IETF111 ADD Adaptive DNS Discovery WG Session Agenda

About ADD

Materials, Charter, Documents

ADD Chairs & Area Director

Session link, minutes, jabber

IETF 111 ADD Session Times

Add has a single 2hr session: Friday July 30, 12:00-14:00 PDT (UTC-7) 1900-2100 UTC

ADD Agenda 12:00-14:00 PDT Friday



Meeting Materials

1. Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR)

2. Analysis of DNS Forwarder Scenario Relative to DDR and DNR

3. DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR)

4. Split-Horizon DNS Configuration

5. Discovery of Encrypted DNS Resolvers: Deployment Considerations

Other Discussion Topics

6. Private IPs, DDR, and PR#11

Question posed by EKR for discussion:

The general assumption for the DDR threat model so far is that:

  1. (presumably because DHCP is secure in some way). If that's not true, then I think we can agree that DDR does not provide much additional security benefit because the attacker can just substitute their own resolver [0].

  2. Either the home network or the ISP network is insecure, otherwise you don't need DoX.

OPPORTUNISTIC MODE So, first, its not entirely clear to me what the Opportunistic mode of S 4.2 provides. In this scenario, presumably the client will be doing TLS to the CPE (because otherwise the IP address would be the resolver's public address), which means that we are concerned with the attacker controlling the home network. So, in this scenario, we are only getting value if you have a network in which:

  1. The attacker can see traffic not destined for their IP address (otherwise there's not much point in encrypting).
  2. The attacker cannot forge traffic from another IP address> (otherwise they can just impersonate the CPE because there is no certificate).

Are there an appreciable number of networks with these properties? If so, can we write down where that happens and put it in Security Considerations? If not, we should consider removing this mode.

Planning & Wrap up

As Time Permits