small part of the traffic aggregate passing through a network device or segment of the network path, the dynamics of the uncharacterised traffic might not have a significant collateral impact on the performance of other traffic that shares this network segment. Once the proportion of this traffic increases, monitoring the traffic can determine if appropriate safety measures have to be put in place.

Tracking the impact of new mechanisms and protocols requires traffic volume to be measured and new transport behaviours to be identified. This is especially true of protocols operating over a UDP substrate. The level and style of encryption needs to be considered in determining how this activity is performed.

Traffic that cannot be classified typically receives a default treatment. Some networks block or rate-limit traffic that cannot be classified.

2.4.5. To Support Network Security Functions

On-path observation of the transport headers of packets can be used for various security functions. For example, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks against the infrastructure or against an endpoint can be detected and mitigated by characterising anomalous traffic (see Section 2.4.4) on a shorter timescale. Other uses include support for security audits (e.g., verifying the compliance with cipher suites), client and application fingerprinting for inventory, and to provide alerts for network intrusion detection and other next generation firewall functions.

When using an encrypted transport, endpoints can directly provide information to support these security functions. Another method, if the endpoints do not provide this information, is to use an on-path network device that relies on pattern inferences in the traffic, and heuristics or machine learning instead of processing observed header information. An endpoint could also explicitly cooperate with an on-path device (e.g., a QUIC endpoint could share information about current uses of connection IDs).

2.4.6. Network Diagnostics and Troubleshooting

Operators monitor the health of a network segment to support a variety of operational tasks [RFC8404] including procedures to provide early warning and trigger action: to diagnose network problems, to manage security threats (including DoS), to evaluate equipment or protocol performance, or to respond to user performance questions. Information about transport flows can assist in setting buffer sizes, and help identify whether link/network tuning is effective. Information can also support debugging and diagnosis of the root causes of faults that concern a particular user's traffic and can support post-mortem investigation after an anomaly. Section 3.1.2 and Section 5 of [RFC8404] provide further examples.

Network segments vary in their complexity. The design trade-offs for radio networks are often very different from those of wired networks [RFC8462]. A radio-based network (e.g., cellular mobile, enterprise Wireless LAN (WLAN), satellite access/back-haul, point-to-point radio) adds a subsystem that performs radio resource management, with impact on the available capacity, and potentially loss/reordering of packets. This impact can differ by traffic type, and can be correlated with link propagation and interference. These can impact the cost and performance of a provided service, and is expected to increase in importance as operators bring together heterogeneous types of network equipment and deploy opportunistic methods to access shared radio spectrum.

2.4.7. Tooling and Network Operations

A variety of open source and proprietary tools have been deployed that use the transport header information observable with widely used protocols such as TCP or RTP/UDP/IP. Tools that dissect network traffic flows can alert to potential problems that are hard to derive from volume measurements, link statistics or device measurements alone.

Any introduction of a new transport protocol, protocol feature, or application might require changes to such tools, and so could impact operational practice and policies. Such changes have associated

costs that are incurred by the network operators that need to update their tooling or develop alternative practises that work without access to the changed/removed information.

The use of encryption has the desirable effect of preventing unintended observation of the payload data and these tools seldom seek to observe the payload, or other application details. A flow that hides its transport header information could imply "don't touch" to some operators. This might limit a trouble-shooting response to "can't help, no trouble found".

An alternative that does not require access to observable transport headers is to access endpoint diagnostic tools or to include user involvement in diagnosing and troubleshooting unusual use cases or to troubleshoot non-trivial problems. Another approach is to use traffic pattern analysis. Such tools can provide useful information during network anomalies (e.g., detecting significant reordering, high or intermittent loss), however indirect measurements need to be carefully designed to provide information for diagnostics and troubleshooting.

If new protocols, or protocol extensions, are made to closely resemble or match existing mechanisms, then the changes to tooling and the associated costs can be small. Equally, more extensive changes to the transport tend to require more extensive, and more expensive, changes to tooling and operational practice. Protocol designers can mitigate these costs by explicitly choosing to expose selected information as invariants that are guaranteed not to change for a particular protocol (e.g., the header invariants and the spin-bit in QUIC [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]). Specification of common log formats and development of alternative approaches can also help mitigate the costs of transport changes.

2.5. To Mitigate the Effects of Constrained Networks

Some link and network segments are constrained by the capacity they can offer, by the time it takes to access capacity (e.g., due to under-lying radio resource management methods), or by asymmetries in the design (e.g., many link are designed so that the capacity available is different in the forward and return directions; some radio technologies have different access methods in the forward and return directions resulting from differences in the power budget).

The impact of path constraints can be mitigated using a proxy operating at or above the transport layer to use an alternate transport protocol.

In many cases, one or both endpoints are unaware of the characteristics of the constraining link or network segment and mitigations are applied below the transport layer: Packet classification and QoS methods (described in various sections) can be beneficial in differentially prioritising certain traffic when there is a capacity constraint or additional delay in scheduling link transmissions. Another common mitigation is to apply header compression over the specific link or subnetwork (see Section 2.5.1).

2.5.1. To Provide Header Compression

Header compression saves link capacity by compressing network and transport protocol headers on a per-hop basis. This has been widely used with low bandwidth dial-up access links, and still finds application on wireless links that are subject to capacity constraints. These methods are effective for bit-congestive links sending small packets (e.g., reducing the cost for sending control packets or small data packets over radio links).

Examples of header compression include use with TCP/IP and RTP/UDP/IP flows [RFC2507], [RFC6846], [RFC2508], [RFC5795], [RFC8724]. Successful compression depends on observing the transport headers and understanding of the way fields change between packets, and is hence incompatible with header encryption. Devices that compress transport headers are dependent on a stable header format, implying ossification of that format.

Introducing a new transport protocol, or changing the format of the transport header information, will limit the effectiveness of header compression until the network devices are updated. Encrypting the transport protocol headers will tend to cause the header compression to fall back to compressing only the network layer headers, with a significant reduction in efficiency. This can limit connectivity if the resulting flow exceeds the link capacity, or if the packets are dropped because they exceed the link MTU.

The Secure RTP (SRTP) extensions [RFC3711] were explicitly designed to leave the transport protocol headers unencrypted, but authenticated, since support for header compression was considered important.

2.6. To Verify SLA Compliance

Observable transport headers coupled with published transport specifications allow operators and regulators to explore and verify compliance with Service Level Agreements (SLAs). It can also be used to understand whether a service is providing differential treatment to certain flows.

When transport header information cannot be observed, other methods have to be found to confirm that the traffic produced conforms to the expectations of the operator or developer.

Independently verifiable performance metrics can be utilised to demonstrate regulatory compliance in some jurisdictions, and as a basis for informing design decisions. This can bring assurance to those operating networks, often avoiding deployment of complex techniques that routinely monitor and manage Internet traffic flows (e.g., avoiding the capital and operational costs of deploying flow rate-limiting and network circuit-breaker methods [RFC8084]).

3. Research, Development and Deployment

Research and development of new protocols and mechanisms need to be informed by measurement data (as described in the previous section). Data can also help promote acceptance of proposed standards specifications by the wider community (e.g., as a method to judge the safety for Internet deployment).

Observed data is important to ensure the health of the research and development communities, and provides data needed to evaluate new proposals for standardisation. Open standards motivate a desire to include independent observation and evaluation of performance and deployment data. Independent data helps compare different methods, judge the level of deployment and ensure the wider applicability of the results. This is important when considering when a protocol or mechanism should be standardised for use in the general Internet. This, in turn, demands control/understanding about where and when measurement samples are collected. This requires consideration of the methods used to observe information and the appropriate balance between encrypting all and no transport header information.

There can be performance and operational trade-offs in exposing selected information to network tools. This section explores key implications of tools and procedures that observe transport protocols, but does not endorse or condemn any specific practises.

3.1. Independent Measurement

Encrypting transport header information has implications on the way network data is collected and analysed. Independent observation by multiple actors is currently used by the transport community to maintain an accurate understanding of the network within transport area working groups, IRTF research groups, and the broader research community. This is important to be able to provide accountability, and demonstrate that protocols behave as intended, although when providing or using such information, it is important to consider the

privacy of the user and their incentive for providing accurate and detailed information.

Protocols that expose the state of the transport protocol in their header (e.g., timestamps used to calculate the RTT, packet numbers used to assess congestion and requests for retransmission) provide an incentive for a sending endpoint to provide consistent information, because a protocol will not work otherwise. An on-path observer can have confidence that well-known (and ossified) transport header information represents the actual state of the endpoints, when this information is necessary for the protocol's correct operation.

Encryption of transport header information could reduce the range of actors that can observe useful data. This would limit the information sources available to the Internet community to understand the operation of new transport protocols, reducing information to inform design decisions and standardisation of the new protocols and related operational practises. The cooperating dependence of network, application, and host to provide communication performance on the Internet is uncertain when only endpoints (i.e., at user devices and within service platforms) can observe performance, and when performance cannot be independently verified by all parties.

3.2. Measurable Transport Protocols

Transport protocol evolution, and the ability to measure and understand the impact of protocol changes, have to proceed hand-in-hand. A transport protocol that provides observable headers can be used to provide open and verifiable measurement data. Observation of pathologies has a critical role in the design of transport protocol mechanisms and development of new mechanisms and protocols, and aides understanding of the interactions between cooperating protocols and network mechanisms, the implications of sharing capacity with other traffic and the impact of different patterns of usage. The ability of other stakeholders to review transport header traces helps develop insight into the performance and the traffic contribution of specific variants of a protocol.

Development of new transport protocol mechanisms has to consider the scale of deployment and the range of environments in which the transport is used. Experience has shown that it is often difficult to correctly implement new mechanisms [RFC8085], and that mechanisms often evolve as a protocol matures, or in response to changes in network conditions, changes in network traffic, or changes to application usage. Analysis is especially valuable when based on the behaviour experienced across a range of topologies, vendor equipment, and traffic patterns.

Encryption enables a transport protocol to choose which internal state to reveal to devices on the network path, what information to encrypt, and what fields to grease [RFC8701]. A new design can provide summary information regarding its performance, congestion control state, etc., or to make available explicit measurement information. For example, [I-D.ietf-quic-transport] specifies a way for a QUIC endpoint to optionally set the spin-bit to explicitly reveal the RTT of an encrypted transport session to the on-path network devices. There is a choice of what information to expose. For some operational uses, the information has to contain sufficient detail to understand, and possibly reconstruct, the network traffic pattern for further testing. The interpretation of the information needs to consider whether this information reflects the actual transport state of the endpoints. This might require the trust of transport protocol implementers, to correctly reveal the desired information.

New transport protocol formats are expected to facilitate an increased pace of transport evolution, and with it the possibility to experiment with and deploy a wide range of protocol mechanisms. At the time of writing, there has been interest in a wide range of new transport methods, e.g., Larger Initial Window, Proportional Rate Reduction (PRR), congestion control methods based on measuring bottleneck bandwidth and round-trip propagation time, the introduction of AQM techniques and new forms of ECN response (e.g., Data Centre TCP, DCTCP, and methods proposed for L4S). The growth and diversity of applications and protocols using the Internet also continues to expand. For each new method or application, it is desirable to build a body of data reflecting its behaviour under a wide range of deployment scenarios, traffic load, and interactions with other deployed/candidate methods.

3.3. Other Sources of Information

Some measurements that traditionally rely on observable transport information could be completed by utilising endpoint-based logging (e.g., based on Quic-Trace [Quic-Trace] and qlog [I-D.marx-qlog-main-schema]). Such information has a diversity of uses, including developers wishing to debug/understand the transport/application protocols with which they work, researchers seeking to spot trends and anomalies, and to characterise variants of protocols. A standard format for endpoint logging could allow these to be shared (after appropriate anonymisation) to understand performance and pathologies.

When measurement datasets are made available by servers or client endpoints, additional metadata, such as the state of the network and conditions in which the system was observed, is often necessary to

interpret this data to answer questions about network performance or understand a pathology. Collecting and coordinating such metadata is more difficult when the observation point is at a different location to the bottleneck or device under evaluation [RFC7799].

Despite being applicable in some scenarios, endpoint logs do not provide equivalent information to on-path measurements made by devices in the network. In particular, endpoint logs contain only a part of the information to understand the operation of network devices and identify issues such as link performance or capacity sharing between multiple flows. An analysis can require coordination between actors at different layers to successfully characterise flows and correlate the performance or behaviour of a specific mechanism with an equipment configuration and traffic using operational equipment along a network path (e.g., combining transport and network measurements to explore congestion control dynamics, to understand the implications of traffic on designs for active queue management or circuit breakers).

Another source of information could arise from operations, administration and management (OAM) (see Section 6) information data records could be embedded into header information at different layers to support functions such as performance evaluation, path-tracing, path verification information, classification and a diversity of other uses.

In-situ OAM (IOAM) data fields [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] can be encapsulated into a variety of protocols to record operational and telemetry information in an existing packet, while that packet traverses a part of the path between two points in a network (e.g., within a particular IOAM management domain). The IOAM-Data-Fields are independent from the protocols into which the IOAM-Data-Fields are encapsulated. For example, IOAM can provide proof that a certain traffic flow takes a pre-defined path, SLA verification for the live data traffic, and statistics relating to traffic distribution.

4. Encryption and Authentication of Transport Headers

There are several motivations for transport header encryption.

One motive to encrypt transport headers is to prevent network ossification from network devices that inspect well-known transport headers. Once a network device observes a transport header and becomes reliant upon using it, the overall use of that field can become ossified, preventing new versions of the protocol and mechanisms from being deployed. Examples include:

- o During the development of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], the design needed to function in the presence of deployed middleboxes that relied on the presence of certain header fields exposed in TLS 1.2 [RFC5426].
- o The design of Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC8684] had to account for middleboxes (known as "TCP Normalizers") that monitor the evolution of the window advertised in the TCP header and then reset connections when the window did not grow as expected.
- o TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] can experience problems due to middleboxes that modify the transport header of packets by removing "unknown" TCP options. Segments with unrecognised TCP options can be dropped, segments that contain data and set the SYN bit can be dropped, and some middleboxes that disrupt connections that send data before completion of the three-way handshake.
- o Other examples of TCP ossification have included middleboxes that modify transport headers by rewriting TCP sequence and acknowledgement numbers, but are unaware of the (newer) TCP selective acknowledgement (SACK) option and therefore fail to correctly rewrite the SACK information to match the changes made to the fixed TCP header, preventing correct SACK operation.

In all these cases, middleboxes with a hard-coded, but incomplete, understanding of a specific transport behaviour (i.e., TCP), interacted poorly with transport protocols after the transport behaviour was changed. In some cases, the middleboxes modified or replaced information in the transport protocol header.

Transport header encryption prevents an on-path device from observing the transport headers, and therefore stops ossified mechanisms being used that directly rely on or infer semantics of the transport header information. This encryption is normally combined with authentication of the protected information. RFC 8546 summarises this approach, stating that it is "The wire image, not the protocol's specification, determines how third parties on the network paths among protocol participants will interact with that protocol" (Section 1 of [RFC8546]), and it can be expected that header information that is not encrypted will become ossified.

Encryption does not itself prevent ossification of the network service. People seeking to understand or classify network traffic could still come to rely on pattern inferences and other heuristics or machine learning to derive measurement data and as the basis for network forwarding decisions [RFC8546]. This can also create dependencies on the transport protocol, or the patterns of traffic it can generate, also resulting in ossification of the service.

Another motivation for using transport header encryption is to improve privacy and to decrease opportunities for surveillance. Users value the ability to protect their identity and location, and defend against analysis of the traffic. Revelations about the use of pervasive surveillance [RFC7624] have, to some extent, eroded trust in the service offered by network operators and have led to an increased use of encryption. Concerns have also been voiced about the addition of metadata to packets by third parties to provide analytics, customisation, advertising, cross-site tracking of users, to bill the customer, or to selectively allow or block content.

Whatever the reasons, the IETF is designing protocols that include transport header encryption (e.g., QUIC [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]) to supplement the already widespread payload encryption, and to further limit exposure of transport metadata to the network.

If a transport protocol uses header encryption, the designers have to decide whether to encrypt all, or a part of, the transport layer information. Section 4 of [RFC8558] states: "Anything exposed to the path should be done with the intent that it be used by the network elements on the path".

Certain transport header fields can be made observable to on-path network devices, or can define new fields designed to explicitly expose observable transport layer information to the network. Where exposed fields are intended to be immutable (i.e., can be observed, but not modified by a network device), the endpoints are encouraged to use authentication to provide a cryptographic integrity check that can detect if these immutable fields have been modified by network devices. Authentication can help to prevent attacks that rely on sending packets that fake exposed control signals in transport headers (e.g., TCP RST spoofing). Making a part of a transport header observable or exposing new header fields can lead to ossification of that part of a header as network devices come to rely on observations of the exposed fields.

The use of transport header authentication and encryption therefore exposes a tussle between middlebox vendors, operators, researchers, applications developers, and end-users:

- o On the one hand, future Internet protocols that support transport header encryption assist in the restoration of the end-to-end nature of the Internet by returning complex processing to the endpoints. Since middleboxes cannot modify what they cannot see, the use of transport header encryption can improve application and end-user privacy by reducing leakage of transport metadata to operators that deploy middleboxes.

- o On the other hand, encryption of transport layer information has implications for network operators and researchers seeking to understand the dynamics of protocols and traffic patterns, since it reduces the information that is available to them.

The following briefly reviews some security design options for transport protocols. A Survey of the Interaction between Security Protocols and Transport Services [RFC8922] provides more details concerning commonly used encryption methods at the transport layer.

Security work typically employs a design technique that seeks to expose only what is needed [RFC3552]. This approach provides incentives to not reveal any information that is not necessary for the end-to-end communication. The IETF has provided guidelines for writing Security Considerations for IETF specifications [RFC3552].

Endpoint design choices impacting privacy also need to be considered as a part of the design process [RFC6973]. The IAB has provided guidance for analyzing and documenting privacy considerations within IETF specifications [RFC6973].

Authenticating the Transport Protocol Header: Transport layer header information can be authenticated. An example transport authentication mechanism is TCP-Authentication (TCP-AO) [RFC5925]. This TCP option authenticates the IP pseudo header, TCP header, and TCP data. TCP-AO protects the transport layer, preventing attacks from disabling the TCP connection itself and provides replay protection. Such authentication might interact with middleboxes, depending on their behaviour [RFC3234].

The IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] was designed to work at the network layer and authenticate the IP payload. This approach authenticates all transport headers, and verifies their integrity at the receiver, preventing modification by network devices on the path. The IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] can also provide authentication and integrity without confidentiality using the NULL encryption algorithm [RFC2410]. SRTP [RFC3711] is another example of a transport protocol that allows header authentication.

Integrity Check Transport protocols usually employ integrity checks on the transport header information. Security method usually employ stronger checks and can combine this with authentication. An integrity check that protects the immutable transport header fields, but can still expose the transport header information in the clear, allows on-path network devices to observe these fields. An integrity check is not able to prevent modification by network devices on the path, but can prevent a receiving endpoint from

accepting changes and avoid impact on the transport protocol operation, including some types of attack.

Selectively Encrypting Transport Headers and Payload: A transport protocol design that encrypts selected header fields, allows specific transport header fields to be made observable by network devices on the path. This information is explicitly exposed either in a transport header field or lower layer protocol header. A design that only exposes immutable fields can also perform end-to-end authentication of these fields across the path to prevent undetected modification of the immutable transport headers.

Mutable fields in the transport header provide opportunities where on-path network devices can modify the transport behaviour (e.g., the extended headers described in [I-D.trammell-plus-abstract-mech]). An example of a method that encrypts some, but not all, transport header information is GRE-in-UDP [RFC8086] when used with GRE encryption.

Optional Encryption of Header Information: There are implications to the use of optional header encryption in the design of a transport protocol, where support of optional mechanisms can increase the complexity of the protocol and its implementation, and in the management decisions that have to be made to use variable format fields. Instead, fields of a specific type ought to be sent with the same level of confidentiality or integrity protection.

Greasing: Protocols often provide extensibility features, reserving fields or values for use by future versions of a specification. The specification of receivers has traditionally ignored unspecified values, however on-path network devices have emerged that ossify to require a certain value in a field, or re-use a field for another purpose. When the specification is later updated, it is impossible to deploy the new use of the field, and forwarding of the protocol could even become conditional on a specific header field value.

A protocol can intentionally vary the value, format, and/or presence of observable transport header fields at random [RFC8701]. This prevents a network device ossifying the use of a specific observable field and can ease future deployment of new uses of the value or code-point. This is not a security mechanism, although the use can be combined with an authentication mechanism.

Different transports use encryption to protect their header information to varying degrees. The trend is towards increased protection.

5. Intentionally Exposing Transport Information to the Network

A transport protocol can choose to expose certain transport information to on-path devices operating at the network layer by sending observable fields. One approach is to make an explicit choice not to encrypt certain transport header fields, making this transport information observable by an on-path network device. Another approach is to expose transport information in a network-layer extension header (see Section 5.1). Both are examples of explicit information intended to be used by network devices on the path [RFC8558].

Whatever the mechanism used to expose the information, a decision to expose only specific information places the transport endpoint in control of what to expose outside of the encrypted transport header. This decision can then be made independently of the transport protocol functionality. This can be done by exposing part of the transport header or as a network layer option/extension.

5.1. Exposing Transport Information in Extension Headers

At the network-layer, packets can carry optional headers that explicitly expose transport header information to the on-path devices operating at the network layer (Section 2.3.2). For example, an endpoint that sends an IPv6 Hop-by-Hop option [RFC8200] can provide explicit transport layer information that can be observed and used by network devices on the path. New hop-by-hop options are not recommended in RFC 8200 [RFC8200] "because nodes may be configured to ignore the Hop-by-Hop Options header, drop packets containing a Hop-by-Hop Options header, or assign packets containing a Hop-by-Hop Options header to a slow processing path. Designers considering defining new hop-by-hop options need to be aware of this likely behavior."

Network-layer optional headers explicitly indicate the information that is exposed, whereas use of exposed transport header information first requires an observer to identify the transport protocol and its format. (See Section 2.2.)

An arbitrary path can include one or more network devices that drop packets that include a specific header or option used for this purpose (see [RFC7872]). This could impact the proper functioning of the protocols using the path. Protocol methods can be designed to probe to discover whether the specific option(s) can be used along the current path, enabling use on arbitrary paths.

5.2. Common Exposed Transport Information

There are opportunities for multiple transport protocols to consistently supply common observable information [RFC8558]. A common approach can result in an open definition of the observable fields. This has the potential that the same information can be utilised across a range of operational and analysis tools.

5.3. Considerations for Exposing Transport Information

Considerations concerning what information, if any, it is appropriate to expose include:

- o On the one hand, explicitly exposing derived fields containing relevant transport information (e.g., metrics for loss, latency, etc) can avoid network devices needing to derive this information from other header fields. This could result in development and evolution of transport-independent tools around a common observable header, and permit transport protocols to also evolve independently of this ossified header [RFC8558].
- o On the other hand, protocols and implementations might be designed to avoid consistently exposing external information that corresponds to the actual internal information used by the protocol itself. An endpoint/protocol could choose to expose transport header information to optimise the benefit it gets from the network [RFC8558]. The value of this information for analysing operation of the transport layer would be enhanced if the exposed information could be verified to match the transport protocol's observed behavior.

The motivation to include actual transport header information and the implications of network devices using this information has to be considered when proposing such a method. RFC 8558 summarises this as "When signals from endpoints to the path are independent from the signals used by endpoints to manage the flow's state mechanics, they may be falsified by an endpoint without affecting the peer's understanding of the flow's state. For encrypted flows, this divergence is not detectable by on-path devices [RFC8558].

6. Addition of Transport OAM Information to Network-Layer Headers

Even when the transport headers are encrypted, on-path devices can make measurements by utilising additional protocol headers carrying OAM information in an additional packet header. OAM information can be included with packets to perform functions such as identification of transport protocols and flows, to aide understanding of network or

transport performance, or to support network operations or mitigate the effects of specific network segments.

Using network-layer approaches to reveal information has the potential that the same method (and hence same observation and analysis tools) can be consistently used by multiple transport protocols. This approach also could be applied to methods beyond OAM (see Section 5). There can also be less desirable implications from separating the operation of the transport protocol from the measurement framework.

6.1. Use of OAM within a Maintenance Domain

OAM information can be restricted to a maintenance domain, typically owned and operated by a single entity. OAM information can be added at the ingress to the maintenance domain (e.g., an Ethernet protocol header with timestamps and sequence number information using a method such as 802.1lag or in-situ OAM [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data], or as a part of the encapsulation protocol). This additional header information is not delivered to the endpoints and is typically removed at the egress of the maintenance domain.

Although some types of measurements are supported, this approach does not cover the entire range of measurements described in this document. In some cases, it can be difficult to position measurement tools at the appropriate segments/nodes and there can be challenges in correlating the downstream/upstream information when in-band OAM data is inserted by an on-path device.

6.2. Use of OAM across Multiple Maintenance Domains

OAM information can also be added at the network layer by the sender as an IPv6 extension header or an IPv4 option, or in an encapsulation/tunnel header that also includes an extension header or option. This information can be used across multiple network segments, or between the transport endpoints.

One example is the IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) destination option [RFC8250]. This allows a sender to optionally include a destination option that carries header fields that can be used to observe timestamps and packet sequence numbers. This information could be authenticated by a receiving transport endpoint when the information is added at the sender and visible at the receiving endpoint, although methods to do this have not currently been proposed. This needs to be explicitly enabled at the sender.

7. Conclusions

Header encryption and strong integrity checks are being incorporated into new transport protocols and have important benefits. The pace of development of transports using the WebRTC data channel, and the rapid deployment of the QUIC transport protocol, can both be attributed to using the combination of UDP as a substrate while providing confidentiality and authentication of the encapsulated transport headers and payload.

This document has described some current practises, and the implications for some stakeholders, when transport layer header encryption is used. It does not judge whether these practises are necessary, or endorse the use of any specific practise. Rather, the intent is to highlight operational tools and practises to consider when designing and modifying transport protocols, so protocol designers can make informed choices about what transport header fields to encrypt, and whether it might be beneficial to make an explicit choice to expose certain fields to devices on the network path. In making such a decision, it is important to balance:

- o User Privacy: The less transport header information that is exposed to the network, the lower the risk of leaking metadata that might have user privacy implications. Transports that chose to expose some header fields need to make a privacy assessment to understand the privacy cost versus benefit trade-off in making that information available. The design of the QUIC spin bit to the network is an example of such considered analysis.
- o Transport Ossification: Unencrypted transport header fields are likely to ossify rapidly, as network devices come to rely on their presence, making it difficult to change the transport in future. This argues that the choice to expose information to the network is made deliberately and with care, since it is essentially defining a stable interface between the transport and the network. Some protocols will want to make that interface as limited as possible; other protocols might find value in exposing certain information to signal to the network, or in allowing the network to change certain header fields as signals to the transport. The visible wire image of a protocol should be explicitly designed.
- o Network Ossification: While encryption can reduce ossification of the transport protocol, it does not itself prevent ossification of the network service. People seeking to understand network traffic could still come to rely on pattern inferences and other heuristics or machine learning to derive measurement data and as the basis for network forwarding decisions [RFC8546]. This

creates dependencies on the transport protocol, or the patterns of traffic it can generate, resulting in ossification of the service.

- o **Impact on Operational Practice:** The network operations community has long relied on being able to understand Internet traffic patterns, both in aggregate and at the flow level, to support network management, traffic engineering, and troubleshooting. Operational practice has developed based on the information available from unencrypted transport headers. The IETF has supported this practice by developing operations and management specifications, interface specifications, and associated Best Current Practises. Widespread deployment of transport protocols that encrypt their information will impact network operations, unless operators can develop alternative practises that work without access to the transport header.
- o **Pace of Evolution:** Removing obstacles to change can enable an increased pace of evolution. If a protocol changes its transport header format (wire image), or its transport behaviour, this can result in the currently deployed tools and methods becoming no longer relevant. Where this needs to be accompanied by development of appropriate operational support functions and procedures, it can incur a cost in new tooling to catch-up with each change. Protocols that consistently expose observable data do not require such development, but can suffer from ossification and need to consider if the exposed protocol metadata has privacy implications. There is no single deployment context, and therefore designers need to consider the diversity of operational networks (ISPs, enterprises, DDoS mitigation and firewall maintainers, etc.).
- o **Supporting Common Specifications:** Common, open, transport specifications can stimulate engagement by developers, users, researchers, and the broader community. Increased protocol diversity can be beneficial in meeting new requirements, but the ability to innovate without public scrutiny risks point solutions that optimise for specific cases, and that can accidentally disrupt operations of/in different parts of the network. The social contract that maintains the stability of the Internet relies on accepting common transport specifications, and on it being possible to detect violations. The existence of independent measurements, transparency, and public scrutiny of transport protocol behaviour, help the community to enforce the social norm that protocol implementations behave fairly and conform (at least mostly) to the specifications. It is important to find new ways of maintaining that community trust as increased use of transport header encryption limits visibility into transport behaviour (see also Section 5.3).

- o Impact on Benchmarking and Understanding Feature Interactions: An appropriate vantage point for observation, coupled with timing information about traffic flows, provides a valuable tool for benchmarking network devices, endpoint stacks, and/or configurations. This can help understand complex feature interactions. An inability to observe transport header information can make it harder to diagnose and explore interactions between features at different protocol layers, a side-effect of not allowing a choice of vantage point from which this information is observed. New approaches might have to be developed.
- o Impact on Research and Development: Hiding transport header information can impede independent research into new mechanisms, measurement of behaviour, and development initiatives. Experience shows that transport protocols are complicated to design and complex to deploy, and that individual mechanisms have to be evaluated while considering other mechanisms, across a broad range of network topologies and with attention to the impact on traffic sharing the capacity. If increased use of transport header encryption results in reduced availability of open data, it could eliminate the independent checks to the standardisation process that have previously been in place from research and academic contributors (e.g., the role of the IRTF Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) and research publications in reviewing new transport mechanisms and assessing the impact of their deployment).

Observable transport header information might be useful to various stakeholders. Other sets of stakeholders have incentives to limit what can be observed. This document does not make recommendations about what information ought to be exposed, to whom it ought to be observable, or how this will be achieved. There are also design choices about where observable fields are placed. For example, one location could be a part of the transport header outside of the encryption envelope, another alternative is to carry the information in a network-layer option or extension header. New transport protocol designs ought to explicitly identify any fields that are intended to be observed, consider if there are alternative ways of providing the information, and reflect on the implications of observable fields being used by on-path network devices, and how this might impact user privacy and protocol evolution when these fields become ossified.

As [RFC7258] notes, "Making networks unmanageable to mitigate (pervasive monitoring) is not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring (pervasive monitoring) would go against the consensus documented here." Providing explicit information can help avoid traffic being

inappropriately classified, impacting application performance. An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are analysed [RFC7258]. This balance between information exposed and information hidden ought to be carefully considered when specifying new transport protocols.

8. Security Considerations

This document is about design and deployment considerations for transport protocols. Issues relating to security are discussed throughout this document.

Authentication, confidentiality protection, and integrity protection are identified as Transport Features by [RFC8095]. As currently deployed in the Internet, these features are generally provided by a protocol or layer on top of the transport protocol [RFC8922].

Confidentiality and strong integrity checks have properties that can also be incorporated into the design of a transport protocol or to modify an existing transport. Integrity checks can protect an endpoint from undetected modification of protocol fields by on-path network devices, whereas encryption and obfuscation or greasing can further prevent these headers being utilised by network devices [RFC8701]. Preventing observation of headers provides an opportunity for greater freedom to update the protocols and can ease experimentation with new techniques and their final deployment in endpoints. A protocol specification needs to weigh the costs of ossifying common headers, versus the potential benefits of exposing specific information that could be observed along the network path to provide tools to manage new variants of protocols.

Header encryption can provide confidentiality of some or all of the transport header information. This prevents an on-path device from gaining knowledge of the header field. It therefore prevents mechanisms being built that directly rely on the information or seeks to infer semantics of an exposed header field. Reduced visibility into transport metadata can limit the ability to measure and characterise traffic, and conversely can provide privacy benefits.

Extending the transport payload security context to also include the transport protocol header protects both types of information with the same key. A privacy concern would arise if this key was shared with a third party, e.g., providing access to transport header information to debug a performance issue, would also result in exposing the transport payload data to the same third party. Such risks would be mitigated using a layered security design that provides one domain of protection and associated keys for the transport payload and

encrypted transport headers; and a separate domain of protection and associated keys for any observable transport header fields.

Exposed transport headers are sometimes utilised as a part of the information to detect anomalies in network traffic. "While PM is an attack, other forms of monitoring that might fit the definition of PM can be beneficial and not part of any attack, e.g., network management functions monitor packets or flows and anti-spam mechanisms need to see mail message content." [RFC7258]. This can be used as the first line of defence to identify potential threats from DoS or malware and redirect suspect traffic to dedicated nodes responsible for DoS analysis, malware detection, or to perform packet "scrubbing" (the normalisation of packets so that there are no ambiguities in interpretation by the ultimate destination of the packet). These techniques are currently used by some operators to also defend from distributed DoS attacks.

Exposed transport header fields can also form a part of the information used by the receiver of a transport protocol to protect the transport layer from data injection by an attacker. In evaluating this use of exposed header information, it is important to consider whether it introduces a significant DoS threat. For example, an attacker could construct a DoS attack by sending packets with a sequence number that falls within the currently accepted range of sequence numbers at the receiving endpoint. This would then introduce additional work at the receiving endpoint, even though the data in the attacking packet might not finally be delivered by the transport layer. This is sometimes known as a "shadowing attack". An attack can, for example, disrupt receiver processing, trigger loss and retransmission, or make a receiving endpoint perform unproductive decryption of packets that cannot be successfully decrypted (forcing a receiver to commit decryption resources, or to update and then restore protocol state).

One mitigation to off-path attack is to deny knowledge of what header information is accepted by a receiver or obfuscate the accepted header information, e.g., setting a non-predictable initial value for a sequence number during a protocol handshake, as in [RFC3550] and [RFC6056], or a port value that cannot be predicted (see Section 5.1 of [RFC8085]). A receiver could also require additional information to be used as a part of a validation check before accepting packets at the transport layer (e.g., utilising a part of the sequence number space that is encrypted; or by verifying an encrypted token not visible to an attacker). This would also mitigate against on-path attacks. An additional processing cost can be incurred when decryption is attempted before a receiver discards an injected packet.

The existence of open transport protocol standards, and a research and operations community with a history of independent observation and evaluation of performance data, encourages fairness and conformance to those standards. This suggests careful consideration will be made over where, and when, measurement samples are collected. An appropriate balance between encrypting some or all of the transport header information needs to be considered. Open data, and accessibility to tools that can help understand trends in application deployment, network traffic and usage patterns can all contribute to understanding security challenges.

The Security and Privacy Considerations in the Framework for Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance (LMAP) [RFC7594] contain considerations for Active and Passive measurement techniques and supporting material on measurement context.

Addition of observable transport information to the path increases the information available to an observer and may, when this information can be linked to a node or user, reduce the privacy of the user. See the security considerations of [RFC8558].

9. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

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Appendix A. Revision information

- 00 This is an individual draft for the IETF community.
 - 01 This draft was a result of walking away from the text for a few days and then reorganising the content.
 - 02 This draft fixes textual errors.
 - 03 This draft follows feedback from people reading this draft.
 - 04 This adds an additional contributor and includes significant reworking to ready this for review by the wider IETF community Colin Perkins joined the author list.
- Comments from the community are welcome on the text and recommendations.
- 05 Corrections received and helpful inputs from Mohamed Boucadair.
 - 06 Updated following comments from Stephen Farrell, and feedback via email. Added a draft conclusion section to sketch some strawman scenarios that could emerge.
 - 07 Updated following comments from Al Morton, Chris Seal, and other feedback via email.
 - 08 Updated to address comments sent to the TSVWG mailing list by Kathleen Moriarty (on 08/05/2018 and 17/05/2018), Joe Touch on 11/05/2018, and Spencer Dawkins.
 - 09 Updated security considerations.
 - 10 Updated references, split the Introduction, and added a paragraph giving some examples of why ossification has been an issue.
 - 01 This resolved some reference issues. Updated section on observation by devices on the path.
 - 02 Comments received from Kyle Rose, Spencer Dawkins and Tom Herbert. The network-layer information has also been re-organised after comments at IETF-103.
 - 03 Added a section on header compression and rewriting of sections referring to RTP transport. This version contains author editorial work and removed duplicate section.
 - 04 Revised following SecDir Review

- o Added some text on TLS story (additional input sought on relevant considerations).
- o Section 2, paragraph 8 - changed to be clearer, in particular, added "Encryption with secure key distribution prevents"
- o Flow label description rewritten based on PS/BCP RFCs.
- o Clarify requirements from RFCs concerning the IPv6 flow label and highlight ways it can be used with encryption. (section 3.1.3)
- o Add text on the explicit spin-bit work in the QUIC DT. Added greasing of spin-bit. (Section 6.1)
- o Updated section 6 and added more explanation of impact on operators.
- o Other comments addressed.

-05 Editorial pass and minor corrections noted on TSVWG list.

-06 Updated conclusions and minor corrections. Responded to request to add OAM discussion to Section 6.1.

-07 Addressed feedback from Ruediger and Thomas.

Section 2 deserved some work to make it easier to read and avoid repetition. This edit finally gets to this, and eliminates some duplication. This also moves some of the material from section 2 to reform a clearer conclusion. The scope remains focussed on the usage of transport headers and the implications of encryption - not on proposals for new techniques/specifications to be developed.

-08 Addressed feedback and completed editorial work, including updating the text referring to RFC7872, in preparation for a WGLC.

-09 Updated following WGLC. In particular, thanks to Joe Touch (specific comments and commentary on style and tone); Dimitri Tikonov (editorial); Christian Huitema (various); David Black (various). Amended privacy considerations based on SECDIR review. Emile Stephan (inputs on operations measurement); Various others.

Added summary text and refs to key sections. Note to editors: The section numbers are hard-linked.

-10 Updated following additional feedback from 1st WGLC. Comments from David Black; Tommy Pauly; Ian Swett; Mirja Kuehlewind; Peter

Gutmann; Ekr; and many others via the TSVWG list. Some people thought that "needed" and "need" could

represent requirements in the document, etc. this has been clarified.

-11 Updated following additional feedback from Martin Thomson, and corrections from other reviewers.

-12 Updated following additional feedback from reviewers.

-13 Updated following 2nd WGLC with comments from D.L.Black; T. Herbert; Ekr; and other reviewers.

-14 Update to resolve feedback to rev -13. This moves the general discussion of adding fields to transport packets to section 6, and discusses with reference to material in RFC8558.

-15 Feedback from D.L. Black, T. Herbert, J. Touch, S. Dawkins and M. Duke. Update to add reference to RFC7605. Clarify a focus on immutable transport fields, rather than modifying middleboxes with Tom H. Clarified Header Compression discussion only provides a list of examples of HC methods for transport. Clarified port usage with Tom H/Joe T. Removed some duplicated sentences, and minor edits. Added NULL-ESP. Improved after initial feedback from Martin Duke.

-16 Editorial comments from Mohamed Boucadair. Added DTLS 1.3.

-17 Revised to satisfy ID-NITs and updates REFs to latest rev, updated HC Refs; cited IAB guidance on security and privacy within IETF specs.

-18 Revised based on AD review.

-19 Revised after additional AD review request, and request to restructure.

-20 Revised after directorate reviews and IETF LC comments.

Gen-ART:

- o While section 2 does include a discussion of traffic mis-ordering, it does not include a discussion of ECMP, and the dependence of ECMP on flow identification to avoid significant packet mis-ordering.:: ECMP added as example.
- o Section 5.1 of this document discusses the use of Hop-by-Hop IPv6 options. It seems that it should acknowledge and discuss the applicability of the sentence "New hop-by-hop options are not

recommended..." from section 4.8 of RFC 8200. I think a good argument can be made in this case as to why (based on the rest of the sentence from 8200) the recommendation does not apply to this proposal. The document should make the argument.:: Quoted RFC sentences directly to avoid interpreting them.

- o I found the discussion of header compression slightly confusing. Given that the TCP / UDP header is small even compared to the IP header, it is difficult to see why encrypting it would have a significant impact on header compression efficacy. :: Added a preface that explains that HC methods are most effective for bit-congestive links.
- o The wording in section 6.2 on adding header information to an IP packet has the drawback of seeming to imply that one could add (or remove) such information in the network, without adding an encapsulating header. That is not permitted by RFC 8200 (IPv6). It would be good to clarify the first paragraph. (The example, which talks about the sender putting in the information is, of course, fine.) :: Unintended - added a sentence of preface.

SECDIR:: Previous revisions were updated following Early Review comments.

OPSEC:: No additional changes were requested in the OPSEC review.

IETF LC:: Tom Herbert: Please refer to 8200 on EH :: addressed in response to Joel above. Michael Richardson, Fernando Gont, Tom Herbert: Continuation of discussion on domains where EH might be (or not) useful and the tussle on what information to reveal. Unclear yet what additional text should be changed within this ID.

- 21 Revised after IESG review:

Revision 21 includes revised text after comments from Zahed, Erik Kline, Rob Wilton, Eric Vyncke, Roman Danyliw, and Benjamin Kaduk.

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Transport Options for UDP
draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-18.txt

Abstract

Transport protocols are extended through the use of transport header options. This document extends UDP by indicating the location, syntax, and semantics for UDP transport layer options.

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1. Introduction

Transport protocols use options as a way to extend their capabilities. TCP [RFC793], SCTP [RFC4960], and DCCP [RFC4340] include space for these options but UDP [RFC768] currently does not. This document defines an extension to UDP that provides space for transport options including their generic syntax and semantics for their use in UDP's stateless, unreliable message protocol.

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

In this document, the characters ">>" preceding an indented line(s) indicates a statement using the key words listed above. This convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying or finding the portions of this RFC covered by these key words.

3. Terminology

The following terminology is used in this document:

- o IP datagram [RFC791][RFC8200] - an IP packet, composed of the IP header and an IP payload area
- o User datagram - a UDP packet, composed of a UDP header and UDP payload; as discussed herein, that payload need not extend to the end of the IP datagram
- o UDP packet - the more contemporary term used herein to refer to a user datagram [RFC768]
- o Surplus area - the area of an IP payload that follows a UDP packet; this area is used for UDP options in this document

- o UDP fragment - one or more components of a UDP packet and its UDP options that enables transmission as IP payloads larger than permitted by IP datagram maximum sizes; note that each UDP fragment is itself transmitted as a UDP packet with its own options
- o (UDP) User data - the user data field of a UDP packet [RFC768]
- o UDP Length - the length field of a UDP header [RFC768]
- o Must-support options - UDP options that all implementations are required to support. Their use in individual UDP packets is optional.

4. Background

Many protocols include a default, invariant header and an area for header options that varies from packet to packet. These options enable the protocol to be extended for use in particular environments or in ways unforeseen by the original designers. Examples include TCP's Maximum Segment Size, Window Scale, Timestamp, and Authentication Options [RFC793][RFC5925][RFC7323].

Header options are used both in stateful (connection-oriented, e.g., TCP [RFC793], SCTP [RFC4960], DCCP [RFC4340]) and stateless (connectionless, e.g., IPv4 [RFC791], IPv6 [RFC8200]) protocols. In stateful protocols they can help extend the way in which state is managed. In stateless protocols their effect is often limited to individual packets, but they can have an aggregate effect on a sequence of packets as well.

UDP is one of the most popular protocols that lacks space for header options [RFC768]. The UDP header was intended to be a minimal addition to IP, providing only ports and a checksum for error detection. This document extends UDP to provide a trailer area for such options, located after the UDP user data.

UDP options are possible because UDP includes its own length field, separate from that of the IP header. Other transport protocols infer transport payload length from the IP datagram length (TCP, DCCP, SCTP). There are a number of reasons why Internet historians suggest that UDP includes this field, e.g., to support multiple UDP packets within the same IP datagram or to indicate the length of the UDP user data as distinct from zero padding required for systems that require writes that are not byte-aligned. These suggestions are not consistent with earlier versions of UDP or with concurrent design of multi-segment multiplexing protocols, however, so the real reason

remains unknown. Regardless, this field presents an opportunity to differentiate the UDP user data from the implied transport payload length, which this document leverages to support a trailer options field.

There are other ways to include additional header fields or options in protocols that otherwise are not extensible. In particular, in-band encoding can be used to differentiate transport payload from additional fields, such as was proposed in [Hi15]. This approach can cause complications for interactions with legacy devices, and is thus not considered further in this document.

IPv6 Teredo [RFC6081] uses values of the UDP Length that are larger than the IP payload as an additional type of signal, as noted in Section 20. UDP options uses a value smaller than the IP payload to enable backwards compatibility with existing UDP implementations, i.e., to deliver the UDP Length of UDP user data to the application and silently ignore the additional surplus area data. Using a value larger than the IP payload could either be considered malformed (and ought to be silently dropped by UDP processing) or could cause buffer overruns, and so is not considered silently and safely backward compatible.

5. The UDP Option Area

The UDP transport header includes demultiplexing and service identification (port numbers), an error detection checksum, and a field that indicates the UDP datagram length (including UDP header). The UDP Length field is typically redundant with the size of the maximum space available as a transport protocol payload, as determined by the IP header (see detail in Section 16). The UDP Option area is created when the UDP Length indicates a smaller transport payload than implied by the IP header.

For IPv4, IP Total Length field indicates the total IP datagram length (including IP header) and the size of the IP options is indicated in the IP header (in 4-byte words) as the "Internet Header Length" (IHL), as shown in Figure 1 [RFC791]. As a result, the typical (and largest valid) value for UDP Length is:

$$\text{UDP_Length} = \text{IPv4_Total_Length} - \text{IPv4_IHL} * 4$$




Figure 1 IPv4 datagram with UDP header

For IPv6, the IP Payload Length field indicates the transport payload after the base IPv6 header, which includes the IPv6 extension headers and space available for the transport protocol, as shown in Figure 2 [RFC8200]. Note that the Next HDR field in IPv6 might not indicate UDP (i.e., 17), e.g., when intervening IP extension headers are present. For IPv6, the lengths of any additional IP extensions are indicated within each extension [RFC8200], so the typical (and largest valid) value for UDP Length is:

$$\text{UDP_Length} = \text{IPv6_Payload_Length} - \text{sum}(\text{extension header lengths})$$




Figure 2 IPv6 datagram with UDP header

In both cases, the space available for the UDP packet is indicated by IP, either directly in the base header (for IPv4) or by adding information in the extensions (for IPv6). In either case, this document will refer to this available space as the "IP transport payload".

As a result of this redundancy, there is an opportunity to use the UDP Length field as a way to break up the IP transport payload into two areas - that intended as UDP user data and an additional "surplus area" (as shown in Figure 3).




Figure 3 IP transport payload vs. UDP Length

In most cases, the IP transport payload and UDP Length point to the same location, indicating that there is no surplus area. This is not

a requirement of UDP [RFC768] (discussed further in Section 16). This document uses the surplus area for UDP options.

The surplus area can commence at any valid byte offset, i.e., it need not be 16-bit or 32-bit aligned. In effect, this document redefines the UDP "Length" field as a "trailer options offset".

6. The UDP Surplus Area Structure

UDP options use the entire surplus area, i.e., the contents of the IP payload after the last byte of the UDP payload. They commence with a 2-byte Option Checksum (OCS) field aligned to the first 2-byte boundary (relative to the start of the IP datagram) of that area, using zeroes for alignment. The UDP option area can be used with any UDP payload length (including zero), as long as there remains enough space for the aligned OCS and the options used.

>> UDP options MAY begin at any UDP length offset.

>> Option area bytes used for alignment before the OCS MUST be zero.

The OCS contains an optional ones-complement sum that detects errors in the surplus area, which is not otherwise covered by the UDP checksum, as detailed in Section 7.

The remainder of the surplus area consists of options defined using a TLV (type, length, and optional value) syntax similar to that of TCP [RFC793], as detailed in Section 8. These options continue until the end of the surplus area or can end earlier using the EOL (end of list) option, followed by zeroes.

7. The Option Checksum (OCS)

The Option Checksum (OCS) option is conventional Internet checksum [RFC791] that detects errors in the surplus area. The OCS option contains a 16-bit checksum that is aligned to the first 2-byte boundary, preceded by zeroes for padding (if needed), as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4 UDP OCS format, here using one zero for alignment

The OCS consists of a 16-bit Internet checksum [RFC1071], computed over the surplus area and including the length of the surplus area as an unsigned 16-bit value. The OCS protects the surplus area from errors in a similar way that the UDP checksum protects the UDP user data (when not zero).

The primary purpose of the OCS is to detect non-standard (i.e., non-option) uses of that area and accidental errors. It is not intended to detect attacks, as discussed further in Section 22.

The design enables traversal of errant middleboxes that incorrectly compute the UDP checksum over the entire IP payload [Fal8], rather than only the UDP header and UDP payload (as indicated by the UDP header length). Because the OCS is computed over the surplus area and its length and then inverted, OCS effectively negates the effect that incorrectly including the surplus has on the UDP checksum. As a result, when OCS is non-zero, the UDP checksum is the same in either case.

>> OCS MUST be non-zero when the UDP checksum is non-zero.

>> When the UDP checksum is zero, the OCS MAY be unused, and is then indicated by a zero OCS value.

Like the UDP checksum, the OCS is optional under certain circumstances and contains zero when not used. UDP checksums can be zero for IPv4 [RFC791] and for IPv6 [RFC8200] when UDP payload already covered by another checksum, as might occur for tunnels [RFC6935]. The same exceptions apply to the OCS when used to detect bit errors; an additional exception occurs for its use in the UDP datagram prior to fragmentation or after reassembly (see Section 9.4).

The OCS covers the surplus area as formatted for transmission and is processed immediately upon reception.

>> If the OCS fails, all options MUST be ignored and the surplus area silently discarded.

>> UDP user data that is validated by a correct UDP checksum MUST be delivered to the application layer, even if the OCS fails, unless the endpoints have negotiated otherwise for this UDP packet's socket pair.

When not used (i.e., containing zero), the OCS is assumed to be "correct" for the purpose of accepting UDP datagrams at a receiver (see Section 12).

8. UDP Options

UDP options are typically a minimum of two bytes in length as shown in Figure 5, excepting only the one byte options "No Operation" (NOP) and "End of Options List" (EOL) described below.




Figure 5 UDP option default format

The Kind field is always one byte. The Length field is one byte for all lengths below 255 (including the Kind and Length bytes). A Length of 255 indicates use of the UDP option extended format shown in Figure 6. The Extended Length field is a 16-bit field in network standard byte order.




Figure 6 UDP option extended format

>> The UDP length MUST be at least as large as the UDP header (8) and no larger than the IP transport payload. Datagrams with length values outside this range MUST be silently dropped as invalid and logged where rate-limiting permits.

>> Option Lengths (or Extended Lengths, where applicable) smaller than the minimum for the corresponding Kind MUST be treated as an error. Such errors call into question the remainder of the surplus area and thus MUST result in all UDP options being silently discarded.

>> Any UDP option other than EOL and NOP MAY use either the default or extended option formats.

>> Any UDP option whose length is larger than 254 MUST use the UDP option extended format shown in Figure 6.

>> For compactness, UDP options SHOULD use the smallest option format possible.

>> UDP options MUST be interpreted in the order in which they occur in the surplus area.

The following UDP options are currently defined:

Kind	Length	Meaning

0*	-	End of Options List (EOL)
1*	-	No operation (NOP)
2*	6	Alternate payload checksum (APC)
3*	10/12	Fragmentation (FRAG)
4*	4	Maximum datagram size (MDS)
5*	4	Maximum reassembled datagram size (MRDS)
6*	6	Request (REQ)
7*	6	Response (RES)
8	10	Timestamps (TIME)
9	(varies)	Authentication (AUTH)
10-126	(varies)	UNASSIGNED (assignable by IANA)
127	(varies)	RFC 3692-style experiments (EXP)
128-191		RESERVED
192	(varies)	Encryption (UENC)
193-253		UNASSIGNED-UNSAFE (assignable by IANA)
254	(varies)	RFC 3692-style experiments (UEXP)
255		RESERVED

Options indicated by Kind values in the range 0..127 are known as SAFE options because they do not alter the UDP data payload and thus do not interfere with use of that data by legacy endpoints. Options indicated by Kind values in the range 192..254 are known as UNSAFE options because they do alter the UDP data payload and thus would interfere with legacy endpoints. UNSAFE option nicknames are expected to begin with "U", which should be avoided for safe option nicknames (see Section 23). Kind values 128-191 and 255 are RESERVED and not otherwise defined at this time.

>> RESERVED Kind values MUST NOT be assumed to be either SAFE nor UNSAFE until defined.

Although the FRAG option modifies the original UDP payload contents (i.e., is UNSAFE with respect to the original UDP payload), it is used only in subsequent fragments with zero UDP payloads, thus is SAFE in actual use, as discussed further in Section 9.4.

These options are defined in the following subsections. Options 0 and 1 use the same values as for TCP.

>> An endpoint supporting UDP options MUST support those marked with a "*" above: EOL, NOP, APC, FRAG, MDS, MRDS, REQ, and RES. This includes both recognizing and being able to generate these options if configured to do so. These are called "must-support" options.

>> An endpoint supporting UDP options MUST treat unsupported options in the UNSAFE range as terminating all option processing.

>> All other SAFE options (without a "*") MAY be implemented, and their use SHOULD be determined either out-of-band or negotiated, notably if needed to detect when options are silently ignored by legacy receivers.

>> Receivers supporting UDP options MUST silently ignore unknown SAFE options (i.e., in the same way a legacy receiver would). That includes options whose length does not indicate the specified value(s), as long as the length is not inherently invalid (i.e., smaller than 2 for the default and 4 for the extended formats).

>> UNSAFE options are used only in with the FRAG option, in a manner that prevents them from being silently ignored but passing the UDP payload to the user when not supported. This ensures their safe use in environments that might include legacy receivers (See Section 10).

>> Receivers supporting UDP options MUST silently drop all UDP options in a datagram containing an UNSAFE option when any UNSAFE option it contains is unknown. See Section 10 for further discussion of UNSAFE options.

>> Except for NOP, EXP, and UEXP, each option SHOULD NOT occur more than once in a single UDP datagram. If an option other than these occurs more than once, a receiver MUST interpret only the first instance of that option and MUST ignore all others.

>> EXP and UEXP MAY occur more than once, but SHOULD NOT occur more than once using the same ExID (see Sections 9.10 and 10.2).

>> Only the OCS and the AUTH and UENC options depend on the contents of the surplus area. AUTH and UENC are never used together, as UENC would serve both purposes. AUTH and UENC are always computed as if their hash and the OCS are zero; the OCS is always computed as if its contents are zero and after the AUTH or UENC hash has been computed. Future options MUST NOT be defined as having a value dependent on the contents of the surplus area. Otherwise, interactions between those values, the OCS, and the AUTH and UENC options could be unpredictable.

Receivers cannot generally treat unexpected option lengths as invalid, as this would unnecessarily limit future revision of options (e.g., defining a new APC that is defined by having a different length). The exception is only for lengths that imply a physical impossibility, e.g., smaller than two for conventional options and four for extended length options. Impossible lengths should indicate a malformed surplus area and all options silently discarded. Lengths other than those expected should result in safe options being ignored and skipped over, as with any other unknown safe option.

>> Option lengths MUST NOT exceed the IP length of the overall IP datagram. If this occurs, the options MUST be treated as malformed and all options dropped, and the event MAY be logged for diagnostics (logging SHOULD be rate limited).

>> "Must-support" options other than NOP and EOL MUST come before other options.

The requirement that must-support options come before others is intended to allow for endpoints to implement DOS protection, as discussed further in Section 22.

9. Safe UDP Options

Safe UDP options can be silently ignored by legacy receivers without affecting the meaning of the UDP user data. They stand in contrast to Unsafe options, which modify UDP user data in ways that render it unusable by legacy receivers (Section 10). The following subsections describe safe options defined in this document.

9.1. End of Options List (EOL)

The End of Options List (EOL, Kind=0) option indicates that there are no more options. It is used to indicate the end of the list of options without needing to use NOP options (see the following section) as padding to fill all available option space.

```
+-----+
| Kind=0 |
+-----+
```

Figure 7 UDP EOL option format

>> When the UDP options do not consume the entire surplus area, the last non-NOP option MUST be EOL.

>> NOPs SHOULD NOT be used as padding before the EOL option. As a one byte option, it need not be otherwise aligned.

>> All bytes in the surplus area after EOL MUST be set to zero on transmit.

>> Bytes after EOL in the surplus area MAY be checked as being zero on receipt but MUST be treated as zero regardless of their content and are not passed to the user (e.g., as part of the surplus area).

Requiring the post-option surplus area to be zero prevents side-channel uses of this area, requiring instead that all use of the surplus area be UDP options supported by both endpoints. It is useful to allow this area to be used for zero padding to increase the UDP datagram length without affecting the UDP user data length, e.g., for UDP DPLPMTUD (Section 4.1 of [Fa22]).

9.2. No Operation (NOP)

The No Operation (NOP, Kind=1) option is a one-byte placeholder, intended to be used as padding, e.g., to align multi-byte options along 16-bit, 32-bit, or 64-bit boundaries.

```
+-----+
| Kind=1 |
+-----+
```

Figure 8 UDP NOP option format

>> UDP packets SHOULD NOT use more than seven consecutive NOPs, i.e., to support alignment up to 8-byte boundaries. UDP packets SHOULD NOT use NOPs at the end of the options area as a substitute for EOL followed by zero-fill. NOPs are intended to assist with alignment, not as other padding or fill.

This issue is discussed further in Section 22.

9.3. Alternate Payload Checksum (APC)

The Alternate Payload Checksum (APC, Kind=2) option provides a stronger alternative to the checksum in the UDP header, using a 32-bit CRC of the conventional UDP user data payload only (excluding the IP pseudoheader, UDP header, and surplus area). It is an "alternate" to the UDP checksum that covers the user data - not to the OCS (the latter covers the surplus area only). Unlike the UDP checksum, APC does not include the IP pseudoheader or UDP header, thus it does not need to be updated by NATs when IP addresses or UDP

ports are rewritten. Its purpose is to detect user data errors that the UDP checksum, when used, might not detect.

A CRC32c has been chosen because of its ubiquity and use in other Internet protocols, including iSCSI and SCTP. The option contains the CRC32c in network standard byte order, as described in [RFC3385].




Figure 9 UDP APC option format

When present, the APC always contains a valid CRC checksum. There are no reserved values, including the value of zero. If the CRC is zero, this must indicate a valid checksum (i.e., it does not indicate that the APC is not used; instead, the option would simply not be included if that were the desired effect).

APC does not protect the UDP pseudoheader; only the current UDP checksum provides that protection (when used). APC cannot provide that protection because it would need to be updated whenever the UDP pseudoheader changed, e.g., during NAT address and port translation; because this is not the case, APC does not cover the pseudoheader.

>> UDP packets with incorrect APC checksums MUST be passed to the application by default, e.g., with a flag indicating APC failure.

Like all safe UDP options, APC needs to be silently ignored when failing by default, unless the receiver has been configured to do otherwise. Although all UDP option-aware endpoints support APC (being in the required set), this silently-ignored behavior ensures that option-aware receivers operate the same as legacy receivers unless overridden.

>> UDP packets with unrecognized APC lengths MUST be receive the same treatment as UDP packets with incorrect APC checksums.

Ensuring that unrecognized APC lengths are treated as incorrect checksums enables future variants of APC to be treated as APC-like.

9.4. Fragmentation (FRAG)

The Fragmentation (FRAG, Kind=3) option supports UDP fragmentation and reassembly, which can be used to transfer UDP messages larger than limited by the IP receive MTU (EMTU_R [RFC1122]). FRAG includes a copy of the same UDP transport ports in each fragment, enabling them to traverse Network Address (and port) Translation (NAT) devices, in contrast to the behavior of IP fragments. FRAG is typically used with the UDP MDS and MRDS options to enable more efficient use of large messages, both at the UDP and IP layers. FRAG is designed similar to the IPv6 Fragmentation Header [RFC8200], except that the UDP variant uses a 16-bit Offset measured in bytes, rather than IPv6's 13-bit Fragment Offset measured in 8-byte units. This UDP variant avoids creating reserved fields.

>> When FRAG is present, it SHOULD come as early as possible in the UDP options list.

>> When FRAG is present, the UDP user data MUST be empty. If the user data is not empty, all UDP options MUST be silently ignored and the user data received sent to the user.

Legacy receivers interpret FRAG messages as zero-length user data UDP packets (i.e., UDP Length field is 8, the length of just the UDP header), which would not affect the receiver unless the presence of the UDP packet itself were a signal (see Section 5 of [RFC8085]). In this manner, the FRAG option also helps hide UNSAFE options so they can be used more safely in the presence of legacy receivers.

The FRAG option has two formats; non-terminal fragments use the shorter variant (Figure 10) and terminal fragments use the longer (Figure 11). The latter includes stand-alone fragments, i.e., when data is contained in the FRAG option but reassembly is not required.




Figure 10 UDP non-terminal FRAG option format

In the non-terminal FRAG option format, Frag. Start indicates the location of the beginning of the fragment data, measured from the beginning of the UDP header of the fragment. The fragment data

follows the remainder of the UDP options and continues to the end of the IP datagram (i.e., the end of the surplus area). Those options are applied to this UDP fragment. Non-terminal fragments never have options after the fragment.

The Frag. Offset field indicates the location of this fragment relative to the original UDP datagram (prior to fragmentation), measured from the start of the original UDP datagram's UDP header.

The FRAG option does not need a "more fragments" bit because it provides the same indication by using the longer, 12-byte variant, as shown in Figure 11.

>> The FRAG option MAY be used on a single fragment, in which case the Frag. Offset would be zero and the option would have the 12-byte format.

>> Endpoints supporting UDP options MUST be capable of fragmenting and reassembling at least 2 fragments, for a total of at least 3,000 bytes (see MRDS in Section 9.6).

Use of the single fragment variant can be helpful in supporting use of UNSAFE options without undesirable impact to receivers that do not support either UDP options or the specific UNSAFE options.




Figure 11 UDP terminal FRAG option format

The terminal FRAG option format adds a Datagram Option Start pointer, measured from the start of the original UDP datagram header, indicating the end of the reassembled data and the start of the surplus area after the original UDP datagram. In this variant, UDP options that apply to the reassembled datagram may occur after the terminal fragment data. UDP options that occur before the FRAG data are processed on the fragment; UDP options after the FRAG data are processed after reassembly, such that the reassembled data represents the original UDP user data. This allows either pre-reassembly or post-reassembly UDP option effects, such as using UENC on each fragment while also using TIME on the reassembled datagram for round-trip latency measurements.

>> During fragmentation, the UDP header checksum of each fragment remains constant and does not depend on the fragment data (which appears in the surplus area), because all fragments have a zero-length user data field.

The Fragment Offset is 16 bits and indicates the location of the UDP payload fragment in bytes from the beginning of the original unfragmented payload. The option Len field indicates whether there are more fragments (Len=10) or no more fragments (Len=12).

>> The Identification field is a 32-bit value that MUST be unique over the expected fragment reassembly timeout.

>> The Identification field SHOULD be generated in a manner similar to that of the IPv6 Fragment ID [RFC8200].

>> UDP fragments MUST NOT overlap.

Similar to IPv6 reassembly [RFC8200], if any of the fragments being reassembled overlap with any other fragments being reassembled for the same UDP packet, reassembly of that UDP packet must be abandoned and all the fragments that have been received for that UDP packet must be discarded, and no ICMP error messages should be sent.

It should be noted that fragments may be duplicated in the network. Instead of treating these exact duplicate fragments as overlapping fragments, an implementation may choose to detect this case and drop exact duplicate fragments while keeping the other fragments belonging to the same UDP packet.

UDP fragmentation relies on a fragment expiration timer, which can be preset or could use a value computed using the UDP Timestamp option.

>> The default UDP reassembly SHOULD be no more than 2 minutes.

>> UDP reassembly space SHOULD be limited to reduce the impact of DOS attacks on resource use.

>> UDP reassembly space limits SHOULD NOT be computed as a shared resource across multiple sockets, to avoid cross-socketpair DOS attacks.

>> Individual UDP fragments MUST NOT be forwarded to the user. The reassembled datagram is received only after complete reassembly, checksum validation, and continued processing of the remaining UDP options.

Any per-datagram UDP options, if used, follow the FRAG option in the final fragment and would be included in the reassembled UDP packet. Processing of those options would commence after reassembly. This is especially important for UNSAFE options, which are interpreted only after FRAG.

In general, UDP packets are fragmented as follows:

1. Create a UDP packet with data and UDP options, which we will call "D". Note that the UDP options treat the data area as UDP user data and thus must follow that data.

Process these UDP options before the rest of the fragmentation steps below. Note that the OCS value of the original packet SHOULD be zero if each fragment will have a non-zero OCS value (as will be the case if the UDP checksum is non-zero).

2. Identify the desired fragment size, which we will call "S". This value should take into account the path MTU (if known) and allow space for per-fragment options.
3. Fragment "D" into chunks of size no larger than "S"-10 each, with one final chunk no larger than "S"-12. Note that all the non-FRAG options in step #1 need not be limited to the terminal fragment, i.e., the Dgram Opt. Start pointer can indicate the start of the original surplus area anywhere in the reassembled data.
4. For each chunk of "D" in step #3, create a zero-data UDP packet followed by the word-aligned OCS, the FRAG option, and any additional UDP options, followed by the FRAG data chunk.

The last chunk includes the non-FRAG options noted in step #1 after the end of the FRAG data. These UDP options apply to the reassembled user data as a whole when received.

5. Process the pre-reassembly UDP options of each fragment.

Receivers reverse the above sequence. They process all received options in each fragment. When the FRAG option is encountered, the FRAG data is used in reassembly. After all fragments are received, the entire UDP packet is processed with any trailing UDP options applying to the reassembled user data.

9.5. Maximum Datagram Size (MDS)

The Maximum Datagram Size (MDS, Kind=4) option is a 16-bit hint of the largest unfragmented UDP packet that an endpoint believes can be

received. As with the TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS) option [RFC793], the size indicated is the IP layer MTU decreased by the fixed IP and UDP headers only [RFC6691]. The space needed for IP and UDP options need to be adjusted by the sender when using the value indicated. The value transmitted is based on EMTU_R, the largest IP datagram that can be received (i.e., reassembled at the receiver) [RFC1122]. However, as with TCP, this value is only a hint at what the receiver believes; it does not indicate a known path MTU and thus MUST NOT be used to limit transmissions.




Figure 12 UDP MDS option format

The UDP MDS option MAY be used as a hint for path MTU discovery [RFC1191][RFC8201], but this may be difficult because of known issues with ICMP blocking [RFC2923] as well as UDP lacking automatic retransmission. It is more likely to be useful when coupled with IP source fragmentation or UDP fragmentation to limit the largest reassembled UDP message as indicated by MRDS (see Section 9.6), e.g., when EMTU_R is larger than the required minimums (576 for IPv4 [RFC791] and 1500 for IPv6 [RFC8200]). It can also be used with DPLPMTUD [RFC8899] to provide a hint to maximum DPLPMTU, though it MUST NOT prohibit transmission of larger UDP packets (or fragments) used as DPLPMTU probes.

9.6. Maximum Reassembled Datagram Size (MRDS)

The Maximum Reassembled Segment Size (MRDS, Kind=5) option is a 16-bit indicator of the largest reassembled UDP segment that can be received. MRDS is the UDP equivalent of IP's EMTU_R but the two are not related [RFC1122]. Using the FRAG option (Section 9.4), UDP packets can be transmitted as transport fragments, each in their own (presumably not fragmented) IP datagram and be reassembled at the UDP layer.




Figure 13 UDP MRDS option format

>> Endpoints supporting UDP options MUST support a local MRDS of at least 3,000 bytes.

9.7. Echo request (REQ) and echo response (RES)

The echo request (REQ, Kind=6) and echo response (RES, Kind=7) options provide a means for UDP options to be used to provide UDP packet-level acknowledgements. One such use is described as part of the UDP options variant of packetization layer path MTU discovery (PLPMTUD) [Fa22]. The options both have the format indicated in Figure 14, in which the token has no internal structure or meaning.




Figure 14 UDP REQ and RES options format

Each of these option kinds appears at most once in each UDP packet, as with other options. Note also that the FRAG option is not used when sending DPLPMTUD probes to determine a PLPMTU [Fa22].

9.8. Timestamps (TIME)

The Timestamp (TIME, Kind=8) option exchanges two four-byte unsigned timestamp fields. It serves a similar purpose to TCP's TS option [RFC7323], enabling UDP to estimate the round trip time (RTT) between hosts. For UDP, this RTT can be useful for establishing UDP fragment reassembly timeouts or transport-layer rate-limiting [RFC8085].




Figure 15 UDP TIME option format

TS Value (TSval) and TS Echo Reply (TSecr) are used in a similar manner to the TCP TS option [RFC7323]. On transmitted UDP packets using the option, TS Value is always set based on the local "time" value. Received TSval and TSecr values are provided to the application, which can pass the TSval value to be used as TSecr on UDP messages sent in response (i.e., to echo the received TSval). A received TSecr of zero indicates that the TSval was not echoed by the transmitter, i.e., from a previously received UDP packet.

>> TIME MAY use an RTT estimate based on nonzero Timestamp values as a hint for fragmentation reassembly, rate limiting, or other mechanisms that benefit from such an estimate.

>> an application MAY use TIME to compute this RTT estimate for further use by the user.

UDP timestamps are modeled after TCP timestamps and have similar expectations. In particular, they are expected to be:

- o Values are monotonic and non-decreasing except for anticipated number-space rollover events
- o Values should "increase" (allowing for rollover) according to a typical 'tick' time
- o A request is defined as TSval being non-zero and a reply is defined as TSecr being non-zero.
- o A receiver should always respond to a request with the highest TSval received (allowing for rollover), which is not necessarily the most recently received.

Rollover can be handled as a special case or more completely using sequence number extension [RFC9187], however zero values need to be avoided explicitly.

>> TIME values MUST NOT use zeros as valid time values, because they are used as indicators of requests and responses.

9.9. Authentication (AUTH)

The Authentication (AUTH, Kind=9) option is intended to allow UDP to provide a similar type of authentication as the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925]. AUTH covers the UDP user data. AUTH supports NAT traversal in a similar manner as TCP-AO [RFC6978]. Figure 16 shows the UDP AUTH format, whose contents are identical to that of the TCP-AO option.




Figure 16 UDP AUTH option format

Like TCP-AO, AUTH is not negotiated in-band. Its use assumes both endpoints have populated Master Key Tuples (MKTs), used to exclude non-protected traffic.

TCP-AO generates unique traffic keys from a hash of TCP connection parameters. UDP lacks a three-way handshake to coordinate connection-specific values, such as TCP's Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) [RFC793], thus AUTH's Key Derivation Function (KDF) uses zeroes as the value for both ISNs. This means that the AUTH reuses keys when socket pairs are reused, unlike TCP-AO.

>> UDP packets with incorrect AUTH HMACs MUST be passed to the application by default, e.g., with a flag indicating AUTH failure.

Like all non-UNSAFE UDP options, AUTH needs to be silently ignored when failing. This silently-ignored behavior ensures that option-aware receivers operate the same as legacy receivers unless overridden.

In addition to the UDP user data (which is always included), AUTH can be configured to either include or exclude the surplus area, in a similar way as can TCP-AO can optionally exclude TCP options. When UDP options are covered, the OCS value and AUTH (and later, UENC) hash areas are zeroed before computing the AUTH hash. It is important to consider that options not yet defined might yield unpredictable results if not confirmed as supported, e.g., if they were to contain other hashes or checksums that depend on the surplus area contents. This is why such dependencies are not permitted except as defined for the OCS and the AUTH (and later, UENC) option.

Similar to TCP-AO-NAT, AUTH (and later, UENC) can be configured to support NAT traversal, excluding (by zeroing out) one or both of the UDP ports and corresponding IP addresses [RFC6978].

9.10. Experimental (EXP)

The Experimental option (EXP, Kind=127) is reserved for experiments [RFC3692]. Only one such value is reserved because experiments are expected to use an Experimental ID (ExIDs) to differentiate concurrent use for different purposes, using UDP ExIDs registered with IANA according to the approach developed for TCP experimental options [RFC6994].




Figure 17 UDP EXP option format

>> The length of the experimental option MUST be at least 4 to account for the Kind, Length, and the minimum 16-bit UDP ExID identifier (similar to TCP ExIDs [RFC6994]).

The UDP EXP option also includes an extended length format, where the option LEN is 255 followed by two bytes of extended length.




Figure 18 UDP EXP option format

Assigned UDP experimental IDs (ExIDs) assigned from a single registry managed by IANA (see Section 23). Assigned ExIDs can be used in either the EXP or UEXP options (see Section 10.2 for the latter).

10. UNSAFE Options

UNSAFE options are not safe to ignore and can be used unidirectionally or without soft-state confirmation of UDP option capability. They are always used only when the user data occurs inside a reassembled set of one or more UDP fragments, such that if UDP fragmentation is not supported, the enclosed UDP user data would be silently dropped anyway.

>> Applications using UNSAFE options SHOULD NOT also use zero-length UDP packets as signals, because they will arrive when UNSAFE options fail. Those that choose to allow such packets MUST account for such events.

>> UNSAFE options MUST be used only as part of UDP fragments, used either per-fragment or after reassembly.

>> Receivers supporting UDP options MUST silently drop the UDP user data of the reassembled datagram if any fragment or the entire

datagram includes an UNSAFE option whose UKind is not supported. Note that this still results in the receipt of a zero-length UDP datagram.

10.1. UNSAFE Encryption (UENC)

UNSAFE encryption (UENC, Kind=192) has the same format as AUTH (Section 9.9), except that it encrypts (modifies) the user data. It provides a similar encryption capability as TCP-AO-ENC, in a similar manner [Tol8]. Its fields, coverage, and processing are the same as for AUTH, except that UENC encrypts only the user data, although it can (optionally) depend on the surplus area (with certain fields zeroed, as per AUTH, e.g., providing authentication over the surplus area). Like AUTH, UENC can be configured to be compatible with NAT traversal.

10.2. UNSAFE Experimental (UEXP)

The UNSAFE Experimental option (UEXP, Kind=254) is reserved for experiments [RFC3692]. As with EXP, only one such UEXP value is reserved because experiments are expected to use an Experimental ID (ExIDs) to differentiate concurrent use for different purposes, using UDP ExIDs registered with IANA according to the approach developed for TCP experimental options [RFC6994].

Assigned ExIDs can be used with either the UEXP or EXP options.

11. Rules for designing new options

The UDP option Kind space allows for the definition of new options, however the currently defined options do not allow for arbitrary new options. The following is a summary of rules for new options and their rationales:

>> New options MUST NOT modify other option content.

>> New options MUST NOT depend on the content of other options.

>> UNSAFE options can both depend on and vary user data content because they are contained only inside UDP fragments and thus are processed only by UDP option capable receivers.

>> New options MUST NOT declare their order relative to other options, whether new or old.

>> At the sender, new options MUST NOT modify UDP packet content anywhere except within their option field, excepting only those

contained within the UNSAFE option; areas that need to remain unmodified include the IP header, IP options, the UDP user data, and the surplus area (i.e., other options).

>> Options MUST NOT be modified in transit. This includes those already defined as well as new options.

>> New options MUST NOT require or intend optionally for modification of any UDP options, including their new areas, in transit.

Note that only certain of the initially defined options violate these rules:

- o >> Only FRAG and UNSAFE options are permitted to modify the UDP body.

The following recommendation helps enable efficient zero-copy processing:

- o >> FRAG SHOULD be the first option, when present.

12. Option inclusion and processing

The following rules apply to option inclusion by senders and processing by receivers.

>> Senders MAY add any option, as configured by the API.

>> All "must-support" options MUST be processed by receivers, if present (presuming UDP options are supported at that receiver).

>> Non-"must-support" options MAY be ignored by receivers, if present, e.g., based on API settings.

>> All options MUST be processed by receivers in the order encountered in the options area.

>> All options except UNSAFE options MUST result in the UDP user data being passed to the application layer, regardless of whether all options are processed, supported, or succeed.

The basic premise is that, for options-aware endpoints, the sender decides what options to add and the receiver decides what options to handle. Simply adding an option does not force work upon a receiver, with the exception of the "must-support" options.

Upon receipt, the receiver checks various properties of the UDP packet and its options to decide whether to accept or drop the UDP packet and whether to accept or ignore some its options as follows (in order):

```
if the UDP checksum fails then
    silently drop the entire UDP packet (per RFC1122)
if the UDP checksum passes then
    if OCS != 0 and fails or is zero when UDP CS != 0 then
        deliver the UDP user data but ignore other options
        (this is required to emulate legacy behavior)
    if OCS is nonzero and passes or is zero then
        deliver the UDP user data after parsing
        and processing the rest of the options,
        regardless of whether each is supported or succeeds
        (again, this is required to emulate legacy behavior)
```

The design of the UNSAFE options as used only inside the FRAG area ensures that the resulting UDP data will be silently dropped in both legacy and options-aware receivers. Again, note that this still results in the delivery of a zero-length UDP packet.

Options-aware receivers can drop UDP packets with option processing errors via either an override of the default UDP processing or at the application layer.

I.e., all options are treated the same, in that the transmitter can add it as desired and the receiver has the option to require it or not. Only if it is required (e.g., by API configuration) should the receiver require it being present and correct.

I.e., for all options:

- o if the option is not required by the receiver, then UDP packets missing the option are accepted.
- o if the option is required (e.g., by override of the default behavior at the receiver) and missing or incorrectly formed, silently drop the UDP packet.
- o if the UDP packet is accepted (either because the option is not required or because it was required and correct), then pass the option with the UDP packet via the API.

Any options whose length exceeds that of the UDP packet (i.e., intending to use data that would have been beyond the surplus area) should be silently ignored (again to model legacy behavior).

13. UDP API Extensions

UDP currently specifies an application programmer interface (API), summarized as follows (with Unix-style command as an example) [RFC768]:

- o Method to create new receive ports
 - o E.g., `bind(handle, recvaddr(optional), recvport)`
- o Receive, which returns data octets, source port, and source address
 - o E.g., `recvfrom(handle, srcaddr, srcport, data)`
- o Send, which specifies data, source and destination addresses, and source and destination ports
 - o E.g., `sendto(handle, destaddr, destport, data)`

This API is extended to support options as follows:

- o Extend the method to create receive ports to include per-packet and per-fragment receive options that are required as indicated by the application. Datagrams not containing these required options MUST be silently dropped and MAY be logged. This includes a minimum datagram length, such that the options list ends in EOL and additional space is zero-filled as needed.
- o WG QUESTION: DO WE ALSO WANT A MIN FRAG SIZE? OR MAX?
- o Extend the receive function to indicate the per-packet options and their parameters as received with the corresponding received datagram. Note that per-fragment options are handled within the processing of each fragment.
- o WG QUESTION: SHOULD WE ACCUMULATE THOSE OPTIONS? OR DISCARD THEM?
- o Extend the send function to indicate the options to be added to the corresponding sent datagram. This includes indicating which options apply to individual fragments vs. which apply to the UDP packet prior to fragmentation, if fragmentation is enabled.

Examples of API instances for Linux and FreeBSD are provided in Appendix A, to encourage uniform cross-platform implementations.

14. UDP Options are for Transport, Not Transit

UDP options are indicated in the surplus area of the IP payload that is not used by UDP. That area is really part of the IP payload, not the UDP payload, and as such, it might be tempting to consider whether this is a generally useful approach to extending IP.

Unfortunately, the surplus area exists only for transports that include their own transport layer payload length indicator. TCP and SCTP include header length fields that already provide space for transport options by indicating the total length of the header area, such that the entire remaining area indicated in the network layer (IP) is transport payload. UDP-Lite already uses the UDP Length field to indicate the boundary between data covered by the transport checksum and data not covered, and so there is no remaining area where the length of the UDP-Lite payload as a whole can be indicated [RFC3828].

UDP options are intended for use only by the transport endpoints. They are no more (or less) appropriate to be modified in-transit than any other portion of the transport datagram.

UDP options are transport options. Generally, transport headers, options, and data are not intended to be modified in-transit. UDP options are no exception and here are specified as "MUST NOT" be altered in transit. However, the UDP option mechanism provides no specific protection against in-transit modification of the UDP header, UDP payload, or surplus area, except as provided by the OCS or the options selected (e.g., AUTH, or UENC).

15. UDP options vs. UDP-Lite

UDP-Lite provides partial checksum coverage, so that UDP packets with errors in some locations can be delivered to the user [RFC3828]. It uses a different transport protocol number (136) than UDP (17) to interpret the UDP Length field as the prefix covered by the UDP checksum.

UDP (protocol 17) already defines the UDP Length field as the limit of the UDP checksum, but by default also limits the data provided to the application as that which precedes the UDP Length. A goal of UDP-Lite is to deliver data beyond UDP Length as a default, which is why a separate transport protocol number was required.

UDP options do not use or need a separate transport protocol number because the data beyond the UDP Length offset (surplus data) is not provided to the application by default. That data is interpreted exclusively within the UDP transport layer.

UDP-Lite cannot support UDP options, either as proposed here or in any other form, because the entire payload of the UDP packet is already defined as user data and there is no additional field in which to indicate a surplus area for options. The UDP Length field in UDP-Lite is already used to indicate the boundary between user data covered by the checksum and user data not covered.

16. Interactions with Legacy Devices

It has always been permissible for the UDP Length to be inconsistent with the IP transport payload length [RFC768]. Such inconsistency has been utilized in UDP-Lite using a different transport number. There are no known systems that use this inconsistency for UDP [RFC3828]. It is possible that such use might interact with UDP options, i.e., where legacy systems might generate UDP datagrams that appear to have UDP options. The OCS provides protection against such events and is stronger than a static "magic number".

UDP options have been tested as interoperable with Linux, macOS, and Windows Cygwin, and worked through NAT devices. These systems successfully delivered only the user data indicated by the UDP Length field and silently discarded the surplus area.

One reported embedded device passes the entire IP datagram to the UDP application layer. Although this feature could enable application-layer UDP option processing, it would require that conventional UDP user applications examine only the UDP user data. This feature is also inconsistent with the UDP application interface [RFC768] [RFC1122].

It has been reported that Alcatel-Lucent's "Brick" Intrusion Detection System has a default configuration that interprets inconsistencies between UDP Length and IP Length as an attack to be reported. Note that other firewall systems, e.g., CheckPoint, use a default "relaxed UDP length verification" to avoid falsely interpreting this inconsistency as an attack.

17. Options in a Stateless, Unreliable Transport Protocol

There are two ways to interpret options for a stateless, unreliable protocol -- an option is either local to the message or intended to

affect a stream of messages in a soft-state manner. Either interpretation is valid for defined UDP options.

It is impossible to know in advance whether an endpoint supports a UDP option.

>> All UDP options other than UNSAFE ones MUST be ignored if not supported or upon failure (e.g., APC).

>> All UDP options that fail MUST result in the UDP data still being sent to the application layer by default, to ensure equivalence with legacy devices.

>> UDP options that rely on soft-state exchange MUST allow for message reordering and loss.

The above requirements prevent using any option that cannot be safely ignored unless it is hidden inside the FRAG area (i.e., UNSAFE options). Legacy systems also always need to be able to interpret the transport fragments as individual UDP packets.

18. UDP Option State Caching

Some TCP connection parameters, stored in the TCP Control Block, can be usefully shared either among concurrent connections or between connections in sequence, known as TCP Sharing [RFC9040]. Although UDP is stateless, some of the options proposed herein may have similar benefit in being shared or cached. We call this UCB Sharing, or UDP Control Block Sharing, by analogy. Just as TCB sharing is not a standard because it is consistent with existing TCP specifications, UCB sharing would be consistent with existing UDP specifications, including this one. Both are implementation issues that are outside the scope of their respective specifications, and so UCB sharing is outside the scope of this document.

19. Updates to RFC 768

This document updates RFC 768 as follows:

- o This document defines the meaning of the IP payload area beyond the UDP length but within the IP length as the surplus area used herein for UDP options.
- o This document extends the UDP API to support the use of UDP options.

20. Interactions with other RFCs (and drafts)

This document clarifies the interaction between UDP Length and IP length that is not explicitly constrained in either UDP or the host requirements [RFC768] [RFC1122].

Teredo extensions (TE) define use of a similar difference between these lengths for trailers [RFC6081]. TE defines the UDP length pointing beyond (larger) than the location indicated by the IP length rather than shorter (as used herein):

"..the IPv6 packet length (i.e., the Payload Length value in the IPv6 header plus the IPv6 header size) is less than or equal to the UDP payload length (i.e., the Length value in the UDP header minus the UDP header size)"

As a result, UDP options are not compatible with TE, but that is also why this document does not update TE. Additionally, it is not at all clear how TE operates, as it requires network processing of the UDP length field to understand the total message including TE trailers.

TE updates Teredo NAT traversal [RFC4380]. The NAT traversal document defined "consistency" of UDP length and IP length as:

"An IPv6 packet is deemed valid if it conforms to [RFC2460]: the protocol identifier should indicate an IPv6 packet and the payload length should be consistent with the length of the UDP datagram in which the packet is encapsulated."

IPv6 is clear on the meaning of this consistency, in which the pseudoheader used for UDP checksums is based on the UDP length, not inferred from the IP length, using the same text in the current specification [RFC8200]:

"The Upper-Layer Packet Length in the pseudo-header is the length of the upper-layer header and data (e.g., TCP header plus TCP data). Some upper-layer protocols carry their own length information (e.g., the Length field in the UDP header); for such protocols, that is the length used in the pseudo-header."

This document is consistent the UDP profile for Robust Header Compression (ROHC) [RFC3095], noted here:

"The Length field of the UDP header MUST match the Length field(s) of the preceding subheaders, i.e., there must not

be any padding after the UDP payload that is covered by the IP Length."

ROHC compresses UDP headers only when this match succeeds. It does not prohibit UDP headers where the match fails; in those cases, ROHC default rules (Section 5.10) would cause the UDP header to remain uncompressed. Upon receipt of a compressed UDP header, Section A.1.3 of that document indicates that the UDP length is "INFERRED"; in uncompressed packets, it would simply be explicitly provided.

This issue of handling UDP header compression is more explicitly described in more recent specifications, e.g., Sec. 10.10 of Static Context Header Compression [RFC8724].

21. Multicast Considerations

UDP options are primarily intended for unicast use. Using these options over multicast IP requires careful consideration, e.g., to ensure that the options used are safe for different endpoints to interpret differently (e.g., either to support or silently ignore) or to ensure that all receivers of a multicast group confirm support for the options in use.

22. Security Considerations

There are a number of security issues raised by the introduction of options to UDP. Some are specific to this variant, but others are associated with any packet processing mechanism; all are discussed in this section further.

The use of UDP packets with inconsistent IP and UDP Length fields has the potential to trigger a buffer overflow error if not properly handled, e.g., if space is allocated based on the smaller field and copying is based on the larger. However, there have been no reports of such vulnerability and it would rely on inconsistent use of the two fields for memory allocation and copying.

UDP options are not covered by DTLS (datagram transport-layer security). Despite the name, neither TLS [RFC8446] (transport layer security, for TCP) nor DTLS [RFC6347] (TLS for UDP) protect the transport layer. Both operate as a shim layer solely on the user data of transport packets, protecting only their contents. Just as TLS does not protect the TCP header or its options, DTLS does not protect the UDP header or the new options introduced by this document. Transport security is provided in TCP by the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO [RFC5925]) or in UDP by the Authentication (AUTH) option (Section 9.9) and UNSAFE Encryption

(UENC) option (Section 10). Transport headers are also protected as payload when using IP security (IPsec) [RFC4301].

UDP options use the TLV syntax similar to that of TCP. This syntax is known to require serial processing and may pose a DOS risk, e.g., if an attacker adds large numbers of unknown options that must be parsed in their entirety, as is the case for IPv6 [RFC8504].

>> Implementations concerned with the potential for this vulnerability MAY implement only the required UDP options and MAY also limit processing of TLVs, either in number of non-padding options or total length, or both. The number of non-zero TLVs allowed in such cases MUST be at least 8.

Because required options come first and at most once each (with the exception of NOPs, which should never need to come in sequences of more than seven in a row), this limits their DOS impact. Note that TLV formats for options does require serial processing, but any format that allows future options, whether ignored or not, could introduce a similar DOS vulnerability.

UDP security should never rely solely on transport layer processing of options. UNSAFE options are the only type that share fate with the UDP data, because of the way that data is hidden in the surplus area until after those options are processed. All other options default to being silently ignored at the transport layer but may be dropped either if that default is overridden (e.g., by configuration) or discarded at the application layer (e.g., using information about the options processed that are passed along with the UDP packet).

UDP fragmentation introduces its own set of security concerns, which can be handled in a manner similar to IP reassembly or TCP segment reordering [CERT18]. In particular, the number of UDP packets pending reassembly and effort used for reassembly is typically limited. In addition, it may be useful to assume a reasonable minimum fragment size, e.g., that non-terminal fragments should never be smaller than 500 bytes.

23. IANA Considerations

Upon publication, IANA is hereby requested to create a new registry for UDP Option Kind numbers, similar to that for TCP Option Kinds. Initial values of this registry are as listed in Section 8. Additional values in this registry are to be assigned from the UNASSIGNED values in Section 8 by IESG Approval or Standards Action

[RFC8126]. Those assignments are subject to the conditions set forth in this document, particularly (but not limited to) those in Section 11.

Although option nicknames are not used in-band, IANA should require UNSAFE safe option values to commence with the letter "U" and avoid that letter as commencing safe options.

Upon publication, IANA is hereby requested to create a new registry for UDP Experimental Option Experiment Identifiers (UDP ExIDs) for use in a similar manner as TCP ExIDs [RFC6994]. UDP ExIDs can be used in either (or both) the EXP or UEXP options. This registry is initially empty. Values in this registry are to be assigned by IANA using first-come, first-served (FCFS) rules [RFC8126]. Options using these ExIDs are subject to the same conditions as new options, i.e., they too are subject to the conditions set forth in this document, particularly (but not limited to) those in Section 11.

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Appendix A. Implementation Information

The following information is provided to encourage interoperable API implementations.

System-level variables (sysctl):

Name	default	meaning
net.ipv4.udp_opt	0	UDP options available
net.ipv4.udp_opt_ocs	1	Default use OCS
net.ipv4.udp_opt_apc	0	Default include APC
net.ipv4.udp_opt_frag	0	Default fragment
net.ipv4.udp_opt_mds	0	Default include MDS
net.ipv4.udp_opt_mrds	0	Default include MRDS
net.ipv4.udp_opt_req	0	Default include REQ
net.ipv4.udp_opt_resp	0	Default include RES
net.ipv4.udp_opt_time	0	Default include TIME
net.ipv4.udp_opt_auth	0	Default include AUTH
net.ipv4.udp_opt_exp	0	Default include EXP
net.ipv4.udp_opt_uenc	0	Default include UENC
net.ipv4.udp_opt_uexp	0	Default include UEXP

Socket options (sockopt), cached for outgoing datagrams:

Name	meaning
UDP_OPT	Enable UDP options (at all)
UDP_OPT_OCS	Use UDP OCS
UDP_OPT_APC	Enable UDP APC option
UDP_OPT_FRAG	Enable UDP fragmentation
UDP_OPT_MDS	Enable UDP MDS option
UDP_OPT_MRDS	Enable UDP MRDS option
UDP_OPT_REQ	Enable UDP REQ option
UDP_OPT_RES	Enable UDP RES option
UDP_OPT_TIME	Enable UDP TIME option
UDP_OPT_AUTH	Enable UDP AUTH option
UDP_OPT_EXP	Enable UDP EXP option
UDP_OPT_UENC	Enable UDP UENC option
UDP_OPT_UEXP	Enable UDP UEXP option

Send/sendto parameters:

Connection parameters (per-socketpair cached state, part UCB):

Name	Initial value

opts_enabled	net.ipv4.udp_opt
ocs_enabled	net.ipv4.udp_opt_ocs

The following option is included for debugging purposes, and MUST NOT be enabled otherwise.

System variables

net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk 0

System-level variables (sysctl):

Name	default	meaning

net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk	0	Default use of junk

Socket options (sockopt):

Name	params	meaning

UDP_JUNK	-	Enable UDP junk option
UDP_JUNK_VAL	fillval	Value to use as junk fill
UDP_JUNK_LEN	length	Length of junk payload in bytes

Connection parameters (per-socketpair cached state, part UCB):

Name	Initial value

junk_enabled	net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk
junk_value	0xABCD
junk_len	4

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Main logging schema for qlog
draft-marx-qlog-main-schema-03

Abstract

This document describes a high-level schema for a standardized logging format called qlog. This format allows easy sharing of data and the creation of reusable visualization and debugging tools. The high-level schema in this document is intended to be protocol-agnostic. Separate documents specify how the format should be used for specific protocol data. The schema is also format-agnostic, and can be represented in for example JSON, csv or protobuf.

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1. Introduction

There is currently a lack of an easily usable, standardized endpoint logging format. Especially for the use case of debugging and evaluating modern Web protocols and their performance, it is often difficult to obtain structured logs that provide adequate information for tasks like problem root cause analysis.

This document aims to provide a high-level schema and harness that describes the general layout of an easily usable, shareable, aggregatable and structured logging format. This high-level schema is protocol agnostic, with logging entries for specific protocols and use cases being defined in other documents (see for example [QLOG-QUIC] for QUIC and [QLOG-H3] for HTTP/3 and QPACK-related event definitions).

The goal of this high-level schema is to provide amenities and default characteristics that each logging file should contain (or should be able to contain), such that generic and reusable toolsets can be created that can deal with logs from a variety of different protocols and use cases.

As such, this document contains concepts such as versioning, metadata inclusion, log aggregation, event grouping and log file size reduction techniques.

Feedback and discussion are welcome at <https://github.com/quiclog/internet-drafts> [1]. Readers are advised to refer to the "editor's draft" at that URL for an up-to-date version of this document.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

While the qlog schema's are format-agnostic, for readability the qlog documents will use a JSON-inspired format ([RFC8259]) for examples and definitions.

As qlog can be serialized both textually but also in binary, we employ a custom datatype definition language, inspired loosely by the "TypeScript" language [2].

This document describes how to employ JSON and NDJSON as textual serializations for qlog in Section 6. Other documents will describe how to utilize other concrete serialization options, though tips and requirements for these are also listed in this document (Section 6).

The main general conventions in this document a reader should be aware of are:

- o `obj?` : this object is optional
- o `type1 | type2` : a union of these two types (object can be either `type1` OR `type2`)
- o `obj:type` : this object has this concrete type
- o `obj:array<type>` : this object is an array of this type
- o `class` : defines a new type
- o `//` : single-line comment

The main data types are:

- o `int8` : signed 8-bit integer
- o `int16` : signed 16-bit integer

- o int32 : signed 32-bit integer
- o int64 : signed 64-bit integer
- o uint8 : unsigned 8-bit integer
- o uint16 : unsigned 16-bit integer
- o uint32 : unsigned 32-bit integer
- o uint64 : unsigned 64-bit integer
- o float : 32-bit floating point value
- o double : 64-bit floating point value
- o byte : an individual raw byte (8-bit) value (use array<byte> or the shorthand "bytes" to specify a binary blob)
- o string : list of Unicode (typically UTF-8) encoded characters
- o boolean : boolean
- o enum: fixed list of values (Unless explicitly defined, the value of an enum entry is the string version of its name (e.g., initial = "initial"))
- o any : represents any object type. Mainly used here as a placeholder for more concrete types defined in related documents (e.g., specific event types)

All timestamps and time-related values (e.g., offsets) in qlog are logged as doubles in the millisecond resolution.

Other qlog documents can define their own data types (e.g., separately for each Packet type that a protocol supports).

2. Design goals

The main tenets for the qlog schema design are:

- o Streamable, event-based logging
- o Flexibility in the format, complexity in the tooling (e.g., few components are a MUST, tools need to deal with this)
- o Extensible and pragmatic (e.g., no complex fixed schema with extension points)

- o Aggregation and transformation friendly (e.g., the top-level element is a container for individual traces, `group_id` can be used to tag events to a particular context)
- o Metadata is stored together with event data

3. The high level qlog schema

A qlog file should be able to contain several individual traces and logs from multiple vantage points that are in some way related. To that end, the top-level element in the qlog schema defines only a small set of "header" fields and an array of component traces. For this document, the required "qlog_version" field MUST have a value of "qlog-03-WIP".

Note: there have been several previously broadly deployed qlog versions based on older drafts of this document (see draft-marx-qlog-main-schema). The old values for the "qlog_version" field were "draft-00", "draft-01" and "draft-02". When qlog was moved to the QUIC working group, we decided to increment the existing counter, rather than reverting back to -00. As such, any numbering indicating in the "qlog_version" field is explicitly not tied to a particular version of the draft documents.

As qlog can be serialized in a variety of ways, the "qlog_format" field is used to indicate which serialization option was chosen. Its value MUST either be one of the options defined in this document (e.g., Section 6) or the field must be omitted entirely, in which case it assumes the default value of "JSON".

In order to make it easier to parse and identify qlog files and their serialization format, the "qlog_version" and "qlog_format" fields and their values SHOULD be in the first 256 characters/bytes of the resulting log file.

An example of the qlog file's top-level structure is shown in Figure 1.

Definition:

```
class QlogFile {  
    qlog_version:string,  
    qlog_format?:string,  
    title?:string,  
    description?:string,  
    summary?: Summary,  
    traces: array<Trace|TraceError>  
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{  
    "qlog_version": "draft-03-WIP",  
    "qlog_format": "JSON",  
    "title": "Name of this particular qlog file (short)",  
    "description": "Description for this group of traces (long)",  
    "summary": {  
        ...  
    },  
    "traces": [...]  
}
```

Figure 1: Top-level element

3.1. summary

In a real-life deployment with a large amount of generated logs, it can be useful to sort and filter logs based on some basic summarized or aggregated data (e.g., log length, packet loss rate, log location, presence of error events, ...). The summary field (if present) SHOULD be on top of the qlog file, as this allows for the file to be processed in a streaming fashion (i.e., the implementation could just read up to and including the summary field and then only load the full logs that are deemed interesting by the user).

As the summary field is highly deployment-specific, this document does not specify any default fields or their semantics. Some examples of potential entries are shown in Figure 2.

Definition (purely illustrative example):

```
class Summary {  
    "trace_count":uint32, // amount of traces in this file  
    "max_duration":uint64, // time duration of the longest trace in ms  
    "max_outgoing_loss_rate":float, // highest loss rate for outgoing packets over  
    // all traces  
    "total_event_count":uint64, // total number of events across all traces,  
    "error_count":uint64 // total number of error events in this trace  
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{  
    "trace_count": 1,  
    "max_duration": 5006,  
    "max_outgoing_loss_rate": 0.013,  
    "total_event_count": 568,  
    "error_count": 2  
}
```

Figure 2: Summary example definition

3.2. traces

It is often advantageous to group several related qlog traces together in a single file. For example, we can simultaneously perform logging on the client, on the server and on a single point on their common network path. For analysis, it is useful to aggregate these three individual traces together into a single file, so it can be uniquely stored, transferred and annotated.

As such, the "traces" array contains a list of individual qlog traces. Typical qlogs will only contain a single trace in this array. These can later be combined into a single qlog file by taking the "traces" entry/entries for each qlog file individually and copying them to the "traces" array of a new, aggregated qlog file. This is typically done in a post-processing step.

The "traces" array can thus contain both normal traces (for the definition of the Trace type, see Section 3.3), but also "error" entries. These indicate that we tried to find/convert a file for inclusion in the aggregated qlog, but there was an error during the process. Rather than silently dropping the erroneous file, we can opt to explicitly include it in the qlog file as an entry in the "traces" array, as shown in Figure 3.

Definition:

```
class TraceError {  
    error_description: string, // A description of the error  
    uri?: string, // the original URI at which we attempted to find the file  
    vantage_point?: VantagePoint // see {{vantage_point}}: the vantage point we w  
ere expecting to include here  
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{  
  "error_description": "File could not be found",  
  "uri": "/srv/traces/today/latest.qlog",  
  "vantage_point": { type: "server" }  
}
```

Figure 3: TraceError definition

Note that another way to combine events of different traces in a single qlog file is through the use of the "group_id" field, discussed in Section 3.4.6.

3.3. Individual Trace containers

The exact conceptual definition of a Trace can be fluid. For example, a trace could contain all events for a single connection, for a single endpoint, for a single measurement interval, for a single protocol, etc. As such, a Trace container contains some metadata in addition to the logged events, see Figure 4.

In the normal use case however, a trace is a log of a single data flow collected at a single location or vantage point. For example, for QUIC, a single trace only contains events for a single logical QUIC connection for either the client or the server.

The semantics and context of the trace can mainly be deduced from the entries in the "common_fields" list and "vantage_point" field.

Definition:

```
class Trace {  
    title?: string,  
    description?: string,  
    configuration?: Configuration,  
    common_fields?: CommonFields,  
    vantage_point: VantagePoint,  
    events: array<Event>  
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{  
  "title": "Name of this particular trace (short)",  
  "description": "Description for this trace (long)",  
  "configuration": {  
    "time_offset": 150  
  },  
  "common_fields": {  
    "ODCID": "abcde1234",  
    "time_format": "absolute"  
  },  
  "vantage_point": {  
    "name": "backend-67",  
    "type": "server"  
  },  
  "events": [...]  
}
```

Figure 4: Trace container definition

3.3.1. configuration

We take into account that a qlog file is usually not used in isolation, but by means of various tools. Especially when aggregating various traces together or preparing traces for a demonstration, one might wish to persist certain tool-based settings inside the qlog file itself. For this, the configuration field is used.

The configuration field can be viewed as a generic metadata field that tools can fill with their own fields, based on per-tool logic. It is best practice for tools to prefix each added field with their tool name to prevent collisions across tools. This document only defines two optional, standard, tool-independent configuration settings: "time_offset" and "original_uris".

Definition:

```
class Configuration {  
    time_offset:double, // in ms,  
    original_uris: array<string>,  
  
    // list of fields with any type  
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{  
  "time_offset": 150, // starts 150ms after the first timestamp indicates  
  "original_uris": [  
    "https://example.org/trace1.qlog",  
    "https://example.org/trace2.qlog"  
  ]  
}
```

Figure 5: Configuration definition

3.3.1.1. time_offset

The `time_offset` field indicates by how many milliseconds the starting time of the current trace should be offset. This is useful when comparing logs taken from various systems, where clocks might not be perfectly synchronous. Users could use manual tools or automated logic to align traces in time and the found optimal offsets can be stored in this field for future usage. The default value is 0.

3.3.1.2. original_uris

The `original_uris` field is used when merging multiple individual qlog files or other source files (e.g., when converting .pcaps to qlog). It allows to keep better track where certain data came from. It is a simple array of strings. It is an array instead of a single string, since a single qlog trace can be made up out of an aggregation of multiple component qlog traces as well. The default value is an empty array.

3.3.1.3. custom fields

Tools can add optional custom metadata to the "configuration" field to store state and make it easier to share specific data viewpoints and view configurations.

Two examples from the qvis toolset [3] are shown in Figure 6.

```

{
  "configuration" : {
    "qvis" : {
      // when loaded into the qvis toolsuite's congestion graph tool
      // zoom in on the period between 1s and 2s and select the 124th event
      defined in this trace
      "congestion_graph": {
        "startX": 1000,
        "endX": 2000,
        "focusOnEventIndex": 124
      }

      // when loaded into the qvis toolsuite's sequence diagram tool
      // automatically scroll down the timeline to the 555th event defined
      in this trace
      "sequence_diagram" : {
        "focusOnEventIndex": 555
      }
    }
  }
}

```

Figure 6: Custom configuration fields example

3.3.2. vantage_point

The `vantage_point` field describes the vantage point from which the trace originates, see Figure 7. Each trace can have only a single `vantage_point` and thus all events in a trace MUST BE from the perspective of this `vantage_point`. To include events from multiple `vantage_points`, implementers can for example include multiple traces, split by `vantage_point`, in a single qlog file.

Definition:

```
class VantagePoint {
  name?: string,
  type: VantagePointType,
  flow?: VantagePointType
}

class VantagePointType {
  server, // endpoint which initiates the connection.
  client, // endpoint which accepts the connection.
  network, // observer in between client and server.
  unknown
}
```

JSON serialization examples:

```
{
  "name": "aioquic client",
  "type": "client",
}

{
  "name": "wireshark trace",
  "type": "network",
  "flow": "client"
}
```

Figure 7: VantagePoint definition

The flow field is only required if the type is "network" (for example, the trace is generated from a packet capture). It is used to disambiguate events like "packet sent" and "packet received". This is indicated explicitly because for multiple reasons (e.g., privacy) data from which the flow direction can be otherwise inferred (e.g., IP addresses) might not be present in the logs.

Meaning of the different values for the flow field: * "client" indicates that this vantage point follows client data flow semantics (a "packet sent" event goes in the direction of the server). * "server" indicates that this vantage point follow server data flow semantics (a "packet sent" event goes in the direction of the client). * "unknown" indicates that the flow's direction is unknown.

Depending on the context, tools confronted with "unknown" values in the vantage_point can either try to heuristically infer the semantics from protocol-level domain knowledge (e.g., in QUIC, the client

always sends the first packet) or give the user the option to switch between client and server perspectives manually.

3.4. Field name semantics

Inside of the "events" field of a qlog trace is a list of events logged by the endpoint. Each event is specified as a generic object with a number of member fields and their associated data. Depending on the protocol and use case, the exact member field names and their formats can differ across implementations. This section lists the main, pre-defined and reserved field names with specific semantics and expected corresponding value formats.

Each qlog event at minimum requires the "time" (Section 3.4.1), "name" (Section 3.4.2) and "data" (Section 3.4.3) fields. Other typical fields are "time_format" (Section 3.4.1), "protocol_type" (Section 3.4.4), "trigger" (Section 3.4.5), and "group_id" (Section 3.4.6). As especially these later fields typically have identical values across individual event instances, they are normally logged separately in the "common_fields" (Section 3.4.7).

The specific values for each of these fields and their semantics are defined in separate documents, specific per protocol or use case. For example: event definitions for QUIC, HTTP/3 and QPACK can be found in [QLOG-QUIC] and [QLOG-H3].

Other fields are explicitly allowed by the qlog approach, and tools SHOULD allow for the presence of unknown event fields, but their semantics depend on the context of the log usage (e.g., for QUIC, the ODCID field is used), see [QLOG-QUIC].

An example of a qlog event with its component fields is shown in Figure 8.

Definition:

```
class Event {
  time: double,
  name: string,
  data: any,

  protocol_type?: Array<string>,
  group_id?: string|uint32,

  time_format?: "absolute"|"delta"|"relative",

  // list of fields with any type
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{
  time: 1553986553572,

  name: "transport:packet_sent",
  data: { ... }

  protocol_type: ["QUIC","HTTP3"],
  group_id: "127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a",

  time_format: "absolute",

  ODCID: "127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a", // QUIC specific
}
```

Figure 8: Event fields definition

3.4.1. timestamps

The "time" field indicates the timestamp at which the event occurred. Its value is typically the Unix timestamp since the 1970 epoch (number of milliseconds since midnight UTC, January 1, 1970, ignoring leap seconds). However, qlog supports two more succinct timestamps formats to allow reducing file size. The employed format is indicated in the "time_format" field, which allows one of three values: "absolute", "delta" or "relative":

- o Absolute: Include the full absolute timestamp with each event. This approach uses the largest amount of characters. This is also the default value of the "time_format" field.

- o **Delta:** Delta-encode each time value on the previously logged value. The first event in a trace typically logs the full absolute timestamp. This approach uses the least amount of characters.
- o **Relative:** Specify a full "reference_time" timestamp (typically this is done up-front in "common_fields", see Section 3.4.7) and include only relatively-encoded values based on this reference_time with each event. The "reference_time" value is typically the first absolute timestamp. This approach uses a medium amount of characters.

The first option is good for stateless loggers, the second and third for stateful loggers. The third option is generally preferred, since it produces smaller files while being easier to reason about. An example for each option can be seen in Figure 9.

The absolute approach will use:
1500, 1505, 1522, 1588

The delta approach will use:
1500, 5, 17, 66

The relative approach will:
- set the reference_time to 1500 in "common_fields"
- use: 0, 5, 22, 88

Figure 9: Three different approaches for logging timestamps

One of these options is typically chosen for the entire trace (put differently: each event has the same value for the "time_format" field). Each event MUST include a timestamp in the "time" field.

Events in each individual trace SHOULD be logged in strictly ascending timestamp order (though not necessarily absolute value, for the "delta" format). Tools CAN sort all events on the timestamp before processing them, though are not required to (as this could impose a significant processing overhead). This can be a problem especially for multi-threaded and/or streaming loggers, who could consider using a separate postprocessor to order qlog events in time if a tool do not provide this feature.

Timestamps do not have to use the UNIX epoch timestamp as their reference. For example for privacy considerations, any initial reference timestamps (for example "endpoint uptime in ms" or "time since connection start in ms") can be chosen. Tools SHOULD NOT assume the ability to derive the absolute Unix timestamp from qlog

traces, nor allow on them to relatively order events across two or more separate traces (in this case, clock drift should also be taken into account).

3.4.2. category and event

Events differ mainly in the type of metadata associated with them. To help identify a given event and how to interpret its metadata in the "data" field (see Section 3.4.3), each event has an associated "name" field. This can be considered as a concatenation of two other fields, namely event "category" and event "type".

Category allows a higher-level grouping of events per specific event type. For example for QUIC and HTTP/3, the different categories could be "transport", "http", "qpack", and "recovery". Within these categories, the event Type provides additional granularity. For example for QUIC and HTTP/3, within the "transport" Category, there would be "packet_sent" and "packet_received" events.

Logging category and type separately conceptually allows for fast and high-level filtering based on category and the re-use of event types across categories. However, it also considerably inflates the log size and this flexibility is not used extensively in practice at the time of writing.

As such, the default approach in qlog is to concatenate both field values using the ":" character in the "name" field, as can be seen in Figure 10. As such, qlog category and type names MUST NOT include this character.

JSON serialization using separate fields:

```
{
  category: "transport",
  type: "packet_sent"
}
```

JSON serialization using ":" concatenated field:

```
{
  name: "transport:packet_sent"
}
```

Figure 10: Ways of logging category, type and name of an event.

Certain serializations CAN emit category and type as separate fields, and qlog tools SHOULD be able to deal with both the concatenated "name" field, and the separate "category" and "type" fields. Text-based serializations however are encouraged to employ the concatenated "name" field for efficiency.

3.4.3. data

The data field is a generic object. It contains the per-event metadata and its form and semantics are defined per specific sort of event. For example, data field value definitions for QUIC and HTTP/3 can be found in [QLOG-QUIC] and [QLOG-H3].

One purely illustrative example for a QUIC "packet_sent" event is shown in Figure 11.

Definition:

```
class TransportPacketSentEvent {  
    packet_size?:uint32,  
    header:PacketHeader,  
    frames?:Array<QuicFrame>  
}
```

JSON serialization:

```
{  
  packet_size: 1280,  
  header: {  
    packet_type: "1RTT",  
    packet_number: 123  
  },  
  frames: [  
    {  
      frame_type: "stream",  
      length: 1000,  
      offset: 456  
    },  
    {  
      frame_type: "padding"  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

Figure 11: Example of the 'data' field for a QUIC packet_sent event

3.4.4. protocol_type

The "protocol_type" array field indicates to which protocols (or protocol "stacks") this event belongs. This allows a single qlog file to aggregate traces of different protocols (e.g., a web server offering both TCP+HTTP/2 and QUIC+HTTP/3 connections).

For example, QUIC and HTTP/3 events have the "QUIC" and "HTTP3" protocol_type entry values, see [QLOG-QUIC] and [QLOG-H3].

Typically however, all events in a single trace are of the same few protocols, and this array field is logged once in "common_fields", see Section 3.4.7.

3.4.5. triggers

Sometimes, additional information is needed in the case where a single event can be caused by a variety of other events. In the normal case, the context of the surrounding log messages gives a hint as to which of these other events was the cause. However, in highly-parallel and optimized implementations, corresponding log messages might be separated in time. Another option is to explicitly indicate these "triggers" in a high-level way per-event to get more fine-grained information without much additional overhead.

In qlog, the optional "trigger" field contains a string value describing the reason (if any) for this event instance occurring. While this "trigger" field could be a property of the qlog Event itself, it is instead a property of the "data" field instead. This choice was made because many event types do not include a trigger value, and having the field at the Event-level would cause overhead in some serializations. Additional information on the trigger can be added in the form of additional member fields of the "data" field value, yet this is highly implementation-specific, as are the trigger field's string values.

One purely illustrative example of some potential triggers for QUIC's "packet_dropped" event is shown in Figure 12.

Definition:

```
class QuicPacketDroppedEvent {
    packet_type?:PacketType,
    raw_length?:uint32,

    trigger?: "key_unavailable" | "unknown_connection_id" | "decrypt_error" | "un
supported_version"
}
```

Figure 12: Trigger example

3.4.6. group_id

As discussed in Section 3.3, a single qlog file can contain several traces taken from different vantage points. However, a single trace from one endpoint can also contain events from a variety of sources.

For example, a server implementation might choose to log events for all incoming connections in a single large (streamed) qlog file. As such, we need a method for splitting up events belonging to separate logical entities.

The simplest way to perform this splitting is by associating a "group identifier" to each event that indicates to which conceptual "group" each event belongs. A post-processing step can then extract events per group. However, this group identifier can be highly protocol and context-specific. In the example above, we might use QUIC's "Original Destination Connection ID" to uniquely identify a connection. As such, they might add a "ODCID" field to each event. However, a middlebox logging IP or TCP traffic might rather use four-tuples to identify connections, and add a "four_tuple" field.

As such, to provide consistency and ease of tooling in cross-protocol and cross-context setups, qlog instead defines the common "group_id" field, which contains a string value. Implementations are free to use their preferred string serialization for this field, so long as it contains a unique value per logical group. Some examples can be seen in Figure 13.

JSON serialization for events grouped by four tuples and QUIC connection IDs:

```
events: [
  {
    time: 1553986553579,
    protocol_type: ["TCP", "TLS", "HTTP2"],
    group_id: "ip1=2001:67c:1232:144:9498:6df6:f450:110b,ip2=2001:67c:2b0:1c1
::198,port1=59105,port2=80",
    name: "transport:packet_received",
    data: { ... },
  },
  {
    time: 1553986553581,
    protocol_type: ["QUIC", "HTTP3"],
    group_id: "127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a",
    name: "transport:packet_sent",
    data: { ... },
  }
]
```

Figure 13: Example of group_id usage

Note that in some contexts (for example a Multipath transport protocol) it might make sense to add additional contextual per-event fields (for example "path_id"), rather than use the group_id field for that purpose.

Note also that, typically, a single trace only contains events belonging to a single logical group (for example, an individual QUIC connection). As such, instead of logging the "group_id" field with an identical value for each event instance, this field is typically logged once in "common_fields", see Section 3.4.7.

3.4.7. common_fields

As discussed in the previous sections, information for a typical qlog event varies in three main fields: "time", "name" and associated data. Additionally, there are also several more advanced fields that allow mixing events from different protocols and contexts inside of the same trace (for example "protocol_type" and "group_id"). In most "normal" use cases however, the values of these advanced fields are consistent for each event instance (for example, a single trace contains events for a single QUIC connection).

To reduce file size and making logging easier, qlog uses the "common_fields" list to indicate those fields and their values that are shared by all events in this component trace. This prevents these fields from being logged for each individual event. An example of this is shown in Figure 14.

JSON serialization with repeated field values per-event instance:

```
{
  events: [{
    group_id: "127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a",
    protocol_type: ["QUIC", "HTTP3"],
    time_format: "relative",
    reference_time: "1553986553572",

    time: 2,
    name: "transport:packet_received",
    data: { ... }
  }, {
    group_id: "127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a",
    protocol_type: ["QUIC", "HTTP3"],
    time_format: "relative",
    reference_time: "1553986553572",

    time: 7,
    name: "http:frame_parsed",
    data: { ... }
  }
]
```

JSON serialization with repeated field values extracted to common_fields:

```
{
  common_fields: {
    group_id: "127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a",
    protocol_type: ["QUIC", "HTTP3"],
    time_format: "relative",
    reference_time: "1553986553572"
  },
  events: [
    {
      time: 2,
      name: "transport:packet_received",
      data: { ... }
    }, {
      7,
      name: "http:frame_parsed",
      data: { ... }
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 14: Example of common_fields usage

The "common_fields" field is a generic dictionary of key-value pairs, where the key is always a string and the value can be of any type, but is typically also a string or number. As such, unknown entries in this dictionary MUST be disregarded by the user and tools (i.e., the presence of an unknown field is explicitly NOT an error).

The list of default qlog fields that are typically logged in common_fields (as opposed to as individual fields per event instance) are:

- o time_format
- o reference_time
- o protocol_type
- o group_id

Tools MUST be able to deal with these fields being defined either on each event individually or combined in common_fields. Note that if at least one event in a trace has a different value for a given field, this field MUST NOT be added to common_fields but instead defined on each event individually. Good example of such fields are "time" and "data", who are divergent by nature.

4. Guidelines for event definition documents

This document only defines the main schema for the qlog format. This is intended to be used together with specific, per-protocol event definitions that specify the name (category + type) and data needed for each individual event. This is with the intent to allow the qlog main schema to be easily re-used for several protocols. Examples include the QUIC event definitions [QLOG-QUIC] and HTTP/3 and QPACK event definitions [QLOG-H3].

This section defines some basic annotations and concepts the creators of event definition documents SHOULD follow to ensure a measure of consistency, making it easier for qlog implementers to extrapolate from one protocol to another.

4.1. Event design guidelines

TODO: pending QUIC working group discussion. This text reflects the initial (qlog draft 01 and 02) setup.

There are several ways of defining qlog events. In practice, we have seen two main types used so far: a) those that map directly to concepts seen in the protocols (e.g., "packet_sent") and b) those

that act as aggregating events that combine data from several possible protocol behaviours or code paths into one (e.g., "parameters_set"). The latter are typically used as a means to reduce the amount of unique event definitions, as reflecting each possible protocol event as a separate qlog entity would cause an explosion of event types.

Additionally, logging duplicate data is typically prevented as much as possible. For example, packet header values that remain consistent across many packets are split into separate events (for example "spin_bit_updated" or "connection_id_updated" for QUIC).

Finally, we have typically refrained from adding additional state change events if those state changes can be directly inferred from data on the wire (for example flow control limit changes) if the implementation is bug-free and spec-compliant. Exceptions have been made for common events that benefit from being easily identifiable or individually logged (for example "packets_acked").

4.2. Event importance indicators

Depending on how events are designed, it may be that several events allow the logging of similar or overlapping data. For example the separate QUIC "connection_started" event overlaps with the more generic "connection_state_updated". In these cases, it is not always clear which event should be logged or used, and which event should take precedence if e.g., both are present and provide conflicting information.

To aid in this decision making, we recommend that each event SHOULD have an "importance indicator" with one of three values, in decreasing order of importance and expected usage:

- o Core
- o Base
- o Extra

The "Core" events are the events that SHOULD be present in all qlog files for a given protocol. These are typically tied to basic packet and frame parsing and creation, as well as listing basic internal metrics. Tool implementers SHOULD expect and add support for these events, though SHOULD NOT expect all Core events to be present in each qlog trace.

The "Base" events add additional debugging options and CAN be present in qlog files. Most of these can be implicitly inferred from data in

Core events (if those contain all their properties), but for many it is better to log the events explicitly as well, making it clearer how the implementation behaves. These events are for example tied to passing data around in buffers, to how internal state machines change and help show when decisions are actually made based on received data. Tool implementers SHOULD at least add support for showing the contents of these events, if they do not handle them explicitly.

The "Extra" events are considered mostly useful for low-level debugging of the implementation, rather than the protocol. They allow more fine-grained tracking of internal behaviour. As such, they CAN be present in qlog files and tool implementers CAN add support for these, but they are not required to.

Note that in some cases, implementers might not want to log for example data content details in the "Core" events due to performance or privacy considerations. In this case, they SHOULD use (a subset of) relevant "Base" events instead to ensure usability of the qlog output. As an example, implementations that do not log QUIC "packet_received" events and thus also not which (if any) ACK frames the packet contains, SHOULD log "packets_acked" events instead.

Finally, for event types whose data (partially) overlap with other event types' definitions, where necessary the event definition document should include explicit guidance on which to use in specific situations.

4.3. Custom fields

Event definition documents are free to define new category and event types, top-level fields (e.g., a per-event field indicating its privacy properties or path_id in multipath protocols), as well as values for the "trigger" property within the "data" field, or other member fields of the "data" field, as they see fit.

They however SHOULD NOT expect non-specialized tools to recognize or visualize this custom data. However, tools SHOULD make an effort to visualize even unknown data if possible in the specific tool's context. If they do not, they MUST ignore these unknown fields.

5. Generic events and data classes

There are some event types and data classes that are common across protocols, applications and use cases that benefit from being defined in a single location. This section specifies such common definitions.

5.1. Raw packet and frame information

While qlog is a more high-level logging format, it also allows the inclusion of most raw wire image information, such as byte lengths and even raw byte values. This can be useful when for example investigating or tuning packetization behaviour or determining encoding/framing overheads. However, these fields are not always necessary and can take up considerable space if logged for each packet or frame. They can also have a considerable privacy and security impact. As such, they are grouped in a separate optional field called "raw" of type RawInfo (where applicable).

```
class RawInfo {  
    length?:uint64; // the full byte length of the entity (e.g., packet or frame)  
    including headers and trailers  
    payload_length?:uint64; // the byte length of the entity's payload, without h  
    eaders or trailers  
  
    data?:bytes; // the contents of the full entity, including headers and traile  
rs  
}
```

Note: The RawInfo:data field can be truncated for privacy or security purposes (for example excluding payload data). In this case, the length properties should still indicate the non-truncated lengths.

Note: We do not specify explicit header_length or trailer_length fields. In most protocols, header_length can be calculated by subtracing the payload_length from the length (e.g., if trailer_length is always 0). In protocols with trailers (e.g., QUIC's AEAD tag), event definitions documents SHOULD define other ways of logging the trailer_length to make the header_length calculation possible.

The exact definitions entities, headers, trailers and payloads depend on the protocol used. If this is non-trivial, event definitions documents SHOULD include a clear explanation of how entities are mapped into the RawInfo structure.

Note: Relatedly, many modern protocols use Variable-Length Integer Encoded (VLIE) values in their headers, which are of a dynamic length. Because of this, we cannot deterministically reconstruct the header encoding/length from non-RawInfo qlog data, as implementations might not necessarily employ the most efficient VLIE scheme for all values. As such, to make exact size-analysis possible, implementers should use explicit lengths in RawInfo rather than reconstructing them from other qlog data. Similarly, tool developers should only utilize RawInfo (and related information) in such tools to prevent errors.

5.2. Generic events

In typical logging setups, users utilize a discrete number of well-defined logging categories, levels or severities to log freeform (string) data. This generic events category replicates this approach to allow implementations to fully replace their existing text-based logging by qlog. This is done by providing events to log generic strings for the typical well-known logging levels (error, warning, info, debug, verbose).

For the events defined below, the "category" is "generic" and their "type" is the name of the heading in lowercase (e.g., the "name" of the error event is "generic:error").

5.2.1. error

Importance: Core

Used to log details of an internal error that might not get reflected on the wire.

Data:

```
{
  code?:uint32,
  message?:string
}
```

5.2.2. warning

Importance: Base

Used to log details of an internal warning that might not get reflected on the wire.

Data:

```
{
  code?:uint32,
  message?:string
}
```

5.2.3. info

Importance: Extra

Used mainly for implementations that want to use qlog as their one and only logging format but still want to support unstructured string messages.

Data:

```
{  
    message:string  
}
```

5.2.4. debug

Importance: Extra

Used mainly for implementations that want to use qlog as their one and only logging format but still want to support unstructured string messages.

Data:

```
{  
    message:string  
}
```

5.2.5. verbose

Importance: Extra

Used mainly for implementations that want to use qlog as their one and only logging format but still want to support unstructured string messages.

Data:

```
{  
    message:string  
}
```

5.3. Simulation events

When evaluating a protocol implementation, one typically sets up a series of interoperability or benchmarking tests, in which the test situations can change over time. For example, the network bandwidth or latency can vary during the test, or the network can be fully disable for a short time. In these setups, it is useful to know when exactly these conditions are triggered, to allow for proper correlation with other events.

For the events defined below, the "category" is "simulation" and their "type" is the name of the heading in lowercase (e.g., the "name" of the scenario event is "simulation:scenario").

5.3.1. scenario

Importance: Extra

Used to specify which specific scenario is being tested at this particular instance. This could also be reflected in the top-level qlog's "summary" or "configuration" fields, but having a separate event allows easier aggregation of several simulations into one trace (e.g., split by "group_id").

```
{
  name?:string,
  details?:any
}
```

5.3.2. marker

Importance: Extra

Used to indicate when specific emulation conditions are triggered at set times (e.g., at 3 seconds in 2% packet loss is introduced, at 10s a NAT rebind is triggered).

```
{
  type?:string,
  message?:string
}
```

6. Serializing qlog

This document and other related qlog schema definitions are intentionally serialization-format agnostic. This means that implementers themselves can choose how to represent and serialize qlog data practically on disk or on the wire. Some examples of possible formats are JSON, CBOR, CSV, protocol buffers, flatbuffers, etc.

All these formats make certain tradeoffs between flexibility and efficiency, with textual formats like JSON typically being more flexible but also less efficient than binary formats like protocol buffers. The format choice will depend on the practical use case of the qlog user. For example, for use in day to day debugging, a plaintext readable (yet relatively large) format like JSON is probably preferred. However, for use in production, a more optimized

yet restricted format can be better. In this latter case, it will be more difficult to achieve interoperability between qlog implementations of various protocol stacks, as some custom or tweaked events from one might not be compatible with the format of the other. This will also reflect in tooling: not all tools will support all formats.

This being said, the authors prefer JSON as the basis for storing qlog, as it retains full flexibility and maximum interoperability. Storage overhead can be managed well in practice by employing compression. For this reason, this document details both how to practically transform qlog schema definitions to JSON and to the streamable NDJSON. We discuss concrete options to bring down JSON size and processing overheads in Section 6.3.

As depending on the employed format different deserializers/parsers should be used, the "qlog_format" field is used to indicate the chosen serialization approach. This field is always a string, but can be made hierarchical by the use of the "." separator between entries. For example, a value of "JSON.optimizationA" can indicate that a default JSON format is being used, but that a certain optimization of type A was applied to the file as well (see also Section 6.3).

6.1. qlog to JSON mapping

When mapping qlog to normal JSON, the "qlog_format" field MUST have the value "JSON". This is also the default qlog serialization and default value of this field.

To facilitate this mapping, the qlog documents employ a format that is close to pure JSON for its examples and data definitions. Still, as JSON is not a typed format, there are some practical peculiarities to observe.

6.1.1. numbers

While JSON has built-in support for integers up to 64 bits in size, not all JSON parsers do. For example, none of the major Web browsers support full 64-bit integers at this time, as all numerical values (both floating-point numbers and integers) are internally represented as floating point IEEE 754 [4] values. In practice, this limits their integers to a maximum value of $2^{53}-1$. Integers larger than that are either truncated or produce a JSON parsing error. While this is expected to improve in the future (as "BigInt" support [5] has been introduced in most Browsers, though not yet integrated into JSON parsers), we still need to deal with it here.

When transforming an `int64`, `uint64` or `double` from qlog to JSON, the implementer can thus choose to either log them as JSON numbers (taking the risk of truncation or un-parseability) or to log them as strings instead. Logging as strings should however only be practically needed if the value is likely to exceed $2^{53}-1$. In practice, even though protocols such as QUIC allow 64-bit values for for example stream identifiers, these high numbers are unlikely to be reached for the overwhelming majority of cases. As such, it is probably a valid trade-off to take the risk and log 64-bit values as JSON numbers instead of strings.

Tools processing JSON-based qlog SHOULD however be able to deal with 64-bit fields being serialized as either strings or numbers.

6.1.2. bytes

Unlike most binary formats, JSON does not allow the logging of raw binary blobs directly. As such, when serializing a byte or `array<byte>`, a scheme needs to be chosen.

To represent qlog bytes in JSON, they MUST be serialized to their lowercase hexadecimal equivalents (with 0 prefix for values lower than 10). All values are directly appended to each other, without delimiters. The full value is not prefixed with 0x (as is sometimes common). An example is given in Figure 15.

For the five raw unsigned byte input values of: 5 20 40 171 255, the JSON serialization is:

```
{
  raw: "051428abff"
}
```

Figure 15: Example for serializing bytes

As such, the resulting string will always have an even amount of characters and the original byte-size can be retrieved by dividing the string length by 2.

6.1.2.1. Truncated values

In some cases, it can be interesting not to log a full raw blob but instead a truncated value (for example, only the first 100 bytes of an HTTP response body to be able to discern which file it actually contained). In these cases, the original byte-size length cannot be obtained from the serialized value directly. As such, all qlog schema definitions SHOULD include a separate, length-indicating field for all fields of type `array<byte>` they specify. This allows always retrieving the original length, but also allows the omission of any

raw value bytes of the field completely (e.g., out of privacy or security considerations).

To reduce overhead however and in the case the full raw value is logged, the extra length-indicating field can be left out. As such, tools MUST be able to deal with this situation and derive the length of the field from the raw value if no separate length-indicating field is present. All possible permutations are shown by example in Figure 16.

```
// both the full raw value and its length are present (length is redundant)
{
  "raw_length": 5,
  "raw": "051428abff"
}

// only the raw value is present, indicating it represents the fields full value
// the byte length is obtained by calculating raw.length / 2
{
  "raw": "051428abff"
}

// only the length field is present, meaning the value was omitted
{
  "raw_length": 5,
}

// both fields are present and the lengths do not match: the value was truncated
// to the first three bytes.
{
  "raw_length": 5,
  "raw": "051428"
}
```

Figure 16: Example for serializing truncated bytes

6.1.3. Summarizing table

By definition, JSON strings are serialized surrounded by quotes. Numbers without.

qlog type	JSON type
int8	number
int16	number
int32	number
uint8	number
uint16	number
uint32	number
float	number
int64	number or string
uint64	number or string
double	number or string
bytes	string (lowercase hex value)
string	string
boolean	string ("true" or "false")
enum	string (full value/name, not index)
any	object ({ ... })
array	array ([...])

6.1.4. Other JSON specifics

JSON files by definition ([RFC8259]) MUST utilize the UTF-8 encoding, both for the file itself and the string values.

Most JSON parsers strictly follow the JSON specification. This includes the rule that trailing comma's are not allowed. As it is frequently annoying to remove these trailing comma's when logging events in a streaming fashion, tool implementers SHOULD allow the last event entry of a qlog trace to be an empty object. This allows loggers to simply close the qlog file by appending "{}]]]]" after their last added event.

Finally, while not specifically required by the JSON specification, all qlog field names in a JSON serialization MUST be lowercase.

6.2. qlog to NDJSON mapping

One of the downsides of using pure JSON is that it is inherently a non-streamable format. Put differently, it is not possible to simply append new qlog events to a log file without "closing" this file at the end by appending "]]]]". Without these closing tags, most JSON parsers will be unable to parse the file entirely. As most platforms do not provide a standard streaming JSON parser (which would be able to deal with this problem), this document also provides a qlog mapping to a streamable JSON format called Newline-Delimited JSON (NDJSON) [6].

When mapping qlog to NDJSON, the "qlog_format" field MUST have the value "NDJSON".

NDJSON is very similar to JSON, except that it interprets each line in a file as a fully separate JSON object. Put differently, unlike default JSON, it does not require a file to be wrapped as a full object with "{ ... }" or "[...]". Using this setup, qlog events can simply be appended as individually serialized lines at the back of a streamed logging file.

For this to work, some qlog definitions have to be adjusted however. Mainly, events are no longer part of the "events" array in the Trace object, but are instead logged separately from the qlog "file header" (QlogFile class in Section 3). Additionally, qlog's NDJSON mapping does not allow logging multiple individual traces in a single qlog file. As such, the QlogFile:traces field is replaced by the singular "trace" field, which simply contains the Trace data directly. An example can be seen in Figure 17. Note that the "group_id" field can still be used on a per-event basis to include events from conceptually different sources in a single NDJSON qlog file.

Note as well from Figure 17 that the file's header (QlogFileNDJSON) also needs to be fully serialized on a single line to be NDJSON compatible.

Definition:

```
class QlogFileNDJSON {
    qlog_format: "NDJSON",

    qlog_version:string,
    title?:string,
    description?:string,
    summary?: Summary,
    trace: Trace
}
// list of qlog events, separated by newlines
```

NDJSON serialization:

```
{"qlog_format":"NDJSON","qlog_version":"draft-03-WIP","title":"Name of this parti
cular NDJSON qlog file (short)","description":"Description for this NDJSON qlog f
ile (long)","trace":{"common_fields":{"protocol_type": ["QUIC","HTTP3"],"group_id
":"127ecc830d98f9d54a42c4f0842aa87e181a","time_format":"relative","reference_time
":"1553986553572"},"vantage_point":{"name":"backend-67","type":"server"}}}
{"time": 2, "name": "transport:packet_received", "data": { ... } }
{"time": 7, "name": "http:frame_parsed", "data": { ... } }
```

Figure 17: Top-level element

Finally, while not specifically required by the NDJSON specification, all qlog field names in a NDJSON serialization MUST be lowercase.

6.2.1. Supporting NDJSON in tooling

Note that NDJSON is not supported in most default programming environments (unlike normal JSON). However, several custom NDJSON parsing libraries exist [7] that can be used and the format is easy enough to parse with existing implementations (i.e., by splitting the file into its component lines and feeding them to a normal JSON parser individually, as each line by itself is a valid JSON object).

6.3. Other optimized formatting options

Both the JSON and NDJSON formatting options described above are serviceable in general small to medium scale (debugging) setups. However, these approaches tend to be relatively verbose, leading to larger file sizes. Additionally, generalized (ND)JSON (de)serialization performance is typically (slightly) lower than that of more optimized and predictable formats. Both aspects make these formats more challenging (though still practical [8]) to use in large scale setups.

During the development of qlog, we compared a multitude of alternative formatting and optimization options. The results of this study are summarized on the qlog github repository [9]. The rest of this section discusses some of these approaches implementations could choose and the expected gains and tradeoffs inherent therein. Tools SHOULD support mainly the compression options listed in Section 6.3.2, as they provide the largest wins for the least cost overall.

Over time, specific qlog formats and encodings can be created that more formally define and combine some of the discussed optimizations or add new ones. We choose to define these schemes in separate documents to keep the main qlog definition clean and generalizable, as not all contexts require the same performance or flexibility as others and qlog is intended to be a broadly usable and extensible format (for example more flexibility is needed in earlier stages of protocol development, while more performance is typically needed in later stages). This is also the main reason why the general qlog format is the less optimized JSON instead of a more performant option.

To be able to easily distinguish between these options in qlog compatible tooling (without the need to have the user provide out-of-band information or to (heuristically) parse and process files in a multitude of ways, see also Section 8), we recommend using explicit file extensions to indicate specific formats. As there are no standards in place for this type of extension to format mapping, we employ a commonly used scheme here. Our approach is to list the

applied optimizations in the extension in ascending order of application (e.g., if a qlog file is first optimized with technique A and then compressed with technique B, the resulting file would have the extension ".qlog.A.B"). This allows tooling to start at the back of the extension to "undo" applied optimizations to finally arrive at the expected qlog representation.

6.3.1. Data structure optimizations

The first general category of optimizations is to alter the representation of data within an (ND)JSON qlog file to reduce file size.

The first option is to employ a scheme similar to the CSV (comma separated value [rfc4180]) format, which utilizes the concept of column "headers" to prevent repeating field names for each datapoint instance. Concretely for JSON qlog, several field names are repeated with each event (i.e., time, name, data). These names could be extracted into a separate list, after which qlog events could be serialized as an array of values, as opposed to a full object. This approach was a key part of the original qlog format (prior to draft 02) using the "event_fields" field. However, tests showed that this optimization only provided a mean file size reduction of 5% (100MB to 95MB) while significantly increasing the implementation complexity, and this approach was abandoned in favor of the default JSON setup. Implementations using this format should not employ a separate file extension (as it still uses JSON), but rather employ a new value of "JSON.namedheaders" (or "NDJSON.namedheaders") for the "qlog_format" field (see Section 3).

The second option is to replace field values and/or names with indices into a (dynamic) lookup table. This is a common compression technique and can provide significant file size reductions (up to 50% in our tests, 100MB to 50MB). However, this approach is even more difficult to implement efficiently and requires either including the (dynamic) table in the resulting file (an approach taken by for example Chromium's NetLog format [10]) or defining a (static) table up-front and sharing this between implementations. Implementations using this approach should not employ a separate file extension (as it still uses JSON), but rather employ a new value of "JSON.dictionary" (or "NDJSON.dictionary") for the "qlog_format" field (see Section 3).

As both options either proved difficult to implement, reduced qlog file readability, and provided too little improvement compared to other more straightforward options (for example Section 6.3.2), these schemes are not inherently part of qlog.

6.3.2. Compression

The second general category of optimizations is to utilize a (generic) compression scheme for textual data. As qlog in the (ND)JSON format typically contains a large amount of repetition, off-the-shelf (text) compression techniques typically succeed very well in bringing down file sizes (regularly with up to two orders of magnitude in our tests, even for "fast" compression levels). As such, utilizing compression is recommended before attempting other optimization options, even though this might (somewhat) increase processing costs due to the additional compression step.

The first option is to use GZIP compression ([RFC1952]). This generic compression scheme provides multiple compression levels (providing a trade-off between compression speed and size reduction). Utilized at level 6 (a medium setting thought to be applicable for streaming compression of a qlog stream in commodity devices), gzip compresses qlog JSON files to 7% of their initial size on average (100MB to 7MB). For this option, the file extension .qlog.gz SHOULD BE used. The "qlog_format" field should still reflect the original JSON formatting of the qlog data (e.g., "JSON" or "NDJSON").

The second option is to use Brotli compression ([RFC7932]). While similar to gzip, this more recent compression scheme provides a better efficiency. It also allows multiple compression levels. Utilized at level 4 (a medium setting thought to be applicable for streaming compression of a qlog stream in commodity devices), brotli compresses qlog JSON files to 7% of their initial size on average (100MB to 7MB). For this option, the file extension .qlog.br SHOULD BE used. The "qlog_format" field should still reflect the original JSON formatting of the qlog data (e.g., "JSON" or "NDJSON").

Other compression algorithms of course exist (for example xz, zstd, and lz4). We mainly recommend gzip and brotli because of their tweakable behaviour and wide support in web-based environments, which we envision as the main tooling ecosystem (see also Section 8).

6.3.3. Binary formats

The third general category of optimizations is to use a more optimized (often binary) format instead of the textual JSON format. This approach inherently produces smaller files and often has better (de)serialization performance. However, the resultant files are no longer human readable and some formats require hard tradeoffs between flexibility for performance.

The first option is to use the CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation [rfc7049]) format. For our purposes, CBOR can be

viewed as a straightforward binary variant of JSON. As such, existing JSON qlog files can be trivially converted to and from CBOR (though slightly more work is needed for NDJSON qlogs). While CBOR thus does retain the full qlog flexibility, it only provides a 25% file size reduction (100MB to 75MB) compared to textual (ND)JSON. As CBOR support in programming environments is not as widespread as that of textual JSON and the format lacks human readability, CBOR was not chosen as the default qlog format. For this option, the file extension `.qlog.cbor` SHOULD BE used. The `"qlog_format"` field should still reflect the original JSON formatting of the qlog data (e.g., `"JSON"` or `"NDJSON"`).

A second option is to use a more specialized binary format, such as Protocol Buffers [11] (protobuf). This format is battle-tested, has support for optional fields and has libraries in most programming languages. Still, it is significantly less flexible than textual JSON or CBOR, as it relies on a separate, pre-defined schema (a `.proto` file). As such, it is not possible to (easily) log new event types in protobuf files without adjusting this schema as well, which has its own practical challenges. As qlog is intended to be a flexible, general purpose format, this type of format was not chosen as its basic serialization. The lower flexibility does lead to significantly reduced file sizes. Our straightforward mapping of the qlog main schema and QUIC/HTTP3 event types to protobuf created qlog files 24% as large as the raw JSON equivalents (100MB to 24MB). For this option, the file extension `.qlog.protobuf` SHOULD BE used. The `"qlog_format"` field should reflect the different internal format, for example: `"qlog_format": "protobuf"`.

Note that binary formats can (and should) also be used in conjunction with compression (see Section 6.3.2). For example, CBOR compresses well (to about 6% of the original textual JSON size (100MB to 6MB) for both gzip and brotli) and so does protobuf (5% (gzip) to 3% (brotli)). However, these gains are similar to the ones achieved by simply compressing the textual JSON equivalents directly (7%, see Section 6.3.2). As such, since compression is still needed to achieve optimal file size reductions even with binary formats, we feel the more flexible compressed textual JSON options are a better default for the qlog format in general.

6.3.4. Overview and summary

In summary, textual JSON was chosen as the main qlog format due to its high flexibility and because its inefficiencies can be largely solved by the utilization of compression techniques (which are needed to achieve optimal results with other formats as well).

Still, qlog implementers are free to define other qlog formats depending on their needs and context of use. These formats should be described in their own documents, the discussion in this document mainly acting as inspiration and high-level guidance. Implementers are encouraged to add concrete qlog formats and definitions to the designated public repository [12].

The following table provides an overview of all the discussed qlog formatting options with examples:

format	qlog_format	extension
JSON Section 6.1	JSON	.qlog
NDJSON Section 6.2	NDJSON	.qlog
named headers Section 6.3.1	(ND)JSON.namedheaders	.qlog
dictionary Section 6.3.1	(ND)JSON.dictionary	.qlog
CBOR Section 6.3.3	(ND)JSON	.qlog.cbor
protobuf Section 6.3.3	protobuf	.qlog.protobuf
gzip Section 6.3.2	no change	.gz suffix
brrotli Section 6.3.2	no change	.br suffix

6.4. Conversion between formats

As discussed in the previous sections, a qlog file can be serialized in a multitude of formats, each of which can conceivably be transformed into or from one another without loss of information. For example, a number of NDJSON streamed qlogs could be combined into a JSON formatted qlog for later processing. Similarly, a captured binary qlog could be transformed to JSON for easier interpretation and sharing.

Secondly, we can also consider other structured logging approaches that contain similar (though typically not identical) data to qlog, like raw packet capture files (for example .pcap files from tcpdump) or endpoint-specific logging formats (for example the NetLog format in Google Chrome). These are sometimes the only options, if an implementation cannot or will not support direct qlog output for any reason, but does provide other internal or external (e.g., SSLKEYLOGFILE export to allow decryption of packet captures) logging options. For this second category, a (partial) transformation from/to qlog can also be defined.

As such, when defining a new qlog serialization format or wanting to utilize qlog-compatible tools with existing codebases lacking qlog

support, it is recommended to define and provide a concrete mapping from one format to default JSON-serialized qlog. Several of such mappings exist. Firstly, [pcap2qlog] (<https://github.com/quiclog/pcap2qlog>) transforms QUIC and HTTP/3 packet capture files to qlog. Secondly, netlog2qlog [13] converts chromium's internal dictionary-encoded JSON format to qlog. Finally, quictrace2qlog [14] converts the older quictrace format to JSON qlog. Tools can then easily integrate with these converters (either by incorporating them directly or for example using them as a (web-based) API) so users can provide different file types with ease. For example, the qvis [15] toolsuite supports a multitude of formats and qlog serializations.

7. Methods of access and generation

Different implementations will have different ways of generating and storing qlogs. However, there is still value in defining a few default ways in which to steer this generation and access of the results.

7.1. Set file output destination via an environment variable

To provide users control over where and how qlog files are created, we define two environment variables. The first, QLOGFILE, indicates a full path to where an individual qlog file should be stored. This path **MUST** include the full file extension. The second, QLOGDIR, sets a general directory path in which qlog files should be placed. This path **MUST** include the directory separator character at the end.

In general, QLOGDIR should be preferred over QLOGFILE if an endpoint is prone to generate multiple qlog files. This can for example be the case for a QUIC server implementation that logs each QUIC connection in a separate qlog file. An alternative that uses QLOGFILE would be a QUIC server that logs all connections in a single file and uses the "group_id" field (Section 3.4.6) to allow post-hoc separation of events.

Implementations **SHOULD** provide support for QLOGDIR and **MAY** provide support for QLOGFILE.

When using QLOGDIR, it is up to the implementation to choose an appropriate naming scheme for the qlog files themselves. The chosen scheme will typically depend on the context or protocols used. For example, for QUIC, it is recommended to use the Original Destination Connection ID (ODCID), followed by the vantage point type of the logging endpoint. Examples of all options for QUIC are shown in Figure 18.

Command: `QLOGFILE=/srv/qlogs/client.qlog quicclientbinary`

Should result in the the `quicclientbinary` executable logging a single qlog file named `client.qlog` in the `/srv/qlogs` directory.

This is for example useful in tests when the client sets up just a single connection and then exits.

Command: `QLOGDIR=/srv/qlogs/ quicserverbinary`

Should result in the `quicserverbinary` executable generating several logs files, one for each QUIC connection.

Given two QUIC connections, with ODCID values `"abcde"` and `"12345"` respectively, this would result in two files:

`/srv/qlogs/abcde_server.qlog`

`/srv/qlogs/12345_server.qlog`

Command: `QLOGFILE=/srv/qlogs/server.qlog quicserverbinary`

Should result in the the `quicserverbinary` executable logging a single qlog file named `server.qlog` in the `/srv/qlogs` directory.

Given that the server handled two QUIC connections before it was shut down, with ODCID values `"abcde"` and `"12345"` respectively, this would result in event instances in the qlog file being tagged with the `"group_id"` field with values `"abcde"` and `"12345"`.

Figure 18: Environment variable examples for a QUIC implementation

7.2. Access logs via a well-known endpoint

After generation, qlog implementers MAY make available generated logs and traces on an endpoint (typically the server) via the following .well-known URI:

`.well-known/qlog/IDENTIFIER.extension`

The `IDENTIFIER` variable depends on the context and the protocol. For example for QUIC, the lowercase Original Destination Connection ID (ODCID) is recommended, as it can uniquely identify a connection. Additionally, the extension depends on the chosen format (see Section 6.3.4). For example, for a QUIC connection with ODCID `"abcde"`, the endpoint for fetching its default JSON-formatted .qlog file would be:

`.well-known/qlog/abcde.qlog`

Implementers SHOULD allow users to fetch logs for a given connection on a 2nd, separate connection. This helps prevent pollution of the logs by fetching them over the same connection that one wishes to observe through the log. Ideally, for the QUIC use case, the logs should also be approachable via an HTTP/2 or HTTP/1.1 endpoint (i.e., on TCP port 443), to for example aid debugging in the case where QUIC/UDP is blocked on the network.

qlog implementers SHOULD NOT enable this .well-known endpoint in typical production settings to prevent (malicious) users from

downloading logs from other connections. Implementers are advised to disable this endpoint by default and require specific actions from the end users to enable it (and potentially qlog itself). Implementers MUST also take into account the general privacy and security guidelines discussed in Section 9 before exposing qlogs to outside actors.

8. Tooling requirements

Tools ingestion qlog MUST indicate which qlog version(s), qlog format(s), compression methods and potentially other input file formats (for example .pcap) they support. Tools SHOULD at least support .qlog files in the default JSON format (Section 6.1). Additionally, they SHOULD indicate exactly which values for and properties of the name (category and type) and data fields they look for to execute their logic. Tools SHOULD perform a (high-level) check if an input qlog file adheres to the expected qlog schema. If a tool determines a qlog file does not contain enough supported information to correctly execute the tool's logic, it SHOULD generate a clear error message to this effect.

Tools MUST NOT produce breaking errors for any field names and/or values in the qlog format that they do not recognize. Tools SHOULD indicate even unknown event occurrences within their context (e.g., marking unknown events on a timeline for manual interpretation by the user).

Tool authors should be aware that, depending on the logging implementation, some events will not always be present in all traces. For example, using a circular logging buffer of a fixed size, it could be that the earliest events (e.g., connection setup events) are later overwritten by "newer" events. Alternatively, some events can be intentionally omitted out of privacy or file size considerations. Tool authors are encouraged to make their tools robust enough to still provide adequate output for incomplete logs.

9. Security and privacy considerations

TODO : discuss privacy and security considerations (e.g., what NOT to log, what to strip out of a log before sharing, ...)

TODO: strip out/don't log IPs, ports, specific CIDs, raw user data, exact times, HTTP HEADERS (or at least :path), SNI values

TODO: see if there is merit in encrypting the logs and having the server choose an encryption key (e.g., sent in transport parameters)

Good initial reference: Christian Huitema's blogpost [16]

10. IANA Considerations

TODO: primarily the .well-known URI

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- [18] <https://github.com/EricssonResearch/spindump>
- [19] <https://www.wireshark.org/>

Appendix A. Change Log

A.1. Since draft-marx-qlog-main-schema-draft-02:

- o These changes were done in preparation of the adoption of the drafts by the QUIC working group (#137)
- o Moved RawInfo, Importance, Generic events and Simulation events to this document.
- o Added basic event definition guidelines
- o Made protocol_type an array instead of a string (#146)

A.2. Since draft-marx-qlog-main-schema-01:

- o Decoupled qlog from the JSON format and described a mapping instead (#89)
 - * Data types are now specified in this document and proper definitions for fields were added in this format
 - * 64-bit numbers can now be either strings or numbers, with a preference for numbers (#10)
 - * binary blobs are now logged as lowercase hex strings (#39, #36)
 - * added guidance to add length-specifiers for binary blobs (#102)
- o Removed "time_units" from Configuration. All times are now in ms instead (#95)
- o Removed the "event_fields" setup for a more straightforward JSON format (#101, #89)
- o Added a streaming option using the NDJSON format (#109, #2, #106)
- o Described optional optimization options for implementers (#30)
- o Added QLOGDIR and QLOGFILE environment variables, clarified the .well-known URL usage (#26, #33, #51)
- o Overall tightened up the text and added more examples

A.3. Since draft-marx-qlog-main-schema-00:

- o All field names are now lowercase (e.g., category instead of CATEGORY)
- o Triggers are now properties on the "data" field value, instead of separate field types (#23)
- o group_ids in common_fields is now just also group_id

Appendix B. Design Variations

- o Quic-trace [17] takes a slightly different approach based on protocolbuffers.
- o Spindump [18] also defines a custom text-based format for in-network measurements
- o Wireshark [19] also has a QUIC dissector and its results can be transformed into a json output format using tshark.

The idea is that qlog is able to encompass the use cases for both of these alternate designs and that all tooling converges on the qlog standard.

Appendix C. Acknowledgements

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Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
draft-westerlund-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis-01

Abstract

This document describes a proposed update for the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol to protect user messages sent over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP).

DTLS over SCTP provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity protection, and replay protection for applications that use SCTP as their transport protocol and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to give communications privacy and to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.

Applications using DTLS over SCTP can use almost all transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions. This document intends to obsolete RFC 6083 and removes the 16 kB limitation on user message size by defining a secure user message fragmentation so that multiple DTLS records can be used to protect a single user message. It further updates the DTLS versions to use, as well as the HMAC algorithms for SCTP-AUTH, and simplifies the implementation by some stricter requirements on the establishment procedures.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the TSVWG Working Group mailing list (tsvwg@ietf.org), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tsvwg/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/glooinul/draft-westerlund-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis>.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, as defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in [RFC4960] with Authenticated Chunks for SCTP (SCTP-AUTH) [RFC4895].

This specification provides mutual authentication of endpoints, confidentiality, integrity protection, and replay protection of user messages for applications that use SCTP as their transport protocol.

Thus it allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to give communications privacy and to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery. DTLS/SCTP uses DTLS for mutual authentication, key exchange with perfect forward secrecy for SCTP-AUTH, and confidentiality of user messages. DTLS/SCTP use SCTP and SCTP-AUTH for integrity protection and replay protection of user messages.

Applications using DTLS over SCTP can use almost all transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions. DTLS/SCTP supports:

- * preservation of message boundaries.
- * a large number of unidirectional and bidirectional streams.
- * ordered and unordered delivery of SCTP user messages.
- * the partial reliability extension as defined in [RFC3758].
- * the dynamic address reconfiguration extension as defined in [RFC5061].
- * large user messages.

The method described in this document requires that the SCTP implementation supports the optional feature of fragmentation of SCTP user messages as defined in [RFC4960]. To efficiently implement and support larger user messages it is also recommended that I-DATA chunks as defined in [RFC8260] as well as an SCTP API that supports partial user message delivery as discussed in [RFC6458].

1.1.1. Comparison with TLS for SCTP

TLS, from which DTLS was derived, is designed to run on top of a byte-stream-oriented transport protocol providing a reliable, in-sequence delivery. TLS over SCTP as described in [RFC3436] has some serious limitations:

- * It does not support the unordered delivery of SCTP user messages.
- * It does not support partial reliability as defined in [RFC3758].
- * It only supports the usage of the same number of streams in both directions.
- * It uses a TLS connection for every bidirectional stream, which requires a substantial amount of resources and message exchanges if a large number of streams is used.

1.1.2. Changes from RFC 6083

The DTLS over SCTP solution defined in RFC 6083 had the following limitation:

- * The maximum user message size is 2^{14} bytes, which is a single DTLS record limit.

This update that replaces RFC6083 defines the following changes:

- * Removes the limitations on user messages sizes by defining a secure fragmentation mechanism.
- * Defines a DTLS extension for the endpoints to declare the user message size supported to be received.
- * Mandates that more modern DTLS version are required (DTLS 1.2 or 1.3)
- * Mandates use of modern HMAC algorithm (SHA-256) in the SCTP authentication extension [RFC4895].
- * Recommends support of [RFC8260] to enable interleaving of large SCTP user messages to avoid scheduling issues.
- * Recommends support of partial message delivery API, see [RFC6458] if larger usage messages are intended to be used.
- * Applies stricter requirements on always using DTLS for all user messages in the SCTP association.
- * Requires that SCTP-AUTH is applied to all SCTP Chunks that can be authenticated.

1.2. Terminology

This document uses the following terms:

Association: An SCTP association.

Stream: A unidirectional stream of an SCTP association. It is uniquely identified by a stream identifier.

1.3. Abbreviations

DTLS: Datagram Transport Layer Security

MTU: Maximum Transmission Unit

PPID: Payload Protocol Identifier

SCTP: Stream Control Transmission Protocol

TCP: Transmission Control Protocol

TLS: Transport Layer Security

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. DTLS Considerations

3.1. Version of DTLS

This document is based on DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], but works also for DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347]. Earlier versions of DTLS MUST NOT be used. It is expected that DTLS/SCTP as described in this document will work with future versions of DTLS.

3.2. Cipher Suites

For DTLS 1.2, the cipher suites forbidden by [RFC7540] MUST NOT be used. Cipher suites without encryption MUST NOT be used.

3.3. Message Sizes

DTLS/SCTP, automatically fragments and reassembles user messages. This specification defines how to fragment the user messages into DTLS records, where each DTLS 1.3 record allows a maximum of 2^{14} protected bytes. Each DTLS record adds some overhead, thus using records of maximum possible size are recommended to minimize the overhead.

The sequence of DTLS records is then fragmented into DATA or I-DATA Chunks to fit the path MTU by SCTP. The largest possible user messages using the mechanism defined in this specification is $2^{64}-1$ bytes.

The security operations and reassembly process requires that the protected user message, i.e. with DTLS record overhead, is buffered in the receiver. This buffer space will thus put a limit on the largest size of plain text user message that can be transferred securely.

A receiver that doesn't support partial delivery of user messages from SCTP [RFC6458] will advertise its largest supported protected message using SCTP's mechanism for Advertised Receiver Window Credit (`a_rwnd`) as specified in Section 3.3.2 of [RFC4960]. Note that the `a_rwnd` value is across all user messages being delivered.

For a receiver supporting partial delivery of user messages `a_rwnd` will not limit the maximum size of the DTLS protected user message because the receiver can move parts of the DTLS protected user message from the SCTP receiver buffer into a buffer for DTLS processing. When each complete DTLS record have been received from SCTP, it can be processed and the plain text fragment can, in its turn, be partially delivered to the user application.

Thus, the limit of the largest user message is dependent on buffering allocated for DTLS processing as well as the DTLS/SCTP API to the application. To ensure that the sender have some understanding of the maximum receiver size a TLS extension "`dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size`" Section 5.2 is used to signal the endpoints receiver capability when it comes to user message size.

All implementors of this specification MUST support user messages of at least 16383 bytes. Where 16383 bytes is the supported message size in RFC 6083. By requiring this message size in this document, we ensure compatibility with existing usage of RFC 6083, not requiring the upper layer protocol to implement additional features or requirements.

Due to SCTP's capability to transmit concurrent user messages the total memory consumption in the receiver is not bounded. In cases where one or more user messages are affected by packet loss, the DATA chunks may require more data in the receiver's buffer.

The necessary buffering space for a single user message of `dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size` (MMS) is dependent on the implementation.

When no partial data delivery is supported, the message size is limited by the `a_rwnd` as this is the largest protected user message that can be received and then processed by DTLS and where the plain text user message is expected to be no more than the signalled MMS.

With partial processing it is possible to have a receiver implementation that is bound to use no more buffer space than MMS (for the plaintext) plus one maximum size DTLS record. The later assumes that one can realign the start of the buffer after each DTLS record has been consumed. A more realistic implementation is two maximum DTLS record sizes.

If an implementation supports partial delivery in both the SCTP API and the ULP API, and also partial processing in the DTLS/SCTP implementation, then the buffering space in the DTLS/SCTP layer ought to be no more than two DTLS records. In which case the MMS to set is dependent on the ULP and the endpoints capabilities.

3.4. Replay Protection

SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895] does not have explicit replay protection. However, the combination of SCTP-AUTH's protection of DATA or I-DATA chunks and SCTP user message handling will prevent third party attempts to inject or replay SCTP packets resulting in impact on the received protected user message. In fact this document's solution is dependent on SCTP-AUTH and SCTP to prevent reordering of the DTLS records within each protected user message.

DTLS optionally supports record replay detection. Such replay detection could result in the DTLS layer dropping valid messages received outside of the DTLS replay window. As DTLS/SCTP provides replay protection even without DTLS replay protection, the replay detection of DTLS MUST NOT be used.

3.5. Path MTU Discovery

DTLS Path MTU Discovery MUST NOT be used. Since SCTP provides own Path MTU discovery and fragmentation/reassembly for user messages, and according to Section 3.3, DTLS can send maximum sized DTLS Records.

3.6. Retransmission of Messages

SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS messages that require it. See Section 4.4. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions MUST NOT be used.

4. SCTP Considerations

4.1. Mapping of DTLS Records

The SCTP implementation MUST support fragmentation of user messages using DATA [RFC4960], and optionally I-DATA [RFC8260] chunks.

DTLS/SCTP works as a shim layer between the user message API and SCTP. The fragmentation works similar as the DTLS fragmentation of handshake messages. On the sender side a user message fragmented into fragments m_0 , m_1 , m_2 , each no larger than $2^{14} - 1 = 16383$ bytes.

$$m_0 \mid m_1 \mid m_2 \mid \dots = \text{user_message}$$

The resulting fragments are protected with DTLS and the records are concatenated

$$\text{user_message}' = \text{DTLS}(m_0) \mid \text{DTLS}(m_1) \mid \text{DTLS}(m_2) \mid \dots$$

The new $\text{user_message}'$, i.e the protected user message, is the input to SCTP.

On the receiving side DTLS is used to decrypt the records. If a DTLS decryption fails, the DTLS connection and the SCTP association are terminated. Due to SCTP-AUTH preventing delivery of corrupt fragments of the protected user message this should only occur in case of implementation errors or internal hardware failures.

The DTLS Connection ID SHOULD NOT be negotiated (Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]). If DTLS 1.3 is used, the length field MUST NOT be omitted and a 16 bit sequence number SHOULD be used.

4.2. DTLS Connection Handling

The DTLS connection MUST be established at the beginning of the SCTP association and be terminated when the SCTP association is terminated, (i.e. there's only one DTLS connection within one association). A DTLS connection MUST NOT span multiple SCTP associations.

As it is required to establish the DTLS connection at the beginning of the SCTP association, either of the peers should never send any SCTP user messages that are not protected by DTLS. So the case that an endpoint receives data that is not either DTLS messages or protected user messages in the form of a sequence of DTLS Records on any stream is a protocol violation. The receiver MAY terminate the SCTP association due to this protocol violation.

4.3. Payload Protocol Identifier Usage

SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers are assigned by IANA. Application protocols using DTLS over SCTP SHOULD register and use a separate Payload Protocol Identifier (PPID) and SHOULD NOT reuse the PPID that they registered for running directly over SCTP.

Using the same PPID does not harm as long as the application can determine whether or not DTLS is used. However, for protocol analyzers, for example, it is much easier if a separate PPID is used.

This means, in particular, that there is no specific PPID for DTLS.

4.4. Stream Usage

All DTLS Handshake, Alert, or ChangeCipherSpec (DTLS 1.2 only) messages MUST be transported on stream 0 with unlimited reliability and with the ordered delivery feature.

DTLS messages of the record protocol, which carries the protected user messages, SHOULD use multiple streams other than stream 0; they MAY use stream 0 as long as the ordered message semantics is acceptable. On stream 0 protected user messages as well as any DTLS messages that isn't record protocol will be mixed, thus the additional head of line blocking can occur.

4.5. Chunk Handling

DATA chunks of SCTP MUST be sent in an authenticated way as described in [RFC4895]. All other chunks that can be authenticated, i.e. all chunk types that can be listed in the Chunk List Parameter [RFC4895], MUST also be sent in an authenticated way. This makes sure that an attacker cannot modify the stream in which a message is sent or affect the ordered/unordered delivery of the message.

If PR-SCTP as defined in [RFC3758] is used, FORWARD-TSN chunks MUST also be sent in an authenticated way as described in [RFC4895]. This makes sure that it is not possible for an attacker to drop messages and use forged FORWARD-TSN, SACK, and/or SHUTDOWN chunks to hide this dropping.

I-DATA chunk type as defined in [RFC8260] is RECOMMENDED to be supported to avoid some of the down sides that large user messages have on blocking transmission of later arriving high priority user messages. However, the support is not mandated and negotiated independently from DTLS/SCTP. If I-DATA chunks are used then they MUST be sent in an authenticated way as described in [RFC4895].

4.6. SCTP-AUTH Hash Function

When using DTLS/SCTP, the SHA-256 Message Digest Algorithm MUST be supported in the SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895] implementation. SHA-1 MUST NOT be used when using DTLS/SCTP. [RFC4895] requires support and inclusion of of SHA-1 in the HMAC-ALGO parameter, thus, to meet both requirements the HMAC-ALGO parameter will include both SHA-256 and SHA-1 with SHA-256 listed prior to SHA-1 to indicate the preference.

4.7. Renegotiation

Renegotiation enables rekeying and reauthentication inside an DTLS 1.2 connection. It is up to the upper layer to use/allow it or not. Application writers should be aware that allowing renegotiations may result in changes of security parameters. Renegotiation has been removed from DTLS 1.3 and partly replaced with Post-Handshake messages such as KeyUpdate. See Section 7 for security considerations regarding rekeying.

4.8. DTLS Epochs

In general, DTLS implementations SHOULD discard records from earlier epochs, as described in Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. To avoid discarding messages, the processing guidelines in Section 4.2.1 of DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] or Section 4.1 of DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] should be followed.

4.9. Handling of Endpoint-Pair Shared Secrets

SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895] is keyed using Endpoint-Pair Shared Secrets. In SCTP associations where DTLS is used, DTLS is used to establish these secrets. The endpoints MUST NOT use another mechanism for establishing shared secrets for SCTP-AUTH.

The endpoint-pair shared secret for Shared Key Identifier 0 is empty and MUST be used when establishing a DTLS connection. In DTLS 1.2, whenever the main secret changes, a 64-byte shared secret is derived from every main secret and provided as a new endpoint-pair shared secret by using the TLS-Exporter. In DTLS 1.3, the exporter_secret never change. For DTLS 1.3, the exporter is described in [RFC8446]. For DTLS 1.2, the exporter is described in [RFC5705]. The exporter MUST use the label given in Section Section 6 and no context. The new Shared Key Identifier MUST be the old Shared Key Identifier incremented by 1. If the old one is 65535, the new one MUST be 1.

Before sending the DTLS Finished message, the active SCTP-AUTH key MUST be switched to the new one.

Once the corresponding Finished message from the peer has been received, the old SCTP-AUTH key SHOULD be removed.

4.10. Shutdown

To prevent DTLS from discarding DTLS user messages while it is shutting down, a CloseNotify message MUST only be sent after all outstanding SCTP user messages have been acknowledged by the SCTP peer and MUST NOT be revoked by the SCTP peer.

Prior to processing a received CloseNotify, all other received SCTP user messages that are buffered in the SCTP layer MUST be read and processed by DTLS.

5. DTLS over SCTP Service

The adoption of DTLS over SCTP according to the current description is meant to add to SCTP the option for transferring encrypted data. When DTLS over SCTP is used, all data being transferred MUST be protected by chunk authentication and DTLS encrypted. Chunks that need to be received in an authenticated way will be specified in the CHUNK list parameter according to [RFC4895]. Error handling for authenticated chunks is according to [RFC4895].

5.1. Adaptation Layer Indication in INIT/INIT-ACK

At the initialization of the association, a sender of the INIT or INIT ACK chunk that intends to use DTLS/SCTP as specified in this specification MUST include an Adaptation Layer Indication Parameter with the IANA assigned value TBD to inform its peer that it is able to support DTLS over SCTP per this specification.

5.2. DTLS/SCTP "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" Extension

The endpoint's DTLS/SCTP maximum message size is declared in the "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" TLS extension. The ExtensionData of the extension is MessageSizeLimit:

```
uint64 MessageSizeLimit;
```

The value of MessageSizeLimit is the maximum plaintext user message size in octets that the endpoint is willing to receive. When the "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" extension is negotiated, an endpoint MUST NOT send a user message larger than the MessageSizeLimit value it receives from its peer.

This value is the length of the user message before DTLS fragmentation and protection. The value does not account for the expansion due to record protection, record padding, or the DTLS header.

The "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" MUST be used to negotiate maximum message size for DTLS/SCTP. A DTLS/SCTP endpoint MUST treat the omission of "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" as a fatal error unless supporting RFC 6083 fallback Section 5.6, and it SHOULD generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. Endpoints MUST NOT send a "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" extension with a value smaller than 16383. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert.

The "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" MUST NOT be send in TLS or in DTLS versions earlier than 1.2. In DTLS 1.3, the server sends the "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" extension in the EncryptedExtensions message.

During resumption, the maximum message size is renegotiated.

5.3. DTLS over SCTP Initialization

Initialization of DTLS/SCTP requires all the following options to be part of the INIT/INIT-ACK handshake:

RANDOM: defined in [RFC4895]

CHUNKS: list of permitted chunks, defined in [RFC4895]

HMAC-ALGO: defined in [RFC4895]

ADAPTATION-LAYER-INDICATION: defined in [RFC5061]

When all the above options are present, the Association will start with support of DTLS/SCTP. The set of options indicated are the DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options. No data transfer is permitted before DTLS handshake is complete. Chunk bundling is permitted according to [RFC4960]. The DTLS handshake will enable authentication of both the peers and also have the declare their support message size.

The extension described in this document is given by the following message exchange.

```

--- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO; ADAPTATION-LAYER-IND] --->
<- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO; ADAPTATION-LAYER-IND] -
----- COOKIE-ECHO ----->
<----- COOKIE-ACK -----
----- AUTH; DATA[DTLS Handshake] ----->
...
...
<----- AUTH; DATA[DTLS Handshake] -----

```

5.4. Client Use Case

When a SCTP Client initiates an Association with DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options, it can receive an INIT-ACK also containing DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options, in that case the Association will proceed as specified in the previous Section 5.3 section. If the peer replies with an INIT-ACK not containing all DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options, the Client can decide to keep on working with RFC 6083 fallback, plain data only, or to ABORT the association.

5.5. Server Use Case

If a SCTP Server supports DTLS/SCTP, when receiving an INIT chunk with all DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options it must reply with INIT-ACK also containing the all DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options, then it must follow the sequence for DTLS initialization Section 5.3 and the related traffic case. If a SCTP Server supports DTLS, when receiving an INIT chunk with not all DTLS/SCTP Mandatory Options, it can decide to continue by creating an Association with RFC 6083 fallback, plain data only or to ABORT it.

5.6. RFC 6083 Fallback

This section discusses how an endpoint supporting this specification can fallback to follow the DTLS/SCTP behavior in RFC 6083. It is recommended to define a setting that represents the policy to allow fallback or not. However, the possibility to use fallback is based on the ULP can operate using user messages that are no longer than 16383 bytes and where the security issues can be mitigated or considered acceptable. Fallback is NOT RECOMMEND to be enabled as it enables downgrade to weaker algorithms and versions of DTLS.

A SCTP client that receives an INIT-ACK that is not compliant according this specification may in certain cases potentially perform an fallback to RFC 6083 behavior. The first case is when the SCTP client receives an INIT-ACK doesn't contain the SCTP-Adaptation-Indication parameter with the DTLS/SCTP adaptation layer codepoint but do include the SCTP-AUTH parameters on a server that are expected to provide services using DTLS. The second case is when the INIT-ACK

do contain the SCTP-Adaptation-Indication parameter with the correct code point, however the HMAC-ALGO or the Chunks parameters values are such that do not fullfil the requirement of this specification but do meet the requirements of RFC 6083. In either of these cases the client could attempt DTLS per RFC 6083 as fallback. However, the fallback attempt should only be performed if policy says that is acceptable.

If fallback is allowed it is possible that the client will send plain text user messages prior to DTLS handshake as it is allowed per RFC 6083. So that needs to be part of the consideration for a policy allowing fallback. When performing the the DTLS handshake, the server is required accepting that lack of the TLS extension "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" and can't treat it as fatal error. In case the "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" TLS extension is present in the handshake the server SHALL continue the handshake including the extension with its value also, and from that point follow this specification. In case the TLS option is missing RFC 6083 applies.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. TLS Exporter Label

RFC 6083 defined a TLS Exporter Label registry as described in [RFC5705]. IANA is requested to update the reference for the label "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP" to this specification.

6.2. DTLS "dtls_over_sctp_buffer_size_limit" Extension

This document registers the "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" extension in the TLS "ExtensionType Values" registry established in [RFC5246]. The "dtls_over_sctp_maximum_message_size" extension has been assigned a code point of TBD. This entry [[will be|is]] marked as recommended ([RFC8447] and marked as "Encrypted" in (D)TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. The IANA registry [RFC8447] [[will list|lists]] this extension as "Recommended" (i.e., "Y") and indicates that it may appear in the ClientHello (CH) or EncryptedExtensions (EE) messages in (D)TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13].

6.3. SCTP Parameter

IANA is requested to assign a Adaptation Code Point for DTLS/SCTP.

7. Security Considerations

The security considerations given in [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], [RFC4895], and [RFC4960] also apply to this document.

7.1. Cryptographic Considerations

Over the years, there have been several serious attacks on earlier versions of Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. [RFC7457] summarizes the attacks that were known at the time of publishing and BCP 195 [RFC7525] provides recommendations for improving the security of deployed services that use TLS.

When DTLS/SCTP is used with DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], DTLS 1.2 MUST be configured to disable options known to provide insufficient security. HTTP/2 [RFC7540] gives good minimum requirements based on the attacks that were publicly known in 2015. DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] only define strong algorithms without major weaknesses at the time of publication. Many of the TLS registries have a "Recommended" column. Parameters not marked as "Y" are NOT RECOMMENDED to support.

DTLS 1.3 requires rekeying before algorithm specific AEAD limits have been reached. The AEAD limits equations are equally valid for DTLS 1.2 and SHOULD be followed for DTLS/SCTP, but are not mandated by the DTLS 1.2 specification. HMAC-SHA-256 as used in SCTP-AUTH has a very large tag length and very good integrity properties. The SCTP-AUTH key can be used until the DTLS handshake is re-run at which point a new SCTP-AUTH key is derived using the TLS-Exporter.

DTLS/SCTP is in many deployments replacing IPsec. For IPsec, NIST (US), BSI (Germany), and ANSSI (France) recommends very frequent re-run of Diffie-Hellman to provide Perfect Forward Secrecy. ANSSI writes "It is recommended to force the periodic renewal of the keys, e.g. every hour and every 100 GB of data, in order to limit the impact of a key compromise." [ANSSI-DAT-NT-003].

For many DTLS/SCTP deployments the DTLS connections are expected to have very long lifetimes of months or even years. For connections with such long lifetimes there is a need to frequently re-authenticate both client and server.

When using DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], AEAD limits, frequent re-authentication and frequent re-run of Diffie-Hellman can be achieved with frequent renegotiation, see TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. When renegotiation is used both clients and servers MUST use the renegotiation_info extension [RFC5746] and MUST follow the renegotiation guidelines in BCP 195 [RFC7525].

In DTLS 1.3 renegotiation has been removed from DTLS 1.3 and partly replaced with Post-Handshake KeyUpdate. When using DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], AEAD limits and frequent rekeying can be achieved by sending frequent Post-Handshake KeyUpdate messages. Symmetric rekeying gives less protection against key leakage than re-running Diffie-Hellman. After leakage of `application_traffic_secret_N`, a passive attacker can passively eavesdrop on all future application data sent on the connection including application data encrypted with `application_traffic_secret_N+1`, `application_traffic_secret_N+2`, etc. There is no way to do Post-Handshake server authentication or Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman inside a DTLS 1.3 connection. Note that KeyUpdate does not update the `exporter_secret`.

7.2. Downgrade Attacks

A peer supporting DTLS/SCTP according to this specification, DTLS/SCTP according to [RFC6083] and/or SCTP without DTLS may be vulnerable to downgrade attacks where an on-path attacker interferes with the protocol setup to lower or disable security. If possible, it is RECOMMENDED that the peers have a policy only allowing DTLS/SCTP according to this specification.

7.3. DTLS/SCTP Message Sizes

The DTLS/SCTP maximum message size extension enables secure negotiation of a message size that fits in the DTLS/SCTP buffer, which improves security and availability. Very small plain text user fragment sizes might generate additional work for senders and receivers, limiting throughput and increasing exposure to denial of service.

The maximum message size extension does not protect against peer nodes intending to negatively affect the peer node through flooding attacks. The attacking node can both send larger messages than the expressed capability as well as initiating a large number of concurrent user message transmissions that never are concluded. For the target of the attack it is more straightforward to determine that a peer is ignoring the node's stated limitation.

7.4. Authentication and Policy Decisions

DTLS/SCTP MUST be mutually authenticated. It is RECOMMENDED that DTLS/SCTP is used with certificate based authentication. All security decisions MUST be based on the peer's authenticated identity, not on its transport layer identity.

It is possible to authenticate DTLS endpoints based on IP addresses in certificates. SCTP associations can use multiple IP addresses per SCTP endpoint. Therefore, it is possible that DTLS records will be sent from a different source IP address or to a different destination IP address than that originally authenticated. This is not a problem provided that no security decisions are made based on the source or destination IP addresses.

7.5. Privacy Considerations

[RFC6973] suggests that the privacy considerations of IETF protocols be documented.

For each SCTP user message, the user also provides a stream identifier, a flag to indicate whether the message is sent ordered or unordered, and a payload protocol identifier. Although DTLS/SCTP provides privacy for the actual user message, the other three information fields are not confidentiality protected. They are sent as clear text, because they are part of the SCTP DATA chunk header.

It is RECOMMENDED that DTLS/SCTP is used with certificate based authentication in DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] to provide identity protection. DTLS/SCTP MUST be used with a key exchange method providing Perfect Forward Secrecy. Perfect Forward Secrecy significantly limits the amount of data that can be compromised due to key compromise.

7.6. Pervasive Monitoring

As required by [RFC7258], work on IETF protocols needs to consider the effects of pervasive monitoring and mitigate them when possible.

Pervasive Monitoring is widespread surveillance of users. By encrypting more information including user identities, DTLS 1.3 offers much better protection against pervasive monitoring.

Massive pervasive monitoring attacks relying on key exchange without forward secrecy has been reported. By mandating perfect forward secrecy, DTLS/SCTP effectively mitigate many forms of passive pervasive monitoring and limits the amount of compromised data due to key compromise.

In addition to the privacy attacks discussed above, surveillance on a large scale may enable tracking of a user over a wider geographical area and across different access networks. Using information from DTLS/SCTP together with information gathered from other protocols increases the risk of identifying individual users.

8. Acknowledgments

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Appendix A. Motivation for Changes

This document proposes a number of changes to RFC 6083 that have various different motivations:

Supporting Large User Messages: RFC 6083 allowed only user messages that could fit within a single DTLS record. 3GPP has run into this limitation where they have at least four SCTP using protocols (F1, E1, Xn, NG-C) that can potentially generate messages over the size of 16384 bytes.

New Versions: Almost 10 years has passed since RFC 6083 was written, and significant evolution has happened in the area of DTLS and security algorithms. Thus DTLS 1.3 is the newest version of DTLS and also the SHA-1 HMAC algorithm of RFC 4895 is getting towards the end of usefulness. Thus, this document mandates usage of relevant versions and algorithms.

Clarifications: Some implementation experiences has been gained that motivates additional clarifications on the specification.

- * Avoid unsecured messages prior to DTLS handshake have completed.
- * Make clear that all messages are encrypted after DTLS handshake.

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Operational Guidance for Deployment of L4S in the Internet
draft-white-tsvwg-l4sops-02

Abstract

This document is intended to provide additional guidance to operators of end-systems, operators of networks, and researchers beyond that provided in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id] and [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled] in order to ensure successful deployment of L4S [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] in the Internet. The focus of this document is on potential interactions between L4S flows and Classic ECN ([RFC3168]) flows in Classic ECN bottleneck links. The document discusses the potential outcomes of these interactions, describes mechanisms to detect the presence of [RFC3168] bottlenecks, and identifies opportunities to prevent and/or detect and resolve fairness problems in such networks.

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1. Introduction

Low-latency, low-loss, scalable throughput (L4S) [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] traffic is designed to provide lower queuing delay than conventional traffic via a new network service based on a modified Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) response from the network. L4S traffic is identified by the ECT(1) codepoint, and network bottlenecks that support L4S should congestion-mark ECT(1) packets to enable L4S congestion feedback. However, L4S traffic is also expected to coexist well with classic congestion controlled traffic even if the bottleneck queue does not support L4S. This includes paths where the bottleneck link utilizes packet drops in response to congestion (either due to buffer overrun or active queue management), as well as paths that implement a 'flow-queuing' scheduler such as fq_codel [RFC8290]. A potential area of poor interoperability lies in network bottlenecks employing a shared queue that implements an Active Queue Management (AQM) algorithm that provides Explicit Congestion Notification signaling according to [RFC3168]. Although RFC3168 has been updated (via [RFC8311]) to reserve ECT(1) for experimental use only (also see [IANA-ECN]), and

its use for L4S has been specified in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id], not all deployed queues have been updated accordingly. It has been demonstrated ([Fallback]) that when a set of long-running flows comprising both classic congestion controlled flows and L4S-compliant congestion controlled flows compete for bandwidth in such a legacy shared RFC3168 queue, the classic congestion controlled flows may achieve lower throughput than they would have if all of the flows had been classic congestion controlled flows. This 'unfairness' between the two classes is more pronounced on longer RTT paths (e.g. 50ms and above) and/or at higher link rates (e.g. 50 Mbps and above). The lower the capacity per flow, the less pronounced the problem becomes. Thus the imbalance is most significant when the slowest flow rate is still high in absolute terms.

The root cause of the unfairness is that a legacy RFC3168 queue does not differentiate between packets marked ECT(0) (used by classic senders) and those marked ECT(1) (used by L4S senders), and provides an identical congestion signal (CE marks) to both types, while the L4S architecture redefines the CE mark and congestion response in the case of ECT(1) marked packets. The result is that the two classes respond differently to the CE congestion signal. The classic senders expect that CE marks are sent very rarely (e.g. approximately 1 CE mark every 200 round trips on a 50 Mbps x 50ms path) while the L4S senders expect very frequent CE marking (e.g. approximately 2 CE marks per round trip). The result is that the classic senders respond to the CE marks provided by the bottleneck by yielding capacity to the L4S flows. The resulting rate imbalance can be demonstrated, and could be a cause of concern in some cases.

This concern primarily relates to single-queue (FIFO) bottleneck links that implement legacy RFC3168 ECN, but the situation can also potentially occur in fq_codel [RFC8290] bottlenecks when flow isolation is imperfect due to hash collisions or VPN tunnels.

While the above mentioned unfairness has been demonstrated in laboratory testing, it has not been observed in operational networks, in part because members of the Transport Working group are not aware of any deployments of single-queue Classic ECN bottlenecks in the Internet. Additionally, this issue was considered and is discussed in Appendix B.1 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]. It was recognized that compromises would have to be made because IP header space is extremely limited. A number of alternative codepoint schemes were compared for their ability to traverse most Internet paths, to work over tunnels, to work at lower layers, to work with TCP, etc. It was decided to progress on the basis that robust performance in presence of these single-queue RFC3168 bottlenecks is not the most critical issue, since it was believed that they are rare. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that such deployments exist, and hence an interest

in providing guidance to ensure that measures can be taken to address the potential issues, should they arise in practice.

2. Per-Flow Fairness

There are a number of factors that influence the relative rates achieved by a set of users or a set of applications sharing a queue in a bottleneck link. Notably the response that each application has to congestion signals (whether loss or explicit signaling) can play a large role in determining whether the applications share the bandwidth in an equitable manner. In the Internet, ISPs typically control capacity sharing between their customers using a scheduler at the access bottleneck rather than relying on the congestion responses of end-systems. So in that context this question primarily concerns capacity sharing between the applications used by one customer. Nonetheless, there are many networks on the Internet where capacity sharing relies, at least to some extent, on congestion control in the end-systems. The traditional norm for congestion response has been that it is handled on a per-connection basis, and that (all else being equal) it results in each connection in the bottleneck achieving a data rate inversely proportional to the average RTT of the connection. The end result (in the case of steady-state behavior of a set of like connections) is that each user or application achieves a data rate proportional to N/RTT , where N is the number of simultaneous connections that the user or application creates, and RTT is the harmonic mean of the average round-trip-times for those connections. Thus, users or applications that create a larger number of connections and/or that have a lower RTT achieve a larger share of the bottleneck link rate than others.

While this may not be considered fair by many, it nonetheless has been the typical starting point for discussions around fairness. In fact it has been common when evaluating new congestion responses to actually set aside N & RTT as variables in the equation, and just compare per-flow rates between flows with the same RTT. For example [RFC5348] defines the congestion response for a flow to be "reasonably fair" if its sending rate is generally within a factor of two of the sending rate of a [Reno] TCP flow under the same conditions.' Given that RTTs can vary by roughly two orders of magnitude and flow counts can vary by at least an order of magnitude between applications, it seems that the accepted definition of reasonable fairness leaves quite a bit of room for different levels of performance between users or applications, and so perhaps isn't the gold standard, but is rather a metric that is used because of its convenience.

In practice, the effect of this RTT dependence has historically been muted by the fact that many networks were deployed with very large

("bloated") drop-tail buffers that would introduce queuing delays well in excess of the base RTT of the flows utilizing the link, thus equalizing (to some degree) the effective RTTs of those flows. Recently, as network equipment suppliers and operators have worked to improve the latency performance of the network by the use of smaller buffers and/or AQM algorithms, this has had the side-effect of uncovering the inherent RTT bias in classic congestion control algorithms.

The L4S architecture aims to significantly improve this situation, by requiring senders to adopt a congestion response that eliminates RTT bias as much as possible (see [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]). As a result, L4S promotes a level of per-flow fairness beyond what is ordinarily considered for classic senders, the legacy RFC3168 issue notwithstanding.

It is also worth noting that the congestion control algorithms deployed currently on the internet tend toward (RTT-weighted) fairness only over long timescales. For example, the cubic algorithm can take minutes to converge to fairness when a new flow joins an existing flow on a link [Cubic]. Since the vast majority of TCP connections don't last for minutes, it is unclear to what degree per-flow, same-RTT fairness, even when demonstrated in the lab, translates to the real world.

So, in real networks, where per-application, per-end-host or per-customer fairness may be more important than long-term, same-RTT, per-flow fairness, it may not be that instructive to focus on the latter as being a necessary end goal.

Nonetheless, situations in which the presence of an L4S flow has the potential to cause harm [Harm] to classic flows need to be understood. Most importantly, if there are situations in which the introduction of L4S traffic would degrade classic traffic performance significantly, i.e. to the point that it would be considered starvation, these situations need to be understood and either remedied or avoided.

Aligned with this context, the guidance provided in this document is aimed not at monitoring the relative performance of L4S senders compared against classic senders on a per-flow basis, but rather at identifying instances where RFC3168 bottlenecks are deployed so that operators of L4S senders can have the opportunity to assess whether any actions need to be taken. Additionally this document provides guidance for network operators around configuring any RFC3168 bottlenecks to minimize the potential for negative interactions between L4S and classic senders.

3. Detection of Classic ECN Bottlenecks

The IETF encourages researchers, end system deployers and network operators to conduct experiments to identify to what degree legacy RFC3168 bottlenecks exist in networks. These types of measurement campaigns, even if each is conducted over a limited set of paths, could be useful to further understand the scope of any potential issues, to guide end system deployers on where to examine performance more closely (or possibly delay L4S deployment), and to help network operators identify nodes where remediation may be necessary to provide the best performance.

The design of such experiments should consider not only the detection of RFC3168 ECN marking, but also the determination whether the bottleneck AQM is a single queue (FIFO) or a flow-queuing system. It is believed that the vast majority, if not all, of the RFC3168 AQMs in use at bottleneck links are flow-queuing systems (e.g. fq_codel [RFC8290] or [COBALT]). When flow isolation is successful, the FQ scheduling of such queues isolates classic congestion control traffic from L4S traffic, and thus eliminates the potential for unfairness. But, these systems are known to sometimes result in imperfect isolation, either due to hash collisions (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8290]) or because of VPN tunneling (see Section 6.2 of [RFC8290]). It is believed that the majority of fq_codel deployments in bottleneck links today (e.g. [Cake]) employ hashing algorithms that virtually eliminate the possibility of collisions, making this a non-issue for those deployments. But, VPN tunnels remain an issue for fq_codel deployments, and the introduction of L4S traffic raises the possibility that tunnels containing mixed classic and L4S traffic would exist, in which case fq_codel implementations that have not been updated to be L4S-aware could exhibit similar unfairness properties as single queue AQMs. Until such queues are upgraded to support L4S or treat ECT(1) as not-ECT traffic, end-host mitigations such as separating L4S and Classic traffic into distinct VPN tunnels could be employed.

[Fallback] contains recommendations on some of the mechanisms that can be used to detect legacy RFC3168 bottlenecks. TODO: summarize the main ones here.

4. Operator of an L4S host

From a host's perspective, support for L4S involves both endpoints: ECT(1) marking & L4S-compatible congestion control at the sender, and ECN feedback at the receiver. Between these two entities, it is primarily incumbent upon the sender to evaluate the potential for presence of legacy RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks and make decisions whether or not to use L4S congestion control. A general purpose

receiver is not expected to perform any testing or monitoring for RFC3168, and is also not expected to invoke any active response in the case that such a bottleneck exists. That said, it is certainly possible for receivers to disable L4S functionality by not negotiating ECN support with the sender.

Prior to deployment of any new technology, it is commonplace for the parties involved in the deployment to validate the performance of the new technology, via lab testing, limited field testing, large scale field testing, etc. The same is expected for deployers of L4S technology. As part of that validation, it is recommended that deployers consider the issue of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks and conduct experiments as described in the previous section, or otherwise assess the impact that the L4S technology will have in the networks in which it is to be deployed, and take action as is described further in this section.

If pre-deployment testing raises concerns about issues with RFC3168 bottlenecks, the actions taken may depend on the server type:

- o General purpose servers (e.g. web servers)
 - * Active testing could be performed by the server. For example, a javascript application could run simultaneous downloads during page reading time in order to survey for presence of legacy RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks on paths to users.
 - * Passive testing could be built in to the transport protocol implementation at the sender in order to perform detection (see [Fallback]).
 - * Taking action based on the detection of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks is likely not needed for short transactional transfers (e.g. sub 10 seconds) since these are unlikely to achieve the steady-state conditions where unfairness has been observed.
 - * For longer file transfers, it may be possible to fall-back to Classic behavior in real-time, or to simply disable L4S for future long file transfers to clients where legacy RFC3168 has been detected.
- o Specialized servers handling long-running sessions (e.g. cloud gaming)
 - * Active testing could be performed at each session startup

- * Active testing could be integrated into a "pre-validation" of the service, done when the user signs up, and periodically thereafter
- * In-band detection as described in [Fallback] could be performed during the session

In addition, the responsibilities of and actions taken by a sender may depend on the environment in which it is deployed. The following sub-sections discuss two scenarios: senders serving a limited known target audience and those that serve an unknown target audience.

4.1. Edge Servers

Some hosts (such as CDN leaf nodes and servers internal to an ISP) are deployed in environments in which they serve content to a constrained set of networks or clients. The operator of such hosts may be able to determine whether there is the possibility of [RFC3168] FIFO bottlenecks being present, and utilize this information to make decisions on selectively deploying L4S and/or disabling it (e.g. bleaching ECN). Furthermore, such an operator may be able to determine the likelihood of an L4S bottleneck being present, and use this information as well.

For example, if a particular network is known to have deployed legacy [RFC3168] FIFO bottlenecks, deployment of L4S for that network should be delayed until those bottlenecks can be upgraded to mitigate any potential issues as discussed in the next section.

Prior to deploying L4S on edge servers a server operator should:

- o Consult with network operators on presence of legacy [RFC3168] FIFO bottlenecks
- o Consult with network operators on presence of L4S bottlenecks
- o Perform pre-deployment testing per network

If a particular network offers connectivity to other networks (e.g. in the case of an ISP offering service to their customer's networks), the lack of RFC3168 FIFO bottleneck deployment in the ISP network can't be taken as evidence that RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks don't exist end-to-end (because one may have been deployed by the end-user network). In these cases, deployment of L4S will need to take appropriate steps to detect the presence of such bottlenecks. At present, it is believed that the vast majority of RFC3168 bottlenecks in end-user networks are implementations that utilize fq_codel or Cake, where the unfairness problem is less likely to be a concern.

While this doesn't completely eliminate the possibility that a legacy [RFC3168] FIFO bottleneck could exist, it nonetheless provides useful information that can be utilized in the decision making around the potential risk for any unfairness to be experienced by end users.

4.2. Other hosts

Hosts that are deployed in locations that serve a wide variety of networks face a more difficult prospect in terms of handling the potential presence of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks. Nonetheless, the steps listed in the earlier section (based on server type) can be taken to minimize the risk of unfairness.

Since existing studies have hinted that RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks are rare, detections using these techniques may also prove to be rare. Therefore, it may be possible for a host to cache a list of end host ip addresses where a RFC3168 bottleneck has been detected. Entries in such a cache would need to age-out after a period of time to account for IP address changes, path changes, equipment upgrades, etc.

It has been suggested that a public blacklist of domains that implement RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks or a public whitelist of domains that are participating in the L4S experiment could be maintained. There are a number of significant issues that would seem to make this idea infeasible, not the least of which is the fact that presence of RFC3168 FIFO bottlenecks or L4S bottlenecks is not a property of a domain, it is the property of a path between two endpoints.

5. Operator of a Network Employing RFC3168 FIFO Bottlenecks

While it is, of course, preferred for networks to deploy L4S-capable high fidelity congestion signaling, and while it is more preferable for L4S senders to detect problems themselves, a network operator who has deployed equipment in a likely bottleneck link location (i.e. a link that is expected to be fully saturated) that is configured with a legacy [RFC3168] FIFO AQM can take certain steps in order to improve rate fairness between classic traffic and L4S traffic, and thus enable L4S to be deployed in a greater number of paths.

Some of the options listed in this section may not be feasible in all networking equipment.

5.1. Configure AQM to treat ECT(1) as NotECT

If equipment is configurable in such a way as to only supply CE marks to ECT(0) packets, and treat ECT(1) packets identically to

NotECT, or is upgradable to support this capability, doing so will eliminate the risk of unfairness.

5.2. ECT(1) Tunnel Bypass

Using an [RFC6040] compatibility mode tunnel, tunnel ECT(1) traffic through the [RFC3168] bottleneck with the outer header indicating Not-ECT.

Two variants exist for this approach

1. per-domain: tunnel ECT(1) pkts to domain edge towards dst
2. per-dst: tunnel ECT(1) pkts to dst

5.3. Configure Non-Coupled Dual Queue

Equipment supporting [RFC3168] may be configurable to enable two parallel queues for the same traffic class, with classification done based on the ECN field.

Option 1:

- o Configure 2 queues, both with ECN; 50:50 WRR scheduler
 - * Queue #1: ECT(1) & CE packets - Shallow immediate AQM target
 - * Queue #2: ECT(0) & NotECT packets - Classic AQM target
- o Outcome in the case of n L4S flows and m long-running Classic flows
 - * if m & n are non-zero, flows get $1/2n$ and $1/2m$ of the capacity, otherwise $1/n$ or $1/m$
 - * never $< 1/2$ each flow's rate if all had been Classic

This option would allow L4S flows to achieve low latency, low loss and scalable throughput, but would sacrifice the more precise flow balance offered by [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]. This option would be expected to result in some reordering of previously CE marked packets sent by Classic ECN senders, which is a trait shared with [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-aqm-dualq-coupled]. As is discussed in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id], this reordering would be either zero risk or very low risk.

Option 2:

- o Configure 2 queues, both with AQM; 50:50 WRR scheduler

- * Queue #1: ECT(1) & NotECT packets - ECN disabled

- * Queue #2: ECT(0) & CE packets - ECN enabled

- o Outcome

- * ECT(1) treated as NotECT

- * Flow balance for the 2 queues the same as in option 1

This option would not allow L4S flows to achieve low latency, low loss and scalable throughput in this bottleneck link. As a result it is a less preferred option.

5.4. WRED with ECT(1) Differentiation

This configuration is similar to Option 2 in the previous section, but uses a single queue with WRED functionality.

- o Configure the queue with two WRED classes

- o Class #1: ECT(1) & NotECT packets - ECN disabled

- o Class #2: ECT(0) & CE packets - ECN enabled

5.5. Disable RFC3168 ECN Marking

Disabling [RFC3168] ECN marking eliminates the unfairness issue. Clearly a downside to this approach is that classic senders will no longer get the benefits of Explicit Congestion Notification.

5.6. Re-mark ECT(1) to NotECT Prior to AQM

While not a recommended alternative, remarking ECT(1) packets as NotECT (i.e. bleaching ECT(1)) ensures that they are treated identically to classic NotECT senders. However, this also eliminates the possibility of downstream L4S bottlenecks providing high fidelity congestion signals.

6. Contributors

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7. IANA Considerations

None.

8. Security Considerations

For further study.

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